A Online Appendix

A.1 A model of debate participation

A parsimonious model of debate participation elucidates relationships between candidates' characteristics, their participation in electoral debates, their campaigning responses, and their ultimate electoral results. The model suggests some key conditions, accounting for the fact that candidates can decide whether to participate or not, under which electoral debates have stratified electoral consequences. The objective of the model is then to formalize key aspects of our theoretical framework while helping to rationalize some of our results on candidates' self-selection into debate participation and subsequent campaigning responses.

Agents and preferences

We consider a probabilistic voting model with two candidates: an incumbent (I) and an opposition challenger (O), with $c \in \{I, O\}$. Each candidate has g_c, which represents her ability to deliver policies for her constituents. This could, in principle, depend both on her policy priorities and her competence, which is likely to determine the fulfillment of those priorities (Denter, 2021; Groseclose, 2001).

Candidates can engage in campaigning either through mass communications, such as the radio (r_c), or through on-the-ground efforts such as local rallies and speeches (v_c). The cost of each campaigning strategy is quadratic and additively separable. Candidates can also decide whether to debate, $d \in \{0, 1\}$, whose effect we discuss later, and pay the associated cost ψ_c, which represents the direct costs of participation, including time and resources to participate, we discuss in our theoretical framework.

Candidates maximize their expected vote share net of the cost of campaigning and debating, $\pi_c\left(d_c, r_c, v_c, d_{-c}, r_{-c}, v_{-c}\right) - \frac{1}{2\rho_c} r_c^2 - \frac{1}{2\rho_c} v_c^2 - d_c\psi_c$, where $\frac{1}{\rho_c}$ and ψ_c capture the candidate-specific marginal cost of campaigning and debating.

A constituent, i, accrues the following utility from voting for candidate c:

$$V_i\left(g_c, d_c, r_c, v_c\right) = g_c\left(d_c\right)\left[\left(1 + \alpha d_c\right) r_c + v_c\right] - \delta_i 1\left(c = I\right),$$

where g_c is the candidate's ability to deliver policies and has a Normal prior distribution with $g_c \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_0, \tau_c^2)$ with publicly known $\mu_0 \geq 0$ and τ_c^2. r_c and v_c are the campaigning terms as above, and δ_i is an idiosyncratic valence shock towards the incumbent, which is drawn from a uniform distribution $d_i \sim \mathrm{U}\left(-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$. Both campaigning strategies can be thought of as raising the salience of g_c.

Debate participation has two effects. First, it provides a signal, s_c, about g_c, drawn from $s_c \sim \mathcal{N}(g_c, \sigma_c^2)$ with publicly known σ_c. As a result, g_c has a posterior Normal distribution $g_c \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\mu_0 + d_c u_c, \frac{\sigma_c^2 \tau_c^2}{\sigma_c^2 + d_c \tau_c^2}\right)$, where $u_c = \frac{\tau_c^2}{\sigma^2 + \tau_c^2}\left(s_c - \mu_0\right)$ denotes the change in expected g_c when the candidate c debates ($d_c = 1$). This is positive if the signal s_c is greater than the prior mean μ_0. As the notation reflects, we assume that the prior distribution of g_c for all candidates is centered at the same μ_0, but that the precision of the prior distribution and debate signal (τ_c^2 and σ_c^2) varies across candidates. In particular, we assume that $\tau_I^2 < \tau_O^2$, since constituents are likely to be more certain about incumbents, and $\sigma_I^2 < \sigma_O^2$, since constituents are likely to pay more attention to incumbents when they debate.[23]

[23] Our assumptions on μ_0 and τ_c^2 map onto the descriptive statistics we present in Table 7, where incumbents are not better aligned with their constituents *on average* (column 1) but constituents are much more certain about

Second, we assume that $\alpha > 0$, and hence that debate participation boosts the effect of radio campaigning after the debates. This is justified by the nature of the initiative we study, which entailed the broadcasting of debates over the radio. Importantly, this parametrization does *not* impose a necessary complementarity between debate participation and different forms of campaigning, as we show later. We simply assume that the relationship with on-the-radio campaigning after the debates is boosted by candidate debating due to their mode of dissemination.

Information structure and timing

The information structure and timing are as follows:

1. Nature draws g_c and s_c from their corresponding distributions.
2. Candidates privately observe their s_c.
3. Candidates decide whether to debate, d_c.
4. Candidates choose the extent to which they campaign, r_c and v_c.
5. Voters cast their vote for a candidate.
6. Payoffs are realized.

This information structure and timing are quite standard, although it is worth highlighting our simplifying assumption that candidates are aware of how they will perform at the debate (s_c) if they choose to attend. It is straightforward to see that, if candidates had the same information as constituents, the model would deliver uninteresting results. Moreover, if candidates only had *relatively* more information than constituents (e.g., modeled through an interim signal about their g_c), including the case that incumbents were better informed than challengers, the model would deliver qualitatively similar results to what we find below.

Equilibrium

Integrating constituents over the distribution of δ_i, the vote share for candidate c is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_c\left(d_c, r_c, v_c, d_{-c}, r_{-c}, v_{-c}\right) &= \frac{1}{2} + \left(\mu_0 + d_c u_c\right)\left(\left(1 + \alpha d_c\right) r_c + v_c\right) - \\ &\quad \left(\mu_0 + d_{-c} u_{-c}\right)\left(\left(1 + \alpha d_{-c}\right) r_{-c} + v_{-c}\right).\end{aligned}$$

Definition *A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is* $\{d_c^*, r_c^*, v_c^*\}$ *for* $c \in \{I, O\}$*, such that:*

$$\left\{r_c^*\left(d_c\right), v_c^*\left(d_c\right)\right\} = \arg\max_{\{d_c, r_c, v_c\}} \left\{\pi_c\left(d_c, r_c, v_c, d_{-c}, r_{-c}, v_{-c}\right) - \frac{1}{2\rho_c} r_c^2 - \frac{1}{2\rho_c} v_c^2\right\},$$

and that:

$$\begin{aligned}d_c^* = \arg\max_{d_c} \quad \{ \quad & \pi_c(d_c, r_c^*\left(d_c\right), v_c^*\left(d_c\right), d_{-c}, r_{-c}^*\left(d_{-c}\right), v_{-c}^*\left(d_{-c}\right)) \\ & -\frac{1}{2} r_c^{*2}\left(d_c\right) - \frac{1}{2} v_c^{*2}\left(d_c\right) - d_c \psi_c \quad \}.\end{aligned}$$

the extent of this alignment. Our assumption on σ_c^2 relates to the discussion in our theoretical framework about constituents' attention to different candidates in a debate.

To solve for the equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that $r_c^*(d_c) = \rho_c(\mu_0 + d_c u_c)(1 + \alpha d_c)$ and that $v_c^*(d_c) = \rho_c(\mu_0 + d_c u_c)$. With these values, we have that:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_c\left(d_c, r_c^*(d_c), v_c^*(d_c), d_{-c}, r_{-c}^*(d_{-c}), v_{-c}^*(d_{-c})\right) &= \frac{1}{2} + \rho_c(\mu_0 + d_c u_c)^2\left((1+\alpha d_c)^2 + 1\right) - \\ &\quad \rho_{-c}(\mu_0 + d_{-c}u_{-c})^2\left((1+\alpha d_{-c})^2 + 1\right).\end{aligned}$$

To determine d_c^*, we evaluate the incentives to attend the debate relative to not. Specifically, we assess the conditions for $\frac{\partial \pi_c\left(d_c, r_c^*(d_c), v_c^*(d_c), d_{-c}, r_{-c}^*(d_{-c}), v_{-c}^*(d_{-c})\right)}{\partial d_c}(d_c = 0) - \psi_c \geq 0$ and thus that candidate c has an incentive to attend the debate, i.e., $d_c^* = 1$.

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \pi_c\left(d_c, r_c^*(d_c), v_c^*(d_c), d_{-c}, r_{-c}^*(d_{-c}), v_{-c}^*(d_{-c})\right)}{\partial d_c} - \psi_c &= 2\rho_c(\mu_0 + d_c u_c)u_c\left((1+\alpha d_c)^2 + 1\right) + \\ &\quad \rho_c(\mu_0 + d_c u_c)^2 2\alpha(1+\alpha d_c) - \psi_c.\end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi_c\left(d_c, r_c^*(d_c), v_c^*(d_c), d_{-c}, r_{-c}^*(d_{-c}), v_{-c}^*(d_{-c})\right)}{\partial d_c}(d_c = 0) - \psi_c = 4\rho_c\mu_0 u_c + 2\rho_c\mu_0^2\alpha - \psi_c.$$

Since $\mu_0 \geq 0$, note that $\frac{\partial \pi_c(.)}{\partial d_c}(d_c = 0) - \psi_c \geq 0$ only if the signal is positive, $u_c \geq 0$, and the cost of debating, ψ_c, is sufficiently low, $\psi_c \leq 2\rho_c\mu_0^2\alpha$. However, and more interestingly, $\frac{\partial \pi_c(.)}{\partial d_c}(d_c = 0) - \psi_c \geq 0$ under certain conditions, even if the signal is lower than the prior, $u_c < 0$, and the cost of debating, ψ_c, is sufficiently low. We discuss this point below, along with the conditions under which a candidate is more likely to participate, after we characterize the equilibrium.

Proposition *A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is* $\{d_c^*, r_c^*, v_c^*\}$ *for* $c \in \{I, O\}$, *such that*

$$(d_c^*, r_c^*, v_c^*) = \begin{cases} (0, \mu_0, \mu_0) & \text{if } 4\rho_c\mu_0 u_c + 2\rho_c\mu_0^2\alpha - \psi_c < 0, \\ (1, \rho_c(\mu_0 + u_c)(1+\alpha), \rho_c(\mu_0 + u_c)) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Comparative statics and predictions

Next, we turn to some comparative statics, which we split across several corollaries depending on the outcomes and variations we consider. We start by analyzing what predicts debate attendance.

Corollary 1 *A candidate c is more likely to attend to the debate if:*

1. *The debate signal,* s_c, *is higher:*
   Fixing τ_c^2, σ_c^2, $\frac{1}{\rho_c}$ *and* ψ_c, $d_c^* = 1$ *if* $s_c \geq \mu_0\left(1 - \frac{\alpha\left(\sigma_c^2 + \tau_c^2\right)}{2\tau_c^2}\right) + \frac{\sigma_c^2 + \tau_c^2}{4\mu_0\tau_c^2}\frac{\psi_c}{\rho_c}$;
2. *The variance of the signal that debate participation provides,* σ_c^2, *is higher:*
   Fixing s_c, τ_c^2, $\frac{1}{\rho_c}$ *and* ψ_c, $d_c^* = 1$ *if* $\sigma_c^2 \geq 2\frac{\tau_c^2}{\mu_0\alpha}(\mu_0 - s_c) - \frac{\psi_c}{\rho_c} - \tau_c^2$;
3. *The variance of the prior distribution,* τ_c^2, *is lower:*
   Fixing s_c, σ_c^2, $\frac{1}{\rho_c}$ *and* ψ_c, $d_c^* = 1$ *if* $\frac{2\mu_0^2\alpha - \frac{\psi_c}{\rho_c}\sigma_c^2}{\left[4\mu_0(\mu_0 - s_c) + \frac{\psi_c}{\rho_c}\right]} \geq \tau_c^2$.

4. *The marginal cost of campaigning and debating, $\frac{1}{\rho_c}$ and ψ_c, are lower.*
Fixing, s_c, τ_c^2 and σ_c^2, $d_c^* = 1$ if $\frac{\psi_c}{\rho_c} \leq 4\mu_0 u_c + 2\mu_0^2\alpha$.

The first result rationalizes that candidates who are expected to perform better are more likely to attend the debate on average, which we observe among the always-takers for both incumbents and challengers.

The second result rationalizes that less prominent candidates, which are likely to be challengers since $\sigma_I^2 < \sigma_O^2$, are more likely to participate. Intuitively, since constituents pay more attention to more prominent candidates, such as incumbents, potentially poor performance by less prominent candidates will be internalized less by voters.

The third result rationalizes that candidates self-selecting into participation are likely to be those with a more precise prior, τ_c, as we see for always-takers. Importantly, while we see incumbents being less likely to participate, which might be at odds with this last result, it is important to note that incumbent candidates have a smaller σ_c^2 and likely greater direct cost of participation ψ_c, as we discuss in our theoretical framework.

The last result is quite intuitive when it comes to the marginal cost of debating, ψ_c. However, it is less so when it comes to the marginal cost of campaigning, $\frac{1}{\rho_c}$, which we conceive as lower for incumbents, who have access to greater and cheaper resources. This result then rationalizes that more prominent candidates, who are more resourceful, are more likely to select into debating.

Next, we analyze what the average effects of debate participation on radio and on-the-ground campaigning are, and how they vary by the signal that the debate provides about the candidate.

Corollary 2 *The average effects of debate participation on radio and on-the-ground campaigning,*

$$r_c^*(d_c = 1) - r_c^*(d_c = 0) = \rho_c(u_c + (\mu_0 + u_c)\alpha),$$
$$v_c^*(d_c = 1) - v_c^*(d_c = 0) = \rho_c u_c,$$

depend on whether the signal s_c is higher (lower) than the prior μ_0, $u_c \geq 0$ ($u_c < 0$).

The results from this corollary highlight that, even if $u_c < 0$, as long as the overall posterior, $\mu_0 + u_c$, remains positive, debating contributes to on-the-radio campaigning. Candidates might then have an incentive to debate even if their debate signal s_c is lower than the prior μ_0 (as highlighted above). In particular, one might see poor debate performance associated with lower on-the-ground campaigning, but more or no effect on radio campaigning, compared to no debate participation. As Figure A5 shows, in our setting, debate *performance* positively correlates with campaigning in general, and more strongly for radio campaigning than on-the-ground.

Next, we assess what the average effects of debate participation on expected g_c and its precision depend on.

Corollary 3 *The average effect of debate participation on $E[g_c]$ and $\frac{1}{V(g_c)}$,*

$$E[g_c|d_c = 1] - E[g_c|d_c = 0] = u_c,$$
$$\frac{1}{V(g_c|d_c = 1)} - \frac{1}{V(g_c|d_c = 0)} = \frac{1}{\sigma_c^2},$$

are respectively increasing in the change in expected g_c when c debates, u_c, and thus s_c, and the precision of the signal that the debate provides, $\frac{1}{\sigma_c^2}$.

The second result highlights that, since we assume that $\sigma_I^2 < \sigma_O^2$, the increase in precision should be greater for incumbent candidates.

Lastly, we turn to analyze the effects of debate participation on candidate vote share, and how it varies by the signal that the debate provides.

Corollary 4 *The effect of debate participation on candidate vote share for those choosing to participate, i.e.,* $d_c^* = 1$,

$$\pi_c\left(1, r_c^*, v_c^*, r_{-c}^*, r_{-c}^*, v_{-c}^*\right) - \pi_c\left(0, r_c^*, v_c^*, d_{-c}^*, r_{-c}^*, v_{-c}^*\right) = \rho_c\left(\mu_0 + u_c\right)^2\left(\left(1+\alpha\right)^2 + 1\right) - 2\rho_c\mu_0^2$$

is always positive. Moreover, we can guarantee that this effect changes with respect to the signal that the debate participation provides,

$$\frac{\partial^2 \pi_c}{\partial d_c s_c}\left(d_c^* = 1\right) = 2\frac{\tau^2}{\sigma_c^2 + \tau^2}\rho_c \left[\begin{array}{c} u_c\left(\left(1+\alpha\right)^2 + 1\right) + \\ \left(\mu_0 + u_c\right)\left(2\left(1+\alpha\right)^2 + \alpha^2\right)\end{array}\right],$$

positively when such signal is higher than the prior, $u_c \geq 0$.

The first result of the corollary is straightforward to show using that $d_c^* = 1$ only if $4\mu_0 u_c + 2\mu_0^2\alpha - \frac{\psi_c}{\rho_c}_c \geq 0$. Importantly, this theoretical result does not contradict our empirical result that challengers who attend the debates as a result of treatment assignment suffer electorally. Because π depends on both c and $-c$, the differential selection into debate participation by candidate type shapes who benefits and loses electorally due to treatment assignment.

To show the second result of the corollary, note that

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial^2 \pi_c}{\partial d_c \partial s_c} &= 2\frac{\tau_c^2}{\sigma_c^2 + \tau_c^2}\rho_c\left(\mu_0 + 2d_c u_c\right)\left(\left(1+\alpha d_c\right)^2 + 1\right) + \\ &\quad 2d_c\frac{\tau_c^2}{\sigma_c^2 + \tau_c^2}\rho_c\left(\mu_0 + d_c u_c\right)2\alpha\left(1+\alpha d_c\right),\end{aligned}$$

and reorganizing terms that,

$$\frac{\partial^2 \pi_c}{\partial d_c \partial s_c} = 2\frac{\tau_c^2}{\sigma_c^2 + \tau_c^2}\rho_c \left[\begin{array}{c} d_c u_c\left(\left(1+\alpha d_c\right)^2 + 1\right) + \\ \left(\mu_0 + d_c u_c\right)\left(2\left(1+\alpha d_c\right)^2 + \left(\alpha d_c\right)^2\right)\end{array}\right].$$

Using that $d_c^* = 1$, one easily arrives at the second expression in the corollary, which is clearly positive if $u_c \geq 0$. Importantly, this second result of the corollary might explain why we have positive interactions of the treatment and candidates' expected performance for incumbents but not for challengers. As explained earlier and corroborated by the experimental results, the former are much more likely to be better selected.

A.2 Classifying candidates as leading candidates

For every candidate running for office we constructed an indicator variable for whether the candidate was a *predicted leading candidate*. We constructed this indicator as follows, in a

sequential fashion until there were three per district: (1) if a candidate was the incumbent; (2) if the candidate ran in the 2011 election and placed 2nd or 3rd; and (3) if the candidate was from a top party. We defined top parties as, sequentially, the incumbent Unity Party (UP), Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC), Liberty Party (LP), the Alternative National Congress (ANC) and the All Liberia Party (ALP). This process resulted in three selected candidates in all districts. These *predicted leading candidates* are then split into two groups: whether the candidate is the *incumbent* or whether they are a *predicted challenger*, i.e., a non-incumbent predicted leading candidate. The incumbent ran in 64/73 (88%) of races, and so in the remaining 9 districts all three of these candidates are coded as challengers. One additional incumbent ran in a new district and is consequently coded as a challenger. Validating our indicator for top candidates with actual electoral results, we find that in 50% of cases our predicted leading candidates came in the top three in their district, and in 71% of cases came in the top five. Given our aim to identify a set of relevant candidates who had plausible chances at electoral success and voters would be interested in, we consider the exercise to be successful.

We show in Table A20 that, using the 'actual' leading candidates who placed in the top three in the election—whether *actual leading candidates, winner* or *actual challengers*—generates a similarly strong first stage on debate participation. Using this alternative categorization generates a set of qualitatively similar results, albeit with a more restricted sample of only those candidates who were both *predicted* and *actual* leading candidates in the respondent-candidate level analysis. However, given the effects we find on voting outcomes, we consider it likely that the definition of *actual leading candidates* is endogenous to our intervention. These additional results are available on request.

A.3 Research ethics

The design of our intervention reflected careful attention to the ethics of field experimentation and associated data collection consistent with APSA's *Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research* (2020).

With regard to the intervention, which sought to increase the share of candidates attending their district's debate, we make three comments. First, the 'control' condition constituted fully delegating debate invitations to the partner journalist associations. The coordinating NGO expressed significant concerns that candidates might not be responsive to these invitation efforts, which would then undermine the broader expected benefits of the debates initiative. However, the coordinating NGO also lacked the capacity to fully manage the process of inviting candidates to the debates. Randomization of such *additional* invitation efforts, which were ultimately designed and implemented by the coordinating NGO, therefore represented an equitable way to leverage their limited additional resources. Our involvement then influenced the randomized targeting of these efforts, which would have otherwise been more ad hoc and selective, but not their existence.

Second, further in line with equity considerations, this randomization took place at the *district-level*, being applied to all candidates in a race, rather than at the candidate-level. Candidate-level randomization could have provided a 'cleaner' research design, to some extent. However if, in the control condition, the partner journalist associations failed to contact all candidates (as some candidates ultimately claimed, see the discussion of Table 3), then candidate-level randomization could have unfairly advantaged some candidates over others. As a result, the randomized assignment of *additional* effort to *all* candidates in a given race was viewed as a fair way to increase the overall intensity of the debates initiative (see below).

Third, while we did pre-register an expectation that the partner-implemented intervention would differentially induce the debate participation of the leading candidates, we did not anticipate *average* electoral effects benefiting incumbents at the expense of their challengers, either among our survey respondents or using administrative data. However, we consider that these average effects are consistent with overall improvements in voters' welfare even *ex post*. Since the debates focused squarely on policy issues, and were carefully designed to minimize any pre-electoral risks, we anticipated they would facilitate political selection on a more informed basis than typically possible. This is indeed what we find, with particularly high quality candidates benefiting (which were more likely to be incumbents). The average effects we find underscore both the potential impact of such initiatives when scaled and have important implications, given how common such initiatives are, for designing them more effectively.

With regard to our associated survey data collection, we anticipated few ethical concerns and complied with all local norms and guidelines relating to data collection. Since no local ethics review board existed at the time of the study, all data collection protocols were approved by our institutional IRBs and discussed intensively with our local partners and area specialists. As per our IRB protocols, survey participants were fully informed about the purpose of the study, no deception was used, their responses were anonymized, and respondents were not paid for their participation in the study nor incentivized in any way to provide particular responses. Liberia is an open democratic system and we anticipated that participants would not face any retaliation or repurcussions from participating in our study. IRB approval was granted by Harvard Committee on the Use of Human Subjects (ID: IRB17-1178) and NORC at the University of Chicago (ID: 7554.072.01).

A.4 Balance

We assess balance as a function of treatment assignment across a range of data sources and units of observation employed in the analysis. These demonstrate both that treatment assignment was effectively randomized and that our panel voter survey does not show evidence of compositional changes between baseline and endline due to attrition. We report balance on pre-treatment covariates at the district, individual, polling station and candidate levels. Balance is assessed by estimating Equation (1) for each covariate as an outcome, but omitting the individual-level $\mathbf{X}_i$ and district-level $\mathbf{Z}_d$ controls. For district-level specifications, we instead use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. For individual-level specifications, we restrict to the the endline survey sample and consider two types of outcomes. First, we assign district-level outcomes to individuals in this sample. Second, we use individual-level covariates collected through the survey. For the polling station-level specifications, first we assign district-level outcomes to each polling station in that district and second we use polling station-level variables using the fact that 90% of polling places in 2017 were also used in the 2011 election. For all new polling places we assign district-level averages. Lastly, for the candidate-level specification, we assess balance on characteristics drawn from our candidate survey. We refer throughout to imbalance on unweighted specifications since patterns of limited imbalance are generally shared irrespective of weighting schemes.

At the district-level, 0 (0) out of 18 covariates are imbalanced at the 5% (10%) level (Table A5). Considering district-level covariates applied to our respondents, 2 (2) out of 18 covariates are imbalanced (Table A6). Considering respondents' individual-level covariates, 1 (1) out of 4 covariates are imbalanced (Table A7). Considering district-level covariates applied to polling stations, 0 (1) out of 18 covariates exhibit imbalance (Table A8). Considering covariates defined

at the polling station-level, 0 (0) out of 8 covariates are imbalanced. Considering measures of incumbent performance, we find 0 (0) of 3 covariates are imbalanced (Table A10). Considering candidate-level measures of balance, we find 0 (0) of 12 covariates are imbalanced whether we consider all candidates, just incumbents, or just challengers (Table A11).

A.5 Divergences from Pre-Analysis Plan

This study was pre-registered with both EGAP (ID: 20171024AA) and AEA (ID: AEARCTR-0002553). Pre-registration took place before endline data collection and any data analysis. In this section we describe the differences between our PAP and the final paper, as well as the logic behind them.

A.5.1 Data and estimation

We reorganized some of categorizations of variables from the PAP to fit into more coherent groupings. This comprised combining 'Knowledge about candidates' and 'Beliefs over candidate competence' into 'Effects on beliefs about candidates' and 'Voter coordination' and relevant parts of 'Debate exposure' into 'Effects on political engagement'.

As we discuss in the paper, we cross-randomized a separate intervention to vary the intensity of debate rebroadcasting (with either two or ten rebroadcasts shortly prior to the election) which ultimately had little effect. Since this additional intervention had only weak effects on our respondents' exposure to the debate,[24] and candidates were unaware of rebroadcasting plans, we pool over rebroadcasting intensity for clarity of exposition. Figure A2 presents treatment effect estimates from this cross-randomized intervention, where 3 (1) out of 22 treatment coefficients are significant at the 10% (5%) level, essentially consistent with chance.[25] Importantly, however, we made no multiplicative hypotheses—rather, all our hypotheses were with respect to the overall *intensity* of the debates initiative and focused on those districts assigned to both high invitation intensity and high rebroadcasting intensity.

The estimating equation we use in the paper is closest to what we called our 'base specification' in our PAP (Equation 5). We additionally pre-registered the possibility of constructing an individual-level instrument for the debate attendance of candidates, leveraging random assignment of candidates to debates with the incumbent and at different times of day in districts where more than one debate was held. We found such an instrument to be underpowered due to the number of districts which only ended up holding one debate and so do not report results using it. We also pre-registered a local regression discontinuity design (Equation 8) leveraging quasi-random assignment to respondents being interviewed before or after the live debate in

[24] In Table A24, we show that the rebroadcasting intervention did not lead to significantly positive effects on debate exposure in either the full sample or the sample restricted to respondents in those districts assigned to the invitation intervention, in spite of being correctly implemented. As discussed, this lack of effects stems from the high share of respondents who heard their district debates when they were only broadcast a few times.

[25] In the top panel, there is marginal evidence that better-aligned incumbents electorally benefitted from increased rebroadcasting in similar ways to the intensive invitation treatment we study. The bottom panel suggests that this could be owed to their campaigning responses, with increased rebroadcasting subsequently inducing more radio campaigning by incumbents but less by challengers. Conditional on incumbents' positive self-selection into the debates, this is consistent with the theoretical model we present in Appendix A.1. Specifically, greater rebroadcasting could be viewed as a positive shock to the α parameter.

their district at baseline, but lacked sufficient within-district variation to pursue this. Finally, we pre-registered the use of one-tailed tests but report two-tailed tests throughout to be conservative.

We pre-registered outcomes relating to campaigning overall but did not distinguish between 'radio' and 'on-the-ground' campaigning by candidates. Additionally, in our PAP we pre-registered the use of a jackknife measure of debate performance; given that actual debate performance is a function of treatment assignment we instead use the predicted measure of performance described in the Data section and in Appendix A.6.3. Further, while our pre-registered hypotheses make reference to the distinction between incumbents and challenger candidates, particularly differential treatment effects of the intervention on their participation, we did not pre-register the descriptive analysis we perform regarding their intervention compliance behavior. Finally, for the voting outcomes we pre-registered using an outcome variable defined as vote switching towards a given candidate. However, since few respondents indicated a concrete vote choice at baseline, using either measure produces qualitatively identical results (see Table A23). Focusing on endline responses allows us to directly compare voter responses to polling station outcomes, while instead controlling for baseline voting intentions.

A.5.2 Hypotheses

We reorganized and grouped many of our pre-registered hypotheses, which were generally made with reference to individual outcome variables, into more coherent aggregated clusters. Out of the 27 hypotheses we pre-registered, results directly testing 19 of them are presented in the final paper.[26] The eight missing hypotheses fall into two categories. First, we do not report results relating to the hypotheses using within-district variation in whether respondents at baseline were interviewed before or after their district debate had been broadcast for the first time due to the lack of variation mentioned above.

Second, we do not report results for our pre-registered set of hypotheses relating to respondents' attitudes towards the media and the electoral process. We anticipated that respondents in districts assigned to more intensive debates would update positively about the neutrality and contribution of the media to the electoral process due to the novelty and unbiasedness of the debate structure. We found little systematic evidence of this happening, potentially due to the campaigning response of incumbent candidates campaigning more aggressively on the radio in these districts. The final paper therefore contains substantially less emphasis on the intervention affecting perceived media credibility than our PAP.

A.6 Variable construction

We provide information here relating to our descriptive statistics about candidates and debate content featured in the first half of the manuscript, the survey-based construction of our outcome variables used in all our analysis, as well as further detail on the construction of our interaction variables (relating to policy alignment and predicted debate performance).

[26] Broadly, we aggregated hypotheses from 'Debate exposure and knowledge about candidates' and 'Beliefs about candidates' into the results on voter response; hypotheses from 'Preferences and voting behavior' into the results on voting outcomes; 'Media consumption, attitudes, and institutions' and 'Debate exposure and knowledge about candidates' into the results on voter response.

A.6.1 Context and debate description variables

These tables provide mean values of relevant descriptive variables among incumbents, challengers and other candidates based on our candidate surveys and analysis of debate transcripts.

Table 1:

- *Age*: Candidate age in years.
- *University educated*: Candidate has completed university.
- *Ran before*: Candidate previously ran for legislature.
- *Govt. job before*: Candidate previously held non-elected government job.
- *NGO job before*: Candidate previously worked for an NGO.
- *Advocacy experience*: Candidate worked on an advocacy campaign before.
- *Campaign expenditure*: Self-reported total campaign expenditure in USD.
- *Radio station*: Candidate either owns or manages a local radio station.

Table 2:

- *Different promises*: Believes that candidates make different promises on radio versus on-the-ground campaigning.
- *Rally credibility*: Believes that promises made by candidates at rallies are very likely to be fulfilled.
- *Radio credibility*: Believes that promises made by candidates on radio are very likely to be fulfilled.

Table 3:

- *Duty*: Cited democratic duty to participate.
- *Policies*: Cited opportunity to present policy platform.
- *Competence*: Cited opportunity to show off competence.
- *Publicity*: Cited opportunity for campaign publicity.
- *Radio*: Cited the specific benefits of radio broadcasting reaching a large audience.
- *Attack*: Cited opportunity to attack other candidates.

Table 4:

- *Intro words*: Number of words spoken in debate introduction.
- *Education emphasis*: Candidate highlighted their education in introduction.
- *Experience emphasis*: Candidate highlighted their experience in introduction.
- *CSDF words*: Number of words spoken about ways to improve management of County Social Development Funds.

- *LSP words*: Number of words spoken about priorities for spending Legislative Support Projects funds.
- *Attacked*: Candidate was verbally attacked by another candidate.
- *Attacker*: Candidate verbally attacked another candidate.

A.6.2 Outcome variables

Unless otherwise noted, all variables come from our panel survey of voters where we refer to specific items in our baseline and endline survey instruments using the format *wave-question*, where *wave* is represented by *B* (baseline) or *E* (endline) and *question* is simply the question on the relevant instrument. Both survey instruments can be found online at http://egap.org/registration/2899.

As described in the Data section, whenever we asked the same question in both baseline and endline we use the difference as an outcome. We preserve whether variables are discrete or continuous. For indices, we standardize each component such that units in the control group have zero mean and standard deviation of one then sum and standardize again.

Table 5:

- *Share of candidates*: share of the total candidates in that district who participated in their district debate.
- *Incumbent*: indicator for whether incumbent participated in their district debate.
- *Share of challengers*: share of the predicted challengers in that district (see Appendix A.2) who participated in their district debate.
- *Share of other candidates*: share of non-predicted challengers in that district (see Appendix A.2) who participated in their district debate.

Table 6:

- Panel 1:
  - *Vote choice*: indicator for whether a respondent named a specific predicted leading candidate as their vote choice at endline (E-Q45).
- Panel 2:
  - *Main effect*: Vote share of candidate at polling station-level.

Table 8:

- *Debate listening index*: standardized index of:
  - *Change in heard debate*: indicator variable for whether the respondent heard their district debate between baseline (B-Q7) and endline (E-Q14) surveys.
  - *Heard debate*: indicator variable for whether the respondent heard their district debate at endline (E-Q14).
  - *Number of times heard*: continuous variable for the number of times respondents reported hearing their district debate at endline (E-Q15).

- *Debate knowledge index*: standardized index of:
  - *Debate winner attended debate:* indicator for whether the respondent's named debate winner actually attended the debate (E-Q17).
  - *Stated share of participating candidates:* continuous variable for the share of candidates in respondent's district they recall participating in debate (E-Q16).
  - *Stated share of participating leading candidate:* continuous variable for the share of leading candidates in respondent's district they recall participating in debate (E-Q39.2, E-Q39.4, E-Q39.6).
- *Policy knowledge index*: standardized index of:
  - *Manager of CSDF*: change in whether respondents switch towards correctly identifying Representatives as the primary controller of CSDF (B-Q9, E-Q9).
  - *CSDF reporting requirement*: change in whether respondents correctly switch towards believing that it is a legal obligation to report CSDF allocation (B-Q10, E-Q10).
  - *CSDF citizen involvement requirement*: change in whether respondents correctly switch towards believing that it is a legal obligation to involve citizens in CSDF allocation decisions (B-Q11, E-Q11).
- *Political information demand index*: standardized index of:
  - *Change in radio listening*: Respondents' change in listening to radio between baseline and endline (B-Q6, E-Q6).
  - *Demand for non-radio information sources*: How frequently respondents sought political information from non-radio sources such as newspapers, television and the internet (E-Q7).
  - *Change in political discussion with friends*: Change in how frequently respondents discussed political issues with friends, family, neighbors and other members of the community (B-Q8, E-Q8).

Table 9:

- *Certainty about competence*: standardized change in how sure respondents were about the competence of specific predicted leading candidates between baseline (B-Q22, B-Q24, B-Q26) and endline (E-Q34, E-Q36, E-Q38).
- *Certainty about issues*: standardized change in how sure respondents were about the priority issues of specific predicted leading candidates between baseline (B-Q16, B-Q18, B-Q20) and endline (E-Q28, E-Q30, E-Q32).
- *Beliefs about competence*: standardized change in how competent respondents believe specific predicted leading candidates were between baseline (B-Q21, B-Q23, B-Q25) and endline (E-Q33, E-Q35, E-Q37).
- *Learning about policy*: standardized change in the share of candidate priority issues that respondents name between baseline (B-Q15, B-Q17, B-Q19) and endline (E-27, E-29, E-31). We define candidate priorities using the aggregate of respondents' beliefs over a given candidate's priorities measured in the baseline survey.

Table 10:

- *Ground*: standardized index of:
  - Whether candidate distributed leaflets or posters in respondent's community (E-Q41.1, E-Q41.2, E-Q41.3).
  - Whether candidate made campaign visits to respondent's community (E-Q41.1, E-Q41.2, E-Q41.3).
  - How frequently other people in their community voted for a given candidate in exchange for money, food or other gifts (E-Q40.1, E-Q40.2, E-Q40.3).
- *Radio*: standardized measure how frequently respondents heard candidates on the radio in the two weeks before the election (E-Q39.1, E-Q39.3, E-Q39.5).

A.6.3 Interaction variables

Our measure of **policy alignment** measures the overlap between a respondent's policy priorities and a given predicted leading candidate we ask about in our surveys. This is defined as the share of the three priority issues the respondent names at baseline (B-Q13) that are shared with the top three priorities of a given candidate.

In our default operationalization, we define candidates' policy priorities by aggregating respondents' beliefs about the candidate's priorities as defined at baseline (B-Q15, B-Q17, B-Q19). For a given candidate, we rank their policy areas according to the share of their constituents reporting they focused on a particular policy area and take the top three ranked policy areas. For example, if a candidate is recorded as prioritizing local roads, youth representation, and electricity, while a respondent reports their own priorities as local roads, education, and security, then the policy alignment score is 0.33. As we discuss in the manuscript, we use the voter survey data because: (1) our transcript data only provides policy priorities for those candidates participating in their debate; (2) our candidate survey data is only recorded for a self-selected group of candidates who took the survey and was administered after the election had taken place. However, as we show in Table 7, using the candidate survey data generates a similar pattern of results relating to candidates' self-selection into debate participation.

Our measure of **debate performance** relies on a prediction exercise that is ultimately based on the share of respondents in a given constituency believing that a given candidate won their debate. We use a prediction model for two reasons: first, debate performance is only observed for those candidates participating in their district debate. Second, the intensive invitation treatment changes the distribution of candidates for whom we observe performance (i.e., we observe performance for the compliers in treated constituencies but not in control). Our prediction exercise therefore trains and optimizes model performance among participating candidates in control constituencies before predicting out of sample *both* to non-participating candidates in control constituencies and to all candidates in treated constituencies. For prediction, we use a random forest (RF) model with five-fold cross validation, which we fit 1000 times and take the median prediction for a given observation. For covariates, we use a high-dimensional matrix of candidate-level and district-level characteristics, and the interaction of each of these with county-level fixed effects.

We summarize this prediction exercise in three ways. First, Table A4 compares the predictive performance of the random forest model compared to a lasso or elastic net model. By taking the

median root mean square error and ρ in the held-out partition across runs, this shows the random forest model performs substantially better than the alternatives. Second, Figure A3 correlates predicted performance with observed performance (among participating candidates) in both control and treated constituencies. The stronger correlation in control constituencies underscores that treatment shifted the composition of participating candidates, and hence that using observed performance in treated constituencies would likely suffer from post-treatment bias.

Third, Figure A4 regresses our predicted performance measure onto a vector of candidate-level characteristics. Beyond reinforcing incumbents' general advantage in perceived performance in the debates, this provides evidence that both policy and valence characteristics likely influenced debate performance. For policy, we find that both alignment and voters' certainty positively predict performance. For valence, perceptions of candidate competence positively predict performance (though we note that competence, in principle, might reflect the likelihood of policy promises being upheld rather than relating to charisma or personality). We also find that candidates' affiliation with the then-ruling Unity Party (UP) positively predicts performance. UP was, at the time, the most institutionalized party (Bowles, Larreguy and Liu, 2020), and so had plausibly the most effective candidate selection processes. We account for these potential differences by including a candidate-level control for belonging to UP in the relevant regressions. Running a joint F-test across all the party dummies, however, suggests that party *overall* is not predictive of performance outside of UP.[27] Candidates' predicted debate performance, along with the extent of their policy alignment with voters, is uncorrelated with treatment assignment (see Tables A11-A12).

[27]That male candidates have greater predicted performance likely relates to valence, but also potentially policy in a setting where female candidates are on average much less experienced than male ones.

A.7 Figures

Figure A1. Scope conditions



Notes: Figure presents region-level (top panel) and country-level within sub-Saharan Africa (bottom panel) indexes drawn from V-Dem data (v14) averaged over the period 2010-2020. *Clientelism* index comes from `v2xnp_client`; *Party institutionalization* index comes from `v2xps_party`; *Free and fair elections* index comes from `v2xel_frefair`.

Figure A2. Treatment effects of rebroadcasting intervention



Notes: Treatment effect estimates of cross-randomized rebroadcasting intervention (see Appendix A.5) for main results in Tables 6-10. Estimated using specifications analogous to Equation (1) and all analysis of the intensive invitation intervention featured in the manuscript. 90% and 95% confidence intervals plotted, with colors indicating weights as defined in the manuscript.

Figure A3. Predicted versus observed performance among participating candidates



Notes: Figure correlates observed versus predicted measures of debate performance across electoral districts assigned to control and treatment. See Appendix A.6.3 for additional details.

Figure A4. Correlates of predicted performance measure



Notes: Figure presents coefficients from a regression of our predicted debate performance measure onto a set of standardized candidate-level characteristics. 90% and 95% confidence intervals plotted. See Appendix A.6.3 for additional details.

Figure A5. Correlation between debate performance and campaigning in control districts



Notes: Figure correlates standardized debate performance among candidates in districts assigned to control with the standardized campaigning outcomes (whether on-the-ground or radio) used in Table 10.

A.8 Tables

Descriptive statistics

Table A1. Descriptive statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
A. District-level variables (n = 73)				
Scheduled debate week	4.18	1.39	1.00	8.00
Number of debates in district	2.08	0.66	1.00	4.00
Number of candidates (2017)	13.55	4.81	3.00	28.00
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.84	0.37	0.00	1.00
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.26	0.11	0.06	0.53
Log registered voters (2017)	10.23	0.40	9.27	11.06
1st voteshare (2011)	0.31	0.13	0.12	0.82
2nd voteshare (2011)	0.18	0.05	0.10	0.36
3rd voteshare (2011)	0.13	0.03	0.05	0.25
Voteshare HHI (2011)	0.19	0.11	0.07	0.69
Turnout (2011)	0.66	0.05	0.56	0.75
Log population density (2008)	-9.51	1.76	-11.91	-5.21
Share over 18 (2008)	0.48	0.02	0.43	0.54
Share with secondary education (2008)	0.15	0.05	0.04	0.28
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.71	0.30	0.01	1.00
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.74	0.12	0.38	1.00
Share gets radio news often (2016)	0.76	0.12	0.50	1.00
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	10.98	7.60	0.00	23.36
B. Individual-level variables (n = 4060)				
Male	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00
Respondent age	31.73	9.27	18.00	99.00
Education: Primary	0.94	0.25	0.00	1.00
Education: Secondary	0.78	0.41	0.00	1.00
Education: Tertiary	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
C. Polling station-level variables (n = 5386)				
Number of registered voters in PS (2017)	405.14	74.86	12.00	505.00
Number of PS in VRC	3.57	1.88	1.00	9.00
VRC added in 2017	0.10	0.31	0.00	1.00
Number of registered voters in VRC (2011)	1423.20	770.30	45.00	3995.00
Number of PS in VRC (2011)	3.36	1.59	1.00	9.00
Turnout (2011)	0.63	0.09	0.14	1.01
Share of invalid votes (2011)	0.07	0.03	0.00	0.35
PS covered by partner radio station	0.85	0.36	0.00	1.00
Urban PS	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00

Notes: Descriptive statistics relating to all predetermined covariates used in the regression analyses. *Sources:* Panel A: Debate variables from Internews. All 2017 and 2011 variables come from National Elections Commission (NEC). All 2008 variables come from 2008 Population and Housing Census. *Share with GSM coverage* comes from Collins Mobile Coverage Explorer; *Share owns a radio* and *Share gets radio news often* come from Afrobarometer. *Avg. N radio stations covering each town* comes from Internews. Pabel B: All come from researchers' panel survey. Panel C: Radio station variables come from Internews. All other variables come from NEC. 90% of polling stations were in locations where a polling place (Voter Registration Center, VRC) existed in 2011. For new polling stations we assign district-level averages.

Table A2. Descriptive statistics (respondent-level outcomes)

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Table 5				
Share of candidates attended debate	0.59	0.22	0.11	1.00
Incumbent attended debate	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Share of challengers attended debate	0.60	0.37	0.00	1.00
Table 8				
Heard debate between baseline and endline	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
Heard debate at endline	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Number of times heard debate	0.46	1.06	0.00	24.00
Debate winner attended debate	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
Stated share of participating candidates	0.12	0.29	0.00	2.53
Stated share of participating leading candidates	0.16	0.34	0.00	1.00
Switches to correct CSDF controller	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
Switches to correct requirement for CSDF reporting	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
Switches to correct requirement for CSDF citizen engagement	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
Change in radio listening	0.26	2.17	-6.00	6.00
Demand for non-radio information sources	5.01	2.15	0.00	7.00
Change in political discussion with friends	-0.07	2.30	-6.00	6.00

Notes: Descriptive statistics relating to all unstandardized, disaggregated outcomes variables used in the respondent-level regressions as outcome variables.

Table A3. Descriptive statistics (respondent-candidate level outcomes)

	Incumbent				Challengers			
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Table 6								
Votes for candidate	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.35	0.00	1.00
Predicted debate performance	0.26	0.09	0.12	0.50	0.19	0.07	0.08	0.54
Policy alignment	0.42	0.27	0.00	1.00	0.42	0.28	0.00	1.00
Table 9								
Change in certainty of candidate competence	0.08	1.40	-4.00	4.00	0.36	1.53	-4.00	4.00
Change in certainty of candidate priority issues	-0.03	1.63	-4.00	4.00	-0.02	1.58	-4.00	4.00
Change in assessment of candidate competence	0.28	1.44	-4.00	4.00	0.12	1.23	-4.00	4.00
Change in share of candidate priorities named	0.02	0.41	-1.00	1.00	0.03	0.42	-1.00	1.00
Table 10								
Frequency of hearing candidate on radio	2.96	1.13	1.00	5.00	2.68	1.11	1.00	5.00
Candidate distributed leaflets in locality	0.93	0.25	0.00	1.00	0.90	0.30	0.00	1.00
Candidate visited locality	0.81	0.39	0.00	1.00	0.74	0.44	0.00	1.00
Frequency of candidate vote buying	2.28	1.39	1.00	5.00	2.10	1.28	1.00	5.00
Table 6 (PS-level)								
Vote share	0.26	0.22	0.00	0.99	0.11	0.16	0.00	0.99
Measure of debate performance	0.26	0.09	0.12	0.50	0.20	0.07	0.08	0.54
Measure of policy alignment	0.43	0.09	0.16	0.59	0.43	0.09	0.00	0.64

Notes: Descriptive statistics relating to all unstandardized, disaggregated outcomes variables used in the respondent-candidate level regressions as outcome variables.

Table A4. Median prediction performance and ρ in holdout sample

Model	RMSE	ρ
Lasso	0.21	0.21
Elastic net	0.23	0.27
Random forest	0.18	0.41

Table presents the median performance measure and ρ of different prediction methods in 20% holdout sample across permutations of the model.

Balance on predetermined covariates

Table A5. District-level balance

	VS of 1st place (2011)		**VS of 1st place (2011)**		**VS of 3rd place (2011)**	
Intensive Invite	-0.011	-0.015	-0.005	-0.008	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Control Mean	0.322	0.309	0.178	0.183	0.129	0.129
	Turnout (2011)		**Share ran in 2011**		**VS HHI (2011)**	
Intensive Invite	-0.004	-0.004	-0.012	-0.019	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Control Mean	0.661	0.667	0.258	0.266	0.198	0.189
	N. candidates (2017)		**Incumbent ran (2017)**		**Number of debates**	
Intensive Invite	-0.509	-0.670	-0.019	-0.052	-0.083	-0.131
	(0.833)	(0.928)	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.126)	(0.140)
Control Mean	13.634	14.780	0.831	0.886	2.115	2.256
	Log pop. dens. (2008)		**Log reg. voters (2017)**		**GSM coverage (2016)**	
Intensive Invite	0.254	0.160	0.056	0.060	0.032	0.005
	(0.365)	(0.370)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.055)
Control Mean	-9.847	-9.108	10.214	10.351	0.645	0.773
	Share owns radio (2015)		**Share radio news (2015)**		**Radio coverage (2016)**	
Intensive Invite	-0.019	-0.034	-0.017	-0.038	-0.109	0.024
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(1.347)	(1.384)
Control Mean	0.755	0.773	0.767	0.780	10.051	12.830
	Debate week		**Share sec. ed. (2008)**		**Share 18+ (2008)**	
Intensive Invite	0.028	-0.030	0.004	0.003	0.000	0.001
	(0.215)	(0.209)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Control Mean	3.980	3.979	0.137	0.154	0.483	0.487
Observations	73	73	73	73	73	73
Weight	None	Reg	None	Reg	None	Reg

Notes: Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table A1. All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A6. Individual-level balance (district covariates)

	VS of 1st place (2011)			**VS of 1st place (2011)**			**VS of 3rd place (2011)**		
Intensive Invite	0.007	-0.009	-0.014	-0.011	-0.005	-0.008	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Control Mean	0.298	0.308	0.308	0.185	0.182	0.183	0.129	0.128	0.129
	Turnout (2011)			**Share ran in 2011**			**VS HHI (2011)**		
Intensive Invite	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.043**	-0.012	-0.019	0.007	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Control Mean	0.665	0.659	0.667	0.275	0.270	0.266	0.181	0.189	0.188
	N. candidates (2017)			**Incumbent ran (2017)**			**Number of debates**		
Intensive Invite	-0.642	-0.549	-0.710	-0.072	-0.024	-0.057	-0.117	-0.091	-0.139
	(0.757)	(0.709)	(0.795)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.120)
Control Mean	15.084	13.963	14.833	0.912	0.860	0.889	2.291	2.152	2.265
	Log pop. dens. (2008)			**Log reg. voters (2017)**			**GSM coverage (2016)**		
Intensive Invite	0.207	0.246	0.149	0.072	0.055	0.059	0.029	0.032	0.004
	(0.317)	(0.312)	(0.317)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.047)
Control Mean	-8.975	-9.611	-9.096	10.342	10.215	10.354	0.795	0.695	0.774
	Share owns radio (2015)			**Share radio news (2015)**			**Radio coverage (2016)**		
Intensive Invite	-0.041**	-0.020	-0.035*	-0.035	-0.017	-0.039*	-0.172	-0.138	-0.010
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(1.222)	(1.159)	(1.190)
Control Mean	0.771	0.750	0.774	0.778	0.767	0.780	13.552	11.275	12.895
	Debate week			**Share sec. ed. (2008)**			**Share 18+ (2008)**		
Intensive Invite	-0.035	0.031	-0.026	0.006	0.004	0.002	-0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.193)	(0.184)	(0.179)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Control Mean	4.162	4.148	3.980	0.160	0.146	0.154	0.488	0.485	0.487
Observations	4,061	4,061	4,061	4,061	4,061	4,061	4,061	4,061	4,061
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs

Notes: Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table A1. All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A7. Individual-level balance (individual covariates)

	Survey date			**Age**		
Intensive Invite	-1.063**	-0.796	-1.006*	0.163	0.359	0.225
	(0.523)	(0.572)	(0.573)	(0.439)	(0.464)	(0.437)
Control Mean	71.801	71.153	71.422	31.728	32.103	31.877
	Male			**Education level**		
Intensive Invite	0.011	0.025	0.021	0.067	0.102	0.081
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.075)
Control Mean	0.746	0.744	0.740	6.586	6.447	6.534
Observations	4,061	4,061	4,061	4,060	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs

Notes: All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A8. Polling station-level balance (district covariates)

	VS of 1st place (2011)			**VS of 1st place (2011)**			**VS of 3rd place (2011)**		
Intensive Invite	-0.015	-0.011	-0.015	-0.009	-0.005	-0.009	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Control Mean	0.308	0.310	0.309	0.183	0.182	0.184	0.129	0.128	0.129
	Turnout (2011)			**Share ran in 2011**			**VS HHI (2011)**		
Intensive Invite	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.016	-0.012	-0.017	-0.009	-0.006	-0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Control Mean	0.665	0.659	0.667	0.265	0.270	0.266	0.188	0.190	0.189
	N. candidates (2017)			**Incumbent ran (2017)**			**Number of debates**		
Intensive Invite	-0.652	-0.509	-0.681	-0.050	-0.019	-0.052	-0.125	-0.083	-0.131
	(0.771)	(0.716)	(0.798)	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.121)
Control Mean	14.659	13.914	14.802	0.883	0.857	0.890	2.240	2.143	2.257
	Log pop. dens. (2008)			**Log reg. voters (2017)**			**GSM coverage (2016)**		
Intensive Invite	0.177	0.254	0.154	0.062	0.056	0.060	0.010	0.032	0.004
	(0.322)	(0.314)	(0.320)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.047)
Control Mean	-9.224	-9.623	-9.098	10.325	10.212	10.352	0.753	0.693	0.775
	Share owns radio (2015)			**Share radio news (2015)**			**Radio coverage (2016)**		
Intensive Invite	-0.031	-0.019	-0.033*	-0.037*	-0.017	-0.038*	-0.011	-0.109	-0.076
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(1.202)	(1.158)	(1.201)
Control Mean	0.770	0.750	0.773	0.778	0.766	0.780	12.496	11.214	12.931
	Debate week			**Share sec. ed. (2008)**			**Share 18+ (2008)**		
Intensive Invite	0.058	0.102	0.051	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.001
	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Control Mean	1.181	1.200	1.176	0.152	0.145	0.154	0.486	0.485	0.487
Observations	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386
Weight	No	1/PS	Reg	No	1/PS	Reg	No	1/PS	Reg

Notes: Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table A1. All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A9. Polling station-level balance (PS covariates)

	N. PS in VRC (2017)			**N. PS in VRC (2011)**			**New VRC**		
Intensive Invite	-0.098	0.008	-0.120	-0.115	-0.012	-0.143	-0.015	-0.009	-0.016
	(0.246)	(0.225)	(0.249)	(0.185)	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Control Mean	3.604	3.326	3.806	3.400	3.220	3.572	0.112	0.118	0.102
	Urban			**Reg. Voters (2017)**			**Reg. Voters (2011)**		
Intensive Invite	0.065	0.078	0.061	2.198	4.625	0.641	-53.574	-0.110	-68.041
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(6.171)	(6.417)	(4.776)	(90.749)	(89.750)	(90.911)
Control Mean	0.300	0.227	0.327	403.853	395.974	418.529	1440.465	1350.474	1526.522
	Turnout (2011)			**Invalid votes (2011)**			**Radio covered**		
Intensive Invite	0.014	0.011	0.016*	0.002	0.004	0.002	-0.015	0.013	-0.024
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Control Mean	0.620	0.613	0.620	0.066	0.065	0.066	0.848	0.835	0.857
Observations	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386	5,386
Weight	No	1/PS	Reg	No	1/PS	Reg	No	1/PS	Reg

Notes: Descriptions of all variables can be found in Table A1. Analysis throughout is at the polling station-level, where multiple polling stations exist within a single location called a VRC. 1780/2080 VRCs existed in the 2011 election; for these 300 new VRCs we assign district-level averages. All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A10. Incumbent balance

	Attendance		**Absent**		**Distant**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intensive Invite	0.026	0.005	-0.001	0.012	-0.022	-0.012
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Control Mean	0.791	0.807	0.117	0.114	0.079	0.066
Observations	73	73	73	73	73	73
Weight	No	Reg	No	Reg	No	Reg

Notes: Outcome variables are plenary session attendance measures taken from legislator scorecards for 2016. Legislators either attend, are absent, or are away from Monrovia for each plenary session. All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A11. Candidate-level balance

	Response	Age	Univ ed	Radio	Male	Ran before	Gov job	Advocacy	NGO	Party: UP	Policy alignment	Debate performance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. All candidates												
Intensive Invite	-0.031	-0.383	0.011	0.020	0.008	-0.023	-0.027	0.063	0.066	0.005	-0.022	0.008
	(0.030)	(0.948)	(0.049)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Control Mean	0.63	48.48	0.55	0.03	0.85	0.30	0.34	0.83	0.38	0.05	0.45	0.21
Observations	982	607	610	610	610	610	610	610	610	982	217	217
C. Incumbents												
Intensive Invite	0.115	2.394	0.061	-0.030	0.121	0.000	-0.394	-0.121	0.061	-0.046	-0.022	-0.012
	(0.132)	(4.085)	(0.210)	(0.200)	(0.174)	(.)	(0.212)	(0.174)	(0.255)	(0.114)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Control Mean	0.43	55.31	0.69	0.15	0.77	1.00	0.69	0.92	0.23	0.33	0.45	0.28
Observations	64	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	64	62	62
D. Challengers												
Intensive Invite	0.010	3.894	-0.014	-0.000	0.022	0.147	0.039	0.152	0.174	0.037	-0.023	0.015
	(0.081)	(1.674)	(0.098)	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.066)	(0.101)	(0.049)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Control Mean	0.64	47.31	0.65	0.06	0.90	0.35	0.31	0.81	0.29	0.16	0.46	0.19
Observations	155	98	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	155	155	155

Notes: Panel A: unweighted balance tests for all candidate respondents, Panel B: restricted to incumbents; Panel C: restricted to predicted challengers. Outcomes: response to candidate survey; age in years; indicator for whether candidate completed university; indicator for whether they own or manage a radio station; indicator for candidate being male; indicator for candidate having run for office before; indicator for candidate having a government job before; indicator for candidate having advocacy experience; indicator for candidate working for an NGO before; indicator for belonging to ruling Unity Party; measure of policy alignment; measure of predicted debate performance. All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A12. Candidate-level balance (weighted)

	Response	Age	Univ ed	Radio	Male	Ran before	Gov job	Advocacy	NGO	Party: UP	Policy alignment	Debate performance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. All candidates												
Intensive Invite	-0.047	-0.178	-0.015	0.030	0.023	-0.027	-0.016	0.042	0.056	-0.002	-0.030	0.012
	(0.034)	(0.902)	(0.056)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Control Mean	0.60	48.45	0.57	0.02	0.84	0.32	0.33	0.83	0.37	0.07	0.46	0.23
Observations	982	607	610	610	610	610	610	610	610	982	217	217
Weight	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand	1/Cand
B. Challengers												
Intensive Invite	-0.033	4.954	0.034	0.009	0.004	0.164	0.056	0.140	0.164	0.047	-0.046	0.015
	(0.061)	(1.824)	(0.105)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.105)	(0.094)	(0.068)	(0.101)	(0.055)	(0.019)	(0.013)
Control Mean	0.68	46.17	0.61	0.07	0.90	0.33	0.27	0.80	0.27	0.17	0.46	0.19
Observations	133	98	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	133	133	133
Weight	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal	1/Chal

Notes: Observations weighted by the inverse of the number of responding candidate types in a given district. Since there is one incumbent per district, for incumbents this would be identical to Panel B of Table A11 and thus we omit it. Panel A: all candidate respondents, Panel B: restricted to predicted challengers. Outcomes: response to candidate survey; age in years; indicator for whether candidate completed university; indicator for whether they own or manage a radio station; indicator for candidate being male; indicator for candidate having run for office before; indicator for candidate having a government job before; indicator for candidate having advocacy experience; indicator for candidate working for an NGO before; indicator for belonging to ruling Unity Party; measure of policy alignment; measure of predicted debate performance. All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Demography-weighted specifications

Table A13. Candidate debate participation (demography-weighted)

	(1)	(2)
A. Share of candidates		
Intensive Invite	0.077**	0.078**
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Control Mean	0.542	0.540
Observations	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	Dem
B. Incumbent		
Intensive Invite	0.211**	0.215**
	(0.084)	(0.084)
Control Mean	0.280	0.276
Observations	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	Dem
C. Share of challengers		
Intensive Invite	0.213***	0.214***
	(0.074)	(0.074)
Control Mean	0.492	0.490
Observations	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	Dem
D. Share of other candidates		
Intensive Invite	0.002	0.003
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Control Mean	0.562	0.560
Observations	3,991	3,991
Weight	No	Dem

Notes: Outcomes: share of candidate types (all, incumbent, challenger, other candidate) who attended a debate out of all candidates in that district. Panel D has fewer observations due to only three candidates running in two districts (and hence no 'other candidates' defined). Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Dem* weights observations to be representative at the electoral district-level with respect to gender and education. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A14. Voting outcomes (demography-weighted)

	Main effect		Interaction term: Std. Performance		Interaction term: Std. Policy alignment	
1. Respondent-level	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Incumbent						
Intensive Invite	0.041**	0.035	0.042**	0.036	0.038**	0.032
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Intensive Invite × $\widehat{\text{Performance}}$			0.069**	0.067**		
			(0.027)	(0.028)		
Intensive Invite × Policy alignment					0.042***	0.058***
					(0.016)	(0.020)
Control Mean	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278	0.278
Observations	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496
B. Challengers						
Intensive Invite	-0.036***	-0.038***	-0.035***	-0.038***	-0.036***	-0.038***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Intensive Invite × $\widehat{\text{Performance}}$			0.017	0.015		
			(0.026)	(0.025)		
Intensive Invite × Policy alignment					-0.002	-0.002
					(0.007)	(0.008)
Control Mean	0.156	0.160	0.156	0.160	0.156	0.160
Observations	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686
Weight	No	Dem	No	Dem	No	Dem

Notes: Outcomes: respondent reported voting for incumbent (Panel 1.A.) or a challenger (Panel 1.B.) at endline. Interactions: Columns 4-6: standardized candidate-level measures of predicted debate performance; 7-9: standardized respondent-candidate-level measures of policy alignment (measured at baseline). Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Dem* weights observations to be representative at the electoral district-level with respect to gender and education. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A15. Debate exposure and information acquisition (demography-weighted)

	(1)	(2)
A. Debate listening index		
Intensive Invite	0.294***	0.279**
	(0.101)	(0.113)
Observations	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	Dem
B. Debate knowledge index		
Intensive Invite	0.123*	0.117**
	(0.063)	(0.055)
Observations	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	Dem
C. Policy knowledge index		
Intensive Invite	0.165*	0.112
	(0.090)	(0.094)
Observations	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	Dem
D. Political information acquisition		
Intensive Invite	0.243***	0.208*
	(0.074)	(0.121)
Observations	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	Dem

Notes: Outcomes are standardized. Panel A: index of (1) indicator for respondent heard debate between baselind and endline; (2) how often respondent heard debate by endline; Panel B: index of (1) indicator for respondent's stated debate winner attended debate; (2) share of candidates respondent claims participated; (3) share of predicted leading candidates respondent claims participated; Panel C: change in how many questions about CSDF management respondents answered correctly. Panel D: index of (1) change in how much respondents listened to radio; (2) change in how much they discussed politics with friends; (3) how much they accessed other sources of political information. See Table A18 for disaggregated indicator-level results and Tables A31-A32 for predetermined covariate coefficients. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Dem* weights observations to be representative at the electoral district-level with respect to gender and education. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A16. Updating about candidates (demography-weighted)

	Certainty about competence		**Certainty about policy**	
1. Uncertainty	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Incumbent				
Intensive Invite	0.180*	0.190*	0.180**	0.226***
	(0.100)	(0.097)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Observations	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496
Weight	No	Dem	No	Dem
B. Challengers				
Intensive Invite	0.060	0.063	0.147**	0.069
	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.060)	(0.071)
Observations	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686
Weight	No	Dem	No	Dem

	Beliefs about competence		**Learning about policy**	
2. Levels	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Incumbent				
Intensive Invite	0.119	0.174	0.135*	0.106
	(0.080)	(0.105)	(0.070)	(0.076)
Observations	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496
Weight	No	Dem	No	Dem
B. Challengers				
Intensive Invite	-0.060	-0.040	0.053	0.025
	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.063)	(0.082)
Observations	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686
Weight	No	Dem	No	Dem

Notes: Outcomes are standardized. Panel 1: Columns 1-3: change in certainty about candidates' competence; 4-6: change in certainty about candidates' policy priorities; Panel 2: Columns 1-3: change in perceptions of candidates' competence; 4-6: change in correctly learning candidates' policy priorities. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Dem* weights observations to be representative at the electoral district-level with respect to gender and education. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A17. Candidate campaigning (demography-weighted)

	Ground		Radio	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Incumbent				
Intensive Invite	-0.027	-0.073	0.091**	0.089**
	(0.040)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,496	3,496
Weight	No	Dem	No	Dem
B. Challengers				
Intensive Invite	-0.067*	-0.099**	-0.028	-0.012
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.031)
Observations	8,678	8,678	8,686	8,686
Weight	No	Dem	No	Dem

Notes: Outcomes are standardized. Columns 1-3: index of how often candidates (1) visited; (2) distributed leaflets; (3) bought votes in respondents' communities; 4-6: index of how often respondents heard candidates on radio in two weeks before election. See Table A19 for disaggregated indicator-level results, and Table A35 for predetermined covariate coefficients. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Dem* weights observations to be representative at the electoral district-level with respect to gender and education. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Effects on disaggregated outcomes

Table A18. Debate exposure (supplementary)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Debate listening index			
(1) Change in heard debate			
Intensive Invite	0.080***	0.081***	0.103***
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Control Mean	0.084	0.082	0.082
(2) Heard debate			
Intensive Invite	0.038*	0.035*	0.051**
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Control Mean	0.195	0.202	0.193
(3) Number of times heard			
Intensive Invite	0.078*	0.088**	0.110**
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Control Mean	0.420	0.440	0.420
B. Debate knowledge index			
(1) Debate winner attended debate			
Intensive Invite	0.072**	0.075**	0.093***
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Control Mean	0.291	0.297	0.283
(2) Stated share of participating candidates			
Intensive Invite	0.023	0.024*	0.031**
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Control Mean	0.111	0.115	0.111
(3) Stated share of participating leading candidates			
Intensive Invite	0.030*	0.026*	0.038**
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Control Mean	0.145	0.153	0.148
C. Policy knowledge index			
(1) Manager of CSDF			
Intensive Invite	0.042	0.054	0.043
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.033)
Control Mean	0.237	0.231	0.243
(2) CSDF reporting requirement			
Intensive Invite	-0.002	0.025	0.003
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Control Mean	0.247	0.249	0.247
(3) CSDF citizen involvement requirement			
Intensive Invite	0.092**	0.107**	0.104**
	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.045)
Control Mean	0.246	0.246	0.244
Observations	4060	4060	4060
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs
D. Political information demand index			
(1) Change in radio listening			
Intensive Invite	0.276*	0.437**	0.332**
	(0.140)	(0.168)	(0.165)
Control Mean	0.233	0.213	0.232
(2) Demand for non-radio information sources			
Intensive Invite	0.156**	0.179**	0.187**
	(0.078)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Control Mean	4.970	4.800	4.932
(3) Change in political discussion with friends			
Intensive Invite	0.475**	0.409*	0.425**
	(0.182)	(0.232)	(0.191)
Control Mean	-0.124	-0.106	-0.117

Notes: All outcome variables are described in Appendix A.6. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A19. Candidate campaigning (supplementary)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Incumbent			
(1) Candidate visited community			
Intensive Invite	-0.021	-0.025	-0.026
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Control Mean	0.823	0.824	0.820
(2) Candidate distributed leaflets			
Intensive Invite	-0.008	-0.006	-0.003
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Control Mean	0.935	0.933	0.932
(3) Vote buying for candidate			
Intensive Invite	0.051	0.081**	0.073**
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Control Mean	2.258	2.223	2.231
Observations	3,492	3,492	3,492
B. Challenger			
(1) Candidate visited community			
Intensive Invite	-0.035***	-0.028**	-0.033**
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Control Mean	0.756	0.753	0.753
(2) Candidate distributed leaflets			
Intensive Invite	-0.015*	-0.017**	-0.019**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Control Mean	0.905	0.908	0.907
(3) Vote buying for candidate			
Intensive Invite	0.018	-0.001	0.003
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.039)
Control Mean	2.109	2.145	2.132
Observations	8,678	8,678	8,678
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs

Notes: All outcome variables are described in Appendix A.6. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Other tables

Table A20. Candidate debate participation (supplementary)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Election winner			
Intensive Invite	0.253**	0.201**	0.274***
	(0.098)	(0.089)	(0.093)
Control Mean	0.501	0.520	0.474
Observations	4,060	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs
B. Share of actual challengers			
Intensive Invite	0.266***	0.173**	0.236***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Control Mean	0.488	0.572	0.525
Observations	4,060	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs
C. Share of actual other candidates			
Intensive Invite	0.017	0.029	0.036
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Control Mean	0.563	0.584	0.584
Observations	3,991	3,991	3,991
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs

Notes: Outcome: share of the respective set of candidates (winner, actual challenger) who attended a debate out of all candidates in that district. Actual challengers are candidates who ranked in the top three in their race in the election but were not the incumbent. Actual other candidates are those who did not rank in the top three. Panel C has fewer observations due to only three candidates running in two districts (and hence no 'actual other candidates' defined). Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A21. Candidate debate participation (district-level)

	(1)	(2)
A. Share of candidates		
Intensive Invite	0.064	0.092*
	(0.044)	(0.048)
Control Mean	0.572	0.587
Observations	73	73
Weight	No	Reg
B. Incumbent		
Intensive Invite	0.174	0.232*
	(0.105)	(0.119)
Control Mean	0.371	0.415
Observations	73	73
Weight	No	Reg
C. Share of challengers		
Intensive Invite	0.143	0.222**
	(0.093)	(0.097)
Control Mean	0.552	0.573
Observations	73	73
Weight	No	Reg
D. Share of other candidates		
Intensive Invite	0.008	0.009
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Control Mean	0.583	0.600
Observations	71	71
Weight	No	Reg

Notes: Outcomes: share of candidate types (all, incumbent, challenger, other candidate) who attended a debate out of all candidates in that district. Panel D has fewer observations due to only three candidates running in two districts (and hence no 'other candidates' defined). For weighted specifications, *Reg* is the number of registered voters in that district. All specifications are estimated using OLS and include randomization block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A22. Debate rebroadcasting

	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Radio monitors			
Intensive Invite	0.386	-0.718	-0.224
	(1.001)	(0.864)	(0.980)
Control Mean	5.230	5.618	5.466
B. Radio survey			
Intensive Invite	1.044	0.304	0.720
	(1.052)	(0.915)	(0.961)
Control Mean	7.473	7.702	7.698
Observations	4,060	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs

Notes: Outcomes: Panel A: number of rebroadcasts confirmed by radio monitors; Panel B: number of rebroadcasts based on survey of radio stations, including those not contracted to rebroadcast but recorded as being present in the debate venue. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A23. Effects on voting outcomes (Panel specification)

	Main effect			Interaction term: Std. Performance			Interaction term: Std. Policy alignment		
1. Respondent-level	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
A. Incumbent									
Intensive Invite	0.050***	0.049**	0.041**	0.052***	0.049**	0.042**	0.048**	0.045**	0.038*
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Intensive Invite × $\widehat{\text{Performance}}$				0.064**	0.055*	0.051*			
				(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.029)			
Intensive Invite × Policy alignment							0.036**	0.049***	0.048***
							(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Control Mean	0.197	0.201	0.204	0.197	0.201	0.204	0.197	0.201	0.204
Observations	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496
B. Challengers									
Intensive Invite	-0.035***	-0.034***	-0.028**	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.028**	-0.035***	-0.034***	-0.028**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Intensive Invite × $\widehat{\text{Performance}}$				0.002	0.009	-0.001			
				(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)			
Intensive Invite × Policy alignment							-0.001	-0.007	-0.004
							(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Control Mean	0.128	0.132	0.128	0.128	0.132	0.128	0.128	0.132	0.128
Observations	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686	8,686
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs

Notes: Panels 1.A. and 1.B: Outcome: Change in indicator that respondent reported voting for incumbent (Panel A) or a predicted challenger (Panel B) between baseline and endline. Columns 4-6 interact treatment assignment with standardized candidate-level measures of predicted debate performance; 7-9 interact treatment with standardized respondent-candidate-level measures of policy alignment (measured at baseline). All specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects. Panel 1 adds enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A24. Rebroadcasting intervention

	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Full sample			
Rebroadcast	0.161	0.115	0.151
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.123)
Observations	4,060	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs
B. Respondents in *Intensive Invite* districts			
Rebroadcast	-0.030	-0.078	-0.020
	(0.203)	(0.157)	(0.201)
Observations	2,252	2,252	2,252
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs

Notes: Outcome is standardized index of debate exposure. Panel A uses respondents in full sample of electoral districts; Panel B restricts to respondents in electoral districts assigned to *Intensive Invite*. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A25. Effects on coordination

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) Discussed debate with friends			
Intensive Invite	0.129*	0.138**	0.174**
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Control Mean	1.645	1.656	1.626
(2) Discussion led to coordination			
Intensive Invite	0.208**	0.210***	0.251***
	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Control Mean	1.686	1.697	1.664
Observations	4,060	4,060	4,060
Weight	No	1/Obs	Reg/Obs

Notes: Outcomes: How much respondents discussed the debate with friends; How much this discussion led to coordinating their vote choices. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Tables with predetermined covariate coefficients

Table A26. Candidate debate participation (Table 5)

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
A. Share of candidates						
Intensive Invite	0.077**	(0.034)	0.065**	(0.031)	0.092***	(0.034)
Scheduled debate week	-0.057**	(0.027)	-0.075***	(0.022)	-0.046*	(0.026)
Number of candidates (2017)	-0.009	(0.014)	0.000	(0.012)	-0.007	(0.014)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.098*	(0.051)	0.136***	(0.047)	0.133**	(0.056)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.178**	(0.080)	-0.162**	(0.073)	-0.180**	(0.076)
Number of debates in district	-0.006	(0.075)	-0.009	(0.066)	-0.003	(0.068)
1st voteshare (2011)	-0.352	(0.667)	-0.162	(0.514)	-0.397	(0.594)
2nd voteshare (2011)	-1.163*	(0.588)	-0.519	(0.531)	-0.890	(0.605)
3rd voteshare (2011)	1.688**	(0.726)	1.866**	(0.740)	1.291	(0.825)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	0.745	(0.852)	0.200	(0.664)	0.618	(0.794)
Turnout (2011)	1.923**	(0.873)	2.648***	(0.818)	2.935***	(0.860)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	-0.589***	(0.194)	-0.674***	(0.197)	-0.738***	(0.200)
Log population density (2008)	-0.057**	(0.027)	-0.058**	(0.026)	-0.065**	(0.027)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.431***	(0.110)	0.435***	(0.098)	0.379***	(0.107)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.993***	(0.265)	0.717***	(0.206)	0.913***	(0.245)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.689***	(0.223)	-0.490**	(0.208)	-0.623***	(0.221)
Share over 18 (2008)	2.530	(1.574)	3.132**	(1.288)	2.339	(1.485)
Share with secondary education (2008)	-0.110	(0.649)	0.046	(0.588)	0.133	(0.629)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.003	(0.006)	-0.010*	(0.006)	-0.006	(0.006)
Control Mean	0.542		0.573		0.557	
Observations	4,060		4,060		4,060	
B. Incumbent						
Intensive Invite	0.211**	(0.084)	0.176**	(0.073)	0.234***	(0.083)
Scheduled debate week	-0.324***	(0.075)	-0.317***	(0.072)	-0.273***	(0.080)
Number of candidates (2017)	0.015	(0.029)	0.045*	(0.026)	0.039	(0.027)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.281**	(0.120)	0.320***	(0.117)	0.320**	(0.124)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.679**	(0.296)	-0.321	(0.245)	-0.549*	(0.291)
Number of debates in district	-0.002	(0.169)	-0.182	(0.147)	-0.117	(0.148)
1st voteshare (2011)	-1.198	(1.549)	-0.163	(1.371)	-0.604	(1.388)
2nd voteshare (2011)	-0.100	(1.842)	1.852	(1.722)	-0.159	(1.765)
3rd voteshare (2011)	1.342	(2.140)	0.899	(1.874)	1.741	(2.056)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	2.070	(1.891)	0.508	(1.650)	1.303	(1.714)
Turnout (2011)	-3.004	(2.332)	-2.090	(1.958)	-0.878	(1.986)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.439	(0.543)	0.728	(0.526)	0.687	(0.559)
Log population density (2008)	0.018	(0.078)	-0.030	(0.064)	-0.023	(0.063)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	-0.717**	(0.357)	-0.702**	(0.302)	-0.816**	(0.315)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.257	(0.613)	0.158	(0.587)	0.446	(0.579)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-1.171**	(0.513)	-1.076**	(0.520)	-1.080**	(0.501)
Share over 18 (2008)	-9.086**	(4.229)	-9.504***	(3.566)	-10.597***	(3.718)
Share with secondary education (2008)	3.263**	(1.550)	2.994**	(1.349)	3.513**	(1.480)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	0.018	(0.014)	0.005	(0.013)	0.011	(0.013)
Control Mean	0.280		0.372		0.299	
Observations	4,060		4,060		4,060	
C. Share of challengers						
Intensive Invite	0.213***	(0.074)	0.143**	(0.064)	0.221***	(0.068)
Scheduled debate week	-0.048	(0.051)	-0.087*	(0.047)	-0.059	(0.046)
Number of candidates (2017)	-0.036	(0.024)	-0.023	(0.022)	-0.042*	(0.023)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.197**	(0.097)	0.216**	(0.092)	0.220**	(0.097)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.378*	(0.206)	-0.336*	(0.201)	-0.426**	(0.203)
Number of debates in district	0.135	(0.139)	0.103	(0.133)	0.157	(0.130)
1st voteshare (2011)	2.592**	(1.228)	2.777**	(1.131)	2.745**	(1.208)
2nd voteshare (2011)	0.003	(1.005)	0.546	(1.024)	-0.092	(1.044)
3rd voteshare (2011)	2.594*	(1.352)	3.105**	(1.317)	2.447	(1.490)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	-3.172**	(1.433)	-3.448**	(1.310)	-3.336**	(1.448)
Turnout (2011)	5.456***	(1.675)	4.411***	(1.555)	5.717***	(1.550)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	-0.984**	(0.436)	-1.241***	(0.405)	-1.205***	(0.418)
Log population density (2008)	-0.139**	(0.054)	-0.111**	(0.053)	-0.170***	(0.054)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.760***	(0.222)	0.897***	(0.203)	0.893***	(0.208)
Share owns a radio (2016)	1.692***	(0.612)	1.415***	(0.529)	1.710***	(0.591)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.607	(0.514)	-0.663	(0.447)	-0.730	(0.488)
Share over 18 (2008)	8.280***	(2.943)	9.828***	(2.436)	9.459***	(2.649)
Share with secondary education (2008)	1.195	(1.331)	0.384	(1.274)	1.602	(1.182)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.022*	(0.013)	-0.027**	(0.012)	-0.020	(0.013)
Control Mean	0.492		0.554		0.528	
Observations	4,060		4,060		4,060	
D. Share of other candidates						
Intensive Invite	0.002	(0.030)	0.007	(0.029)	0.009	(0.029)
Scheduled debate week	0.015	(0.030)	-0.011	(0.029)	0.032	(0.029)
Number of candidates (2017)	-0.022**	(0.011)	-0.013	(0.011)	-0.021*	(0.011)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.018	(0.049)	0.063	(0.046)	0.051	(0.049)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.107	(0.098)	-0.122	(0.087)	-0.112	(0.096)
Number of debates in district	-0.022	(0.058)	-0.009	(0.057)	-0.009	(0.053)
1st voteshare (2011)	-1.886***	(0.591)	-1.586***	(0.518)	-1.976***	(0.535)
2nd voteshare (2011)	-2.476***	(0.520)	-1.934***	(0.512)	-2.291***	(0.517)
3rd voteshare (2011)	1.015	(0.686)	1.356*	(0.721)	0.623	(0.793)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	2.899***	(0.764)	2.196***	(0.692)	2.852***	(0.722)
Turnout (2011)	1.635*	(0.878)	2.636***	(0.745)	2.766***	(0.800)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	-0.453**	(0.190)	-0.558***	(0.206)	-0.660***	(0.211)
Log population density (2008)	-0.035	(0.029)	-0.038	(0.028)	-0.035	(0.027)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.469***	(0.114)	0.414***	(0.108)	0.373***	(0.121)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.919***	(0.216)	0.649***	(0.186)	0.808***	(0.206)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.610***	(0.207)	-0.378*	(0.206)	-0.582***	(0.207)
Share over 18 (2008)	1.928	(1.421)	2.265*	(1.278)	1.860	(1.386)
Share with secondary education (2008)	-0.826	(0.791)	-0.311	(0.667)	-0.570	(0.707)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	0.006	(0.006)	-0.002	(0.005)	0.003	(0.006)
Control Mean	0.562		0.583		0.575	
Observations	3,991		3,991		3,991	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	

Notes: Outcomes: share of candidate types (all, incumbent, challenger, other candidate) who attended a debate out of all candidates in that district. Panel D has fewer observations due to only three candidates running in two districts (and hence no 'other candidates' defined). Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A27. Voting outcomes (Table 6, Panel 1.A.)

	Main effect			Interaction term: Std. Performance			Std. Policy alignment		
1. Respondent-level	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
A. Incumbent									
Intensive Invite	0.041** (0.019)	0.047** (0.022)	0.037* (0.021)	0.042** (0.019)	0.047** (0.021)	0.038* (0.020)	0.038** (0.019)	0.043* (0.022)	0.034 (0.020)
Intensive Invite × $\widehat{\text{Performance}}$				0.069** (0.027)	0.068** (0.032)	0.062** (0.030)			
Intensive Invite × Policy alignment							0.042*** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.018)	0.055*** (0.018)
Days since Sept 1	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Respondent is male	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.019)
Respondent age	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Education: Primary	-0.040 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.050)	-0.017 (0.048)	-0.044 (0.037)	-0.020 (0.050)	-0.019 (0.048)	-0.041 (0.037)	-0.019 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.048)
Education: Secondary	0.004 (0.020)	0.017 (0.024)	0.010 (0.021)	0.004 (0.020)	0.017 (0.024)	0.010 (0.021)	0.004 (0.020)	0.020 (0.024)	0.014 (0.021)
Education: Tertiary	-0.049** (0.020)	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.049** (0.020)	-0.034 (0.023)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.049** (0.020)	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.040* (0.022)
Candidate party: UP	0.057 (0.048)	0.095** (0.045)	0.046 (0.048)	0.070 (0.048)	0.102** (0.044)	0.065 (0.048)	0.053 (0.048)	0.088** (0.044)	0.042 (0.047)
Number of candidates (2017)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.010)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	-0.171*** (0.051)	-0.133** (0.058)	-0.124** (0.057)	-0.229*** (0.055)	-0.196*** (0.062)	-0.182*** (0.062)	-0.172*** (0.050)	-0.139** (0.058)	-0.125** (0.056)
Log registered voters (2017)	0.050 (0.103)	-0.043 (0.113)	-0.012 (0.110)	0.104 (0.102)	0.021 (0.107)	0.032 (0.106)	0.049 (0.102)	-0.043 (0.113)	-0.019 (0.109)
Number of debates in district	0.028 (0.057)	0.024 (0.060)	0.077 (0.053)	0.009 (0.050)	0.020 (0.054)	0.063 (0.047)	0.033 (0.056)	0.026 (0.060)	0.083 (0.053)
1st voteshare (2011)	1.270*** (0.390)	0.847** (0.328)	0.971*** (0.359)	0.502 (0.432)	0.344 (0.383)	0.462 (0.412)	1.240*** (0.379)	0.860*** (0.317)	0.988*** (0.350)
2nd voteshare (2011)	0.096 (0.326)	-0.045 (0.355)	0.079 (0.349)	-0.082 (0.322)	-0.228 (0.349)	-0.144 (0.350)	0.050 (0.318)	-0.100 (0.343)	0.006 (0.335)
3rd voteshare (2011)	0.066 (0.530)	-0.416 (0.600)	-0.454 (0.584)	0.175 (0.479)	-0.196 (0.536)	-0.334 (0.527)	0.057 (0.531)	-0.392 (0.610)	-0.441 (0.596)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	-1.646*** (0.422)	-1.233*** (0.378)	-1.421*** (0.412)	-0.668 (0.512)	-0.541 (0.502)	-0.732 (0.517)	-1.623*** (0.410)	-1.252*** (0.365)	-1.445*** (0.401)
Turnout (2011)	-2.099 (1.263)	-1.627 (1.302)	-1.452 (1.336)	-3.414*** (1.228)	-2.717** (1.339)	-2.518* (1.402)	-2.037 (1.252)	-1.518 (1.306)	-1.325 (1.340)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.398 (0.258)	0.369 (0.296)	0.294 (0.285)	0.590** (0.236)	0.512* (0.281)	0.424 (0.267)	0.377 (0.255)	0.355 (0.294)	0.274 (0.282)
Log population density (2008)	-0.007 (0.034)	-0.010 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.035)	0.021 (0.033)	0.019 (0.036)	0.004 (0.037)	-0.007 (0.033)	-0.014 (0.033)	-0.027 (0.034)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	-0.088 (0.154)	0.033 (0.181)	0.075 (0.182)	-0.224 (0.175)	-0.153 (0.223)	-0.087 (0.213)	-0.085 (0.154)	0.044 (0.184)	0.089 (0.185)
Share owns a radio (2016)	-0.113 (0.196)	-0.001 (0.205)	-0.046 (0.204)	-0.197 (0.198)	-0.136 (0.221)	-0.147 (0.215)	-0.123 (0.192)	-0.000 (0.201)	-0.044 (0.200)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	0.021 (0.237)	-0.152 (0.255)	-0.056 (0.226)	0.148 (0.242)	0.084 (0.288)	0.099 (0.246)	0.037 (0.231)	-0.148 (0.252)	-0.052 (0.220)
Share over 18 (2008)	-2.065 (1.365)	-1.163 (1.524)	-1.044 (1.630)	-3.135** (1.400)	-1.885 (1.566)	-1.997 (1.649)	-1.916 (1.372)	-0.976 (1.526)	-0.840 (1.650)
Share with secondary education (2008)	0.571 (0.511)	0.639 (0.509)	0.572 (0.476)	0.443 (0.479)	0.677 (0.508)	0.616 (0.480)	0.550 (0.497)	0.681 (0.498)	0.616 (0.458)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	0.011** (0.006)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.014** (0.006)	0.015** (0.006)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	0.011** (0.006)
ED: scheduled debate week	-0.202*** (0.076)	-0.169* (0.087)	-0.168* (0.088)	-0.275*** (0.086)	-0.241** (0.096)	-0.236** (0.098)	-0.201** (0.076)	-0.173** (0.086)	-0.172* (0.088)
Control Mean	0.278	0.282	0.288	0.278	0.282	0.288	0.278	0.282	0.288
Observations	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496	3,496

Notes: Outcomes: respondent reported voting for incumbent at endline. Interactions: Columns 4-6: standardized candidate-level measures of predicted debate performance; 7-9: standardized respondent-candidate-level measures of policy alignment (measured at baseline). All specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects. Panel 1 adds enumerator fixed effects and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Panel 2 adds predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, polling station, and candidate levels. Weights: *PS*: polling stations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters at polling station. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A28. Voting outcomes (Table 6, Panel 1.B.)

	Main effect						Interaction term: Std. Performance						Interaction term: Std. Policy alignment					
1. Respondent-level	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)		(9)	
B. Challengers																		
Intensive Invite	-0.036***	(0.012)	-0.035***	(0.011)	-0.027**	(0.012)	-0.035***	(0.013)	-0.037***	(0.011)	-0.027**	(0.012)	-0.036***	(0.012)	-0.035***	(0.011)	-0.027**	(0.012)
Intensive Invite × $\widehat{\text{Performance}}$							0.017	(0.026)	0.023	(0.027)	0.012	(0.027)						
Intensive Invite × Policy alignment													-0.002	(0.007)	-0.004	(0.008)	-0.002	(0.008)
Days since Sept 1	0.002***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)	0.002***	(0.000)
Respondent is male	-0.007	(0.009)	-0.005	(0.010)	-0.005	(0.010)	-0.007	(0.009)	-0.005	(0.010)	-0.005	(0.010)	-0.007	(0.009)	-0.005	(0.010)	-0.005	(0.010)
Respondent age	0.001*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.001*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.001*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Education: Primary	0.009	(0.016)	0.009	(0.019)	0.008	(0.017)	0.009	(0.016)	0.010	(0.019)	0.008	(0.017)	0.009	(0.016)	0.009	(0.019)	0.008	(0.017)
Education: Secondary	-0.012	(0.009)	-0.021*	(0.011)	-0.014	(0.011)	-0.012	(0.009)	-0.021*	(0.011)	-0.014	(0.011)	-0.012	(0.009)	-0.021*	(0.011)	-0.014	(0.011)
Education: Tertiary	0.012	(0.009)	0.016	(0.011)	0.012	(0.011)	0.012	(0.009)	0.016	(0.011)	0.013	(0.011)	0.012	(0.009)	0.016	(0.011)	0.012	(0.011)
Candidate party: UP	0.032	(0.026)	0.041	(0.029)	0.042	(0.028)	0.031	(0.026)	0.040	(0.028)	0.041	(0.028)	0.032	(0.026)	0.041	(0.029)	0.042	(0.028)
Number of candidates (2017)	-0.003	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.004)	-0.002	(0.004)	-0.002	(0.005)	-0.002	(0.004)	-0.001	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.004)	-0.002	(0.004)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	-0.028**	(0.014)	-0.028**	(0.013)	-0.028**	(0.013)	-0.027*	(0.014)	-0.028**	(0.013)	-0.028**	(0.013)	-0.028**	(0.014)	-0.029**	(0.013)	-0.028**	(0.013)
Log registered voters (2017)	0.078**	(0.035)	0.076**	(0.030)	0.057*	(0.033)	0.076**	(0.034)	0.078**	(0.030)	0.056*	(0.033)	0.079**	(0.035)	0.077**	(0.030)	0.057*	(0.032)
Number of debates in district	-0.001	(0.025)	-0.000	(0.022)	-0.007	(0.024)	-0.003	(0.027)	-0.000	(0.023)	-0.007	(0.025)	-0.001	(0.025)	-0.000	(0.022)	-0.007	(0.024)
1st voteshare (2011)	-0.165	(0.209)	-0.198	(0.206)	-0.211	(0.234)	-0.160	(0.212)	-0.213	(0.213)	-0.207	(0.235)	-0.162	(0.209)	-0.195	(0.207)	-0.210	(0.234)
2nd voteshare (2011)	0.300	(0.189)	0.337*	(0.175)	0.317*	(0.184)	0.264	(0.183)	0.288*	(0.165)	0.289	(0.182)	0.303	(0.187)	0.343*	(0.174)	0.319*	(0.182)
3rd voteshare (2011)	-0.447*	(0.243)	-0.363	(0.272)	-0.319	(0.284)	-0.473*	(0.244)	-0.395	(0.276)	-0.345	(0.292)	-0.447*	(0.242)	-0.365	(0.272)	-0.319	(0.284)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	0.178	(0.250)	0.218	(0.232)	0.234	(0.260)	0.183	(0.250)	0.254	(0.233)	0.238	(0.262)	0.175	(0.250)	0.215	(0.233)	0.233	(0.260)
Turnout (2011)	-0.147	(0.259)	-0.198	(0.248)	-0.097	(0.268)	-0.130	(0.266)	-0.189	(0.258)	-0.083	(0.276)	-0.147	(0.260)	-0.199	(0.248)	-0.097	(0.268)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	-0.035	(0.067)	-0.002	(0.067)	-0.013	(0.076)	-0.025	(0.065)	0.000	(0.066)	-0.008	(0.074)	-0.035	(0.067)	-0.001	(0.067)	-0.013	(0.076)
Log population density (2008)	-0.023*	(0.012)	-0.011	(0.012)	-0.012	(0.012)	-0.023*	(0.012)	-0.010	(0.012)	-0.012	(0.012)	-0.023*	(0.012)	-0.011	(0.012)	-0.012	(0.012)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.123***	(0.042)	0.078	(0.048)	0.074	(0.050)	0.122***	(0.040)	0.081*	(0.046)	0.076	(0.049)	0.123***	(0.042)	0.077	(0.048)	0.074	(0.049)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.128	(0.083)	0.028	(0.078)	0.076	(0.088)	0.125	(0.083)	0.026	(0.077)	0.078	(0.089)	0.129	(0.083)	0.029	(0.078)	0.077	(0.088)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.203***	(0.074)	-0.125	(0.078)	-0.142*	(0.082)	-0.197**	(0.075)	-0.125	(0.077)	-0.144*	(0.081)	-0.204***	(0.074)	-0.124	(0.078)	-0.142*	(0.082)
Share over 18 (2008)	-0.019	(0.380)	-0.288	(0.363)	-0.175	(0.400)	0.033	(0.392)	-0.174	(0.403)	-0.111	(0.437)	-0.022	(0.377)	-0.296	(0.359)	-0.178	(0.396)
Share with secondary education (2008)	-0.047	(0.253)	-0.369	(0.229)	-0.253	(0.232)	-0.023	(0.260)	-0.348	(0.237)	-0.231	(0.240)	-0.047	(0.253)	-0.372	(0.228)	-0.255	(0.232)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)
ED: scheduled debate week	0.010	(0.022)	0.019	(0.020)	0.019	(0.023)	0.014	(0.023)	0.025	(0.022)	0.021	(0.024)	0.010	(0.022)	0.019	(0.020)	0.019	(0.023)
Control Mean	0.156		0.156		0.156		0.156		0.156		0.156		0.156		0.156		0.156	
Observations	8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs		No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs		No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	

Notes: Outcomes: respondent reported voting for a challenger at endline. Interactions: Columns 4-6: standardized candidate-level measures of predicted debate performance; 7-9: standardized respondent-candidate-level measures of policy alignment (measured at baseline). All specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects. Panel 1 adds enumerator fixed effects and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Panel 2 adds predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, polling station, and candidate levels. Weights: *PS*: polling stations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters at polling station. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A29. Voting outcomes (Table 6, Panel 2.A.)

	Main effect						Interaction term: Std. Performance						Std. Policy alignment					
2. Polling station-level	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)		(9)	
A. Incumbent																		
Intensive Invite	0.048*	(0.024)	0.043*	(0.023)	0.050**	(0.023)	0.047**	(0.023)	0.042*	(0.022)	0.050**	(0.022)	0.045*	(0.024)	0.039*	(0.023)	0.048**	(0.023)
Candidate party: UP	-0.113**	(0.047)	-0.085**	(0.041)	-0.121**	(0.047)	-0.090*	(0.045)	-0.075*	(0.039)	-0.096**	(0.045)	-0.120**	(0.050)	-0.095**	(0.044)	-0.126**	(0.050)
ED: N candidates	-0.014	(0.008)	-0.007	(0.010)	-0.016**	(0.008)	-0.015**	(0.007)	-0.010	(0.008)	-0.016**	(0.007)	-0.014*	(0.008)	-0.007	(0.010)	-0.017**	(0.008)
ED: incumbent running	-0.132**	(0.057)	-0.141**	(0.059)	-0.137**	(0.056)	-0.208***	(0.057)	-0.221***	(0.057)	-0.213***	(0.058)	-0.135**	(0.059)	-0.149**	(0.062)	-0.139**	(0.057)
ED: log reg voters	0.128	(0.108)	0.167	(0.106)	0.135	(0.104)	0.192*	(0.109)	0.248**	(0.106)	0.194*	(0.107)	0.123	(0.110)	0.169	(0.108)	0.129	(0.105)
ED: N debates	0.100*	(0.054)	0.050	(0.056)	0.117**	(0.052)	0.088*	(0.047)	0.048	(0.050)	0.100**	(0.045)	0.104*	(0.056)	0.050	(0.057)	0.121**	(0.053)
ED: 2011 1st voteshare	0.289	(0.431)	0.086	(0.416)	0.350	(0.446)	-0.377	(0.455)	-0.554	(0.462)	-0.334	(0.472)	0.291	(0.431)	0.084	(0.416)	0.352	(0.446)
ED: 2011 2nd voteshare	1.030***	(0.371)	0.932**	(0.364)	1.020***	(0.363)	0.695**	(0.342)	0.659*	(0.339)	0.696**	(0.332)	0.944***	(0.341)	0.862**	(0.342)	0.946***	(0.326)
ED: 2011 3rd voteshare	-0.632	(0.529)	-0.862	(0.525)	-0.572	(0.522)	-0.418	(0.482)	-0.554	(0.485)	-0.387	(0.476)	-0.615	(0.541)	-0.833	(0.527)	-0.561	(0.532)
ED: 2011 HHI	-0.367	(0.514)	-0.094	(0.500)	-0.461	(0.529)	0.547	(0.562)	0.796	(0.578)	0.469	(0.575)	-0.369	(0.513)	-0.088	(0.501)	-0.462	(0.528)
ED: 2011 turnout	-1.846*	(1.055)	-2.039*	(1.048)	-2.050*	(1.043)	-3.292***	(1.103)	-3.455***	(1.054)	-3.480***	(1.103)	-1.696	(1.140)	-1.891*	(1.119)	-1.934*	(1.122)
ED: share candidates who ran before in 2011	0.415*	(0.230)	0.416*	(0.214)	0.435*	(0.225)	0.592***	(0.213)	0.609***	(0.207)	0.612***	(0.207)	0.388*	(0.215)	0.394*	(0.199)	0.413*	(0.212)
ED: log pop density	0.011	(0.033)	0.026	(0.030)	0.011	(0.034)	0.051	(0.031)	0.065**	(0.028)	0.049	(0.032)	0.008	(0.035)	0.022	(0.032)	0.009	(0.035)
ED: share with GSM coverage	-0.291**	(0.130)	-0.338**	(0.128)	-0.297**	(0.131)	-0.527***	(0.156)	-0.585***	(0.159)	-0.516***	(0.154)	-0.276*	(0.142)	-0.325**	(0.138)	-0.285**	(0.141)
ED: share own radio	-0.223	(0.188)	-0.272	(0.186)	-0.270	(0.190)	-0.389**	(0.185)	-0.460**	(0.186)	-0.420**	(0.188)	-0.229	(0.186)	-0.282	(0.181)	-0.276	(0.188)
ED: share get radio news often	0.131	(0.203)	0.090	(0.211)	0.192	(0.201)	0.392*	(0.205)	0.419*	(0.218)	0.424**	(0.202)	0.147	(0.199)	0.105	(0.207)	0.206	(0.198)
ED: share over 18	-2.602*	(1.418)	-2.957**	(1.342)	-2.743*	(1.401)	-3.863**	(1.455)	-3.867***	(1.375)	-4.015***	(1.414)	-2.366	(1.486)	-2.714*	(1.374)	-2.558*	(1.473)
ED: share have secondary ed	-0.645	(0.587)	-0.937*	(0.540)	-0.578	(0.572)	-0.595	(0.553)	-0.882*	(0.525)	-0.544	(0.534)	-0.635	(0.570)	-0.929*	(0.525)	-0.567	(0.560)
ED: average N radio stations covering each locality	0.015***	(0.005)	0.014***	(0.005)	0.017***	(0.005)	0.020***	(0.005)	0.019***	(0.005)	0.021***	(0.005)	0.015***	(0.005)	0.014***	(0.005)	0.017***	(0.005)
ED: scheduled debate week	-0.176*	(0.091)	-0.141*	(0.082)	-0.196**	(0.090)	-0.271***	(0.093)	-0.237***	(0.086)	-0.286***	(0.091)	-0.177*	(0.090)	-0.143*	(0.082)	-0.198**	(0.090)
Number of PS in VRC	0.006	(0.006)	0.006	(0.006)	0.005	(0.006)	0.006	(0.006)	0.005	(0.006)	0.005	(0.006)	0.006	(0.006)	0.006	(0.006)	0.005	(0.006)
VRC added in 2017	0.019	(0.014)	0.028*	(0.015)	0.018	(0.015)	0.021	(0.014)	0.030**	(0.015)	0.020	(0.015)	0.019	(0.014)	0.028*	(0.015)	0.017	(0.015)
Number of PS in VRC (2011)	-0.030	(0.019)	-0.040**	(0.019)	-0.028	(0.019)	-0.028	(0.019)	-0.038*	(0.019)	-0.027	(0.019)	-0.029	(0.018)	-0.039**	(0.019)	-0.027	(0.019)
Number of registered voters in VRC (2011)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Turnout (2011)	-0.051	(0.114)	-0.038	(0.124)	-0.045	(0.117)	-0.025	(0.107)	-0.011	(0.115)	-0.017	(0.109)	-0.046	(0.112)	-0.032	(0.121)	-0.041	(0.115)
Share of invalid votes (2011)	-0.107	(0.236)	-0.205	(0.251)	-0.103	(0.243)	-0.197	(0.237)	-0.291	(0.253)	-0.195	(0.242)	-0.116	(0.236)	-0.214	(0.252)	-0.113	(0.243)
Number of registered voters in PS (2017)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)
PS covered by partner radio station	0.025	(0.026)	0.049	(0.030)	0.012	(0.025)	0.017	(0.025)	0.038	(0.028)	0.006	(0.024)	0.026	(0.026)	0.050*	(0.030)	0.013	(0.025)
Urban PS	0.010	(0.014)	0.007	(0.017)	0.010	(0.014)	0.010	(0.014)	0.008	(0.017)	0.011	(0.014)	0.008	(0.014)	0.006	(0.017)	0.009	(0.014)
Control Mean	0.246		0.246		0.250		0.246		0.246		0.250		0.246		0.246		0.250	
Observations	4,618		4,618		4,618		4,618		4,618		4,618		4,618		4,618		4,618	

Notes: Outcomes: Panel 2: votes divided by registered voters for incumbent using polling station-level data. Interactions: district-level analogs of interaction terms (see Data section and above tables). All specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects. Panel 1 adds enumerator fixed effects and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Panel 2 adds predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, polling station, and candidate levels. Weights: *PS*: polling stations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters at polling station. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A30. Voting outcomes (Table 6, Panel 2.B.)

	Main effect						Interaction term: Std. Performance						Std. Policy alignment					
2. Polling station-level	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)		(9)	
B. Challengers																		
Intensive Invite	-0.030**	(0.013)	-0.035***	(0.012)	-0.028**	(0.013)	-0.030**	(0.013)	-0.035***	(0.012)	-0.028**	(0.013)	-0.029**	(0.013)	-0.032**	(0.013)	-0.028**	(0.013)
Candidate party: UP	0.010	(0.025)	0.014	(0.026)	0.006	(0.024)	0.009	(0.025)	0.013	(0.026)	0.006	(0.025)	0.010	(0.025)	0.013	(0.026)	0.007	(0.024)
ED: N candidates	-0.008**	(0.004)	-0.009**	(0.004)	-0.008*	(0.004)	-0.008**	(0.004)	-0.009**	(0.004)	-0.008*	(0.004)	-0.008**	(0.004)	-0.008**	(0.004)	-0.008*	(0.004)
ED: incumbent running	0.003	(0.015)	0.002	(0.015)	0.001	(0.016)	0.003	(0.015)	0.002	(0.015)	0.002	(0.016)	0.003	(0.015)	0.002	(0.015)	0.001	(0.016)
ED: log reg voters	0.013	(0.033)	0.028	(0.033)	0.012	(0.033)	0.013	(0.033)	0.029	(0.033)	0.012	(0.033)	0.013	(0.033)	0.036	(0.032)	0.008	(0.033)
ED: N debates	-0.016	(0.022)	-0.006	(0.023)	-0.018	(0.023)	-0.016	(0.022)	-0.006	(0.023)	-0.018	(0.024)	-0.016	(0.022)	-0.008	(0.023)	-0.016	(0.024)
ED: 2011 1st voteshare	0.110	(0.218)	0.228	(0.208)	0.026	(0.222)	0.112	(0.216)	0.228	(0.208)	0.031	(0.219)	0.111	(0.233)	0.271	(0.226)	0.011	(0.236)
ED: 2011 2nd voteshare	0.343*	(0.180)	0.409**	(0.179)	0.370**	(0.183)	0.336*	(0.188)	0.404**	(0.189)	0.357*	(0.190)	0.346**	(0.173)	0.468***	(0.175)	0.342*	(0.174)
ED: 2011 3rd voteshare	-0.303	(0.292)	-0.286	(0.278)	-0.376	(0.294)	-0.306	(0.295)	-0.287	(0.280)	-0.383	(0.297)	-0.303	(0.296)	-0.279	(0.278)	-0.379	(0.299)
ED: 2011 HHI	-0.215	(0.243)	-0.377	(0.232)	-0.123	(0.249)	-0.215	(0.242)	-0.376	(0.234)	-0.125	(0.246)	-0.217	(0.265)	-0.431*	(0.258)	-0.103	(0.271)
ED: 2011 turnout	0.630**	(0.313)	0.578*	(0.307)	0.643**	(0.312)	0.634*	(0.323)	0.580*	(0.317)	0.651**	(0.322)	0.630**	(0.316)	0.591*	(0.308)	0.642**	(0.315)
ED: share candidates who ran before in 2011	-0.144*	(0.080)	-0.112	(0.077)	-0.152*	(0.083)	-0.143*	(0.080)	-0.112	(0.077)	-0.150*	(0.083)	-0.144*	(0.079)	-0.114	(0.075)	-0.150*	(0.082)
ED: log pop density	-0.000	(0.010)	0.000	(0.010)	-0.001	(0.010)	-0.000	(0.010)	0.000	(0.010)	-0.001	(0.010)	-0.000	(0.010)	-0.001	(0.011)	-0.001	(0.010)
ED: share with GSM coverage	0.006	(0.047)	0.004	(0.046)	0.005	(0.048)	0.007	(0.049)	0.005	(0.047)	0.008	(0.049)	0.006	(0.049)	0.010	(0.046)	0.004	(0.050)
ED: share own radio	0.101	(0.075)	0.077	(0.073)	0.110	(0.075)	0.101	(0.075)	0.076	(0.072)	0.111	(0.076)	0.101	(0.072)	0.091	(0.071)	0.104	(0.072)
ED: share get radio news often	0.017	(0.062)	0.019	(0.063)	0.023	(0.062)	0.016	(0.063)	0.018	(0.064)	0.021	(0.064)	0.017	(0.062)	0.013	(0.062)	0.026	(0.062)
ED: share over 18	1.544***	(0.472)	1.405***	(0.462)	1.512***	(0.466)	1.563***	(0.506)	1.418***	(0.488)	1.549***	(0.502)	1.544***	(0.470)	1.395***	(0.450)	1.516***	(0.467)
ED: share have secondary ed	-0.365	(0.233)	-0.388	(0.238)	-0.372	(0.236)	-0.358	(0.244)	-0.384	(0.252)	-0.359	(0.245)	-0.366	(0.224)	-0.407*	(0.227)	-0.362	(0.229)
ED: average N radio stations covering each locality	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.007***	(0.002)	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.007***	(0.002)	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.007***	(0.002)	-0.005***	(0.002)
ED: scheduled debate week	0.059***	(0.021)	0.053**	(0.020)	0.062***	(0.022)	0.060***	(0.022)	0.053**	(0.022)	0.063***	(0.023)	0.059***	(0.021)	0.056***	(0.021)	0.061***	(0.022)
Number of PS in VRC	-0.006**	(0.003)	-0.005*	(0.003)	-0.006*	(0.003)	-0.006**	(0.003)	-0.005*	(0.003)	-0.006*	(0.003)	-0.006*	(0.003)	-0.005*	(0.003)	-0.006*	(0.003)
VRC added in 2017	-0.009	(0.006)	-0.007	(0.007)	-0.009	(0.007)	-0.009	(0.006)	-0.007	(0.007)	-0.009	(0.007)	-0.009	(0.006)	-0.007	(0.007)	-0.009	(0.007)
Number of PS in VRC (2011)	0.004	(0.008)	0.005	(0.008)	0.004	(0.008)	0.004	(0.008)	0.005	(0.008)	0.005	(0.008)	0.004	(0.008)	0.005	(0.008)	0.004	(0.008)
Number of registered voters in VRC (2011)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
Turnout (2011)	0.102**	(0.047)	0.100**	(0.047)	0.103**	(0.049)	0.102**	(0.046)	0.100**	(0.046)	0.104**	(0.048)	0.101**	(0.049)	0.096**	(0.048)	0.104**	(0.051)
Share of invalid votes (2011)	-0.112	(0.087)	-0.066	(0.087)	-0.139	(0.092)	-0.114	(0.092)	-0.067	(0.091)	-0.142	(0.097)	-0.112	(0.087)	-0.066	(0.087)	-0.140	(0.092)
Number of registered voters in PS (2017)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
PS covered by partner radio station	-0.015	(0.015)	-0.028*	(0.017)	-0.011	(0.014)	-0.015	(0.015)	-0.028*	(0.017)	-0.011	(0.014)	-0.015	(0.015)	-0.028*	(0.016)	-0.011	(0.014)
Urban PS	0.001	(0.009)	0.006	(0.010)	0.000	(0.009)	0.001	(0.009)	0.006	(0.010)	0.001	(0.009)	0.001	(0.009)	0.005	(0.010)	0.001	(0.009)
Control Mean	0.113		0.113		0.112		0.113		0.113		0.112		0.113		0.113		0.112	
Observations	11,385		11,385		11,385		11,385		11,385		11,385		11,385		11,385		11,385	
Weight	No		1/PS		Reg		No		1/PS		Reg		No		1/PS		Reg	

Notes: Outcomes: Panel 2: votes divided by registered voters for challengers using polling station-level data. Interactions: district-level analogs of interaction terms (see Data section and above tables). All specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects. Panel 1 adds enumerator fixed effects and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Panel 2 adds predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, polling station, and candidate levels. Weights: *PS*: polling stations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters at polling station. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A31. Debate exposure and information acquisition (Table 8, Panels A-B)

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
A. Debate listening index						
Intensive Invite	0.294***	(0.101)	0.330***	(0.102)	0.419***	(0.101)
Days since Sept 1	-0.005**	(0.002)	-0.005***	(0.002)	-0.004*	(0.002)
Male	0.210***	(0.036)	0.224***	(0.037)	0.222***	(0.038)
Respondent age	0.001	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)
Education: Primary	-0.017	(0.070)	-0.015	(0.066)	-0.022	(0.074)
Education: Secondary	0.092**	(0.043)	0.087**	(0.042)	0.090**	(0.042)
Education: Tertiary	0.071*	(0.040)	0.055	(0.057)	0.063	(0.061)
Scheduled debate week	-0.033	(0.051)	-0.040	(0.045)	-0.051	(0.041)
Number of candidates (2017)	0.006	(0.017)	0.021	(0.017)	0.016	(0.017)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.197**	(0.089)	0.268***	(0.090)	0.241***	(0.086)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.405**	(0.170)	-0.305**	(0.151)	-0.416***	(0.153)
Number of debates in district	-0.115	(0.087)	-0.168*	(0.086)	-0.130	(0.081)
1st voteshare (2011)	0.086	(0.903)	0.794	(0.733)	0.763	(0.782)
2nd voteshare (2011)	-1.246	(0.915)	-0.698	(0.846)	-0.702	(0.826)
3rd voteshare (2011)	1.591*	(0.932)	2.076**	(0.954)	2.271**	(0.996)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	0.198	(1.253)	-0.854	(1.040)	-0.749	(1.105)
Turnout (2011)	3.637***	(1.094)	3.898***	(0.962)	3.847***	(0.974)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	-0.038	(0.285)	0.063	(0.303)	0.001	(0.293)
Log population density (2008)	-0.106**	(0.045)	-0.126***	(0.043)	-0.117***	(0.039)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.978***	(0.198)	0.938***	(0.189)	0.883***	(0.178)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.880**	(0.335)	0.606**	(0.298)	0.708**	(0.294)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-1.307***	(0.262)	-1.160***	(0.273)	-1.127***	(0.243)
Share over 18 (2008)	7.802***	(2.446)	7.439***	(2.099)	6.739***	(2.179)
Share with secondary education (2008)	0.708	(1.174)	1.115	(1.105)	1.205	(0.990)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.017**	(0.008)	-0.023***	(0.008)	-0.022***	(0.008)
Observations	4,060		4,060		4,060	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	
B. Debate knowledge index						
Intensive Invite	0.123*	(0.063)	0.124**	(0.058)	0.162***	(0.059)
Days since Sept 1	-0.003	(0.002)	-0.003*	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)
Male	0.269***	(0.034)	0.281***	(0.037)	0.267***	(0.037)
Respondent age	0.003**	(0.001)	0.003**	(0.002)	0.003*	(0.002)
Education: Primary	0.105	(0.064)	0.106*	(0.061)	0.099	(0.063)
Education: Secondary	0.076	(0.050)	0.071	(0.045)	0.080*	(0.045)
Education: Tertiary	0.061	(0.038)	0.032	(0.040)	0.040	(0.037)
Scheduled debate week	-0.099	(0.063)	-0.104*	(0.056)	-0.110**	(0.054)
Number of candidates (2017)	0.010	(0.022)	0.027	(0.022)	0.021	(0.022)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.249**	(0.118)	0.316***	(0.119)	0.301**	(0.119)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.629***	(0.209)	-0.518***	(0.180)	-0.668***	(0.189)
Number of debates in district	-0.216*	(0.111)	-0.249**	(0.106)	-0.212*	(0.107)
1st voteshare (2011)	0.501	(1.195)	0.914	(1.044)	0.813	(1.158)
2nd voteshare (2011)	-1.533	(1.172)	-0.655	(1.114)	-0.996	(1.162)
3rd voteshare (2011)	2.790**	(1.269)	2.931**	(1.357)	3.321**	(1.435)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	-0.398	(1.642)	-1.204	(1.438)	-0.937	(1.593)
Turnout (2011)	5.425***	(1.493)	5.746***	(1.305)	5.881***	(1.371)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	-0.198	(0.377)	-0.069	(0.398)	-0.085	(0.405)
Log population density (2008)	-0.164**	(0.062)	-0.185***	(0.061)	-0.190***	(0.057)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	1.205***	(0.266)	1.163***	(0.271)	1.122***	(0.269)
Share owns a radio (2016)	1.368***	(0.445)	0.965**	(0.387)	1.071***	(0.393)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-1.294***	(0.355)	-1.061***	(0.377)	-1.004***	(0.358)
Share over 18 (2008)	9.422***	(3.020)	8.601***	(2.591)	8.093***	(2.743)
Share with secondary education (2008)	2.213	(1.461)	2.431*	(1.324)	2.824**	(1.255)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.018	(0.011)	-0.024**	(0.010)	-0.019*	(0.011)
Observations	4,060		4,060		4,060	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	

Notes: Outcomes are standardized. Panel A: index of (1) indicator for respondent heard debate between baselind and endline; (2) how often respondent heard debate by endline; Panel B: index of (1) indicator for respondent's stated debate winner attended debate; (2) share of candidates respondent claims participated; (3) share of predicted leading candidates respondent claims participated. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A32. Debate exposure and information acquisition (Table 8, Panels C-D)

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
C. Policy knowledge index						
Intensive Invite	0.165*	(0.090)	0.234*	(0.123)	0.189*	(0.102)
Days since Sept 1	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)
Male	-0.095**	(0.039)	-0.079**	(0.039)	-0.089**	(0.040)
Respondent age	-0.000	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	0.000	(0.002)
Education: Primary	0.163**	(0.066)	0.151*	(0.089)	0.150*	(0.080)
Education: Secondary	-0.050	(0.049)	-0.059	(0.057)	-0.079	(0.057)
Education: Tertiary	-0.113**	(0.044)	-0.127***	(0.045)	-0.125**	(0.048)
Scheduled debate week	-0.061**	(0.026)	-0.077***	(0.029)	-0.086***	(0.027)
Number of candidates (2017)	0.026**	(0.011)	0.024**	(0.011)	0.027**	(0.011)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.036	(0.041)	0.042	(0.044)	0.041	(0.041)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.010	(0.120)	0.029	(0.120)	-0.036	(0.124)
Number of debates in district	-0.090	(0.069)	-0.086	(0.067)	-0.078	(0.064)
1st voteshare (2011)	0.923	(0.740)	0.864	(0.744)	1.051	(0.728)
2nd voteshare (2011)	0.710	(0.514)	0.820	(0.603)	0.816	(0.514)
3rd voteshare (2011)	1.120	(0.696)	1.347*	(0.795)	1.662**	(0.801)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	-1.196	(0.838)	-1.177	(0.859)	-1.485*	(0.841)
Turnout (2011)	0.806	(0.901)	0.367	(0.974)	0.852	(0.931)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.320	(0.220)	0.347	(0.231)	0.351	(0.232)
Log population density (2008)	-0.116***	(0.030)	-0.124***	(0.033)	-0.121***	(0.030)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.195	(0.147)	0.123	(0.164)	0.140	(0.158)
Share owns a radio (2016)	-0.031	(0.239)	-0.213	(0.233)	-0.157	(0.231)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.076	(0.197)	-0.011	(0.199)	0.058	(0.192)
Share over 18 (2008)	-0.437	(1.626)	-0.637	(2.027)	-0.272	(1.912)
Share with secondary education (2008)	2.357***	(0.715)	2.471***	(0.706)	2.609***	(0.679)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.006	(0.005)	-0.002	(0.006)	-0.005	(0.006)
Observations	4,060		4,060		4,060	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	
D. Political information acquisition						
Intensive Invite	0.243***	(0.074)	0.283***	(0.085)	0.278***	(0.086)
Days since Sept 1	-0.003*	(0.002)	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.005**	(0.002)
Male	0.079*	(0.044)	0.101**	(0.042)	0.072*	(0.040)
Respondent age	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.006***	(0.002)	-0.005**	(0.002)
Education: Primary	0.187**	(0.078)	0.165*	(0.085)	0.229***	(0.081)
Education: Secondary	0.252***	(0.051)	0.285***	(0.057)	0.240***	(0.053)
Education: Tertiary	0.102**	(0.050)	0.064	(0.054)	0.050	(0.057)
Scheduled debate week	-0.017	(0.029)	-0.047*	(0.027)	-0.032	(0.029)
Number of candidates (2017)	-0.002	(0.012)	0.013	(0.011)	0.005	(0.011)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	-0.130**	(0.053)	-0.106*	(0.055)	-0.091*	(0.053)
Log registered voters (2017)	0.163*	(0.092)	0.119	(0.090)	0.171*	(0.092)
Number of debates in district	0.096*	(0.055)	0.058	(0.053)	0.096*	(0.049)
1st voteshare (2011)	0.520	(0.687)	1.012*	(0.584)	1.043*	(0.587)
2nd voteshare (2011)	1.102	(0.668)	1.089	(0.676)	1.204*	(0.683)
3rd voteshare (2011)	-1.678**	(0.660)	-0.924	(0.668)	-0.830	(0.626)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	-0.896	(0.879)	-1.586**	(0.754)	-1.603**	(0.761)
Turnout (2011)	0.152	(0.843)	0.460	(0.836)	0.566	(0.818)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.280	(0.196)	0.443**	(0.191)	0.333*	(0.195)
Log population density (2008)	-0.020	(0.028)	-0.021	(0.029)	-0.022	(0.026)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.099	(0.128)	-0.004	(0.133)	0.002	(0.130)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.190	(0.244)	0.033	(0.226)	0.074	(0.223)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.115	(0.198)	0.008	(0.198)	-0.044	(0.191)
Share over 18 (2008)	-1.682	(1.398)	-1.866	(1.258)	-1.971	(1.364)
Share with secondary education (2008)	-0.043	(0.627)	0.537	(0.616)	0.195	(0.590)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	0.002	(0.006)	0.001	(0.006)	-0.001	(0.006)
Observations	4,060		4,060		4,060	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	

Notes: Outcomes are standardized. Outcomes: Panel C: change in how many questions about CSDF management respondents answered correctly. Panel D: index of (1) change in how much respondents listened to radio; (2) change in how much they discussed politics with friends; (3) how much they accessed other sources of political information. See Table A18 for disaggregated indicator-level results and Tables A31-A32 for predetermined covariate coefficients. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district and individual respondent levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A33. Updating about candidates (Table 9, Panel 1)

	Certainty about competence						Certainty about policy					
1. Uncertainty	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
A. Incumbent												
Intensive Invite	0.180*	(0.100)	0.201*	(0.101)	0.184**	(0.079)	0.180**	(0.068)	0.207***	(0.072)	0.196***	(0.061)
Days since Sept 1	0.000	(0.002)	-0.000	(0.003)	0.001	(0.003)	0.006***	(0.002)	0.006**	(0.002)	0.005**	(0.002)
Respondent is male	-0.079*	(0.042)	-0.083*	(0.050)	-0.063	(0.045)	-0.072*	(0.038)	-0.054	(0.053)	-0.044	(0.042)
Respondent age	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	0.007***	(0.002)	0.007***	(0.002)	0.008***	(0.002)
Candidate party: UP	-0.109*	(0.062)	-0.102	(0.074)	-0.133	(0.080)	-0.041	(0.043)	-0.049	(0.051)	-0.091*	(0.051)
Education: Primary	-0.130*	(0.070)	-0.179**	(0.087)	-0.127	(0.083)	-0.036	(0.063)	-0.057	(0.077)	-0.103	(0.071)
Education: Secondary	0.041	(0.056)	0.033	(0.056)	0.020	(0.059)	0.023	(0.050)	0.005	(0.058)	0.032	(0.059)
Education: Tertiary	0.003	(0.043)	-0.049	(0.058)	-0.039	(0.047)	0.055	(0.049)	0.034	(0.058)	0.048	(0.059)
Number of candidates (2017)	0.028**	(0.012)	0.025	(0.016)	0.021	(0.013)	-0.001	(0.013)	0.015	(0.017)	0.004	(0.014)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	-0.242***	(0.076)	-0.215**	(0.082)	-0.218***	(0.078)	-0.260***	(0.048)	-0.290***	(0.060)	-0.271***	(0.057)
Log registered voters (2017)	0.540***	(0.185)	0.401**	(0.179)	0.448**	(0.208)	0.255**	(0.124)	0.275**	(0.124)	0.250*	(0.143)
Number of debates in district	-0.124*	(0.069)	-0.103	(0.096)	-0.083	(0.078)	0.076	(0.073)	0.004	(0.092)	0.065	(0.080)
1st voteshare (2011)	0.780	(0.744)	0.476	(0.824)	0.515	(0.851)	0.518	(0.665)	0.218	(0.800)	0.564	(0.745)
2nd voteshare (2011)	2.373***	(0.554)	2.140***	(0.556)	2.170***	(0.599)	1.458***	(0.324)	1.601***	(0.358)	1.654***	(0.360)
3rd voteshare (2011)	0.213	(0.977)	-0.171	(1.211)	-0.566	(1.212)	-1.761***	(0.579)	-1.915***	(0.669)	-2.104***	(0.701)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	-1.159	(0.778)	-0.873	(0.881)	-0.947	(0.894)	-1.314*	(0.732)	-1.066	(0.893)	-1.455*	(0.826)
Turnout (2011)	-0.365	(2.127)	-0.274	(2.413)	0.258	(2.497)	0.395	(1.197)	0.264	(1.550)	1.130	(1.446)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.179	(0.503)	0.209	(0.527)	0.081	(0.557)	0.207	(0.285)	0.569*	(0.332)	0.353	(0.326)
Log population density (2008)	-0.083**	(0.042)	-0.050	(0.047)	-0.067	(0.046)	-0.046*	(0.027)	-0.050	(0.036)	-0.061*	(0.032)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.236	(0.322)	0.245	(0.363)	0.322	(0.351)	0.199	(0.195)	0.207	(0.254)	0.315	(0.241)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.245	(0.329)	0.045	(0.390)	0.201	(0.380)	0.201	(0.279)	0.274	(0.345)	0.373	(0.338)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	0.089	(0.317)	0.213	(0.392)	0.092	(0.362)	-0.127	(0.314)	-0.274	(0.390)	-0.278	(0.370)
Share over 18 (2008)	2.445	(2.568)	2.720	(2.836)	3.745	(2.839)	-0.812	(1.159)	-1.285	(1.785)	0.125	(1.595)
Share with secondary education (2008)	0.299	(0.969)	-0.313	(1.300)	-0.292	(1.299)	1.182*	(0.631)	1.237	(0.844)	0.914	(0.774)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.004	(0.009)	-0.005	(0.010)	-0.008	(0.010)	-0.009*	(0.005)	-0.010	(0.007)	-0.013*	(0.007)
ED: scheduled debate week	-0.090	(0.161)	-0.068	(0.202)	0.020	(0.217)	-0.132	(0.089)	-0.145	(0.127)	-0.072	(0.123)
Observations	3,496		3,496		3,496		3,496		3,496		3,496	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs		No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	
B. Challengers												
Intensive Invite	0.060	(0.066)	0.066	(0.077)	0.041	(0.073)	0.147**	(0.060)	0.124	(0.079)	0.097	(0.068)
Days since Sept 1	0.002	(0.001)	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	0.006***	(0.001)	0.005***	(0.001)	0.006***	(0.001)
Respondent is male	-0.079***	(0.029)	-0.042	(0.035)	-0.046	(0.033)	-0.042*	(0.024)	-0.014	(0.030)	-0.007	(0.029)
Respondent age	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.003	(0.002)	0.005***	(0.002)	0.007***	(0.002)	0.007***	(0.002)
Candidate party: UP	-0.055*	(0.032)	-0.038	(0.028)	-0.043	(0.028)	0.064*	(0.033)	0.016	(0.032)	0.037	(0.028)
Education: Primary	0.025	(0.050)	0.034	(0.058)	0.025	(0.056)	0.050	(0.052)	0.058	(0.068)	0.030	(0.059)
Education: Secondary	-0.003	(0.044)	-0.026	(0.054)	-0.043	(0.048)	0.005	(0.034)	0.042	(0.039)	0.020	(0.040)
Education: Tertiary	0.008	(0.030)	0.016	(0.037)	0.022	(0.035)	0.029	(0.034)	0.020	(0.042)	0.025	(0.037)
Number of candidates (2017)	0.001	(0.007)	0.001	(0.007)	-0.003	(0.006)	-0.009	(0.008)	-0.009	(0.009)	-0.012	(0.007)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.000	(0.031)	-0.004	(0.030)	-0.001	(0.034)	-0.015	(0.039)	-0.005	(0.039)	-0.012	(0.037)
Log registered voters (2017)	0.182**	(0.073)	0.182**	(0.074)	0.240***	(0.083)	0.134	(0.089)	0.136	(0.098)	0.148	(0.092)
Number of debates in district	0.047	(0.049)	0.060	(0.051)	0.071	(0.046)	0.157***	(0.052)	0.173***	(0.056)	0.177***	(0.048)
1st voteshare (2011)	-0.189	(0.542)	-0.169	(0.507)	-0.226	(0.567)	0.899*	(0.513)	0.659	(0.545)	0.678	(0.520)
2nd voteshare (2011)	0.588	(0.379)	0.639	(0.451)	0.966**	(0.438)	0.733*	(0.405)	0.625	(0.479)	0.944**	(0.444)
3rd voteshare (2011)	-0.913*	(0.529)	-0.855	(0.644)	-1.173*	(0.657)	-0.838	(0.552)	-0.576	(0.713)	-1.115	(0.673)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	0.278	(0.614)	0.293	(0.582)	0.259	(0.648)	-1.309**	(0.591)	-0.961	(0.638)	-1.011	(0.615)
Turnout (2011)	-0.943	(0.587)	-1.543**	(0.660)	-1.583**	(0.648)	0.498	(0.656)	0.183	(0.701)	0.222	(0.647)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.017	(0.159)	0.013	(0.168)	-0.019	(0.182)	0.122	(0.186)	0.101	(0.198)	0.096	(0.197)
Log population density (2008)	-0.008	(0.023)	0.039	(0.025)	0.032	(0.024)	-0.032	(0.024)	0.013	(0.029)	0.012	(0.026)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	-0.089	(0.095)	-0.179*	(0.098)	-0.172	(0.104)	0.075	(0.112)	0.013	(0.112)	-0.008	(0.107)
Share owns a radio (2016)	-0.325	(0.212)	-0.338	(0.210)	-0.346	(0.209)	0.064	(0.234)	-0.081	(0.247)	0.074	(0.208)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.020	(0.152)	0.023	(0.161)	-0.040	(0.161)	-0.040	(0.142)	0.013	(0.177)	-0.074	(0.153)
Share over 18 (2008)	-1.423	(0.980)	-1.710	(1.042)	-1.568	(1.091)	1.003	(1.253)	1.337	(1.327)	1.469	(1.274)
Share with secondary education (2008)	-0.046	(0.546)	-0.880	(0.558)	-0.809	(0.516)	1.250**	(0.534)	0.536	(0.606)	0.417	(0.533)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	0.008*	(0.005)	0.005	(0.005)	0.005	(0.005)	-0.005	(0.005)	-0.010*	(0.006)	-0.009	(0.006)
ED: scheduled debate week	-0.111*	(0.066)	-0.090	(0.064)	-0.100	(0.071)	-0.155**	(0.069)	-0.140**	(0.069)	-0.113*	(0.065)
Observations	8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs		No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	

Notes: Outcomes are standardized. Outcomes: Columns 1-3: change in certainty about candidates' competence; 4-6: change in certainty about candidates' policy priorities. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A34. Updating about candidates (Table 9, Panel 2)

	Beliefs about competence						Learning about policy					
2. Levels	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
A. Incumbent												
Intensive Invite	0.119	(0.080)	0.062	(0.095)	0.109	(0.092)	0.135*	(0.070)	0.170*	(0.091)	0.134*	(0.073)
Days since Sept 1	0.005**	(0.002)	0.003	(0.002)	0.003	(0.002)	-0.009***	(0.002)	-0.009***	(0.002)	-0.008***	(0.002)
Respondent is male	-0.014	(0.035)	0.006	(0.041)	-0.017	(0.038)	0.006	(0.034)	-0.009	(0.044)	-0.008	(0.039)
Respondent age	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)	0.000	(0.002)	-0.000	(0.002)
Candidate party: UP	0.039	(0.054)	0.001	(0.056)	-0.009	(0.049)	-0.134***	(0.041)	-0.121***	(0.042)	-0.123***	(0.040)
Education: Primary	-0.072	(0.097)	-0.017	(0.104)	0.036	(0.107)	0.087	(0.086)	0.113	(0.090)	0.081	(0.091)
Education: Secondary	0.020	(0.051)	-0.057	(0.059)	-0.075	(0.057)	-0.016	(0.042)	-0.035	(0.056)	-0.021	(0.052)
Education: Tertiary	-0.032	(0.049)	-0.048	(0.060)	-0.044	(0.055)	0.033	(0.046)	0.007	(0.054)	-0.019	(0.050)
Number of candidates (2017)	0.026**	(0.010)	0.045***	(0.012)	0.036***	(0.011)	0.003	(0.013)	0.006	(0.014)	0.005	(0.013)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.275***	(0.062)	0.198*	(0.102)	0.276***	(0.081)	-0.155**	(0.067)	-0.091	(0.074)	-0.086	(0.074)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.722***	(0.134)	-0.637***	(0.150)	-0.783***	(0.146)	0.584***	(0.145)	0.340**	(0.148)	0.369**	(0.145)
Number of debates in district	-0.011	(0.062)	-0.118	(0.074)	-0.057	(0.067)	-0.119	(0.078)	-0.111	(0.078)	-0.094	(0.073)
1st voteshare (2011)	-0.275	(0.654)	0.178	(0.711)	-0.109	(0.639)	0.062	(0.702)	-0.318	(0.571)	-0.386	(0.611)
2nd voteshare (2011)	-0.250	(0.515)	-0.048	(0.628)	-0.392	(0.570)	-0.393	(0.338)	-0.508	(0.412)	-0.516	(0.382)
3rd voteshare (2011)	0.951	(0.738)	1.359	(0.817)	1.492**	(0.735)	1.151	(0.725)	0.814	(0.896)	1.156	(0.917)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	-0.084	(0.747)	-0.592	(0.835)	-0.235	(0.740)	-0.020	(0.785)	0.392	(0.637)	0.473	(0.687)
Turnout (2011)	4.018***	(1.179)	4.714***	(1.276)	5.185***	(1.195)	1.764	(1.580)	2.145	(1.669)	1.702	(1.562)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.068	(0.227)	0.240	(0.234)	0.137	(0.207)	-0.615	(0.393)	-0.372	(0.410)	-0.315	(0.422)
Log population density (2008)	-0.051	(0.032)	-0.090**	(0.038)	-0.092***	(0.033)	-0.036	(0.028)	-0.063*	(0.034)	-0.055*	(0.032)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.584***	(0.200)	0.580**	(0.234)	0.709***	(0.198)	0.172	(0.251)	0.454	(0.298)	0.363	(0.294)
Share owns a radio (2016)	-0.201	(0.314)	-0.131	(0.335)	-0.030	(0.319)	-1.129***	(0.306)	-0.975***	(0.299)	-1.081***	(0.306)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.241	(0.331)	-0.358	(0.349)	-0.373	(0.318)	1.237***	(0.430)	0.907**	(0.451)	1.032**	(0.443)
Share over 18 (2008)	2.271	(1.592)	2.418	(1.967)	3.155*	(1.741)	1.908	(1.316)	3.176	(1.956)	2.737	(1.699)
Share with secondary education (2008)	0.494	(0.627)	0.829	(0.606)	0.626	(0.521)	-0.959	(0.648)	-0.887	(0.695)	-0.636	(0.669)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.006	(0.005)	-0.006	(0.007)	-0.006	(0.006)	-0.007	(0.006)	-0.004	(0.007)	-0.002	(0.007)
ED: scheduled debate week	-0.025	(0.093)	-0.066	(0.106)	-0.009	(0.091)	0.104	(0.095)	0.101	(0.116)	0.054	(0.102)
Observations	3,496		3,496		3,496		3,496		3,496		3,496	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs		No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	
B. Challengers												
Intensive Invite	-0.060	(0.077)	-0.132	(0.088)	-0.083	(0.079)	0.053	(0.063)	0.030	(0.091)	0.074	(0.078)
Days since Sept 1	0.002	(0.001)	0.002	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	-0.008***	(0.001)	-0.008***	(0.002)	-0.009***	(0.001)
Respondent is male	0.022	(0.030)	0.025	(0.033)	0.028	(0.031)	-0.007	(0.028)	-0.005	(0.034)	-0.005	(0.032)
Respondent age	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.002)
Candidate party: UP	0.003	(0.022)	0.004	(0.020)	0.006	(0.021)	0.016	(0.024)	0.027	(0.025)	0.028	(0.026)
Education: Primary	0.039	(0.057)	0.017	(0.092)	-0.029	(0.089)	0.075	(0.056)	0.047	(0.059)	0.060	(0.058)
Education: Secondary	-0.016	(0.032)	-0.014	(0.041)	-0.007	(0.038)	-0.030	(0.036)	-0.016	(0.042)	-0.035	(0.042)
Education: Tertiary	0.017	(0.035)	-0.025	(0.046)	-0.001	(0.041)	0.012	(0.030)	-0.001	(0.035)	0.011	(0.032)
Number of candidates (2017)	-0.002	(0.007)	-0.005	(0.007)	-0.002	(0.007)	0.006	(0.008)	0.001	(0.008)	-0.002	(0.008)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.104***	(0.026)	0.101***	(0.028)	0.100***	(0.028)	0.009	(0.037)	0.003	(0.038)	-0.018	(0.042)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.164**	(0.063)	-0.109*	(0.061)	-0.140**	(0.067)	0.103	(0.087)	0.085	(0.079)	0.106	(0.086)
Number of debates in district	0.057	(0.050)	0.080*	(0.047)	0.061	(0.046)	0.030	(0.048)	0.069	(0.050)	0.084*	(0.048)
1st voteshare (2011)	0.202	(0.449)	0.024	(0.440)	0.030	(0.483)	0.483	(0.545)	-0.164	(0.430)	-0.005	(0.465)
2nd voteshare (2011)	-0.142	(0.309)	-0.116	(0.358)	0.012	(0.332)	0.481	(0.356)	0.649	(0.390)	0.882**	(0.441)
3rd voteshare (2011)	-0.379	(0.411)	-0.263	(0.490)	-0.306	(0.466)	0.079	(0.553)	-0.212	(0.584)	-0.709	(0.604)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	-0.457	(0.510)	-0.274	(0.500)	-0.253	(0.538)	-0.808	(0.608)	-0.146	(0.490)	-0.358	(0.544)
Turnout (2011)	0.658	(0.534)	0.151	(0.575)	0.409	(0.564)	-0.105	(0.668)	-0.018	(0.525)	-0.315	(0.595)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	-0.056	(0.120)	-0.075	(0.129)	-0.059	(0.136)	0.280**	(0.134)	0.260**	(0.128)	0.240*	(0.132)
Log population density (2008)	0.002	(0.023)	0.018	(0.025)	0.013	(0.024)	0.011	(0.020)	0.037*	(0.019)	0.033	(0.020)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.092	(0.086)	0.039	(0.084)	0.055	(0.086)	-0.027	(0.097)	-0.033	(0.083)	-0.041	(0.094)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.222	(0.172)	0.192	(0.183)	0.313*	(0.180)	-0.243	(0.183)	-0.303*	(0.160)	-0.332**	(0.164)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.246*	(0.135)	-0.233	(0.153)	-0.226	(0.144)	0.292*	(0.156)	0.369**	(0.142)	0.335**	(0.150)
Share over 18 (2008)	1.090	(0.976)	0.033	(0.887)	0.416	(0.903)	-1.234	(1.287)	0.186	(1.129)	-0.235	(1.202)
Share with secondary education (2008)	0.831	(0.533)	0.159	(0.580)	0.293	(0.524)	0.265	(0.446)	-0.284	(0.410)	-0.090	(0.412)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.006	(0.004)	-0.004	(0.004)	-0.005	(0.004)	-0.002	(0.005)	-0.004	(0.005)	-0.004	(0.005)
ED: scheduled debate week	-0.101**	(0.043)	-0.136***	(0.045)	-0.121***	(0.044)	0.007	(0.048)	0.052	(0.046)	0.040	(0.048)
Observations	8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686		8,686	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs		No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	

Notes: Outcomes are standardized. Outcomes: Columns 1-3: change in perceptions of candidates' competence; 4-6: change in correctly learning candidates' policy priorities. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A35. Campaigning responses (Table 10)

	Ground						Radio					
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
A. Incumbent												
Intensive Invite	-0.027	(0.040)	-0.027	(0.046)	-0.021	(0.046)	0.091**	(0.037)	0.115***	(0.039)	0.105**	(0.040)
Days since Sept 1	0.010***	(0.002)	0.009***	(0.002)	0.010***	(0.002)	0.007***	(0.002)	0.006***	(0.002)	0.007***	(0.002)
Respondent is male	0.031	(0.041)	0.050	(0.047)	0.027	(0.041)	0.206***	(0.036)	0.216***	(0.041)	0.187***	(0.039)
Respondent age	-0.004**	(0.002)	-0.005**	(0.002)	-0.005**	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.003*	(0.002)	0.003	(0.002)
Candidate party: UP	-0.025	(0.092)	0.010	(0.103)	0.031	(0.120)	0.016	(0.077)	0.073	(0.075)	-0.022	(0.076)
Education: Primary	0.050	(0.071)	0.064	(0.083)	0.028	(0.072)	-0.008	(0.073)	-0.019	(0.077)	-0.018	(0.070)
Education: Secondary	-0.003	(0.044)	0.008	(0.050)	-0.009	(0.047)	0.113***	(0.036)	0.131***	(0.042)	0.126***	(0.039)
Education: Tertiary	-0.007	(0.056)	-0.011	(0.069)	0.015	(0.058)	0.037	(0.053)	-0.000	(0.059)	0.036	(0.056)
Number of candidates (2017)	0.009	(0.015)	0.001	(0.018)	0.005	(0.015)	-0.010	(0.019)	0.002	(0.021)	-0.018	(0.018)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	0.085	(0.109)	-0.015	(0.121)	0.031	(0.123)	-0.308**	(0.117)	-0.422***	(0.147)	-0.352***	(0.132)
Log registered voters (2017)	-0.252	(0.239)	-0.137	(0.241)	-0.223	(0.264)	0.120	(0.208)	0.218	(0.211)	0.264	(0.213)
Number of debates in district	-0.048	(0.084)	-0.009	(0.098)	-0.019	(0.087)	0.127	(0.107)	0.083	(0.112)	0.171*	(0.099)
1st voteshare (2011)	-0.285	(0.705)	0.553	(0.959)	0.537	(1.030)	2.556**	(1.003)	1.733*	(0.929)	2.181**	(0.997)
2nd voteshare (2011)	0.055	(0.750)	0.225	(0.829)	-0.000	(0.866)	0.123	(0.641)	0.335	(0.677)	0.363	(0.678)
3rd voteshare (2011)	1.907*	(1.022)	1.708	(1.282)	2.730**	(1.348)	-0.767	(0.934)	-1.117	(0.972)	-1.290	(0.966)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	0.277	(0.816)	-0.580	(1.025)	-0.572	(1.117)	-2.854**	(1.156)	-1.928*	(1.082)	-2.487**	(1.145)
Turnout (2011)	-5.027**	(2.338)	-5.631*	(2.956)	-5.629*	(3.130)	-2.258	(2.193)	-3.845*	(2.187)	-2.838	(2.336)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	1.124***	(0.421)	1.317**	(0.558)	1.274**	(0.537)	0.473	(0.442)	0.943**	(0.429)	0.718*	(0.405)
Log population density (2008)	0.034	(0.049)	-0.007	(0.061)	0.009	(0.060)	0.021	(0.052)	0.041	(0.050)	0.006	(0.051)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.054	(0.318)	-0.234	(0.409)	-0.156	(0.386)	-0.296	(0.320)	-0.481	(0.303)	-0.282	(0.315)
Share owns a radio (2016)	-0.208	(0.346)	-0.009	(0.433)	-0.186	(0.415)	0.117	(0.392)	0.050	(0.357)	0.060	(0.377)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.270	(0.473)	-0.346	(0.566)	-0.197	(0.536)	-0.172	(0.429)	-0.171	(0.419)	-0.070	(0.390)
Share over 18 (2008)	-3.545	(2.305)	-5.161*	(2.926)	-5.214	(3.158)	-7.396***	(2.467)	-9.506***	(2.533)	-8.035***	(2.817)
Share with secondary education (2008)	1.072	(1.196)	3.307*	(1.830)	2.832	(1.735)	2.214**	(0.935)	2.686***	(0.961)	2.234**	(0.885)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	0.013	(0.009)	0.019	(0.012)	0.019	(0.013)	0.007	(0.009)	0.014	(0.009)	0.012	(0.010)
ED: scheduled debate week	-0.521**	(0.196)	-0.669**	(0.282)	-0.743**	(0.301)	-0.365**	(0.152)	-0.493***	(0.154)	-0.385**	(0.154)
Observations	3,492		3,492		3,492		3,496		3,496		3,496	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs		No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	
B. Challengers												
Intensive Invite	-0.067*	(0.037)	-0.078**	(0.033)	-0.081**	(0.037)	-0.028	(0.028)	-0.005	(0.030)	-0.018	(0.029)
Days since Sept 1	0.012***	(0.002)	0.012***	(0.002)	0.012***	(0.002)	0.012***	(0.001)	0.011***	(0.001)	0.012***	(0.001)
Respondent is male	0.085***	(0.032)	0.059*	(0.034)	0.078**	(0.032)	0.212***	(0.028)	0.211***	(0.037)	0.194***	(0.034)
Respondent age	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.002)	-0.002	(0.002)	0.001	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.002)	-0.000	(0.002)
Candidate party: UP	0.122***	(0.038)	0.108***	(0.031)	0.103***	(0.034)	0.185***	(0.067)	0.138**	(0.059)	0.124**	(0.056)
Education: Primary	0.004	(0.054)	0.040	(0.055)	0.029	(0.053)	-0.015	(0.061)	-0.017	(0.068)	0.004	(0.066)
Education: Secondary	0.025	(0.036)	0.046	(0.039)	0.027	(0.035)	0.124***	(0.039)	0.139***	(0.038)	0.135***	(0.038)
Education: Tertiary	-0.012	(0.036)	0.001	(0.038)	0.002	(0.037)	0.018	(0.035)	0.017	(0.044)	0.018	(0.041)
Number of candidates (2017)	-0.009	(0.014)	-0.023*	(0.012)	-0.009	(0.013)	-0.015	(0.010)	-0.014	(0.011)	-0.013	(0.010)
Incumbent ran in election (2017)	-0.050	(0.052)	-0.049	(0.046)	-0.064	(0.050)	-0.081*	(0.047)	-0.085*	(0.044)	-0.103**	(0.046)
Log registered voters (2017)	0.123	(0.096)	0.138	(0.084)	0.110	(0.096)	0.135	(0.113)	0.103	(0.089)	0.072	(0.089)
Number of debates in district	0.026	(0.085)	0.085	(0.070)	0.015	(0.076)	0.045	(0.074)	0.056	(0.069)	0.049	(0.068)
1st voteshare (2011)	-0.305	(0.573)	0.180	(0.514)	-0.191	(0.539)	-0.320	(0.650)	-0.067	(0.616)	-0.114	(0.667)
2nd voteshare (2011)	0.680	(0.506)	0.741	(0.520)	0.374	(0.543)	0.710	(0.488)	0.525	(0.485)	0.220	(0.479)
3rd voteshare (2011)	-0.492	(0.815)	0.300	(0.686)	0.342	(0.905)	-1.919**	(0.849)	-0.990	(0.936)	-1.210	(0.943)
Voteshare HHI (2011)	0.506	(0.685)	-0.021	(0.626)	0.405	(0.644)	0.235	(0.751)	0.130	(0.683)	0.134	(0.734)
Turnout (2011)	0.238	(0.821)	-0.378	(0.712)	-0.018	(0.717)	1.214	(1.064)	0.469	(0.855)	0.381	(0.859)
Share of repeat candidates (2017)	0.031	(0.169)	-0.042	(0.147)	-0.057	(0.171)	-0.326*	(0.180)	-0.142	(0.200)	-0.207	(0.209)
Log population density (2008)	-0.021	(0.033)	-0.029	(0.030)	-0.020	(0.032)	-0.005	(0.037)	0.030	(0.037)	0.036	(0.034)
Share with GSM coverage (2015)	0.016	(0.113)	0.045	(0.098)	0.022	(0.102)	0.239	(0.161)	0.103	(0.136)	0.107	(0.134)
Share owns a radio (2016)	0.388	(0.238)	0.358*	(0.207)	0.383*	(0.201)	0.538*	(0.315)	0.267	(0.276)	0.334	(0.264)
Share gets radio news often (2016)	-0.084	(0.184)	-0.110	(0.167)	-0.137	(0.178)	-0.327	(0.203)	-0.200	(0.215)	-0.262	(0.199)
Share over 18 (2008)	-0.256	(1.185)	0.020	(1.016)	-0.047	(1.078)	-1.041	(1.506)	-1.760	(1.277)	-1.255	(1.376)
Share with secondary education (2008)	-0.227	(0.652)	-0.129	(0.699)	0.085	(0.669)	-0.517	(0.806)	-1.010	(0.802)	-0.809	(0.766)
Avg. N radio stations covering each town (2016)	-0.005	(0.005)	-0.004	(0.005)	-0.005	(0.004)	-0.011**	(0.005)	-0.009*	(0.005)	-0.012**	(0.005)
ED: scheduled debate week	0.104	(0.080)	0.050	(0.061)	0.066	(0.074)	0.152*	(0.088)	0.109	(0.075)	0.136	(0.082)
Observations	8,678		8,678		8,678		8,686		8,686		8,686	
Weight	No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs		No		1/Obs		Reg/Obs	

Notes: Outcomes are standardized. Columns 1-3: index of how often candidates (1) visited (2) distributed leaflets (3) bought votes in respondents' communities; 4-6: index of how often respondents heard candidates on radio in two weeks before election. Specifications estimated using OLS including randomization block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, and predetermined covariates defined at the electoral district, individual respondent, and candidate levels. Weights: *Obs*: observations in electoral district; *Reg*: registered voters in electoral district. Standard errors clustered by electoral district in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.