**POLITICAL EMANCIPATION AND MODERN JEWISH NATIONAL IDENTITY**

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION**

**APPENDIX A. TIMING OF FORMAL EMANCIPATION AND STRENGTH OF POLITICAL ZIONISM ACROSS COUNTRIES**

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**TABLE A.1. FORMAL EMANCIPATION AND STRENGTH OF ZIONISM**

Per Capita Contribution to Zionist

World Organization (Logged Shillings)

Without

All All Maghreb

Proportion Years Emancipated since 1800 -2.34\*\* -2.40\*\* -1.81\*

(1.02) (0.92) (0.96)

Defeated in World War One -1.70\*\* -1.51\*\*

(0.67) (0.67)

R2 0.19 0.37 0.29

N 25 25 23

\*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses. Estimation: OLS.

Per capita contributions are adjusted by estimating each national contribution relative to British per capita income. The adjustment takes place by dividing total contributions (in shillings) by the ratio of the country’s per capita income to Britain’s per capita income in 1920. The adjusted figure is then divided by Jewish population (in 100,000).

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Table A.1 reports the model without (Column 1) and with (Column 2) a control for defeat in World War I, which arguably reduced the capacity of Jews to pay their membership dues among Central powers. Because the data on the number of Maghrebi Jews with French citizenship is imprecise, Column 3 reports the model without the Maghreb territories. The level of Zionist mobilization, which, again, measures the distribution of national self-identification among Jews, was negatively correlated with the length of Jewish emancipation. The estimated contribution level in a country which had not granted equal rights at the end of the war was, at around 240 shillings per 100,000 Jews, almost ten times larger than in a country were emancipation had taken place in the late eighteenth century.

**APPENDIX B. REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY GRAPHS FOR COVARIATE BALANCE TEST IN FIGURE 5.**

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Note. All the plots report the full range of observations (clustered by equally sized bins) and the fitted local polynomial around the cutoff. The bandwidth selection (to estimate the local regression) is based on the mean square error criterion that minimizes the sum of the square bias and the variance of the estimator.

**APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL COVARIATE BALANCE TESTS.**

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1. Literacy rates (for all the population older than 10) at the town level reported in the census of 1931 (Table 17). In some instances, the census volumes provided the information for all towns aggregated at the powiat (county) level and not for each separate town. Accordingly, I have generated two types of variables: (i) raw data from the volumes containing only the information published for separate towns; (ii) imputed values where I have assigned the aggregate urban data of each powiat to every miasto (town) for which we do not have separate data. Results shown here rely on (ii).

2. Participation rate in election of 1922, which proxies for political engagement.

3. Percent vote in 1922 for six main party lists (covering 85.0 percent of all voters): List 8 -- Christian National Union (CNU, 29.1 percent of total vote), List 16 -- Bloc of National Minorities (BNM, 16.0 percent), List 1 -- Piast (13.2 percent), List 3 -- Polish People’s Party (PPP, 11.0 percent), List 2 -- Polish Socialist Party (PSP, 10.4 percent); and List 7 -- National Workers’ Party (NWP, 5.4 percent). Besides measuring the left-right ideological distribution (on economic issues), they approximate orientation toward national minorities (and antisemitism). In this latter dimension, their position from less to more accommodating to Jewish demands was as follows: CNU, Piast, NWP, PPP, PSP and BNM. None of these variables is discontinuous at the border

4. Quality of the information gathered from Pinkas.

5. Free loan societies (gmiles khesed kases) in Jewish life. These societies were set up by the Joint Distribution Committee (a foreign organization) to enable Jews to buy licenses, etc. or even to rebuild after experiencing a pogrom. Although the organization was developed abroad and mainly in the latest years of the interwar period, it could proxy for some extra level of civic engagement in the receiving communities (even preceding the reception of the money).

6. Change in Jewish Population. Data comes from Leitenberg (2008).

7. Traditional heders or primary schools that taught the basics of Judaism and Hebrew language. Their location is taken from Pinkas Ha-kehilot.

8. Jewish Public Libraries, employed as a measure of cultural modernization in Jewish communities. According to Biesaga (2019), Jewish public libraries were associated with the Haskallah or Jewish Enlightenment movement and strongly opposed by Orthodox circles. Again according to Biesaga. “the public libraries became the centres of culture and self-education … the venue for literary events, author’s meetings, lectures, as well as exhibitions, plays, and concerts … drama circles, choirs, and even sports clubs” (p.162). The data employed here is taken from a nationwide register of public libraries, conducted by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education in 1929 (Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego 1932), and reporting 748 Jewish libraries (out of 8,256 libraries in total).

9. Russian Evacuation Plans in WWI. On top of the restrictions on permanent migartion of Jews, the Russian army imposed additional limitations on any kind of internal movements (of traders, etc.) during World War I. In 1915 (until the fall of that year), Russian commanders forced (or at least planned) the evacuation of Jews in areas around the (moving) frontline on the grounds that Jews were Germanophile (Goldin 2022). Employing the information in Goldin (2022) and existing information on the position of the frontline, I have coded those powiat potentially affected by Russian orders.

10. Pogroms of 1941. Taken from Kopstein and Wittenberg (2018). The location of pogroms was mainly restricted to northeastern Poland.

**APPENDIX D. CONSTRUCTION OF LANDMANSHAFTN VARIABLE**

To consider the possibility that emigration (to other countries) altered the type of Jewish population on each side differently, I have relied on recent work by Spitzer (2018) on the geographical origin (and causes of migration) of Jewish populations leaving the Pale of Settlement.

Following Spitzer’s empirical strategy to assess the causes of Jewish emigration to the New World between 1881 and 1914, I have collected information on “landmanshaftn” or mutual benefit organizations of Jewish immigrants in New York (the main area of residence of Jewish immigrants) in the early twentieth century. Landmanshaftn, which “provided a way for Jewish immigrants to continue the operation of some of the age-old traditional social and economic roles previously assumed by the old-country close-knitted kehilah (a corporate Jewish community encompassing all the Jewish population in a town and its vicinity), as well as by more recent local institutions that had developed during the nineteenth century” (Spitzer 2018: 15), grouped Jewish immigrants by town of origin.

According to a 1919-1920 survey, Jewish organizations in the United States had more than one million members. Half of these members were affiliated to “fraternal orders and mutual benefit associations”. Although there could be some misreporting and missingness of landmanshaftn, Spitzer concludes that those potential biases are not correlated with the characteristics of the administrative districts in which towns of origins were located (Spitzer 2018: 16 and Appendix A). Also according to Spitzer, landmanshaftn data is well with correlated individual level data (aggregated to district level) obtained (for a shorter period of time) from the passenger lists submitted by shipping companies to US Immigration.

Exploiting the landmanshaftn data, Spitzer shows that neither pogroms nor economic or demographic conditions determined the timing of the beginning of mass migration from each district. Instead, in line with substantial work in the general economics of migration literature, Jewish migration developed through chain-migration networks, spreading spatially over several decades, from the northwestern districts of Congress Poland (in the 1870s) to the southern provinces of current Ukraine (in the 1900s and 1910s). There is little evidence that, given these chain-migration flows, there was some sharp ideological or politically-driven selection of migrants – at least among contiguous areas. The second wave of pogroms (in 1903-06), overwhelmingly located far from the Russian Pale border, had some causal impact on the volume of emigrants in the Pale of Settlement. However, it did not alter the demographic composition of Jewish migrants.[[1]](#footnote-1)

**APPENDIX E. ROBUSTNESS TEST FOR SEVERAL BANDWIDTHS**













**APPENDIX F. PLACEBO TESTS – DISPLACED RUSSIAN PALE BORDER**













**APPENDIX G. ROBUSTNESS TEST USING CURZON LINE**





**APPENDIX H. ROBUSTNESS TEST OF RESULTS IN TABLE 2 INCLUDING BORDER VILLAGES WITH 500 JEWS OR MORE**

Observations ----- Russ. Pale Robust Bandwidth

Total Bandwidth effect std. error in km2

MODEL 1 Number Zionist Schools West 561 125 0.614\*\*\* (0.189) 84

East 170 90

MODEL 2 Zionist Schools adjusted West 547 208 0.297\*\*\* (0.109) 139

per 1,000 Jews East 170 119

MODEL 3. Number of Jewish Schools West 561 149 0.337 (0.327) 99

East 170 97

MODEL 4. Jewish Schools adjusted West 547 124 0.249 (0.210) 82

per 1,000 Jews East 170 88

Models 1 and 3 control for Jewish population.

Bandwidth selection based on the mean square error (MSE) criterion that minimizes the sum of the square bias and the variance of the estimator.

Robust standard errors following Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik (2019).

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Sources: Information collected from Pinkas Ha-kehillot.

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**APPENDIX I. NORTH AFRICAN JEWS UNDER FRENCH RULE**

The political status of North African Jews under French rule and their response to decolonization provide a valuable, even if imperfect, “out-of-sample” test of the Russian case. In parallel to a generalized process of colonial expansion by other European powers, France came to dominate most of the Maghreb by the early twentieth century. Paris annexed most of northern Algeria between 1830 and 1848, governing it directly as civilian departments, and expanded toward the Sahara in the following decades, putting it under military jurisdiction. Tunisia and the majority of Morocco were brought under France’s fold as protectorates in 1881 and 1912 respectively. Right before these countries became independent, there were approximately 485,000 Jews under French control in the whole region.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Jews’ legal status varied across territories as a function of their historical origin and type of French jurisdiction in place. The Crémieux Decree of 1870 granted full French citizenship to all Jews living in Algeria’s northern departments. By contrast, French authorities denied French citizenship to M’zab Jews living in the valley of Ghardaïa, an area located in the Sahara, and occupied by France twelve years after the passage of the Crémieux Decree. Although French officials grounded their objections to the extension of citizenship to Ghardaïan Jews on the fact that the area was under military control, the existing official correspondence points to their conviction that M’zab Jews were too different and “uncivilized” to be susceptible of assimilation to French culture (Wall 2014: 14 ff.).[[3]](#footnote-3) As a result, they were treated as “non-citizen French subjects” to be ruled by the 1881 *Code de l’indigénat* that applied to Algerian Muslims. Moroccan Jews, most of them of direct Spanish descent, were subject to the Moroccan authorities and, except for individual cases, did not enjoy French citizenship. Tunisian Jews included descendants from the diasporas following the destruction of the Temple, Jews exiled from Spain (often via Morocco), and Sephardim Jews emigrated from Italy. As a result, around 13,000 out of 95,000 Tunisian Jews had French or Italian citizenship. The rest were under the authority of the Tunisian bey.

The Zionist movement took time to develop, at least organizationally. Algerian Jews celebrated their French citizenship as part of a path toward emancipation, “civilization”, and the hegemony of republican values. The anti-Jewish riots that took place in Constantine in 1934 only reinforced their attachment to France (Katz 2012). Moroccan Jews strove, without any success, to persuade the colonial authority to make them French citizens. In Tunisia, wealthy Jews, sentimentally attached to Italy (and France) and often in possession of European citizenship, opposed Zionism. Poor Jewish communities were alienated by Zionists’ secularism. Interest in the cause of Zionism broadened in the interwar period, accelerated with World War II, marked by the abrogation of the Crémieux Decree under the Pétain administration and the direct German occupation of Tunisia, and crested with the creation of the state of Israel.

Nevertheless, it was the rise of Arab nationalism that prompted the Maghrebi Jews to weigh aliyah as a realistic alternative. In its 1960 “appeal to the Jews of Algeria,” the FLN promised them equal rights (Laskier 1994: 329). In Tunisia, Bourghiba assured in public that “we have always considered the Tunisian nation as including Muslims and Jews” (Laskier 1994: 288). However, their demands that Jews forsake their French citizenship as well as a string of anti-Jewish riots and attacks in the late 1950s, ended up pushing an overwhelming number of Jewish individuals to leave the Maghreb.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Their choice of destination corresponded with the type of treatment under French rule. Ninety five percent of about 140,000 coastal Algerian Jews moved to France. Algerian M’zab Jews took the opposite route – even after a last minute concession of French citizenship in June of 1961, one year before Algeria’s independence. Out of the 2,437 Jews born in the M’zab according to the census of 1961, almost all had left Algeria by the summer of 1962. Only around 250 relocated to France – with many of them eventually leaving for Israel (Wall 2014). About two thirds of Moroccan Jews and over half of Tunisian Jews migrated to Israel. Aliyah was particularly common among southern Tunisians, most of whom had been direct subjects of the bey.

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1. Table 1 in Spitzer (2018) shows that, across regions, the characteristics of Jewish migrants – by gender, age group, percent married and household size – appear to have been quite similar. The data is based on passenger lists submitted to the US Bureau of Immigration. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This section’s information on Jewish population and legal status and on the strength of Zionism is particularly informed by Laskier (1983, 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. French authorities turned down all the collective requests of M’zab Jews (in 1892, 1919, 1932, 1951 and 1955/56) to obtain French citizenship until 1961 (Wall 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The choice of migration happened under different conditions than in Eastern Europe. Israel was already an independent state. Moreover, the Jewish Agency (together with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee until 1951 and alone afterward) ran a comprehensive operation in the Maghreb to convince Jews to make Aliyah, funding their evacuation and transfer to Israel (Laskier 1994, chapters 4-8 and 10). Hence, we cannot extrapolate automatically from one case to the other. Still, because all those factors affected the entire region, it is plausible to conclude that France’s differential treatment of Maghreb Jews mattered in shaping their different national leanings or sympathies, and that the latter influenced, in turn, their varying rates of migration to Israel. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)