# Online Appendix: A New Measure of Affective Polarization

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### A Ethics Statement

All Surveys were approved by the University of Minnesota's Institutional Review Board (IRB). All participants were offered a consent form at the outset of each survey, and participation in the surveys were conditional on voluntary consent. Payment was predetermined by each survey provider, and was calculated based on the survey length. Below are the IRB certification numbers.

Studies 1 and 2: STUDY00014251 Study 3: STUDY00016932 Study 4: STUDY00017422

### **B** Survey Information

	Study 1	Study 2	Study 3	Study 4W1	Study 4W2	Study 4W3	2022 CES
Ν	500	501	1346	2004	1404	1054	
Mean Age	39.0	39.0	50.2	46.6	47.9	48.6	50.4
Gender							
Man	36.0%	37.8%	50.5%	48.3%	49.5%	49.5%	46.1%
Woman	64.0%	62.2%	49.5%	51.7%	50.5%	50.5%	53.2%
Race/Ethnicity							
White	81.0%	84.6%	74.0%	69.2%	71.3%	72.9%	69.2%
Black	2.8%	4.4%	11.8%	12.3%	11.6%	11.1%	13.4%
Hispanic/Latino	6.8%	5.0%	8.5%	17.2%	16.6%	15.7%	8.9%
Asian	8.2%	5.3%	3.6%	4.8%	5.1%	5.2%	2.7%
Bachelor's Degree	57.6%	53.7%	40.9%	34.2%	35.7%	37.2%	34.7%
Party Identification							
Republican	50.0%	50.3%	45.0%	39.4%	39.7%	38.6%	41.0%
Democrat	50.0%	49.7%	55.0%	60.6%	60.3%	61.4%	59.0%

 Table B.1: Survey Demographics

Note: Because all analyses excluded pure Independents, the percentages for party affiliation are based on the sample after these respondents were removed. All other totals include the full sample.

### C Part I: Additional Scale Construction Information

### C.1 Hypothesized Subdimensions and Factor Structure for the APS

After we completed the studies reported here, Finkel et al. (2024) presented a working paper using their own scale measure of political sectarianism. Given that we depart from their conceptualization in a number of ways, the content of our scale–though related–differs from theirs in multiple ways. Above all, as we describe in our main article, our conceptualizations of othering, aversion, and moralization differ in some respects from those offered by Finkel et al. (2024). Among other things, whereas Finkel et al. (2020) conceptualize othering, aversion, and moralization as three kinds of negative attitudes toward out-partisans, we define each more broadly as a general interrelated set of beliefs about the out-party, the in-party, and the relation between the two. For this reason, our measurement approach to each facet differs somewhat as well. We directly highlight these differences below. With respect to *othering*, our items focus more directly on asking respondents to compare the in-party and out-party categories, whereas the Finkel et al. (2024) items ask the respondent to contrast the individual self with the out-party:

Table C.1: Comparative Measurement of Othering

Campos and Federico (2025) I feel as though [in-party] are very different from [out-party]. [Out-party] live in a different world from us [in-party]. [Out-party] act in ways that us [in-party] could never understand. Finkel et al. (2024) I feel distant from [out-party]. I am different from [out-party]. No matter how hard I try, I can't see the world the way [out-party members] do.

With respect to *aversion*, our items ask not only about dislike of out-partisans in comparison to in-partisans, but also a desire to be separate as a member of the in-party from out-partisans. In contrast, the Finkel et al. (2024) items focus more exclusively on the experience of negative affect about out-partisans:

Table C.2: Comparative Measurement of Aversion

Campos and Federico (2025) As a [in-party], I would not want to be friends with someone who was a [out-party]. If I found out a friend of mine was a [out-party], I would want to stop spending time with them. \*Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are [out-party]. Finkel et al. (2024) My feelings toward [out-party] are negative. I hate [out-party]. [Out-party members] have lots of negative traits.

With respect to *moralization*, the differences are especially pronounced, as noted in the main article. Whereas our items focus on the moralization of in-party identification (Skitka et al. 2021), the Finkel et al. (2024) moralization items focus a perception of out-partisans as evil:

 Table C.3: Comparative Measurement of Moralization

Campos and Federico (2025)
My identity as a [in-party] is connected to my core moral beliefs.
My identity as a [in-party] reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong.
My identity as a [in-party] is rooted in moral principles.
Finkel et al. (2024)
[Out-party members] are immoral.
[Out-party members] are evil.
[Out-party members] lack integrity.

Beyond differences in the hypothesized content of the subdimensions, the Finkel et al. (2024) model also relies on different expectations about factor structure. Specifically, rather than positing a three-factor structure with moderate and uniformly positive correlations among the factors (as we do), they argue that political sectarianism is best described by a bifactor model (Reise, Mansolf, and Haviland 2023) in which each item loads on both a 'general' factor (representing sectarianism as a whole) and one of three uncorrelated 'specific' factors (corresponding to residual variance in othering, aversion, or moralization). For Finkel et al. (2024) the most important element of this model is the general factor, which theoretically represents the variance that all measures of sectarianism have in common; indeed, they do not consider the specific factors corresponding to the subdimensions. Interestingly, their final model differs from a traditional bifactor model in that it does not include a specific factor for aversion, producing a bifactor s-1 model. In this model, the aversion items load directly on the general factor but not on a specific aversion factor.

Though aspects of this bifactor specification make sense (i.e., the notion of a general factor that includes what various subdimensions have in common), we retain our expectation of a correlated three-factor structure for several reasons. A key issue is that the bifactor s-1 specification in Finkel et al. (2024) anchors the meaning of the general factor on aversion in particular (since the general factor is directly defined by the aversion items, which load on no other latent variable; Heinrich et al. 2023). This anchoring centers the definition of the general construct on aversion in ways that may or may not be theoretically justified. In this vein, the bifactor s-1 model requires the *a priori* designation of one subdimension as a reference dimension–whose items load only on the general factor–for defining the general factor (Heinrich et al. 2023). Finkel et al. (2024), however, chose the aversion items to anchor the general factor on a data-driven basis: the traditional bifactor model produced an inadmissible solution, and the specific factor for aversion needed to be eliminated to address this problem. In considering our own model, we could identify no reason to privilege any one subdimension as a reference dimension for a bifactor s-1 model of our own scale; all three are constitutive of and necessary for affective polarization. When an appropriate reference dimension cannot be identified from theory, a correlated three-factor model is preferred to a bifactor or bifactor s-1 structure (Eid 2020; Heinrich et al. 2023).

Finally, our conceptualization not only regards othering, aversion, and moralization as distinct and non-redundant, but suggests that each subdimension may relate in independent and slightly different ways to polarization-related outcome variables. In this respect, the three-factor model makes the unique contributions of each subdimension easier to conceptually and empirically distinguish.

#### C.2 Study 1 Item Reduction Process

The exploratory factor-analytic procedures used in Study 1 to select the items for the original 20-item version of the Affective Polarization Scale are described in detail in Part I of our paper, though we describe analyses not reported in the main text here.

The first step we took in generating a reduced set of items was to examine the skewness and kurtosis of each item in order to eliminate any items that deviated excessively from normality. No items were eliminated during this step, as none exceeded the conventional cutoffs (i.e. skewness > |2| and kurtosis > |7|, Finney and DiStefano 2013). We then examined the item-total correlations between each individual item and a scale constructed from the full set of items. No items were eliminated during this step, as all items had a correlation of more than 0.30 with the total scale. Furthermore, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy indicated that the strength of the relationships among variables was high enough to indicate the presence of common factors (KMO = .98). No items were eliminated after the KMO test, as each item was over the conventional cutoff of 0.50. The final test before proceeding with the exploratory factor analysis was a Bartlett test of sphericity, which indicated that the items related enough to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality ( $\chi^2(990) = 18640.59, p < .001$ ).

Most of the subsequent decisions we made in winnowing our original pool of 45 items down to the initial 20-item APS were straightforward and relied on standard psychometric criteria (e.g., elimination of items with low loadings or cross-loadings on multiple factors, retention of highest-loading items for each subdimension). Table C.4 shows the results of the initial EFA for the full 45 items.

However, given that our own conceptualization of moralization differs from that originally suggested by Finkel et al. (2020), we provide additional information on the item-reduction process for moralization here. As noted in the introduction, whereas Finkel et al. (2020) conceptualize moralization as a perception of out-partisans as immoral, we conceptualize it in terms of the extent to which individuals believe that their own in-partisan identity is rooted in basic moral values (see Skitka et al. 2021). Nevertheless, as an empirical check on this conceptual decision, we cast a wide net in developing our original pool of 15 moralization items. Six of the moralization items not eliminated during the early stages of the item-reduction process due to low loadings mapped on the Finkel et al. (2020) conceptualization of moralization: "In general, us [in-partisans] are better people than [out-partisans]," "Unlike us [in-partisans], most [out-partisans] lack a moral compass," "Us [in-partisans] are the good guys, and [out-partisans]," "[Out-partisans] do not differ morally from us [in-partisans]," and "It is impossible to see how a morally decent person could ever identify as a [out-partisan]."

Despite the inclusion of these items, it is important to note that the above items were ultimately passed over for inclusion in the initial 20-item APS on the basis of simple psychometric criteria. First, the six moralization items we selected for the 20-item APS were the only moralization items (of those not eliminated during earlier stages of the scale reduction process due to low loadings) that loaded on a third factor distinct from the othering and aversion items. Indeed, the items listed in the preceding paragraph, despite their conceptual correspondence with the original Finkel et al. (2020) conceptualization of moralization, loaded on the same factor as the othering items and not on the same factor as the six moralization items we ultimately selected.

As an additional check on this, we repeated our final Study 1 exploratory factor analysis with the six aforementioned alternate moralization items substituted for the six items we ultimately selected for the 20-item version of the APS. When we did this, a parallel analysis procedure similar to that reported in the main text suggested a two-factor solution rather than the expected three-factor solution. Examination of the factor loadings for the two-factor solution indicated that the alternate moralization items loaded on the same factor as the othering items. This suggests that the alternate slate of moralization items were more akin to othering than to a distinct moralization subdimension. An examination of the alternate

	Aversion	Moralization
0.85	-0.23	0.09
0.56	0.07	-0.09
0.64	0.17	-0.15
0.20	0.49	90.0-
0.10	0.03	0.00
000	0.0	0T-0
0.00	10.0-	0.00
0.79	-0.14	-0.04
0.74	-0.05	0.13
0.72	0.09	-0.08
0.80	-0.03	-0.04
0.60	0.23	0.01
0.83	-0.10	-0.01
0.40	0.28	0.07
0.76	-0.07	0.05
0.75	-0.12	0.04
0.70	0.22	-0.06
0.35	0.38	0.17
0.03	0.86	0.09
-0.03	0.84	0.11
0.65	0.13	-0.10
0.65	0.22	-0.01
0.54	0.29	-0.07
0.48	0.38	0.00
0.30	0.47	0.06
0.00	0.75	-0.05
0.50	0.34	-0.09
0.47	0.43	0.04
0.30	0.47	0.10
0.46	0.34	01.02
0.49	0.31	0.01
-0.07	0.07	0.83
0.03	-0.05	0.85
0.04	0.07	0.73
0.17	0.00	0.72
-0.09	0.06	0.87
0.00	-0.03	0.89
0.55	-0.09	0.44
0.54	0.37	0.00
0.36	0.52	0.05
0.70	0.10	0.06
0.76	0.06	0.05
0.71	0.02	0.15
0.57	0.23	0.09
0.63	0.04	0.11
0.57	0.22	0.14
	$\begin{array}{c} 0.26\\ 0.64\\ 0.20\\ 0.63\\ 0.63\\ 0.74\\ 0.72\\ 0.66\\ 0.72\\ 0.60\\ 0.72\\ 0.60\\ 0.76\\$	

Table C.4: Factor Loadings for Initial 45 APS Items

items reinforces this: many of the items focus on how out-partisans are different and alien, just with a specific focus on alienness in the moral domain (e.g., "Unlike us [in-partisans], most [out-partisans] lack a moral compass.")

In sum, the moralization items chosen for the 20-item and 9-item versions of the APS, focused on the extent to which in-partisan identity is thought to be rooted in basic moral convictions, appear to be optimal not only in terms of how well they reflect our modified conceptualization of moralization, but also in terms of their psychometric ability to identify a subdimension of affective polarization (or political sectarianism) that is distinct from aversion and especially othering.

### C.3 Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the 20-Item Scale

Once the 20-item version of the APS was derived in Study 1, we used confirmatory factor analysis to verify the three-factor solution in Studies 2-4. A three-factor structure with the items from each of the subdimensions loading in three correlated factors was fit in R version 4.2.1 using the lavaan package (version 0.6-12) and the MLM estimator. In Study 2, the analysis suggested that the model fit well,  $\chi^2(167) = 373.790, p < .001, CFI = 0.964, RMSEA = 0.056$ , relative to traditional cutoffs (for  $CFI \ge .95$  and for  $RMSEA \le 0.06$ , Hu and Bentler 1999). For comparison, we also estimated a one-factor model (where all items loaded on a single factor), which fit poorly,  $\chi^2(170) = 2541.773, p < .001, CFI = 0.577, RMSEA = 0.191$ . A likelihood-ratio suggested that the three-factor model fit better than the one-factor model,  $\Delta\chi^2(3) = 299.82, p < .001$ . For the three-factor model, the correlation between othering and aversion was 0.67, othering and moralization was 0.53, and aversion and moralization was 0.29 (all ps < .001).

In Study 3, the three-factor model fit moderately well,  $\chi^2(167) = 704.425, p < .001, CFI = 0.940, RMSEA = 0.063$ . In comparison, the one-factor model fit poorly,  $\chi^2(170) = 3824.476, p < .001, CFI = 0.599, RMSEA = 0.162$ . Again, the three-factor model fit better than the one-factor model,  $\Delta\chi^2(3) = 1079.90, p < .001$ . For the three-factor model, the correlation between othering and aversion was 0.64, othering and moralization was 0.57, and aversion and moralization was 0.23 (all ps < .001).

Finally, the data from Study 4 W1 indicated that the three-factor model fit well,  $\chi^2(167) = 814.212, p < .001, CFI = 0.952, RMSEA = 0.056$ . The one-factor model fit comparatively poorly,  $\chi^2(170) = 5729.013, p < .001, CFI = 0.594, RMSEA = 0.163$ . A likelihood-ratio test confirmed the superior fit of the three-factor model,  $\Delta\chi^2(3) = 773.77, p < .001$ . For the three-factor model, the correlation between othering and aversion was 0.62, othering and moralization was 0.54, and aversion and moralization was 0.22 (all ps < .001).

### C.4 Further Item Reduction: Deriving the Final 9-Item APS

As noted in the main text, we reduced the initial 20-item APS to a 9-item reduced scale (with 3 items per subdimension) using item-response theory (IRT) methods for polytomous items (e.g., Samejima 1969) and subjective considerations of face-validity, item content, and item non-overlap<sup>1</sup>. Item reduction was done in Study 4 W1, given its large sample size and representativeness. The further winnowing of the scale was conducted separately within each

<sup>1.</sup> Scale reduction using the Study 4 survey was not preregistered.

subdimension, since the unidimensional structure of the items within each subdimension (as revealed in the confirmatory factor analysis of the 20-item scale in Study 4 W1) allows us to be sure that the unidimensionality criterion for IRT methods is met (Embretson and Reise 2013). In the analyses for all three subdimensions, an IRT model appropriate for polytomous Likert-type items—the graded response model (GRM; Samejima 1969)—was used to examine the informativeness of the individual items and scales comprised of different subsets of items. The items from the initial 20-item APS are shown in Table C.5.

 Table C.5:
 20-item Affective Polarization Scale

O2: [out-party] lead very different lifestyles from us as [in-party]

- O4: Compared to [in-party], [out-party] seem like strange people.
- O5: [out-party] seem out of place when they are around us [in-party].
- O6: [out-party] live in a different world from us [in-party].
- O7: It is often difficult for us as [in-party] to relate to people who are [out-party]
- O8: [out-party] act in ways that us [in-party] could never understand.
- A1: As a [in-party], I would not want to be friends with someone who was a [out-party].
- A2: If I found out a friend of mine was a [out-party], I would want to stop spending time with them.
- A3: I would be happy to attend a social gathering where most people were [out-party].
- A4: Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are [out-party].
- A5: Identifying as a [out-party] rather than a [in-party] makes someone a bad person.
- A6: Some people like to say that us [in-party] are fundamentally different from [out-party], but deep down we are all Americans.
- M1: As a [in-party], my feelings about politics are connected to my core moral beliefs.
- M2: My identity as a [in-party] is connected to my core moral beliefs.
- M3: As a [in-party], my feelings about politics are based on fundamental questions of right and wrong.
- M4: My identity as a [in-party] reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong.
- M5: As a [in-party], my feelings about politics are based on moral principles.
- M6: My identity as a [in-party is rooted in moral principles.

Othering. For othering, we began by examining the area under that item's information curve (which plots how precisely scores on the latent trait dimension are estimated against latent trait scores; Embretson and Reise 2013). The item information curves are shown in panel A of Figure C.1. Two items showed relatively low information (O2: 5.94; O3: 5.33), as indicated by the low area under their curves, and were discarded on that basis. Of the remaining items, we chose the two with the highest area under their information curves (O6: 9.98; O8: 7.90): "[out-party] live in a different world from us [in-party]" and "[out-party] act in ways that we [in-part] could never understand."

The remaining items were relatively similar in information (O1: 7.35; O4: 7.67; O5: 7.83; O7: 7.05). Of these, we ultimately chose O1 ("I feel as though [in-party] are very different from [out-party]") despite the fact that two other items had higher information. We made this choice on the basis of a comparison of information curves (see panel A of Figure C.1), which indicated that O1 covered a wider range of the latent othering dimension compared to the other 3. Additional analyses indicated that a final scale based on these 3 items (O1, O6, O8) provided 98.1% of the information of a scale based on the 3 items with the highest information scores (O5, O6, O8), indicating minimal information loss with this voice. Moreover, the chosen scale provides 42.7% of the information of the full 8-item scale, which is only slightly less than the 43.5% provided by a scale based on O5, O6, and O8. A test information curve for the final 3-item subdimension scale is shown in panel B of Figure C.1.

O1: I feel as though [in-party] are very different from [out-party].

O3: [out-party] are hurting our society.




Figure C.1: Item Information Curves for Othering and 3-item Test Information Curve

Aversion. For aversion, a similar procedure was employed, starting with the six items from the full initial subscale. The item information curves are shown in Figure A3. On the basis of the areas under the items' information curves, the two items with markedly lower information than the others were dropped (A3: 3.00; A6: 2.85). Conversely, we retained two items with much higher information scores than the other (A1: 18.79; A2: 14.47): "As a [in-party], I would not want to be friends with someone who is a [out-party]" and "If I found out a friend of mine was a [out-party], I would want to stop spending time with them."

The two remaining aversion items were relatively similar in information (A4: 6.04; A5: 8.12). Of these two, we ultimately chose A4 ("Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are [out-party]") despite the slightly lower area under its item information. We had several reasons for this choice. First, as shown in panel A of Figure C.2, the item information curve for A4 covered a somewhat wider range of latent version scores (on the x-axis) than the curve for A5. Second, A4 was preferable to A5 on face-validity grounds: whereas A5 included information about perceptions of out-partisans' morality ("Identifying as a [out-party] rather than a [in-party] makes someone a bad person"), creating potential overlap with moralization, A4 did not. Finally, A4 also had the strength of being reverse-coded. Additional analyses indicated that a final aversion scale based on these 3 items (A1, A2, A4) provided 95% of the information of a scale chosen solely on the basis of which items had the higher information scores (A1, A2, A5). The chosen scale provided 73.8% of the information of the full initial 6-item aversion scale; this is only a slight drop from the 77.7% provided by a scale based on A1, A2, and A5. Thus, our final aversion scale does not produce an appreciable loss of information compared to one chosen only the basis of item information scores. The test information curve for the final 3-item aversion scale is shown in panel B of Figure C.2.




Figure C.2: Item Information Curves for Aversion and 3-item Test Information Curve

*Moralization.* For moralization, the 6 items from the initial APS consisted of 3 pairs of corresponding items, with the only difference between each pair being whether they asked about the respondents' "feelings about politics" or the respondents "identity as a [in-party]." As noted in the main text, we chose to keep the 3 items that asked directly about partisan identity on substantive face-validity grounds to reflect our specific interest in the moralization of partisan identification. These items are M2 ("My identity as a [in-party] is connected to my core moral beliefs"), M4 ("My identity as a [in-party] reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong"), and M6 ("My identity as a [in-party] is rooted in moral principles."). To check that this selection did not produce a measure that was lower in information relative to the alternative three-item scale, we estimated a GRM using the full set of six moralization items from the initial 20-item APS. The item information curves from this analysis are shown in panel A of Figure C.3.

The estimates yielded by this analysis indicated that the partisan-identity version of each item had slightly greater area under its information curve (M2: 16.31; M4: 9.37; M6: 13.99) compared to its counterpart (M1: 15.76; M3: 8.83; M5: 13.24). Additional analyses indicated that our preferred partisan-identity version provided 57.8% of the information of the full initial 6-item subscale, compared to 55.1% provided by a scale based on the other 3 items. The preferred version of the scale (M2, M4, M6) provided 86.2% of the information provided of a scale constructed from the items with 3 highest information scores (M1, M2, M6). Thus, our final moralization scale is satisfactory not just on substantive grounds, but also scale information grounds. The test information curve for the final 3-item moralization scale is shown in panel B of Figure C.3. The final 9 items are summarized in Table C.6.




Figure C.3: Item Information Curves for Moralization and 3-item Test Information Curve

Table C.6: Final 9-item Affective Polarization Scale

- O3: [out-party] act in ways that us [in-party] could never understand.
- A1: As a [in-party], I would not want to be friends with someone who was a [out-party].
- A2: If I found out a friend of mine was a [out-party], I would want to stop spending time with them.
- A3: Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are [out-party].
- M1: My identity as a [in-party] is connected to my core moral beliefs.
- M2: My identity as a [in-party] reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong.
- M3: My identity as a [in-party] is rooted in moral principles.

To check the structure of this reduced scale, we estimated a three-factor confirmatory factor analysis model in the Study 4 Wave 1 data. This model fit very well,  $\chi^2(24) =$ 87.989, p < .001, CFI = 0.988, RMSEA = 0.045. For comparison, we also estimated a one-factor model with all items loading onto a single factor. This model fit poorly,  $\chi^2(27) =$ 2360.722, p < .001, CFI = 0.547, RMSEA = 0.264. It also produced a significant decline in fit compared to the focal three-factor model,  $\Delta \chi^2(3) = 991.78, p < .001$ . Of course, it is not ideal to confirm the structure of the reduced scale in the same data used to derive it (Study 4 W1). Therefore, we examined the fit of the three-factor confirmatory factor analysis model in the two other datasets that were not used to generate the original 20-item scale (Studies 2 and 3). The three-factor model fit very well in Study 2,  $\chi^2(24) = 51.290, p < 100$ .001, CFI = 0.988, RMSEA = 0.052; and in Study 3,  $\chi^2(24) = 72.599, p < .001, CFI =$ 0.987, RMSEA = 0.048. In comparison, the one-factor alternative model fit poorly in both Study 2,  $\chi^2(27) = 1048.595, p < .001, CFI = 0.523, RMSEA = 0.310$ ; and in Study 3,  $\chi^2(27) = 1389.819, p < .001, CFI = 0.610, RMSEA = 0.243$ . The one-factor model also produced a significant decline in fit compared to the focal three-factor model in Study 2,  $\Delta \chi^2(3) = 1580.90, p < .001;$  and in Study 3,  $\Delta \chi^2(3) = 3407.80, p < .001.$ 

O1: I feel as though [in-party] are very different from [out-party].

O2: [out-party] live in a different world from us [in-party].

In sum, the hypothesized correlated three-factor model fits the short APS in Study 2, Study 3, and Study 4 Wave 1. For reference, Tables C.7 presents the standardized factor loadings and factor correlations for the correlated three-factor solution for the final nine-item APS. Table C.8 presents the mean and standard deviations for the APS and each subscale in all samples.

	5	Study 2		5	Study 3		Stu	idy 4 W	1
	0	Å	$\mathbf{M}$	0	Å	$\mathbf{M}$	0	Å	$\mathbf{M}$
O1	0.76			0.75			0.73		
O6	0.77			0.78			0.78		
08	0.69			0.75			0.75		
A1		0.93			0.90			0.92	
A2		0.90			0.83			0.84	
A4		0.75			0.47			0.63	
M2			0.89			0.84			0.87
M4			0.82			0.79			0.76
M6			0.93			0.89			0.83
Correlations									
Othering	1.00			1.00			1.00		
Aversion	0.55	1.00		0.52	1.00		0.50	1.00	
Moralization	0.53	0.26	1.00	0.60	0.25	1.00	0.56	0.24	1.00

Table C.7: Standardized Loadings and Factor Correlations for the 9-item APS

Table C.8: Descriptive Statistics for 9-item Affective Polarization Scale

	Study 1		St	udy 2	Study 3		Study 4 W1	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Full Scale	4.19	1.04	4.15	1.05	4.13	1.01	4.06	1.02
Othering	4.49	1.36	4.51	1.34	4.59	1.40	4.56	1.36
Aversion	2.78	1.47	2.61	1.45	2.49	1.29	2.55	1.38
Moralization	5.30	1.20	5.34	1.30	5.30	1.26	5.08	1.32

### C.5 Test-Retest Statistics for the Final 9-Item Scale

Given its three-wave panel structure, Study 4 allowed us to examine the test-retest reliability of the APS and its subdimensions. To provide information on test-retest reliability for the full scale and its subdimensions, we first present simple between-wave test-retest correlations and then present more formal estimates using the intra-class correlation (Shrout and Fleiss 1979). These estimates are summarized in Table C.9.

Table C.9: Test-Retest Reliability Estimates for 9-Item Scale

	W1-W2	W2-W3	W1-W3	ICC	ICC 95% CI
Full Scale	0.80	0.84	0.82	0.84	[0.83, 0.86]
Othering	0.71	0.76	0.79	0.71	[0.69, 0.73]
Aversion	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.78	[0.76, 0.79]
Moralization	0.65	0.71	0.79	0.67	[0.65, 0.69]

Looking first at the raw test-retest correlations, we find that the APS and its subdimensions are highly correlated over time, though this varies by subdimension. Test-retest correlations exceed 0.80 for all wave intervals for the full scale, and they exceed 0.70 for all wave intervals for othering and aversion. The test-retest correlations for moralization were somewhat lower, though they exceeded 0.65 for all wave intervals. While raw test-retest correlations are informative, test-retest reliability is usually more formally examined using the intra-class correlation coefficient (Shrout and Fleiss 1979). For estimation of test-retest reliability, a two-way mixed effects model is used (which does not assume that time points represent a random sample of times; McGraw and Wong 1996).

We present ICC estimates and their 95% confidence intervals for the full scale and its subdimensions in the rightmost columns of Table 1. The ICC ranges from 0-1 and represents the level of absolute agreement between measures of the same construct across time. ICC estimates from 0.50-0.75 indicate moderate reliability, whereas ICC estimates between 0.75-0.90 indicate good reliability (Shrout and Fleiss 1979). By this standard, the full scale and aversion show good reliability, whereas othering and moralization show moderate reliability. As one would expect, the full APS shows higher test-retest reliability, given the larger number of items. Interestingly, test-retest reliability is slightly lower for moralization (though still within acceptable range), despite the fact that the moralization scale shows similar internal consistency to the other subscales. This suggests that moralization scores, while internally consistent, may vary more over time.

#### C.6 Measurement Invariance Analyses

It is essential that any measure of affective polarization function equivalently across partisan groups. Therefore, we conducted a series of sequential measurement invariance tests comparing the properties of our three-factor solution for the final nine-item scale for Democrats and Republicans. To maximize sample size, we did this only in our two larger datasets with approximately representative samples. Measurement-invariance analysis relies on the estimation of multigroup confirmatory factor analysis models. Three increasingly restrictive invariance models are tested in succession: (1) configural invariance, or equivalence of factor structures across groups; (2) metric invariance, or equivalence of factor structure and loadings across groups, and (3) scalar invariance, or equivalence of factor structure, loadings, and item intercepts across groups (Brown 2006; Vandenberg and Lance 2000).

We first examine Study 3. Configural invariance was examined by estimating the target three-factor model simultaneously among Democrats and Republicans. This model fit the data well,  $\chi^2(334) = 877.28, p < .001, CFI = 0.941, RMSEA = 0.06$ , providing evidence for equivalent factor structures across partisanship. Metric invariance was tested by constraining all factor loadings to equality across partisan groups; if the fit of the model does not decline, the metric invariance is sustained. This model provided a similar but slightly worse fit,  $\chi^2(351) = 910.99, p < .001, CFI = 0.939, RMSEA = 0.062$ . Though the likelihood-ratio chi-square difference test comparing the configural and metric models was significant,  $\Delta\chi^2(17) = 33.53, p = .010$ , this test is inflated by larger sample sizes and produces inaccurate conclusions. Thus,  $|\Delta CFI| \leq 0.01$  and  $|\Delta RMSEA| \leq 0.015$  are taken as more appropriate evidence of invariance in samples of the size we employ here (Chen 2007). According to these criteria, constraining the factor loadings across groups does not produce a decline in model fit ( $\Delta CFI = -0.002$  and  $\Delta RMSEA = 0.002$ ), providing evidence for metric invariance. Finally, scalar invariance was tested by constraining all loadings and item intercepts to equality across Democrats and Republicans. This model's fit was again similar,  $\chi^2(368) = 936.47, p < .001, CFI = 0.939, RMSEA = 0.061$ . In this case, both the likelihood-ratio chi-square difference test comparing the metric and scalar models the change in CFI and RMSEA indicated little decline in model fit and were consistent with scalar invariance  $\Delta \chi^2(17) = 18.82, p > .250, \Delta CFI < .001, \Delta RMSEA = .001$  (with the RMSEA actually dropping).

In Study 4 W1, the same procedure was used to assess measurement invariance. The configural model fit the data well,  $\chi^2(334) = 1044.85, p < .001, CFI = 0.948, RMSEA = 0.059,$ suggesting equivalent factor structures across parties. Constraining the factor loadings to equality to examine metric invariance did not appreciably reduce model fit,  $\chi^2(351) =$ 1065.47, p < .001, CFI = 0.948, RMSEA = 0.057. The likelihood-ratio chi-square difference test comparing the configural and metric models failed to reach significance,  $\Delta \chi^2(17) =$ 16.58, p > .250, and the changes in CFI and RMSEA were small and below the cutoff for noninvariance ( $\Delta CFI \leq .001$ ;  $\Delta RMSEA = -0.002$ , with the RMSEA suggesting improved fit). Having established metric invariance, we examined scalar invariance by constraining all loadings and item intercepts to equality across partisanship. The fit of the scalar-invariance model was somewhat worse,  $\chi^2(368) = 1104.57, p < .001, CFI = 0.947, RMSEA = 0.056.$ The likelihood-ratio chi-square difference test comparing the metric and scalar models did indicate a significant decline in fit,  $\Delta \chi^2(17) = 34.24, p = .008$ . However,  $\Delta CFI$  and  $\Delta RMSEA$ -which are less sensitive to inflation by sample size-fell below the cutoffs for non-invariance:  $\Delta CFI = .001$  and  $\Delta RMSEA = .001$  (with the RMSEA again dropping). Thus, Study 4 W1, like the data from Study 3, suggest that the measurement properties of the APS are largely invariant across partian boundaries.

### D Part II: Additional Tables

 Table D.1: Variable Labels Key

Label	Measure
apstot9	Affective Polarization Scale
otot9	Othering
atot9	Aversion
mtot9	Moralization
ba	Respondent has Bachelor's
hisplat	Respondent is Hispanic or Latino
inc	Respondent's Income

				PID Ext	remity				
		Stud	y 1		Study 2				
	OLS	ordered logistic	OLS	ordered logistic	OLS	ordered logistic	OLS	ordered logistic	
apstot9	$0.83^{***}$ (0.09)	$5.25^{***}$ (0.61)			$0.89^{***}$ (0.08)	$5.76^{***}$ (0.62)			
otot9			0.14 (0.08)	0.82 (0.49)	. ,		0.05 (0.08)	0.16 (0.52)	
atot9			0.20**	$1.58^{**}$			$0.24^{***}$	1.97***	
mtot9			(0.07) $0.57^{***}$ (0.08)	(0.49) $3.25^{***}$ (0.51)			(0.07) $0.67^{***}$ (0.08)	(0.50) $4.14^{***}$ (0.52)	
age	$0.21^{**}$ (0.06)	$1.18^{**}$ (0.40)	$0.19^{**}$ (0.06)	$1.13^{**}$ (0.40)	$0.21^{**}$ (0.06)	$1.29^{**}$ (0.41)	$0.19^{**}$ (0.06)	(0.42) (0.42)	
ba	(0.03) (0.03)	(0.40) 0.13 (0.20)	(0.03) (0.03)	(0.40) 0.15 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.03)	(0.41) -0.25 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.03)	(0.42) -0.29 (0.20)	
white	0.07	$0.50^{*}$	0.06	0.44	$0.13^{**}$	$0.77^{**}$	0.11**	0.69**	
hisplat	(0.04) -0.08	(0.24) -0.48	(0.04) -0.09	(0.24) -0.53	(0.04) 0.05	(0.26) 0.17	(0.04) 0.06	(0.26) 0.23	
male	$(0.06) \\ -0.08^*$	$(0.39) \\ -0.36$	$(0.06) \\ -0.07^*$	$(0.38) \\ -0.30$	(0.07) $-0.09^{**}$	(0.42) $-0.52^{**}$	$(0.07) \\ -0.08^*$	$(0.43) -0.46^*$	
inc	$(0.03) \\ 0.004$	$(0.20) \\ -0.01$	$(0.03) \\ 0.001$	$(0.20) \\ -0.03$	$(0.03) \\ -0.02$	$(0.19) \\ -0.18$	$(0.03) \\ -0.04$	$(0.19) \\ -0.27$	
Constant	(0.05) 0.12 (0.07)	(0.31)	(0.05) 0.03 (0.07)	(0.32)	(0.05) 0.08 (0.07)	(0.33)	(0.05) -0.003 (0.07)	(0.33)	
N	(0.07) 495	495	(0.07) 495	495	(0.07) 488	488	(0.07) 488	488	

**Table D.2:** PID Extremity Analyses with Ordered Logistic Regression, Study 1 and Study 2

				PID Ext	$\mathbf{remity}$			
		Study	y 3			Study $4$	4 W1	
	OLS	ordered logistic	OLS	ordered logistic	OLS	ordered logistic	OLS	ordered logistic
apstot9	$1.00^{***}$ (0.07)	$5.13^{***}$ (0.42)			$0.73^{***}$ (0.05)	$4.21^{***}$ (0.31)		
otot9	( )	× ,	$0.16^{*}$ (0.07)	$0.72^{*}$ (0.33)	( )	~ /	0.08 (0.05)	$0.59^{*}$ (0.27)
atot9			$0.29^{***}$ (0.06)	$1.65^{***}$			0.04 (0.04)	0.32
mtot9			(0.06) $0.61^{***}$ (0.07)	(0.35) $3.20^{***}$ (0.37)			(0.04) $0.64^{***}$ (0.05)	(0.26) $3.46^{***}$ (0.26)
age	$0.15^{*}$	$0.75^{*}$	$0.14^{*}$	$0.76^{*}$	$0.27^{***}$	$1.41^{***}$	0.20***	1.15***
ba	(0.06) 0.03	(0.29) 0.19	(0.06) 0.03	(0.30) 0.17	(0.04) -0.01	(0.22) -0.04	(0.04) -0.01	(0.23) -0.05
white	$\begin{array}{c}(0.03)\\0.01\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c}(0.14)\\0.07\end{array}$	$(0.03) \\ 0.01$	$(0.14) \\ 0.05$	$(0.02) \\ -0.01$	$(0.10) \\ -0.05$	$(0.02) \\ -0.03$	$(0.10) \\ -0.17$
hisplat	$(0.03) \\ -0.02$	$(0.16) \\ -0.13$	$(0.03) \\ -0.01$	$(0.16) \\ -0.09$	$(0.02) \\ -0.003$	$(0.11) \\ -0.02$	$(0.02) \\ 0.003$	$(0.11) \\ 0.01$
male	$(0.05) \\ -0.04$	$(0.24) \\ -0.20$	$(0.05) \\ -0.03$	$(0.24) \\ -0.17$	$(0.03) \\ -0.04^*$	$(0.13) \\ -0.19$	$(0.02) \\ -0.03$	$(0.14) \\ -0.15$
	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.10)
inc	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \ (0.05) \end{array}$	$0.18 \\ (0.22)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \\ (0.05) \end{array}$	0.17 (0.23)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.05) \end{array}$	$-0.06 \\ (0.28)$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \\ (0.05) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \\ (0.28) \end{array}$
Constant	-0.0003 (0.05)		-0.07 (0.06)		$0.18^{***}$ (0.04)		$0.10^{**}$ (0.04)	
N	1053	1053	1053	1053	1658	1658	1658	1658

Table D.3: PID Extremity Analyses with Ordered Logistic Regression, Study 3 and Study 4W1

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

### Table D.4: Partisan Social Identity as a Function of APS and Subdimensions

				Partisan Soci	al Identity			
	Study 1		$\mathbf{Stud}_{\mathbf{i}}$	Study 2		у З	Study 4	4 W1
apstot9	0.67***		$0.65^{***}$		0.75***		0.68***	
1	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.03)	
otot9		$0.16^{***}$	. ,	$0.15^{**}$		$0.14^{***}$		$0.09^{**}$
		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
atot9		0.08*		0.04		0.13***		0.07**
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)
mtot9		0.50***		0.51***		0.51***		0.55***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)
age	$0.19^{***}$	$0.17^{***}$	$0.18^{***}$	$0.14^{***}$	0.06	0.03	$0.13^{***}$	0.08***
-	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ba	0.003	0.0004	-0.01	-0.01	$0.03^{*}$	0.03*	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	0.02	0.004	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.002	$-0.02^{*}$	$-0.04^{***}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
hisplat	0.01	-0.01	0.08	0.08*	0.02	0.03	0.0000	0.005
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
male	-0.02	-0.01	$-0.04^{*}$	$-0.04^{*}$	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	-0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	$0.13^{***}$	0.04	0.11**	0.03	0.17***	0.09**	0.22***	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ν	494	494	487	487	1048	1048	1658	1658

				Ideological l	Extremity			
		Study	y 1			Stud	y 2	
	OLS	$\mathbf{ordered}$ $\mathbf{logistic}$	OLS	$\mathbf{ordered}$ $\mathbf{logistic}$	OLS	$\mathbf{ordered}$ logistic	OLS	ordered logistic
apstot9	$0.69^{***}$ (0.07)	$5.55^{***}$ (0.57)			$0.75^{***}$ (0.07)	$5.77^{***}$ (0.57)		
otot9	(0.01)	(0.01)	0.02 (0.06)	0.11 (0.49)	(0101)	(0.01)	0.04 (0.06)	0.34 (0.48)
atot9			0.24***	2.25***			$0.25^{***}$	2.18***
mtot9			$(0.05) \\ 0.50^{***} \\ (0.06)$	(0.45) $3.93^{***}$ (0.53)			(0.06) $0.51^{***}$ (0.06)	(0.46) $3.80^{***}$ (0.50)
age	0.02 (0.05)	0.23	0.01 (0.05)	0.21 (0.37)	0.05 (0.05)	0.33 (0.38)	0.04 (0.05)	(0.31) (0.39)
ba	$0.03^{-1}$	(0.37) 0.25	0.03	0.26	-0.001	-0.04	-0.004	$-0.07^{'}$
white	$(0.02) \\ 0.06$	$(0.19) \\ 0.47^*$	$(0.02) \\ 0.05$	$(0.19) \\ 0.45$	$(0.03) \\ 0.08^*$	$(0.19) \\ 0.55^*$	$(0.02) \\ 0.07$	$(0.19) \\ 0.49$
hisplat	$(0.03) \\ 0.10^*$	$(0.23) \\ 0.99^*$	$(0.03) \\ 0.09$	$(0.24) \\ 0.92^*$	$(0.03) \\ 0.11^*$	$(0.26) \\ 0.79$	$(0.03) \\ 0.12^*$	$(0.26) \\ 0.87^*$
-	(0.05)	(0.40)	(0.05)	(0.39)	(0.05)	(0.41)	(0.05)	(0.42)
male	$-0.06^{**}$ (0.02)	$-0.48^{**}$ (0.18)	$-0.05^{*}$ (0.02)	$-0.40^{*}$ (0.19)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.30 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.19 (0.18)
inc	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.30)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.07 (0.04)	$-0.67^{*}$ (0.32)	$-0.08^{*}$ (0.04)	$-0.74^{*}$ (0.32)
Constant	(0.04) $0.25^{***}$ (0.05)	(0.00)	(0.04) $0.17^{**}$ (0.05)	(0.00)	(0.04) $0.24^{***}$ (0.06)	(0.02)	(0.04) $0.18^{**}$ (0.06)	(0.52)
N	495	495	495	495	487	487	487	487

 Table D.5: Ideological Extremity Analyses with Ordered Logistic Regression, Study 1 and 2

\*\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table D.6: Ideological Extremity Analyses with Ordered Logistic Regression, Study 3 and 4W1

				Ideological I	Extremity				
		Study	y 3		J. J	Study 4	Study 4 W1		
	OLS	$\mathbf{ordered}$	OLS	ordered logistic	OLS	$\mathbf{ordered}$	OLS	ordered logistic	
apstot9	$0.75^{***}$ (0.06)	$4.16^{***}$ (0.37)			$0.66^{***}$ (0.05)	$3.71^{***}$ (0.28)			
otot9	. ,		0.10 (0.06)	0.48 (0.31)			$0.10^{*}$ (0.05)	$0.57^{*}$ (0.25)	
atot9			$0.12^{*}$ (0.06)	(0.01) $(0.79^{*})$ (0.31)			$0.20^{***}$ (0.04)	(0.23) $1.17^{***}$ (0.23)	
mtot9			(0.00) $0.57^{***}$ (0.06)	(0.31) $3.29^{***}$ (0.35)			(0.04) $0.38^{***}$ (0.04)	(0.25) $2.10^{***}$ (0.25)	
age	-0.06	-0.45 (0.26)	$-0.09^{-}$	$-0.56^{*}$	0.02	0.10 (0.20)	0.02	0.08	
ba	(0.05) $0.09^{***}$	0.45***	(0.05) $0.09^{***}$	(0.27) $0.48^{***}$	(0.04) $0.06^{**}$	0.30**	(0.04) $0.05^{**}$	(0.21) $0.28^{**}$	
white	$(0.02) \\ 0.06^*$	$(0.13) \\ 0.30^*$	$(0.02) \\ 0.05$	$(0.13) \\ 0.27$	$(0.02) \\ 0.07^{***}$	$(0.09) \\ 0.40^{***}$	$(0.02) \\ 0.07^{***}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.09) \\ 0.37^{***} \end{array}$	
hisplat	$(0.03) \\ -0.07$	(0.15) -0.44	$(0.03) \\ -0.06$	$(0.15) \\ -0.38$	$(0.02) \\ 0.02$	$(0.10) \\ 0.11$	$(0.02) \\ 0.02$	$(0.11) \\ 0.13$	
male	$(0.04) \\ 0.01$	$(0.23) \\ 0.04$	$(0.04) \\ 0.02$	$(0.23) \\ 0.07$	$(0.02) \\ 0.01$	$(0.13) \\ 0.03$	$(0.02) \\ 0.01$	$(0.13) \\ 0.03$	
	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.09)	
inc	0.02 (0.04)	0.14 (0.21)	0.01 (0.04)	0.12 (0.21)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.26)	
Constant	0.07 (0.05)	× /	-0.02 (0.05)	~ /	0.03 (0.03)	× /	0.01 (0.04)		
N	(0.05) 1052	1052	(0.05) 1052	1052	(0.03) 1658	1658	(0.04) 1658	1658	

		Political K	nowledge	
	$\mathbf{Study}$		Study 4	$\mathbf{W1}$
apstot9	$-0.15^{***}$		0.12**	
-	(0.04)		(0.04)	
otot9	× /	0.03		0.06
		(0.04)		(0.04)
atot9		$-0.29^{***}$		$-0.07^{*}$
		(0.04)		(0.03)
mtot9		0.08*		0.13***
		(0.04)		(0.03)
age	$0.41^{***}$	$0.37^{***}$	$0.14^{***}$	$0.11^{***}$
0	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ba	0.06***	$0.07^{***}$	0.12***	0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	0.003	-0.004	0.03*	$0.03^{-1}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
hisplat	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
male	0.06***	0.06***	0.05***	$0.05^{***}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	0.05	0.04	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	$0.58^{***}$	0.52***	0.48***	0.46***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ν	1039	1039	1643	1643

 Table D.7:
 Political Knowledge as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table D.8: Warmth Bias as a Function of APS and Subdimensions

	Q+	. 0	Warmth Study		Stud	3871	
	Study	/ 4		уð	Study 4 W1		
apstot9	0.69***		0.44***		0.58***		
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		
otot9		$0.31^{***}$		$0.21^{***}$		$0.25^{***}$	
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
atot9		$0.18^{***}$		0.002		$0.10^{***}$	
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
mtot9		$0.22^{***}$		$0.21^{***}$		$0.21^{***}$	
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
age	$0.10^{***}$	0.08***	$0.12^{***}$	0.09***	$0.18^{***}$	0.15***	
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
ba	0.002	0.004	-0.02	-0.01	$-0.03^{***}$	$-0.03^{**}$	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
white	0.01	0.003	-0.01	-0.02	-0.0000	-0.004	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
hisplat	$0.05^{*}$	0.05	-0.01	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
male	0.001	-0.003	-0.01	-0.01	$-0.03^{**}$	$-0.02^{**}$	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
inc	-0.003	-0.005	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	
-	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Constant	0.28***	0.26***	0.47***	0.44***	0.33***	0.32***	
2	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Ν	481	481	1017	1017	1657	1657	

		Trait Rati	ng Bias	
	Study		Study	y 3
apstot9	0.73***		0.41***	
	(0.04)		(0.03)	
otot9	~ /	$0.44^{***}$	· · /	0.20***
		(0.04)		(0.03)
atot9		0.18***		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.02)
mtot9		0.10**		0.16***
		(0.04)		(0.03)
age	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ba	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	$-0.03^{*}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
hisplat	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
male	0.03	0.02	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	-0.01	-0.01	$-0.05^{**}$	$-0.05^{**}$
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.01	0.01	0.45***	0.43***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ν	480	480	1037	1037

### Table D.9: Trait Rating Bias as a Function of APS and Subdimensions

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05

 Table D.10: PID Extremity as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, by Party.

				PID Ext	remity			
		Stud	y 1		0	Stud	y 2	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	$0.81^{***}$	$0.77^{***}$			$0.65^{***}$	$0.99^{***}$		
-	(0.13)	(0.12)			(0.11)	(0.14)		
otot9	· · · ·		0.16	$0.23^{*}$	. ,	. ,	-0.19	$0.29^{*}$
			(0.12)	(0.11)			(0.11)	(0.12)
atot9			$0.21^{*}$	-0.02			$0.34^{***}$	-0.04
			(0.10)	(0.12)			(0.09)	(0.12)
mtot9			$0.52^{***}$	$0.58^{***}$			0.57***	0.68**
			(0.13)	(0.11)			(0.09)	(0.12)
age	$0.24^{*}$	$0.23^{*}$	$0.24^{*}$	$0.21^{*}$	$0.31^{***}$	0.16	0.32***	0.14
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)
ba	0.06	-0.01	0.06	-0.01	$-0.10^{*}$	-0.06	$-0.09^{*}$	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
white	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.08	$0.16^{***}$	0.15	$0.15^{**}$	0.12
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.09)
hisplat	$-0.22^{*}$	0.10	$-0.22^{*}$	0.08	0.14	-0.14	$0.17^{*}$	-0.12
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.13)
male	$-0.12^{*}$	-0.03	$-0.12^{*}$	0.004	-0.06	$-0.09^{*}$	-0.05	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
inc	-0.01	0.01	-0.005	-0.01	0.10	-0.08	0.06	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Constant	0.16	0.08	0.08	-0.06	0.17	0.03	0.13	-0.10
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.13)
N	248	247	248	247	245	243	245	243

				PID Ext	remity			
		Stud	y 3		0	Study $4$	4 W1	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	0.99***	$0.95^{***}$			$0.71^{***}$	0.77***		
1	(0.09)	(0.12)			(0.07)	(0.09)		
otot9	× /	· · · ·	$0.20^{*}$	0.07	( )	· · · ·	0.10	0.05
			(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.06)	(0.08)
atot9			0.25**	$0.29^{*}$			-0.03	$0.15^{*}$
			(0.08)	(0.11)			(0.06)	(0.08)
mtot9			$0.59^{***}$	$0.66^{***}$			$0.68^{***}$	0.58**
			(0.09)	(0.11)			(0.06)	(0.07)
age	$0.18^{*}$	0.14	$0.16^{*}$	0.13	$0.33^{***}$	$0.17^{**}$	0.25***	$0.14^{*}$
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
ba	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.02	-0.06	0.01	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
white	-0.02	0.09	-0.02	0.10	-0.04	0.09*	$-0.06^{*}$	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
hisplat	-0.05	0.05	-0.04	0.07	-0.004	0.02	0.004	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
male	$-0.07^{*}$	0.01	-0.06	0.02	-0.01	$-0.09^{**}$	-0.01	$-0.07^{*}$
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
inc	0.10	-0.05	0.11	-0.07	-0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Constant	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.15	$0.17^{***}$	$0.15^{*}$	0.07	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
N	581	472	581	472	1007	651	1007	651 <sup>´</sup>

# Table D.11: PID Extremity as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, by Party.

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table D.12: Partisan Social Identity as a Function of the APS and	d Subdimensions, by Party.
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				Partisan Soci	al Identity			
		Stud	y 1			Stud	y 2	
	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	$0.56^{***}$	$0.77^{***}$			$0.58^{***}$	$0.77^{***}$		
1	(0.07)	(0.07)			(0.06)	(0.08)		
otot9	( )	× /	$0.21^{**}$	$0.12^{*}$	( )	· · · ·	0.11	$0.15^{*}$
			(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.06)	(0.06)
atot9			0.04	0.12			0.04	0.11
			(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.05)	(0.07)
mtot9			0.39***	0.59***			0.50***	0.50**
			(0.07)	(0.06)			(0.06)	(0.06)
age	$0.24^{***}$	$0.13^{*}$	0.22***	$0.11^{*}$	$0.37^{***}$	-0.02	$0.31^{***}$	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ba	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	0.05	-0.03	0.03	-0.04	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
hisplat	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.004	$0.15^{**}$	-0.02	$0.14^{**}$	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
male	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	$-0.05^{*}$	-0.04	$-0.05^{*}$	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	0.01	-0.04	0.01	-0.05	$0.09^{*}$	-0.01	0.06	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	$0.14^{**}$	$0.17^{**}$	0.06	0.05	0.08	$0.18^{*}$	-0.01	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Ν	247	247	247	247	244	243	244	243

				Partisan Soci	al Identity			
		Study	y 3		v	Study 4	4 W1	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	Rep	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	$0.74^{***}$	$0.75^{***}$			$0.63^{***}$	$0.75^{***}$		
1	(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.04)	(0.05)		
otot9	· · /	( )	$0.12^{**}$	$0.16^{**}$	( )	· · · ·	$0.09^{**}$	0.08
			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.03)	(0.04)
atot9			0.13**	0.10			0.005	0.17**
			(0.04)	(0.06)			(0.03)	(0.04)
mtot9			$0.53^{***}$	0.48***			$0.58^{***}$	0.50**
			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.03)	(0.04)
age	$0.09^{*}$	0.01	0.07	-0.003	$0.17^{***}$	0.06	0.11***	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
ba	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.001	$-0.05^{**}$	-0.01	$-0.05^{**}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
white	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	$-0.03^{*}$	0.01	$-0.05^{***}$	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
hisplat	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
male	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	$-0.03^{*}$	0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
inc	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Constant	$0.16^{***}$	$0.19^{***}$	0.07	$0.11^{*}$	0.22***	0.21***	0.14***	$0.15^{**}$
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Ν	579 <sup>´</sup>	469	579 <sup>´</sup>	469	1007	651	1007	651

Table D.13: Partisan Social Identity as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, by Party.

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05

**Table D.14:** Ideological Identity Extremity as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, byParty.

				Ideological l	Extremity			
		Stud	y 1	0	U	Stud	y 2	
	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	0.59***	0.65***			0.61***	0.82***		
1	(0.10)	(0.09)			(0.10)	(0.10)		
otot9	~ /	~ /	0.04	0.06			-0.13	$0.17^{*}$
			(0.09)	(0.08)			(0.10)	(0.08)
atot9			$0.27^{***}$	0.03			0.35***	0.05
			(0.07)	(0.09)			(0.08)	(0.09)
mtot9			0.29**	0.63***			0.41***	0.58***
			(0.09)	(0.08)			(0.09)	(0.08)
age	$-0.14^{*}$	$0.22^{**}$	-0.12	0.19**	-0.01	0.12	0.02	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)
ba	0.04	-0.002	0.04	-0.004	0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
white	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	$0.11^{*}$	0.05	$0.10^{*}$	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)
hisplat	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.12	0.05	$0.15^{*}$	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)
male	$-0.08^{*}$	-0.02	$-0.07^{*}$	0.01	-0.05	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
inc	-0.03	0.05	-0.02	0.04	-0.06	-0.05	-0.09	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	$0.37^{***}$	0.11	0.36***	-0.04	0.33***	0.17	$0.32^{***}$	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Ν	248	247	248	247	244	243	244	243

				Ideological l	Extremity			
		Study	y 3	C	·	Study $4$	4 W1	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	Rep	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	$0.68^{***}$	$0.89^{***}$			0.66***	$0.65^{***}$		
1	(0.09)	(0.10)			(0.06)	(0.08)		
otot9	( )	× /	0.06	0.16	( )	· · · ·	0.05	$0.18^{*}$
			(0.08)	(0.08)			(0.06)	(0.07)
atot9			$0.16^{*}$	0.06			0.28***	0.07
			(0.07)	(0.09)			(0.05)	(0.07)
mtot9			$0.50^{***}$	0.66***			0.36***	0.39***
			(0.08)	(0.09)			(0.06)	(0.06)
age	$-0.34^{***}$	$0.24^{***}$	$-0.35^{***}$	0.21**	$-0.13^{**}$	$0.26^{***}$	$-0.11^{*}$	0.22***
-	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
ba	0.11**	$0.07^{*}$	0.10**	0.08*	$0.07^{**}$	0.04	0.06**	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
white	$0.08^{*}$	-0.001	$0.07^{*}$	0.001	$0.07^{**}$	0.05	$0.07^{**}$	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
hisplat	$-0.13^{*}$	0.04	$-0.13^{*}$	0.07	0.02	0.003	0.03	0.002
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
male	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
inc	0.03	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	-0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Constant	0.19**	-0.04	0.11	$-0.16^{*}$	0.09*	-0.05	0.07	$-0.10^{\circ}$
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Ν	581	471	581	471	1007	651	1007	651

**Table D.15:** Ideological Identity Extremity as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, byParty.

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table D.16:         Political Knowledge as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, by F	Party.
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				Political K	nowledge			
		Study	y 3		0	Study -	4W1	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	-0.07	$-0.25^{***}$			$0.13^{**}$	0.09		
	(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.05)	(0.06)		
otot9	. ,	. ,	0.03	0.06		. ,	0.05	0.09
			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.04)	(0.06)
atot9			$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.42^{***}$			-0.03	$-0.17^{**}$
			(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.04)	(0.06)
ntot9			$0.13^{*}$	-0.02			0.11**	$0.13^{*}$
			(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.04)	(0.05)
ıge	$0.43^{***}$	$0.38^{***}$	$0.38^{***}$	0.34***	$0.08^{*}$	$0.25^{***}$	0.06	0.19**
-	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
ba	0.09***	0.04	0.09***	$0.05^{*}$	0.10***	0.12***	$0.10^{***}$	$0.13^{**}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	0.004	-0.01	-0.0000	-0.02	$0.05^{**}$	0.03	$0.04^{*}$	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
nisplat	-0.02	-0.08	-0.02	-0.07	$-0.03^{-1}$	0.03	-0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
nale	$0.05^{*}$	0.07**	$0.05^{**}$	$0.07^{***}$	$0.04^{*}$	0.06**	$0.04^{*}$	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
nc	-0.01	0.11**	-0.01	0.10**	0.04	-0.11	0.04	$-0.09^{-0.09}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Constant	$0.53^{***}$	$0.65^{***}$	$0.47^{***}$	$0.60^{***}$	0.51***	0.42***	0.49***	0.38**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
N	572	467	572	467	998	645	998	645

				Trait Rati	ng Bias			
		Study	y 2		-	Stud	y 3	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	$\mathbf{Dem}$	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	$0.68^{***}$	0.82***			$0.37^{***}$	0.50***		
-	(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.04)	(0.04)		
otot9	× /	× /	$0.54^{***}$	$0.38^{***}$	· · · ·	· · · ·	$0.22^{***}$	$0.17^{***}$
			(0.06)	(0.05)			(0.03)	(0.04)
atot9			0.06	0.33***			-0.01	$0.10^{*}$
			(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.03)	(0.04)
mtot9			0.10	$0.12^{*}$			$0.13^{***}$	0.21***
			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.04)	(0.04)
age	0.05	-0.01	0.02	-0.004	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.002
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ba	0.01	0.02	0.0000	0.02	0.01	-0.0004	0.02	0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
white	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
hisplat	-0.03	0.02	-0.05	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
male	$0.05^{*}$	0.005	$0.04^{*}$	-0.004	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01	$-0.06^{**}$	-0.01	$-0.07^{**}$	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	0.04	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	$0.47^{***}$	0.40***	$0.45^{***}$	0.39***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Ν	240	240	240	240	573	464	573	464

Table D.17: Trait Rating Bias as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, by Par	rty.
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		Study 2	, 2			Warmth Bias Study 3	Bias 3			Study 4 W1	W1	
	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\operatorname{Rep}$	$\mathbf{Dem}$	Rep	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$	$\mathbf{Dem}$	Rep	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	$0.59^{***}$ (0.04)	$0.77^{***}$			$0.38^{***}$ (0.04)	$0.53^{***}$ (0.04)			$0.58^{***}$ (0.03)	$0.57^{***}$ (0.04)		
otot9		()	$0.22^{***}$	$0.42^{***}$		()	$0.21^{***}$	$0.20^{***}$			$0.25^{***}$	$0.27^{***}$
			(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.03)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.04)
atot9			$0.14^{***}$	$0.18^{***}$			-0.02	0.03			$0.09^{***}$	$0.10^{**}$
			(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.03)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.04)
mtot9			$0.26^{***}$	$0.14^{**}$			$0.17^{***}$	$0.26^{***}$			$0.23^{***}$	$0.18^{***}$
			(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.03)
age	$0.15^{***}$	0.06	$0.13^{***}$	0.05	$0.15^{***}$	$0.07^{*}$	$0.11^{***}$	0.05	$0.20^{***}$	$0.17^{***}$	$0.16^{***}$	$0.14^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
$_{\rm ba}$	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.003	-0.03	-0.01	$-0.06^{***}$	-0.01	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.005	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
hisplat	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.04	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
male	-0.002	0.01	-0.001	-0.003	$-0.03^{*}$	0.02	$-0.03^{*}$	0.02	-0.02	$-0.03^{*}$	-0.01	$-0.03^{*}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	0.03	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	-0.04	0.002	-0.03	0.04	-0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant	$0.32^{***}$	$0.23^{***}$	$0.29^{***}$	$0.22^{***}$	$0.51^{***}$	$0.43^{***}$	$0.48^{***}$	$0.40^{***}$	$0.33^{***}$	$0.32^{***}$	$0.31^{***}$	$0.31^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Z	243	238	243	238	561	456	561	456	1006	651	1006	651

**Table D.18:** Warmth Bias as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, by Party.

				PID Ext	remity			
	$\mathbf{Stud}$	y 1	$\mathbf{Stud}$	у 2	Stud	у З	Study $4$	4W1
scale(apstot9)	$0.39^{***}$		$0.42^{***}$		0.38***		0.32***	
· - /	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
scale(otot9)		0.09	. ,	0.03		$0.08^{*}$		0.04
, ,		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.03)
scale(atot9)		0.13**		0.15***		0.14***		0.03
· · ·		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(mtot9)		0.30***		0.39***		0.29***		0.36***
· · · ·		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(age)	$0.14^{**}$	0.13**	$0.14^{**}$	0.12**	$0.08^{*}$	$0.07^{*}$	$0.16^{***}$	0.12***
( )	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ba	0.07	0.07	-0.14	-0.14	0.08	0.08	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
white	0.19	0.15	0.36**	0.30**	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
hisplat	-0.22	-0.25	0.14	0.15	-0.05	$-0.03^{\circ}$	-0.01	0.01
-	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)
male	$-0.22^{*}$	$-0.20^{*}$	$-0.24^{**}$	$-0.20^{*}$	-0.08	-0.07	$-0.11^{*}$	-0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
scale(inc)	0.004	0.001	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.0002	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	$-0.10^{-0.10}$	$-0.08^{-0.08}$	$-0.15^{'}$	-0.11	-0.004	-0.01	0.08	0.10
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ν	495	495	488	488	1053	1053	1658	1658

# $\label{eq:table_transform} \textbf{Table D.19: PID Extremity as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, Standardized$

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \*p < .05

Table D.20: Partisan Social Identity as	a Function of the APS and	d Subdimensions, Standardized
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				Partisan Soci	al Identity			
	Study	y 1	Study	y 2	Stud	у 3	$\mathbf{Study}$	4W1
scale(apstot9)	$0.52^{***}$		$0.51^{***}$		$0.51^{***}$		$0.48^{***}$	
, _ ,	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
scale(otot9)	. ,	$0.17^{***}$		$0.14^{**}$		$0.13^{***}$		$0.08^{**}$
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(atot9)		0.08		0.04		$0.11^{***}$		$0.07^{**}$
. ,		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)
scale(mtot9)		$0.46^{***}$		0.48***		$0.43^{***}$		0.50***
· · · ·		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)
scale(age)	$0.23^{***}$	0.20***	$0.19^{***}$	0.14***	0.05	0.03	$0.12^{***}$	0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ba	0.01	-0.003	-0.06	-0.04	$0.13^{*}$	$0.13^{*}$	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
white	0.10	0.03	0.19	0.08	0.03	0.01	$-0.10^{*}$	$-0.16^{***}$
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
hisplat	0.04	-0.02	0.35	$0.34^{*}$	0.08	0.12	0.0001	0.02
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.06)
male	-0.09	-0.05	$-0.18^{*}$	$-0.16^{*}$	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
scale(inc)	-0.02	$-0.03^{-1}$	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-0.06	0.001	$-0.10^{-0.10}$	-0.01	$-0.05^{'}$	$-0.05^{-0.05}$	$0.11^{*}$	0.14**
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ν	494	494	487	487	1048	1048	1658	1658

				Ideological 1	Exremity			
	Study	y 1	$\mathbf{Stud}$	y 2	Stud	y 3	Study $4$	4W1
scale(apstot9)	0.43***		0.45***		0.33***		0.32***	
· · · /	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
scale(otot9)	× /	0.02		0.03	. ,	0.06	· · · ·	$0.06^{*}$
· · ·		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.03)
scale(atot9)		0.21***		0.21***		$0.07^{*}$		0.13***
· · ·		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(mtot9)		$0.36^{***}$		$0.38^{***}$		$0.32^{***}$		0.23***
· · · ·		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(age)	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.03	-0.04	-0.05	0.01	0.01
( )	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
ba	0.11	0.11	-0.005	-0.01	0.24***	0.24***	$0.15^{**}$	$0.14^{**}$
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
white	0.21	0.19	$0.27^{*}$	0.22	$0.15^{*}$	0.13	0.20***	0.19***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
hisplat	$0.35^{*}$	0.31	$0.37^{*}$	$0.39^{*}$	$-0.19^{-}$	-0.16	0.05	0.06
-	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)
male	$-0.23^{**}$	$-0.19^{*}$	$-0.13^{-0.13}$	$-0.10^{-1}$	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
scale(inc)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.07	$-0.08^{*}$	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01
× /	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	$-0.18^{-0.18}$	-0.16	$-0.20^{-0.20}$	$-0.17^{'}$	$-0.21^{**}$	$-0.21^{**}$	$-0.21^{***}$	-0.20***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ν	495	495	487	487	1052	1052	1658	1658

**Table D.21:** Ideological Identity Extremity as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions,Standardized

\*\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table D.22: Political Knowledge as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, Standardi
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		Political K	nowledge	
	Study	y 3	Study 4	4W1
scale(apstot9)	$-0.10^{***}$		0.08**	
	(0.03)		(0.02)	
scale(otot9)		0.03	. ,	0.05
, ,		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(atot9)		$-0.25^{***}$		$-0.06^{*}$
· · ·		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(mtot9)		0.06*		0.10***
. ,		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(age)	$0.38^{***}$	$0.34^{***}$	$0.12^{***}$	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
ba	0.26***	0.29***	0.42***	0.43***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
white	0.01	-0.02	$0.12^{*}$	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
hisplat	-0.14	-0.11	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)
male	0.22***	0.23***	0.16***	0.18***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
scale(inc)	0.06	0.05	-0.003	-0.004
· /	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	$-0.23^{**}$	$-0.23^{**}$	$-0.31^{***}$	$-0.31^{***}$
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ν	1039	1039	1643	1643

			Warmth	Bias		
	Stud	y 2	Study	y 3	Study	4W1
scale(apstot9)	0.70***		0.43***		0.50***	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
scale(otot9)		$0.39^{***}$	× /	$0.29^{***}$	· · · ·	0.29***
· · ·		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(atot9)		$0.25^{***}$		0.002		0.11***
· · · ·		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)
scale(mtot9)		$0.27^{***}$		0.25***		0.24***
· · · ·		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)
scale(age)	$0.13^{***}$	$0.12^{***}$	$0.16^{***}$	0.12***	$0.21^{***}$	0.18***
( ) /	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ba	0.01	0.02	-0.09	-0.06	$-0.15^{***}$	$-0.13^{**}$
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
white	0.03	0.02	-0.06	-0.09	-0.0002	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
hisplat	$0.30^{*}$	0.29	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)
male	0.003	-0.02	-0.06	-0.05	$-0.13^{**}$	$-0.11^{**}$
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
scale(inc)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01
· · /	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-0.07	-0.05	0.11	0.12	$0.12^{*}$	$0.12^{*}$
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ν	481	481	1017	1017	1657	1657

 Table D.23:
 Warmth Bias as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, Standardized

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05

Table D.24: Trait Rating Bias as a Function of the APS and Subdimensions, Standardized

		Trait Rati	ng Bias	
	$\mathbf{Stud}$	y 2	$\mathbf{Stud}$	у З
scale(apstot9)	$0.64^{***}$		0.41***	
	(0.04)		(0.03)	
scale(otot9)	· · · ·	$0.49^{***}$		$0.28^{***}$
· · ·		(0.04)		(0.04)
scale(atot9)		0.21***		0.03
. ,		(0.04)		(0.03)
scale(mtot9)		0.11**		0.20***
· · · ·		(0.04)		(0.03)
scale(age)	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.02
( ) /	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ba	0.08	0.09	0.03	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
white	-0.06	-0.05	-0.14	$-0.16^{*}$
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)
hisplat	-0.07	$-0.10^{\circ}$	-0.09	$-0.08^{\circ}$
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.11)
male	0.14	0.09	-0.03	$-0.02^{-1}$
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
scale(inc)	-0.02	-0.01	$-0.09^{**}$	$-0.09^{**}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	-0.04	$-0.03^{\circ}$	0.12	0.11
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Ν	480	480	1037	1037

	Affective	e Polarization	Scale
fctot	$0.48^{***}$	$0.70^{***}$	$0.73^{***}$
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.14)
ctot		0.15	0.15
		(0.09)	(0.12)
101			0.12
			(0.15)
	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ite	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
lat	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
e	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
	0.004	0.004	0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ot:pktot		$-0.32^{*}$	-0.26
		(0.15)	(0.19)
ot:pid01			-0.16
			(0.23)
pt:pid01			-0.07
			(0.19)
ot:pktot:pid01			-0.003
			(0.30)
stant	$0.19^{***}$	0.08	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.09)
	1044	1030	1030

 Table D.25:
 Preregistered Analysis: Need for

Closure

**Table D.26:** Preregistered Analysis: Political\_\_\_\_\_\_ Interest

	Political I	nterest
apstot9	$0.35^{***}$	
-	(0.05)	
otot9		-0.01
		(0.05)
atot9		0.07
		(0.04)
mtot9		0.33***
		(0.05)
age	$0.28^{***}$	$0.27^{***}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)
ba	$0.04^{*}$	$0.04^{*}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
hisplat	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)
male	$0.06^{***}$	$0.06^{***}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	$0.11^{***}$	$0.11^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	$0.27^{***}$	$0.22^{***}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ν	1053	1053

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \*p < .05

## E Part III: Additional Tables

 Table E.1: Variable Labels Key

Label	Measure
rotg	Rules of the Game
dnorms	ANES Democratic Norms
antidemcand	Vote for Anti-Democratic Candidate
pspite	Partisan Spite
authrule	Support for Authoritarian Rule

	$\mathbf{rotg}$	S2	$\mathbf{rotg}$	<b>S</b> 3	dnorm	s S3
apstot9	0.10		0.48***		$-0.07^{*}$	
	(0.07)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
otot9		$0.28^{***}$		$0.13^{***}$	· · · ·	-0.02
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
atot9		-0.02		0.31***		$-0.16^{***}$
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
mtot9		$-0.17^{***}$		0.04		$0.12^{***}$
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
wbias	$-0.13^{*}$	$-0.17^{*}$	$-0.28^{***}$	$-0.23^{***}$	$0.17^{***}$	0.13***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
age	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.29^{***}$	$-0.26^{***}$	$0.18^{***}$	0.16***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ba	$-0.05^{**}$	$-0.04^{*}$	$-0.03^{*}$	$-0.03^{**}$	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.004	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
hisplat	0.0000	-0.01	-0.04	$-0.05^{*}$	0.001	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
male	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	$0.03^{**}$	$0.04^{**}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	$0.08^{**}$	0.09**	$0.06^{**}$	$0.07^{**}$	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	$0.45^{***}$	$0.48^{***}$	$0.46^{***}$	$0.48^{***}$	$0.42^{***}$	0.39***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ν	478	478	1013	1013	1014	1014

### Table E.2: Anti-Democratic Attitudes With Warmth Bias

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05

	antidem o	and S3	$\mathbf{pspite}$	S3	authru	le S3
apstot9	$0.56^{***}$		0.80***		$0.53^{***}$	
-	(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
otot9		$0.14^{***}$	× /	$0.19^{***}$		$0.09^{*}$
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)
wbias	$0.18^{***}$	0.22***	$-0.13^{**}$	-0.05	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.18^{***}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
atot9		0.30***		0.52***	· · ·	0.36***
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)
mtot9		$0.11^{**}$		0.09*		0.08
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.05)
age	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.18^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$	$-0.48^{***}$	$-0.45^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ba	0.01	0.005	-0.01	-0.02	$-0.04^{*}$	$-0.04^{*}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
hisplat	$-0.07^{*}$	$-0.07^{*}$	$-0.05^{*}$	$-0.06^{*}$	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
male	0.0003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	$-0.04^{*}$	$-0.04^{*}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	0.01	0.01	0.06**	$0.07^{**}$	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.22***	0.23***	0.03	$0.07^{*}$	$0.36^{***}$	0.38***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ν	927	927	1016	1016	1017	1017

Table E.3:	Anti-Democratic	Attitudes	With	Warmth	Bias	continued
Table 1.0.		ruuuuu	** 1011	v v ar mun	Dias,	commutu

		$\mathbf{rotg}$	S2			$\mathbf{rotg}$	S3	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	0.04	$0.35^{***}$			$0.53^{***}$	0.40***		
1	(0.08)	(0.10)			(0.05)	(0.06)		
otot9		( )	$0.12^{*}$	$0.33^{***}$	( )		$0.13^{**}$	$0.11^{*}$
			(0.06)	(0.07)			(0.04)	(0.04)
atot9			0.04	0.21**			0.33***	0.31***
			(0.05)	(0.07)			(0.04)	(0.05)
ntot9			$-0.16^{**}$	$-0.14^{*}$			0.06	-0.003
			(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.04)	(0.05)
wbias	$-0.24^{**}$	0.01	$-0.22^{*}$	-0.06	$-0.41^{***}$	-0.04	$-0.36^{***}$	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
age	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.21^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.31^{***}$	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.28^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$
-	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ba	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	$-0.03^{\circ}$	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	$-0.07^{**}$	-0.01	$-0.05^{*}$	0.02	0.003	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
nisplat	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	$-0.06^{*}$	0.02	$-0.06^{*}$	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
nale	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.0000	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
nc	0.06	0.05	0.08*	0.05	0.11***	-0.01	0.11***	0.001
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.54***	0.30***	$0.57^{***}$	$0.37^{***}$	$0.51^{***}$	0.39***	$0.53^{***}$	0.42***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	240	238	240	238	557	456	557	456

### Table E.4: Rules of the Game With Warmth Bias, by Party

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table E.5:	Democratic Norms	and Anti-Democratic	Candidate With	Warmth Bias, by Party

		dnorm	s S3			antidem o	and S3	
	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	-0.07	$-0.11^{*}$			$0.57^{***}$	$0.56^{***}$		
1	(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.06)		
otot9	( )	( )	-0.03	-0.001	( )		$0.13^{*}$	$0.14^{**}$
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.05)
wbias	$0.25^{***}$	0.05	0.19***	0.004	$0.16^{*}$	$0.24^{***}$	0.22***	0.26***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
atot9		( )	$-0.19^{***}$	$-0.21^{***}$	· · · ·	( )	0.36***	0.27***
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.06)
mtot9			$0.17^{***}$	0.08			0.06	$0.17^{**}$
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.06)	(0.05)
age	$0.24^{***}$	$0.13^{***}$	0.21***	$0.12^{***}$	$-0.21^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.18^{***}$
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
ba	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	0.01	0.01	0.004	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
hisplat	-0.01	0.01	-0.004	0.02	$-0.07^{*}$	-0.03	$-0.08^{*}$	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
male	$0.04^{**}$	$0.03^{*}$	$0.05^{**}$	$0.04^{*}$	0.01	-0.02	0.002	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.04	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	$0.37^{***}$	$0.49^{***}$	$0.33^{***}$	$0.47^{***}$	0.20***	$0.24^{***}$	0.22***	0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	560	454	560	454	518	409	518	409

		$\mathbf{pspite}$	S3			authru	le S3	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	$0.83^{***}$	$0.74^{***}$			$0.56^{***}$	$0.45^{***}$		
-	(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.07)	(0.08)		
otot9	· · /		0.20***	$0.16^{***}$			0.06	0.12
			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.06)
wbias	$-0.15^{**}$	-0.07	-0.08	0.01	$-0.27^{***}$	-0.13	$-0.21^{**}$	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
atot9	× /	( )	0.51***	$0.56^{***}$	( )	( )	$0.38^{***}$	0.34***
			(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.05)	(0.07)
mtot9			0.09	0.08			0.12	0.02
			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.07)
age	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.50^{***}$	$-0.43^{***}$	$-0.46^{***}$	$-0.42^{***}$
-	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ba	-0.02	0.003	-0.02	-0.005	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
white	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.001	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
hisplat	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	0.09	-0.02	0.08
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)
male	0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	$-0.07^{**}$	-0.02	$-0.07^{**}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	0.10**	0.01	0.10**	0.02	$0.13^{**}$	0.02	$0.14^{***}$	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.01	0.07	0.04	$0.11^{*}$	$0.34^{***}$	0.38***	$0.35^{***}$	0.41***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Ν	560 <sup>´</sup>	456	560	456	561	456	561	456

Table E.6: Partisan Spite and Authoritarian Rule With Warmth Bias, by Party

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \*p < .05

Table E.7: Anti-Democratic Attitudes Without Warmth Bias, 1st Row

	$\mathbf{rotg}$	S2	$\mathbf{rotg}$	S3	dnorm	s S3
apstot9	0.01		0.36***		0.001	
	(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
otot9		$0.23^{***}$		$0.08^{**}$		0.01
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
atot9		-0.06		0.31***		$-0.17^{***}$
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
mtot9		$-0.20^{***}$		-0.01		$0.15^{***}$
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
age	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.31^{***}$	$-0.27^{***}$	0.20***	$0.17^{***}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
ba	$-0.05^{**}$	$-0.04^{**}$	$-0.03^{*}$	$-0.03^{**}$	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.003	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
hisplat	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	$-0.04^{*}$	0.004	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
male	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	$0.03^{**}$	0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	$0.08^{**}$	$0.09^{**}$	$0.07^{**}$	$0.07^{***}$	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	$0.41^{***}$	$0.44^{***}$	0.33***	0.38***	0.50***	0.45***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ν	485	485	1048	1048	1050	1050

	antidem c	and S3	$\mathbf{pspite}$	e S3	authru	le S3
apstot9	$0.65^{***}$		$0.73^{***}$		$0.42^{***}$	
-	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
otot9	· · · ·	0.20***		$0.17^{***}$		0.05
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)
atot9		0.30***		$0.52^{***}$		0.36***
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)
mtot9		$0.16^{***}$		0.08*		0.04
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)
age	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.16^{***}$	$-0.23^{***}$	$-0.18^{***}$	$-0.50^{***}$	$-0.46^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ba	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	$-0.04^{*}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
hisplat	$-0.07^{*}$	$-0.07^{**}$	$-0.05^{*}$	$-0.06^{**}$	0.01	0.001
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
male	-0.004	-0.01	-0.0003	-0.004	$-0.03^{*}$	$-0.03^{*}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	-0.002	-0.0003	0.06**	0.07**	0.09**	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.30***	0.33***	-0.02	0.05	$0.25^{***}$	0.30***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Ν	953	953	1052	1052	1053	1053

 Table E.8: Anti-Democratic Attitudes Without Warmth Bias, 2nd Row

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05

Table E.9: Rules of the Game Without Warmth Bias, by
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		$\mathbf{rotg}$	S2			$\mathbf{rotg}$	S3	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	Rep	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	-0.10	$0.36^{***}$			$0.37^{***}$	$0.38^{***}$		
	(0.06)	(0.07)			(0.05)	(0.05)		
otot9	()	()	0.07	0.30***	()	()	0.05	$0.11^{**}$
			(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.04)	(0.04)
atot9			0.01	0.19**			0.33***	0.32***
			(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.04)	(0.05)
mtot9			$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.15^{*}$			-0.01	0.004
			(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.04)	(0.04)
age	$-0.26^{***}$	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.23^{***}$	$-0.36^{***}$	$-0.23^{***}$	$-0.31^{***}$	$-0.21^{***}$
0	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
ba	-0.01	$-0.02^{'}$	$-0.02^{'}$	-0.01	-0.02	$-0.02^{'}$	$-0.03^{-}$	$-0.03^{-1}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	$-0.07^{**}$	-0.004	$-0.06^{*}$	0.02	-0.002	-0.01	0.002	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
hisplat	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03	$-0.06^{*}$	0.02	$-0.06^{*}$	0.002
-	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
male	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.003	$0.04^{*}$	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	0.05	0.05	$0.07^{*}$	0.05	0.12***	-0.005	$0.12^{***}$	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	$0.47^{***}$	0.31***	0.51***	0.36***	0.30***	$0.37^{***}$	$0.36^{***}$	0.42***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ν	242	243	242	243	577	471	577	471

		dnorm	s S3			antidem o	and S3	
	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	0.02	-0.09			$0.65^{***}$	$0.69^{***}$		
1	(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.06)		
otot9		( )	0.02	0.01	( )	~ /	$0.19^{***}$	$0.19^{***}$
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.05)
atot9			$-0.19^{***}$	$-0.23^{***}$			$0.35^{***}$	0.28***
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.06)
mtot9			0.20***	0.08			0.10	0.24***
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.05)	(0.05)
age	$0.27^{***}$	$0.14^{***}$	0.22***	0.12***	$-0.19^{***}$	$-0.16^{***}$	$-0.15^{**}$	$-0.16^{***}$
0	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
ba	0.003	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	$-0.03^{-1}$	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
hisplat	-0.003	0.02	0.0001	0.03	$-0.07^{*}$	-0.05	$-0.07^{*}$	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
male	$0.04^{*}$	$0.03^{*}$	$0.04^{**}$	$0.04^{*}$	-0.002	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	-0.005	0.03	-0.004	0.02	0.02	$-0.03^{\circ}$	0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant	0.50***	0.51***	$0.42^{***}$	0.47***	0.28***	0.34***	0.33***	0.34***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
N	580	470	580	470	534	419	534	419

 Table E.10: Democratic Norms and Anti-Democratic Candidate Without Warmth Bias, by

 Party

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

		$\mathbf{pspite}$	s S3			authru	le S3	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$	$\mathbf{Dem}$	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	$0.75^{***}$	0.70***			$0.45^{***}$	$0.39^{***}$		
1	(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.07)		
otot9	× /	( )	$0.17^{***}$	$0.16^{***}$	( )	( )	0.02	0.10
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.06)	(0.06)
atot9			$0.51^{***}$	$0.56^{***}$			0.38***	$0.35^{***}$
			(0.04)	(0.05)			(0.05)	(0.07)
mtot9			0.08	0.09			0.08	0.002
			(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.06)	(0.06)
age	$-0.23^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.16^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$	$-0.52^{***}$	$-0.45^{***}$	$-0.47^{***}$	$-0.43^{***}$
0	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ba	-0.01	0.004	-0.02	-0.01	$-0.03^{-}$	$-0.03^{-1}$	$-0.03^{-}$	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
white	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.001	0.03	0.002
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
hisplat	$-0.05^{\circ}$	-0.05	-0.05	-0.07	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
male	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	$-0.07^{**}$	-0.01	$-0.07^{**}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
inc	0.10**	0.005	0.10**	0.02	$0.14^{***}$	0.02	0.14***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.06	0.04	0.01	$0.11^{**}$	0.21***	$0.33^{***}$	$0.25^{***}$	0.38***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Ν	580 <sup>´</sup>	472	580 <sup>´</sup>	472	581	472	581	472

		Partisan	Violence			Political V	iolence	
	OLS	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	OLS	$\mathbf{Tobit}$	OLS	Tobit
apstot9	$0.12^{**}$	$0.24^{**}$			0.28***	0.46***		
-	(0.04)	(0.09)			(0.03)	(0.05)		
wbias	$-0.03^{'}$	$-0.02^{'}$	-0.02	0.01	$-0.12^{***}$	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.10^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
otot9	· · · ·		0.03	0.03	( )	× /	0.06**	0.15***
			(0.03)	(0.07)			(0.02)	(0.04)
atot9			0.10***	0.22***			0.22***	0.35***
			(0.02)	(0.05)			(0.02)	(0.04)
mtot9			-0.03	-0.05			-0.02	-0.07
			(0.03)	(0.06)			(0.02)	(0.04)
age	$-0.06^{**}$	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.04^{*}$	$-0.13^{**}$	$-0.18^{***}$	$-0.32^{***}$	$-0.14^{***}$	$-0.25^{***}$
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
ba	0.002	0.01	0.0001	0.005	-0.001	-0.02	-0.004	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	-0.01	-0.03	-0.0005	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.002	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
hisplat	-0.02	-0.09	-0.02	-0.08	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
male	$0.03^{**}$	$0.06^{**}$	$0.03^{**}$	$0.06^{**}$	$0.03^{***}$	0.06***	$0.03^{***}$	$0.06^{***}$
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Constant	0.01	$-0.14^{*}$	0.03	-0.10	$0.13^{***}$	0.03	$0.15^{***}$	$0.07^{*}$
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Ν	478	478	478	478	1655	1655	1655	1655

# Table E.12: Political Violence Analyses with Tobit Regression

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table E.13:         Political Violence Analyses with Tobit Regression, no V	Warmth Bias
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		Partisan V	/iolence			Political V	/iolence	
	OLS	Tobit	OLS	$\mathbf{Tobit}$	OLS	$\mathbf{Tobit}$	OLS	Tobit
apstot9	$0.10^{***}$	$0.22^{***}$			0.20***	$0.35^{***}$		
-	(0.03)	(0.06)			(0.02)	(0.04)		
otot9		× /	0.03	0.03	( )	· · · ·	0.04	$0.11^{**}$
			(0.03)	(0.06)			(0.02)	(0.04)
atot9			0.10***	0.22***			0.21***	0.33***
			(0.02)	(0.05)			(0.02)	(0.04)
mtot9			$-0.03^{-}$	$-0.05^{-0.05}$			$-0.04^{*}$	$-0.11^{**}$
			(0.02)	(0.06)			(0.02)	(0.04)
age	$-0.06^{**}$	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.05^{*}$	$-0.14^{**}$	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.36^{***}$	$-0.16^{***}$	$-0.28^{***}$
0	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
ba	0.001	0.01	0.0001	0.01	0.002	-0.01	-0.001	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
white	-0.01	-0.04	-0.001	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.002	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
hisplat	-0.02	-0.09	-0.02	-0.08	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
male	0.03**	0.06**	0.03**	0.06**	0.04***	0.07***	0.03***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Constant	0.002	$-0.15^{**}$	0.02	$-0.10^{-0.10}$	0.08***	-0.04	0.12***	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
N	485	485	485	485	1656	1656	1656	1656

		Partisa	n Violence			Political V	iolence	
	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	0.10	$0.19^{**}$			0.25***	$0.34^{***}$		
	(0.05)	(0.06)			(0.03)	(0.05)		
wbias	$-0.09^{-0.09}$	-0.0004	-0.06	-0.01	$-0.16^{***}$	-0.05	$-0.14^{***}$	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
otot9			-0.02	0.08	. ,	. ,	0.04	0.07
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.04)
atot9			0.12***	0.14***			$0.19^{***}$	$0.32^{***}$
			(0.03)	(0.04)			(0.02)	(0.03)
mtot9			-0.03	-0.01			-0.004	-0.03
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.03)
age	-0.05	$-0.06^{*}$	-0.03	-0.05	$-0.18^{***}$	$-0.20^{***}$	$-0.15^{***}$	$-0.14^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
ba	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.003	0.01	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	-0.01	-0.004	-0.002	0.002	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
hisplat	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
male	0.02	$0.03^{*}$	0.02	$0.03^{*}$	0.02	$0.04^{**}$	0.02	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.03	$0.14^{***}$	-0.03	$0.11^{**}$
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant	$0.07^{*}$	-0.05	$0.09^{*}$	-0.03	$0.16^{***}$	$0.10^{**}$	$0.18^{***}$	$0.14^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
N	240	238	240	238	1004	651	1004	651

### Table E.14: Political Violence Analyses With Warmth Bias, by Party

\*\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

### Table E.15: Political Violence Analyses Without Warmth Bias, by Party

		Partisan	Violence			Political V	/iolence	
	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$	Dem	$\mathbf{Rep}$
apstot9	0.04	$0.18^{***}$			$0.15^{***}$	$0.31^{***}$		
-	(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.04)		
otot9	. ,	. ,	-0.04	0.07			0.01	0.06
			(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.04)
atot9			0.11***	$0.14^{***}$			0.18***	0.32***
			(0.03)	(0.04)			(0.02)	(0.03)
mtot9			-0.05	-0.01			-0.04	-0.04
			(0.03)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.03)
age	$-0.06^{*}$	$-0.06^{*}$	$-0.03^{-1}$	$-0.06^{*}$	$-0.21^{***}$	$-0.21^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.14^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
ba	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.002
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
white	-0.01	-0.004	-0.004	0.002	-0.01	$-0.04^{*}$	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
hisplat	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
-	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
male	0.02	0.03*	0.02	$0.03^{*}$	$0.02^{*}$	0.04**	$0.02^{*}$	$0.03^{*}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
inc	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.03	$0.14^{**}$	-0.02	$0.11^{**}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Constant	0.04	$-0.05^{-0.05}$	$0.07^{*}$	$-0.03^{-}$	0.10***	0.08**	0.13***	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Ν	242	243	242	243	1005	651	1005	651

	Sei	ntence Length	L	Support Pardon			
apstot9		$0.12 \\ (0.10)$			$0.34^{**}$ (0.12)		
otot9		()	0.06			0.05	
atot9			$(0.08) \\ 0.22^*$			$(0.10) \\ -0.07$	
mtot9			(0.09) -0.14			(0.11) $0.35^{**}$	
ovcond2	0.06**	0.03	(0.10) -0.03	$-0.16^{***}$	$-0.19^{*}$	(0.12) -0.08	
ovcond3	(0.02) $0.17^{***}$	(0.07) $0.27^{***}$	(0.08) $0.20^{*}$	(0.03) $-0.17^{***}$	(0.09) -0.15 (0.00)	(0.10) -0.01	
ovcond4	(0.02) $0.56^{***}$ (0.02)	(0.07) $0.70^{***}$ (0.07)	(0.08) $0.56^{***}$ (0.08)	$(0.03) \\ -0.34^{***} \\ (0.03)$	$(0.09) \\ -0.26^{**} \\ (0.09)$	(0.10) -0.09 (0.10)	
ovcond5	(0.02) $0.60^{***}$ (0.02)	(0.07) $0.80^{***}$ (0.07)	(0.08) $0.68^{***}$ (0.08)	(0.03) $-0.39^{***}$ (0.03)	(0.09) $-0.27^{**}$ (0.09)	$(0.10) \\ -0.16 \\ (0.10)$	
ovcond6	(0.02) $0.86^{***}$ (0.02)	(0.07) $1.01^{***}$ (0.07)	(0.08) $0.92^{***}$ (0.08)	(0.03) $-0.39^{***}$ (0.03)	(0.09) $-0.24^{**}$ (0.09)	(0.10) -0.12 (0.10)	
apstot9:pvcond2	(0.02)	(0.01) 0.04 (0.13)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.05) (0.16)	(0.10)	
apstot9:pvcond3		-0.21 (0.14)			(0.10) -0.04 (0.17)		
apstot9:pvcond4		$-0.27^{*}$ (0.13)			-0.16 (0.17)		
pstot9:pvcond5		$-0.39^{**}$ (0.14)			-0.24 (0.17)		
pstot9:pvcond6		$-0.29^{*}$ (0.13)			-0.29 (0.17)		
otot9:pvcond2		. *	$   \begin{array}{c}     -0.02 \\     (0.11)   \end{array} $			-0.07 (0.14)	
otot9:pvcond3			-0.12 (0.12)			-0.08 (0.15)	
otot9:pvcond4			$-0.08 \\ (0.12)$			$0.01 \\ (0.15)$	
otot9:pvcond5			$-0.09 \\ (0.12)$			-0.16 (0.14)	
otot9:pvcond6			-0.13 (0.12)			-0.10 (0.15)	
ovcond2:atot9			$-0.12 \\ (0.12)$			$0.37^{**}$ (0.14)	
ovcond3:atot9			$   \begin{array}{c}     -0.21 \\     (0.13)   \end{array} $			$0.34^{*}$ (0.16)	
ovcond4:atot9			$-0.43^{***}$ (0.12)			$\begin{array}{c} 0.30 \\ (0.15) \end{array}$	
ovcond5:atot9			$-0.48^{***}$ (0.12)			$0.25 \\ (0.15)$	
ovcond6:atot9			$-0.31^{*}$ (0.12)			$0.20 \\ (0.15)$	
ovcond2:mtot9			$0.17 \\ (0.12)$			-0.18 (0.15)	
ovcond3:mtot9			$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \ (0.12) \end{array}$			-0.26 (0.15)	
ovcond4:mtot9			$0.19 \\ (0.13)$			$-0.45^{**}$ (0.16)	
ovcond5:mtot9			$\begin{array}{c} 0.11 \\ (0.13) \end{array}$			-0.26 (0.16)	
ovcond6:mtot9			$0.12 \\ (0.13)$			$-0.35^{*}$ (0.16)	
Constant	$0.08^{***}$ (0.02)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \\ (0.05) \end{array}$	$0.10 \\ (0.06)$	$0.56^{***}$ (0.02)	$0.39^{***}$ (0.07)	$0.30^{***}$ (0.07)	
N	909	905	905	909	905	905	

# Table E.16: Preregistered Analysis: Full Results of Study 3 Political Violence Experiment

		Sentence					Support Pardon		
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	
apstot9	0.13	0.09			0.27	0.49**			
otot9	(0.15)	(0.14)	0.12	-0.07	(0.18)	(0.17)	0.11	0.15	
51019			(0.12)	(0.12)			(0.16)	(0.15)	
atot9			0.12	0.42**			0.02	-0.28	
			(0.12)	(0.15)			(0.14)	(0.19)	
mtot9			-0.14	-0.11 (0.13)			0.13 (0.18)	$0.50^{**}$ (0.16)	
ovcond2	0.07	-0.03	(0.14) 0.01	-0.06	$-0.31^{*}$	-0.01	-0.23	(0.10) 0.12	
57COHG2	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.14)	
ovcond3	$0.25^{*}$	0.28**	0.17	0.23	-0.10	-0.18	0.04	-0.05	
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.15)	
ovcond4	$0.68^{***}$	$0.72^{***}$ (0.11)	$0.55^{***}$ (0.12)	$0.61^{***}$ (0.13)	-0.24 (0.13)	$-0.30^{*}$ (0.14)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.15)	
ovcond5	$(0.10) \\ 0.77^{***}$	(0.11) $0.83^{***}$	$0.64^{***}$	$0.73^{***}$	(0.13) -0.24	(0.14) $-0.29^*$	-0.17	-0.18	
, veonuo	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0, 12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.14)	
pvcond6	1.02***	1.00***	0.93***	0.93***	$-0.21^{'}$	-0.24	-0.17	$-0.09^{\prime}$	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	
apstot9:pvcond2	-0.04	0.18			0.30	-0.35			
apstot9:pvcond3	$(0.18) \\ -0.15$	$(0.20) \\ -0.24$			$(0.23) \\ -0.11$	$(0.24) \\ -0.04$			
apstot9.pvcond3	(0.20)	(0.20)			(0.25)	(0.25)			
apstot9:pvcond4	-0.26	-0.29			-0.15	-0.14			
	(0.18)	(0.22)			(0.23)	(0.27)			
apstot9:pvcond5	-0.36	-0.41			-0.26	-0.27			
	$(0.20) \\ -0.29$	$(0.21) \\ -0.29$			$(0.25) \\ -0.27$	(0.25) -0.38			
apstot9:pvcond6	(0.19)	(0.29)			(0.23)	(0.25)			
otot9:pvcond2	(0110)	(0.21)	-0.17	0.23	(0.20)	(0.20)	-0.14	-0.06	
-			(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.21)	(0.21)	
otot9:pvcond3			-0.13	-0.02			-0.27	-0.09	
			(0.17)	(0.18)			(0.22) - 0.03	(0.22)	
otot9:pvcond4			-0.11 (0.17)	0.01 (0.19)			(0.21)	-0.13 (0.23)	
otot9:pvcond5			-0.22	0.12			-0.22	-0.24	
•			(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.22)	(0.21)	
otot9:pvcond6			-0.17	-0.01			-0.11	-0.23	
10			(0.18)	(0.17)			(0.22)	(0.21)	
ovcond2:atot9			-0.01 (0.15)	-0.35 (0.20)			$0.41^{*}$ (0.18)	0.30 (0.24)	
ovcond3:atot9			-0.15	-0.41			0.34	0.50	
			(0.16)	(0.22)			(0.20)	(0.26)	
pvcond4:atot9			$-0.36^{*}$	-0.60**			0.19	$0.60^{*}$	
15 0			(0.16)	(0.22)			(0.19)	(0.27)	
ovcond5:atot9			$-0.31^{*}$ (0.16)	$-0.80^{***}$ (0.21)			0.17 (0.20)	0.46 (0.25)	
pvcond6:atot9			-0.23	$-0.52^{*}$			0.01	(0.23) $0.64^*$	
			(0.15)	(0.22)			(0.19)	(0.26)	
ovcond2:mtot9			0.19	0.11			0.09	$-0.49^{*}$	
			(0.18)	(0.18)			(0.22)	(0.22)	
ovcond3:mtot9			0.15 (0.18)	0.07			-0.17	-0.29	
ovcond4:mtot9			0.20	(0.18) 0.13			(0.22) - 0.30	(0.22) -0.42	
5114 11110000			(0.18)	(0.20)			(0.22)	(0.24)	
ovcond5:mtot9			0.21	0.003			-0.16	-0.28	
			(0.20)	(0.18)			(0.24)	(0.22)	
ovcond6:mtot9			0.12	0.07			-0.16	$-0.49^{*}$	
Constant	0.02	0.03	$(0.19) \\ 0.09$	$(0.18) \\ 0.09$	0.40***	0.35***	$(0.23) \\ 0.37^{**}$	(0.21) $0.22^*$	
.011504110	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.22)	
N	487	418	487	418	486	419	486	419	

**Table E.17:** Preregistered Analysis: Full Results of Study 3 Political Violence Experiment, byParty

 $\frac{N}{***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05}$ (0.07)

	$\mathbf{rotg}$	S2	$\mathbf{rotg}$	S3	dnorm	s S3
scale(apstot9)	0.09		0.39***		$-0.07^{*}$	
· · · /	(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
scale(otot9)		$0.32^{***}$	× /	$0.14^{***}$	. ,	-0.03
· · ·		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.04)
scale(atot9)		$-0.03^{-1}$		0.32***		$-0.19^{***}$
. ,		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(mtot9)		$-0.19^{***}$		0.04		$0.14^{***}$
· · · ·		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.04)
scale(wbias)	$-0.12^{*}$	$-0.15^{*}$	$-0.23^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$	$0.17^{***}$	0.12***
. ,	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
scale(age)	$-0.25^{***}$	$-0.25^{***}$	$-0.31^{***}$	$-0.29^{***}$	$0.23^{***}$	0.21***
( ) /	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ba	$-0.24^{**}$	$-0.22^{*}$	$-0.15^{*}$	$-0.17^{**}$	0.10	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
white	-0.11	-0.07	0.05	0.08	-0.02	-0.06
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
hisplat	0.0002	-0.03	-0.19	$-0.21^{*}$	0.003	0.04
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
male	0.17	0.11	0.07	0.07	$0.18^{**}$	$0.20^{**}$
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
scale(inc)	$0.12^{**}$	$0.13^{**}$	$0.09^{**}$	$0.10^{**}$	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.16	0.15	0.01	0.001	-0.13	-0.12
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Ν	478	478	1013	1013	1014	1014

 Table E.18:
 Anti-Democratic Attitudes With Warmth Bias, Standardized

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

Table E.19:	Anti-Democratic	Attitudes	With	Warmth Bias	Continued,	Standardized
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	antidem o	and S3	$\mathbf{pspi}$	te	authr	ule
scale(apstot9)	0.39***		$0.56^{***}$		0.31***	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
scale(otot9)	· · · ·	$0.14^{***}$	· · · ·	$0.19^{***}$		$0.08^{*}$
. ,		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)
scale(atot9)		$0.27^{***}$		$0.47^{***}$		0.27***
. ,		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(mtot9)		0.10**		0.08*		0.06
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
scale(wbias)	$0.13^{***}$	$0.15^{***}$	$-0.09^{**}$	-0.04	$-0.14^{***}$	$-0.11^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
scale(age)	$-0.19^{***}$	$-0.17^{***}$	$-0.22^{***}$	$-0.18^{***}$	$-0.38^{***}$	$-0.36^{***}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ba	0.04	0.02	-0.04	-0.07	$-0.12^{*}$	$-0.14^{*}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
white	-0.05	-0.04	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.14
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
hisplat	$-0.28^{*}$	$-0.29^{*}$	$-0.21^{*}$	$-0.25^{*}$	0.05	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
male	0.001	-0.005	-0.004	-0.01	$-0.12^{*}$	$-0.13^{*}$
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
scale(inc)	0.01	0.02	$0.08^{**}$	$0.09^{**}$	$0.10^{**}$	$0.10^{**}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.05	0.05	-0.0002	-0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Ν	927	927	1016	1016	1017	1017

	Partisan	Violence	Political V	Violence
scale(apstot9)	0.21**		0.26***	
· · · · ·	(0.06)		(0.03)	
scale(wbias)	$-0.05^{'}$	-0.04	$-0.14^{***}$	$-0.11^{***}$
· /	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)
scale(otot9)		0.07	( )	0.08**
		(0.06)		(0.03)
scale(atot9)		0.23***		0.29***
		(0.05)		(0.03)
scale(mtot9)		-0.06		-0.02
· · · ·		(0.05)		(0.03)
scale(age)	$-0.14^{**}$	$-0.10^{*}$	$-0.24^{***}$	$-0.19^{***}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ba	0.02	0.001	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)
white	-0.07	-0.005	-0.03	0.01
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)
hisplat	$-0.20^{\circ}$	-0.19	0.08	0.07
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.06)
male	$0.26^{**}$	$0.25^{**}$	$0.19^{***}$	$0.17^{***}$
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.04)
scale(inc)	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-0.03	-0.08	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ν	478	478	1655	1655

Table E.20: Political Violence Analyses with Warmth Bias, Standardized

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

### F Adapting the APS for Multiparty Systems

As noted in our main article, our primary focus in developing the Affective Polarization Scale was to assess affective polarization in the US two-party context. The wording in our final scale reflects this intended usage. However, as we note in our introduction, a wealth of evidence suggests that affective polarization can be found in multiparty systems as well (Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro 2024; Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2020). Studies in this comparative literature have also operationalized affective polarization in terms of warmthbias measures (Röllicke 2023). In multiparty contexts, warmth bias is often measured in terms of in-party affect minus mean affect toward all out-parties (Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro 2024; Reiljan 2020) or in-party affect minus mean affect toward all parties outside the in-party's electoral bloc (Reiljan and Ryan 2021; Wagner 2021). The indices used in analyses of this sort usually weight evaluations of various parties by their vote share (Reiljan 2020). Other strategies are more similar that used in the US context, with the analysis simply being limited to respondents who identify with one of the two major parties in a given system (Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2020).

Despite its origins in the study of affective polarization in the US, the APS can be readily adapted for use in multiparty systems with simple textual modifications. In this section, we offer four multiparty variants of the APS, each of which relies on the conceptual logic of different multiparty indices of warmth bias. All of the indices we describe below, like the US version of the APS, rely on prior responses to self-report measures of partisan identification. In multiparty contexts, responses to the two standard Comparative Study of Electoral Systems party identification questions (Reiljan 2020) will be used: (1) "Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?"; (2) [if yes] "Which party do you feel closest to?" Responses to this item will then be used to populate the actual items administered to respondents in all of the APS variants we suggest. We describe each version below.

### Multiparty APS: Generic In-Party versus Out-party

Following the logic of multiparty warmth bias measure that simply subtract the mean evaluation of all out-parties from the evaluation of the in-party (Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro 2024; Reiljan 2020), this multiparty version of the APS pipes in the name of the respondents' in-party and – where needed – identifies 'members of other parties' or 'a member of another party' as the contrast. It is the most general multiparty version of the Affective Polarization Scale.

 Table F.1: Generic In-Party versus Out-party APS

Othering
I feel as though [in-party] are very different from members of other parties.
Members of other parties live in a different world from us [in-party].
Members of other parties act in ways that us [in-party] could never understand.
Aversion
As a [in-party], I would not want to be friends with someone who was a member of another party.
If I found out a friend of mine was a member of another party, I would want to stop spending time with them.
*Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are members of other parties.
Moralization
My identity as a [in-party] is connected to my core moral beliefs.
My identity as a [in-party] reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong.
My identity as a [in-party] is rooted in moral principles.
Note: (*) denotes reverse coded items.

### Multiparty APS: In-Party versus Opposition Parties, Version 1

This version of the multiparty APS parallels the logic of warmth-bias measures that subtract the mean evaluation of only 'opposition' out-parties outside the in-party's coalition from the evaluation of the in-party (Reiljan and Ryan 2021). This version of the APS pipes in the name of the respondents' in-party but specifies a contrast only with parties recognized or regarded as opposition parties. This version is useful for multiparty systems with a clear coalition or bloc structure, as it focuses respondents not just on 'other parties' but on parties that usually work in opposition to the in-party.

### Table F.2: In-Party versus Opposition Parties APS (Version 1)

Othering
I feel as though [in-party] are very different from members of opposition parties.
Members of opposition parties live in a different world from us [in-party].
3. Members of opposition parties act in ways that us [in-party] could never understand.
Aversion
As a [in-party], I would not want to be friends with someone who was a member of an opposition party.
If I found out a friend of mine was a member of an opposition party, I would want to stop spending time with them.
*Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are members of opposition parties.
Moralization
My identity as a [in-party] is connected to my core moral beliefs.
My identity as a [in-party] reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong.
My identity as a [in-party] is rooted in moral principles.

Note: (\*) denotes reverse coded items.

### Multiparty APS: In-Party versus Opposition Parties, Version 2

This version of the multiparty APS is a slight variant of the first opposition-parties version of the APS. Rather than focusing respondents on "members of opposition parties" or "a member of an opposition party" as the contrast, it focuses respondents on "members of parties that oppose [in-party]" or "a member of a party that opposed [in-party]." Again, the emphasis is on instructing respondents to think about parties in other opposed coalitions. Like Version 1, it is also useful for multiparty systems with a coalition or bloc structure, as it focuses respondents not just on 'other parties' but on parties that usually work in opposition to the in-party.

Table F.3: In-Party versus Opposition Parties APS (Version 2)

 Othering

 I feel as though [in-party] are very different from members of parties that oppose [in-party].

 Members of parties that oppose [in-party] live in a different world from us [in-party].

 Members of parties that oppose [in-party] act in ways that us [in-party] could never understand.

 Aversion

 As a [in-party], I would not want to be friends with someone who was a member of a party that opposes [in-party].

 If I found out a friend of mine was a member of a member of a party that opposes [in-party], I would want to stop spending time with them.

 \*Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are members of parties that oppose [in-party].

 Moralization

 My identity as a [in-party] is connected to my core moral beliefs.

 My identity as a [in-party] reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong.

 My identity as a [in-party] is rooted in moral principles.

Note: (\*) denotes reverse coded items.

### Multiparty APS: Two Dominant Parties

This version of the multiparty APS is applicable to multiparty systems with two historically dominant parties where each dominant party (e.g., Labour in the UK) has a "key out-party" (e.g., the Conservative Party) and vice versa (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). It simply pipes in the name of in-party and the name of the key out-party depending on what party the respondent indicates they identify with.

#### Table F.4: Two Dominant Parties APS

Othering
I feel as though [in-party] are very different from [key out-party].
[Key out-party] live in a different world from us [in-party].
[Key out-party] act in ways that us [in-party] could never understand.
Aversion
As a [in-party], I would not want to be friends with someone who was a [key out-party].
If I found out a friend of mine was a [key out-party], I would want to stop spending time with them.
\*Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are [key out-party].
Moralization
My identity as a [in-party] reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong.
My identity as a [in-party] is rooted in moral principles.

Note: (\*) denotes reverse coded items.

### G Adapting the APS for Pure Independents

Though our main interest is in developing a novel theory and measure of affective polarization among partisans, some researchers may be interested in how to measure attitudes parallel to affective polarization among independents. As an exploratory check we administered a modified version of the APS for pure independents where "Independents" are framed as the ingroup and "Democrats and Republicans" are framed as the outgroup in Study 4 W3 (Table G.1). Our sample of pure Independents was small in this dataset (N = 161), but these analyses are only meant to serve as a starting point for future work. We estimated a three-factor CFA model in the Study 4 Wave 3 data. This model fit well,  $\chi^2(24) = 41.52, p = .015, CFI = 0.954, RMSEA = 0.074$ . It also fit better than an alternative single-factor model, p < .001. Interestingly, the correlations between subdimensions were quite low and sometimes not significant: Othering/Aversion = 0.40, p = .016, Othering/Moralization = 0.29, p = .019, Aversion/Moralization = -.12, p = .196. The subscales were also internally consistent, Othering:  $\omega = 0.69$ , Aversion:  $\omega = 0.80$ , Moralization:  $\omega = 0.85$ .

Finally, some basic validation analyses were done using OLS regression. In these models the APS and the subscales predicted a Republican feeling thermometer, a Democrat feeling thermometer, an average partisan feeling thermometer score, Independent social identity, political knowledge, and general political violence. These basic analyses are presented in Table G.2 and Table G.3. To summarize, we only found significant effects of othering on party feeling thermometers, with higher othering scores predicting colder feelings toward partisans. Moralization was the only significant predictor of Independent social identity. Aversion was the only significant predictor of general political violence as well as political knowledge, with higher aversion scores being associated with more support for violence and less political knowledge. Overall these results largely mirror what we found in the main text using the partisan APS.

#### Table G.1: Pure Independents APS

### Othering

I feel as though Independents are very different from Democrats and Republicans.

Democrats and Republicans live in a different world from us Independents.

Democrats and Republicans act in ways that us Independents could never understand.

#### Aversion

As an Independent, I would not want to be friends with someone who was a Democrat or Republican.

If I found out a friend of mine was a Democrat or Republican, I would want to stop spending time with them.

\*Although I do not agree with their political views, there are people I like who are Democrats or Republicans. Moralization

#### My identity as an Independent is connected to my core moral beliefs.

My identity as an Independent reflects my beliefs about the difference between right and wrong.

My identity as an Independent is rooted in moral principles.

Note: (\*) denotes reverse coded items.

### Table G.2: Independent APS and Subscales Predicting Party Feeling Thermometers

	ftre	ftrep		$\mathbf{ftdem}$		ftparties	
apstot9	-0.23		-0.18		-0.28		
	(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.15)		
otot9		-0.18	. ,	$-0.23^{*}$		$-0.28^{*}$	
		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.12)	
atot9		0.07		0.12		0.13	
		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.12)	
mtot9		-0.11		-0.04		-0.10	
		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.10)	
age	0.0003	0.001	-0.002	-0.0004	-0.001	0.001	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
ba	-0.01	-0.01	$-0.11^{**}$	$-0.12^{**}$	-0.09	-0.09	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
white	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
hisplat	-0.05	-0.06	0.01	0.003	-0.02	-0.03	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
male	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
inc	-0.001	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Constant	0.43***	0.44***	0.49***	0.47***	0.63***	0.62***	
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	
Ν	159	159	159	159	159	159	

\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \*<br/> p < .05

**Table G.3:** Independent APS and Subscales Predicting Partisan Social Identity, General

 Political Violence, and Political Knowledge

	independent social id		gen pol violence		pol knowledge	
apstot9	$0.47^{***}$		$0.38^{***}$		-0.15	
	(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.14)	
otot9	. ,	0.02		0.10		0.16
		(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.12)
atot9		0.04		0.44***		$-0.34^{**}$
		(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.12)
mtot9		$0.48^{***}$		-0.08		-0.05
		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.10)
age	$0.003^{*}$	0.002	$-0.003^{**}$	-0.001	0.003	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ba	-0.05	-0.06	0.01	0.01	$0.14^{**}$	$0.15^{**}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
white	-0.003	0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
hisplat	0.09	$0.11^{*}$	0.09*	0.06	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
male	0.06	0.04	$0.08^{*}$	$0.10^{**}$	$0.16^{***}$	$0.14^{**}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
inc	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	$0.21^{*}$	0.14	0.09	0.04	$0.51^{***}$	$0.58^{***}$
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Ν	160	160	153	153	158	158

\*\*\*\*p < .001; \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05

### **H** Appendix References

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