

Web Appendix

The Class Ceiling in Politics

W1. The “so what?” question of preference representation

There is a strong social justice argument for numerical political representation by social class. Instrumental arguments include potential positive impacts on substantial and symbolic representation. As discussed in the paper’s introduction, if there are more workers in political office, this may shift the output of the political system toward working-class citizens’ preferences and improve perceptions of the democratic system’s legitimacy.

Theories about democratic governance in multiparty systems assume that political preferences differ by social class (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt 1994). The party system embodies this left–right ideological divide in parties’ political platforms – and, according to the “mass party” model, in the selection of their politicians.

A very large research literature documents systematic differences in left–right political ideology and preferences by social class (examples include Lipset 1959; McCall and Manza 2011; Svallfors et al. 2012). The literature on politicians’ ideology and preferences is also relatively large. US members of Congress from the working class vote more liberal and less conservative than those with experience in white-collar occupations and businesspeople on economic issues (Carnes 2012). Bartels finds that U.S. senators’ roll-call voting is more congruent with high-income residents’ opinions (Bartels 2009). Carnes and Lupu (2015) establish that Argentinian legislators from working-class backgrounds propose and co-sponsor bills that are more leftist on labor, economic, and redistributive issues. Papers that can estimate a causal effect of a politician’s social class on political outcomes are rarer. One exception is Hemingway (2022), who finds that Finnish municipal councilors with a working-class background increase social spending more than those with a background in business. Another is O’Grady’s (2019) analysis of working-class legislators’ policy influence within the British Labor Party.

We provide descriptive evidence that aligns with the notion that having political representatives with a working-class background increases workers’ substantive political representation. We conceptualize substantive representation by social class as parties channeling different proportions of social classes into political office and choosing policies that

match these classes’ preferences along the left–right political divide. This conceptualization is consistent with one observation at the individual level and three observations at the party level.

At the individual level, we should observe that working-class voters and politicians have more leftist political preferences than those from other social classes. At the party level, we should observe that parties with more working-class voters also have more working-class politicians, and that these parties have more leftist political positions than other parties.




Figure W1. Means of Political Ideology and Preferences by Social Class.

Note: The figure shows the means with 95% standard errors for left–right ideology and preferences for reducing the size of the public sector among voters and municipal councilors by social class. Ideology and preferences are standardized ordinal variables. Left–right ideology is based on answers to the question “People sometimes say that political opinions can be placed on a scale from left to right. Where would you place yourself on a scale like that?” (1) Clearly to the left, (2) Somewhat to the left, (3) Neither to the left nor to the right, (4) Somewhat to the right, of (5) Clearly to the right. The preference question asks “Below is a number of proposals which have formed part of the political debate. What is your opinion on each one of them? – Reduce the size of the public sector”: (1) A very bad proposal, (2) A pretty bad proposal, (3) Neither a good nor a bad proposal, (4) A pretty good proposal, (5) A very good proposal. N(Voters, left–right ideology)=57,510, N(Voters, welfare state reduction)=34,311; N(Councilors, left–right ideology)=4,964; N(Councilors, welfare state reduction)=6,214. Appendix Section W3 defines social classes in both surveys.

We follow Carnes’s (2012) empirical study by selecting left–right political ideology and preferences about domestic economic policies as the focus of the analysis, and showing variation in these measurements across many social classes. Left–right ideology is available in both our voter survey (SOM 2005–2020) and our politician survey (KOLFU 2017), and in answers to a question about whether the size of the welfare state should be reduced (SOM 2005–2013 and KOLFU 2017). We standardize the ordinal categorical score for each of these survey

questions. Figure W1 displays averages by social class among voters and municipal councilors after applying the same sample restrictions as in the main analysis of these two surveys. It illustrates that workers have the lowest value on both variables, i.e., of the six class categories, they are most leftist and most negative on reducing the size of the welfare state.

The paper’s main analysis establishes that parties with more working-class voters also have more working-class politicians. Shares of both are higher in left-leaning parties (Left Party and Social Democrats) and in the radical right (the Sweden Democrats) compared to center-right parties (Appendix Table W5 and Appendix Figure W7).

The third piece of evidence links each party’s share of workers to their average ideological positions. Figure W2 plots averages of the ideology and preference variables by party among voters and councilors against the share of workers in the corresponding group (voters or politicians). With the exception of the Sweden Democrats, parties with higher shares of workers have much more leftist views on average. This party has the highest share of workers but a political ideology that is nearly on par with Sweden’s center-right parties.




Figure W2. Share of Workers in Parties and Average Left–right Ideology and Preferences.

Note: The figure shows party-level averages for the share of workers among voters (top) and politicians (bottom), and voters’ and politicians’ left-right ideology and preferences for the size of the public sector. Pooled data on voters from the national SOM surveys and cross-sectional data on municipal councilors from the 2017 KOLFU survey. Sample sizes and variable definitions appear in the notes to figure W1.

A more demanding test of substantive representation might require that the preferences of working-class politicians differ from those of other (non-worker) politicians in their party. This

would indicate that increasing the share of working-class politicians within a party shifts its platform to the left. This dynamic approach might not be true if the political system is in a “steady state” in which parties’ long-standing political platforms change slowly and different parties attract people from different social classes whose ideology mostly aligns with these pre-existing and slow-changing platforms. In this situation, dramatic disagreement by social class within political parties may not appear even if social classes were fundamental in platform development.

Table W1. Ideology and Economic Preferences Relative to the Working Class.

	Sample: Citizens			Sample: Elected Municipal Councilors		
	DV: Left–Right Ideology (SD)			DV: Reduce the Size of the Public Sector (SD)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reference=Workers						
Routine Non-Manual=1	0.09***	0.13***	0.03**	0.18***	0.13**	0.02
Lower-Grade Professionals=1	0.24***	0.26***	0.06***	0.24***	0.13***	0.02
Higher-Grade Professionals=1	0.25***	0.27***	0.06***	0.30***	0.16***	0.02
Self-employed=1	0.48***	0.48***	0.12***	0.40***	0.30***	0.02
Farmers=1	0.66***	0.63***	0.14***	0.81***	0.79***	-0.00
Observations	63,416	27,862	25,813	4,964	4,859	4,858
	DV: Left–Right Ideology (SD)			DV: Reduce the Size of the Public Sector (SD)		
Reference=Workers						
Routine Non-Manual=1	0.00	0.11***	0.04*	0.15***	0.14***	0.03
Lower-Grade Professionals=1	0.08***	0.14***	0.02	0.16***	0.10**	-0.00
Higher-Grade Professionals=1	0.12***	0.23***	0.08***	0.25***	0.14***	0.00
Self-employed=1	0.40***	0.40***	0.19***	0.32***	0.24***	-0.00
Farmers=1	0.46***	0.43***	0.17**	0.80***	0.71***	0.09
	34,311	15,039	14,109	6,214	6,081	6,080
F.E.s for Sex, Age, Education		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
F.E.s for Municipality and Year		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
F.E.s for Party			Yes			Yes

Note: Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results from regressing the dependent variables on dummy variables for each social class and the control variables listed in the bottom of the table. Pooled data on voters from the national SOM surveys and cross-sectional data on municipal councilors from the 2017 KOLFU survey. Sample sizes and variable definitions appear in the notes to figure W1.

We regress the ideology and preference variables on dummies for each social class from Figure W1 and leave out the working class to make it the reference. The coefficients reported in Table W1 exhibit positive differentials between workers and non-workers: non-workers are more rightist in their political ideology and more positive about reducing the size of the welfare state. Adding demographic control variables and municipality and time fixed effects does not change this pattern. Once we control for political party, however, all gaps between social classes disappear in the sample of politicians and decline to less than half their size in the sample of

voters. We conclude that class divides in Swedish politics are largely incorporated into the political party system, at least among politicians.

W2. External validity of local-to-national political careers

Our stylized career model assumes that political careers progress from the subnational to the national level. This section discusses the international relevance of this assumption. Table W2 presents a simple diagnostic from previous studies – the proportion of parliamentarians with experience in subnational elected office before entering parliament.

In most countries for which we were able to locate statistics, most parliamentarians have a background as an elected politician at the subnational level. Proportions are above two-thirds in the Nordic countries, Brazil and France, and around 50% in Spain, Italy, Mexico, and Germany.

Other relevant studies use alternative conceptions of career paths. For example, Durose et al. (2011) observe that the “traditional” career path to parliament in the UK goes from local party involvement and local elected office to national office. They also note that a different pathway via university and national political organizations has become more important over time. Korom (2022) produces a thick description of positions listed on Austrian parliamentarians’ CVs for cohorts starting in the mid-1940s to today for the two largest parties. About 20–25% of parliamentarians report experience as a mayor on their CV, 10% report experience in regional government, 15–25% in state parliaments, 30–40% in municipal councils, and 5–10% in city councils.

Another relevant observation from previous research is that the subnational level offers a separate career path that ends there. It is certainly true in the Swedish case that the position of mayor of a municipality is often more politically important than a backbench position in parliament. Local careers may be more insulated from the national level in federal systems, but this varies from country to country (Stolz 2003). Across six countries, the proportion of parliamentarians who previously held elected office at the regional level ranges from 6% in Canada to 68% in Switzerland. Although our paper focuses on explaining workers’ absence from parliament, our results also speak to workers’ likelihood of obtaining top positions in the local political hierarchy. This is especially true for the alternative definition of the career ladder that includes post-election appointments to positions in the local government, including the equivalent of Mayor (Appendix Figures W8 and W9).

Table W2. Proportion of Parliamentarians who Previously held Subnational Political Office.

Country	Elected body	Time	Proportion with prior subnational office	Variable	References	Data source (publicly available)
Italy	House and Senate	2013	42%	Previously elected to municipal, provincial, or regional office after 1987	Profeta and Woodhouse (2022), Baltrunaite et al. (2014)	Administrative data (No)
France	Parliament	2007,	88.4%	Elected to any subnational elected office before entering parliament	Rainbow Murray, book manuscript, title TBD.	French parliament's website, politicians' personal webpages, Wikipedia, and news reports
		2012	88.1%			
		2017	69%			
Mexico	Chamber of Deputies and Senate	1997–2018	53.42%	Elected to any local office (city councilor, mayor, state legislator or governor) before entering parliament	Kerevel (2015)	Biographical information reported by politicians to Legislative Information System (a)
Finland	Parliament	1999–2019	75%	Contemporaneously holding a municipal council seat and a parliamentary seat	von Schoultz (2019)	Electoral administrative data
Norway	Parliament		>80%	Elected as a local councilor, regional councilor, or mayor prior to entering parliament	Cirone et al. 2021	Parliamentarians' biographies (b)
Spain	Congress	2004–2008	0.44	Prior elected position in municipal government	Carozzi and Gago (2023)	Information from politicians' public profiles on the websites of the Senate/Congress, public information from Google and LinkedIn
Spain	Congress	2019–2022	0.43			
Spain	Senate	2019–2022	0.64			
Brazil	National congress	1996–2010	86%	Held a subnational elected position the election period before entry into parliament.	De Magalhães and Hirvonen (2015)	National Electoral Office
Germany	Parliament	1998–2014	39%	Held local executive position before entering parliament	Ohmura et al. (2018)	Biographies (No)
Germany	Parliament		3.4%	Held local legislative office before entering parliament		
Germany	Parliament		11.8%	Held land legislative office before entering parliament		

(a) <http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/portal>(b) <https://www.jon.fiva.no/data.htm>

Section W3. Data sources and variable creation

1. Attitudes and personality traits

1A. Public service motivation

We use the Perry score, which is based on a battery of questions about private vs. altruistic motives (Kim et al. 2012). The survey question asks: “How well do the following statements describe your views?” The response options are: (1) Disagree strongly, (2) Disagree a little, (3) Neither agree nor disagree, (4) Agree a little, (5) Agree strongly. The items are:

- I admire people who initiate or are involved in activities to aid my community.
- It is important to contribute to activities tackling social problems.
- Meaningful public service is very important to me.
- It is important for me to contribute to the common good.
- I think equal opportunities for citizens are very important.
- It is important that citizens can rely on the continuous provision of public services.
- It is fundamental that the interests of future generations are taken into account.
- To act ethically is essential for public servants.
- I feel sympathetic to the fight for the underprivileged.
- I empathize with other people who face difficulties.
- I get very upset when I see other people being treated unfairly.
- Considering the welfare of others is very important.
- I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society.
- I believe in putting civic duty before self.
- I am willing to risk personal loss in order to help society.
- I would agree to a good plan to make a better life for the poor, even if it costs me money.

1B. Honesty-humility

We use the HEXACO module of questions developed by social psychologists Lee and Ashton (2004) to construct an index for morality (the Honesty-Humility score). The survey question reads: “Below you will find a series of statements about you. Please read each statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Answer every one of them, even if you are not completely sure of your response.” Each response is graded on the following scale: (1) Disagree strongly, (2) Disagree a little, (3) Neither agree nor disagree, (4) Agree a little, (5) Agree strongly. Response items are:

- I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion, even if I thought it would succeed.
- If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
- Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
- I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
- If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes.
- I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.

- I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
- I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
- I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
- I'd be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.

1C. Hours worked

The survey question about hours worked asked the politician to approximate the number of hours spent on their “political engagement/job/position” in a “normal work week.” Because politicians hold different paid political appointments in the local government structure and these affect their workload in a mechanical manner, we measure hours worked conditional on their hours of paid political work. Statistics Sweden collects this information in a mandatory survey (*Förtroendemannundersökningen*). We link the two datasets via the anonymized personal ID codes and run a regression of self-reported hours worked on dummy variables for each value (i.e., fixed effects) of the variable measuring the number of paid hours per week. We take the residual from this regression to measure hours worked relative to the number of paid work hours. In the final step, we transform the residual into a z-score.

1D. Campaign work

To measure participation in campaign work we must consider the large differences across parties and municipalities in how much parties campaign. We therefore ask in the KOLFU survey: “About how many political campaigns among citizens has your party carried out in your municipality?” and “How many of these did you participate in?” Our measure of campaign work is the self-stated number of campaigns the individual participated in divided by the number of campaigns the party carried out. We then transform this fraction into a z-score.

2. Cognitive skills

2A. Cognitive score

Military enlistment was mandatory for men born in 1953–1979. The 2-day enlistment process included an evaluation of each individual’s cognitive abilities. Men generally enlisted in the year they graduated from high school. The cognitive evaluation was a written test assessing ability in problem solving, induction capacity, and numerical, verbal, spatial, and technology comprehension (Ståhlberg-Carlstedt and Sköld 1981). According to army expert Berit Carlstedt (2000), the Swedish enlistment test is a good measure of general intelligence. Others, such as the U.S. Armed Forces Qualification Test, focus more on “crystallized” intelligence, that is, teachable skills. We recalculate the cognitive test scores to a (stanine) scale such that a 5 is

reserved for the middle 20 percentiles of the test population, while 6, 7, and 8 are given to the next 17, 12, and 7 percentiles, and the top score of 9 to the uppermost 4 percentiles (scoring below 5 is symmetric).

2B. High school grades

Swedish high schools are required to submit all grades to the government reporting system. This data is available for cohorts graduating in 1973–2018. The 1973–1996 cohorts were graded on a scale of 1–5 in each subject. Since 1996, the grades have been Fail (U), Pass (G), Pass with distinction (VG), or Pass with special distinction (MVG). We standardize grades to z-scores by cohort and transform the standardized variable into a rank variable ranging from the 1st to the 100th percentile for easier interpretation.

2C. Earnings score

If ability is priced in the market, it shows up in earnings. Earnings may also reflect a number of other personal characteristics, however, such as education, choice of employment, or the time and place of employment. To obtain a measure of relative earning power that more likely reflects personal ability, we construct an earnings score following the approach of Besley et al. (2017). These authors use the residuals from a Mincer equation, defined over a large set of socio-economic characteristics. We estimate the Mincer equation year by year in the following form:

$$y_{i,t,m} = f(\text{age}_{i,t}, \text{edu}_{i,t}, \text{ind}_{i,t}, \text{sex}_i) + \alpha_{m,t,s} + \varepsilon_{i,m,t} \quad (\text{A1})$$

where the dependent variable $y_{i,t,m}$ is the annual earnings of person i in municipality m in year t . The independent variables are two sets of fixed effects. The first is a fixed effect for each possible combination of the variables $\text{age}_{i,t}$ (a set of binary indicators over 5-year intervals), $\text{edu}_{i,t}$ (a binary indicator for tertiary education), $\text{ind}_{i,t}$ (a set of 15 binary indicators for industry codes),¹ and sex_i (a binary indicator for sex at birth). The regression also includes municipality fixed effects by sex at birth, $\alpha_{m,t,s}$, to capture systematic earnings differences

¹ These are the same as the European NACE code and international ICIC code, namely: “agriculture, hunting and forestry,” “fishing,” “mining and quarrying,” “manufacturing,” “electricity, gas and water supply,” “construction,” “wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods,” “hotels and restaurants,” “transport, storage and communication,” “financial intermediation,” “real estate, renting and business activities,” “public administration and defense; compulsory social security,” “education,” “health and social work,” and “other community, social and personal service activities.” Two categories, “activities of households” and “extra-territorial organization and bodies,” have fewer than 30 individual-year observations. We therefore add the former to “other community, social and personal service activities,” and the latter to “public administration and defense; compulsory social security.”

across regions or urban vs. rural areas. This flexible specification allows for different age-earnings profiles across industry sectors and education levels. We run regression A1 for each year between 1970 and 2019. We predict the individual-level residuals from these regressions and standardize that variable within each year to a Z-score. We calculate each individual's average of these standardized residuals for all available years, standardize these averages into a new z-score and label this final variable the *Earnings Score*.

To minimize measurement error and endogeneity, we drop observations for full-time politicians, both while they are in office and after leaving office.

We rely on five sources of data. Between 1979 and 1974 we obtain industry codes from the nearest census year and from 1975 to 1989 we obtain them from the income and taxation database (IoT). Between 1970 and 1989 we obtain earnings data from the IoT register and education from the census data. Between 1990 and 2019 we get all three variables from *the longitudinal integrated database for health insurance and labour market studies* (LISA) database. Birth year and sex at birth always come from the population register. We obtain the municipality of residence from the census data between 1970 and 1978, from IoT between 1979 and 1989, and from the geography database between 1990 and 2019.

3. Inflexible Occupations

To measure traits of occupations, we use the Swedish Work Environment Survey, the Swedish government's biannual survey that provides statistics on physical and psychosocial work conditions and how they have changed over time. It contains 100+ questions about work environment traits, as well as a 4-digit occupation code. The data is stratified by age, sex at birth, occupation, industry, and social class, which ensures that it is representative of the employed Swedish population (shown by, e.g., Folke and Rickne 2022). The survey supplements the Labour Force Survey (AKU) and is administered to a representative sample of the Swedish labor force. Each wave has 7,000–15,000 respondents. These respondents are entirely anonymous, and Statistics Sweden does not inform employers that their workers have been sampled. Workers are thus unlikely to feel pressured to self-report a certain way, reducing the likelihood of social desirability bias in responses. Table W3 lists the questions used to measure inflexible work conditions and how we code our variables.

Table W3. Creation of Dummies for Inflexible Work Conditions.

Question	Response categories	Our coding
Do you generally have opportunities to set your own work times?	1=Yes, I have schedule flexibility (defined as schedule without pre-specified start or end times) 2= Yes, I have a relatively free schedule 3=No, I generally cannot affect my own work times	Dummy for schedule inflexibility 1=3 0=1 or 2 Available for 1995–2019
Do you have split work shifts, i.e., scheduled shifts with an unpaid break of several hours in the middle?	1=Yes 2=No	Dummy for split-shift work 1=1 2=0 Available for 2015–2019
What fraction of your regular work hours do you usually work from home?	1=All my time or the great majority of my time 2=3–4 days per week 3=1–2 days per week 4=A couple of hours per week 5=I do not work from home	Dummy for no work from home 1=5 0=1–4 Available for 1995–2019
What type of work hours do you usually have? Do you have....(mark only one answer)	1. Daytime work (between about 0600 and 1800) 2. Evening work (between about 1800 and 2200) 3. Nighttime work (between about 2200 and 0600) 4. Shift work, two shifts 5. Shift work, three shifts 6. Work according to varying schedule	Dummy for shift work 1=1 0=2–6 Available for 1991–2003

4. Alternative Measures of Social Class

4A. Class measured at age 37

The dummy for being a worker in the main analysis measures this status in each election year or as close as possible to that year. This alternative variable instead uses class measured as close as possible to the age of 37. We limit the sample to people for whom we can observe class between the ages of 35 and 40 and who were not full-time politicians at this age. For this sample, we use the class observation closest in age to 37, moving out from this value to each side (lower and higher values) within the 35–40 interval. The measurement’s theoretical foundation is the idea that a person’s occupational position in the labor market “matures” with age (Bihagen et al. 2022). Jobs held in one’s youth are worse approximations of social class than jobs held when an individual is in their late 30s.

4B. Most common class

For this variable we take all years between the ages of 18 and 65 for which we can observe an individual's class, excluding years in which they are employed full time as a politician. If an individual is classified as a worker (or non-worker) in more than half of these years, we define them as such. This alternative variable aims to correct for a potential situation in which occupations that a person holds while serving as a politician are unrepresentative of their labor market background.

4C. Low education

Swedish universities, colleges, and schools report education records to Statistics Sweden, which includes them in the LISA dataset. These statistics include an annual variable for each person's highest level of education. Information from immigrants is collected through surveys, and their education levels are categorized into a Swedish standard. We define someone as a worker if they have no tertiary education.

4D. Below-median income

We use a measure of annual earned income, constructed from individual tax records (there is no joint family taxation) including all earned income sources from wages and business ownership. Between 1968 and 1989 we obtain this data from the IoT data base and from the LISA database between 1990 and 2019. In each election year we take the full adult population (i.e., those aged 18–65) and define those that have an annual earned income below the median as a worker. We exclude those who have reached retirement age from this analysis.

4E. ISCO-based measurement

Following Carnes and Lupu (2023c) we code ISCO 08 categories as follows. We count as working-class jobs 1-digit ISCO categories 4 (clerical support workers), 5 (service and sales workers), 7 (craft and related trades workers), 8 (plant and machine operators and assemblers), and 9 (elementary occupations). Carnes and Lupu count some unspecified sub-categories of category 6 (skilled farm workers) as workers. We select the following sub-categories: 9210 (agricultural laborers), 611 (Market gardeners and crop growers), and 614 (forestry and related workers). We cannot link the Swedish occupation code to the ISCO code before 1985, which limits the time span that we can study with this alternative definition.

5. Survey Datasets

5A. *Swedish national election studies*

We do not use the raw data from the Swedish nation election studies, but instead rely on the aggregate statistics provided by Hedberg (2020). He defines the class variable based on self-reported occupation in all years except 2018, when self-reported class is used. While we do not have access to the exact coding scheme, the groupings identified in the text as underpinning the working-class definition are identical to the 7-category EGP classification used in our main analysis.²

5B. *National Society, Opinion and Media survey (SOM)*³

These annual population surveys are carried out by the SOM Institute in the University of Gothenburg's Department of Government. The sample for the national survey is a **random selection** of people aged 16–85 listed as living in Sweden drawn from the national tax agency register. Selected individuals receive information about the survey, as well as the survey itself, by standard mail to their home. Reminders are sent by mail and sometimes by text message. The survey can be completed on paper or online by logging onto a digital platform using a code provided with the survey.

The net response rate for the national SOM surveys is usually around 50%. Given that respondents do not self-select into the survey and occasionally cannot even be reached at their official addresses, the 50% response rate is high from an international perspective.

The national SOM survey is mainly financed by means of collaboration. Researchers from all across the country, as well as public organizations and Swedish authorities, collaborate to include research questions in addition to the SOM Institute's own. This process optimizes the data collection process without burdening the Swedish population with many different surveys.

The SOM survey contains occupation codes according to the classification scheme used by the official government statistics, which allows us to apply the same classification of EGP categories. It also contains a categorization of self-reported social class. This question asks the person to mark the option that best fits their “previous or current occupation type” and has the following options:

² For more information about the surveys, see: <https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/democracy/general-elections/referenda-election-study/produktrelaterat/more-information/facts-about-the-election-study/>.

³ This subsection reports information from <https://www.gu.se/en/som-institute/the-som-surveys/method>. For more details, see Falk et al. (2021).

1. White-collar worker
2. White-collar worker with personnel responsibilities
3. White-collar worker with company management responsibilities
4. Blue-collar worker
5. Blue-collar worker with personnel responsibilities
6. Self-employed
7. Farmer with no employees
8. Farmer with one or more employees
9. Business owner with no employees
10. Business owner with 1–9 employees
11. Business owner with 10 or employees
12. Never worked

5C. The Regional SOM survey in Western Sweden⁴

This annual survey is sent to a random sample of the population living in Western Sweden. It is carried out by the SOM Institute together with the regional authority of Västra Götaland. The method is largely the same as for the national SOM survey: a postal survey is sent to respondents with information on how to respond by mail or online. The age range is slightly wider than the national SOM survey, 16–90. Social class is measured as in the national SOM survey (5A).

5D. The Swedish local and regional council survey 2012 (KOLFU)

Gothenburg University sent this survey to all municipal and regional councilors in 2012 (Karlsson and Gilljam 2014). The response rate was 80%. We drop regional politicians and politicians from parties not represented in parliament. Social class was self-reported in response to the question “Apart from your political appointment, what is your main occupation?” with the following options:

1. White-collar worker
2. White-collar worker with personnel responsibilities
3. White-collar worker with company management responsibilities
4. Blue-collar worker
5. Blue-collar worker with personnel responsibilities
6. Farmer with no employees
7. Farmer with one or more employees
8. Business owner with no employees
9. Business owner with 1–9 employees
10. Business owner with 10 or employees
11. Home maker
12. Retiree
13. Retiree with disability insurance
14. Student

⁴ Methodological details (in Swedish) in report 2023:5 of the SOM-institute (Den västsvenska SOM-undersökningen 2022 - En metodöversikt).

15. Unemployed

Retirement is a separate category, which prevents us from including retired people in the analysis. We also exclude those who answered stay-at-home spouse, early retirement, unemployed, or “other.” About one-fourth (24%) of elected local councilors in the remaining sample define themselves as working class (categories 4 and 5).

5E. The Swedish local and regional council survey (KOLFU 2017)

Gothenburg university conducted this survey using the same method as KOLFU 2012; they obtained a response rate of 67%. We link this wave of the survey to the administrative data using scrambled personal ID codes, which allows us to use the exact same definition of social class as in the paper’s main analysis.

5F. The Swedish work environment survey (AMU)

See Section W3.3 below.

5G. The Swedish labor force survey (AKU)

Statistics Sweden administers the monthly Swedish workforce survey (AKU) to a representative sample of the population aged 15–74. This is the official survey used to collect information about the development of the country’s labor market, for example to calculate the official unemployment rate. It typically has 10,000–15,000 respondents each month.

6. Occupational Task Similarity with Legislators

The Occupational Information Network (O*NET) database contains occupation-specific descriptors, including occupations’ tasks. The database is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment & Training Administration. It is updated annually based on data collected by the non-profit organization RTI International from a broad range of workers in each occupation.

The list of 30 tasks for the occupation “Legislators” is shown below (accessed on February 12, 2024, from <https://www.onetonline.org/link/details/11-1031.00>). We use “The Related Task Search” at O*NET OnLine to obtain a numerical measurement for how similar other occupations’ tasks are to this benchmark. This tool is meant to facilitate occupation switches for workers who wonder which new job might fit the skills they have developed on their current job. The tool allows a customer to select one or more occupation-specific tasks for this calculation of task-similarity. For more information about the methodology behind the Related

Task Search, see Morris (2015) and the links therein. Because the tasks lack importance scores, we chose all 30 tasks for our search. The search returns a quantitative score for the number of related tasks. We link the O*NET variables to the Swedish occupation codes via cross walks (from the SOC to the ISCO scheme, and from ISCO to the Swedish SSK scheme).

- Analyze and understand the local and national implications of proposed legislation.
- Appoint nominees to leadership posts, or approve such appointments.
- Confer with colleagues to formulate positions and strategies pertaining to pending issues.
- Debate the merits of proposals and bill amendments during floor sessions, following the appropriate rules of procedure.
- Develop expertise in subject matters related to committee assignments.
- Hear testimony from constituents, representatives of interest groups, board and commission members, and others with an interest in bills or issues under consideration.
- Keep abreast of the issues affecting constituents by making personal visits and phone calls, reading local newspapers, and viewing or listening to local broadcasts.
- Maintain knowledge of relevant national and international current events.
- Make decisions that balance the perspectives of private citizens, public officials, and party leaders.
- Negotiate with colleagues or members of other political parties in order to reconcile differing interests, and to create policies and agreements.
- Prepare drafts of amendments, government policies, laws, rules, regulations, budgets, programs and procedures.
- Read and review concerns of constituents or the general public and determine if governmental action is necessary.
- Represent their parties in negotiations with political executives or members of other parties, and when speaking with the media.
- Review bills in committee, and make recommendations about their future.
- Seek federal funding for local projects and programs.
- Serve on commissions, investigative panels, study groups, and committees in order to examine specialized areas and recommend action.
- Vote on motions, amendments, and decisions on whether or not to report a bill out from committee to the assembly floor.
- Write, prepare, and deliver statements for the Congressional Record.
- Alert constituents of government actions and programs by way of newsletters, personal appearances at town meetings, phone calls, and individual meetings.
- Attend receptions, dinners, and conferences to meet people, exchange views and information, and develop working relationships.
- Conduct "head counts" to help predict the outcome of upcoming votes.
- Determine campaign strategies for media advertising, positions on issues, and public appearances.
- Encourage and support party candidates for political office.
- Establish personal offices in local districts or states, and manage office staff.
- Evaluate the structure, efficiency, activities, and performance of government agencies.
- Organize and maintain campaign organizations and fundraisers, in order to raise money for election or re-election.
- Oversee expense allowances, ensuring that accounts are balanced at the end of each fiscal year.
- Promote the industries and products of their electoral districts.
- Represent their government at local, national, and international meetings and conferences.
- Speak to students to encourage and support the development of future political leaders.

7. Organizational Ties to Blue-Collar Labor Unions

We obtain our dummy variable for union ties by combining itemized data from tax records with survey data on union membership. We use the industry code to identify all payments from labor unions (blue- or white collar) in tax records for all payments above 10 USD in each calendar year (1985–2019). We then identify blue-collar unions by matching the (anonymized) individual ID-code for these pay recipients to survey data on union membership (the Swedish Labor Force Survey). We define an employing organization as a blue-collar union if at least 80% of its pay recipients self-report blue-collar union membership (and conditional on $N > 10$ in the survey data for that specific organization). We further subdivide organizational ties into two groups. We define those whose annual earnings from the labor union amount to more than 3.5 Price Base Amounts are counted as labor union employees. Smaller amounts are counted as union representatives.

Tables and Figures

Table W4. Proportion of People who Self-define as Working Class across EGP Categories.

EGP Code		% Self-defined workers
11	Unskilled manual workers	74
21	Skilled manual workers	82
36	Routine non-manual workers	36
46	Lower grade professionals	22
56	Higher grade professionals	15
79	Self-employed	15
89	Farmers	18

Note: The table reports the proportion of respondents who self-report as working class in 16 pooled yearly cross-sections of the Society, Opinion, and Media (SOM) survey, collected and kept by the University of Gothenburg (<https://www.gu.se/som-institutet>) (N=61,221).

Table W5. Share of Workers among Parties' Voters.

	Social Democrats	Left Party	Green Party	Center Party	Liberal Party	Christian Democrats	Conservative Party	Sweden Democrats
1970	0.74	0.70		0.48	0.33	0.58	0.17	
1973	0.76	0.81		0.41	0.32	0.58	0.17	
1976	0.72	0.64		0.46	0.30	0.65	0.18	
1979	0.74	0.50		0.45	0.37	0.36	0.22	
1982	0.70	0.49	0.26	0.42	0.28	0.42	0.25	
1985	0.70	0.50	0.33	0.45	0.34	0.27	0.28	
1988	0.68	0.47	0.43	0.46	0.29	0.41	0.22	
1991	0.65	0.47	0.40	0.51	0.24	0.43	0.32	
1994	0.64	0.60	0.41	0.44	0.21	0.41	0.25	
2002	0.60	0.54	0.38	0.48	0.27	0.34	0.25	
2006	0.64	0.49	0.35	0.39	0.34	0.37	0.28	0.81
2010	0.63	0.42	0.29	0.41	0.28	0.38	0.36	0.74
2014	0.58	0.44	0.23	0.35	0.17	0.21	0.40	0.70
2018	0.59	0.56	0.40	0.41	0.31	0.46	0.33	0.68
Average	0.67	0.54	0.35	0.44	0.29	0.42	0.26	0.73

Note: Shares of workers among each party's voters in each election are reported by Hedberg (2020) using data from the Swedish National Election Survey. This data contains our definition of workers from the EGP class scheme, to which we add students as non-workers. We combine the survey data with administrative data on the share of workers in the population in an election year to impute the expected share of the party's voters who are workers. The share of workers among the voters of party p in election t is given by $W_{ptm} = (V_{pt}^W * Pop_t^W) / (V_{pt}^W * Pop_t^W + V_{pt}^{NW} * Pop_t^{NW})$, where V_{pt}^W and V_{pt}^{NW} are national-level vote shares among workers and non-workers, and Pop_t^W and Pop_t^{NW} are population shares.

Table W6. Difference in Preference Votes between Workers and Non-workers.

DV: Residualized preference votes in standard deviations	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Sample: Nominated local politicians		Sample: Elected local councilors	
Worker = 1	-0.029*** (0.003)	-0.046*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.041*** (0.014)
Dummies for categories of age, and global region of birth, as well as for sex at birth, and being a student in tertiary education		x		x
Observations	178,979	178,979	57,342	57,342
R-squared	0.398	0.405	0.413	0.427

Note: Preference votes are measured as standardized residuals from a regression of the politician's number of preference votes on dummies for each list rank. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table W7. Validation of Competence Variables from Administrative Data.

	DV: Promotion from Nominated to Elected=1 (1)	DV: Promotion from Elected to Local Party Leader=1 (2)	DV: Promotion from Municipal Councilor to Parliamentarian=1 (3)
Seniority (# of previous terms in the local council)		0.115*** (0.010)	0.365*** (0.027)
Observations	115,885	47,339	55,098
Grades (SD)	0.186*** (0.019)	0.120*** (0.046)	0.575*** (0.153)
Observations	34,414	10,807	12,845
Cognitive Score (SD)	0.282*** (0.024)	0.127* (0.068)	0.457** (0.207)
Observations	22,947	6,178	7,578
Earnings Score (SD)	0.313*** (0.011)	0.213*** (0.020)	0.364*** (0.057)
F.E.s for party-muni- year	x	x	x
F.E.s for socio-demographic traits	x	x	x
Observations	115,499	47,169	54,914

Note: The table reports the relationship between promotion probabilities and our qualification measures across adjacent rungs of the political career ladder. Ordinary least squares estimates in percentage points are rescaled by the mean of the outcome variable so that 0.5 in the table equals a 50% higher promotion probability from a 1 unit increase in the qualification measure. Fixed effects for socio-demographic traits are dummies for five categories of age, two categories of global region of birth, one dummy variable for female sex at birth, and one dummy for being a full-time student in tertiary education. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table W8A. Gaps in Promotion Probabilities from Population to Nominated between Workers and Non-workers, with Control Variables.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Worker = 1	-0.543*** (0.005)		-0.563*** (0.005)	-0.414*** (0.009)	-0.380*** (0.010)	-0.647*** (0.014)	-0.510*** (0.015)
Earnings Score			-0.027*** (0.003)		-0.137*** (0.006)		-0.275*** (0.011)
Grades					0.113*** (0.004)		
Cognitive Score							0.138*** (0.004)
Student	-0.124*** (0.013)		-0.086*** (0.014)	-0.014 (0.016)	-0.033* (0.017)	0.206*** (0.046)	0.087* (0.047)
Age below 30	0.252*** (0.018)		0.253*** (0.018)	-0.237** (0.096)	-0.239** (0.096)	-0.099 (0.086)	-0.045 (0.087)
Age 30-39	0.419*** (0.018)		0.419*** (0.018)	-0.099 (0.096)	-0.090 (0.096)	0.251*** (0.084)	0.295*** (0.084)
Age 40-49	0.478*** (0.018)		0.477*** (0.018)	-0.163* (0.096)	-0.149 (0.096)	0.165** (0.083)	0.198** (0.083)
Age 50-64	0.197*** (0.018)		0.197*** (0.018)	-0.278*** (0.096)	-0.263*** (0.096)	0.008 (0.083)	0.026 (0.083)
Age Above 60	-0.312*** (0.017)		-0.276*** (0.018)	-0.254** (0.116)	-0.315*** (0.116)	0.138 (0.096)	0.129 (0.096)
Woman	-0.202*** (0.005)		-0.213*** (0.005)	-0.204*** (0.008)	-0.238*** (0.008)	0.571*** (0.155)	0.550*** (0.155)
Non-Nordic	-0.032*** (0.009)		-0.013 (0.010)	0.187*** (0.030)	0.222*** (0.030)	0.322*** (0.068)	0.394*** (0.068)
Non-OECD	0.127*** (0.014)		0.152*** (0.015)	0.043 (0.038)	0.050 (0.039)	0.028 (0.094)	0.094 (0.094)
Observations	44,630,774		43,178,534	17,045,663	16,812,712	8,159,313	8,143,817
F.E.s for party-muni- year	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Grade Sample				x	x		
Cognitive Score Sample					x	x	

Note: The table reproduces the results for Table 1, but includes the full set of control variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table W8B. Gaps in Promotion Probabilities from Nominated to Elected as Councilor between Workers and Non-workers, with Control Variables.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Worker = 1	-0.393*** (0.020)		-0.342*** (0.021)	-0.322*** (0.041)	-0.223*** (0.041)	-0.426*** (0.047)	-0.288*** (0.047)
Earnings Score			0.333*** (0.012)		0.407*** (0.024)		0.355*** (0.030)
Grades					0.130*** (0.020)		
Cognitive Score							0.131*** (0.013)
Student	-0.449*** (0.053)		-0.310*** (0.054)	-0.441*** (0.068)	-0.305*** (0.068)	-0.433*** (0.120)	-0.346*** (0.120)
Age below 30	0.709*** (0.063)		0.675*** (0.063)	0.329 (0.501)	0.175 (0.518)	0.737 (0.524)	0.780* (0.473)
Age 30-39	0.808*** (0.059)		0.810*** (0.059)	0.437 (0.501)	0.337 (0.517)	0.680 (0.519)	0.741 (0.468)
Age 40-49	0.783*** (0.058)		0.801*** (0.058)	0.380 (0.500)	0.311 (0.517)	0.694 (0.518)	0.755 (0.466)
Age 50-64	0.381*** (0.057)		0.403*** (0.057)	0.222 (0.501)	0.158 (0.517)	0.443 (0.516)	0.497 (0.464)
Age Above 60	-0.412*** (0.057)		-0.422*** (0.057)	-0.517 (0.562)	-0.560 (0.576)		
Woman	0.196*** (0.019)		0.193*** (0.019)	0.209*** (0.038)	0.155*** (0.038)	0.617 (0.454)	0.516 (0.460)
Non-Nordic	-0.129** (0.054)		-0.039 (0.054)	0.023 (0.150)	0.097 (0.150)	0.336 (0.271)	0.508* (0.275)
Non-OECD	-0.111 (0.082)		-0.016 (0.082)	-0.287 (0.204)	-0.190 (0.205)	-0.775** (0.385)	-0.552 (0.388)
Observations	131,679		131,283	39,593	39,437	27,896	27,861
F.E.s for party- muni- year	x	x	x	X	x	x	x
F.E.s for Seniority		x	x	X	x	x	x
Grade Sample				X	x		
Cognitive Score Sample					x	x	

Note: The table reproduces the results for Table 1, but includes the full set of control variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table W8C. Gaps in Promotion Probabilities from Elected as Councilor to Local Party Leader between Workers and Non-workers, with Control Variables.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Worker = 1	-0.355*** (0.032)	-0.329*** (0.031)	-0.305*** (0.031)	-0.524*** (0.088)	-0.478*** (0.088)	-0.516*** (0.116)	-0.459*** (0.117)
Earnings Score			0.199*** (0.021)		0.296*** (0.061)		0.261*** (0.093)
Grades					0.078* (0.042)		
Cognitive Score							0.061* (0.033)
Student	-0.341*** (0.099)	-0.290*** (0.099)	-0.241** (0.098)	-0.264 (0.162)	-0.196 (0.164)	-1.150*** (0.360)	-0.925*** (0.350)
Age below 30	0.620*** (0.096)	0.905*** (0.098)	0.882*** (0.099)	1.177 (0.944)	1.138 (0.933)	1.395** (0.625)	1.487** (0.637)
Age 30-39	0.904*** (0.089)	1.125*** (0.091)	1.121*** (0.092)	1.525 (0.932)	1.518* (0.920)	1.219** (0.580)	1.305** (0.592)
Age 40-49	0.777*** (0.083)	0.930*** (0.084)	0.942*** (0.084)	1.338 (0.928)	1.354 (0.916)	0.910 (0.571)	1.001* (0.583)
Age 50-64	0.425*** (0.079)	0.488*** (0.079)	0.500*** (0.080)	0.785 (0.928)	0.807 (0.916)	0.466 (0.556)	0.551 (0.567)
Age Above 60	-0.174** (0.082)	-0.174** (0.083)	-0.181** (0.083)	-0.063 (1.023)	-0.058 (1.011)		
Woman	-0.232*** (0.028)	-0.201*** (0.028)	-0.208*** (0.028)	-0.240*** (0.076)	-0.281*** (0.077)	0.677 (0.843)	0.683 (0.840)
Non-Nordic	-0.127 (0.092)	-0.090 (0.092)	-0.048 (0.092)	0.124 (0.278)	0.216 (0.281)	0.173 (0.490)	0.318 (0.502)
Non-OECD	-0.418*** (0.117)	-0.385*** (0.116)	-0.331*** (0.117)	-0.502 (0.347)	-0.444 (0.348)	-0.212 (0.838)	-0.129 (0.861)
Observations	53,464	53,464	53,308	12,887	12,840	7,971	7,954
F.E.s for party- muni- year	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
F.E.s for Seniority		x	x	x	x	x	x
Grade Sample				x	x		
Cognitive Score Sample					x	x	

Note: The table reproduces the results for Table 1, but includes the full set of control variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table W8D. Gaps in Promotion Probabilities from Elected as Councilor to Parliamentarian Leader between Workers and Non-workers, with Control Variables.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Worker = 1	-0.689*** (0.094)	-0.587*** (0.093)	-0.555*** (0.092)	-1.148*** (0.283)	-1.031*** (0.282)	-1.137*** (0.372)	-1.044*** (0.370)
Earnings Score			0.292*** (0.073)		0.223 (0.261)		0.190 (0.362)
Grades					0.446*** (0.156)		
Cognitive Score							0.141 (0.112)
Student	-0.610 (0.498)	-0.409 (0.496)	-0.303 (0.494)	-0.338 (0.800)	-0.232 (0.789)	1.310 (2.479)	1.739 (2.467)
Age below 30	2.127*** (0.327)	3.079*** (0.346)	2.981*** (0.341)	4.743** (2.374)	4.953** (2.347)	4.183*** (1.306)	4.380*** (1.350)
Age 30-39	1.788*** (0.204)	2.495*** (0.225)	2.455*** (0.222)	3.676 (2.352)	3.996* (2.328)	2.578*** (0.704)	2.785*** (0.747)
Age 40-49	1.558*** (0.171)	2.022*** (0.189)	2.004*** (0.186)	3.191 (2.347)	3.524 (2.322)	2.093*** (0.589)	2.296*** (0.606)
Age 50-64	0.572*** (0.138)	0.748*** (0.142)	0.730*** (0.138)	2.523 (2.321)	2.873 (2.295)	0.040 (0.481)	0.251 (0.508)
Age Above 60	-0.147 (0.139)	-0.131 (0.139)	-0.189 (0.135)	1.674 (2.275)	1.773 (2.256)		
Woman	0.059 (0.102)	0.175* (0.102)	0.161 (0.102)	0.115 (0.296)	-0.032 (0.296)	1.387 (2.959)	1.378 (2.955)
Non-Nordic	0.005 (0.441)	0.142 (0.439)	0.200 (0.441)	1.113 (1.744)	1.379 (1.739)	5.837 (3.549)	6.105* (3.555)
Non-OECD	0.101 (0.735)	0.233 (0.734)	0.172 (0.730)	0.540 (2.416)	0.099 (2.412)	-3.742 (4.973)	-3.587 (5.007)
Observations	62,762	62,762	62,586	15,625	15,569	10,035	10,010
F.E.s for party- muni- year	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
F.E.s for Seniority		x	x	x	x	x	x
Grade Sample				x	x		
Cognitive Score Sample					x	x	

Note: The table reproduces the results for Table 1, but includes the full set of control variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table W9. Sensitivity Analysis for Occupation Inflexibility.

	(1)	(2)
DV: Entry from Population to Nominated = 1		
Worker=1	-0.475*** (0.006)	-0.479*** (0.009)
Occupation Inflexibility (SD)		0.003 (0.005)
Observations	24,333,371	24,333,371
DV: Promotion from Nominated to Elected=1		
Worker=1	-0.370*** (0.030)	-0.241*** (0.042)
Occupation Inflexibility (SD)		-0.080*** (0.020)
Observations	55,004	55,004
DV: Promotion from Elected to Local Party Leader = 1		
Worker=1	-0.275*** (0.051)	-0.165** (0.075)
Occupation Inflexibility (SD)		-0.065* (0.034)
Observations	22,500	22,500
DV: Promotion from Municipal Councilor to Parliamentarian = 1		
Worker=1	-0.602*** (0.157)	-0.462* (0.246)
Occupation Inflexibility (SD)		-0.082 (0.121)
Observations	26,177	26,177
Sample with non-missing data for occupation	x	x
F.E.s for party-municipality-year	x	x
F.E.s for socio-demographic traits	x	x

Note: Data for elections in 1982–2018. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See the note under Table 1 for more details.

Table W10. Promotions into Political Positions from the Full Population.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DV: Promotion from Full Population to Elected=1						
Worker = 1	-0.714*** (0.009)	-0.701*** (0.010)	-0.632*** (0.017)	-0.555*** (0.018)	-0.932*** (0.026)	-0.670*** (0.027)
Observations	43,919,214	42,481,021	17,060,323	16,827,351	8,159,713	8,144,375
DV: Promotion from Full Population to Local Party Leader = 1						
Worker = 1	-0.937*** (0.028)	-0.886*** (0.028)	-0.965*** (0.051)	-0.831*** (0.051)	-1.612*** (0.091)	-1.117*** (0.093)
Observations	43,972,371	42,534,027	17,074,806	16,841,803	8,170,243	8,154,882
DV: Promotion from Full Population to Parliamentarian = 1						
Worker = 1	-0.940*** (0.045)	-0.869*** (0.045)	-1.237*** (0.090)	-0.991*** (0.085)	-1.344*** (0.129)	-0.950*** (0.128)
Observations	43,973,529	42,535,266	17,075,231	16,842,230	8,170,779	8,155,414
F.E.s for party- muni- year	X	x	x	x	x	x
F.E.s for socio- demographic traits	X	x	x	x	x	x
Earnings Score		x		x		x
Grade Sample			x	x		
Grades				x		
Cognitive Score Sample					x	x
Cognitive Score						x

Note: Data for elections in 1982–2018. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See the notes under Table 1 for more details.

Table W11. Political Promotions in National Politics.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DV: Entry from Population to Nominated as Parliamentarian= 1						
Worker = 1	-0.786*** (0.011)	-0.799*** (0.011)	-0.783*** (0.021)	-0.677*** (0.021)	-0.942*** (0.029)	-0.686*** (0.031)
Observations	43,958,316	42,520,102	17,068,814	16,835,839	8,166,941	8,151,583
DV: Promotion from Nominated as Parliamentarian to Elected as Parliamentarian=1						
Worker = 1	-0.483*** (0.087)	-0.396*** (0.088)	-0.499*** (0.142)	-0.412*** (0.144)	-0.319 (0.197)	-0.284 (0.200)
Observations	20,304	20,217	10,413	10,413	5,472	5,472
F.E.s for party-muni-year	x	x	x	x	x	x
F.E.s for socio-demographic traits	x	x	x	x	x	x
Earnings Score		x		x		x
Grade Sample			x	x		

Table W12. Gap in Re-nomination between Workers and Non-workers.

Sample: DV:	Nominated or Elected in t		Elected in t	
	Renominated in t+1=1	Renominated in t+1=1	Renominated in t+1=1	Renominated in t+1=1
	(1)	(2)	(5)	(6)
Worker=1	-0.042*** (0.004)	-0.023*** (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)
F.E.s for party-muni-year	x	x	x	x
F.E.s for socio-demographic traits	x	x	x	x
Observations	192,063	192,063	63,457	63,457

Notes: Data for elections in 1982–2018. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See the notes under Table 1 for more details.

Table W13. Replication of Table 1 for an ISCO-based Definition of the Working-Class.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DV: Entry from Population to Nominated = 1							
Worker = 1	-0.589*** (0.006)		-0.611*** (0.006)	-0.407*** (0.009)	-0.383*** (0.010)	-0.531*** (0.014)	-0.396*** (0.015)
Observations	37,592,124		37,328,092	15,396,301	15,347,735	7,841,513	7,831,028
DV: Promotion from Nominated to Elected=1							
Worker = 1	-0.392*** (0.022)		-0.308*** (0.022)	-0.208*** (0.040)	-0.156*** (0.041)	-0.360*** (0.048)	-0.246*** (0.049)
Observations	83,975		83,876	32,642	32,642	22,625	22,625
DV: Promotion from Elected to Local Party Leader = 1							
Worker = 1	-0.297*** (0.041)	-0.280*** (0.041)	-0.239*** (0.041)	-0.455*** (0.091)	-0.438*** (0.092)	-0.285** (0.128)	-0.258** (0.129)
Observations	34,381	34,381	34,339	11,963	11,963	7,309	7,309
DV: Promotion from Municipal Councilor to Parliamentarian = 1							
Worker = 1	-0.854*** (0.117)	-0.780*** (0.117)	-0.730*** (0.118)	-1.212*** (0.285)	-1.092*** (0.288)	-1.006*** (0.347)	-0.977*** (0.352)
Observations	40,403	40,403	40,355	14,517	14,517	9,229	9,229
F.E.s for party-muni- year	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
F.E.s for socio-demographic traits	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Seniority		x	x	x	x	x	x
Earnings Score			x		x		x
Grade Sample				x	x		
Grades					x		
Cognitive Score Sample						x	x
Cognitive Score							x

Note: The table replicates Table 1 using the ISCO-based definition of the Working-class from, e.g., Carnes et al. (2023c). Data for elections in 1982–2018. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table W14. Sensitivity Analysis for Tertiary Education.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
DV: Entry from Population to Nominated = 1			
Worker=1	-0.554*** (0.005)	-0.256*** (0.006)	-0.377*** (0.006)
Observations	43,524,005	43,524,005	30,623,300
DV: Promotion from Nominated to Elected=1			
Worker=1	-0.393*** (0.021)	-0.256*** (0.022)	-0.288*** (0.025)
Observations	130,986	130,986	83,047
DV: Promotion from Elected to Local Party Leader = 1			
Worker=1	-0.330*** (0.032)	-0.245*** (0.034)	-0.275*** (0.036)
Observations	53,347	53,347	31,080
Municipal Councilor to Parliament			
Worker=1	-0.589*** (0.093)	-0.495*** (0.098)	-0.463*** (0.106)
Observations	62,607	62,607	36,374
Sample with non-missing data for education	x	x	x
F.E.s for party-municipality-year	x	x	x
F.E.s for socio-demographic traits	x	x	x
Education-level fixed effects		x	
Sample without university education			x

Notes: Data for elections in 1982–2018. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See the notes under Table 1 for more details.

Table W15. Replication of Table 1 with Controls for Occupational Task Similarity with Legislators.

	(1)	(2)
DV: Entry from Population to Nominated = 1		
Worker=1	-0.545*** (0.005)	-0.515*** (0.005)
Occupational Task Similarity		0.025*** (0.002)
Observations	43,720,989	43,720,989
DV: Promotion from Nominated to Elected=1		
Worker=1	-0.358*** (0.027)	-0.304*** (0.030)
Occupational Task Similarity		0.027*** (0.007)
Observations	70,474	70,474
DV: Promotion from Elected to Local Party Leader = 1		
Worker=1	-0.318*** (0.046)	-0.318*** (0.053)
Occupational Task Similarity		-0.000 (0.012)
Observations	28,618	28,618
DV: Promotion from Municipal Councilor to Parliamentarian = 1		
Worker=1	-0.716*** (0.135)	-0.769*** (0.161)
Occupational Task Similarity		-0.024 (0.041)
Observations	33,605	33,605
Sample with non-missing data for occupation	x	x
F.E.s for party-municipality-year	x	x
F.E.s for socio-demographic traits	x	x

Notes: Data for elections in 1982–2018. See the notes under Table 1 for more details. See Appendix Section W2.6 for measurement details for occupational task similarity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table W16. Comparison of Different Union-related Groups and the Full Population.

	Population	Union Representative	Union Employee	Labor Union Member	Not Labor Union Member
Working-class	0.45	0.75	0.17	0.81	0.27
Below Tertiary Education	0.65	0.85	0.81	0.88	0.47
Student	0.06	0.01	0	0.01	0.03
Age					
< 30	0.19	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.12
30—39	0.17	0.15	0.1	0.16	0.19
40—49	0.18	0.26	0.21	0.25	0.22
50—64	0.24	0.36	0.39	0.35	0.29
> 64	0.21	0.17	0.27	0.17	0.16
Woman	0.51	0.43	0.54	0.48	0.53
Global Birth Region					
Non-Nordic	0.11	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.08
Non-European	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04
Observations	30,391,457	1,833,121	54,807	951,764	1,694,734

Note: Data for the adult Swedish population consists of pooled cross-sections in 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018. Payments from labor unions can be measured back to 1985. "Union Representative" is defined as someone who has previously received a payment of 10 USD or more from a blue-collar labor union, but is not defined as a union Employee. "Union Employee" is defined as someone who in a previous year received their main source of income from a labor union and where this total income exceeded 3.5 Price Base Amounts. "Labor Union Member" is defined as someone who was a member of a labor union the last time they responded to the Labor Force Survey, and "Not Labor Union Member" is someone who was *not* a member of a labor union the last time they responded to the Labor Force Survey.

Table W17. Gaps in Promotion Probabilities by Politicians' Organizational Ties to Labor Unions, with Control Variable Estimates.

	Population to Nominated		Nominated to Municipal councilor		Municipal Councilor to Local Party Leader		Municipal Councilor to Parliamentarian	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Worker without union tie = 1	-0.717*** (0.013)	-0.556*** (0.006)	-0.492*** (0.049)	-0.384*** (0.037)	-0.260*** (0.075)	-0.391*** (0.099)	-0.563** (0.221)	-1.029*** (0.282)
Worker with union tie = 1	4.130*** (0.029)	-0.478*** (0.015)	-0.050 (0.040)	-0.278*** (0.081)	-0.209*** (0.061)	-0.583** (0.250)	-0.495*** (0.183)	-1.575** (0.720)
Earnings Score	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.099*** (0.004)	0.459*** (0.026)	0.282*** (0.018)	0.218*** (0.042)	0.205*** (0.048)	0.597*** (0.123)	0.049 (0.136)
Student	-0.272*** (0.031)	-0.179*** (0.016)	-0.268** (0.111)	-0.352*** (0.088)	-0.356 (0.222)	-0.119 (0.276)	-1.758*** (0.638)	0.037 (0.789)
Age bel. 30	0.697*** (0.048)	0.176*** (0.025)	0.860*** (0.131)	0.409*** (0.108)	0.848*** (0.191)	0.964*** (0.258)	3.010*** (0.566)	3.755*** (0.746)
Age 30-39	0.654*** (0.048)	0.197*** (0.024)	0.865*** (0.122)	0.630*** (0.102)	1.192*** (0.162)	1.456*** (0.227)	2.365*** (0.482)	3.366*** (0.657)
Age 40-49	0.583*** (0.048)	0.191*** (0.024)	0.739*** (0.119)	0.649*** (0.099)	0.817*** (0.153)	1.295*** (0.218)	1.897*** (0.458)	2.728*** (0.630)
Age 50-64	0.265*** (0.047)	0.055** (0.024)	0.371*** (0.117)	0.328*** (0.098)	0.363** (0.147)	0.638*** (0.210)	0.598 (0.439)	0.820 (0.608)
Age Ab. 60	-0.311*** (0.047)	-0.260*** (0.024)	-0.508*** (0.123)	-0.501*** (0.100)	-0.075 (0.158)	-0.194 (0.221)	0.079 (0.472)	-0.355 (0.640)
Woman	0.043*** (0.011)	-0.238*** (0.006)	0.141*** (0.034)	0.153*** (0.030)	-0.171*** (0.047)	-0.262*** (0.070)	0.038 (0.141)	0.313 (0.201)
Non-Nordic	0.298*** (0.026)	-0.028** (0.014)	0.191** (0.089)	-0.102 (0.082)	-0.076 (0.146)	-0.075 (0.224)	0.008 (0.442)	0.672 (0.659)
Non-OECD	0.487*** (0.036)	0.037** (0.018)	-0.093 (0.117)	-0.002 (0.129)	-0.243 (0.208)	-0.377 (0.373)	0.298 (0.627)	0.244 (1.104)
Observations	32,466,900	32,466,900	31,958	39,044	15,291	13,394	17,549	16,195
F.E.s for party-muni- year	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
F.E.s for Seniority	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Note: The table reproduces the results for Table 2, but includes the full set of control variables. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Figure W3. Political Seniority and Promotions by Political Party.

Note: The figures indicate the probability of being the local party leader (left) or being promoted to parliament from the municipal council (right) as a function of the number of terms the individual has been elected to the council. Those with zero previous periods in office were elected for the first time. The sample is restricted to elections held in 1982 or later.




Figure W4. Political Seniority and Promotions for Workers and Non-Workers.

Note: See note for figure W3.




Figure W5. Shares of Workers in Political Office for Alternative Definitions of the Working-class.

Note: The figure displays four versions of the analysis in Figure 2. Definitions of working class are listed at the top of each graph. “Most common class” is the most common value for all years in which we can observe the person’s binary indicator of being working class or not.




Figure W6. Workers' Numerical Political Representation for an ISCO-Based Definition of the Working-class (Carnes and Lupu 2023c)

Notes: The figure displays an alternative version of the analysis in Figure 1. The definition of the working-class follows the description in Carnes and Lupu 2023c. N(population)=39,034,888; N(nominated)= 352,939; N(municipal councilors)= 109584; N(local party leader)= 6,722; N(parliamentarian)= 2899.




Figure W7. Replication of Figure 2 with Data Restricted to Swedish Citizens.

Note: The figure replicates the left-hand side of Figure 2 after restricting the sample to Swedish citizens.




Figure W8. Share of Workers among Municipal Councilors and Parliamentarians by Political Party.




Figure W9. Alternative Career Ladder Including Post-Election Appointments in the Local Government.




Figure W10. Representation of Workers on an Alternative Career Ladder (See Figure W9).

Note: The figure shows the relative representation of workers in positions in an alternative career ladder that includes post-election appointments at the municipal level. The appointment data is collected by Statistics Sweden via a mandatory survey, available for research from 2006 onward. The sample is restricted to the 2006–2018 elections and political parties that appointed the mayor in a specific municipality and election. The population share of workers is measured at the municipal level for all local positions and the plot shows averages across municipalities of these municipality-level representation numbers. For MPs, the population share of workers is measured in at the national level. See Folke and Rickne (2016) for a detailed description of the alternative local career ladder.




Figure W11. Gaps in Political Interest and Friendship with Local Politician.

Note: The figure shows percentage-point gaps between workers and non-workers estimated with OLS regressions. Interest in politics is a dummy variable for self-reporting a “pretty large” or “very large” interest in politics, and 0 otherwise. Friendship or acquaintance is a dummy variable for responding affirmatively to the question “are you friends or acquaintances with at least one local politician?” Age controls are five dummies for age categories. The data is pooled cross-sections of the Regional SOM survey in Western Sweden in 1996–2003. Social class is self-reported (see Appendix Subsection W3). $N(\text{interest})=18,234$; $N(\text{friend})=18,387$.

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