Military Service and Immigrants' Integration: Evidence from the Vietnam Draft Lotteries

Online Appendix

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Note: Any views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the U.S. Census Bureau. The Census Bureau has reviewed this data product to ensure appropriate access, use, and disclosure avoidance protection of the confidential source data used to produce this product. This research was performed at a Federal Statistical Research Data Center under FSRDC Project Number 2896 (CBDRB-FY24-P2896-R11129, CBDRB-FY24-0364, CBDRB-FY24-P2896-R11579, and CBDRB-FY25-0074).

A1 The Restricted-use Long-form 2000 Decennial Census

Identifying an individual's draft number (and hence draft risk) requires data on his exact date of birth. This information first becomes available in the restricted-use microdata files of the long-form 2000 decennial census (Bureau of the Census 2000).

The US Census Bureau makes restricted-use datasets available to researchers with approved projects. Because the disclosure of sensitive and confidential data is prohibited under US law, researchers must agree to protect the data and avoid the disclosure of personal identifiable information and other confidential data. Confidentiality extends to products created using the restricted-use data until the Census Bureau has reviewed and approved those products for release.¹

This policy has several implications for transparency and replication. First, the Census Bureau limits the volume of output. Because a greater volume of output increases the risk of disclosure, researchers must request essential estimates only. Requests that exceed the volume of output limit will be denied by the Census Bureau. As such, we are unable to report estimates for the covariates in our regression models.

Second, we comply with the Census Bureau's rounding rules: all observation counts are rounded according to the Bureau's rules, and all estimates are rounded to no more than four significant digits.

Third, we do not report median, minimum, or maximum values in Table A4.1 because these values could potentially correspond to actual confidential values.

Fourth, the Census Bureau prohibits the release of replication data but permits the release of replication code. As such, we have posted our replication code at the APSR Dataverse at https://doi. org/10.7910/DVN/O80SKQ. Readers interested in replicating the findings in this paper may apply to the US Census Bureau to access the restricted-use microdata at a Federal Statistical Research

¹The Census Bureau's review is limited only to compliance with policies to avoid disclosure of confidential information.

Data Center (RDC). Approved researchers can import the code and run the replication within the RDC. More information about applying for access is available from the Census Bureau's FSRDC website: https://www.census.gov/about/adrm/fsrdc.html.

A2 Vietnam-Era Immigrants in Historical Context

How does the composition of immigrants in our sample compare to both prior and more recent waves of immigration to the United States?

Figure A2.1 shows how the proportions of foreign-born individuals from different regions of the world has changed over time. The data are drawn from samples of the US population census from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024). We observe that, as a result of immigration quotas between the 1920s and 1960s, most foreign-born during this period were of European ancestry. However, the numbers of foreign-born from the rest of the world started to rise dramatically in the 1970s after these quotas were lifted.



Figure A2.1: Origins of the Foreign-Born over Time

Note: The figure displays the number of foreign-born from various countries and regions of the world in each decennial census. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).



Figure A2.2: Origins of Draft-Eligible versus Older Immigrants in 1970

Note: The figure displays the percentage of foreign-born from various countries and regions of the world in the 1970 census, split between older men and men of draft age (18-21). Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).

When considering the raw number of foreign-born in 1970, immigrants of European ancestry make up the the majority. However, this is no longer true when considering the cohorts of drafteligible men, as shown in Figure A2.2. Due to the opening up of immigration policy, a much larger proportion of young men in 1970 hailed from the "new" immigration countries.

Consideration of these distributions is important if we believe that (i) European immigrants have higher integration potential regardless of draft status, *and* (ii) our null results are due to the over-representation of Europeans in our sample. As we show in Figure A2.2, however, this is not the case – rather, we believe that our sample represents a true mix of individuals from "old" and "new" immigration countries.

A3 IV Assumptions and Additional Details about the Lottery

To interpret our estimates as causal, the instrumental variables framework requires the assumption of monotonicity, or "no defiers." In our context, defiers are individuals who would have evaded the draft under high draft risk, but *who would have joined the military in the face of low draft risk*. We assume our sample contains no defiers, an assumption that we consider to be reasonable given the very costly and risky nature of military service.

A second assumption holds that the instrument (here: draft numbers above and below the cutoff for induction into service) must be independent of potential outcomes. In our context, this is largely assured through randomization introduced by the draft lottery. One concern that arises pertains to the 1969 lottery, which was the only one to use physical randomization, in which 366 blue plastic capsules containing birth dates were placed in a large glass container and drawn by hand. Due to imperfect mixing of the capsules, November and December birthdays were assigned lower RSNs. However, Berinsky and Chatfield (2015) show that individuals born in the last three months of 1969 are not meaningfully different from those born in other times of the year in terms of political outcomes or demographic characteristics correlated with political outcomes. In any case, our models include controls for month of birth.

A4 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Obs.
Draft risk	0.418	0.493	28500
Veteran	0.168	0.374	28500
Age at immigration	11.82	6.132	28500
Years since immigration	37.66	6.241	28500
Naturalized	0.743	0.437	24500
Residential integration (tract)	0.932	0.126	28500
Residential integration (blkgrp)	0.916	0.131	28500
English only	0.245	0.430	26000
English ability	2.810	0.967	26000
Non-co-national spouse	0.417	0.493	28500
Native-born spouse	0.335	0.472	28500
Married	0.739	0.439	28500
Some college	0.512	0.500	28500
College graduate	0.253	0.435	28500
Unemployed	0.206	0.405	28500

Table A4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Pooled Sample

Note: Observation counts are rounded to comply with Census Bureau policy. Results have been approved for release under FSRDC Project Number 2896 (CBDRB-FY24-P2896-R11579 and CBDRB-FY25-0074).

A5 Relationships among Outcomes

Figs. A5.3 - A5.8 display the relationships between pairs of outcome variables. Given limitations on the number of results we can export from the RDC, we create these figures from publicly-available samples of the 2000 census available from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024). Given the large sample sizes (observation counts ranging approximately from 4500 to 8500, depending on the comparison), we do not consider statistical tests very informative for the most part, as even very weak correlations are likely to be statistically significant. Therefore, we rely on a presentation of the raw patterns.

Figure A5.3 shows that immigrants who are naturalized also tend to be more linguistically integrated than their non-naturalized counterparts.



Figure A5.3: Naturalization and English Language Ability

Note: The figure shows the relationship between naturalization and English-language ability among immigrants in the 2000 census who meet our sample selection criteria. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).

Naturalized citizens are also more likely to be married to a native-born spouse, while nonnaturalized immigrants are more likely to marry a co-national spouse (Figure A5.4).



Figure A5.4: Naturalization and Inter-marriage

Note: The figure shows the relationship between naturalization and marriage outcomes among immigrants in the 2000 census who meet our sample selection criteria. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).

Marriage to a native-born (as opposed to co-national) spouse is also indicative of higher (lower) levels of linguistic integration (Figure A5.5). Intermediate patterns can be found among immigrants married to spouses of a third nationality.



Figure A5.5: English Language Ability and Intermarriage

Note: The figure shows the relationship between English language ability and marriage outcomes among immigrants in the 2000 census who meet our sample selection criteria. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).

Turning to the residential integration variables, note that the smallest geographic unit in the publicly-available IPUMS data is the county. We therefore calculate residential integration at this level of aggregation. By contrast, our results in the main text capture residential integration at much more granular census tracts and block groups.

Figure A5.6 shows that immigrants who are more lingustically integrated also live in counties with higher shares of native born.



Figure A5.6: Residential Integration and English Language Ability

Note: The figure shows the relationship between residential integration and English-language ability among immigrants in the 2000 census who meet our sample selection criteria. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).

Individuals married to a native-born spouse also live in areas with a greater share of nativeborn (Figure A5.7). However, we do not find different residential integration patterns between individuals married to a co-national versus a third nationality.



Figure A5.7: Residential Integration and Inter-marriage

Note: The Figure shows the relationship between residential integration and marriage outcomes among immigrants in the 2000 census who meet our sample selection criteria. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).

Finally, we detect a very small difference in the expected direction for the relationship between residential integration and naturalization: naturalized immigrants live in counties with on average 1pp higher share of native-born, compared to non-naturalized immigrants (t = -4.12, N=8580).



Figure A5.8: Residential Integration and Naturalization

Note: The Figure shows the relationship between residential integration and naturalization outcomes among immigrants in the 2000 census who meet our sample selection criteria. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).

A6 First Stage Results

Table A6.2 presents the results of military service regressed on draft risk for the pooled sample, immigrants born in Western countries, and immigrants born in non-Western countries.

	1949–1952	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Panel A: Pooled sample							
Draft risk	0.0678***	0.0192	0.0506***	0.0691***	0.0641***	0.0942***	0.0226**
	(0.00461)	(0.00983)	(0.00967)	(0.00949)	(0.00885)	(0.00968)	(0.008)
Observations	28500	7700	7300	6700	7000	7400	7800
F	216.5	3.822	27.38	53.00	52.47	94.86	7.987
		Par	nel B: Wester	n immigrants			
Draft risk	0.107***	0.0382*	0.0921***	0.0747***	0.119***	0.152***	0.0203
	(0.00896)	(0.0178)	(0.0170)	(0.0174)	(0.0175)	(0.0206)	(0.017)
Observations	9700	3000	2700	2400	2300	2300	2200
F	142.5	4.598	26.21	18.45	45.92	54.50	1.414
		Panel	C: Non-West	tern immigra	nts		
Draft risk	0.0484***	0.00551	0.074*	0.0654***	0.0377***	0.0697***	0.0236**
	(0.00523)	(0.0115)	(0.0111)	(0.0111)	(0.00998)	(0.0106)	(0.0895)
Observations	18500	4800	4700	4200	4700	5200	5600
F	85.67	0.231	6.078	34.85	14.24	43.16	6.92

Table A6.2: Effect of Draft Risk on Military Service

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The dependent variable is MILITARY SERVICE. All models include AGE AT IMMIGRATION, YEAR OF BIRTH, and MONTH OF BIRTH as controls as well as BIRTHPLACE fixed effects. Observation counts are rounded to comply with Census Bureau policy. Results have been approved for release under FSRDC Project Number 2896 (CBDRB-FY24-P2896-R11579 and CBDRB-FY24-0364).

A7 Profiling Compliers

In the instrumental variables framework, treatment effects are only defined for the population of COMPLIERS: that is, those individuals who would serve in the military if their draft number was called, and who would not serve otherwise. We differentiate COMPLIERS from both ALWAYS-TAKERS (e.g. individuals who volunteer for service regardless of their draft number) and NEVER-TAKERS (e.g. individuals who would not serve despite their draft number).

To provide some more context for interpreting our causal quantities of interest, we compare the demographic profiles of these three populations, implementing the procedure described in Marbach and Hangartner 2020. In brief, this procedure estimates the covariate means ($\hat{\mu}$) amongst observable always-takers (i.e., DRAFT RISK = 0, MILITARY SERVICE = 1) and observable never-takers (i.e., DRAFT RISK = 1, MILITARY SERVICE = 0). Call these quantities $\hat{\mu}_{at}$ and $\hat{\mu}_{nt}$, respectively. Further, since the instrument is independently assigned, we can assume the same covariate distributions for the unobservable always-takers (for whom DRAFT RISK = 0).

Finally, since we also know the proportions $(\hat{\pi})$ of always-takers, never-takers and compliers, as well as $\hat{\mu}$ for the entire sample, we can simply "back out" the covariate means for compliers $(\hat{\mu}_c)$ using the following formula:

$$\hat{\mu}_c = \frac{1}{\hat{\pi}_c} \hat{\mu} - \frac{\hat{\pi}_{nt}}{\hat{\pi}_c} \hat{\mu}_{nt} - \frac{\hat{\pi}_{at}}{\hat{\pi}_c} \hat{\mu}_{at}$$

Since our population of study (i.e. men born between 1949 and 1952) is already fairly homogeneous with respect to pre-treatment characteristics, we focus on AGE AT IMMIGRATION and indicators for BIRTHPLACE. The results are presented graphically in Figure A7.9. Numerical results can be found in Table A7.3. We observe that compliers tend to be younger than the overall sample. They also tend to have immigrated to the United States at a younger age. Further, compliers are more likely to have been born in a Western, English-speaking country. In particular, we find an over-representation of Canadians and an under-representation of Mexicans amongst compliers.



Figure A7.9: Complier Profiles: Pooled Sample

Note: The figure displays the estimated covariate means and bootstrapped confidence intervals for the full sample (All), Compliers (C), Always-takers (AT) and Never-takers (NT). Results have been approved for release under FSRDC Project Number 2896 (CBDRB-FY24-P2896-R11579).

	Mean	Standard Error
Panel A: Full S	ample	
Age at immigration	11.83	0.0368
Age in 2000	48.95	0.0067
Born in a Western country	0.340	0.0029
Born in an English-speaking country	0.0937	0.0018
Birthplace: Canada	0.0577	0.0014
Birthplace: Mexico	0.241	0.0026
Birthplace: Puerto Rico	0.1255	0.0019
Birthplace: Italy	0.055	0.0014
Birthplace: Germany	0.0703	0.0016
Panel B: Com	pliers	
Age at immigration	8.225	0.5479
Age in 2000	46.48	0.1793
Born in a Western country	0.509	0.0402
Born in an English-speaking country	0.1845	0.0242
Birthplace: Canada	0.1209	0.0188
Birthplace: Mexico	0.1449	0.0366
Birthplace: Puerto Rico	0.1281	0.0273
Birthplace: Italy	0.0903	0.0193
Birthplace: Germany	0.0644	0.0207
Panel C: Always	-Takers	
Age at immigration	8.834	0.122
Age in 2000	49.09	0.0265
Born in a Western country	0.4361	0.0105
Born in an English-speaking country	0.1354	0.0072
Birthplace: Canada	0.0894	0.0058
Birthplace: Mexico	0.1202	0.007
Birthplace: Puerto Rico	0.1702	0.008
Birthplace: Italy	0.046	0.0044

 Table A7.3: Complier Profiles: Full Results for the Pooled Sample

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	Mean	Standard Error		
Birthplace: Germany	0.1537	0.0076		
Panel D: Never-	Takers			
Age at immigration	12.7	0.063		
Age in 2000	49.18	0.0113		
Born in a Western country	0.307	0.0048		
Born in an English-speaking country	0.0775	0.0028		
Birthplace: Canada	0.046	0.0022		
Birthplace: Mexico	0.2707	0.0045		
Birthplace: Puerto Rico	0.1175	0.0033		
Birthplace: Italy	0.0531	0.0022		
Birthplace: Germany	0.0566	0.0024		
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors reported. Results have been				

 Table A7.3 – continued from previous page

approved for release under FSRDC Project Number 2896

(CBDRB-FY24-P2896-R11579 and CBDRB-FY24-0364).

A8 Attrition and Draft Status

In our study, we observe integration outcomes in the year 2000, nearly three decades after military service during the Vietnam War. Although this long gap allows us to examine whether military service contributes to durable, long-term integration, one challenge that arises is non-random attrition over time. Sources of non-random attrition include excess mortality among servicemembers during the war and veterans after the war, permanent emigration during the war as a form of draft dodging, and permanent emigration after the war – all of which may be plausibly correlated with treatment status (i.e., draft risk).

Existing scholarship and data suggest that mortality-related selective attrition is unlikely to bias our results. US military fatalities during the Vietnam War are overwhelmingly concentrated during the pre-1970 period, prior to the advent of the draft lottery (US National Archives 2022). Of the nearly 58,000 deaths incurred between 1965–1975 – from the beginning of combat operations until US withdrawal and the fall of South Vietnam – approximately 84% date to 1965–1969 (see Figure A8.10). Moreover, an analysis of the effects of conscription on long-term mortality that utilizes data from the National Center for Health Statistics finds little evidence of a draft risk effect regardless of educational attainment and nativity status (Conley and Heerwig 2012, 851).

Setting aside mortality concerns, non-random attrition could still affect our sample because our population of interest consists of immigrants who could in principle return to their countries of origin during or after the war. To examine this possible source of bias, we compare the expected proportion of individuals who were at risk of being drafted in the 2000 decennial against the observed proportion of individuals in our sample. In the absence of selective attrition, the expected and observed proportions should be statistically indistinguishable.

To calculate the expected proportion of at-risk men, we first assume that births are distributed uniformly across the year. We then divide the administrative processing number for year t (the highest draft number called) by the number of days in year t. We then compare that result against



Figure A8.10: US Military Fatalities in the Vietnam War, 1965–1975

Note: The figure displays yearly casualties and cumulative casualties for the period 1965–1975, covering the start of combat operations through US withdrawal. The dashed vertical line indicates the first year in which the draftees were inducted in to service on the basis of the draft lottery. Data are from the US National Archives (2022).

the proportion of at-risk men in our sample. Table A8.4 shows the results. We detect no evidence that attrition is correlated with draft status.

Table A8.4: Attrition Analysis, 1949–1952 Cohort

Predicted	Pooled sample	Western-origin	Non-western-origin
0.417	0.418	0.418	0.418
	N = 28500	N = 9700	N = 18500

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The table reports results for the difference between the expected and observed proportions of draft-eligible men. Observation counts are rounded to comply with Census Bureau policy. Results have been approved for release under FSRDC Project Number 2896 (CBDRB-FY24-P2896-R11579).

Predicted	Germans	Italians	Mexicans	Non-Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	From English-speaking country
0.417	0.432	0.408	0.412	0.419	0.417	0.408
	N = 2000	N = 1600	N = 6800	N = 21500	N = 3600	N = 2700

Table A8.5: Attrition Analysis, Subgroup Results for Populations Present in 2000 Census

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The table reports results for the difference between the expected and observed proportions of draft-eligible men. Observation counts are rounded to comply with Census Bureau policy. Results have been approved for release under FSRDC Project Number 2896 (CBDRB-FY25-0074).

A9 Comparing 2000 and 1970 Census Counts

Our analysis conditions on being present in the 2000 long-form census, which results in a slightly different sample compared to the ideal design comprising all individuals at risk of being drafted in 1970–1972. To gauge the correspondence between our 2000 sample and the population of men who were subject to the draft in 1970-1972, we compare birthplace-specific counts of individuals present in the 1970 census against individuals in the 2000 census who report having immigrated before 1970. Due to limitations on the number of results we can export from the Census Bureau's restricted data environment, we make these comparisons on the basis of publicly-available samples from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024). The results are shown in Figure A9.11.



Figure A9.11: Comparing 2000 and 1970 Census Samples

Note: The Figure shows birthplace-specific counts of draft-eligible men from the 1970 and 2000 census samples. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024). Small discrepancies between the reported numbers and actual full counts may arise due to sampling.

For the most part, we find that the 2000 counts are comparable to the 1970 counts. We do find a decrease in the counts of men born in the US territories and Canada, which may reflect the ease of travel to these places. For robustness, we conduct analyses excluding these immigrants (see Appendix Table A10). Our results are unchanged.

One prominent exception to the pattern just described concerns Mexican-born individuals. Here, we find that there are significantly *more* men in 2000 who claim to have immigrated before 1970 than actually appear in the 1970 census count. Interestingly, we find the same pattern for Mexican-born women (see Figure A9.12). Because women were not subject to the draft, this pattern suggests that the 1970 "undercount" is not simply capturing draft dodging. Rather, we can think of two possibilities: (i) Mexican-born individuals in 2000 are mis-reporting their date of immigration to the United States and / or (ii) Mexican-born individuals in 1970 were not "found" by census-takers. In either case, it appears that a significant portion of Mexican-born individuals in our 2000 sample were not exposed to the draft lottery – either because they were living in Mexico, or because they had such a transient status in the United States for Mexican-born are likely to be biased. We therefore re-estimate our models dropping the Mexican-born in our robustness checks. Column 2 of Table A10.6 in the following section shows that our conclusions remain unchanged.



Figure A9.12: Mexican-born Individuals in 2000 and 1970

Note: The Figure shows counts of Mexican-born men and women from the 1970 and 2000 census samples born between 1949 and 1952 and claiming presence in the US since 1970. Data are from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2024).

A10 Excluding Specific National-Origin Groups

A potential violation of the exclusion restriction relates to the issue of non-permanent (or circular) migration. Briefly, the idea is that immigrants at risk of being drafted could have returned to their home countries during the Vietnam War, but then re-immigrated to the United States after draft dodgers were pardoned. To the extent that these temporary stints in their home countries depressed integration outcomes amongst those "assigned to treatment", we might observe negative ITT and 2SLS estimates.

For robustness, we re-estimate our 2SLS models dropping individuals from Mexico and Canada. The assumption is that individuals born in these two countries should be best positioned (due to geographic proximity) to take advantage of opportunities for circular migration. Thus, to the extent that circular migration is driving our results, we may observe *more positive* results when dropping these national-origin groups.

In addition, we noted discrepancies in the counts of men in the US territories, Canada, and Mexico between the 1970 and 2000 censuses (see Appendix Section A8). The numbers are especially "off" for Mexican-born men. To recap, we believe that some Mexican-born may not have been actually exposed to the draft lottery, thereby biasing our ITT and 2SLS estimates. This is an additional reason for examining how our results change after dropping the Mexican-born.

Table A10 presents our findings. In general, we observe the same consistent null results of military service as reported in the main text.

	Non-Canadian Westerners N = 8000	Non-Mexican Non-Westerners N = 12000	Not born in US Territories N = 24500
Panel A: Integration Outcomes			
Naturalized	-0.0884	0.0438	
	(0.0928)	(0.174)	
Residential integration (tract)	-0.0032	-0.0021	-0.0259
	(0.0042)	(0.163)	(0.0209)
Residential integration (block group)	-0.0075	-0.0079	-0.0340
	(0.0063)	(0.201)	(0.0271)
Only English		-0.1076	-0.112 †
		(0.117)	(0.079)
English ability		-0.062	-0.236 †
		(0.31)	(0.207)
Non-co-national spouse	-0.163	0.125	-0.0292
-	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.0919)
Native-born spouse	-0.144	-0.177	-0.138
-	(0.126)	(0.146)	(0.0845)
Panel B: Additional Outcomes			
Married	-0.106	0.408**	0.1219
	(0.0725)	(0.143)	(0.0756)
Some college	-0.0535	0.208	-0.0766
	(0.0750)	(0.135)	(0.0998)
College graduate	-0.0364	0.307**	0.0876
	(0.0742)	(0.110)	(0.0582)
Unemployed	-0.0846	-0.290*	-0.0668
	(0.0725)	(0.137)	(0.0111)

Table A10.6: Effect of Military Service on Integration Outcomes, 1949-1952 Birth Cohorts bySub-group

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. † indicates N = 22000 for these models only. The table reports 2SLS results for the effect of DRAFT RISK on integration outcomes, separating out individuals from Canada and Mexico. Dependent variables appear in the rows. All models include AGE AT IMMIGRATION, YEAR OF BIRTH, and MONTH OF BIRTH as controls as well as BIRTHPLACE fixed effects. Observation counts are rounded to comply with Census Bureau policy. Results have been approved for release under FSRDC Project Number 2896 (CBDRB-FY24-P2896-R11579 and CBDRB-FY25-0074).

A11 Student Deferments

During the Vietnam War, a complex system of deferments and exemptions allowed men to avoid military service. While many of the deferments were gradually eliminated, student deferments, which were granted to men enrolled full-time in post-secondary education, were among the last to be abolished. Student deferments violate the exclusion restriction if immigrants at risk of being drafted were more likely to enroll in college and if their resulting educational attainment increased their likelihood of integrating into the national mainstream.

To examine this possibility, we compare results for the 1952 birth cohort, for whom educational deferments were unavailable, against results for earlier cohorts. We find no systematic differences between the 1952 cohort and earlier cohorts and null results throughout.

Table A11.7: Effect of Military Service on Integration Outcomes by Individual Birth Cohort,

 Pooled Sample

	1949	1950	1951	1952
Panel A: Integration Outcomes				
Naturalized	-0.186	-0.190	0.0978	-0.429
	(0.216)	(0.113)	(0.192)	(0.107)
	N = 6300	N = 5700	N = 6100	N = 6600
Residential integration tract	-0.0852	-0.0205	0.0032	-0.001
	(0.103)	(0.0342)	(0.0107)	(0.0263)
	N = 7300	N = 6700	N = 7000	N = 7500
Residential integration block group	-0.0901	-0.0296	-0.0188	-0.0053
	(0.107)	(0.0374)	(0.0104)	(0.0227)
	N = 7300	N = 6700	N = 7000	N = 7500
Only English	-0.108	-0.0242	-0.123	-0.182
	(0.155)	(0.125)	(0.156)	(0.109)
	N = 6600	N = 6000	N = 6300	N = 6800
English ability	-0.0118	-0.331	-0.575	-0.222
	(0.342)	(0.265)	(0.387)	(0.204)
	N = 6600	N = 6000	N = 6300	N = 6800
Non-co-national spouse	0.227	-0.157	-0.253	0.111
	(0.219)	(0.162)	(0.196)	(0.128)
	N = 7300	N = 6700	N = 7000	N = 7400
Native-born spouse	0.115	-0.190	-0.349*	-0.0401
	(0.200)	(0.146)	(0.136)	(0.102)
	N = 7300	N = 6700	N = 7000	N = 7400
Panel B: Additional Outcomes				
Married (Contin	-0.0222 (0.193) <i>ued on next</i>	0.297* (0.149) + page)	0.115 (0.186)	0.0391 (0.102)

	1949	1950	1951	1952
	N = 7300	N = 6700	N = 7000	N = 7400
Some college	0.0676	-0.0572	-0.137	0.0341
	(0.204)	(0.217)	(0.171)	(0.0852)
	N = 7300	N = 6700	N = 7000	N = 7400
College graduate	0.388	0.792	0.0104	0.100
0.0	(0.214)	(0.144)	(0.163)	(0.0714)
	N = 7300	N = 6700	N = 7000	N = 7400
Unemployed	-0.219	-0.185	0.0338	0.053
	(0.163)	(0.130)	(0.182)	(0.106)
	N = 7300	N = 6700	N = 7000	N = 7400

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Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The table reports results for the effect of DRAFT RISK on integration outcomes by birth cohort. Dependent variables appear in the rows. All models include controls for AGE AT IMMIGRATION, YEAR OF BIRTH, and MONTH OF BIRTH as well as BIRTHPLACE fixed effects. Observation counts are rounded to comply with Census Bureau policy. Results have been approved for release under FSRDC Project Number 2896 (CBDRB-FY24-0364 and CBDRB-FY25-0074).

Supplementary References

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