Supplementary Information for *"The Gendered Impact of Corruption Revelations: Unveiling the Role of Parties and Voters in Mexico"*

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1. Details on data coverage

We collected candidate lists for mayoral elections through a combination of transparency requests to government agencies and state-level electoral institutes. We then identified the gender and party of 47,141 candidates running in 10,119 municipal elections between 2000 and 2019. We match our candidate data with municipality characteristics and election outcomes from mayoral elections from the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI) and the National Electoral Institute (INE). We exclude municipalities with indigenous autonomy, a common practice in studies of Mexican elections, because their autonomy weakens the grasp of national political parties from local processes and election methods differ considerably from case to case. Table A.1 presents information on data coverage for each Mexican state. We identified candidates' gender for all election years after 2000 for 21 states (65.6%). We have partial coverage (missing some election years) for 10 states (31.2%) and no data for the state of Oaxaca. We manually identified cases because our source data comprised messy low-resolution PDFs and inconsistent formatting within and across states.

Table A.1 Data collection coverage by state

State	Status	Election year coverage
Aguascalientes	Complete	2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Baja California	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Baja California Sur	Complete	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018
Campeche	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Coahuila	Partial coverage	2002, 2005, 2009, 2013
Colima	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Chiapas	Partial coverage	2004, 2007, 2008, 2015
Chihuahua	Complete	2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Ciudad de México	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Durango	Partial coverage	2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Guanajuato	Complete	2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Guerrero	Complete	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018
Hidalgo	Partial coverage	2008, 2011, 2016
Jalisco	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
México	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Michoacán	Partial coverage	2004, 2007, 2011, 2018
Morelos	Complete	2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Nayarit	Complete	2002, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2014, 2017
Nuevo León	Partial coverage	2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Oaxaca	No data	-
Puebla	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2018
Querétaro	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Quintana Roo	Partial coverage	2005, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2018
San Luis Potosí	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Sinaloa	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2018
Sonora	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Tabasco	Partial coverage	2006, 2007, 2009, 2018
Tamaulipas	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Tlaxcala	Partial coverage	2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
Veracruz	Partial coverage	2004, 2007, 2010, 2017
Yucatán	Complete	2004, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2018
Zacatecas	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2018

Complete = Candidate lists for all elections after the year 2000 were found.
Partial coverage = Data for some election years was missing.
No data = No data available for that state.

2. Examples of media publicizing ASF results

News stories below were translated with Google Translate's option to translate websites.

Story (1)



Tlaxcala, the pending accounts found by the ASF

The evaluation of federalized spending carried out by the Superior Audit of the Federation on state authorities, in the 2021 Public Account, classified the Government of Tlaxcala as the eleventh state with the most anomalies in the application of these resources, even though it is an entity with one of the smallest populations in the country

Luis Herrera

Although the state of **Tlaxcala** has one of the smallest populations in the country, the volume of **irregularities** that were found regarding its **federalized spending** caused its state government to end up being classified by the Superior Audit of the Federation (**ASF**) as one of those that They obtained worse results in that area in the **2021 Public Account** .

The total amount that was observed to the Government of Tlaxcala was 1,197,100,000 pesos, which means that there were only 10 states with more irregularities in this area of federalized spending.

Story (2)



March 2, 2023 4:27 am

The ASF makes observations to the Acapulco government for 64 million expenses in 2021

The federal authority presumes "probable damage to the federal public treasury." It finds that the municipality paid companies for the collection of solid waste and the provision of the service was not accredited; that invoices were falsified in payment for pumping equipment and works that lacked authorization and for irregularities in the award and contracting processes

Chilpancingo, Guerrero, March 2, 2023 . According to the Individual Report of the Result of the Superior Audit of the Public Account 2021, the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF) made observations for the municipal government of Acapulco to clarify 64 million 150 thousand 345.80 pesos, because it generated "probable damage to the Federal Public Treasury."

Story (3)



MILENIO

ASF finds in Coyoacán possible embezzlement for 440 million pesos; figure higher than irregularities in Fonatur

Raphael Montes

Mexico City /21.02.2022 21:25:27

The **Coyoacán mayor's office** could not verify to the **Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF)** in what it used more than 440 million pesos that were assigned to carry out public works during 2020, the year in which the demarcation was governed by former soccer player Manuel **Negrete .**

Social media

Luis Ángel Rodríguez @Luis_TV10 · Aug 16, 2022

Denuncian **irregularidades** por más de 20 millones de pesos en obras supuestamente realizadas en el municipio de **Mezquital**, Dgo., piden que la @ASF_Mexico atraiga el caso ante la falta de confianza en la @EASEDGO: @BernabeAguilarC. Diputado local

Ricardo Rocha @RicardoRocha_MX · Jan 31, 2023

Encuentra **ASF irregularidades** en la SEP por 830 millones de pesos

Del periodo cuando la maestra Delfina Gómez estaba al frente



Renata Turrent @rturrent · Mar 24

El exalcalde aún no puede explicar cómo incrementó su patrimonio de 40 mil a 14.4 mdp en un par de años. Mismo monto por el cual la **ASF** encontró **irregularidades** en la alcaldía que gobernó, por cierto.

Excelente texto de @HernanGomezB.

Source 1: https://www.reporteindigo.com/reporte/tlaxcala-las-cuentas-pendientes-encontradas-por-la-asf/

Source 2: https://suracapulco.mx/realiza-la-asf-observaciones-al-gobierno-de-acapulco-por-64-millones-de-gastos-en-2021/

Source 3: https://www.milenio.com/politica/asf-identifica-coyoacan-desfalco-440-mdp#:~:text=La%20alcald%C3%ADa%20Coyoac%C3%A1n%20no%20pudo,el%20ex%20futbolista%20Manuel%20Negrete.

3. Additional information on audits

This section provides additional information on audits drawn from the ASF's publicly available information and summaries of the responses of ASF auditors and former mayors to information requests.

How are municipalities chosen for an audit? Auditors use a risk-based approach to auditing, which is common worldwide. Criteria are secret but rely on the size of the FISM, historical performance indicators, signs of institutional weakness, and whether the municipality had been audited previously. For logistical reasons, the ASF sometimes selects municipalities neighboring those audited.

The auditing process. ASF auditors examine the expenditure and financial records of federal resources a year after spending has concluded (unless an exception goes through due process). Audits follow four broad steps. 1) Auditors select a representative sample of public entities or municipalities according to their criteria. 2) The audit is conducted. Before 2019, the ASF would announce its Annual Program of Audits (PAF) and auditors would visit the municipality or government agency to examine their records. These records must have been previously certified by the Tax Service Administration (SAT) and the Secretary of Economy (SE). Since 2019, electronic audits have become more common. For federal transfers, auditors revise both the distribution and spending of the funds. 3) Auditors finalize their report and send it to the Chamber of Deputies. 4) Entities subject to adverse audit findings are notified, and they can request supporting information for those allegations.

Do mayors control FISM? Mayors are the highest authority in the municipality (*ayuntamiento*). The law of fiscal coordination gives mayors discretion on the types of project FISM is used for, but the money must be directed toward infrastructure projects that benefit marginalized and impoverished communities. Deviations from these guidelines are considered wrongdoing by auditors. Additional checks guarantee mayors have responsibility and control over the FISM: mayors can hold "keys" to the account (preventing other personnel from accessing the fund) and quantities over 500 thousand pesos must be approved by the municipal government.

Are there any concerns over biased auditing? The ASF is constitutionally endowed with technical autonomy, hires its own personnel, and is internally and externally monitored. Regarding internal checks, the ASF receives integrity evaluations that follow a model developed in the Netherlands (*IntoSAINT*). It also has a system for self-evaluations, quality control, and an internal control organ devoted to supervising its administration. Regarding external checks, the ASF collaborates and engages in peer review with the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), the Organization of Latin American and Caribbean Supreme Audit Institutions (OLACEFS), the Central American and Caribbean Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (OCCEFS), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Since 2018 concerns have been raised over the lack of independence of the ASF due to the appointment of a head linked to AMLO. However, personnel dismissed the possibility of biased auditing and underscored their technical autonomy, guaranteeing discretion on how to audit cases.

4. Candidate registration timelines

Table A.2 summarizes candidate registration timelines by state as articulated in state electoral laws. Mexican elections are held in June and July, and registration deadlines are mostly between January and April. This gives party leaders ample time to react to audit results published in the previous year.

Table A.2 Candidate registration timelines

State	Source	Article	Candidate registration timeline
Aguascalientes	State electoral code	142	December 1-15
Baja California	State electoral law	142	February 1-15
Baja California Sur	State electoral law	101	January 1-15
Campeche	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	390	February 1-20
Chiapas	State electoral code	233	44 days before election
Chihuahua	State electoral law	109	April 12-22
Coahuila	State electoral code	146	48 days before election
Colima	State electoral code	161	February 15-28
Durango	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	185	January 1-15
Estado de México	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	253	38 days before election
Guanajuato	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	176	March 1-7
Guerrero	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	270	Last week of February
Hidalgo	State electoral code	114	74-78 days before election
Jalisco	State electoral law	231	March 15-April 15
Mexico City	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	380	February 15-22 | March 22-29*
Michoacán	State electoral code	190	59 days before election
Morelos	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	177	March 8-15
Nayarit	State electoral law	140	April 1-15
Nuevo León	State electoral law	143	March 1-20
Oaxaca	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	184	January 1-15
Puebla	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	205	February 1-28
Queretaro	State electoral law	175	12 days before campaign
Quintana Roo	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	276	March 2-7
San Luis Potosí	State electoral law	260	March 8-15
Sinaloa	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	188	March 12-21
Sonora	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	194	20 days before campaign
Tabasco	State electoral law	187	January 1-15
Tamaulipas	State electoral code	209	May 5-15 | May 15-25 | May 28-June 3**
Tlaxcala	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	144	April 5-21
Veracruz	State electoral code	174	April 16-25
Yucatan	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	217	February 15-22 | March 22-29*
Zacatecas	State electoral code	139	January 1-15

* Vary depending on whether elections are concurrent with the governor.

** Vary depending on the population in the municipality.

5. Modeling justification

We believe that state-election year fixed effects (FE) allow us to better leverage the variation in our data. First, treatment variation within municipalities is very limited, compared to that within state-election years. We observe a minimum of 1, maximum of 7, and average of 5 elections per municipality because our analysis considers election years only. Moreover, as shown in Figure A.1, most municipalities are never treated (79%). Additionally, each election has on average 4.6 candidates, with 70 percent of elections having 5 or fewer candidates. With municipality FE in the test for H1, we would mostly observe incumbent/opposition and women/men candidates under the same treatment status. Similarly, for H2, the type of variation that we are interested in (comparing treated women vs. control women and treated men vs. control men) would be exceptionally rare within municipalities. Other common issues of including fixed effects for groups with few observations and limited variation are the instability of estimates, bias, and larger standard errors. Second, variation within municipalities would not account for important time-varying state-election year level factors. State-election year confounders are particularly important because administrative, electoral, and funding decisions are made at this level. Examples include the size of federal transfers for municipalities, how many women are required on party lists, how parties run together in coalitions, the number of audits, and the election-specific strategies of parties. We believe that we can overcome these concerns by 1) comparing municipalities within the same state and election year to account for unobserved confounders in a state-election year. 2) Controlling for theoretically relevant time-varying factors at the municipality level that are both related to treatment and outcome. 3) Clustering at the municipality-election level to address a potential lack of independence of errors at that level.

Figure A.1 Treatment variation within municipalities



6. Women and audits

Table A.3 shows the differences in means between men and women for whether a mayor received an audit [0/1] ("Audit") and the percentage of FISM inspected by auditors ("Coverage"). Neither difference in means is statistically significant, meaning that women are not more likely to be audited than men, and auditors are not more thorough with women mayors when scrutinizing the FISM.

Table A.3 Audits and women in office

Variable	Mean		Difference	p-value
	Women	Men		
Audit	0.068	0.062	0.006	0.1766
Coverage	80.71	80.52	0.19	0.8912

7. Audited vs not-audited municipalities

Table A.4 compares municipalities that have been audited at least once with those never audited (as of 2019) on key municipality characteristics. Some statistically significant differences exist (audit assignment is not random); most notably, audited municipalities are slightly larger and more developed.

Table A.4 Balance table: Audited vs non-audited municipalities as of 2019

	Means		*p-values*	
	Treatment	Control	Differences in means	Kolmogorov
Development index	0.850	0.858	0.001	0.004
Access to water	0.905	0.922	0.001	0.0001
Access to sewage	0.852	0.867	0.044	0.033
Access to electricity	0.976	0.982	0.0004	0.052
Previous margin of victory	0.148	0.134	0.017	0.122
Volatility index	25.383	26.177	0.182	0.349
Men to women ratio	95.739	96.016	0.244	0.095
Population (log)	10.797	9.221	0.00	0.00
Average schooling	7.195	6.695	0.00	0.00

8. Summary statistics

Table A.5 Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Woman candidate	47,145	0.215	0.411	0	1
Incumbent candidate	39,458	0.182	0.386	0	1
Candidate victory	47,006	0.201	0.401	0	1
Revelation last year	47,241	0.083	0.276	0	1
Revelation last 2 years	47,241	0.130	0.336	0	1
Revelation last 3 years	47,241	0.160	0.367	0	1
Previous mayor was a woman	43,957	0.050	0.217	0	1
Proportion of women candidates	46,660	0.214	0.236	0.000	1
Coalition candidate	47,239	0.242	0.428	0	1
Margin of victory in last election	44,541	0.145	0.156	0.0001	1
Volatility index	44,436	22.457	13.909	0.134	100
Human development index	47,082	0.831	0.068	0.000	0.92
Population (log)	47,120	10.063	1.391	5.489	14.42
Neighboring treated (potential spillovers)	47,241	0.296	0.457	0	1
Total treated neighbors	47,241	0.359	1.241	0	10
PRI	47,027	0.210	0.408	0	1
PAN	47,027	0.179	0.384	0	1
PRD	47,027	0.146	0.353	0	1
PAN-PRD	47,027	0.029	0.169	0	1
MORENA	47,027	0.049	0.216	0	1
MC	47,027	0.042	0.200	0	1
PT	47,027	0.090	0.286	0	1
PVEM	47,027	0.062	0.242	0	1
PES	47,027	0.015	0.121	0	1
CONV	47,027	0.025	0.156	0	1
PANAL	47,027	0.057	0.232	0	1
Independent	47,027	0.010	0.100	0	1
Other	47,027	0.085	0.279	0	1

9. Women as candidates (full table)

Table A.6 reports the results of different specifications testing H1. Results from model 2 are used to create Figure 1 in the main text. Models are OLS (1-4) or logistic (5-8), and all include standard errors clustered on municipality-election. The models are without controls (1 and 5), with the main controls (2 and 6), with additional controls such as coalition candidate and party dummy variables (3 and 7), and with municipality fixed effects (4 and 8). The number of observations varies for two reasons. First, the incumbent candidate variable will be missing for the first election because we do not have information in the dataset on who the incumbent party was in the previous election. Second, some controls have missing values.

Table A.6 Women as candidates and revelations of corruption

	Woman candidate							
	OLS				*Logistic*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Revelation X Incumbent	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Recent revelation	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.35**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.09
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Incumbent candidate	0.04***	0.04***	0.03***	0.05***	0.28***	0.32***	0.24***	0.35***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Development index		0.18***	0.19***	0.61***		1.28***	1.38***	5.37***
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.15)		(0.34)	(0.34)	(1.10)
Population (log)		-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.11***		-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.50**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.19)
Previous margin of victory		0.08***	0.07***	0.00		0.50***	0.47***	-0.04
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Volatility index		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coalition candidate			-0.00				-0.02	
			(0.01)				(0.04)	
PAN			-0.01				-0.08	
			(0.01)				(0.05)	
PRD			0.00				0.00	
			(0.01)				(0.06)	
PAN-PRD			-0.02				-0.12	
			(0.01)				(0.08)	

MORENA			0.03**				0.13*	
			(0.01)				(0.06)	
MC			0.02				0.10	
			(0.01)				(0.07)	
PT			0.02*				0.15*	
			(0.01)				(0.06)	
PVEM			0.01				0.04	
			(0.01)				(0.07)	
PES			0.01				0.04	
			(0.02)				(0.10)	
Convergencia			-0.00				-0.03	
			(0.02)				(0.14)	
PANAL			0.03*				0.14*	
			(0.01)				(0.07)	
Independent			-0.28***				-1.54***	
			(0.02)				(0.14)	
Other			0.09***				0.49***	
			(0.01)				(0.06)	
Constant	0.08	0.21***	0.19**	0.88	-2.39***	-1.56**	-1.72***	-13.88
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.49)	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(1,526.04)
Observations	39,375	37,060	36,854	37,060	39,375	37,060	36,854	37,060
State-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Municipality and year FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.20				
Akaike Inf. Crit.					37,085.53	35,418.71	34,865.49	37,148.85
F Statistic	49.44***	47.65***	46.90***	4.71***				

Note: OLS (1-4) and logistic (5-8) regressions predicting a woman becoming candidate. State-election year fixed effects (1-3, 5-7) and municipality and year fixed effects (4, 8). Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. Baseline party is PRI for models with party dummy variables. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

10. Women as candidates (party models)

Figure A.2 presents the results of a model that interacts the indicator for recent revelation of corruption with a categorical variable for political party. For all parties, recent revelations of corruption do not increase the likelihood of a woman running as candidate. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.2 Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Party names are PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*), PAN (*Partido de Acción Nacional*), PRD (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*), MORENA (*Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional*), MC (*Movimiento Ciudadano*), PT (*Partido del Trabajo*), PVEM (*Partido Verde Ecologista de México*), PES (*Partido Encuentro Social*), CONV (*Convergencia*), PANAL (*Partido Nueva Alianza*), INDEP (Independent). The "*Other*" category includes small regional parties.

11. Women as candidates (gender of the audited mayor)

Figure A.3 presents results from the main specification for two samples—cases where the mayor linked to the recent revelation of corruption was a woman (left panel) or a man (right panel). Recent revelations of corruption under female mayors yield a lower probability of a woman winning election compared to when female mayors had no corruption revelations, and this occurs for incumbent and opposition parties. However, the differences are not statistically significant. Overall, we conclude that results of the main specification do not differ depending on the gender of the audited mayor. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.3 Probability of nominating women and recent revelation of corruption, samples where the audited mayor was a woman or a man.



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0).

12. Women as candidates (revelation in the last 3 years)

Figure A.4 presents results from the main specification for cases where a revelation of corruption happened in the last three years. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.4 Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption in the last three years



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past 3 years (1) or not (0).

13. Women as candidates (only audited municipalities)

Figure A.5 presents results from the main specification for a sample that only includes municipalities that were audited. Units in the control group are cases where no irregularities were found. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.5 Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption (only audited municipalities)



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0). Sample only includes municipalities that were audited. Units in the control group are cases where no irregularities were found.

14. Women as candidates (quotas)

Figure A.6 presents results from the main specification, splitting the sample before and after a national law started to require parity in subnational elections (before and after 2014). While quotas clearly increase the probability of women becoming candidates in elections, recent revelations of corruption do not change the probability of women running for incumbent and opposition parties differently pre- and post-2014. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.6 Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption (before and after quotas)



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0).

15. Women as candidates (spillover models)

One potential concern is that a revelation of corruption in a municipality impacts neighboring municipalities. If spillovers were present, this could bias the effect towards zero, explaining the null results for models predicting women as candidates. To address spillover concerns, we used data on the geometric location of Mexican municipalities and identified municipalities with contiguous boundaries. With this data, we perform two tests:

1. We run our analysis for H1 (models predicting women as candidates) excluding neighboring (non-treated) municipalities from the sample, thus removing the municipalities with potential spillovers.
2. We run our analysis for H1 (models predicting women as candidates) where we consider municipalities that neighbor treated municipalities as "treated" and compare them to the control group (non-neighboring municipalities in the control group). This analysis would help us determine if spillovers are in place.

Results for test #1 (1-2) and test #2 (3-4) are shown in Table A.7. We find no evidence of spillovers in neighboring municipalities. Models (1-2) exclude neighboring (non-treated) municipalities, and no significant effect is found for the interaction term *Revelation X Incumbent*. Models (3-4) compare municipalities that neighbor treated municipalities (*Neighboring treated*) in the control group. Similarly, no effect is found for the interaction term (*Neighbor X Incumbent*). Models include state-election year (1,3) and municipality and year (2,4) fixed effects, standard errors clustered on municipality-election, and all models control for the number of neighboring municipalities that were treated (*Total treated neighbors*).

Table A.7 Potential spillover models

	Woman candidate			
	Test #1		Test #2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Revelation X Incumbent	0.01	0.01		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Neighbor X Incumbent			0.02	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Recent revelation	-0.00	0.01		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Neighboring treated			-0.03*	-0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Incumbent candidate	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Total treated neighbors	-0.00	-0.02***	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Development index	0.20***	0.54**	0.18***	0.50**

	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.16)
Population (log)	-0.03***	-0.14***	-0.03***	-0.11***
	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.03)
Previous margin of victory	0.06**	-0.01	0.07***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Volatility index	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.25***	1.33**	0.22***	1.16**
	(0.08)	(0.61)	(0.07)	(0.52)
Observations	26,785	26,785	33,364	33,364
State-year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Municipality and year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.17	0.22	0.18	0.22
Adjusted R^2	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
F Statistic	35.40***	3.90***	46.89***	4.68***

Note: OLS regressions predicting a woman becoming candidate. State-election year fixed effects (1, 3) and municipality and year fixed effects (2, 4). Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

16. Candidate victory models (full table)

Table A.8 reports the results of different specifications that test H2. Results from model 2 are used to create Figure 2 in the main text. All models are OLS, and they include standard errors clustered on municipality-election. Models 1-4 use revelations of corruption in the last year, Models 5-8 revelations in the last 2 years, and Models 9-12 in the last three years. For each indicator of revelations of corruption, we include the model with no controls (1, 5, and 9), the main controls (2, 6, and 10), additional controls such as coalition candidate, proportion of women candidates, neighboring treated municipality, and party dummy variables (3, 7, and 11); and municipality and year fixed effects (4, 8, and 12).

Table A.8 Candidate victory, gender, and revelations of corruption

	Dependent variable:											
	Candidate victory											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Revelation (t-1) X Woman	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**								
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)								
Revelation (t-2) X Woman					0.03*	0.03*	0.04***	0.04**				
					(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Revelation (t-3) X Woman									0.03*	0.03*	0.03**	0.03**
									(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Revelation in the last year	-0.04***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01								
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)								
Revelation in the last 2 years					-0.04***	0.00	-0.01	-0.01				
					(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Revelation in the last 3 years									-0.04***	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
									(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman candidate	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Development index		-0.07	-0.02	-0.07		-0.06	-0.01	-0.07		-0.06	-0.01	-0.07
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Population (log)		-0.02***	-0.01***	0.02		-0.02***	-0.01***	0.02		-0.02***	-0.01***	0.02
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)
Previous margin of victory		0.06***	0.03*	0.04**		0.06***	0.03*	0.04**		0.06***	0.03*	0.04**
		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Volatility index		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coalition candidate			0.02***				0.02***				0.02***	
			(0.01)				(0.01)				(0.01)	
Proportion of women			0.09***				0.09***				0.09***	
			(0.01)				(0.01)				(0.01)	
Neighboring treated			0.00				0.00				0.00	
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)	
PAN			-0.22***				-0.22***				-0.22***	
			(0.01)				(0.01)				(0.01)	

PRD			-0.38***			-0.38***				-0.38***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PAN-PRD			-0.27***			-0.27***				-0.27***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
MORENA			-0.36***			-0.36***				-0.36***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
MC			-0.39***			-0.39***				-0.39***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PT			-0.45***			-0.45***				-0.45***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PVEM			-0.39***			-0.39***				-0.39***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PES			-0.46***			-0.46***				-0.46***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
Convergencia			-0.49***			-0.49***				-0.49***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PANAL			-0.42***			-0.42***				-0.42***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
Independent			-0.48***			-0.48***				-0.48***		
			(0.02)			(0.02)				(0.02)		
Other			-0.48***			-0.48***				-0.48***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
Constant	0.35***	0.64***	0.61***	-0.05	0.36***	0.64***	0.61***	-0.04	0.36***	0.64***	0.61***	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.31)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.31)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.31)
Observations	46,918	44,000	43,552	44,000	46,918	44,000	43,552	44,000	46,918	44,000	43,552	44,000
State-election year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Municipality and year FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.22	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.22	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.22	0.05
F Statistic	9.10***	10.43***	61.41***	1.08**	9.13***	10.42***	61.42***	1.08**	9.15***	10.41***	61.41***	1.08**

Note: OLS regressions predicting candidate victory. State-election year fixed effects (1-3, 5-7, 9-11) and municipality and year fixed effects (4, 8, 12). Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. Baseline party is PRI for models with party dummy variables. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

17. Candidate victory models (gender of the audited mayor)

Figure A.8 presents results from the main specification for H2 for two subsamples: observations where the audited mayor was a woman and observations where the audited mayor was a man. As described in the paper, we might expect women to be more likely to win only when the audited mayor is a man if gender stereotypes about women are really at work. The figure shows a higher probability for women winning in both scenarios, but it is only statistically significant when the audited mayor was a man. Find full model results in Table B.2 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.8 Candidate victory and revelations of corruption, samples where the audited mayor was a woman or a man.



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0).

18. Candidate victory models (placebo tests)

Table A.9 conducts two placebo tests:[1]

1. Test #1 assesses whether spending irregularities becoming public are driving the effect and not anything related to audit selection. Audits are announced a year before they are conducted and results became publicly available a year afterwards. Finding a significant effect of audit year (1 = audit was announced, 0 = no audit announced) would suggest that something other than revelations of corruption could be driving significance. Table A.9 uses audit year as treatment, finding no effect if an audit was conducted that same year (columns 1 and 2).
2. Test #2 compares cases where revelations found no irregularities ("clean revelations") with cases in the control group that were not audited, with the expectation being that there is no significant effect. This is confirmed in columns 3 and 4.

Table A.9 Placebo tests for candidate victory models

	Candidate victory			
	Test #1		Test #2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Audit year X Woman candidate	0.00	-0.19		
	(0.02)	(0.14)		
Audit year	0.01	0.08		
	(0.01)	(0.05)		
Clean X Woman candidate			-0.03	-0.18
			(0.04)	(0.29)
Clean revelation			-0.01	-0.08
			(0.02)	(0.13)
Woman candidate	-0.10***	-0.78***	-0.08*	-0.65*
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.29)
Constant	0.64***	1.27**	0.68***	1.46*
	(0.08)	(0.43)	(0.10)	(0.57)
Observations	44,000	44,000	40,181	40,181
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.04		0.04	
Log Likelihood		-21,051.10		-19,455.36
F Statistic	10.38***		9.58***	

Note: OLS (1,3) and logistic (2,4) regressions predicting candidate victory. State-election year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

[1] Find full model results in Table B.3 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

19. Candidate victory models (quotas)

Figure A.10 re-runs the main specification for H2, splitting the sample before and after a national law started to require parity in subnational elections (before and after 2014). Recent revelations of corruption increase the probability of women winning the election in both time periods (significance at the 95 percent level post 2014, p-value for pre 2014 was 0.06) but do not affect men's probability of winning. Find full model results in Table B.2 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.10 Candidate victory and revelations of corruption, samples before and after quotas



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0).

20. Candidate victory models (audited municipalities)

Table A.10 reports the results of the main specifications for test H2 (A.8), considering our main treatment indicator (Revelation of corruption in the last year) and with a sample of only audited municipalities. The models now compare cases with "clean" audit results to cases where auditors found irregularities. While we continue to find a positive relationship, the effect loses significance.

This may be a result of the much-reduced sample size, the small number of cases with completely "clean" audit results, and the small number of women in the control group. Our overall sample size drops from ~44,000 observations to ~4,000 observations. Out of the ~4,000 observations for these models, 599 observations have "clean audits." However, our data is at the candidate-level, and the 599 observations with "clean" audit results correspond to 99 unique municipalities. Municipalities can be audited more than once, and among audited municipalities, only 11.3% (92 municipalities) only had "clean" audit results (zero irregularities) for the period of study. Additionally, the control group of "clean audits" only has 167 women in it.

To explore whether the null results emerge from omitting the non-audited cases from the control group, we ran a placebo test comparing cases where revelations found no irregularities ("clean revelations") with cases in the control group that were not audited (Table A.9, columns 3-4). This allows us to test for differences among those groups that might suggest the non-audited cases are driving the significant results in the main models. We find no significant effect for clean revelations. This suggests that the large sample size in the control group of our main models is not creating significance when compared to a group of municipalities that were audited but not treated (had no revelations of corruption).

Table A.10 Candidate victory, gender, and revelations of corruption, only audited municipalities

	Candidate victory			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Revelation X Woman	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Recent revelation	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Woman candidate	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Development index		-0.16	-0.10	0.31
		(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.59)
Population (log)		-0.01	0.00	-0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.15)
Previous margin of victory		0.03	0.01	0.06
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Volatility index		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00

		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coalition candidate			0.07***	
			(0.02)	
Proportion of women			0.04	
			(0.03)	
PAN			-0.16***	
			(0.02)	
PRD			-0.35***	
			(0.02)	
PAN-PRD			-0.42***	
			(0.04)	
MORENA			-0.32***	
			(0.02)	
MC			-0.37***	
			(0.02)	
PT			-0.42***	
			(0.02)	
PVEM			-0.29***	
			(0.02)	
PES			-0.42***	
			(0.03)	
Convergencia			-0.45***	
			(0.05)	
PANAL			-0.39***	
			(0.03)	
Independent			-0.42***	
			(0.04)	
Other			-0.43***	
			(0.02)	
Constant	0.34***	0.55***	0.54***	0.27
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(2.05)
Observations	4,493	4,402	4,365	4,402
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.04

F Statistic	0.91	0.94	7.61***	0.33

Note: OLS regressions predicting candidate victory. State-election year fixed effects (1, 3) and municipality and year fixed effects (2, 4). Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. Baseline party is PRI for models with party dummy variables. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

21. Candidate victory models (size of revelations)

Figure A.11 presents results from the main specification for H2 with a new indicator of revelations of corruption that accounts for the size of irregularities found by auditors. The new categorical variable has four categories: No revelations (no audit results or zero irregularities found), 1st tercile (bottom third of irregularities), 2nd tercile (middle third of irregularities), and 3rd tercile (top third of irregularities). We find consistent results. Varying amounts of irregularities do not affect men's probability of winning differently. For women, they are more likely to win when irregularities are greater than 0, but differences in the amount of irregularities produce similar increases in women's probability of winning. Find full model results in Table B.2 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.11 Candidate victory and revelations of corruption, size of revealed irregularities



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means.