A1 Appendix

Appendix to the manuscript "Vox Populi – Popular Support for the Popular Initiative"
American Political Science Review (Leemann, Lucas, Patrick Emmenegger, and André Walter)

Contents

A1.1 Federal Votes used in Measurement Model

Table A1: Federal Votes Used in Measurement Model

Vote	Year	Title	Ballot	Parliament	CAP Topic	Result
3	1866	Equal treatment of Jews and naturalized individuals regarding settlement	✓	–	Civil Rights	53.2%
7	1866	Freedom of belief and worship	✓	–	Civil Rights	49.2%
11	1872	Federal Constitution (Total Revision)	✓	–	Government Operations	49.5%
12	1874	Federal Constitution (Total Revision)	✓	✓	Government Operations	63.2%
13	1875	Federal Law concerning the determination and certification of civil status and marriage	✓	✓	Law and Crime	51.0%
14	1875	Federal Law on the political voting rights of Swiss citizens	–	✓	Civil Rights	49.4%
15	1876	Federal Law on the Issuance and Redemption of Banknotes	✓	✓	Macroeconomics	38.3%
16	1876	Federal Law concerning the Military Service Replacement Tax	✓	–	Macroeconomics	45.8%

Vote	Year	Title	Ballot	Parliament	CAP Topic	Result
17	1877	Federal Law concerning work in factories	✓	✓	Labor	51.5%
19	1877	Federal Law concerning the political rights of settled residents and residents and the loss of political rights of Swiss citizens	✓	–	Civil Rights	38.2%
20	1879	Federal Law concerning the granting of subsidies for alpine railways	✓	✓	Transportation	70.7%
21	1879	Federal resolution concerning the amendment of Article 65 of the Federal Constitution (Death Penalty)	–	✓	Law and Crime	52.5%
23	1882	Federal resolution concerning the protection of inventions	✓	✓	Domestic Commerce	47.5%
24	1882	Federal Law concerning measures against communally dangerous epidemics	–	✓	Public Health	21.1%

Vote	Year	Title	Ballot	Parliament	CAP Topic	Result
27	1884	Federal resolution concerning the patent taxes of commercial travelers	–	✓	Domestic Commerce	47.9%
28	1884	Federal Law concerning the supplement of the Federal Criminal Law	–	✓	Law and Crime	44.0%
30	1885	Federal resolution concerning partial amendment of the Federal Constitution (Economic Affairs and Alcohol Issue)	✓	✓	Public Health	59.4%
31	1887	Federal Law concerning distilled spirits	–	✓	Public Health	65.9%
33	1889	Federal Law on Debt Collection and Bankruptcy	–	✓	Domestic Commerce	52.9%
34	1890	Federal resolution regarding legislative authority over accident and health insurance	–	✓	Public Health	75.4%
36	1891	Introduction of the popular initiative	✓	–	Government Operations	60.3%

Vote	Year	Title	Ballot	Parliament	CAP Topic	Result
39	1891	Federal resolution concerning the purchase of the Swiss Central Railway	–	✓	Transportation	31.1%

Notes: Check mark signs indicate whether the federal vote was used for the estimation of the ideological positions of voters and legislators respectively. Inclusion is a function of data availability. All federal votes are categorized in terms of topic areas used in the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). The column 'Results' displays the nation-wide yes-shares in the popular vote. The data are from Linder, Bollinger, and Rielle (2010).

A1.2 Item Response Theory (IRT) Model

A1.2.1 More Details on Customized IRT Model

Our IRT model departs in two ways from simple applications. First, we observe votes from two different sets of decision makers. We observe municipality-level returns of voters and we have roll-call votes from the parliament. A number of votes take place in both loci and provide *bridges*. This is what eventually allows us to map MPs and voters in the same ideological space. The second difference is that the municipality returns are reported as percentages while the roll-call votes are binary.

Like most other studies, we only exploit yes and no votes in the parliament and abstentions do not inform the model. While nonresponse can bias estimates of ideological positions (e.g., Rosas, Shomer, and Haptonstahl, 2015), we are interested in the chamber median rather than the individual MP positions.

We achieve identification by using standard normal priors for all θs and forcing the model to provide us with draws where the θ parameter for the city of Zurich is smaller (i.e. more liberal) than the parameter estimate for Altdorf (i.e more conservative). Zurich was one of the main strongholds of the radical-liberal coalition and Switzerland's economic capital. Zurich's unique position is reflected in the fact that all official sequences of cantonal flags list Zurich first – before Switzerland's political capital Bern. Altdorf is the main city in the canton of Uri, which has been one of the key members of the losing coalition in Switzerland's 1847 civil war. Politically, the canton of Uri was completely dominated by the Catholic Conservatives.

We implement this model in Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017). We run four chains for 2500 iterations and discard the first 500 iterations and only rely on every 8th draw (thinning). To assess convergence of all chains, we explore the $\hat{R}$ value and find the largest value is 1.0370 as well as visually inspect traceplots (examples presented in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3) .

Figure 1: Traceplot for Ideal Point of City of Zurich

Figure 2: Traceplot for Ideal Point of City of Lucerne

Figure 3: Traceplot for Ideal Point of Altdorf (UR)

A1.2.2 Discrimination Parameter Estimates

	Discrimination Parameter	run_id	vote_id	Vote
β_7	5.20	22	7	Freedom of belief and religious practice (1866)
β_3	5.16	15	3	Equal rights for Jews and naturalised citizens with regard to the right of residence (1866)
β_{12}	3.24	2	12	Federal Constitution, Total Revision (1874)
β_{28}	2.58	14	28	Federal Criminal Law (1884)
β_{11}	2.46	1	11	Federal Constitution, Total Revision (1872)

	Discrimination Parameter	run_id	vote_id	Vote
β_{17}	0.19	7	17	Factories Act (1877)
β_{34}	0.30	19	34	Right to Legislate on Accident and Health Insurance (1890)
β_{30}	0.40	16	30	Federal Competence to Regulate the Alcohol Sector (1885)
β_{31}	0.61	17	31	Federal Law on State Monoply for Liquor (1887)
β_{15}	0.62	5	15	Banknotes Act (1876)

A1.2.3 Factor Analysis of Direct Democratic Votes

Figure 4: Scree Plot of Eigenvalues (Factor Analysis, all Municipalities, 1866-1891)

Scree plot

A1.2.4 Robustness with Dichotomized Municipality Returns

We also estimate alternative IRT models where we rely on the conventional binary IRT model. We dichotomize the vote return data from municipalities by recording whether a vote share was below or above the median. Figure 5 shows the ideal points where the estimates of the main model are displayed on the y−axis and the alternative measure (from the dichotomized data) are shown on the x−axis.

Figure 5: Ideal Points from Two Different Models

We find a very high correlation between both strategies of 0.88 and take this as an indication that our customized models yields substantively similar results for most units with the exception of the few very extreme municipalities at far right of the dimension.

A1.2.5 Is There a Common Space for MPs and Municipalities?

An additional robustness check is to verify that the two group of decision makers – MPs and municipalities – can be projected into the same common space. To verify this we separate the voting data of MPs and the vote returns from the municipalities and estimate two separate IRT models.

We can thereby verify whether the political space of politicians and voters is fundamentally different or if it is indeed similar. If the results would show that the similarity with the estimates of joint model (one model with both choice makers) it would call in question the validity. Figure 6 shows the results of two separate models whereas the y−axis shows the ideal point of our main model in the main part

of the manuscript and the x−axis shows the estimates based on two separate models.

Figure 6: Ideal Points from Two Different Models

The results show that we uncover the same substantive positions in both models as we did in the main model. Among the municipalities the correlation is .86 and for the MPs we find a correlation of 0.95 – these results bolster our confidence that municipalities and MPs can be displayed in a *meaningful* way in a common political space. The municipality data shows slightly more observations for the municipalities at the very end of the dimension as we already observed in Figure 5.

A1.3 Summary Statistics of all Variables

Table A2: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Municipality ID	1875	3268	2119	1	1128	5132	6806
Cantonal ID	1875	13	8.4	1	3	21	25
Electoral District	1875	26	15	1	11	40	49
Ideological Position	1875	-0.23	0.55	-1.5	-0.61	-0.0058	4.5
Municipality Population	1875	1272	4027	35	344	1266	103958
Cantonal Population	1875	194339	161846	12538	94810	228174	530365
Share Catholics	1875	0.53	0.45	0	0.036	0.99	1
Share German-speakers	1875	0.67	0.44	0	0.069	1	1
Share foreigners	1875	0.051	0.081	0	0.0031	0.058	0.66
Population Density	1875	0.12	0.22	0.0011	0.038	0.13	4.8
Historic Direct Democracy Index	1875	2.5	1.4	0	1.2	3.9	4.5
Vote Share Liberals	1680	0.1	0.19	0	0	0.14	0.82
Vote Share Radicals	1680	0.42	0.36	0	0	0.7	1
Vote Share Socialists	1680	0.02	0.056	0	0	0	0.37
Vote Share Democrats	1680	0.079	0.21	0	0	0	1
Vote Share Conservative Catholics	1680	0.37	0.4	0	0	0.77	1
Vote Share Others	1680	0.014	0.069	0	0	0	0.67
Turnout	1663	0.48	0.22	0	0.32	0.65	1.3
Share Agricultural Sector	1799	0.66	0.24	0.015	0.5	0.85	1
Share Industrial Sector	1799	0.23	0.2	0	0.065	0.35	0.9
Vote Deviation PARL-MUN	1875	0.34	0.12	0.099	0.24	0.43	0.7
Ideological Deviation MUN-MP	1875	0.47	0.4	0.00017	0.17	0.66	4.2
Ideological Deviation MUN-PARL	1875	0.4	0.44	0.00029	0.15	0.49	5
Ideological Deviation MUN-medianMUN	1875	0.39	0.41	0.00057	0.13	0.47	4.9
Extreme Municipality	1875	0.25	0.43	0	0	0.5	1

A1.4 Full Model Output

Table A3: Strategic Vote for the Adoption of the Popular Initiative

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	59.36***	61.03***	68.22***	59.21***
	(6.19)	(5.94)	(8.41)	(11.55)
$(|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}| - |\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}|)$	107.43***	89.68***	89.37***	66.01***
	(7.66)	(7.51)	(7.51)	(7.92)
Share Agricultural Sector	1.66	−4.72	−4.72	−2.89
	(5.54)	(5.35)	(5.35)	(5.14)
Share Industrial Sector	12.53	7.72	7.78	11.11
	(7.04)	(6.78)	(6.78)	(6.51)
Extreme Municipality		16.50***	16.43***	9.96***
		(1.36)	(1.36)	(1.37)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−2.94	−5.48*
			(2.46)	(2.64)
Electoral share Radicals				−5.93
				(7.95)
Electoral share Socialists				129.01***
				(13.41)
Electoral share Democrats				67.91***
				(9.74)
Electoral share Conservatives				30.94***
				(8.00)
Electoral share Others				2.05
				(11.72)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−7931.56	−7859.80	−7857.28	−7004.80
# Municipalities	1783	1783	1783	1622
# Electoral District	44	44	44	43
# Cantons	24	24	24	24
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	96.07	83.83	86.44	71.89
σ^2_{Canton}	210.56	195.18	182.62	219.66
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	404.42	374.06	374.06	318.79

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$, *HDDI*: Historical Direct Democracy Index value for the canton, *Local labor market structure*: Employment shares in first and second sectors. *Party vote shares* for Radicals, Socialists, Democrats, Catholic Conservatives, and others. Constant included but not shown.

A1.5 Robustness

In the manuscript we rely on hierarchical models to estimate partial correlations between ballot box support for the initiative and various explanatory factors. Here, we will show that these results can also be shown when relying on a fixed effects models. Specifically, we introduce a fixed effect for each electoral district to restrict the analyzed variance.

Table A4: Alternative Model Specification

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 4
$(|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}| - |\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}|)$	106.18***	89.24***	62.18***
	(7.80)	(7.63)	(8.04)
Share Agricultural Sector	2.54	−3.65	−0.98
	(5.59)	(5.40)	(5.18)
Share Industrial Sector	15.08*	10.31	13.98*
	(7.13)	(6.87)	(6.58)
Extreme Municipality		16.37***	9.22***
		(1.37)	(1.38)
Electoral share Radicals			−16.63
			(11.57)
Electoral share Socialists			121.44***
			(15.11)
Electoral share Democrats			78.98***
			(13.94)
Electoral share Conservatives			25.63*
			(11.85)
Electoral share Others			−7.43
			(14.68)
District FE	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.10	0.17	0.31
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.14	0.29
Num. obs.	1783	1783	1622

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

In a next step, we also show the estimation results for an alternative specification where we interact the two distance measures to show that the coefficients associated with the two distance measures remain significant even when we allow for the interaction. In this specification, the interaction term captures ideologically extreme municipalities. In Table A5, one can see that the substantive results remain unchanged as do the significance levels.

Table A5: Robustness Check with Interaction

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	61.91***	62.46***	69.55***	59.91***
	(6.12)	(5.93)	(8.42)	(11.42)
$(|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}| - |\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}|)$	104.92***	89.82***	89.52***	66.56***
	(7.56)	(7.47)	(7.47)	(7.88)
$\Delta_{mun,Mun} \times \Delta_{mun,MP}$	3.61***	2.27***	2.27***	1.92***
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.46)
Share Agricultural Sector	−2.20	−6.53	−6.53	−4.63
	(5.48)	(5.33)	(5.33)	(5.13)
Share Industrial Sector	8.78	5.85	5.92	9.30
	(6.96)	(6.75)	(6.75)	(6.49)
Extreme Municipality		14.89***	14.82***	8.68***
		(1.40)	(1.40)	(1.40)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−2.90	−5.37*
			(2.46)	(2.60)
Electoral share Radicals				−5.18
				(7.85)
Electoral share Socialists				129.32***
				(13.32)
Electoral share Democrats				67.06***
				(9.62)
Electoral share Conservatives				31.21***
				(7.90)
Electoral share Others				3.15
				(11.62)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−7905.36	−7849.25	−7846.75	−6996.02
# of Observations	1783	1783	1783	1622
# of Electoral Districts	44	44	44	43
# of Cantons	24	24	24	24
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	84.56	80.01	82.35	68.39
σ^2_{Canton}	212.36	197.96	186.46	214.98
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	393.35	370.03	370.02	315.77

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A1.6 Model Estimates with Additional Structural Information

Table A6: Robustness Check with Additional Structural Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
$(|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}| - |\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}|)$	56.58***	66.12***	65.26***	58.00***
	(8.08)	(7.93)	(7.88)	(8.09)
Share of Catholics	12.28***			9.90***
	(2.37)			(2.51)
Population Denisty (log.)		−0.30		−0.32
		(0.64)		(0.63)
Share of German-Speakers			−12.06***	−8.36**
			(2.75)	(2.88)
Extreme Municipality	9.51***	9.91***	9.37***	9.13***
	(1.36)	(1.37)	(1.37)	(1.37)
Hist Direct Democracy Index	−4.20	−5.56*	−4.25	−3.66
	(2.39)	(2.65)	(2.59)	(2.42)
Share Agricultural Sector	−1.30	−3.22	−3.05	−2.04
	(5.12)	(5.20)	(5.12)	(5.17)
Share Industrial Sector	12.50	11.46	11.11	12.68
	(6.47)	(6.55)	(6.48)	(6.50)
Electoral share Radicals	−0.93	−6.17	−4.13	−0.92
	(7.77)	(7.98)	(8.16)	(8.01)
Electoral share Socialists	123.54***	129.06***	130.44***	125.54***
	(13.31)	(13.43)	(13.46)	(13.42)
Electoral share Democrats	62.55***	67.93***	64.80***	61.40***
	(9.64)	(9.77)	(10.17)	(10.04)
Electoral share Conservatives	29.62***	30.75***	32.52***	30.83***
	(7.80)	(8.03)	(8.22)	(8.06)
Electoral share Others	5.76	1.83	4.33	6.40
	(11.52)	(11.74)	(11.84)	(11.69)
Constant	47.21***	58.94***	64.42***	52.77***
	(11.16)	(11.60)	(11.63)	(11.52)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−6989.84	−7004.22	−6993.47	−6983.27
# of Municipalities	1622	1622	1622	1622
# of Electoral Districts	43	43	43	43
# of Cantons	24	24	24	24
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	70.39	72.78	91.47	87.59
σ^2_{Canton}	167.66	221.28	192.04	158.27
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	314.63	318.87	314.68	312.68

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A1.7   Turnout as Outcome Variable in Models

Table A7: Robustness Check on Turnout

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	0.41***	0.42***	0.33***	0.39**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.12)
$(\lvert\bar{\theta}_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}\rvert$ - $\lvert\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}\rvert)$	0.20**	0.12	0.12	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Share Agricultural Sector	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Share Industrial Sector	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Extreme Municipality		0.07***	0.07***	0.05***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			0.03	0.02
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Electoral share Radicals				−0.08
				(0.07)
Electoral share Socialists				−0.19
				(0.12)
Electoral share Democrats				0.11
				(0.08)
Electoral share Conservatives				0.04
				(0.07)
Electoral share Others				0.13
				(0.10)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	636.33	654.17	652.24	605.22
# of Municipalities	1643	1643	1643	1484
# of Electoral Districts	38	38	38	35
# of Cantons	20	20	20	20
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistricts}$	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
$\sigma^2_{Cantons}$	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
$\sigma^2_{Municipalities}$	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A1.8   Turnout as Additional Control Variable

Table A8: Robustness Check with Turnout as Control Variable

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	54.97***	60.30***	62.86***	59.40***
	(6.78)	(6.41)	(9.59)	(12.97)
($\lvert\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}\rvert$ - $\lvert\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}\rvert$)	103.46***	84.11***	84.02***	59.71***
	(8.06)	(7.85)	(7.86)	(8.25)
Voter Turnout	12.71***	5.93	6.03	1.70
	(3.37)	(3.26)	(3.26)	(3.19)
Share Agricultural Sector	0.90	−6.08	−6.04	−4.35
	(5.79)	(5.56)	(5.56)	(5.31)
Share Industrial Sector	10.38	4.68	4.79	8.26
	(7.38)	(7.06)	(7.07)	(6.76)
Extreme Municipality		18.09***	18.06***	11.74***
		(1.45)	(1.45)	(1.45)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−1.09	−6.06
			(2.97)	(3.31)
Electoral share Radicals				−5.16
				(8.32)
Electoral share Socialists				129.32***
				(13.60)
Electoral share Democrats				72.21***
				(10.14)
Electoral share Conservatives				31.75***
				(8.35)
Electoral share Others				1.60
				(12.17)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−7251.39	−7175.45	−7173.38	−6353.20
# of Municipalities	1627	1627	1627	1472
# of Electoral Districts	38	38	38	35
# of Cantons	20	20	20	20
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	96.54	87.31	87.82	79.28
σ^2_{Canton}	233.19	192.81	204.81	263.46
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	414.06	378.25	378.24	320.04

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A1.9 Model Estimates on Sample Without Socialist Candidates

Table A9: Robustness Check on Sample Without Socialist Candidates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	59.85***	61.89***	67.94***	64.99***
	(6.85)	(6.54)	(8.85)	(12.68)
$(\lvert\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}\rvert$ - $\lvert\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}\rvert)$	134.88***	110.20***	109.82***	77.96***
	(9.34)	(9.14)	(9.15)	(9.10)
Share Agricultural Sector	1.11	−6.11	−6.10	−7.17
	(6.22)	(5.95)	(5.95)	(5.58)
Share Industrial Sector	3.55	−0.93	−0.85	0.51
	(8.46)	(8.06)	(8.06)	(7.59)
Extreme Municipality		16.46***	16.39***	10.15***
		(1.42)	(1.42)	(1.43)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−2.45	−5.48*
			(2.44)	(2.66)
Electoral share Radicals				−8.39
				(9.17)
Electoral share Democrats				68.14***
				(11.25)
Electoral share Conservatives				28.89**
				(9.20)
Electoral share Others				−0.65
				(12.90)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−5713.08	−5647.92	−5645.61	−5550.87
# of Municipalities	1283	1283	1283	1283
# of Electoral Districts	39	39	39	39
# of Cantons	21	21	21	21
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	82.69	67.27	70.53	94.14
σ^2_{Canton}	193.26	184.47	176.58	195.57
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	408.25	370.04	369.99	322.96

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A1.10 Model Estimates on Sample With Low Competition Municipalities

Table A10: Estimates on Sample with Low Competition Municipalities

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	52.14***	53.64***	62.98***	41.70**
	(6.95)	(6.76)	(9.62)	(13.27)
($\|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}\|$ - $\|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}\|$)	121.38***	104.58***	104.17***	63.18***
	(9.09)	(9.12)	(9.12)	(9.17)
Share Agricultural Sector	8.58	2.99	2.91	3.42
	(6.26)	(6.15)	(6.15)	(5.75)
Share Industrial Sector	21.85**	18.28*	18.20*	20.65**
	(7.86)	(7.67)	(7.67)	(7.20)
Extreme Municipality		12.41***	12.31***	6.97***
		(1.57)	(1.57)	(1.54)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−3.88	−3.98
			(2.88)	(2.39)
Electoral share Radicals				6.22
				(10.93)
Electoral share Socialists				122.52***
				(16.48)
Electoral share Democrats				36.08
				(20.51)
Electoral share Conservatives				41.98***
				(11.03)
Electoral share Others				10.79
				(14.88)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−5449.04	−5417.22	−5414.35	−5307.24
# of Municipalities	1236	1236	1236	1236
# of Electoral Districts	40	40	40	40
# of Cantons	23	23	23	23
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	54.99	38.75	40.14	76.23
σ^2_{Canton}	296.91	286.42	270.00	145.76
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	371.26	354.76	354.72	305.85

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A1.11 Model Estimates with 'Noisy' Measures of Ideological Positions

We re-estimate the models with modified ideological measures. We first use the original estimates, θ_{mun} and θ_{MP}, and then add random noise to the measures. Finally, we re-estimate the models. To generate the random noise we draw from a normal distribution with mean 0. The variance of the noise is based on the actual variation we find in the ideological measures. In both cases, the municipalities and the MPs, we take a third of the standard deviation to be the standard deviation of the noise

component.

$$\theta^{\text{noise}}_{mun,i} = \theta_{mun,i} + \mu_i$$

$$\mu_i \sim N\left(\mu = 0, \sigma^2 = 1/4 * V(\theta_{mun,i})\right)$$

The above identities show how the noisy measure is derived and we follow the same procedure for the measures of the MPs. The following table shows the estimation results based on these noisy measures.

Table A11: Robustness to Noisy Measures

Constant	59.20***	60.90***	69.96***	63.46***
	(6.50)	(6.20)	(8.86)	(12.10)
$(\mid\theta_{mun} - \theta^{\text{noisy}}_{\text{med MP}}\mid - \mid\theta_{mun} - \theta^{\text{noisy}}_{\text{med Mun}}\mid)$	67.80***	45.98***	45.83***	35.12***
	(7.75)	(7.63)	(7.63)	(7.60)
Share Agricultural Sector	4.17	−2.76	−2.81	−1.91
	(5.70)	(5.50)	(5.50)	(5.21)
Share Industrial Sector	11.25	6.35	6.37	10.92
	(7.26)	(6.97)	(6.97)	(6.61)
Extreme Municipality		17.73***	17.64***	9.58***
		(1.41)	(1.41)	(1.40)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−3.69	−6.33*
			(2.61)	(2.78)
Electoral share Radicals				−11.50
				(8.35)
Electoral share Socialists				128.57***
				(13.74)
Electoral share Democrats				67.95***
				(10.32)
Electoral share Conservatives				32.12***
				(8.45)
Electoral share Others				1.42
				(12.13)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−7987.01	−7910.19	−7907.34	−7027.90
# of Observations	1783	1783	1783	1622
# of Electoral Districts	44	44	44	43
# of Cantons	24	24	24	24
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	88.80	76.21	78.67	92.81
σ^2_{Canton}	268.00	241.74	220.33	238.30
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	430.44	396.00	396.00	326.95

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A1.12 Model with Ideological Gap between Municipality and Local MP

Table A12: Robustness Check: Including Distance Measure to Local MP

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	57.01***	59.93***	66.94***	57.75***
	(6.13)	(5.94)	(8.37)	(11.49)
$(\|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med MP}}\| - \|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{\text{med Mun}}\|)$	105.63***	89.65***	89.34***	66.34***
	(7.62)	(7.50)	(7.51)	(7.92)
$\text{abs}(\theta_{mun} - \theta_{Local\ MP})$	7.58***	3.32*	3.30*	2.50
	(1.59)	(1.58)	(1.58)	(1.50)
Share Agricultural Sector	0.18	−5.09	−5.10	−3.24
	(5.51)	(5.35)	(5.35)	(5.14)
Share Industrial Sector	11.33	7.40	7.46	10.77
	(7.00)	(6.77)	(6.77)	(6.51)
Extreme Municipality		15.81***	15.74***	9.47***
		(1.40)	(1.40)	(1.40)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−2.87	−5.31*
			(2.43)	(2.60)
Electoral share Radicals				−5.43
				(7.90)
Electoral share Socialists				130.07***
				(13.40)
Electoral share Democrats				66.53***
				(9.73)
Electoral share Conservatives				31.27***
				(7.96)
Electoral share Others				2.33
				(11.68)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−7918.91	−7856.22	−7853.73	−7002.08
# of Municipalities	1783	1783	1783	1622
# of Electoral Districts	44	44	44	43
# of Cantons	24	24	24	24
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	103.30	86.76	89.46	70.56
σ^2_{Canton}	189.37	187.02	174.90	212.58
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	399.44	373.32	373.32	318.60

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A1.13 Breaking the Main Explanatory Variable into its Components

Table A13: Breaking the Main Explanatory Variable into its Components

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	60.08***	60.78***	67.51***	56.74***
	(5.94)	(5.89)	(8.42)	(11.23)
abs($\theta_{mun} - \theta_{medianMP}$)	106.65***	96.98***	96.69***	73.48***
	(7.32)	(7.47)	(7.47)	(7.92)
abs($\theta_{mun} - \theta_{medianmun}$)	−87.90***	−83.95***	−83.68***	−63.24***
	(7.47)	(7.44)	(7.44)	(7.84)
Share Agricultural Sector	−6.94	−7.87	−7.87	−5.76
	(5.33)	(5.29)	(5.29)	(5.11)
Share Industrial Sector	5.20	4.78	4.86	8.16
	(6.74)	(6.69)	(6.69)	(6.45)
Extreme Municipality		9.21***	9.16***	4.62**
		(1.66)	(1.66)	(1.61)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−2.75	−5.04*
			(2.48)	(2.55)
Electoral share Radicals				−3.02
				(7.71)
Electoral share Socialists				131.88***
				(13.20)
Electoral share Democrats				65.59***
				(9.42)
Electoral share Conservatives				31.70***
				(7.74)
Electoral share Others				5.36
				(11.48)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−7847.72	−7831.05	−7828.61	−6984.61
# of Municipalities	1783	1783	1783	1622
# of Electoral Districts	44	44	44	43
# of Cantons	24	24	24	24
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	79.67	79.75	81.91	62.79
σ^2_{Canton}	204.73	199.14	189.77	208.23
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	368.99	362.88	362.88	312.15

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A1.14 Cantonal Population Size as Additional Control Variable

Table A14: Cantonal Population Size as Additional Control Variable

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant	110.42**	112.32**	127.44**	89.34
	(42.24)	(40.35)	(40.52)	(45.98)
$(|\theta_{mun} - \theta_{medianMP}| - |\theta_{mun} - \theta_{medianmun}|)$	106.88***	89.11***	88.64***	65.81***
	(7.68)	(7.52)	(7.53)	(7.93)
log(Cantonal Population)	−4.50	−4.53	−5.12	−2.56
	(3.69)	(3.52)	(3.43)	(3.80)
Share Agricultural Sector	1.93	−4.44	−4.40	−2.72
	(5.54)	(5.35)	(5.35)	(5.15)
Share Industrial Sector	12.81	8.01	8.11	11.28
	(7.04)	(6.78)	(6.78)	(6.52)
Extreme Municipality		16.51***	16.42***	9.97***
		(1.36)	(1.36)	(1.37)
Hist Direct Democracy Index			−3.42	−5.78*
			(2.42)	(2.71)
Electoral share Radicals				−6.47
				(7.98)
Electoral share Socialists				128.80***
				(13.42)
Electoral share Democrats				67.91***
				(9.75)
Electoral share Conservatives				30.24***
				(8.06)
Electoral share Others				1.57
				(11.74)
Canton RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District RE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log Likelihood	−7928.59	−7856.80	−7854.02	−7002.32
# Municipalities	1783	1783	1783	1622
# of Electoral Districts	44	44	44	43
# of Cantons	24	24	24	24
$\sigma^2_{ElectoralDistrict}$	96.62	83.84	86.46	71.82
σ^2_{Canton}	204.08	188.85	170.41	228.16
$\sigma^2_{Municipality}$	404.39	374.04	374.02	318.78

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A1.15 Examples of Data Sources

St. Galler Volksblatt.

Eidgen. Volksabstimmung

über das Schuldbetreibungs- und Konkursgesetz
Sonntag den 17. November 1889.

	Ja	Nein		Ja	Nein
Zürich	48,448	14,881	Schaffhausen	5,705	1,139
Bern	32,873	31,382	Appenz.A.-Rh.	4,261	6,313
Luzern	4,856	19,876	Appenz.J.-Rh.	186	2,080
Uri	625	3,050	St. Gallen	19,098	22,298
Schwyz	1,788	6,152	*Graubünden	4,303	9,298
Obwalden	200	2,890	Aargau	11,297	23,608
Nidwalden	591	1,333	Thurgau	10,681	7,164
Glarus	4,197	1,687	*Tessin	7,629	8,813
Zug	1,297	2,460	*Waadt	39,327	15,511
Freiburg	5,963	15,253	*Wallis	2,149	2,058
*Solothurn	5,307	7,628	Neuenburg	12,560	824
Baselstadt	6,792	1,126	*Genf	7,821	2,616
Baselland	3,911	3,877			

Die mit einem * bezeichneten Kantone sind noch unvollständig.

Total: Annehmende 241,281 — Verwerfende 212,959.

Kanton St. Gallen.

	Ja	Nein		Ja	Nein
Bez. St. Gallen.			**Seebezirk.**		
St. Gallen	3892	431	Gommiswald	7	187
Bez. Tablat.			Ernetschwyl	3	136
Tablat	888	660	Uznach	163	153
Wittenbach	108	258	Schmerikon	28	150
Häggenschwil	24	168	Rapperswil	417	60
Waldien	22	192	Jona	201	191
Bez. Rorschach.			Eschenbach	103	284
Mörschwyl	64	223	Goldingen	26	164
Golbach	101	194	St. Gallenkappel	4	204
Steinach	56	88	**Bez. Obertoggenburg.**		
Berg	9	96	Wildhaus	136	91
Tübach	24	62	Alt St. Johann	126	181
Untereggen	33	137	Stein	57	58
Eggersriet	31	205	Neslau	200	177
Rorschacherberg	54	184	Krummenau	145	113
Rorschach	596	205	Ebnat	428	118
Bez. Unterrheinthal.			Kappel	359	160
Thal	429	280	**Bez. Neutoggenburg.**		
Rheineck	301	32	Wattwil	747	323
St. Margrethen	183	94	Lichtensteig	178	140
Au	92	140	Oberhelfenswil	115	113
Berneck	232	256	Brunnadern	130	44
Balgach	129	175	Hemberg	114	190
Diepoldsau	98	264	St. Peterzell	130	178
Widnau	31	254	Krinau	31	47
Bez. Oberrheinthal.			**Bez. Alttoggenburg.**		
Rebstein	172	154	Bütschwyl	85	462
Marbach	109	87	Lütisburg	107	156
Altstätten	354	938	Mosnang	17	517
Eichberg	138	47	Kirchberg	99	979
Oberriet	73	706	**Bez. Untertoggenburg.**		
Rüthi	52	246	Mogelsberg	321	268
Bez. Werdenberg.			Ganterswil	77	102
Gemswald	64	90	Jonschwyl	32	257
Gams	21	329	Oberuzwyl	281	349
Grabs	355	188	Henau	394	403
Buchs	394	171	Flawyl	708	255
Sevelen	149	108	Degersheim	284	384
Wartau	398	46	**Bez. Wyl.**		
Bez. Sargans.			Wyl	254	357
Sargans	86	84	Bronschhofen	19	233
Ragaz	194	100	Zuzwyl	44	176
Pfäfers	79	123	Oberbüren	17	337
Mitlers	35	336	Niederbüren	85	218
Mels	112	634	N.-Helfenswil	32	259
Flums	93	483	**Bez. Gossau.**		
Wallenstadt	325	125	Gossau	192	859
Quarten	283	211	Andwyl	13	185
Bez. Gaster.			Waldkirch	71	505
Amden	17	240	Gaiserwald	156	289
Weesen	80	56	Straubenzell	630	376
Schännis	119	199	Bahnangestellte	7	2
Benken	23	244	Militärschule	39	10
Kaltbrunn	44	323	**Gesamtresultat:**		
Rieden	5	78	19,098 Ja 22,298 Nein.		

Figure 8: Newspaper with published vote outcome on the front page (Grisons, 1889)

L'ESTAFETTE

RESUMÉ DES NOUVELLES et feuille d'annonces

RESUMÉ DES NOUVELLES et feuille d'annonces

JOURNAL DU MATIN

Votation du 17 novembre sur la loi concernant les poursuites et faillites.

Le premier chiffre est celui des *oui*, le second, celui des *non*.

CANTON DE VAUD.

District d'Aigle.

Aigle, 600, 25 ; Corbeyrier, 43, — ; Leysin, 92, 1 ; Yvorne, 158, 5 ; Bex, 474, 33 ; Gryon , 87 , 1 ; Lavey-Morcles, 74, 3 ; Olmont-dessous, 474, 22 ; Villeneuve, 206, 3 ; Chessel, 26, — ; Noville, 100, 1 ; Rennaz, 46, — ; Roche, 73, 6.

District d'Aubonne.

Aubonne, 269, 12 ; Bougy-Villars, 58, 3 ; Féchy, 55, 2 ; St-Livres, 107, 15 ; Ballens, 86, 4 ; Appies, 130, 2 ; Berolles, 68, 1 ; Bière, 291, 15 ; Mollens, 107, 4 ; Gimel, 183 12 ; Longirod, 69, 1 ; Marchissy, 81, 7 ; Montherod, 58, 4 ; Pizy, 19, — ; St-Georges, 93, — ; St-Oyens, 35, 11 ; Saubraz, 71, 3.

District d'Avenches.

Avenches , 260, 8 ; Donatyre, 21, — ; Faoug, 80, 5 ; Oleyres, 67, 3 ; Cudrefin, 106, 3 ; Bellerive, 102, — ; Chabrey, 53, 2 ; Champmartin, 7, — ; Constantine, 48, — ; Montmagny, 49, — ; Mur, 36, — ; Vallamand-dessus, 64, — ; Villars-le-Grand, 88, 2.

District de Cossonay.

Cossonay, 130, 9 ; Chavannes-le-Veyron, 23, 7 ; Cottens, 48, 2 ; Gollion, 116, 6 ; Grancy, 79, 2 ; La Chaux, 94, 6 ; Penthalaz, 63, 2 ; Senarclens, 45, 4 ; Sévery, 33, — ; La Sarraz, 120, 9 ; Chevilly, 57, 2 ; Dizy, 36, 4 ; Eclépens, 94, 7 ; Ferreyres, 43, 1 ; Lussery, 39, 4 ; Moiry, 55, 4 ; Oray, 60, 2 ; Pompaples, 53, — ; Villars Lussery, 14, 3 ; L'Isle, 146, 2 ; Cuarnens, 110, 3 ; Mauraz, 15, 2 ; Mont-la-Ville, 83, 7 ; Montricher, 146, 8 ; Pampigny, 96, 3 ; Sullens, 69, 2 ; Battens, 48, — ; Bournens, 44, 2 ; Boussens, 41, 4 ; Daillens, 106, 4 ; Mex, 50, 1 ; Penthaz, 43, — ; Vufflens-la-Ville, 65, 3.

District d'Echallens.

Echallens, 146, 44 ; Assens, 63, 18 ; Bioley-Orjulaz, 52, 6 ; Eclagnens, 31, — ; Etagnières, 48, 5 ; Goumoens-la-Ville, 117, 1 ; Goumoens-le-Jux, 40, — ; Oulens, 69, 6 ; St-Barthélemy, 38, 29 ; Villars-le-Terroir, 121, 12 ; Bottens, 75, 13 ; Bretigny-sur-Morrens, 60, 2 ; Cugy, 68, 6 ; Dommartin, 60, 1 ; Froideville, 80, 3 ; Malapalud, 12, — ; Morrens, 78, 1 ; Poliez-le-Grand, 98, 7 ; Poliez-Pittet, 68, 19 ; Villars-Tiercelin, 66, 1 ; Vuarrens, 142, 5 ; Essertines, 119, 2 ; Fey, 120, 2 ; Naz, 22, 11 ; Pailly, 94, 1 ; Penthéréaz, 80, 1 ; Rueyres, 48, — ; Sugnens, 61, —.

District de Grandson.

Grandson, 203, 6 ; Champagne, 97, 7 ; Fiez, 43, 1 ; Fontaines, 38, — ; Giez, 57, 6 ; Grandevent, 28, — ; Mauborget, 21, — ; Novalles, 30, 4 ; Romairon, 19, 1 ; Vaugondry, 16, — ; Villars-Burquin, 64, 1 ; Ste-Croix, 715, 19 ; Bullet, 144, — ; Concise, 116, 6 ; Bonvillars, 66, 2 ; Corcelles, 44, 2 ; Fontanezier, 20, 4 ; Mutrux, 24, 2 ; Onnens, 58, 5 ; Provence, 52, 1.

District de Lausanne.

Lausanne, 4383, 207 ; Pully, 304, 8 ; Belmont, 84, 3 ; Epalinges, 118, 10 ; Paudex, 40, 4 ; Romanel, 58, 4 ; Cheseaux, 77, 1 ; Crissier, 116, 7 ; Jouxtens-Mézery, 49, 1 ; Le Mont, 191, 1 ; Prilly, 114, 6 ; Renens, 127, 6.

District de La Vallée.

Le Chenit, 624, 20 ; L'Abbaye (Pont), 195, 10 ; Le Lieu, 312, 10.

District de Lavaux.

Cully, 172, 8 ; Villette, 64, 4 ; Epesses, 104, — ; Forel, 156, 5 ; Grandvaux, 94, 1 ; Riez, —, — ; Lutry, 423, 26 ; Savigny, 193, 9 ; St-Saphorin, 63, 3 ; Chexbres, 111, 4 ; Puidoux, 162, 2 ; Rivaz, 52, —.

District de Morges.

Morges, 448, 22 ; Tolochenaz, —, — ; Colombier, 73, 5 ; Aclens, 85, 2 ; Chigny, 27, 2 ; Clarmont, —, — ; Echichens, 68, — ;

Monnaz, 29, 3 ; Reverolles, 36, 4 ; Romanel, 38, 7 ; St-Saphorin, 49, 2 ; Vaux, 24, — ; Vufflens-le-Château, 57, 4 ; Vullierens, 92, 2 ; Ecublens, 116, 5 ; Bremblens, 17, 24 ; Bussigny, 138, 9 ; Chavannes, 49, 2 ; Denges, 52, 7 ; Echandens, 47, 19 ; Lonay, 86, 2 ; Préverenges, 55, — ; St-Sulpice, 52, 4 ; Villars-Ste-Croix, 37, 2 ; Villars-sous-Yens, 64, 2 ; Buchillon, 31, 2 ; Bussy, 23, 12 ; Chardonney (Régie), 13, 2 ; Denens, 48, 1 ; Etoy, 116, 3 ; Lavigny, 53, 7 ; Lully, 46, 1 ; Lussy, 35, 5 ; St-Prex, 175, 6 ; Yens, 102, 6.

District de Moudon.

Moudon, 456, 32 ; Bussy, 24, » ; Chavannes, 79, 2 ; Hermenches, 72, 4 ; Rossenges, 39 2 ; Syens, 39, 2 ; Vucherens, 89, 18 ; Lucens, 277, 6 ; Brenles, 58, 2 ; Chesalles, 20, 5 ; Courtilles, 77, 1 ; Cremin, 20, » ; Denezy, 47, 3 ; Dompierre, 77, 2 ; Forel, 47, » ; Lovatens, 60, 4 ; Neyruz, 47, » ; Oulens, 23, » ; Prévonloup, 34, » ; Sarzens, 24, 3 ; Villars-le-Comte, 64, 4 ; St-Cierges, 111, 3 ; Bercher, 96, 3 ; Boulens, 56, 5 ; Chapelles, 75, 3 ; Correvon, 20, » ; Marthereuges, 22, » ; Montanbion-Chardonnay, 4, 29 ; Ogens, 40, 14 ; Peyres-Possens, 23, 14 ; Sottens, 48, » ; Thierreus, 127, 18 ; Villars-Mendraz, 29, 4.

District de Nyon.

Nyon, 439, 25 ; Prangins, 67, 9 ; Begnins, 155, 2 ; Arzier et le Muids, 98, — ; Bassins, 93, 3 ; Coinsins, 44 — ; Genollier, 49, 4 ; Gland, 78, 9 ; Le Vaud, 51, — ; Vich, 55, 5 ; Coppet, 62, 3 ; Arnex, 14, — ; Bogis-Bossey, —, — ; Chavannes-de-Bogis, —, — ; Chavannes-des-Bois, 10, — ; Commugny, 44, 2 ; Crans, 73, 10 ; Founex, 37, — ; Mies, — ; Tannay, 24, 6 ; Gingins, 63, 3 ; Borex, 25, 3 ; Chéserex, 44, 4 ; Crassier, 36, 4 ; Duillier, 60, 1 ; Eysins, 47, 4 ; Givrins, 48, 11 ; Grens, 26, 2 ; La Rippe, 54, 1 ; St-Cergues, 46, 1 ; Signy, 27, — ; Trélex, 55, —.

District d'Orbe.

Orbe, 246, 42 ; Bavois, —, — ; Chavornay, —, — ; Corcelles, —, — ; Montcherand, 65, 1 ; Baulmes, 184, 6 ; l'Abergement, 45, 5 ; Lignerolles, 80, 2 ; Rances, 106, 14 ; Sergey, 32, 4 ; Valleyres-sous-Rances, 52, 16 ; Vuitebœuf, 57, 1 ; Romainmôtier, 77, 2 ; Agiez, 77, 1 ; Arnex, 118, 18 ; Bofflens 73, 1 ; Bretonnières, 62, 2 ; Les Clées, 58, 2 ; Croy, 76, 2 ; Envy, 18, — ; Juriens, 68, 1 ; Lapraz, 61, 1 ; Premier, 60, — ; Vallorbes, 355, 18 ; Ballaigues, 119, 2 ; Vaulion, 166, 25.

District d'Oron.

Oron-la-Ville, 70, 4 ; Bussigny 13, — ; Châtillens, 33, 2 ; Chesalles, 33, — ; Ecoteaux, 54, 3 ; Essertes, 29, — ; Ferlens, 24, 12 ; Maracon, 54, 4 ; Oron-le-Châtel, 39, 4 ; Palézieux, 65, — ; La Rogivue, 44, — ; Servion, 54, 2 ; Tavernes (les) 29, 1 ; Thioleyres (les) 30, — ; Vuibroye, 13, 2 ; Mézières, 72, 4 ; Carrouge, 85, 5 ; Corcelles-le-Jorat, 79, 15 ; Cullayes (les) 37, 8 ; Montpreveyres, 43, 3 ; Peney 66, — ; Ropraz, 48, 2 ; Vulliens, 54, 3.

District de Payerne.

Payerne, 713, 4 ; Trey, 85, — ; Grandcour, 151, 5 ; Chevroux, 77, 1 ; Corcelles, 227, 9 ; Missy, 60, 10 ; Granges, 155, 12 ; Corniaz, 37, 5 ; Champtauroz, 47, 1 ; Combremont-le-Grand , 93 , 8 ; Combremont-le-Petit 102 , 1 ; Henniez, 30, 3 ; Marnand, 43, — ; Rossens, 49, — ; Sassel, 48, 10 ; Sédeilles, 52, 2 ; Seigneux, 72, — ; Treytorrens, 46, — ; Villars-Bramard, 39 , 4 ; Villarzel, 70, 2.

District du Pays-d'Enhaut.

Château-d'OEx, 375, 65 ; Rougemont, 138, 20 ; Rossinières, 103, 2.

District de Rolle.

Rolle, 230, 1 ; Allaman, 80, 4 ; Mont, 149, 4 ; Perroy, 83, 4 ; Gilly, 96, — ; Bursinel, 37, — ; Bursins, 69, — ; Burtigny, 73, 2 ; Dullit, 32, 4 ; Essertines, 104, 4 ; Luins, 42, 1 ; Tartegnins, 30, —, Vinzel, 34, 1.

District de Vevey.

Vevey, 775, 44 ; Corsier, 322, 7 ; Char-

donne, 129, 7 ; Corseaux, 70, 4 ; Jongny, —, — ; Tour-de-Peilz (la) 174, 9 ; Blonay, 118, — ; St-Légier-La Chiésaz, 142, 5 ; Les Planches (Montreux), 221, 6 ; Châtelard (le) 589, 29 ; Veytaux, 62, 4.

District d'Yverdon.

Yverdon 1233, 54 ; Cheseaux-Noréaz, 20, — ; Belmont, 74, 5 ; Ependes, 70, — ; Essert-Pittet, —, — ; Gossens, 21, 1 ; Gressy, 42, 2 ; Oppens, 72, 1 ; Orzens, 65, 2 ; Pomy, 86, 4 ; Suchy, —, — ; Ursins, 44, — ; Valeyres-s'-Ursins, 55, — ; Champvent, 86, 1 ; Chamblon, 38, — ; Essert-s'-Champvent, 19, — ; Mathod, —, — ; Montagny, 57, 1 ; Orges, 50, 2 ; Suscévaz, 46, — ; Treycovagnes, 37, — ; Valeyres-s'-Montagny, 41, — ; Villars-s'-Champvent, 10, 3 ; Vugelles-la-Mothe, 59, 2 ; Mollondins, 66, 1 ; Arrisoules , 20 , 1 ; Bioley-Magnoux, 65, 1 ; Chanéaz, 40, — ; Chavannes-le-Chêne, 80, — ; Chêne-et-Paquier, 44, 1 ; Cronay, 87, 5 ; Cuarny , 49 , 3 ; Démoret, 42, 1 ; Donneloye, 76, 4 ; Mézery , 22, 2 ; Prahins, 44, — ; Rovray, 36, — ; Villars-Epeney, 12, — ; Yvonand, 149, 17

Places d'armes.

Aarau, 1, — ; Zurich, 16, — ; Thoune, 1.

Voici le résultat de la votation, résumée par district :

DISTRICTS	Electeurs inscrits	OUI	NON
Aigle	4772	2615	125
Aubonne . . .	2307	1780	96
Avenches . . .	1285	981	23
Cossonay . . .	3240	2283	107
Echallens . . .	3607	2036	196
Grandson . . .	3243	1852	67
Lausanne . . .	9002	5639	253
La Vallée . . .	1533	1131	40
Lavaux	2715	1594	59
Morges	3478	2381	168
Moudon	3048	2288	177
Nyon	3054	1924	106
Orbe	3728	2282	163
Oron	1706	1065	74
Payerne	2677	2186	77
Pays-d'Enhaut .	1267	616	87
Rolle	1807	1089	25
Vevey	4721	2602	109
Yverdon . . .	3998	3054	444
Places d'armes . .	—	18	—
Totaux :	59888	39386	2063

Il manque les résultats des communes de Riex, Tolochenaz, Clarmont, Bogis-Bossey, Chavannes-de-Bogis, Mies, Bavois, Chavornay, Corcelles, Jongny, Essert-Pittet, Suchy et Mathod.

Voici le résultat de la votation par cantons :

CANTONS	OUI	NON
Zurich	48,448	14,884
Berne	32,873	34,382
Lucerne	4,858	19,977
Uri	612	2,640
Schwytz	1,788	6,192
Unterwald-le-Haut	200	2,890
Unterwald-le-Bas	391	1,383
Glaris	4,496	1,687
Zoug	4,297	2,460
Fribourg	5,963	15,253
Bâle-Ville . . .	6,792	4,126
Bâle-Campagne . .	3,311	3,877
Soleure	5,307	7,625
Schaffhouse . . .	5,705	1,139
Appenzell (Rh.-ext.)	4,261	6,313
Appenzell (Rh.-int.)	186	2,080
St-Gall	19,198	22,398
Grisons	.	.
Argovie	11,297	23,608
Thurgovie	10,681	7,164
Tessin	7,629	8,843
Vaud	39,386	2,063
Valais	4,980	13,828
Neuchâtel	12,087	762
Genève	7,329	2,346
Totaux :	236,575	201,820

Chronique lausannoise.

Voici le résultat pour les bureaux du cercle de Lausanne :

	OUI	NON
Gare	200	4
Saint-François	277	63
La Cité	523	24
Saint-Laurent	452	74
Martheray	289	12
Ouchy	450	5
La Ponthaise	95	5
Vennes	54	—
Chailly	102	6
Montblesson	21	2
Chalet-à-Gobet	77	10
Montherond	31	1
Vernand	30	—
Cour	85	4
Totaux :	4383	207

Electeurs inscrits, 9002. — Votants, 4643.

Elections communales.

Le Comité libéral nous prie d'annoncer qu'il est étranger à la confection de la liste soi-disant conservatrice distribuée hier à l'entrée des lieux de vote, pour l'élection des conseillers communaux.

DÉPÊCHES

Bâle, 17 novembre.

M. Speiser, conservateur, a été nommé conseiller national par 4323 suffrages.

M. Wullschleger, candidat ouvrier, a fait 2199 voix.

Paris, 16 novembre.

Après l'élection de M. Floquet comme président définitif de la Chambre, MM. de Mahy, Develle, Casimir Périer et Peytral ont été élus vice-présidents.

Outre les projets connus, la déclaration du gouvernement annoncera des projets modifiant les droits de succession, exonérant le passif de tous droits et tendant à rendre la justice plus expéditive et moins coûteuse.

Le bruit court dans les couloirs que le cabinet n'a pas été unanime sur l'opportunité de la déclaration, et que M. Constans, notamment, s'est prononcé contre.

Le 6e bureau s'est prononcé pour l'invalidation de M. du Mesnildot, député de Valognes. M. du Mesnildot, dans la dernière semaine de la période électorale, avait fait distribuer aux électeurs de la circonscription, avec sa profession de foi et ses bulletins de vote, une circulaire anonyme attaquant la nationalité, la naissance et le nom de son concurrent, M. de Lagorsse.

Le 11e bureau proposera aussi l'invalidation de M. Léouzon-Leduc, député boulangiste de la Haute-Vienne.

La révolution du Brésil.

Paris, 16 novembre.

Le ministre des affaires étrangères n'avait reçu samedi à midi, aucune communication officielle de ses agents au sujet de la révolution du Brésil. A la légation du Brésil, on n'avait reçu non plus aucune communication officielle, mais des avis venant de pays voisins du Brésil faisaient incliner les représentants du gouvernement de Rio-Janeiro à considérer comme très probable la nouvelle.

Bruxelles, 16 novembre.

D'après les dépêches reçues par l'*Indépendance belge*, le mouvement insurrectionnel de Rio-Janeiro ne serait autre chose qu'un pronunciamento favorisé par les anciens propriétaires d'esclaves mécontentés par l'émancipation.

Figure 9: Newspaper with published vote outcome on the front page (Vaud, 1889)

Supplementary References

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