**Online Appendix to Accompany “A Ticking Time Bomb: Restrictions on Abortion Rights and Physical Integrity Rights Abuses”**

**\*This appendix includes the most relevant 25 pages of information and robustness tests. Please also see additional documentation on Dataverse.**

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# **Causal Mediation Model**

## **Table 1: Full Model for Results Shown in Table 2 in Text**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Treatment = Comparative Abortion Index #1 (0 to 7), Control level is 4, Treatment level is 3** | | **Treatment = Comparative Abortion Index #1 (0 to 7), Control level is 4, Treatment level is 2** | | **Treatment = Comparative Abortion Index #2 (0 to 1), Control level is 0.481, Treatment level is 0** | | **Treatment = Comparative Abortion Index #2 (0 to 1), Control level is 1, Treatment level is 0** | |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 | Human Rights Protection Score | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 | Human Rights Protection Score | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 | Human Rights Protection Score | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.00217 | 0.0972\*\*\* | 0.00217 | 0.0972\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00296) | (0.00864) | (0.00296) | (0.00864) |  |  |  |  |
| Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 | 0.0123 |  | 0.0123 |  | 0.0144\*\* |  | 0.0144\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00855) |  | (0.00855) |  | (0.00717) |  | (0.00717) |  |
| Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 X Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.00197 |  | 0.00197 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00165) |  | (0.00165) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.952\*\*\* |  | 0.952\*\*\* |  | 0.952\*\*\* |  | 0.952\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00702) |  | (0.00702) |  | (0.00703) |  | (0.00703) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.00145\* | 0.0820\*\*\* | 0.00145\* | 0.0820\*\*\* | 0.00144\* | 0.0819\*\*\* | 0.00144\* | 0.0819\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000852) | (0.00318) | (0.000852) | (0.00318) | (0.000850) | (0.00317) | (0.000850) | (0.00317) |
| Population t-1 | -0.0185\*\*\* | -0.0820\*\*\* | -0.0185\*\*\* | -0.0820\*\*\* | -0.0185\*\*\* | -0.0827\*\*\* | -0.0185\*\*\* | -0.0827\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00369) | (0.0107) | (0.00369) | (0.0107) | (0.00371) | (0.0108) | (0.00371) | (0.0108) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.0147\*\*\* | -0.0154 | 0.0147\*\*\* | -0.0154 | 0.0145\*\*\* | -0.0136 | 0.0145\*\*\* | -0.0136 |
|  | (0.00401) | (0.0114) | (0.00401) | (0.0114) | (0.00398) | (0.0115) | (0.00398) | (0.0115) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.00905 | -0.511\*\*\* | -0.00905 | -0.511\*\*\* | -0.00899 | -0.490\*\*\* | -0.00899 | -0.490\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0211) | (0.139) | (0.0211) | (0.139) | (0.0212) | (0.139) | (0.0212) | (0.139) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | 0.0105 | -0.354\*\*\* | 0.0105 | -0.354\*\*\* | 0.0106 | -0.351\*\*\* | 0.0106 | -0.351\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0161) | (0.0486) | (0.0161) | (0.0486) | (0.0161) | (0.0488) | (0.0161) | (0.0488) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | -0.000160 | 0.0210\*\*\* | -0.000160 | 0.0210\*\*\* | -0.000151 | 0.0215\*\*\* | -0.000151 | 0.0215\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000563) | (0.00144) | (0.000563) | (0.00144) | (0.000568) | (0.00143) | (0.000568) | (0.00143) |
| Catholic (%) t-1 | 0.0183 | -0.167\*\*\* | 0.0183 | -0.167\*\*\* | 0.0186 | -0.184\*\*\* | 0.0186 | -0.184\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0117) | (0.0579) | (0.0117) | (0.0579) | (0.0116) | (0.0578) | (0.0116) | (0.0578) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.0181 | 0.207\*\*\* | -0.0181 | 0.207\*\*\* | -0.0178 | 0.208\*\*\* | -0.0178 | 0.208\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0176) | (0.0633) | (0.0176) | (0.0633) | (0.0177) | (0.0637) | (0.0177) | (0.0637) |
| Post Soviet | -0.0326\*\*\* | 0.107\*\* | -0.0326\*\*\* | 0.107\*\* | -0.0344\*\*\* | 0.0972\* | -0.0344\*\*\* | 0.0972\* |
|  | (0.0121) | (0.0519) | (0.0121) | (0.0519) | (0.0125) | (0.0537) | (0.0125) | (0.0537) |
| NIE | -0.00177\*\*\* |  | -0.00315\*\* |  | -0.00396\*\* |  | -0.00824\*\* |  |
|  | (0.000590) |  | (0.00129) |  | (0.00200) |  | (0.00416) |  |
| NDE | -0.00417\*\* |  | -0.00834\*\* |  | -0.0129\*\* |  | -0.0303\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00209) |  | (0.00418) |  | (0.00611) |  | (0.0120) |  |
| TE | -0.00594\*\*\* |  | -0.0115\*\*\* |  | -0.0168\*\*\* |  | -0.0385\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00198) |  | (0.00407) |  | (0.00630) |  | (0.0118) |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  |  |  |  | 0.0145 | 0.572\*\*\* | 0.0145 | 0.572\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0190) | (0.0537) | (0.0190) | (0.0537) |
| Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 X Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  |  |  |  | 0.0120 |  | 0.0120 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0102) |  | (0.0102) |  |
| Constant | 0.188\*\*\* | 1.484\*\*\* |  |  | 0.192\*\*\* | 1.593\*\*\* | 0.192\*\*\* | 1.593\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0562) | (0.188) |  |  | (0.0567) | (0.190) | (0.0567) | (0.190) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**NOTE: This table provides the full model results of the causal mediation model shown in Table 2 of the manuscript.**

# **Additional Specifications / Modeling Decisions**

## **Table 2: Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.853\*\*\* | 0.853\*\*\* |  |  | 0.852\*\*\* | 0.851\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0207) | (0.0207) |  |  | (0.0210) | (0.0210) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.0109\*\* |  | 0.00383 |  | 0.0103\* |  |
|  | (0.00555) |  | (0.00290) |  | (0.00550) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.00388 | 0.00393 | 0.000962 | 0.000957 | 0.00356 | 0.00361 |
|  | (0.00263) | (0.00264) | (0.00178) | (0.00178) | (0.00251) | (0.00251) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.0303 | -0.0259 | -0.0156 | -0.0126 | -0.0257 | -0.0217 |
|  | (0.0491) | (0.0480) | (0.0239) | (0.0234) | (0.0490) | (0.0479) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.0204 | 0.0209 | -0.00449 | -0.00408 | 0.0203 | 0.0208 |
|  | (0.0181) | (0.0181) | (0.0138) | (0.0138) | (0.0181) | (0.0181) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.0284 | -0.0289 | -0.0159 | -0.0157 | -0.0276 | -0.0281 |
|  | (0.0270) | (0.0270) | (0.0156) | (0.0156) | (0.0270) | (0.0270) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | -0.0163 | -0.0161 | -0.00140 | -0.00146 | -0.0155 | -0.0153 |
|  | (0.0264) | (0.0264) | (0.0123) | (0.0123) | (0.0262) | (0.0262) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | 0.000567 | 0.000524 | -0.000709 | -0.000702 | 0.000436 | 0.000396 |
|  | (0.000932) | (0.000934) | (0.000644) | (0.000638) | (0.000937) | (0.000938) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | -0.138\* | -0.139\* | 0.0109 | 0.0107 | -0.144\* | -0.144\* |
|  | (0.0822) | (0.0822) | (0.0483) | (0.0485) | (0.0822) | (0.0822) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | 0.191 | 0.197 | 0.123\* | 0.129\* | 0.198 | 0.204 |
|  | (0.152) | (0.152) | (0.0730) | (0.0734) | (0.150) | (0.150) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.0776\*\* |  | 0.0151 |  | 0.0739\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0366) |  | (0.0201) |  | (0.0363) |
| Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 |  |  | 0.841\*\*\* | 0.841\*\*\* | 0.0172 | 0.0170 |
|  |  |  | (0.0370) | (0.0369) | (0.0200) | (0.0201) |
| Constant | 0.370 | 0.278 | 0.390 | 0.339 | 0.286 | 0.201 |
|  | (0.881) | (0.863) | (0.464) | (0.454) | (0.881) | (0.862) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 |
| R-squared | 0.974 | 0.974 | 0.988 | 0.988 | 0.974 | 0.974 |

NOTE: This table shows that our results are consistent if we include fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 3: Random Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.954\*\*\* | 0.954\*\*\* |  |  | 0.945\*\*\* | 0.945\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00879) | (0.00881) |  |  | (0.0106) | (0.0106) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.00622\*\*\* |  | 0.00273\*\* |  | 0.00462\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00217) |  | (0.00128) |  | (0.00228) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.00282\*\*\* | 0.00280\*\*\* | 0.000723 | 0.000711 | 0.00164\* | 0.00162\* |
|  | (0.000851) | (0.000850) | (0.000613) | (0.000615) | (0.000864) | (0.000866) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.0197\*\*\* | -0.0199\*\*\* | -0.00416\*\* | -0.00416\*\* | -0.0209\*\*\* | -0.0211\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00442) | (0.00443) | (0.00180) | (0.00180) | (0.00461) | (0.00461) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.0140\*\*\* | 0.0138\*\*\* | -0.00281\* | -0.00271 | 0.0176\*\*\* | 0.0174\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00461) | (0.00460) | (0.00169) | (0.00168) | (0.00553) | (0.00551) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.0209 | -0.0202 | -0.0202\* | -0.0194\* | -0.00947 | -0.00904 |
|  | (0.0253) | (0.0254) | (0.0118) | (0.0117) | (0.0270) | (0.0272) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | 0.0110 | 0.0112 | 0.00682 | 0.00690 | 0.00929 | 0.00946 |
|  | (0.0188) | (0.0189) | (0.00888) | (0.00889) | (0.0186) | (0.0186) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | 9.08e-05 | 0.000104 | -0.000345 | -0.000330 | -0.000140 | -0.000135 |
|  | (0.000427) | (0.000426) | (0.000225) | (0.000222) | (0.000422) | (0.000423) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | 0.0178 | 0.0179 | 0.00367 | 0.00305 | 0.0190 | 0.0193 |
|  | (0.0170) | (0.0170) | (0.00866) | (0.00875) | (0.0179) | (0.0179) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.0185 | -0.0178 | -0.0129 | -0.0130 | -0.0206 | -0.0200 |
|  | (0.0164) | (0.0166) | (0.00928) | (0.00929) | (0.0161) | (0.0162) |
| Post Soviet | -0.0310\*\* | -0.0337\*\* | -0.0193\*\*\* | -0.0193\*\*\* | -0.0347\*\* | -0.0372\*\* |
|  | (0.0155) | (0.0160) | (0.00732) | (0.00745) | (0.0161) | (0.0167) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.0401\*\*\* |  | 0.0155\*\* |  | 0.0306\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0138) |  | (0.00749) |  | (0.0144) |
| Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 |  |  | 0.989\*\*\* | 0.989\*\*\* | 0.0216\*\*\* | 0.0216\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.00390) | (0.00387) | (0.00663) | (0.00662) |
| Constant | 0.210\*\*\* | 0.219\*\*\* | 0.0989\*\*\* | 0.101\*\*\* | 0.196\*\*\* | 0.204\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0645) | (0.0659) | (0.0325) | (0.0324) | (0.0625) | (0.0637) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 |
| Number of ccode | 156 | 156 | 156 | 156 | 156 | 156 |

NOTE: This table shows that our results are consistent if we include random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 4: Yearly Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.962\*\*\* | 0.962\*\*\* |  |  | 0.954\*\*\* | 0.954\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00607) | (0.00606) |  |  | (0.00687) | (0.00687) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.00344\*\* |  | 0.00129 |  | 0.00194 |  |
|  | (0.00169) |  | (0.00114) |  | (0.00184) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.00272\*\*\* | 0.00271\*\*\* | 0.00108\* | 0.00107\* | 0.00170\*\* | 0.00170\*\* |
|  | (0.000897) | (0.000896) | (0.000603) | (0.000600) | (0.000845) | (0.000845) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.0165\*\*\* | -0.0165\*\*\* | -0.00397\*\*\* | -0.00395\*\*\* | -0.0176\*\*\* | -0.0176\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00353) | (0.00353) | (0.00151) | (0.00151) | (0.00357) | (0.00357) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.0127\*\*\* | 0.0127\*\*\* | -0.00163 | -0.00144 | 0.0159\*\*\* | 0.0160\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00395) | (0.00393) | (0.00150) | (0.00148) | (0.00397) | (0.00394) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.0222 | -0.0214 | -0.0193 | -0.0188 | -0.00969 | -0.00920 |
|  | (0.0227) | (0.0228) | (0.0127) | (0.0126) | (0.0223) | (0.0223) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | 0.0136 | 0.0138 | 0.00609 | 0.00608 | 0.0120 | 0.0121 |
|  | (0.0162) | (0.0162) | (0.00879) | (0.00880) | (0.0161) | (0.0161) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | 0.000294 | 0.000306 | 0.000172 | 0.000186 | -1.87e-05 | -1.52e-05 |
|  | (0.000603) | (0.000608) | (0.000222) | (0.000221) | (0.000598) | (0.000602) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | 0.0178 | 0.0173 | 0.00123 | 0.000317 | 0.0194\* | 0.0193\* |
|  | (0.0113) | (0.0112) | (0.00813) | (0.00822) | (0.0113) | (0.0112) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.0163 | -0.0163 | -0.00869 | -0.00898 | -0.0197 | -0.0197 |
|  | (0.0179) | (0.0179) | (0.00904) | (0.00908) | (0.0176) | (0.0176) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.0202\*\* |  | 0.00575 |  | 0.0115 |
|  |  | (0.0101) |  | (0.00667) |  | (0.0109) |
| Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 |  |  | 0.987\*\*\* | 0.987\*\*\* | 0.0183\*\*\* | 0.0184\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.00406) | (0.00401) | (0.00564) | (0.00561) |
| Constant | 0.195\*\*\* | 0.198\*\*\* | 0.0886\*\*\* | 0.0888\*\*\* | 0.180\*\*\* | 0.182\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0606) | (0.0605) | (0.0325) | (0.0325) | (0.0599) | (0.0597) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 |
| R-squared | 0.972 | 0.972 | 0.987 | 0.987 | 0.972 | 0.972 |

NOTE: This table shows that our results are largely consistent if yearly fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 5: Two-way Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.845\*\*\* | 0.844\*\*\* |  |  | 0.843\*\*\* | 0.842\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0208) | (0.0208) |  |  | (0.0211) | (0.0211) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.00890$ |  | 0.00363 |  | 0.00816$ |  |
|  | (0.00569) |  | (0.00295) |  | (0.00564) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.00305 | 0.00309 | 0.000847 | 0.000848 | 0.00265 | 0.00269 |
|  | (0.00260) | (0.00261) | (0.00177) | (0.00177) | (0.00247) | (0.00248) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.247\*\*\* | -0.243\*\*\* | -0.00253 | -0.000442 | -0.243\*\*\* | -0.239\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0547) | (0.0542) | (0.0302) | (0.0299) | (0.0547) | (0.0543) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | -0.0991\*\*\* | -0.0984\*\*\* | 0.00198 | 0.00217 | -0.1000\*\*\* | -0.0993\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0244) | (0.0245) | (0.0165) | (0.0165) | (0.0244) | (0.0245) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.0324 | -0.0328 | -0.0122 | -0.0122 | -0.0315 | -0.0319 |
|  | (0.0274) | (0.0275) | (0.0155) | (0.0155) | (0.0273) | (0.0274) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | -0.0304 | -0.0303 | 0.000142 | 0.000112 | -0.0296 | -0.0295 |
|  | (0.0265) | (0.0265) | (0.0123) | (0.0123) | (0.0264) | (0.0264) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | -0.00147 | -0.00149 | -0.000551 | -0.000551 | -0.00164 | -0.00166 |
|  | (0.00105) | (0.00105) | (0.000730) | (0.000726) | (0.00106) | (0.00106) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | 0.0343 | 0.0342 | 0.00895 | 0.00918 | 0.0284 | 0.0283 |
|  | (0.0786) | (0.0787) | (0.0491) | (0.0492) | (0.0789) | (0.0789) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.0226 | -0.0174 | 0.121 | 0.125 | -0.0143 | -0.00964 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.151) | (0.0764) | (0.0767) | (0.149) | (0.149) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.0598$ |  | 0.0173 |  | 0.0550$ |
|  |  | (0.0371) |  | (0.0207) |  | (0.0369) |
| Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 |  |  | 0.839\*\*\* | 0.840\*\*\* | 0.0211 | 0.0211 |
|  |  |  | (0.0369) | (0.0367) | (0.0201) | (0.0202) |
| Constant | 5.812\*\*\* | 5.726\*\*\* | 0.0564 | 0.0212 | 5.741\*\*\* | 5.663\*\*\* |
|  | (1.103) | (1.101) | (0.656) | (0.650) | (1.106) | (1.104) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 | 3,421 |
| R-squared | 0.975 | 0.975 | 0.988 | 0.988 | 0.975 | 0.975 |

NOTE: This table shows that our results are largely consistent if both year and country-fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, $p<.14

## **Table 6: Change as Dependent Variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | CHANGE Human Rights Protection Score | CHANGE Human Rights Protection Score | CHANGE Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | CHANGE Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties | CHANGE Human Rights Protection Score | CHANGE Human Rights Protection Score |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | -0.0394\*\*\* | -0.0394\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00620) | (0.00620) |  |  |  |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.00536\*\*\* |  | 0.00273\*\* |  | 0.00395\* |  |
|  | (0.00203) |  | (0.00135) |  | (0.00214) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.00255\*\*\* | 0.00253\*\*\* | 0.000723 | 0.000711 | 0.00149\* | 0.00147\* |
|  | (0.000903) | (0.000901) | (0.000588) | (0.000586) | (0.000851) | (0.000850) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.0172\*\*\* | -0.0173\*\*\* | -0.00416\*\*\* | -0.00416\*\*\* | -0.0184\*\*\* | -0.0185\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00367) | (0.00368) | (0.00154) | (0.00154) | (0.00372) | (0.00373) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.0118\*\*\* | 0.0117\*\*\* | -0.00281\* | -0.00271\* | 0.0151\*\*\* | 0.0149\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00397) | (0.00394) | (0.00155) | (0.00154) | (0.00397) | (0.00393) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.0211 | -0.0203 | -0.0202 | -0.0194 | -0.00933 | -0.00885 |
|  | (0.0216) | (0.0217) | (0.0130) | (0.0129) | (0.0214) | (0.0214) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | 0.0127 | 0.0130 | 0.00682 | 0.00690 | 0.0111 | 0.0113 |
|  | (0.0163) | (0.0163) | (0.00880) | (0.00882) | (0.0161) | (0.0161) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | 0.000105 | 0.000117 | -0.000345 | -0.000330 | -0.000118 | -0.000115 |
|  | (0.000565) | (0.000570) | (0.000220) | (0.000217) | (0.000564) | (0.000569) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | 0.0180 | 0.0180 | 0.00367 | 0.00305 | 0.0192\* | 0.0194\* |
|  | (0.0116) | (0.0115) | (0.00842) | (0.00847) | (0.0116) | (0.0115) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.0171 | -0.0166 | -0.0129 | -0.0130 | -0.0193 | -0.0189 |
|  | (0.0182) | (0.0183) | (0.00947) | (0.00954) | (0.0180) | (0.0181) |
| Post Soviet | -0.0285\*\* | -0.0306\*\* | -0.0193\*\* | -0.0193\*\* | -0.0318\*\*\* | -0.0339\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0123) | (0.0126) | (0.00888) | (0.00906) | (0.0123) | (0.0127) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.0342\*\*\* |  | 0.0155\* |  | 0.0260\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0124) |  | (0.00816) |  | (0.0129) |
| Social Group Equality in Respect for Civil Liberties t-1 |  |  | -0.0112\*\*\* | -0.0110\*\*\* | 0.0192\*\*\* | 0.0192\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.00387) | (0.00383) | (0.00577) | (0.00573) |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 |  |  |  |  | -0.0478\*\*\* | -0.0478\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.00706) | (0.00706) |
| Constant | 0.188\*\*\* | 0.196\*\*\* | 0.0989\*\*\* | 0.101\*\*\* | 0.177\*\*\* | 0.183\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0577) | (0.0584) | (0.0283) | (0.0285) | (0.0568) | (0.0575) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 |
| R-squared | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.030 | 0.031 |

NOTE: This table shows that our results are largely consistent if we measure our dependent variable as change in PIR instead of level. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 7: Backsliding as the IVAR**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score |
|  |  |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.0252\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0102) |  |
| Any Abortion Backsliding - Comparative Abortion Index 1 | -0.0507\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0196) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.0222\*\*\* | 0.0223\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00664) | (0.00661) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.312\*\*\* | -0.311\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0414) | (0.0415) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.417\*\*\* | 0.419\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0465) | (0.0466) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.0150 | -0.0157 |
|  | (0.0133) | (0.0141) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | -0.0793\*\* | -0.0788\*\* |
|  | (0.0311) | (0.0312) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | 0.00327\*\* | 0.00336\*\* |
|  | (0.00154) | (0.00153) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | -0.352 | -0.361 |
|  | (0.244) | (0.244) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.610\*\*\* | -0.611\*\*\* |
|  | (0.198) | (0.199) |
| Post Soviet | -0.102 | -0.0970 |
|  | (0.162) | (0.163) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.137\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0647) |
| Any Abortion Backsliding - Comparative Abortion Index 2 |  | 0.0145 |
|  |  | (0.0120) |
| Constant | 2.010\*\*\* | 2.018\*\*\* |
|  | (0.699) | (0.699) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,258 | 3,258 |
| Number of ccode | 153 | 153 |

NOTE: This table shows results where we used a dichotomous indicator for whether abortion “backsliding” occurred between the previous year and the current year. Results are consistent with our overall logic. Robust standard errors in parentheses. GEE Model with AR(1) Correlation Structure.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 8: Change in CAI as Independent Variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score | CIRIGHTS - Physical Integrity Score | CIRIGHTS - Physical Integrity Score |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.0450\*\*\* |  | 0.0904\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0153) |  | (0.0369) |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) Change | 0.0273\*\*\* |  | 0.128\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0100) |  | (0.0554) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.0220\*\*\* | 0.0220\*\*\* | 0.0925\*\*\* | 0.0920\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00665) | (0.00663) | (0.0134) | (0.0134) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.315\*\*\* | -0.315\*\*\* | -0.610\*\*\* | -0.612\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0410) | (0.0409) | (0.0582) | (0.0581) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.405\*\*\* | 0.404\*\*\* | 0.400\*\*\* | 0.391\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0467) | (0.0466) | (0.0699) | (0.0704) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.0129 | -0.0127 | -0.435\*\* | -0.436\*\* |
|  | (0.0136) | (0.0137) | (0.188) | (0.187) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | -0.0796\*\* | -0.0797\*\* | -0.445\*\*\* | -0.445\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0312) | (0.0312) | (0.135) | (0.135) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | 0.00327\*\* | 0.00330\*\* | 0.00303 | 0.00282 |
|  | (0.00154) | (0.00155) | (0.00495) | (0.00496) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | -0.316 | -0.317 | -0.244 | -0.224 |
|  | (0.242) | (0.242) | (0.348) | (0.345) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.583\*\*\* | -0.574\*\*\* | -0.331 | -0.309 |
|  | (0.198) | (0.199) | (0.309) | (0.313) |
| Post Soviet | -0.168 | -0.187 | -0.333 | -0.405 |
|  | (0.164) | (0.166) | (0.256) | (0.264) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.292\*\*\* |  | 0.638\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0993) |  | (0.237) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) Change |  | 0.171\*\* |  | 0.702\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0735) |  | (0.352) |
| Constant | 2.080\*\*\* | 2.125\*\*\* | 10.80\*\*\* | 10.97\*\*\* |
|  | (0.695) | (0.693) | (1.100) | (1.102) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,258 | 3,258 | 3,214 | 3,214 |
| Number of ccode | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 |

NOTE: This table shows results where our indicator for abortion rights is change instead of level of CAI scores. Results are consistent with our overall logic. Robust standard errors in parentheses. GEE Model with AR(1) Correlation Structure.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# **Causality-Related Information**

## **Table 9: Granger Causality Test**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Direction of Causal Relationship** | **p-value** | **F** |
| Human Rights Protection Score Granger-Causes CAI #2 | 0.7204 | 0.33 |
|  |  |  |
| CAI #2 Granger-Caused Human Rights Protection Score | 0.8634 | 0.15 |
|  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score Granger-Causes CAI #1 | 0.4523 | 0.80 |
|  |  |  |
| CAI #1 Granger-Caused Human Rights Protection Score | 0.7494 | 0.29 |

Note: F-test, *Ho = X does not Granger-cause Y* (null hypothesis). We first estimate OLS models with the lagged DVAR and the current and *t-1* independent variable with robust standard errors. The Granger causality tests show that physical integrity rights do not Granger-cause abortion rights.

## **Table 10: Panel VAR Model**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) | Human Rights Protection Score | Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.917\*\*\* | -0.000239 | 0.865\*\*\* | -0.0390 |
|  | (0.0742) | (0.00754) | (0.0776) | (0.0724) |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-2 | -0.000152 | -0.000890 | -0.00548 | -0.0154 |
|  | (0.0642) | (0.00489) | (0.0613) | (0.0314) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 | 1.549\*\*\* | 1.132\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.577) | (0.158) |  |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-2 | 0.226\*\*\* | 0.00199 |  |  |
|  | (0.0820) | (0.0190) |  |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 |  |  | 0.224\*\*\* | 1.150\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0787) | (0.142) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-2 |  |  | 0.0293\*\*\* | 0.000737 |
|  |  |  | (0.0107) | (0.0149) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,980 | 2,980 | 2,980 | 2,980 |

NOTE: The panel VAR model here shows that past levels of abortion rights do matter for future levels of physical integrity rights. However, according to the panel VAR model, the same is not true in reverse: we continue to find no evidence that past levels of physical integrity rights violations contribute to future abortion rights. The totality of this evidence is consistent with the causal process we lay out in our argument. It represents a good-faith effort to explore causality within the confines of our observational data. Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 11:** **Decreases in Human Rights and Abortion Rights – Timing**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #1) and Future (t+1) Decreases in CIRIGHTS CIRIGHTS - Physical Integrity Score | 6 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #1) and Current (t) Decreases in CIRIGHTS CIRIGHTS - Physical Integrity Score | 10 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #1) and Past (t-1) Decreases in CIRIGHTS CIRIGHTS - Physical Integrity Score | 3 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #2) and Future (t+1) Decreases in CIRIGHTS CIRIGHTS - Physical Integrity Score | 102 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #2) and Current (t) Decreases in CIRIGHTS CIRIGHTS - Physical Integrity Score | 99 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #2) and Past (t-1) Decreases in CIRIGHTS CIRIGHTS - Physical Integrity Score | 64 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #1) and Future (t+1) Decreases in Human Rights Protection Score | 9 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #1) and Current (t) Decreases in Human Rights Protection Score | 12 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #1) and Past (t-1) Decreases in Human Rights Protection Score | 8 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #2) and Future (t+1) Decreases in Human Rights Protection Score | 153 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #2) and Current (t) Decreases in Human Rights Protection Score | 133 |
| Number of Decreases in Abortion Rights (CAI #2) and Past (t-1) Decreases in Human Rights Protection Score | 129 |

NOTE: In this table, we descriptively examine what came first, abortion rights decrease or physical integrity rights decrease. We find that abortion rights decreases come before or at the same time as decreases in physical integrity rights in the majority of situations in the dataset.

# **O’Brien (2002, 2010) Model Performance Metrics**

## **Table 12: Predicting Future Decreases in Human Rights Protection Scores**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Accuracy** | **Recall** | **Precision** |
| ***In-Sample*** | | | |
| Model with CAI#1 | .61 | .40 | .40 |
| Model with CAI #2 | .50 | .40 | .40 |
| Model without CAI Indicator | .51 | .40 | .40 |
| ***Out-of-Sample (through 2011 to predict 2012-2016)*** | | | |
| Model with CAI#1 | .46 | .40 | .29 |
| Model with CAI #2 | .46 | .40 | .29 |
| Model without CAI Indicator | .45 | .35 | .27 |

NOTE: we have conducted both in-sample and out-of sample tests, using O Brien’s (2010) suggested methodology, and the metrics of accuracy, precision, and recall for models with and without CAI1 and CAI2. Out of sample forecasts are obtained by running the baseline model on years prior to 2012 and using the model parameters to make predictions for 2012-2016. Out of sample forecasts are superior for in-sample on accuracy and precision, but similar on recall.

O’Brien, Sean. 2002. "Anticipating the good, the bad, and the ugly: An early warning approach to conflict and instability analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (6): 791-811.

O'Brien, Sean P. 2010. "Crisis early warning and decision support: Contemporary approaches and thoughts on future research." *International Studies Review* 12 (1): 87-104.

# **Additional Potential Mediators**

## **Table 13: World Values Survey Indicators: Confidence in Police and Justice System/Courts**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | Confidence: The Police | Confidence: The Police | Confidence: Justice System/Courts | Confidence: Justice System/Courts |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.121\*\*\* | 0.123\*\*\* | 0.0797\*\*\* | 0.0811\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0215) | (0.0210) | (0.0229) | (0.0229) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.0110 |  | -0.0116 |  |
|  | (0.00993) |  | (0.0115) |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) Change | 0.0701 |  | 0.0912\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0606) |  | (0.0454) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | -0.0227\*\*\* | -0.0228\*\*\* | -0.0245\*\*\* | -0.0239\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00473) | (0.00474) | (0.00520) | (0.00519) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | 0.0177 | 0.0182 | 0.0323\*\* | 0.0336\*\* |
|  | (0.0132) | (0.0131) | (0.0160) | (0.0159) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.0633\*\*\* | 0.0601\*\*\* | 0.0512\* | 0.0499\* |
|  | (0.0227) | (0.0227) | (0.0262) | (0.0261) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.383\*\*\* | -0.383\*\*\* | -0.00745 | -0.0144 |
|  | (0.114) | (0.112) | (0.224) | (0.221) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | 0.186\*\*\* | 0.192\*\*\* | 0.151\*\* | 0.151\*\* |
|  | (0.0585) | (0.0579) | (0.0725) | (0.0734) |
| Catholic (%) t-1 | -0.172\*\*\* | -0.168\*\*\* | -0.390\*\*\* | -0.394\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0590) | (0.0587) | (0.0612) | (0.0612) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | 0.209\*\* | 0.203\*\* | 0.112 | 0.0996 |
|  | (0.0814) | (0.0808) | (0.0888) | (0.0897) |
| Post Soviet | -0.317\*\*\* | -0.320\*\*\* | -0.241\*\*\* | -0.229\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0584) | (0.0583) | (0.0624) | (0.0622) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.0664 |  | -0.0987 |
|  |  | (0.0587) |  | (0.0683) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) Change |  | 0.538\* |  | 0.470\*\* |
|  |  | (0.306) |  | (0.196) |
| Constant | 1.744\*\*\* | 1.776\*\*\* | 1.755\*\*\* | 1.750\*\*\* |
|  | (0.280) | (0.279) | (0.321) | (0.319) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 249 | 249 | 218 | 218 |
| R-squared | 0.496 | 0.500 | 0.429 | 0.431 |

NOTE: This table shows that abortion restrictions are associated with lower confidence in the police and justice system. We see this result as consistent with our argument concerning an indirect pathway between abortion restrictions and lower PIR. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 14: World Values Survey Indicators: Confidence in Government, Willingness to Fight for Country**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | Confidence: The Government | Confidence: The Government | Willingness to fight for country | Willingness to fight for country |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.0456 | 0.0472 | -0.0130 | -0.0128 |
|  | (0.0289) | (0.0288) | (0.0131) | (0.0131) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | -0.00638 |  | 0.0128\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0137) |  | (0.00550) |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) Change | 0.129\*\* |  | 0.0201\* |  |
|  | (0.0621) |  | (0.0115) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | -0.0340\*\*\* | -0.0335\*\*\* | -0.00562\*\* | -0.00572\*\* |
|  | (0.00675) | (0.00683) | (0.00227) | (0.00227) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | 0.0270 | 0.0281 | -0.0188\*\* | -0.0193\*\* |
|  | (0.0198) | (0.0199) | (0.00803) | (0.00809) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | -0.0238 | -0.0273 | -0.0305\*\* | -0.0308\*\* |
|  | (0.0284) | (0.0285) | (0.0118) | (0.0120) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.121 | -0.126 | 0.0923\*\* | 0.0936\*\* |
|  | (0.177) | (0.174) | (0.0452) | (0.0451) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | 0.0586 | 0.0629 | 0.0546 | 0.0558 |
|  | (0.0764) | (0.0766) | (0.0361) | (0.0363) |
| Catholic (%) t-1 | -0.198\*\* | -0.193\*\* | -0.0252 | -0.0253 |
|  | (0.0807) | (0.0805) | (0.0418) | (0.0411) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | 0.0353 | 0.0240 | 0.0619 | 0.0621 |
|  | (0.109) | (0.110) | (0.0402) | (0.0403) |
| Post Soviet | -0.0960 | -0.0895 | -0.0503\* | -0.0546\* |
|  | (0.0828) | (0.0845) | (0.0284) | (0.0291) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | -0.0527 |  | 0.0775\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0829) |  | (0.0332) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) Change |  | 0.758\*\*\* |  | 0.0627 |
|  |  | (0.286) |  | (0.0605) |
| Constant | 2.390\*\*\* | 2.402\*\*\* | 1.277\*\*\* | 1.303\*\*\* |
|  | (0.353) | (0.353) | (0.179) | (0.182) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 217 | 217 | 189 | 189 |
| R-squared | 0.317 | 0.319 | 0.335 | 0.335 |

NOTE: This table shows that abortion restrictions are associated with lower confidence in the government and willingness to fight for your country. We see this result as consistent with our argument concerning an indirect pathway between abortion restrictions and lower PIR. Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 15: World Values Survey Indicators: Feelings of Happiness**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| VARIABLES | Feeling of happiness | Feeling of happiness |
|  |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | 0.0397\*\* | 0.0397\*\* |
|  | (0.0195) | (0.0194) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | -0.0336\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00960) |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) Change | 0.0280 |  |
|  | (0.0209) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | -0.00648\* | -0.00585\* |
|  | (0.00330) | (0.00325) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | 0.0257\*\* | 0.0269\*\* |
|  | (0.0116) | (0.0115) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.0756\*\*\* | 0.0761\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0171) | (0.0170) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.0464 | -0.0548 |
|  | (0.0735) | (0.0712) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | 0.107\* | 0.104\* |
|  | (0.0554) | (0.0551) |
| Catholic (%) t-1 | 0.0607 | 0.0579 |
|  | (0.0524) | (0.0525) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | 0.0297 | 0.0214 |
|  | (0.0684) | (0.0694) |
| Post Soviet | -0.135\*\* | -0.122\*\* |
|  | (0.0555) | (0.0554) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | -0.221\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0557) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) Change |  | 0.111 |
|  |  | (0.100) |
| Constant | 2.102\*\*\* | 2.051\*\*\* |
|  | (0.242) | (0.241) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 253 | 253 |
| R-squared | 0.361 | 0.368 |

NOTE: This table shows that abortion restrictions are not associated with lower overall happiness. We see this result as consistent with our argument concerning an indirect pathway between abortion restrictions and lower PIR in that changes lead to shifts in opinions on government and government agents and not overall happiness. .Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 16: Nonviolent Protest Women and Non-Women Protest – Bell et al. 2018**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | Non-Women Nonviolent Protest (Negative Binomial Regression) | Non-Women Nonviolent Protest (Negative Binomial Regression) | Women Nonviolent Protest (Negative Binomial Regression) | Women Nonviolent Protest (Negative Binomial Regression) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Women Nonviolent Protest t-1 | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.110\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0158) | (0.0159) |  |  |
| Human Rights Protection Score t-1 | -0.293\*\*\* | -0.299\*\*\* | -0.437\*\*\* | -0.450\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0646) | (0.0652) | (0.162) | (0.165) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.0795\*\*\* |  | 0.157\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0307) |  | (0.0759) |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | -0.000103 | -0.000684 | 0.0127 | 0.0133 |
|  | (0.0115) | (0.0115) | (0.0238) | (0.0241) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | 0.461\*\*\* | 0.460\*\*\* | 0.538\*\*\* | 0.535\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0435) | (0.0437) | (0.0804) | (0.0796) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.254\*\*\* | 0.248\*\*\* | 0.420\*\*\* | 0.416\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0510) | (0.0511) | (0.120) | (0.121) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.243 | -0.230 | 0.502 | 0.525 |
|  | (0.232) | (0.235) | (0.532) | (0.543) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | -0.0959 | -0.0947 | -0.686\*\*\* | -0.685\*\*\* |
|  | (0.152) | (0.152) | (0.265) | (0.263) |
| Catholic (%) t-1 | -0.163 | -0.140 | 1.010\*\*\* | 1.030\*\*\* |
|  | (0.188) | (0.187) | (0.365) | (0.367) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.315 | -0.294 | 0.901\*\* | 0.935\*\* |
|  | (0.210) | (0.210) | (0.384) | (0.388) |
| Post Soviet | -0.574\*\* | -0.632\*\*\* | -0.422 | -0.516 |
|  | (0.234) | (0.238) | (0.473) | (0.479) |
| lnalpha | 1.122\*\*\* | 1.119\*\*\* | 2.256\*\*\* | 2.249\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0717) | (0.0717) | (0.162) | (0.161) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.566\*\*\* |  | 1.078\*\* |
|  |  | (0.192) |  | (0.467) |
| Women Nonviolent Protest t-1 |  |  | 0.144\*\*\* | 0.139\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0399) | (0.0404) |
| Constant | -10.27\*\*\* | -10.17\*\*\* | -15.57\*\*\* | -15.39\*\*\* |
|  | (0.744) | (0.752) | (1.620) | (1.615) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,715 | 2,715 | 2,715 | 2,715 |

NOTE: This table shows that abortion restrictions are associated with lower collective action. As such, limiting abortion rights diminishes non-violent protests concerning both women and gender issues and for protests where women or gender is not mentioned. This finding would be consistent with the idea that abortion rights restrictions somehow limit collective action, perhaps because individuals are exasperated or otherwise distrustful of the government’s ability to protect their rights. Non-violent mobilization may be critical in bringing about regime change and improving human rights (Simmons 2009; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Robust standard errors in parentheses\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 17: Secular Values Index**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | Secular Values Index | Secular Values Index | Human Rights Protection Score | Human Rights Protection Score |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.00807\*\*\* |  | 0.0420 |  |
|  | (0.00293) |  | (0.0324) |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  | 0.0567\*\*\* |  | 0.186 |
|  |  | (0.0181) |  | (0.197) |
| Secular Values Index t-1 |  |  | 1.295\* | 1.333\* |
|  |  |  | (0.747) | (0.752) |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.00164 | 0.00152 | 0.0449\*\*\* | 0.0447\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00155) | (0.00152) | (0.0110) | (0.0109) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.00143 | -0.00161 | -0.354\*\*\* | -0.355\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00429) | (0.00419) | (0.0430) | (0.0430) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.0156\*\*\* | 0.0149\*\* | 0.447\*\*\* | 0.451\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00595) | (0.00588) | (0.0563) | (0.0566) |
| International Conflict t-1 | -0.00270 | -0.00253 | 0.949\*\*\* | 0.979\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0289) | (0.0287) | (0.258) | (0.257) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | 0.00316 | 0.00401 | -0.829\*\*\* | -0.833\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0134) | (0.0136) | (0.142) | (0.143) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | 6.80e-05 | 9.60e-05 | 0.0249\*\*\* | 0.0253\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000500) | (0.000496) | (0.00548) | (0.00548) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | -0.0147 | -0.0120 | -0.239 | -0.270 |
|  | (0.0175) | (0.0175) | (0.214) | (0.213) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | -0.117\*\*\* | -0.115\*\*\* | 0.165 | 0.154 |
|  | (0.0212) | (0.0214) | (0.220) | (0.221) |
| Post Soviet | 0.0904\*\*\* | 0.0851\*\*\* | -0.310\* | -0.297\* |
|  | (0.0170) | (0.0171) | (0.160) | (0.162) |
| Constant | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.250\*\*\* | 1.361 | 1.422 |
|  | (0.0904) | (0.0892) | (0.898) | (0.892) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 205 | 205 | 207 | 207 |
| R-squared | 0.516 | 0.524 | 0.761 | 0.760 |

NOTE: These tables on secular values use similar causal mediation models to those in the manuscript and find suggestive evidence that secular values diminish when abortion rights are restricted and that reductions in secular values are associated with worse physical integrity rights (Welzel 2013). These results come from models with a very small sample (around 200 observations) but are suggestive of our theorized causal process.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **Table 18: Causal Mediation Models – Secular Values Index – Summary Information**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Treatment = Comparative Abortion Index #1 (0 to 7), Control level is 4, Treatment level is 3** | **Treatment = Comparative Abortion Index #2 (0 to 1), Control level is 0.481, Treatment level is 0** |
| **Natural Indirect Effects** | -0.00710  (0.00927) | -0.00920  (0.0382) |
| **Natural Direct Effects** | -0.0461  (0.0314) | -0.101  (0.0907) |
| **Total Effects** | -0.0532\*  (0.0319) | -0.110  (0.0948) |
| **Proportion Mediated** | 13.3% | 8.3% |
|  |  |  |

NOTE: These tables on secular values use similar causal mediation models to those in the manuscript and find suggestive evidence that secular values diminish when abortion rights are restricted and that reductions in secular values are associated with worse physical integrity rights (Welzel 2013). These results come from models with a very small sample (around 200 observations) but are suggestive of our theorized causal process.

## **Table 19: Causal Mediation Models – Secular Values Index – Full Model Information**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Treatment = Comparative Abortion Index #1 (0 to 7), Control level is 4, Treatment level is 3** | | **Treatment = Comparative Abortion Index #2 (0 to 1), Control level is 0.481, Treatment level is 0** | |
| VARIABLES | Human Rights Protection Score | Secular Values Index t-1 | Human Rights Protection Score | Secular Values Index t-1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | -0.0256 | 0.00853\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.100) | (0.00289) |  |  |
| Secular Values Index t-1 | 0.267 |  | 0.337 |  |
|  | (1.671) |  | (1.392) |  |
| Secular Values Index t-1 X Comparative Abortion Index 1 (0 to 7) t-1 | 0.188 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.256) |  |  |  |
| Regime Type t-1 | 0.0454\*\*\* | 0.00149 | 0.0456\*\*\* | 0.00139 |
|  | (0.0105) | (0.00146) | (0.0104) | (0.00143) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | -0.352\*\*\* | -0.00222 | -0.352\*\*\* | -0.00227 |
|  | (0.0415) | (0.00409) | (0.0415) | (0.00402) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) t-1 | 0.452\*\*\* | 0.0157\*\*\* | 0.458\*\*\* | 0.0150\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0553) | (0.00572) | (0.0556) | (0.00570) |
| International Conflict t-1 | 0.960\*\*\* | -0.00425 | 0.992\*\*\* | -0.00370 |
|  | (0.249) | (0.0440) | (0.247) | (0.0442) |
| Civil Conflict t-1 | -0.820\*\*\* | 0.00657 | -0.820\*\*\* | 0.00677 |
|  | (0.141) | (0.0122) | (0.143) | (0.0123) |
| Lower Chamber Female Legislators t-1 | 0.0250\*\*\* | 2.36e-07 | 0.0254\*\*\* | 3.02e-05 |
|  | (0.00531) | (0.000476) | (0.00532) | (0.000471) |
| Catholics (%) t-1 | -0.232 | -0.0130 | -0.262 | -0.0111 |
|  | (0.209) | (0.0171) | (0.208) | (0.0171) |
| Islam (%) t-1 | 0.148 | -0.119\*\*\* | 0.133 | -0.117\*\*\* |
|  | (0.214) | (0.0205) | (0.215) | (0.0206) |
| Post Soviet | -0.317\*\* | 0.0880\*\*\* | -0.304\* | 0.0838\*\*\* |
|  | (0.154) | (0.0164) | (0.156) | (0.0165) |
| Natural Indirect Effects | -0.00710 |  | -0.00920 |  |
|  | (0.00927) |  | (0.0382) |  |
| Natural Direct Effects | -0.0461 |  | -0.101 |  |
|  | (0.0314) |  | (0.0907) |  |
| Total Effects | -0.0532\* |  | -0.101 | -0.110 |
|  | (0.0319) |  | (0.0907) | (0.0948) |
| Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  |  | -0.321 | 0.0568\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.606) | (0.0177) |
| Secular Values Index t-1 X Comparative Abortion Index 2 (0 to 1) t-1 |  |  | 1.398 |  |
|  |  |  | (1.511) |  |
| Constant | 1.630\* | 0.249\*\*\* | 1.641\* | 0.262\*\*\* |
|  | (0.986) | (0.0858) | (0.921) | (0.0848) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 207 | 207 | 207 | 207 |

# **Country Profiles**

## **Figure 1: Nicaragua**

A comparison of the same graph

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

A graph of different groups of people

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

## **Figure 2: Poland**

A comparison of different types of abortion index

Description automatically generated

A graph of different groups of people

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

# **Illustrative Case Vignettes**

## **Case Vignettes: An Overview**

In the subsequent section, we provide case vignettes for two countries, Nicaragua and Poland. Of these cases, Nicaragua best exemplifies our theoretical model, in that amplifying restrictions on abortion rights have preceded mounting PIR violations. Under each vignette, we draw attention to both direct and indirect mechanisms. As we argue in the paper, authoritarian regimes and those inclined to crack down on human rights are likely to exhibit the direct link between abortion restrictions and PIR abuses.

We also discuss indirect mechanisms, whereby abortion restrictions create vulnerable human rights contexts and activate other pernicious mechanisms, such as the criminalization of the vulnerable (including migrants, refugees, LGBTQ communities, as well as indigenous and impoverished communities), and increased intolerance of alternative lifestyles and exclusionism, retrenchment of secular worldviews and the ascendancy of dogmatic worldviews, and, weakened trust in the state and its institutions.

The case of Poland starkly illustrates how normative re-alignment can become entrenched. The new government under Tusk has expressed its desire to course correct by undoing the restriction placed on abortion access by the Law and Justice Party (PiS). However, abortion access advocates worry that course correction may not come easy, given disagreements within the government, a president aligned with the Law and Justice Party, and, equally importantly, a new normative normal, which views abortion as taboo. As well, Poland showcases the difficulties of redressing democratic and liberal backsliding. As we argue in the paper, the direct connection to PIR violations manifests more readily in countries marked by democratic backsliding.

## **Nicaragua**

Nicaragua is one of the most, if not the most, restrictive countries with respect to abortion rights, with a complete ban on abortion first starting in 2006. Since 2008, abortion has been criminalized in all instances, including in instances of rape and the likely health or death of the pregnant person (AI 2009, 5). Healthcare workers are also subject to criminal prosecution for any fetal injury or death, regardless of whether their actions were intended to preserve the health of the pregnant person or the fetus (AI 2009, 8). In 2015, there was a “citizens’ initiative” to decriminalize abortion; the National Assembly rejected the initiative in 2017 without any debate (HRW 2017, np). Domestic abuse and femicides are increasing (HRW 2023).

Normative re-alignment: Nicaragua’s restrictions on abortion are part of a larger turn to reject secular values in the country; President Daniel Ortega has increased his use of religious rhetoric to justify attacks on social groups even as he has ousted Catholic bishops and religious civil society organizations for speaking out against his widespread use of repression (Gooren 2010; Steigenga, Coleman, and Marenco 2017; HRW 2023). V-Dem’s social group equality measure shows a stop decline starting in 2007 and worsening in the early 2010s.

Criminalization of behaviors of the vulnerable and scapegoating: After a violent crackdown on protests in 2018, Ortega’s regime has closed NGOs, universities, and media outlets, limiting all forms of dissent against the regime. Political rivals are routinely jailed. Although the F&M Global Barometer of Gay Rights (GBGR) does not yet show a decline, LGBT+ advocates have been especially targeted as visible and “foreign” actors that drove the 2018 protests (Viera 2021, np). Association with human rights of any kind often leads to a person being categorized as “traitors to the homeland” and losing their nationality (Selser 2023, np).

There is presently a human rights “crisis” in Nicaragua (AI 2024), with scholars concerned that abuses could even intensify further if Ortega, who is 78 years old, were to die and be replaced by his wife or favored son (La Prensa 2024). As the director of Human Rights Watch, José Miguel Vivanco, reported, the current situation is “completely Orwellian” (Alfonsi 2022, np).

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## **Poland**

The graphs in the “Country Profiles” depict that Poland’s CAI indices have been more liberal relative to the global averages, and that the country has slightly liberalized its policies in the early 2000s, though the weighted index paints a more complicated picture. To reiterate however, these graphs depict CAI until 2016, due to data availability.

Delving deeper, the country has experienced setbacks to its abortion regime since then, particularly after 2020. As the 2023 HRW report cogently summarizes, “since the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) came to power in 2015, Poland’s government has carried out a sustained attack on sexual and reproductive health rights, particularly access to abortion. The ruling party brought the abortion case to the Constitutional Tribunal after parliament voted not to adopt legislation effectively banning legal abortion.” The ruling was the culmination of an attack on abortion rights, including the PiS’s previous attempt in 2016 to institute a total ban on abortion, which was rejected by the parliament.

In October of 2020, the Constitutional Court passed a virtual total ban on abortion (with the only exemption being for fetal abnormalities), with the law entering into force in 2021. The Constitutional Court was widely believed to be ideologically biased and compromised, given the erosion of judicial independence under the ruling PiS regime. The 2020 ruling repealed abortion access for fetal abnormalities, stating that abortion for “severe and irreversible fetal defect or incurable illness that threatens the fetus’ life” was unconstitutional. Crucially, prior to 2020, legal abortion was permitted under three grounds, and 90 % of abortions sought had invoked these reasons for terminating pregnancies. This was known as the “abortion compromise” whereby the government allowed abortion on three conditions (in addition to fetal defects, to preserve the life of the mother, and in cases of rape or incest), and was a concession to the Catholic Church in the immediate post-Soviet era. This is consistent with the CAI scores. Our graphic shows a score of 4, and then 5, until 2016, when the data ends. Thus, by revoking all but one of these reasons (fetal abnormalities), the law constituted a significant rollback of abortion rights.

Criminalization: While the law did not criminalize seeking an abortion, it imposed criminal penalties against those assisting women obtain an abortion (Human Rights Watch 2023). The overall restrictive climate, however, resulted in authorities opening investigations against women seeking medical care for miscarriages and legal medical abortions. Additionally, women’s rights defenders and abortion-activists were intimidated, for example, in the case of one activist receiving a community service indictment for aiding women obtain medical abortions.

The original bill to ban abortion was supported by ultra-conservative groups who also supported measures to ban sexual education and to restrict the rights of LGBTQ communities. Human rights groups voiced concerns that abortion restrictions were part of a broader assault on women’s rights, leading to Poland’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on protections against GBV. A women’s rights activist noted, “extreme restrictions on abortion are part of a broader assault by Poland’s government on human rights, including women’s rights and LGBTI rights, and the rule of law” (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

Democratic backsliding: Our paper argues that authoritarian creep, or more generally, democratic erosion, can herald crackdowns on abortion rights. The HRW report makes this point and observes that the Law and Justice government’s clampdown on women’s rights is symptomatic of democratic backsliding, as indicated in the erosion of the rule of law and judicial independence.

Decreased collective action: The HRW report ties democratic erosion to the dismantling of reproductive rights and further points to parallel processes at work, namely the intimidation of activists, civil society groups, and abortion defenders. In other cases, women’s rights activists were detained for politically motivated criminal charges, and others received bomb and death threats. Most of the harassment centered on activists for reproductive rights initially, but then generalized to repression of anti-PiS protests. This is consistent with the notion that crackdowns on abortion rights may at the outset silence specific types of collective action, with downstream, broader effects on collective voicing of grievances. The climate of intimidation served to subdue peaceful protests, such as when activists sought to protest the government’s policies legally, through the police and courts.

Targeted abuses: Like in other countries with restrictive regimes, the abortion ban unduly affected women from poorer, marginalized backgrounds. “The Constitutional Tribunal ruling is causing incalculable harm to women and girls – especially those who are poor, live in rural areas, or are marginalized,” said Urszula Grycuk, international advocacy coordinator at the Federation for Women and Family Planning in Poland (Human Rights Watch 2021).

Normative re-alignment: Since coming to power, the centrist government of Tusk has promised to reverse the abortion ban, by allowing abortion-on-demand up to 12 weeks. However, it remains to be seen whether Tusk will be able to overcome several challenges to undoing restrictions. These challenges include the Constitutional Court, internal divisions within the ruling coalition that remains ideologically aligned with the right-wing, and a veto-wielding president aligned with the PiS (Brad and Vynck 2024). Tusk has introduced draft legislation but also acknowledged that the necessary number of votes may not materialize. According to our argument, this would indicate ideational regression, whereby the restrictionist ideology becomes socially accepted and dominant.

Authoritarianism as conduit: In the paper, we maintain that authoritarianism presents a condition for the testing ground mechanism to come into play. Poland showcases that democratic backsliding and abortion regression are associated. In fact, commentators lament that the democratic backslide has become so entrenched—lodged in the judicial system, for example, due to the machinations of the Law and Justice (PiJ) regime— that the new government will now face formidable challenges to reversing the trend. Indeed, Tusk will need to resort to “iron broom” types of policies—hardline measures—to unwind entrenched authoritarianism and purge PiJ partisan elements from the judiciary, to restore confidence in the rule of law, and reestablish the independence of the judiciary (Goldberg 2024).

Thus, Poland is a good example of how normative alignment can cement restrictionism, and lock restrictive policies in place, for the foreseeable future. A change in electoral fortunes, where a populist leader (Kaczyński) is replaced by a centrist one (Tusk) does not immediately bring in liberalization. As such, as of now, women and health care providers remain in limbo.

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