

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

— For Online Publication —

A Labor Racketeering Data Validation

A.1 Order of treatment and levels of exploitation

In this section, I correlate the order in which locations treated and the levels of exploitation of each location recorded by the union in their report.¹ The union conducted an investigation on the levels of exploitation in agriculture in Italy by sending questionnaires to their local union representatives. Levels of exploitation are classified from 1 to 3 (low to high exploitation). While treatment is known at the municipal level, the report often includes information about broader locations, such as provinces. When this is the case, I attribute the value of the province to the treated location. For 10% of the treated sample, in the regions of Lazio, Abruzzo, and Basilicata, the union did not collect information and those observations are thus excluded from this analyses. Table A.1 presents a correlation analysis for locations in the treated sample (Columns 1-2) and for all locations on which there are data (Columns 3-4). There is no significant correlation between levels of exploitation and order of treatment when considering the treated sample, whether we consider the question in absolute terms or within regions (Columns 1 and 2). Considering the entire possible sample of locations the union could have chosen from (with the caveat that we can only observe areas on which they have collected data), there is a positive significant correlation for the entire country – meaning that the union prioritized low exploitation areas first – but not within regions (Columns 3-4). In line with the indications of the reports, the campaign targeted areas with presence of exploitation, but the order of treatment did not give priority to the highest (or lowest) exploitation zones.

A.2 Validation of labor racketeering news-based measure

I obtained data on audits detecting labor-related irregularities in agricultural firms from the Labor Inspectorate (Ministry of Interior). Irregularities include hiring workers without a contract, using intermediaries to hire workers, minor labor, pregnant women heavy labor, excessive work hours, safety and health substandard conditions, and criminal offenses. Data are at the province level and start in 2012. To match this province-level database, I collapse my news-based measure at the province-year level, and I normalize both measure by province population in 2011. I do not normalize the audit-based measure by the number of inspections, as this variable is likely to be endogenous (but results are consistent using this measure and available upon request). I display the non-parametric correlation between the two measures in Figure A.2 and consider an OLS regression of one measure on the other including fixed effects and controls in Table A.2.

Given the limited sample size of news in treated areas, I read and classify each news item and seek validation by having a research assistant independently read and classify each news. This method improves precision and reduces the potential for subjective decisions by the researcher.

¹Primo Rapporto Agromafie, 2011, pages 92-224.

Table A.1: Correlation between order of treatment and levels of exploitation


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Within treated	Within treated	All locations	All locations
Order treatment	0.0667 (0.109)	0.0730 (0.148)	0.0683* (0.0377)	0.0355 (0.0499)
Observations	18	18	48	48
R-squared	0.032	0.197	0.062	0.235
Region fe	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Coefficients from the regression of the level of exploitation (range 1-3, where 3 is the highest level) on the order of treatment for treated units (Columns 1-2) and all locations (Columns 3-4). Region fixed effects are included in even columns and robust standard errors are in all regressions.

Figure A.1: News, population, and treated areas



Figure A.2: Correlation between audit-based and news-based measure of labor racketeering



Note: Province-year level data on labor racketeering from 7 newspapers and from audits conducted by the Labor Inspectorate (2012-2016). Both measures are normalized by 2011 population and multiplied by 1000. Right panel: both measures are winsorized (90th percentile) to exclude outliers.

Table A.2: Correlation between audit-based and news-based measure of labor racketeering

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Labor Irregularities in Agriculture (Inspectorate)	Labor Irregularities in Agriculture (Inspectorate)	Labor Irregularities in Agriculture (Inspectorate)
Labor Racketeering News	5.347*** (0.420)	3.373*** (0.479)	3.397*** (0.481)
Observations	430	430	430
R-squared	0.314	0.461	0.462
Year fe	Y	Y	Y
Region fe	N	Y	Y
Controls	N	N	Y
Mean DV Control	.05	.05	.05

Note: Province-year level data on labor racketeering from 7 newspapers (independent variable) and from audits conducted by the Labor Inspectorate (dependent variable), period 2012 to 2016. Both measures are normalized by 2011 population and multiplied by 1000. Controls, included in Column 3 only, include pre-2012 number of foreign born inhabitants, the number of union members and the number of inspections led by the Inspectorate. Year and region fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the province level.

Table A.3: Null effect of change in voting on reporting on labor racketeering

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	News	News	News	News
Change Vote Center-left	-0.00111 (0.00132)			
Change Vote Far-left		1.31e-05 (0.000166)		
Change Vote Center-right			-0.000514 (0.000732)	
Change Vote Far-right				0.000647 (0.000742)
Observations	39,699	39,699	39,699	39,699
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Regression of province-level newspaper-based data of labor racketeering on change in vote share. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table A.4: Summary Statistics

	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Any News Labor Racketeering	137258	0.01	0.08	0.00	1.00
News Labor Racketeering	137258	0.01	0.32	0.00	40.00
News per capita	137258	0.00	0.05	0.00	6.97
Properties seized	290880	0.11	3.11	0.00	983.00
Properties to social use	290880	0.04	1.49	0.00	423.00
Properties to agricultural cooperatives	290880	0.01	0.35	0.00	60.00
Vote Rifondazione	4312	0.10	0.23	0.00	0.88
Vote Comunisti	4312	0.10	0.24	0.00	0.88
Anti-Immigrant Feel	4312	0.28	0.44	0.00	1.00
Trust in unions	4312	0.45	0.26	0.00	1.00
Change Vote Center-right	47920	-0.03	0.41	-1.00	25.83
Change Vote Far-right	47920	0.84	3.14	-1.00	134.62
Change Vote Center-left	47920	-0.09	0.41	-1.00	40.74
Change Vote Far-left	47920	0.11	1.47	-1.00	79.85
change_lega	47920	3.93	22.44	-1.00	653.09
Vote Center-right	47920	0.26	0.12	0.00	5.89
Vote Far-right	47920	0.10	0.10	0.00	2.56
Vote Center-left	47920	0.24	0.11	0.00	7.39
Vote Far-left	47920	0.05	0.04	0.00	1.74

Table A.5: Political parties in each group

Far-Right	Center-Right	Center-Left	Far-Left
Alleanza Lombarda	Nuovo Psi (2001, 2006)	Alleanza Democratica	Comunisti Italiani
Alternativa Sociale	Abolizione Scorporo	Alleanza Democratica	Democrazia Atea
Alternativa Sociale	Alleanza Nazionale	Centro Democratico	La Rete
Azione Sociale	Ambienta-Lista	Civica Popolare Lorenzin	La Sinistra L'Arcobaleno
Blocco Nazionale per le liberta'	Cantiere Popolare (2013)	Cristiano Sociali	Liberi E Uguali
Casapound	Centro Cristiano Democratico	Democratici Cristiani Uniti	
Destra Nazionale	Centro Democratico Cristiano	Democratici Di Sinistra	Nuova Sinistra
Die Freiheitlichen	Forza Italia	Democratici Sinistra	della Valle D'Aosta
Fiamma Tricolore	Fratelli D'Italia	Democrazia Cristiana (2006)	Nuova Sinistra Unita
Forza Nuova	Futuro E Liberta'	Federazione Laburista (1996)	Smaller far-left parties
Fronte Nazionale	Grande Sud (2013)	Girasole	Per Una Sinistra Rivoluzionaria
Grande Nord	Il Popolo Della Famiglia	Italia Dei Valori (2006, 2008)	Potere Al Popolo
Grande Sud	Intesa Popolare (2013)	Italia Europa Insieme	Proletaria
Italia Agli Italiani	Liberal Democratici (2008)	Lega Autonomia Veneta	Rifondazione Comunista
La Destra	Liberi Per Una Italia Equa	Lega Consumatori (2006)	Rivoluzione Civile
Lega	Mir - Moderati In Rivoluzione	Lega Pensionati (2006)	Sardigna Natzione
Lega Alpina Lumbarda	Moderati In Rivoluzione (2013)	Liberal Democratici Europei	Sinistra Critica
Lega Angela Bossi	Nuovo Psi (2001, 2006)	Liberali Per L'Italia	Sinistra Ecologia Liberta'
Lega Nord	Partito Pensionati	Liga Fronte Veneto (2006)	Verdi
Lega Per L'Autonomia	Partito Repubblicano Italiano (2001, 2006)	Lista Consumatori	
Lega Sud	Partito Socialista (2001, 2006)	Lista Dini	
Movimento Per L'Autonomia	Pensionati Uniti	L'Ulivo	
Movimento Sociale	Popolo Della Liberta'	Margherita	
Movimento Sociale Italiano	Riformisti Italiani	Mastella (2006)	
Mussolini	Sos Italia	Paese Nuovo	
Rifondazione Missina	UDC E Democratici Di Centro	Partito Democratico	
Terzo Polo	Unione Democratici Cristiani	Partito Pensionati (2006)	
		Partito Popolare Italiano	
		Partito Popolare Italiano (1996)	
		Partito Repubblicano Italiano (1996)	
		Partito Sardo D'Azione	
		Partito Socialista Italiano	
		Patto Segni (1996)	
		Piu Europa	
		Prodi	
		Repubblicani Europei	
		Rete - Movimento Democratico	
		Rinnovamento	
		Rinnovamento Democratico	
		Rosa Nel Pugno (2006)	
		Socialisti Italiani (1996)	
		Udeur (2006)	
		Unione Democratica (1996)	
		Südtiroler Volkspartei	

B Identifying Assumptions


Figure B.1 and B.2 use an event-study specification to test the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption. I create dummies for each relative time period before and after treatment, and interact each dummy with the treatment variable (leads and lags specification). In line with the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption, these interactions are insignificant. Pre-trends are also plausibly parallel for change in voting, except for the change in vote for far-right parties, which exhibits an increasing trend even before treatment starts. This indicates that the results on far-right voting should not be interpreted. The coefficients for propensity-score matched units are plotted in gray and are generally consistent. With the matched sample, pre-trends are slightly improved, particularly for political outcomes. I formally test for the joint significance of the pre-trends in Table B.1. Each column includes the main DiD specification including, alongside the treatment dummy, a dummy equal to 1 in all the relative time periods before treatment. The lack of significance for the pre-periods coefficients contributes to supporting the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption. Additionally, pre-trends coefficients are considerably smaller than treatment coefficients, as shown by the relative magnitude of preperiod over postperiod coefficients at the bottom of the table. For properties seized from mafias only, the pre-trends coefficient is larger, but it is of the opposite sign than treatment effects, and insignificant.

Table B.1: Joint significance of the pre-trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	News Labor racketeering	Seized goods	Destined goods	Vote Share Left-Wing	Change Vote Left-Wing
preperiod	-0.00108 (0.00409)	-2.026 (1.352)	0.0608 (0.102)	4.09e-05 (0.00221)	0.00601 (0.0799)
Observations	137,258	274,720	274,720	47,397	39,973
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Relative magnitude	-0.027	-1.523	0.056	0.003	0.008


Note: Coefficients from the main DiD specification including a dummy equal to 1 for the relative time periods before treatment (period -1 is omitted and used as reference category). Relative magnitude at the bottom of the table refers to the size of the coefficient displayed in this table relative to the magnitude of the treatment coefficient for the respective outcome.

Figure B.1: Event Study: Labor racketeering news, Properties seized from mafias, and Mafia properties destined for social use



Note: Coefficients from the interaction of treatment indicator and a dummy for each year before and after the intervention. Dependent variables: Labor racketeering news (top), Properties seized from mafias (mid), and Mafia properties destined for social use (bottom). Treated periods are shaded in blue. Coefficients in gray refer to the propensity score matched sample. The omitted category is $t - 1$. Results in tabular form in Tables 6 and 7, APSR Dataverse files.

Figure B.2: Event Study: Change in Vote Share



Note: Coefficients from the interaction of treatment indicator and a dummy for each election year before and after the intervention. The omitted category is lag $t - 1$, the election year right before treatment starts. Treated periods are shaded. Coefficients in gray refer to the propensity score matched sample. Results in tabular form in Table 8, APSR Dataverse files.

Table B.2: Descriptive differences in full and matched sample

	(1) Control Full	(2) Control Matched	(3) Treated	(4) Std. Diff. C Full vs T	(5) Std. Diff. C Match vs T
Emp Agriculture	9.148 (8.545)	18.555 (13.684)	18.541 (11.961)	0.639	-0.001
Emp Unskilled	18.441 (7.424)	22.316 (8.970)	23.412 (8.913)	0.429	0.087
Unemployed	10.123 (6.401)	18.112 (8.933)	18.410 (6.044)	0.941	0.028
Foreign population	57.741 (42.135)	28.662 (28.654)	30.942 (27.528)	-0.532	0.057
Union members 2006	8.131 (3.709)	5.896 (2.933)	5.286 (2.915)	-0.603	-0.148
Analphabetism	1.200 (1.438)	2.650 (2.066)	2.642 (1.467)	0.702	-0.003
Population density	294.798 (623.853)	589.532 (1,109.332)	628.996 (1,512.845)	0.204	0.021
Population	7,093.142 (38,041.418)	65,005.824 (366596.969)	47,765.773 (139278.375)	0.282	-0.044
City Surface	9.975 (13.441)	12.902 (19.322)	9.597 (16.049)	-0.018	-0.132
Share males	97.143 (6.390)	97.260 (6.931)	95.416 (3.368)	-0.239	-0.239
Elderly dependence	35.933 (12.301)	33.040 (10.765)	28.044 (7.531)	-0.547	-0.380
Young dependence	20.375 (3.899)	20.685 (4.742)	22.563 (3.778)	0.403	0.310
Index old people	195.349 (141.825)	178.549 (100.674)	132.542 (59.287)	-0.409	-0.394
Share divorced	4.668 (2.027)	3.198 (1.744)	2.812 (1.238)	-0.782	-0.181
Foreign pop minors	21.060 (8.153)	16.904 (7.861)	19.501 (5.704)	-0.157	0.267
Foreign italian couples	2.531 (1.527)	1.673 (1.160)	1.224 (0.799)	-0.758	-0.319
Foreign Employment	55.641 (10.827)	55.047 (12.689)	54.890 (10.801)	-0.049	-0.009
Ratio foreign employed	83.340 (22.995)	72.057 (18.321)	69.809 (15.022)	-0.493	-0.095
Ratio foreign unemp	73.217 (59.998)	124.890 (77.347)	136.743 (97.342)	0.556	0.095
Foreign commuting	16.137 (8.356)	15.573 (8.927)	15.239 (5.816)	-0.088	-0.031
Foreign in education	35.637 (20.816)	35.040 (26.668)	28.200 (11.850)	-0.310	-0.234
Family size	2.361	2.500	2.668	0.796	0.397

	(0.269)	(0.321)	(0.278)		
Young living alone	7.331	6.410	4.967	-0.431	-0.286
	(4.478)	(3.938)	(3.162)		
Single parent family	0.985	0.826	0.855	-0.153	0.050
	(0.794)	(0.478)	(0.309)		
Couples without kids	3.055	2.364	2.881	-0.096	0.312
	(1.535)	(1.357)	(0.953)		
Old living alone	29.536	27.823	26.723	-0.334	-0.161
	(7.540)	(5.676)	(3.782)		
Property houses	76.884	73.262	71.582	-0.564	-0.163
	(6.685)	(7.938)	(6.617)		
Urban housing	28.991	28.368	23.047	-0.260	-0.278
	(20.204)	(15.826)	(10.731)		
Sparse housing	35.824	33.788	37.949	0.059	0.122
	(25.586)	(22.561)	(25.435)		
Age house	29.233	29.959	28.492	-0.114	-0.204
	(4.623)	(5.575)	(4.546)		
Services in house	99.134	97.630	98.357	-0.195	0.095
	(3.006)	(7.168)	(2.614)		
Houses in good state	82.800	79.474	76.116	-0.466	-0.222
	(11.122)	(12.122)	(9.063)		
Urban expansion	8.468	7.400	7.284	-0.133	-0.015
	(6.572)	(5.268)	(6.005)		
Inhabitants per room	54.802	60.933	65.359	0.915	0.328
	(7.323)	(10.159)	(8.911)		
Education gender diff	102.379	101.825	103.162	0.051	0.074
	(13.470)	(16.484)	(7.622)		
Adults studying	4.549	5.003	5.533	0.499	0.254
	(1.454)	(1.611)	(1.330)		
Early exit education	16.604	21.675	21.069	0.363	-0.041
	(9.975)	(12.740)	(7.184)		
Diploma or bachelor	49.277	43.768	45.084	-0.312	0.086
	(9.059)	(11.565)	(9.948)		
Adults with diploma	18.626	17.753	17.664	-0.096	-0.009
	(7.539)	(7.956)	(6.669)		
Education 15-19 years old	98.224	97.662	97.266	-0.305	-0.136
	(2.490)	(2.196)	(1.913)		
Education, middle school	37.866	38.857	35.373	-0.284	-0.357
	(6.991)	(8.189)	(5.322)		
Not in empl nor educ	19.818	28.205	30.511	0.888	0.184
	(8.540)	(9.234)	(8.481)		
Share empl over inactive	62.910	54.240	48.749	-0.423	-0.227
	(31.570)	(21.364)	(11.235)		
Unemployed male	8.293	15.132	14.958	0.863	-0.019
	(5.719)	(7.782)	(5.183)		
Unemployed female	12.890	23.185	24.213	0.956	0.071
	(8.234)	(11.772)	(8.505)		

Unemployed young	29.156 (15.433)	42.113 (18.047)	45.668 (10.799)	0.877	0.169
Employed Male	55.118 (7.716)	49.590 (7.564)	49.706 (5.071)	-0.586	0.013
Employed Female	35.581 (8.771)	27.461 (8.706)	26.248 (6.026)	-0.877	-0.115
Employed	45.135 (7.957)	38.277 (7.727)	37.604 (5.125)	-0.796	-0.073
Employed in industry	31.302 (10.805)	22.965 (8.966)	22.340 (6.218)	-0.719	-0.057
Employed in services	40.774 (8.819)	41.916 (10.486)	42.499 (10.142)	0.128	0.040
Employed in commerce	18.776 (5.138)	16.567 (4.650)	16.609 (2.489)	-0.380	0.008
Employed high skilled	25.829 (6.547)	25.721 (9.154)	29.355 (8.404)	0.331	0.292
Employed med skilled	27.070 (7.753)	25.579 (9.689)	21.522 (5.030)	-0.600	-0.372
Share pop commuting	59.777 (8.534)	52.972 (7.871)	52.027 (5.657)	-0.757	-0.098
Improper housing conditions	0.170 (0.669)	0.156 (0.253)	0.167 (0.211)	-0.004	0.035
Economic issues	2.001 (1.880)	4.283 (3.766)	4.346 (2.695)	0.714	0.014
Overcrowded houses	1.010 (1.020)	1.903 (1.903)	1.984 (1.821)	0.467	0.031
Observations	136,510	816	833	-	-

Note: Descriptive comparison of treated units vs control units in the full and matched sample.

C Treatment and Migrants Activation: Qualitative Evidence

This section presents qualitative evidence of three types of migrant political activation from the union’s intervention. The evidence comes from (i) union documents, (ii) newspaper articles on labor racketeering, and (iii) relevant legislation. I also conducted unstructured interviews with a union leader organizing the campaign and with the activist and researcher Marco Omizzolo to gain insights and clarifications on the intervention. First, multiple treated areas witnessed public mobilizations of migrants after the union intervention. Section 6 highlights two notable protests organized by migrants in 2011 and 2012, leading to judicial investigations into labor exploitation. Significant protests occurred in Agropontino, Gioia Tauro, and Caserta, with 2,000 and 1,000 agricultural workers rallying against exploitation (Il Manifesto, 2016, Il Manifesto, 2021, Global Project, 2011). Second, migrants began denouncing their employers following the union’s intervention. While

newspapers do not typically cover individual reports, they do highlight large police operations stemming from these reports. For example, Section 6 mentions migrants reporting their exploiters after union intervention. In another instance, a large group of migrants in a treated area near Foggia denounced their racketeers, leading to the prosecution of seven agricultural companies (Foggia Today, 2023). Similarly, in Sermide, numerous denunciations were made by migrants following the union’s efforts (Radio Popolare, 2015). Lastly, for some migrants, the political capital gained through the union’s intervention extended beyond initial mobilization and led to long-term political activism. Yvan Sagnet, a migrant who harvested tomatoes in Nardò, a location treated by the FLAI campaign, played a crucial role in organizing sustained migrant mobilization. Sagnet continued his activism for migrant rights, becoming a Flai employee and founding an association dedicated to combating labor racketeering (Il Post, 2021). While not initially part of the Flai campaign, other examples exist of migrants who independently escaped exploitation and chose to engage in political activism to help others. Magdalena Jarczak, a worker in the Puglia countryside, managed to flee from labor exploitation and now assists other migrants as a unionist for Flai (Sky Tg24, 2017). Aboubakar Soumahoro played a significant role in organizing the mobilization of agricultural migrant workers and, in 2022, became a member of Parliament. (Infomigrants, 2022).

D Statements

The data used for the results in this paper relies on publicly available data, with sources reported in the paper. This paper also cites interviews with two experts — individuals who led the intervention in the field – to learn about the roll out of the intervention. These interviews fall within the category of experts or third party consultations (e.g., interviews with social agency directors about their client intake procedures, or interviews with managers about their use of a particular program), classifying the project as non-human subject research. The interviews were conducted after the intervention had concluded, and the researcher had no involvement in the intervention as a consultant or participant at any stage. The interviews did not include information about the experts themselves, focusing instead on professional experiences related to the intervention. Consequently, these consultations fall outside the purview of the IRB according to the code of federal regulations. The researcher obtained informed consent by providing her name, affiliation, and contact information, explaining the general purpose of the research, and describing the objective of the interview— – gaining a better understanding of the intervention. This study did not benefit from any financial support.

E Robustness and Additional Analyses

Table E.1: Treatment effect on labor racketeering news, dropping the first years of treatment


	(1) Drop Treat 2008	(2) Drop Treat 2010	(3) Drop Treat 2011	(4) Drop Treat 2012
Treated	0.0266** (0.0119)	0.0237* (0.0124)	0.0254* (0.0139)	0.0256* (0.0144)
Observations	137,105	137,071	137,020	137,003
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	.0017	.0017	.0017	.0017

Table E.2: Effect on labor racketeering news is driven by migrants activation

	(1) News	(2) News	(3) News	(4) Protests
Treated	0.0406* (0.0209)			0.00660* (0.00396)
Placebo (dummy)		0.00235 (0.00163)		
Placebo (medium)			0.00222 (0.00189)	
Placebo (high)			0.00248 (0.00264)	
Observations	137,258	136,425	136,425	137,258
Municipality-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.00170	0.00170	0.00170	0.000400

Note: Main result (column 1). Placebo for locations where the union led investigations due to any (column 2) or medium-high levels of exploitation (column 3), but did not contact migrants. Effect of treatment on news on labor racketeering news including the word protest (“protesta, rivolta, corteo, dimostrazione”, column 4).

Figure E.1: Labor racketeering news, robustness to treatment effects heterogeneity bias




Note: Estimators proposed by De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020), Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021), Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024), and Sun and Abraham (2020). Each of these plots employs a distinct estimator to address the inherent issue in DiD designs with multiple treatment periods, where improper comparisons may arise between units treated later (acting as treatment) and units treated earlier (acting as controls). As treatment effects may not be homogeneous, these comparisons can lead to biased coefficients. The methods presented here adopt various approaches, including re-weighting observations and imputing as-if missing values, to address this potential source of bias. Results in tabular form are in Table 9, APSR Dataverse file.

Table E.3: Displacement: Effect on labor racketeering news excluding and including only municipalities neighboring treated areas

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Without neighbors 10km	Only neighbors 10km	Without neighbors 20km	Only neighbors 20km
Treated	0.0422* (0.0217)	-0.0108 (0.0227)	0.0442* (0.0234)	-0.00157 (0.0122)
Observations	136,659	599	135,758	1,500
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	.002	.002	.002	.002


Note: Results from DiD in Equation 1 on labor racketeering news for the effect of the intervention. Columns 1 and 3 consider a control group which excludes all municipalities neighboring treated areas. Columns 2 and 4 include in the control group only municipalities within 10 or 20 kilometers from treated locations.

Figure E.2: Goods and properties seized from mafias, robustness to treatment effects heterogeneity bias




Note: Estimators proposed by De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2020), Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024), and Sun and Abraham (2020). Results in tabular form are in Table 10, APSR Dataverse file.

Figure E.3: Properties destined to public use, robustness to treatment effects heterogeneity bias




Note: Estimators proposed by De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2020), Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024), and Sun and Abraham (2020).

Figure E.4: Voting (vote share and change), robustness to treatment effects heterogeneity bias



Note: Estimators proposed by De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2020), Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), Borusyak, Jaravel and Spiess (2024), and Sun and Abraham (2020). Results in tabular form are in Table 11, APSR Dataverse file.

Figure E.5: Robustness to treatment duration



Note: The coefficient in red plots the treatment effect from the main specification in Equation 1. The following coefficients reduce the duration of treatment by one year at the time, until treatment is assumed to only last during the first year of the intervention. Findings are not dependent on the definition of the duration of treatment. Results in tabular form are in Tables 12 and 13, APSR Dataverse file.

Table E.4: Treatment effect on labor racketeering news, by newspaper

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Full sample Corriere	Matched sample Corriere	Full sample Repubblica	Matched sample Repubblica
treated	0.133*** (0.0334)	0.0935*** (0.0337)	0.108*** (0.0330)	0.0914*** (0.0335)
Observations	137,343	1,649	137,343	1,649
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.00110	0.00613	0.00543	0.0429

Note: Results from a DiD capturing the change in labor racketeering news in treated municipalities after the intervention took place. The DV is the population share of news from Corriere (columns 1-2) and Repubblica (columns 3-4) in 1000 inhabitants. Municipality and year FE are included and standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table E.5: Treatment effect on labor racketeering news, robustness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Total news	Poisson	Neg Binomial	Stacked by-event	Drop post 8 and 9	Control foreign pop	Control unemployment
Treated	0.735*** (0.263)	1.243** (0.526)	1.247* (0.697)	0.0533* (0.0323)	0.0221** (0.00948)	0.0394* (0.0209)	0.0382* (0.0206)
Observations	137,343	7,803	7,803	1,231,871	137,240	137,258	137,258
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Mean DV	.012	.006	.006	.006	.002	.002	.002
Number of panelvar		459	459				

Note: Results from a DiD capturing treatment effect on news on labor racketeering in treated municipalities after the intervention. Municipality and year FE are included and standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. Column 1 includes the total number of news as dependent variable, Column 2 and 3 use a Poisson and Negative binomial model. Column 4 uses a stacked-by-event design to account for treatment effects heterogeneity (?), and includes cohort FE. Column 5 drops the last two post-periods, in which larger but more imprecise effects are observed. Column 6 includes flexible controls for foreign population and 7 for male unemployment.

Table E.6: Treatment effect on firms seized from mafias

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Full	Matched	Neg Binomial
Treated	0.115** (0.0517)	-0.0196 (0.118)	0.818** (0.344)
Observations	274,720	3,230	1,224
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of panelvar			36

Note: DiD as in Equation 1 on firms seized from mafias. Results are reported on the full sample (column 1), matched sample (column 2), and using a negative binomial regression to account for the rarity of the seizure events (column 3).

Table E.7: Treatment effect on goods seized from mafias, Poisson and Negative Binomial

	Seized		Destined	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Poisson	Neg Binomial	Poisson	Neg Binomial
Treated	0.310+ (0.312)	0.654*** (0.171)	0.575** (0.266)	0.620*** (0.227)
Observations	52,836	52,836	29,546	29,546
Number of municipalities	1,554	1,554	869	869
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: DiD as in Equation 1 on properties seized from mafias (columns 1-2) and destined to public use (columns 3-4).

Table E.8: Treatment effect on change in parties' vote share, treatment close to elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Full	Full	Full	Full	Matched	Matched	Matched	Matched
	Center-Left	Far-Left	Center-Right	Far-Right'	Center-Left	Far-Left	Center-Right	Far-Right'
Treated	-0.0593** (0.0256)	0.901*** (0.268)	-0.0525** (0.0253)	0.247 (0.336)	0.0223 (0.0699)	0.929** (0.380)	0.0673* (0.0399)	0.216 (0.381)
Observations	39,973	39,973	39,973	39,973	240	240	240	240
City Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	-0.0649	0.150	-0.00559	0.262	-0.0649	0.150	-0.00559	0.262

Note: DiD as in Equation 1 on change in parties' vote share. Here, municipalities are considered treated only when the intervention happened less than one year before elections. Other treated observations are set as missing.

Table E.9: P-values from Fisher randomization inference

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	News	Goods seized	Anti-Immigrant	Change Vote Far-left
Main	0.0406 (1.95)	1.331** (2.82)	-0.0925* (-2.00)	0.308** (3.15)
RI p-values	0.00170*** (47.10)	0.114*** (278.09)	0.274*** (538.88)	0.106*** (542.61)
Observations	137258	274720	5816	47835


Note: P-values from main specification and from randomization inference with resampling replications n=1000.

Table E.10: Conley-Taber 2011 confidence intervals

	Beta	Low 95	Upper 95
News			
Standard	0.041	-0.000	0.081
Conley-Taber	0.067	0.050	0.070
Goods seized			
Standard	1.331	0.407	2.254
Conley-Taber	1.699	-0.686	2.104
Goods destined			
Standard	1.089	0.015	2.162
Conley-Taber	1.341	0.375	1.496
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes			
Standard	-0.093	-0.183	-0.002
Conley-Taber	0.138	0.747	0.747
Change in far-left voting			
Standard	0.308	0.116	0.500
Conley-Taber	0.287	-1.937	2.187

Note: Coefficients and confidence intervals in the standard model and using the (Conley and Taber, 2011) correcting for a small number of policy changes.

Figure E.6: Dropping one observation at a time



Note: Each line is a coefficient from the main specification (Equation 1) dropping one treated unit at a time. Zero is marked as a red vertical line. Each coefficient is similar and does not lose significance, indicating that effects are not driven by any specific location. Results in tabular form are in Table 14, APSR Dataverse file.

Table E.11: Main results using Synthetic Difference-in-Differences

	(1) News	(2) Imm Seized	(3) Vote Far-Left
Treated	0.049* (0.027)	1.258** (0.560)	0.008*** (0.003)
<i>N</i>	137258	274720	50421

Note: Results from a Synthetic DiD (Arkhangelsky, Dmitry and Athey, Susan and Hirshberg, David A and Imbens, Guido W and Wager, Stefan, 2021) of treatment effect on each outcome. Municipality and year FE and standard errors clustered at the municipal level are included.

Table E.12: Change in voting, comparison within treated units

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Change vote Center-Left	Change vote Far-Left	Change vote Center-Right	Change vote Far-Right
Treated	0.0634 (0.0461)	0.490*** (0.137)	-0.110** (0.0412)	0.843** (0.387)
Observations	288	288	288	288
R-squared	0.542	0.500	0.550	0.389
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Results from a DiD capturing treatment effect on change in vote share in municipalities treated with the union intervention. Municipality and year FE are included and standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. In this table, I compare only within treated units.

Table E.13: Multiple hypothesis testing correction

	Standard	FDR Sharpened
Anti-immigrant attitudes	3.74e-06	.001
Change in far-left vote	.0455616	.032
Destined to public use	.0468491	.032
Labor racketeering news	.0516422	.032
Properties seized from mafia	.0047525	.01
Total	.0297618	.0214

Note: Estimates using Anderson (2008) method for multiple hypothesis testing correction.

Table E.14: Controlling for region specific time trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	News about racketeering	Goods seized from mafia	Goods destined to public use	Change vote Far-Left
Treated	0.0372* (0.0201)	1.170** (0.492)	0.953* (0.561)	0.308*** (0.0980)
Observations	137,258	274,720	274,720	47,835
R-squared	0.162			0.268
Municipality and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region times year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.00200	0.109	0.0370	0.106

Note: Main DiD specification replicated on each of the main outcomes of interest using region times years fixed effects.

SM References

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