Allies of the Weak:
La Résistance and Jews in the Holocaust

Supplementary Materials

Kasia Nalewajko

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Number FFI and FFC insurgents per 1,000 inhabitants (logged)

Note: Units are counties ("cantons") by their 1940 boundaries (Gay, 2021).

Figure A2: Instrument: WWI military victims by place of birth

Number victims per 1,000 inhabitants (logged)

Note: Units are counties ("cantons") by their 1940 boundaries (Gay, 2021). Gray areas are counties in Alsace-Lorraine region that did not form part of France before 1914.

Figure A3: Covariate balance test of WWI soldier death rates on pre-WWI variables (ignorability assumption)

Note: The figure displays OLS coefficients with robust standard errors. Units of analysis are 1940 counties. All specifications include district-level fixed effects and spatial controls (area size, longitude, longitude squared, latitude, latitude squared) to account for spatial autocorrelation. The errors are clustered at military bureau and displayed as confidence intervals. The electoral specifications (1914) involve 2,847 observations (data from Cagé et al., 2023); WWI battles specifications involve 2,912 observations (data from Cagé et al., 2023); 1872 census specifications involve 396 observations (data from Squicciarini, 2020); Other historical specifications involve between 1,303 (average household expenditure) and 1,938 observations (total number of schools and share of catholic schools) (data from Squicciarini, 2020). See Tables A13-A16 in the Dataverse repository for results in table format.

Figure A4: Covariate balance test of post-WWI variables on WWI soldier death rates (exclusion restriction assumption)


Note: The figure displays OLS coefficients with robust standard errors. Units of analysis are 1940 counties. All specifications include district-level fixed effects and spatial controls (area size, longitude, longitude squared, latitude, latitude squared) to account for spatial autocorrelation. The errors are clustered at military bureau and displayed as confidence intervals. The electoral data stems from Cagé et al. (2023). 1919 election specifications involve 2,864 observations; 1924 election specifications involve 2,796 observations; 1932 election specifications involve 2,459 observations; 1936 election specifications involve 1,980 observations; and collaboration specification involves 2,912 observations. See Tables A17-A20 in the Dataverse repository for results in table format.

Figure A5: P-values of reduced-form specifications by maximum number of insurgents in county (DV: count of victims) (exclusion restriction assumption)

Note: The figure displays p-values of the WWI victimisation rate variable from OLS regressions with robust standard errors. The vertical lines refer to the 25th percentile and median distributions of insurgents. The x-axis is truncated. All specifications include the standard minimal controls from main models. The lines stand for lower 25th percentile (N = 767) and median (N = 1470) densities of insurgents. See columns 1 and 2 in Table A3 for results of the 25th percentile regression in a table format.

Figure A6: P-values of reduced-form specifications by maximum number of insurgents in county (DV: proportion of victims) (exclusion restriction assumption)

Note: The figure displays p-values of the WWI victimisation rate variable from OLS regressions with robust standard errors. The vertical lines refer to the 25th percentile and median distributions of insurgents. The x-axis is truncated. All specifications include the standard minimal controls from main models. The lines stand for lower 25th percentile (N = 767) and median (N = 1470) densities of insurgents. See columns 3 and 4 in Table A3 for results of the 25th percentile regression in a table format.

Figure A7: Distribution of p-values in 1,500 simulations of random samples of reduced form specifications (25 percent of total sample size). Outcome: Number Holocaust victims.

Note: P-values associated with robust OLS coefficients of variations of specifications with controls (Table A3, column 1). The vertical line stands for the p-value of 0.05.

Figure A8: Distribution of p-values in 1,500 simulations of random samples of reduced form specifications (25 percent of total sample size). Outcome: Proportion Holocaust victims.

Note: P-values associated with robust OLS coefficients of variations of specifications with controls (Table A3, column 3). The vertical line stands for the p-value of 0.05.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analyses

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
All Jewish victims	3,068	25.2	219.3	0	1	6,826
Deported Jews	3,068	25.0	219.2	0	1	6,826
Murdered Jews	3,068	0.2	1.9	0	0	67
FFI insurgents (gentile)	3,068	67.2	112.8	0	39	3,072
FFC insurgents (gentile)	3,068	16.1	42.0	0	8	1,244
WWI milit. deaths	2,979	416.2	1,228.2	0	336	64,219
Months Vérdun Pétain	2,954	0.8	0.9	0.0	1.0	3.0
1936 population	2,979	13,423.7	28,790.3	69.0	7,887.0	891,808.4
1941 Jewish population	3,068	74.8	424.8	0	8	9,635
Synagogues	3,068	0.1	0.4	0	0	5
Catholic churches	3,068	13.5	8.0	0	12	110
1942 state presence	3,068	2.9	13.9	0	0	452
Collaborators	2,979	18.2	71.4	0.0	4.0	1,420.0
Action Française vote 1919	3,015	0.001	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.2
Franciste vote 1936	2,093	0.000	0.003	0.0	0.0	0.1
Turnout 1936	2,093	0.8	0.1	0.4	0.9	1.1
Empty ballots 1936	2,093	0.001	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.1
Extreme-left votes 1936	2,093	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.0
Left votes 1936	2,093	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.001	0.9
Centre-left votes 1936	2,093	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.2	1.0
Centre-right votes 1936	2,093	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.4	1.0
Right votes 1936	2,093	0.03	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.0
Extreme-right votes 1936	2,093	0.000	0.003	0.0	0.0	0.1
Other votes 1936	2,093	0.01	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.8

Table A2: Main results. Dependent variable: Number Holocaust victims (logged)[1]

	First Stage (1)	Second Stage (2)	First Stage (3)	Second Stage (4)
Insurgent presence		**-2.234****		**-3.259****
		(1.066)		**(1.356)**
WWI military death rates	**0.230*****		**0.212*****	
	(0.074)		**(0.067)**	
1936 population	0.009	0.668***	-0.006	0.600***
	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.026)	(0.100)
Synagogues	-0.042	0.661***	-0.041	0.876***
	(0.050)	(0.200)	(0.064)	(0.321)
Collaborators	0.062**	0.248**	0.047	0.248
	(0.028)	(0.104)	(0.037)	(0.168)
1942 state presence	0.032**	0.345***	0.021	0.326***
	(0.015)	(0.058)	(0.018)	(0.081)
Area size (km2)	0.000***	0.000	0.000**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Longitude	0.104**	0.511***	0.157***	0.779**
	(0.052)	(0.171)	(0.059)	(0.300)
Longitude (sq)	-0.001	-0.005	0.001	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.036)
Latitude	-0.926	-0.056	2.199	9.532
	(1.941)	(5.804)	(1.994)	(9.851)
Latitude (sq)	0.011	0.001	-0.021	-0.093
	(0.021)	(0.062)	(0.022)	(0.104)
Catholic churches			0.002	0.004
			(0.002)	(0.008)
Franciste vote 1936			0.578	6.497**
			(0.670)	(2.620)
Action Française vote 1919			1.203	16.981*
			(4.052)	(9.883)
Turnout 1936			-0.357	-0.386
			(0.326)	(1.529)
Centre-right vote 1936			-0.551	-1.956
			(0.402)	(1.657)
Right vote 1936			-0.181	-1.012
			(0.383)	(1.436)
Centre-left vote 1936			-0.327	-1.350
			(0.371)	(1.485)
Left vote 1936			-0.186	-0.913
			(0.387)	(1.481)
Extreme left vote 1936			-0.299	-0.849
			(0.413)	(1.649)
Occup. zones FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Num.Obs.	2912	2912	1945	1945
Std. errors by:	WWI bureau, Rés. region	WWI bureau, Rés. region	WWI bureau, Rés. region	WWI bureau, Rés. region
F stat. (1st stage)	35	35	18	18
Moran stat.	0.032	0.032	0.006	0.006
Wu-Hausman p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

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[1]Interpreting the results of the regressions with number of victims in the dependent variable indicates that one percent increase in the density of insurgents led to between 1,597 and 1,717 less victims. The coefficients of 2.234 and 3.259 % relate to a mean number of 25.2 Jewish victims in a county; 25.2 x 0.0234 x 2912 units of obs. = 1717; 25.2 x 0.03259 x 1945 units of obs. = 1597.

Table A3: Reduced form regressions.
Sample of counties in the lowest 25th percentile distribution of insurgent density.

	Logged count of Holocaust victims		Logged proportion of Holocaust victims	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WWI military death rates	-0.410	-0.356	-0.100	-0.103
	(0.272)	(0.278)	(0.086)	(0.091)
1936 population	0.211**	0.225**	-0.037	-0.028
	(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.036)	(0.039)
1941 Jewish population			-0.276***	-0.273***
			(0.029)	(0.031)
Synagogues	-0.592*	-0.581	-0.258**	-0.330**
	(0.315)	(0.402)	(0.130)	(0.156)
Collaborators	0.015	0.049	0.051	0.049
	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.035)	(0.038)
1942 state presence	0.238**	0.220*	0.105***	0.107**
	(0.097)	(0.114)	(0.036)	(0.045)
Catholic churches	0.002	0.003	0.005	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Action Française vote 1919	-27.654	-45.061	-16.262	-12.998
	(19.390)	(31.365)	(14.899)	(16.572)
Area size (km2)	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Longitude	0.214	0.238	0.080	0.092
	(0.155)	(0.177)	(0.078)	(0.085)
Longitude (sq)	-0.020	-0.020	-0.022	-0.023
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Latitude	1.117	1.612	-1.533	-1.572
	(5.872)	(5.880)	(2.187)	(2.297)
Latitude (sq)	-0.011	-0.016	0.015	0.016
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Turnout 1924		0.771		-0.028
		(1.142)		(0.482)
Right vote 1924		0.224		-0.272
		(1.447)		(0.615)
Centre-right vote 1924		1.107		-0.065
		(1.236)		(0.514)
Centre-left vote 1924		0.436		-0.195
		(1.578)		(0.636)
Left vote 1924		1.256		-0.275
		(1.490)		(0.645)
Extreme left vote 1924		-0.755		-0.687
		(1.632)		(0.613)
Fixed effects	Districts, Occup. zones	Districts, Occup. zones	Districts, Occup. zones	Districts, Occup. zones
Num.Obs.	624	597	624	597
R2	0.451	0.453	0.645	0.641
R2 Adj.	0.237	0.221	0.505	0.487
AStd.Errors by:	WWI bureau	WWI bureau	WWI bureau	WWI bureau

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

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Table A4: Reduced form regressions. Full sample.

	Logged count of Holocaust victims		Logged proportion of Holocaust victims	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WWI military death rates	-0.732***	-0.498***	-0.313***	-0.169***
	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.066)	(0.052)
1936 population	0.824***	0.604***	0.262***	0.124***
	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.026)	(0.025)
1941 Jewish population			-0.293***	-0.266***
			(0.025)	(0.016)
Synagogues	0.912***	0.748***	0.398***	0.163**
	(0.158)	(0.173)	(0.128)	(0.076)
Area size (km2)	-0.001***	-0.001	0.000**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Longitude	0.206**	0.255***	0.035	0.063
	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.043)	(0.049)
Longitude (sq)	-0.001	-0.004	0.002	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Latitude	1.504	1.401	1.234	0.931
	(4.355)	(4.468)	(2.253)	(2.213)
Latitude (sq)	-0.017	-0.016	-0.014	-0.010
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Collaborators		0.132**		0.053*
		(0.065)		(0.029)
1942 state presence		0.284***		0.163***
		(0.041)		(0.021)
Catholic churches		0.004		0.000
		(0.004)		(0.002)
Action Française vote 1919		8.945*		5.369
		(5.321)		(4.751)
Turnout 1924		0.626		-0.085
		(0.476)		(0.204)
Right vote 1924		0.488		0.483**
		(0.633)		(0.245)
Centre-right vote 1924		0.965**		0.440*
		(0.490)		(0.238)
Centre-left vote 1924		0.085		0.346
		(0.609)		(0.307)
Left vote 1924		0.907		0.433*
		(0.577)		(0.251)
Extreme left vote 1924		0.837		0.552*
		(0.707)		(0.299)
Fixed effects	Districts, Occup. zones	Districts, Occup. zones	Districts, Occup. zones	Districts, Occup. zones
Num.Obs.	2912	2755	2912	2755
R2	0.552	0.531	0.522	0.525
R2 Adj.	0.507	0.480	0.474	0.472
Std.Errors by:	WWI bureau	WWI bureau	WWI bureau	WWI bureau

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

B   Additional information to "Data: Sources and Measurement" Section

B.1   Predicting wartime Jewish presence

There is no register of prewar Jewish population in France due to the French constitutional principle of "laïcité" (secularism). At any rate, such register would misrepresent wartime ethnic composition of France, because Jews migrated on a massive scale—internally and abroad—especially at the beginning of the war. The best example of how unprecedented the exodus was is the case of Alsace-Lorraine region. All the Jews who lived there were forced to leave their homes and were resettled to the Massif Central region (e.g., Reviriego, 2003). While the ethnic French population did go back to their homes after the terms of the armistice were concluded, Jews by and large did not. I therefore decide not to attempt the estimation of the prewar Jewish population in France.

Instead, I gather census province-level data from Klarsfeld (1983) (N=229,577[2] across 90 provinces) and employ an OLS prediction model to allocate people across the province-nested counties. Firstly, I run a province-level regression of Jews' wartime presence on chosen covariates to determine influential predictors. I then use the resulting coefficients to compute county-level weights that are used to distribute the populations. The final model uses predictors of (1) prewar population estimates that I code manually from "The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life before and during the Holocaust" (Spector and Wigoder, 2001) (382,999 individuals across 97 localities), (2) total population figures from the 1936 census, (3) the difference between 1936 and 1931 population figures that captures—among other demographic changes—the Jewish migration from Germany and some parts of Eastern Europe, (4) number of synagogues, (5) political and military posts as of December 1940 (see DHI database described in the main text), (6) kilometres of railway as of 1922 (Pengl et al., ming), and (7) mean elevation.[3] To make sure that thus-generated predictions are reliable and that my main results are not due to an erroneous distribution of the population, I conduct two placebo tests.

Firstly, I randomly allocate the population values across the province-nested counties and run my main model with thus-specified dependent variable. I do it to check how consequential it is to approximate the true population distribution. I repeat this exercise 1,500 times. The results of this test are displayed in Figure B.1. It turns out that less than five percent of thus-specified models return statistically significant results on my main independent variable—a proportion that is expected due to chance. This means that not any distribution will do. In order to conduct a valid test of the existence of the theorised relationship I need to approximate the

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[2]The number is lower than the prewar 330,000 estimate, because the Nazi census disregarded children (involved people of 15 years old and above) and did not include the Jews who managed to flee abroad in 1940.

[3]In some counties, thus-estimated total Jewish population turns out to be 0. To deal with the zeros in nominator and denominator I therefore use the log of $\frac{(\text{number victims}+1)}{(\text{allocated Jewish population}+1)}$. In some counties the estimated population is lower than the number of victims. I do not adjust these estimates post-hoc.

Figure B1: Distribution of p-values in 1,500 simulations of alternative denominator specifications. Specifications based on random allocation of Jewish populations across the counties.

Note: P-values associated with 2SLS coefficients of variations of fully controlled base specifications (Table 2, column 4). The vertical line stands for the p-value of 0.05.

Table B1: OLS regressions of predicted and evenly-distributed values of Jews' presence on the logged number of Holocaust victims

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1941 Jewish population (predicted)	0.369***	0.170***		
	(0.018)	(0.017)		
1941 Jewish population (evenly distributed)			0.404***	0.214***
			(0.018)	(0.019)
1936 population		0.668***		0.627***
		(0.037)		(0.037)
Synagogues		0.958***		1.073***
		(0.165)		(0.160)
Collaborators		0.224***		0.254***
		(0.055)		(0.055)
1942 state presence		0.266***		0.266***
		(0.030)		(0.030)
Area size (km2)		-0.001***		-0.001***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Longitude		0.143***		0.113***
		(0.012)		(0.013)
Longitude (sq)		-0.024***		-0.020***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Latitude		1.947***		1.851***
		(0.450)		(0.448)
Latitude (sq)		-0.022***		-0.021***
		(0.005)		(0.005)
(Intercept)	0.306***	-49.436***	0.111**	-47.402***
	(0.040)	(10.354)	(0.044)	(10.306)
Occup. zone FE	—	✓	—	✓
Num.Obs.	3066	2979	3068	2979
R2	0.198	0.486	0.216	0.490
R2 Adj.	0.198	0.484	0.216	0.488

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

true distribution of the Jewish population across France.

Secondly, I therefore check whether my estimation approximates this true distribution by comparing its prediction power with an alternative, even allocation. Jews' presence depended on social ties, risk appreciation and economic conditions, so we know that an even distribution is an imperfect approximation. However, if the province-level data is of good quality, we should expect the even distribution to reflect to some extent the Jewish presence independently of the error. Table B1 shows simple binary correlations (columns 1 and 3) and correlations in models with basic controls (columns 2 and 4). All the variables in the model except for the dummy "synagogues" and the longitude and latitude controls have been log transformed. If either of the Jewish population measures approximates the true distribution, we would expect it to be correlated with victim statistics.

The results suggest that both measures are very strongly and substantively associated with victim statistics even when controlling for total population figures and presence of a synagogue. Similar substantive significance levels and R-squared statistics across both measures suggest that the predicted measure fares similarly to a simple "even" distribution. These results are reassuring, because they show that the gathered province-level data on Jews' presence

are of high quality. Importantly, I cannot use the even distribution in my main models as one of my strategies for handling unobserved heterogeneity is to include district-level fixed effects in my specifications. Due to perfect multicollinearity, thus-specified Jews' presence would be effectively dropped out of the model and prevent me from estimating the main relationship of interest. It is therefore important to know that the proposed predicted measure is similarly accurate to the "even" alternative, while at the same time offering the advantage of being econometrically usable.

I am therefore assured that my prediction approach not only approximates the true distribution of Jewish wartime population, but also that my main results are not due to chance.

B.2 Assigning Jewish ethnicity to La Résistance members

To classify La Résistance members as either Jewish or gentile, I match insurgents' surnames against the records of the Avotaynu platform, which gathers historical and contemporaneous genealogical records of Jews from around the world. I search each surname (190,000 unique

Figure B2: Estimates of the number of Jewish insurgents in La Résistance

Note: Results of the surname matching exercise, conditional on the step-wise classification of the French surnames as Jewish, by surname popularity. Matching was performed against Avotaynu internet search engine. The value of "0.00" on the X-axis corresponds to the complete exclusion of all insurgents initially classified as Jewish who bore French surnames. The resulting estimation of 2 percent corresponds to all foreigner fighters among La Résistance ranks who were classified as Jews. The value of "1.00" on the X-axis signifies that all insurgents with French surnames are included, which results in the estimate of 34 percent of Jewish insurgents among La Résistance. The value of 0.99 excludes only the most popular French surnames, such as "Dupont" or "Martin."

values) in the Jewish names' search engine that contains 700,000 Jewish surnames gathered from across 42 databases. I assign the Jewish ethnic status to all exact matches that appear in more than one database. In the next step, to make sure I do not commit the Type I error by over-assigning the Jewish ethnic status to people with surnames commonly shared by both Jews and non-Jews, I discard all matches that were common surnames in WWII France. To construct the measure of the surname popularity, I summarise the frequency of surnames given at birth to people born on the territory of France between 1891 and 1940. To do that, I use the birth records of the Insee Institute (INSEE, 2018). Figure B2 shows the results of the exercise.

Given my reliance on the insurgents' surnames uniquely, it is difficult to ascertain the true proportion of Jews among La Résistance ranks as there are no official statistics of their involvement (Diamant, 1962; Poznanski, 1995). While the estimate of 34 percent relative to the point "1.00" on the X-axis surely contains Type I error as it classifies as Jewish also those insurgents who bore surnames typical for non-Jews, but also sometimes borne by Jews (e.g., "Dupont" or "Martin"), the exclusion of all typical surnames inevitably ends up dismissing typically Jewish surnames as well, producing the Type II error. Thus, e.g., the 98th percentile on the X-axis (14 percent estimate) excludes from the list all insurgents who bore the typically Jewish surname "Lévy." Michel (1970, 191) suggests in fact that participation of Jews in La Résistance was higher than that of any other religious or ethnic group. I cautiously conclude that the true proportion falls somewhere between 5 and 15 percent. This is significant if we consider that Jews constituted only one percent of the prewar French population and that only approximately 1.5-3 percent of the French population joined La Résistance. In fact, this estimate might be conservative, because numerous surnames of foreign origin in the original database contain spelling errors while my matching strategy against the genealogical databases of Avotaynu includes exact matches only. Figure 3 in the main text shows the distribution of the results by insurgent group. I use the conservative estimates respective to the 99th percentile results.

B.3   Assigning 1936 French election parties to left-right spectrum

I follow the below protocol developed by Cagé et al. (2023, Online Appendix):

- extreme left: *Parti communiste français*;

- left: *Parti socialiste - Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière*, miscellaneous left;

- centre-left: *Union socialiste républicaine* and *Radicaux Socialistes*;

- centre-right: *Alliance démocratique*, *Fédération républicaine - Union républicaine et démocratique*, *Parti républicain national*;

- right: *Parti agraire et paysan français*, miscellaneous right;

- miscallaneous "other" parties (baseline for comparison).

C Additional information to "Method" Section

C.1 Spatial autocorrelation

Spatial autocorrelation is a serious concern in studies with geographical units of observation that try to assess relationships between phenomena over time (Kelly, 2020). To make sure that my results are not mere reflections of persistence of local conditions, I follow five steps.

As described in the main article:

1. In my regressions I include district-level ("arrondissement") fixed effects (N=283). Districts are administrative units one level above counties. Due to high granularity, they are the hardest administrative measure I can account for.[4]

2. To account for the potentially adverse effects of directional gradients, I add longitude and latitude controls together with their squared variants.

3. I employ two-way clustering at the level of the assignment (county military bureau b that determined level and character of exposure to WWI violence and strategy; N=162) and the treatment (county Résistance military region r that determined leadership strategy and the resulting incentives and resources for helping the Jews; N=27).

4. I perform Moran tests to numerically assess the potential scale of the problem, even after the inclusion of the above controls. I find no spatial autocorrelation as the highest Moran statistic is only 0.015.

Additionally, to make sure that extreme values do not drive my results, I repeat my main specification model removing one resistance region at a time. Figures C1 and C2 show results of the test. Independently of which region is excluded, the main coefficient of interests remains statistically significant.

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[4]See Tables A5 and A6 in the Dataverse repository for additional specifications with province level-fixed effects (N=87).

Figure C1: 2SLS results removing one Résistance region at a time (assessing influential cases). Dependent variable: Number Holocaust victims (logged)

Note: The figure displays 2SLS coefficients. Units of analysis are 1940 counties. All specifications are replications of main results (Table 3, column 4).

Figure C2: 2SLS results removing one Résistance region at a time (assessing influential cases). Dependent variable: Proportion Holocaust victims (logged)

Note: The figure displays 2SLS coefficients. Units of analysis are 1940 counties. All specifications are replications of main results (Table 3, column 4).

D   Scope conditions (extended discussion)

In this section I discuss in more detail the two scope conditions I mention in the main article, (1) the importance of inclusive ideologies and (2) the limiting effects of the extraordinary state targeting. The first condition makes the theory most applicable to genocides where either left-leaning or coethnic insurgents are present. The second condition suggests that given the increased victimisation during times of extreme targeting, the theory is most applicable to longer-unfolding genocides where the weak actors (insurgents and genocide targets) have time to adapt their response strategies to the realities of the persecution. I contrast these two conditions with evidence from other genocides.

Firstly, insurgents harbouring inclusive ideologies exhibited higher rates of "moral" motivations and were the most likely to help the persecuted. Most probably, inclusive ideologies are therefore more likely than exclusive ones to increase insurgent assistance. This interpretation could explain why "deviant" provinces with high insurgent density exhibited more extreme but directionally similar behaviour to their ideologically "typical" counterparts. The insurgents in the "deviant" left-wing province, Dordogne, assisted the Jews even more than insurgents in the "typical" left-wing Creuse. Conversely, the insurgents in the "deviant" right-wing province, Vosges, assisted the Jews less than insurgents in the "typical" Doubs. This interpretation is also supported by the quantitative results, since my instrument is more likely to isolate the effect of the "moral" insurgents; those who joined La Résistance out of anti-German sentiments would have been more likely to support Jews out of "structural balance" motivations.

In Poland, left-wing socialist and communist insurgent groups and individuals were more likely to help Jews than their right-wing counterparts. Some nationalist Home Army (AK) units from rural regions of Eastern Poland regarded Jews as a Soviet enemy and would even murder hiding Jewish civilians (Zimmerman, 2015, 267-298).[5] Conversely, socialist and communist partisans from the same regions—e.g., Polish People's Army (PAL) and GL/AL—would assist the Jews in hiding and admit them into their ranks (Bańkowska et al., 2005, 159-164). Polish government in exile, the executive arm of AK, sponsored *Żegota* network which helped Jews hiding in Warsaw, Cracow and Lwów. Among its many feats, it forged 50,000 *sets* of false documents and connected many with trusted Polish rescuers (Zimmerman, 2015, 306). However, the Polish Secret State could have acted on "material" incentives when establishing the network by seeking to use *Żegota* for its propaganda abroad: "saving human lives (...) was not their most important goal" (Urynowicz, 2006, 224) ("reputational" motivation in Table 1, main text). At any rate, the *Żegota* helpers working on the ground were members of left-wing parties and most of them were Jewish (Urynowicz, 2006, 239). They acted on identifiably "moral" motivations. For example, Irena Sendler—a member of the Polish Socialist Party who smuggled 2,500 Jewish babies and children out of the Warsaw ghetto—said to have acted on

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[5]This feeling was reciprocal. Jews regarded nationalist Polish partisan units as "an enemy equally dangerous as the Germans" (Ainsztein, 1974; Bańkowska et al., 2005; Gutman and Krakowski, 1986; Krzyzanowski, 2020).

ethical grounds (Skinner, 2011). Another well-documented large-scale assistance to 250 Jews by AK took place in Hanaczów near Lwów. The unit likely acted on "moral" motivations as well; since the region was majority-Ukrainian, it would have been possible for minority Poles to empathise with the Jews (Zimmerman, 2015, 314-317) ("empathy" motivation in Table 1, main text).

Secondly, presence of insurgents was helpful to the targeted group only for as long as the state did not strategically target those regions. In the French case, the studied "deviant" provinces were exposed to higher levels of persecution of partisans and Jews, and to indiscriminate violence against civilians during the volatile beginning and end of the occupation (1940 and 1944). The highest proportions of survivors from my sample who were arrested and deported to Auschwitz were from Dordogne (17%), Vosges (24%), but also from the "typical" Gironde (18%), where insurgent density was low.[6] This reconciles my findings with previous studies of insurgency in civil war and means that the positive impact of insurgents on the survival of the persecuted is more likely to transpire in longer-unfolding genocides such as that of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and less likely in short, high-intensity genocides such as the one in Rwanda.

The Rwandan genocide took only 10 days to engulf some 80 percent of all of its victims (Straus, 2006, 57). It would have therefore been impossible for the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—the Tutsi rebel troops—to react on time. Noteworthily however, the only commune where the genocide did not take place was Giti, where the RPF insurgents arrived just before the onset of violence in the rest of the country: "If the *Inkotanyi*[7] had not arrived, there would have been massacres," believed a survivor interviewed by Straus (2006, 87). In contrast, the Armenian Genocide spanned almost two years. There, Kurds of Dersim—who were not insurgents strictly speaking, but who lived in opposition to the central Ottoman government and in full control of their mountainous territory—helped to smuggle and shelter up to 15,000 Armenians fleeing villages from the 100 km radius.[8] Being a minority themselves they could have acted on "moral" motivations, especially because they saved some Armenians for free. However, we also know that they did require payments from most (Kévorkian, 2011, 421-422; Suny, 2015, 322-323).

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[6]All three experienced heightened counterinsurgency campaigns. See Dataverse repository Section H.7 for more details.

[7]A synonym for the RPF.

[8]See also the case of Musa Dagh insurgency in Çiçek (2020).

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