

Supplementary Information for “Politicians’ Theories of Voting Behavior”

July 29, 2024

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1 Representativity of the data

Tables [SM.1](#), [SM.2](#), and [SM.3](#) provide additional information on the data collection process and representativity for our elite datasets. Table [SM.1](#) summarizes fieldwork, target population, response rate, and survey mode for each country in our analysis. Tables [SM.2](#) and [SM.3](#) summarize the distribution of gender, age, and seniority in our sample and population, by country (table [SM.2](#)) and the distribution of party ideology (drawn from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey’s ideology scores) for parties in our sample and population (table [SM.3](#)).

Country	Timing Fieldwork	Target population	Total	Responses	Rate	Online	In Person
Australia	November 2022 – March 2023	151 Members of House of Representatives; 76 Senators; 46 Representatives not re-elected in 2022	273	58	0.21	36	22
Belgium (Flanders)	March 2022 – August 2022	89 Federal Dutch-speaking MPs (second chamber only); 11 Federal Dutch-speaking government members (not in parliament); 124 Flemish MPs; 9 Flemish government members (not in parliament); 17 Brussels Dutch-speaking MPs; 3 Brussels Dutch-speaking government members (not in parliament); 7 Flemish party leaders (six in parliament)	254	215	0.85	24	191
Canada	October 2022 – February 2023	337 federal MPs; 87 British Columbia MLAs; 86 Alberta MLAs; 124 Ontario MPPs; 124 Quebec MNAs	758	87	0.12	86	1
Czechia	April 2022 – October 2022	All 200 Deputies from the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech parliament	200	64	0.32	0	64
Denmark	March 2022 – August 2022	All 179 national Members of Parliament	179	48	0.27	20	28
Germany	May 2022 – March 2023	Sampled population of members of parliament at the national level (because of parliament size). Sampling was in four waves, ensuring representativity of parliament in terms of gender, party, and incumbent status.	658	178	0.27	167	11
Israel	May 2022 – February 2023	120 Members of Parliament; 28 Ministers (7 in Parliament); 26 Ex-MPs (not re-elected in November 2022 but serving more than 1 year)	174	55	0.32	12	43
Netherlands	May 2022 – September 2022	All 152 national Members of Parliament	152	38	0.25	22	16
Portugal	July 2022 - December 2022	All 230 national Members of Parliament	230	70	0.30	10	60
Sweden	October 2022 - February 2023	All 353 national Members of Parliament; 21 Ex-MPs not re-elected in 2022	374	67	0.19	67	0
Switzerland	May 2022 – December 2022	200 National Council (first chamber); 46 Council of States (second chamber)	246	103	0.42	0	103

Table SM.1: Response Rates and Fieldwork Approach, by Country

Country	Overall		Gender (Women)		Mean Age (SD)		Seniority (SD)	
	Part.	Pop.	Part.	Pop.	Part.	Pop.	Part.	Pop.
Australia	58 (21.%)	273	20 (34.5%)	109 (39.9%)	53.6 (9.6)	52.3 (9.6)	7.7 (7.4)	8.7 (7.7)
Canada	87 (11.5%)	758	25 (29%)	267 (35%)	51 (11)	52 (10.7)	6.5 (4.9)	7 (5.5)
Czechia	64 (32%)	200	21 (33%)	52 (26%)	48.45 (9.6)	52.13 (9.5)	4.8 (5.15)	5.7 (4.7)
Denmark	48 (27%)	179	23 (48%)	72 (40%)	51.92 (11.7)	49.94 (11.4)	9.98 (9.3)	10.9 (8.4)
Belgium (Flanders)	215 (85%)	254	89 (41%)	115 (45%)	47.5 (9.2)	47.4 (8.95)	9.0 (7.4)	9.1 (7.4)
Germany	178 (27%)	738	72 (41%)	258 (35%)	46.8 (12.0)	48.5 (11.1)	6.2 (6.5)	8.6 (7.8)
Israel	55 (32%)	174	17 (47%)	36 (21%)	55 (10.2)	54.4 (10.9)	6.3 (7.2)	8.2 (7.9)
Netherlands	38 (25%)	152	21 (55%)	59 (39%)	45.2 (7.5)	46.4 (9.2)	4.2 (3.5)	6.4 (5.7)
Portugal	70 (30%)	230	27 (39%)	85 (37%)	47.0 (12.6)	49.5 (11.1)	4.3 (6.0)	6.0 (7.8)
Sweden	67 (19%)	374	31 (46%)	178 (48%)	48.8 (11.5)	46 (11.2)	4.6 (5.1)	5.8 (5.8)
Switzerland	102 (41%)	246	42 (43%)	98 (40%)	52.11 (9.5)	52.57 (9.8)	6.87 (4.91)	7.99 (5.56)

Table SM.2: Comparison of Survey Participants and Population

Country	Overall		Left (CHES 1-3)		Centre (CHES 4-6)		Right (CHES 7-10)		Other	
	Part.	Pop.	Part.	Pop.	Part.	Pop.	Part.	Pop.	Part.	Pop.
Australia	58 (21.3%)	272	24 (41.4%)	129 (47.2%)	4 (6.9%)	16 (5.9%)	30 (51.7%)	127 (46.5%)		
Czechia	64 (32%)	200	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	45 (70%)	132 (66%)	19 (30%)	68 (34%)		
Denmark	48 (27%)	179	9 (19%)	34 (19%)	31 (65%)	113 (63%)	5 (10%)	23 (13%)	3 (6%)	9 (5%)
Belgium (Flanders)	215 (85%)	254	61 (28%)	67 (26%)	62 (29%)	75 (30%)	89 (41%)	108 (43%)	3 (1%)	4 (2%)
Germany	178 (27.1%)	738	103 (57.9%)	364 (49.3%)	46 (25.8%)	245 (33.2%)	28 (15.7%)	125 (16.9%)	1 (0.01%)	4 (0.01%)
Israel	55 (32%)	166	17 (31%)	63 (38%)	7 (13%)	23 (14%)	31 (57%)	80 (48%)		
Netherlands	38 (25%)	152	11 (28.95%)	34 (22.4%)	16 (42.11%)	51 (33.6%)	11 (28.95%)	67 (44%)		
Portugal	70 (30%)	230	2 (2.9%)	13 (5.7%)	60 (85.7%)	197 (85.6%)	8 (11.4%)	20 (8.9%)		
Sweden	67 (19%)	374	30 (45%)	156 (42%)	9 (13%)	45 (12%)	28 (42%)	173 (46%)		
Switzerland	102 (41%)	246	42 (42%)	80 (33%)	26 (26%)	61 (25%)	32 (32%)	104 (42%)	0 (0%)	1 (0%)

Table SM.3: Comparison of Survey Participants and Population

2 Items and Measurement: Additional Information

2.1 Item Correlations

Figures SM.1 and SM.2 summarize distributions and correlations for each of our eight items for the citizen data (Fig. SM.1) and the politician data (Fig. SM.2). Along the diagonal, the figures summarise the distribution of each item. In the upper triangle, the figure reports the correlation between respective items. In the bottom triangle, the figure plots the relationship between the respective variables with correlation ellipses.




Figure SM.1: Correlation and Distribution of Items: Citizens.




Figure SM.2: Correlation and Distribution of Items: Politicians.

2.2 Monitored vs. Unmonitored Surveys

When comparing the citizen and politician responses, some may worry that the results simply originate in differences of survey mode: citizens completed the survey online in an unobserved setting, while politicians completed the survey as part of a larger face-to-face interview. In practice, these differences are minimal, because politicians completed the survey on the same platform (Qualtrics) as did citizens, and researchers could not see politicians' responses as the politicians completed the survey. We thus expected that few differences between politicians and citizens were likely to emerge merely by virtue of the face-to-face setting. However, we can confirm this expectation by taking advantage of our pilot study of more than 1,000 Belgian local politicians, all of whom completed the survey in the same unobserved online context as the citizens. We used these data to replicate our politician-citizen comparison and report the results in Figure SM.3 below. Black coefficients in the figure represent Belgian politicians who completed the survey in a monitored setting and gray coefficients are the politicians who completed the survey in the unmonitored pilot study.




Figure SM.3: **Differences with Citizens, Belgian Local vs. National Politicians.**

We would not expect this test to produce identical results across levels, because Belgian local politicians are different from national politicians in important ways, including political experience and policy jurisdiction. What would be concerning, however, is if the politician-citizen differences were to simply disappear among politicians who completed the survey in an unobserved data collection setting. Reassuringly, this is not the case: coefficients for the differences between politicians and citizens are in fact similar in direction and magnitude for most comparisons (especially those we emphasize as robust differences in the main text, such as ideas vs. leaders, short-term vs. long-term, and fair vs. unfair blame). This finding reassures us that the politician-citizen differences we observe in the main text analysis do not originate in differences in survey mode.

2.3 Response Timing

Even if, as we just demonstrated, politicians’ responses are similar across modes, we might worry that politicians still spent more time than citizens on their responses, and thus that the politicians’ responses reflect more considered responses that citizens would also choose, were they to devote more time and reflection to the task. We tested for this possibility and report our results in Table SM.4. The table reports the difference in per-question time spent by politicians (1) vs. citizens (0) across two blocks of questions, the first of which contained three questions and the second of which contained six questions (timing data were collected at the level of these blocks rather than individual questions).

	Block 1	Block 2
	(1)	(2)
Politician	2.501 (6.925)	2.792* (1.512)
Constant	25.302*** (2.065)	14.876*** (0.448)
Observations	12,707	12,633
Adjusted R ²	-0.0001	0.0002

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.4: Response Timing Comparison

Our results suggest that differences in timing between politicians and citizens are substantively small and not statistically significant at conventional levels. Politicians appear to have spent about 2.5 seconds more than citizens on each question, a substantively small amount of time that our analysis suggests may well simply reflect chance variation. We note that these differences are especially small given that some politicians, who were completing their surveys in the context of face-to-face with researchers, occasionally wished to briefly describe their responses before moving forward in the survey.

2.4 Response Extremity

Another possible concern – and one that is especially important when respondents are provided with 0-10 response scales – is that citizens and politicians are simply using the scales differently. If, for instance, citizens are more likely than politicians to choose extreme values on the scale, this could potentially threaten inferences about the firmness or extremity of citizens’ vs. politicians’ positions. While none of our inferences in the main text are specifically related to position extremity, it is nevertheless useful to explore how citizens and politicians used the available response scale. This helps us understand our results and make better decisions about coding and analysis. In figure SM.4, we report the differences in the

probability that politicians (1) or citizens (0) will use each point in the scale, where low values reflect points near the middle of the scale and high values reflect points near the ends of the scale.




Figure SM.4: **Scale Use, Politicians vs. Citizens.**

We find that, in general, citizens and politicians do indeed make use of the scale somewhat differently. Politicians are about two percentage points less likely than citizens to select the exact centre point of the scale; this reflects the higher proportion of “undecided” theorists among citizens, as discussed in the main text. Politicians, however, are also more likely than citizens to select moderate points on the scale in the 3-4 and 6-7 range (the differences in probability are in the range of 4-5 percentage points) and less likely than citizens to select points at the extreme ends of the scale, in the 0-1 or 9-10 range (here the differences in probability are in the range of 3-5 percentage points).

We draw two conclusions from these differences. First, we note that the differences between politicians and citizens, while certainly present, are substantively small and probably reflect the fact that, with more than ten times the responses among citizens than politicians, our citizen data are more likely to include individuals with more extreme positions on all issues in the survey, including these. Second, and more importantly, these results speak to the need for comparisons in which we concern ourselves less with the *extremity* of a respondent’s view and more with the *side* of the debate on which they have placed themselves. We emphasize that our final Latent Class Analysis in the main text recodes politician and citizen responses in such a way that the analysis ignores position extremity and focuses instead on which side of the debate the respondents place themselves. The results in figure SM.4 support this decision, because our recoded LCA analysis ensures that the differences between politician and citizen theory types are not simply due to differences in response extremity.

In the second set of panels in the figure, we provide additional analysis of response patterns among demographic groups in the citizen data: older respondents vs. younger respondents (bottom left), women vs. men and non-binary respondents (bottom middle), and university degree holders versus others (bottom right). The results provide additional information on how citizen respondents used the available response scales. Women, for instance, were more likely than men to choose the middle position and were slightly more likely to choose a moderate position (4 or 6) rather than a more extreme option. Those with university degrees, in contrast, were *less* likely than those without degrees to select a middle or very moderate position, preferring to make choices in the 1-3 and 7-9 range. Overall, however, the differences are modest, and similar in magnitude to the citizen-politician differences in the top panel. This suggests that citizen-politician differences are unlikely to be strongly driven by differences in scale usage among citizens or among particular demographic subgroups of citizens.

2.5 Response Extremity and Main Text Figure 2

While our LCA relies on recoded data and thus is not vulnerable to differences in response extremity recorded in figure SM.4 above, our OLS models in Figure 2 in the main text *do* make comparisons using the full 0-10 scales. Given the small differences in response extremity between citizens and politicians, we may worry that the differences reported in Main Text Figure 2 are thus the result of response extremity rather than meaningful differences in beliefs between politicians and citizens.

To test this possibility, we recoded all citizen and politician responses to match those used in the LCA – responses on one side of the debate (0-4), responses in the centre (5), and responses on the other side of the debate (6-10). We then fit multinomial logit models to test for meaningful politician-citizen differences using these recoded values. We report the results in Figure SM.5, which summarizes the differences between the two sides of each debate, ignoring the central position.¹

The results in figure SM.5 strongly align with our findings in the main text: politicians

¹To be clear, the central position is included in the multinomial logit model, but we do not report these coefficients in the figure.




Figure SM.5: **Multinomial Logit, Politician vs. Citizen Responses.**

are more likely than citizens to endorse egocentric rather than sociotropic voting and leader-driven rather than issue-driven voting; there are no meaningful differences between politicians and citizens on policy vs. identity or knowledge vs. ignorance; and politicians are less likely than citizens to think that voters are clear-eyed in their retrospection, vote on the basis of many issues, or long-term in their orientations.

We find only one difference in this model when compared to the main text analysis: in this model, there are no meaningful differences between politicians and citizens on the prospective vs. retrospective variable. This is unsurprising; as we note in the main text, this difference is not consistent across countries. In other words, when we recode the data to ignore the extremity of responses and focus entirely on the *position* that the respondent takes on one side or the other of each theoretical debate, our results strongly reinforce the findings from the simpler OLS models reported in the main text.

3 Citizen Responses: Additional Data

3.1 Who Do Citizens Have in Mind?

When comparing how politicians and citizens answer our theory items, we might worry that while politicians have *voters* in mind, citizens have *themselves* in mind when answering the questions. If some forms of voting behaviour are more socially desirable than others (e.g. knowledgeable rather than ignorant voting), and if citizens are thinking of their own behaviour when answering the questions, then the observed differences between the two groups may simply emerge from differences in social desirability. In the main text, we argued that worries about differences in social desirability are less pronounced than one might at first believe; after all, politicians may be equally tempted to select socially desirable responses because the questions are ultimately about the individuals who elected them to office.

Fortunately, however, we can go further and test this possibility empirically, because we randomly assigned half of our citizen respondents to describe their *own* voting behaviour, while the other half of citizen respondents received questions about voting behaviour in general, identical to the questions asked of politicians. We summarize the differences between the two questions in Figure SM.6 below; the figure summarizes models (including country fixed effects) in which we compare the responses of citizen respondents randomly assigned to self-description to citizen respondents assigned to general description of voters' behaviour. The two groups are dramatically different: citizens asked about themselves tend strongly in the direction of long-term orientation, multiple-issue voting, fair blame, policy ideas, future orientation, knowledge, policy orientation, and sociotropic voting.

If we interpret these effects as reflecting the kinds of voting behaviour that citizens see in themselves and would like to see in others, these results offer a fascinating glimpse into citizens' implicit theories of normatively desirable voting behaviour. For our purposes, however, they also offer something more immediately practical: they provide strong evidence that, when answering the ordinary items about voting behaviour in general, citizens are *not* thinking only of themselves. These results suggest that citizens are not only able to understand the eight questions, but also understood that they were being asked to report their beliefs about how voters' behave in general.

This finding also has implications for our interpretation of the citizen-politician comparison in the main text. In Figure SM.7, we replicate the top panel of Figure 2 in the main text (the black coefficients) but add what the coefficients would look like if we instead compared citizens' self-perceptions to politicians' theories (the orange coefficients). Across all items, we see that the differences are considerably more extreme in the case of the orange coefficients, indicating even greater distance between the two positions.

Overall, then, while citizens are surely incorporating some degree of introspection in their theories of voting behavior, these results suggest that citizens are genuinely reflecting on voting behaviour in general when asked to respond to the items that are identical to the politician items and used in the main text. Citizens thus appear to be able not only to understand the eight theory items and offer responses, but also to be able to do so in a way that steps outside a (likely idealized) perception of self to reflect on voting behavior more generally.




Figure SM.6: **Citizen Responses; Self-Description vs. Description of All Voters.** Difference in responses between citizens who were randomly assigned to the general theory question (identical to those answered by politicians) versus a question that asked how they themselves vote. Positive values indicate that respondents who received the “how you vote” frame were more likely to choose the right-hand pole of the debate; negative values indicate that they were more likely to choose the left-hand pole of the debate.




Figure SM.7: **Politicians vs. Citizens, by Citizen Question Type.** Average difference in responses between politicians and citizens when we use identical questions (black coefficients) or estimate citizen responses using the alternative question about how they themselves vote (orange coefficients).

3.2 Variation in Citizen Types

Are the citizen-politician differences that we observe in the main text due to *compositional* differences between politicians and citizens? In other words, are these differences a result of the fact that politicians are more likely than the citizens they represent to be older, better educated, and men? To test this possibility, Figure SM.8 summarizes the probability of belonging to each of our four latent classes among politicians (in green) and various subgroups of citizens (in blue).




Figure SM.8: **Latent Class Membership, by Demographic Subgroups of Citizens.** Latent class membership among demographic subgroups of citizens (in blue) and politicians (in green). Politician-citizen differences persist within all demographic subgroups.

The results in Figure SM.8 suggest that there are indeed meaningful sources of variation in citizens’ theories; for instance, those with university degrees are substantially more likely

to be democratic realists than those without university degrees. Still, what stands out most in Figure [SM.8](#) is the much higher likelihood of democratic realism among politicians than among *any* of the demographic subgroups in the figure. In other words, while some subsets of the population are more or less likely to resemble politicians' theories, something about *being* a politician appears to push individuals toward more "realist" theories even aside from their underlying socio-demographic characteristics.

4 Politicians' Theory Types: Country-Level Variation

Figure SM.9 provides a complete version of main text figure 4.



Figure SM.9: Politicians' LCA Types, by Country

5 Variance in Theoretical Beliefs: Additional Analysis

To assess within-country and across-country variance, we fit null multilevel models for each theory question – that is, multilevel models containing only varying country-level intercepts – and calculate Intraclass Correlation Coefficients for each item: $\frac{\sigma_j^2}{\sigma_j^2 + \sigma_i^2}$, where σ_j^2 is between-group variance and σ_i^2 is within-group variance.




Figure SM.10: **Intra-Class Correlation Coefficients.**

Figure SM.10 summarises these analyses. ICC values are well below 0.1 in all but two cases: policy versus identity among politicians, and policy ideas versus leaders among politicians.

6 LCA: Robustness Tests and Alternative Clustering Approaches

As is standard in many Latent Class Analyses (Weller, Bowen and Faubert, 2020), our LCA began by recoding all theory questions into three theoretically salient basic types: a position on one side of the debate, a position in the exact centre of the debate, and a position on the other side of the debate. We then estimate latent classes using the poLCA package (Linzer and Lewis, 2011) in R (for “polytomous latent class analysis”) for latent class solutions ranging from two to twenty classes, estimating each model with five different starting values to obtain global rather than local optimum solutions (Linzer and Lewis, 2011) and recording fit statistics for each latent class solution.

Methodologists recommend using multiple fit statistics to make decisions about the latent class solution to selection (Weller, Bowen and Faubert, 2020). We visualize three fit statistics in figure SM.11. To select an appropriate number of classes, researchers typically look for visible “elbows” in the fit statistics – points at which the marginal increase in fit begins to level off. Figure SM.11 reveals a distinct elbow for the four-class solution in all three fit statistics.





Figure SM.11: Latent Class Analysis Fit Statistics.

Some methodologists recommend using BIC as a criteria for selecting a class solution (Nylund, Asparouhov and Muthén, 2007). In our case, an eight-class solution minimizes BIC. Figure SM.12 visualizes this solution and demonstrates that, while necessarily more

Class Membership, Citizens and Politicians



Distribution of Responses, by Class




Figure SM.12: **Eight-Class LCA Solution.**

complex than the four-class solution, this alternative solution reinforces our interpretation in the main text. Notice that the most common class for politicians is characterized by strong “democratic realist” views, and that politicians are much more likely than citizens to belong to this class. A strong “democratic optimism” class is fairly common among citizens (13.6%) but very uncommon among politicians (3.8%). Politicians and citizens are equally likely to belong to a class with “realist” positions on most but not all issues (1), and politicians are more likely than citizens to belong to an “undecided weak realist” class (3). The remaining classes capture idiosyncratic responses or undecided respondents. Overall,

then, these findings reinforce our interpretation while adding little additional theoretical substance, supporting the value of the four-class solution. Following recommendations in the methodological literature, we rely on a combination of statistical fit and theoretical interpretability to select the four-class solution (Nylund, Asparouhov and Muthén, 2007).

Our main-text latent class analysis recodes each response into three simple types: one side, middle position, and the other side. This isolates the most theoretically important differences in our responses and makes the LCA solution as straightforward as possible to interpret. However, some may consider this too extreme: perhaps we want to distinguish between those who *strong* and *weak* positions on each theoretical debate. We believe that the three-category coding is most theoretically appropriate, because we are interested in understanding latent clustering for respondents’ *beliefs* on each theory item, rather than clustering based on the strength of those beliefs. Nevertheless, to test the robustness of our findings, we carried out four-class LCA using an alternative coding that distinguishes the strength of each respondent’s response.² We report the results of this analysis in figure SM.13.

Given the additional information contained in this second LCA model, we would not expect the results to be identical. Broadly speaking, however, the results reinforce our findings in the main text. Class one captures a “democratic optimism” perspective; citizens are much more likely to belong to this class. Classes two and four are broadly “realist” positions; politicians are more likely to belong to both. Class three are “undecideds” with a small minority of both citizens and politicians falling into this class. In general, then, we find that our interpretation of the differences between politicians and citizens are robust to this alternative (and in our view less theoretically defensible) coding of our variables.

6.1 Continuous Variable Approach: HCA

An even more extreme alternative to this recoding procedure could be to preserve the entire distribution of responses in the recoded data. We believe this approach is clearly inferior to our preferred approach on theoretical grounds, because it places much more weight on the extremity of the positions that respondents adopt rather than their actual *positions* on one side or the other of the debate. Even more importantly, this approach fails to distinguish theoretically important differences (such as the difference between choosing four and five on the scale) from less theoretically important differences (such as the difference between choosing three and four on the scale). This approach is also susceptible to variation in response extremity described in SM 2.4 above.

Nevertheless, it may be valuable to demonstrate that our results are broadly consistent even when we employ this less theoretically satisfactory clustering method. We fit a hierarchical cluster analysis (complete linkage) on our eight items and extract four classes from the resulting model. We visualize the results of this HCA approach in figure SM.14.

Cluster one captures more strongly realist views; politicians are more likely than citizens to belong to this cluster. Cluster two captures more weakly realist views; politicians and citizens are equally likely to belong to this cluster. Cluster three captures a strongly optimist

²The coding was 0:2 = strong view on one side, 3:4 = weak view on one side, 5 = middle position, 6:7 = weak view on the other side, and 8:10 = strong view on the other side.




Figure SM.13: Summary of LCA with Recoded Theory Items.

position, and citizens are much more likely than politicians to belong to this cluster. Cluster four captures a more mixed position. Thus the hierarchical cluster analysis recovers similar findings to the latent class analysis that we employ in the main text. We note, however, the important absence here of a theoretically important group: those who tend to select the middle value (the “undecided” group) across many questions. In our view, this difference illustrates one of the important advantages of the LCA procedure using recoded question responses.

Class Membership, Citizens and Politicians




Figure SM.14: Alternative Model: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis.

7 Citizen-Politician Types: Additional Analysis

To confirm the visual differences in main text Figure 2 between politicians and citizens, we fit multinomial logit models in which class belonging is predicted by a politician vs. citizen indicator along with country fixed effects. Because the most theoretically important difference is between democratic optimists and democratic realists, we set democratic optimism as the base category in this analysis. Our results, reported in Table SM.5, confirm that the differences are statistically significant.




Figure SM.15: **Predicted Probabilities of Latent Class Membership, LCR Model.**

However, methodologists have demonstrated that this multi-step procedure produces biased estimates (Linzer and Lewis, 2011). We therefore fit a four-class Latent Class Regression model with the respondent type (Politician vs. Citizen) as a model covariate. Results confirm that politicians are significantly less likely than citizens to belong to the “democratic optimism” class ($p < 0.01$). We plot the predicted probabilities of latent class membership drawn from this model in figure SM.15, confirming substantial differences between citizens and politicians.

	Democratic Realist	Undecided	Inattentive
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Politician	1.451*** (0.097)	0.265* (0.138)	-1.528*** (0.315)
Belgium	0.525*** (0.110)	0.366*** (0.133)	-0.145 (0.132)
Canada	1.044*** (0.110)	0.572*** (0.136)	-0.696*** (0.160)
Czechia	0.199* (0.110)	0.409*** (0.127)	-1.160*** (0.159)
Denmark	1.182*** (0.109)	0.500*** (0.138)	0.099 (0.135)
Germany	0.357*** (0.108)	0.154 (0.133)	-0.425*** (0.134)
Israel	0.908*** (0.104)	0.152 (0.134)	-0.621*** (0.139)
Netherlands	1.088*** (0.115)	0.536*** (0.143)	-0.023 (0.144)
Portugal	0.933*** (0.109)	0.275** (0.140)	-0.280** (0.140)
Sweden	0.053 (0.110)	0.238* (0.128)	-0.924*** (0.144)
Switzerland	0.639*** (0.109)	0.529*** (0.130)	-0.515*** (0.143)
Constant	-0.552*** (0.082)	-1.038*** (0.098)	-0.701*** (0.088)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	29,706.050	29,706.050	29,706.050

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.5: Citizen-Politician Comparison (Base = Democratic Optimism)

8 Additional Information: Ethics Protocols

This research project involved human participants. Political elite and public opinion surveys were approved by the following Research Ethics Boards: [Removed for review]

- Australia: Humanities and Social Sciences DERC, Australian National University (2022-408)
- Canada: University of Calgary Research Ethics Board (REB22-0205) and University of Toronto Research Ethics Board (REB 00043361)
- Czechia: Commission for Ethics in Research of Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University
- Denmark: Ethics Committee, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen (2022-04)
- Flanders (Belgium): Ethical Advice Committee, Social and Human Sciences, University of Antwerp (SHW_22_032)
- Francophone Belgium: Ethical Committee, Social and Human Sciences, Université libre de Bruxelles (R2022-004)
- Germany: Ethical Advice Committee, University of Konstanz (10-2021)
- Israel: University Committee for the Use of Human Subjects in Research, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (29042022)
- Luxembourg: LISER Research Ethics Committee
- Netherlands: Ethics Committee, Faculty of Behavioral Sciences (2022-PCJ-1477)
- Norway: Data Protection Services, Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research (770184)
- Portugal: Ethical Committee of the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon (07-2022)
- Sweden: Ekprövningsmyndighetens (2022-00734-01)
- Switzerland: University of Geneva Ethics Commission (CUREG-2021-10-10), Government of the Canton of Geneva (379-2022)

In this section, we describe our research procedures in relation to APSA Council’s 2020 Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research.

None of the researchers involved in this study have any potential or perceived conflicts of interest in relation to this research. Participants in the survey of political elites were not compensated for their participation. Participants in the public opinion surveys were online panel members recruited by Dynata, a commercial survey sample firm. All participants were

compensated in keeping with Dynata’s recruitment policy. As is customary for commercial sample providers, the exact terms of compensation are proprietary and were not shared with the researchers.

Consent. All participants provided informed consent prior to starting the online surveys, and were free to withdraw from the study at any time by closing their browsers. Informed consent documents were written in accessible language.

Deception. This project did not involve deception.

Harm and trauma. Our surveys were assessed by the research ethics review committees and boards listed above as having minimal risk to participants. The participant pool was not primarily comprised of members of vulnerable or marginalized groups, and we did not anticipate differential benefits or harms for particular groups.

Confidentiality. Confidentiality was guaranteed to all participants. All replication data and code are pseudonymized to protect the confidentiality of both public and elite respondents.

Impact. Our research did not involve intervention in political processes.

Laws and Regulations. Our research complies with applicable laws and regulations on human subjects research in the case countries.

Shared responsibility. All members of the research team, including research assistants, were aware of applicable ethics requirements and the necessity of protecting respondents’ privacy and confidentiality.

Power. Respondents to public opinion surveys in our study were members of an online panel and their participation in the survey was entirely voluntary. For this reason, we are unaware of power imbalances that may have caused participants to feel compelled to participate. This is all the more true of our politician sample, which consisted of elected representatives at the national and regional levels; these public figures are in positions of power and are unlikely to have experienced power imbalances in relation to a request to participate in a confidential academic survey.

9 Citizen-Politician Differences: Full Models

Table SM.6 provides full results (plotted in figure 2 in main text). All models are OLS.

	Unfair v. Fair	Policy v. Identity	Future v. Past	Sociotropic v. Egocentric	Single-Issue v. Many-Issue	Ideas v. Leaders	Knowledge v. Ignorance	Short-term v. Long-term
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Politician	-0.454*** (0.080)	0.841*** (0.081)	0.036 (0.078)	0.127* (0.077)	-1.492*** (0.084)	-1.534*** (0.084)	0.639*** (0.082)	-1.171*** (0.074)
Belgium	0.279*** (0.099)	-0.498*** (0.100)	0.500*** (0.097)	0.361*** (0.095)	-1.314*** (0.104)	-1.051*** (0.104)	0.930*** (0.101)	-0.439*** (0.091)
Canada	-0.064 (0.102)	-0.334*** (0.103)	0.131 (0.099)	0.033 (0.098)	-0.669*** (0.107)	-0.580*** (0.107)	0.292*** (0.104)	-0.509*** (0.093)
Czechia	-0.126 (0.102)	-0.341*** (0.103)	0.459*** (0.100)	-0.110 (0.098)	-1.588*** (0.107)	-0.959*** (0.107)	0.777*** (0.105)	-0.559*** (0.094)
Denmark	-0.399*** (0.102)	-0.710*** (0.104)	-0.634*** (0.100)	-0.541*** (0.098)	-0.947*** (0.107)	-0.537*** (0.107)	-0.098 (0.105)	-0.368*** (0.094)
Germany	-0.137 (0.100)	-0.595*** (0.102)	-0.452*** (0.098)	-0.018 (0.097)	-0.483*** (0.105)	-0.446*** (0.105)	0.383*** (0.103)	-0.220** (0.092)
Israel	0.121 (0.097)	0.202** (0.099)	0.025 (0.095)	1.025*** (0.094)	-1.782*** (0.102)	-1.116*** (0.102)	0.162 (0.100)	-1.061*** (0.089)
Netherlands	0.093 (0.105)	-0.582*** (0.107)	0.437*** (0.103)	0.421*** (0.102)	-1.296*** (0.111)	-0.960*** (0.111)	0.719*** (0.108)	-0.651*** (0.097)
Portugal	0.264*** (0.102)	-0.196* (0.103)	0.630*** (0.100)	0.225** (0.098)	-1.498*** (0.107)	-0.689*** (0.107)	0.359*** (0.104)	-0.346*** (0.094)
Sweden	-0.437*** (0.101)	-0.978*** (0.103)	-0.388*** (0.099)	0.086 (0.098)	-0.279*** (0.107)	-0.510*** (0.106)	-0.100 (0.104)	-0.500*** (0.093)
Switzerland	-0.161 (0.101)	-1.266*** (0.102)	-0.257*** (0.098)	0.066 (0.097)	-1.036*** (0.106)	-0.907*** (0.106)	0.299*** (0.103)	-0.465*** (0.093)
Constant	5.452*** (0.074)	5.767*** (0.075)	5.789*** (0.072)	5.251*** (0.071)	5.828*** (0.078)	5.794*** (0.078)	5.586*** (0.076)	6.103*** (0.068)
Observations	12,383	12,396	12,400	12,377	12,394	12,392	12,386	12,393
Adjusted R ²	0.011	0.035	0.031	0.028	0.068	0.042	0.025	0.032

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.6: Citizen-Politician Comparison: Pooled Data

	Unfair v. Fair										
	Australia	Canada	Czechia	Denmark	Belgium	Germany	Israel	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	Switzerland
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Politicians	-0.451 (0.356)	-0.960*** (0.172)	0.108 (0.274)	0.076 (0.316)	-0.761** (0.325)	-0.974*** (0.196)	-0.026 (0.342)	-0.433 (0.389)	-0.167 (0.314)	-0.653** (0.284)	0.438** (0.220)
Constant	5.451*** (0.082)	5.815*** (0.070)	5.345*** (0.076)	5.295*** (0.076)	5.066*** (0.067)	5.390*** (0.075)	5.557*** (0.065)	5.544*** (0.076)	5.699*** (0.075)	5.027*** (0.069)	5.215*** (0.064)
Observations	1,001	1,276	1,105	1,074	1,081	1,185	1,345	948	1,095	1,122	1,151
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.023	-0.001	-0.001	0.004	0.020	-0.001	0.0003	-0.001	0.004	0.003

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.7: Citizen-Politician Comparison by Country

		Policy v. Identity										
		Australia	Canada	Czechia	Denmark	Belgium	Germany	Israel	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	Switzerland
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Politicians		0.276 (0.347)	1.077*** (0.173)	1.527*** (0.278)	1.164*** (0.306)	0.561* (0.324)	0.940*** (0.193)	1.559*** (0.346)	1.420*** (0.387)	0.740** (0.323)	0.837*** (0.300)	-0.704*** (0.231)
Constant		5.798*** (0.081)	5.230*** (0.071)	5.380*** (0.078)	5.407*** (0.073)	5.069*** (0.067)	5.158*** (0.074)	5.941*** (0.068)	5.164*** (0.075)	5.577*** (0.078)	4.789*** (0.073)	4.633*** (0.068)
Observations		998	1,269	1,103	1,092	1,087	1,192	1,346	947	1,094	1,121	1,147
Adjusted R ²		-0.0004	0.029	0.026	0.012	0.002	0.019	0.014	0.013	0.004	0.006	0.007

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.8: Citizen-Politician Comparison by Country

		Future v. Past										
		Australia	Canada	Czechia	Denmark	Belgium	Germany	Israel	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	Switzerland
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Politicians		-0.093 (0.341)	0.091 (0.158)	0.386 (0.258)	0.547* (0.289)	0.086 (0.338)	0.157 (0.188)	0.753** (0.349)	-0.237 (0.346)	-0.793*** (0.297)	-0.091 (0.306)	-0.530** (0.233)
Constant		5.796*** (0.079)	6.280*** (0.065)	5.893*** (0.072)	6.218*** (0.070)	5.153*** (0.070)	5.320*** (0.071)	5.787*** (0.067)	6.237*** (0.067)	6.465*** (0.070)	5.409*** (0.074)	5.581*** (0.068)
Observations		997	1,269	1,109	1,094	1,089	1,190	1,344	945	1,095	1,120	1,148
Adjusted R ²		-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.001	-0.0003	0.003	-0.001	0.006	-0.001	0.004

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.9: Citizen-Politician Comparison by Country

		Sociotropic v. Egocentric										
		Australia	Canada	Czechia	Denmark	Belgium	Germany	Israel	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	Switzerland
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Politicians		-0.156 (0.341)	-0.183 (0.157)	0.752*** (0.265)	0.201 (0.294)	-0.453 (0.332)	0.039 (0.184)	1.388*** (0.324)	0.839** (0.359)	-0.069 (0.319)	0.133 (0.266)	-0.113 (0.228)
Constant		5.267*** (0.079)	5.665*** (0.064)	5.236*** (0.073)	5.138*** (0.070)	4.735*** (0.069)	5.246*** (0.069)	6.227*** (0.064)	5.647*** (0.069)	5.488*** (0.076)	5.337*** (0.065)	5.337*** (0.067)
Observations		999	1,276	1,103	1,080	1,081	1,177	1,349	949	1,097	1,119	1,147
Adjusted R ²		-0.001	0.0003	0.006	-0.0005	0.001	-0.001	0.013	0.005	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.10: Citizen-Politician Comparison by Country

		Single-Issue v. Many-Issue										
		Australia	Canada	Czechia	Denmark	Belgium	Germany	Israel	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	Switzerland
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Politicians		-1.847*** (0.363)	-1.179*** (0.178)	-2.164*** (0.291)	-1.326*** (0.325)	-0.944*** (0.350)	-2.192*** (0.196)	-1.092*** (0.356)	-0.910** (0.411)	-0.807** (0.332)	-1.917*** (0.321)	-1.117*** (0.238)
Constant		5.847*** (0.084)	4.461*** (0.073)	5.211*** (0.081)	4.230*** (0.078)	4.857*** (0.072)	5.446*** (0.075)	4.031*** (0.068)	4.510*** (0.079)	4.291*** (0.079)	5.574*** (0.078)	4.760*** (0.070)
Observations		1,000	1,269	1,105	1,092	1,091	1,188	1,341	945	1,094	1,123	1,146
Adjusted R ²		0.024	0.033	0.047	0.014	0.006	0.095	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.030	0.018

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.11: Citizen-Politician Comparison by Country

	Ideas v. Leaders										
	Australia	Canada	Czechia	Denmark	Belgium	Germany	Israel	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	Switzerland
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Politicians	-1.809*** (0.361)	-1.599*** (0.173)	-2.107*** (0.289)	-1.521*** (0.324)	-0.519 (0.358)	-1.731*** (0.201)	-1.577*** (0.367)	-1.211*** (0.383)	-0.944*** (0.328)	-1.554*** (0.315)	-1.402*** (0.238)
Constant	5.809*** (0.084)	4.754*** (0.071)	5.259*** (0.081)	4.834*** (0.078)	5.214*** (0.074)	5.377*** (0.076)	4.680*** (0.070)	4.822*** (0.075)	5.071*** (0.079)	5.286*** (0.077)	4.876*** (0.069)
Observations	996	1,269	1,103	1,094	1,091	1,189	1,344	946	1,095	1,121	1,144
Adjusted R ²	0.024	0.063	0.045	0.019	0.001	0.058	0.013	0.009	0.007	0.020	0.029

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.12: Citizen-Politician Comparison by Country

	Knowledge v. Ignorance										
	Australia	Canada	Czechia	Denmark	Belgium	Germany	Israel	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	Switzerland
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Politicians	0.538 (0.367)	0.537*** (0.157)	0.734*** (0.279)	0.919*** (0.330)	0.847** (0.347)	0.816*** (0.190)	0.297 (0.361)	0.409 (0.344)	0.619* (0.338)	0.537* (0.306)	0.590** (0.235)
Constant	5.592*** (0.085)	6.533*** (0.064)	5.870*** (0.078)	6.346*** (0.080)	5.479*** (0.071)	5.943*** (0.073)	5.761*** (0.071)	6.314*** (0.067)	5.946*** (0.080)	5.492*** (0.075)	5.889*** (0.068)
Observations	999	1,269	1,104	1,089	1,086	1,191	1,345	945	1,094	1,119	1,145
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.008	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.014	-0.0002	0.0004	0.002	0.002	0.005

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.13: Citizen-Politician Comparison by Country

	Short-term v. Long-term										
	Australia	Canada	Czechia	Denmark	Belgium	Germany	Israel	Netherlands	Portugal	Sweden	Switzerland
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Politicians	-1.358*** (0.322)	-1.162*** (0.159)	-1.461*** (0.260)	-1.466*** (0.289)	-0.943*** (0.303)	-1.666*** (0.168)	-1.057*** (0.316)	-0.573 (0.360)	-0.647** (0.288)	-0.922*** (0.275)	-0.747*** (0.196)
Constant	6.113*** (0.074)	5.662*** (0.065)	5.616*** (0.072)	5.561*** (0.070)	5.725*** (0.062)	5.955*** (0.064)	5.038*** (0.063)	5.430*** (0.069)	5.728*** (0.069)	5.588*** (0.067)	5.602*** (0.057)
Observations	1,001	1,274	1,108	1,083	1,087	1,181	1,344	949	1,097	1,123	1,146
Adjusted R ²	0.017	0.039	0.027	0.022	0.008	0.076	0.008	0.002	0.004	0.009	0.012

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SM.14: Citizen-Politician Comparison by Country

References

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