ONLINE APPENDIX

to

I'm a Survivor:

Political Dynamics in Bureaucratic Elites' Partisan Identification

Data appendix: ASAP access & reproduction

Appendix A: Additional tables and figures

Appendix B: Simulation procedure and results

Data appendix: ASAP access & reproduction

This article uses data collected within 10 waves of the American State Administrators Project (ASAP) from 1964 to 2008. The authors of this article were not directly involved in this data collection. They did not engage in human subjects research, and no ethics approval was required for their research. Instead, the de-identified data were provided under a data transfer agreement from Dr. Cynthia Bowling and Auburn University. The first waves of the survey were collected by the late Dr. Deil S. Wright. Dr. Bowling became involved with ASAP in 1994 and became the Co-ASAP Director of the project in 2004. The survey data used in the article's analyses were in full compliance with the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR), as well as with APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research in terms of consent, deception, confidentiality, harm and impact.

We confirm that the de-identified quantitative data and related code necessary to reproduce the results in this article will be made available to scholars. Access to these replication data will require the signing of that ASAP data transfer agreement (https://asap.wisc.edu/dataset)

Appendix A: Additional tables and figures

Figure A.1: Shift self-reported party identification between survey waves



Note: *Shift Party ID* and *Shift Party ID (detailed)* represent the shift in respondents' self-reported partisan identification between two consecutive survey waves. The former is derived from partisanship variables coded 1 for Democrat, 2 for Independent and 3 for Republican, and therefore ranges from -2 (i.e., move to the left from Republican to Democrat) to 2 (move to the right from Democrat to Republican). The latter is similarly constructed from partisanship variables coded 1 for Democrat, 2 for Independent leaning Democrat, 3 for Independent, 4 for Independent leaning Republican, and 5 for Republican.

Figure A.2: Graphical representation of current versus lagged Governor party shifts



Note: The figure displays the cross-tabulation of the shift in the state Governor's partisan affiliation between two survey waves (on the Y-axis) against its lagged value between two previous survey waves (on the X-axis). For instance, the Governor party shift from 2004 to 2008 relative to the Governor party shift from 1998 to 2004. These partisan shifts are derived from partisanship variables coded 1 for Democrat, 2 for Independent and 3 for Republican, and therefore range from -2 (i.e., move to the left from Republican to Democrat) to 2 (move to the right from Democrat to Republican). The height of the bars reflects the number of observations in each category, and the Pearson Chi^2 test verifies whether the rows and columns are independent. Overall, the figure indicates that consecutive political turnover events commonly go in opposite directions – with political shifts towards the left followed by shifts towards the right, and vice versa. This mitigates concerns that pre-trends in political developments – and state agency leaders' responses to them – may drive our findings.

Figure A.3: Heterogeneity by polarization from ASAP dataset (1994-2008)



Note: The figure displays marginal effects obtain from ordered logistic regression models (secondary y-axis), overlayed on a histogram indicating the distribution of the absolute ideological difference between Democrats and Republicans in state *s* in year *t* on a 7-point liberal-conservative scale (primary y-axis). The independent variable is *Shift Governor party*, which equals -2 when the governor changed from Republican to Democrat, 2 when the governor changed from Democrat to Republican, and 0 otherwise. This is interacted with the ideological difference between both parties in the state and year. The left-hand panel has *Shift Party ID* as the dependent variable, whereas the dependent variable in the right-hand panel is *Shift Party ID (detailed)*. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects and exclude the top 1% observations at both extremes of the polarization spectrum. The 95%-confidence interval is based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Full details provided in Column (1) of Online Appendix Table A.16.

Figure A.4: Heterogeneity by polarization from NOMINATE dataset (1964-2008)



Note: The figure displays marginal effects obtain from ordered logistic regression models (secondary y-axis), overlayed on a histogram indicating the distribution of the absolute ideological difference between the Democrat and Republican members of the US Congress in state *s* in year *t* using NOMINATE scores (primary y-axis). The independent variable is *Shift Governor party*, which equals -2 when the governor changed from Republican to Democrat, 2 when the governor changed from Democrat to Republican, and 0 otherwise. This is interacted with the ideological difference between both parties in the state and year. The left-hand panel has *Shift Party ID* as the dependent variable, whereas the dependent variable in the right-hand panel is *Shift Party ID (detailed)*. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects and exclude the top 1% observations at both extremes of the polarization spectrum. Some US states have no congressional delegation from one of the two main parties in certain years, which we treat as missing observations in this analysis. The 95%-confidence interval is based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Full details provided in Column (2) of Online Appendix Table A.16.

Figure A.5: Heterogeneity by (self-reported) time allocation on policy development



Note: The figure displays marginal effects obtain from ordered logistic regression models (secondary y-axis), overlayed on a histogram indicating the distribution of self-reported share of the respondent's time spent on policy development tasks (primary y-axis). The left-hand panel has *Shift Party ID* as the dependent variable, whereas the dependent variable in the right-hand panel is *Shift Party ID (detailed)*. The independent variable is *Shift Governor party*, which equals -2 when the governor changed from Republican to Democrat, 2 when the governor changed from Democrat to Republican, and 0 otherwise. This is interacted with the self-reported share of the respondent's time spent on policy development tasks. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. 95%-confidence interval is based on standard errors clustered at the individual level. Full details provided in Column (3) of Online Appendix Table A.16.

Figure A.6: Placebo check on the impact of false positives and measurement error



Note: This figure shows the results of 1,000 replications of an analysis that estimates the model in Column 2 of Table 2 on a dataset where we randomly assign a (counterfactual) change in partisan identification to respondents observed only once in the ASAP dataset (N=9,448). The left-hand plot displays the distribution of the obtained coefficient estimates, while the right-hand plot shows the distribution of association t-statistics. The vertical line represents the point estimate and t-statistic obtained in our original analysis (i.e., Column 2 of Table 2).

Figure A.7: Robustness check including non-panel respondents with $\Delta PartyID_i$ set to 0



Note: Each plot displays the distribution of coefficient estimates obtained from 1,000 ordered logistic regression models when we extend our dataset with x % randomly chosen non-panel respondents (with x = 10, 20, 30, 40). Reflecting the assumption that resigning/leaving out-partisans may be (much) less willing to adjust their partisanship, we set the dependent variable $\Delta PartyID_i = 0$ for these 'imputed' observations. The vertical line represents the point estimate obtained from our original analysis (i.e., Column 2 in Table 2).

Figure A.8: Robustness check excluding each state or year, one by one



Note: The figure displays coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models, as reported in Column (1) of Table 2 in the main text. The dependent variable in *Shift Party ID*, which represents the shift in respondents' partisan identification between two consecutive survey waves and ranges from -2 (i.e., move to the left from Republican to Democrat) to 2 (move to the right from Democrat to Republican). The independent variable is *Shift Governor party*, which has the same range as *Shift Party ID* (see note to Table 2 for further details. The top panel excludes respondents from each US state one by one, while the bottom panel excludes all respondents from a given survey wave one by one. The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects.

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics and representativeness of matched sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Full ASAP sample	Non-matched sample during first wave	Perfect Matches during first wave	p-value of difference (2) versus (3)
Party ID	1.846 (1 – 3)	1.846	1.843	0.000
Party ID (detailed)	2.660 (1 – 5)	2.662	2.639	0.000
Party state Governor	1.851 (1 – 3)	1.857	1.789	0.053
Party state Lower Chamber	1.630 (1 – 3)	1.620	1.730	0.001
Party state Upper Chamber	1.715 (1 – 3)	1.713	1.737	0.604
Party state Legislature	1.785 (1 – 3)	1.778	1.854	0.043
Male	0.855 (0 – 1)	0.852	0.888	0.002
Age	49.418 (24 – 87)	49.528	48.376	0.000
Agency size	900.726 (1 – 45000)	920.262	695.495	0.011
Length in agency	10.167 (0 – 52)	10.097	10.882	0.015
Education	4.087 (1 – 5)	4.078	4.174	0.018
Civil servant	0.244 (0 – 1)	0.243	0.261	0.229
Type of position	3.584 (1 – 7)	3.558	3.845	0.000
Agency type	7.404 (1 – 13)	7.428	7.171	0.000
US state	25.882 (1 – 50)	25.817	26.530	0.029
N	~10,000	~9,050	~950	

Note: Column (1) includes the entire sample of ASAP respondents during their first (and possibly only) participation in the survey. Columns (2) and (3) provide separate results for respondents we can (column (3)) and cannot (column (2)) perfectly match across multiple waves of the ASAP surveys. Column (4) contains the p-value of formal tests evaluating whether the respondents in column (3) differ from the respondents in column (2) for the background characteristics mentioned. We use a t-test for numerical data (age, agency size, length in agency) and a Chi^2 test for categorical data (gender, education, civil servant, party identification, type of position, agency type, and state). The ~ in the bottom row indicates that the exact number of observations varies slightly across variables due to non-response.

Table A.2: Balancing check at initial point of measurement, by treatment status

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	'Treated' with change in governor	'Untreated' with change in governor	p-value of difference of (1) versus (2)
Party ID	1.822	1.854	0.339
Party ID (detailed)	2.674	2.621	0.587
Male	0.910	0.878	0.119
Age	47.535	48.788	0.128
Agency size	727.037	678.875	0.795
Length in agency	10.961	10.840	0.821
Education	4.263	4.130	0.518
Civil servant	0.298	0.243	0.359
Type of position	4.114	3.714	0.201
Agency type	7.006	7.250	0.265
US state	27.087	26.258	0.000
N	~300	~630	

Note: The table contains the p-value of formal tests evaluating whether the respondents treated with change in governor (Column 1) differ on the background characteristics mentioned from respondents who did not experience a change in governor (Column 2). We use a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank tests for numerical data (age, agency size, length in agency) and a Chi^2 test for categorical data (gender, education, civil servant, party identification, type of position, agency type, and state). The ~ in the bottom row indicates that the exact number of observations varies slightly across variables due to non-response.

Table A.3: Assessment of pre-trends in agency leaders' party identification

	Dependent variable: 'Shift Party ID'	Dependent variable: 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'
Shift Governor party	0.387 *	0.380 **
	(0.202)	(0.159)
Shift Governor party (forward lag)	0.021	-0.081
	(0.181)	(0.188)
N (observations)	159	123
N (Individuals)	124	96

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models. For details on the dependent and independent variables, see note to Table 2 in main text. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.4: Robustness check using only the first two waves of each respondent

	Shift Party ID (1)	Shift Party ID (detailed) (2)	Shift Party ID (3)	Shift Party ID (detailed) (4)
Shift Governor party	0.234 ***	0.197 **	-	-
	(0.081)	(0.079)		
Shift legislative party in power	-	-	0.360 **	0.280 *
			(0.166)	(0.146)
N (observations)	906	684	760	680
N (Individuals)	906	684	760	680

Note: See main text Table 2 for variable definitions. Sample restricted to only the first two waves of each respondent. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.5: Robustness check using only survey waves that are four years apart

	All respondents (Governor shift) (1)	Excluding cross-party shifts (2)	Excluding Independents (3)	All respondents (Legislature shift) (4)
	Panel I: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID'			
Shift Governor party	0.278 ***	0.296 ***	0.345 ***	-
	(0.093)	(0.102)	(0.126)	
Shift legislative party in power	-	-	-	0.453 **
				(0.204)
N (observations)	799	787	524	671
N (Individuals)	697	686	468	573
	Panel II: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'			
Shift Governor party	0.252 ***	0.257 ***	0.337 **	-
	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.133)	
Shift legislative party in power	-	-	-	0.335 *
				(0.176)
N (observations)	633	623	412	641
N (Individuals)	553	544	365	558

Note: See main text Table 2 for variable definitions. Sample restricted to restricted to respondents answering subsequent survey waves four years apart. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.6: Robustness check on operationalization of party in power

	State Lower Chamber (1)	State Upper Chamber (2)	US President (3)	Voters (4)	Horserace (5)
	Panel I: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID'				
Shift Governor party	-	-	-	-	0.251 ***
					(0.084)
Shift party in Lower Chamber	0.250 *	-	-	-	-
	(0.130)				
Shift party in Upper Chamber	-	0.138	-	-	-
		(0.114)			
Shift President party	-	-	-0.087	-	0.114
			(0.174)		(0.200)
Shift voter sentiment	-	-	-	0.011	0.011
				(0.007)	(0.008)
N (observations)	1082	1074	1082	1082	1048
N (Individuals)	921	913	921	921	891
	Panel II: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'				
Shift Governor party	-	-	-	-	0.225 ***
					(0.073)
Shift party in Lower Chamber	0.296 ***	-	-	-	-
	(0.112)				
Shift party in Upper Chamber	-	0.103	-	-	-
		(0.100)			
Shift President party	-	-	0.295 *	-	0.205
			(0.159)		(0.163)
Shift voter sentiment	-	-	-	0.015	0.015
				(0.010)	(0.011)
N (observations)	839	839	839	839	811
N (Individuals)	715	715	715	715	691

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models. See main text Table 2 for variable definitions The independent variable *Shift voter sentiment* in Column (4) measures the change in the balance of voter support at the state level between the Democratic and Republican parties in presidential elections (with negative values implying support shifted towards the Democratic party, and vice versa). Column (5) presents a 'horserace' specification including *Shift Governor party* (as used in our main analysis) alongside shifts in the party of the president and state-level voter sentiment. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.7: Separating left- and right-ward shifts in the party in power

	All respondents (Governor shift) (1)	Excluding cross-party shifts (2)	Excluding Independents (3)
	Panel I: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID'		
Shift Governor to **right**	0.387 *	0.487 **	0.362
	(0.212)	(0.233)	(0.284)
Shift Governor to **left**	-0.567 **	-0.495 *	-0.698 **
	(0.252)	(0.271)	(0.349)
N (observations)	1068	1048	705
N (Individuals)	910	891	612
$Chi^2(1)$	0.26	0.00	0.48
	Panel II: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'		
Shift Governor to **right**	0.254	0.295	0.435
	(0.193)	(0.203)	(0.324)
Shift Governor to **left**	-0.616 ***	-0.596 **	-0.542
	(0.231)	(0.240)	(0.401)
N (observations)	826	811	538
N (Individuals)	705	691	463
$Chi^2(1)$	1.27	0.81	0.04

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models. See main text Table 2 for variable definitions. The independent variable *Shift Governor to left/right* are indicator variables equal to 1 when the Governor party shifts to the right or left, 0 otherwise. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects and exclude the very few Independent state Governors (0.56% of the sample). Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.8: Robustness check using shifts in liberal/conservative placement

	Ideological placement (1)	Ideological placement (2)	Ideological placement (3)	Ideological placement (4)
	Panel I: All available observations		*Panel II: Only observations from survey waves four years apart*	
Shift Governor party	0.052	-	0.077	-
	(0.049)		(0.064)	
Shift Governor to **right**	-	0.060	-	0.059
		(0.148)		(0.175)
Shift Governor to **left**	-	-0.177	-	-0.356 **
		(0.141)		(0.178)
N (observations)	323	323	268	268
N (Individuals)	298	298	255	255

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from linear regression models. The dependent variable equals the shift in respondents' ideological self-placement on a seven-point liberal-conservative scale (coded such that higher numbers imply a move towards a more conservative stance). The independent variable *Shift Governor party* ranges from -2 (i.e., move to the left from Republican to Democrat) to 2 (move to the right from Democrat to Republican). *Shift Governor to right/left* are indicator variables equal to 1 when the Governor party shifts to the right or left, 0 otherwise. Panel I includes all available observations, while Panel II includes only observations from survey waves that are four years apart. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. Variations in N are due to differences in the number of missing values across variables. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.9: Robustness check using placebo outcome measures

	Hours worked (1)	Salary (2)	Hours worked (3)	Salary (4)
Shift Governor party	0.166	-132.689	-	-
	(0.196)	(446.133)		
Shift Governor to **right**	-	-	0.358	-801.287
			(0.603)	(1304.45)
Shift Governor to **left**	-	-	-0.299	-361.342
			(0.663)	(1433.871)
N (observations)	841	898	841	898
N (Individuals)	716	761	716	761

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from linear regression models. The dependent variable is the shift in respondents' answer to questions about their weekly hours worked (column (1)) and yearly salary (column (2)). The independent variable *Shift Governor party* ranges from -2 (i.e., move to the left from Republican to Democrat) to 2 (move to the right from Democrat to Republican). *Shift Governor to right/left* are indicator variables equal to 1 when the Governor party shifts to the right or left, 0 otherwise. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.10: Robustness check on heterogeneity results

	Appointment (1)	Contacts (2)	Full model (3)
	Panel I: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID'		
Shift Governor party	0.183 **	0.169 *	0.120
	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.107)
Appointment process	-0.185	-	-0.245
	(0.171)		(0.188)
Contact frequency	-	-0.005	0.100
		(0.178)	(0.190)
Shift Governor party	0.179	-	0.218
* Appointment process	(0.151)		(0.169)
Shift Governor party	-	0.142	0.129
* Contact frequency		(0.152)	(0.155)
N (observations)	1023	920	897
N (Individuals)	869	783	763
Chi^2 (appointment)	9.10 ***	-	4.27 **
Chi^2 (contacts)	-	7.08 ***	3.21 *
	Panel II: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'		
Shift Governor party	0.173 **	0.143	0.104
	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.095)
Appointment process	-0.002	-	-0.021
	(0.148)		(0.156)
Contact frequency	-	0.038	0.073
		(0.147)	(0.157)
Shift Governor party	0.194	-	0.167
* Appointment process	(0.153)		(0.155)
Shift Governor party	-	0.145	0.173
* Contact frequency		(0.136)	(0.139)
N (observations)	801	813	790
N (Individuals)	683	694	674
Chi^2 (appointment)	7.95 ***	-	3.23 *
Chi^2 (contacts)	-	7.52 ***	5.34 **

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models. The dependent variable in Panels I and II are *Shift Party ID* and *Shift Party ID (detailed)*, respectively, and the main independent variable is *Shift Governor party* – see note to Table 2 in main text. *Appointment process* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if respondents was appointed with Governor consent (0 otherwise). *Contact frequency* equals 1 if respondents frequent contact with the Governor/Legislature and/or their staff at the current point of measurement (i.e., at least monthly contact versus less than monthly; 0 otherwise). Since there are only very few Independent state Governors (0.56% of the sample), these are excluded throughout the analysis. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.11: Heterogeneity by Governor contact frequency (alternative operationalization)

	High contact frequency with Governor (1)	Low contact frequency with Governor (2)	High contact frequency with Governor staff (3)	Low contact frequency with Governor staff (4)
	Panel I: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID'			
Shift Governor party	0.338 **	0.197 **	0.221 **	0.182
	(0.157)	(0.091)	(0.112)	(0.146)
N (observations)	320	592	591	241
N (Individuals)	289	507	520	212
	Panel II: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'			
Shift Governor party	0.260 *	0.192 **	0.282 ***	0.080
	(0.139)	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.119)
N (observations)	261	544	576	234
N (Individuals)	236	467	506	205

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models. For details on the dependent and independent variables, see note to Table 2 in main text. Columns (1) and (2) differentiate between respondents based on their contact frequency with the Governor at the current point of measurement (i.e., at least monthly contact versus less than monthly). Columns (3) and (4) focus instead on contacts with the Governor's staff using the same frequency cutoff. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level between are brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.12: Heterogeneity by partisan primaries and/or voter registration

	Identifiable party (**yes**) (1)	Identifiable party (**no / maybe**) (2)	Identifiable party (**yes / maybe**) (3)	Identifiable party (**no**) (4)
	Panel I: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID'			
Shift Governor party	0.358 ***	0.139	0.301 ***	0.153
	(0.124)	(0.099)	(0.091)	(0.144)
N (observations)	450	618	716	352
N (Individuals)	380	530	603	307
	Panel II: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'			
Shift Governor party	0.311 ***	0.136	0.285 ***	0.141
	(0.115)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.132)
N (observations)	341	485	555	271
N (Individuals)	288	417	470	235

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models. For details on the dependent and independent variables, see note to Table 2 in main text. Distinct columns differentiate between respondents based on whether their partisanship might be identifiable to outside observers from partisan primaries and/or voter registration in their state (obtained in January 2024 from *Open Primaries*; https://openprimaries.org/rules-in-your-state). 'Yes' ('No') indicates that one's partisan leaning is definitely (not) identifiable if the person votes in the primary or general election. 'Maybe' indicates that a person voting in a primary or general election could credibly claim to be independent or unaffiliated. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects and include the entire 1964-2008 sample (due to a lack of historical information, we impose that no change occurred in a state's institutional rules). Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.13: Robustness check using non-answers to party identification

	Aligned wave 1 & Shift in Governor	Aligned wave 1 & No shift in Governor	Misaligned wave 1 & Shift in Governor	Misaligned wave 1 & No shift in Governor
Answer	140	354	209	365
	(97.22%)	(99.44%)	(97.66%)	(97.59%)
No answer	4	2	5	9
	(2.78%)	(0.56%)	(2.34%)	(2.41%)

Note: The table reports the absolute number of respondents that answers (top row) or fails to answer (bottom row) the party identification question in the second of two survey waves. Respondents are split in two dimensions depending on whether they aligned with the state Governor in the previous survey wave ('Aligned/Misaligned wave 1'), and whether there as a change in the party of the governor ('Shift/No shift in Governor). The Pearson chi^2 test assessing the difference in share of respondents in each group (reported in parentheses) has a value of 4.88 with 3 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.181$).

Table A.14: Robustness check including controls for state-level political instability

	Gov. shift (1)	Gov. shift (2)	Leg. shift (3)	Leg. shift (4)
	Panel I: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID'			
Shift Governor party	0.233 ***	0.227 ***	-	-
	(0.075)	(0.075)		
Shift legislative party in power	-	-	0.256 *	0.256 *
			(0.149)	(0.149)
Governor shifts since WW II (count)	-0.117 ***	-	-0.116 ***	-
	(0.036)		(0.038)	
Governor shifts since WW I (count)	-	-0.059 **	-	-0.063 **
		(0.025)		(0.026)
N (observations)	1068	1068	934	934
N (Individuals)	910	910	794	794
	Panel II: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'			
Shift Governor party	0.207 ***	0.203 ***	-	-
	(0.069)	(0.069)		
Shift legislative party in power	-	-	0.233 *	0.238 *
			(0.130)	(0.130)
Governor shifts since WW II (count)	-0.056 *	-	-0.060 *	-
	(0.032)		(0.031)	
Governor shifts since WW I (count)	-	-0.035	-	-0.043 **
		(0.022)		(0.022)
N (observations)	826	826	835	835
N (Individuals)	705	705	711	711

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models. For details on the dependent and independent variables, see note to Table 2 in main text. *Governor shifts since WW II* (WW I) counts the number of changes in the partisan affiliation of the state Governor since WWII (or WW I). All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.15: Full details of results in Figure 1 (main text)

	Panel I: Multinomial regression results	
	Dependent variable: Shift Party ID	
No change in Governor party (ref.cat.)	-	
Shift Governor party to left	-0.190	
	(0.118)	
Shift Governor party to right	0.252 ***	
	(0.104)	
N (observations)	891	
N (Individuals)	1049	
	Panel II: Predicted probabilities	
	Probability shift in Party ID to left	Probability shift in Party ID to right
No change in Governor party	0.075	0.067
Shift Governor party to left	0.098	0.046
Shift Governor party to right	0.045	0.120

Note: Results from multinomial logit model in Panel I, with associated predicted probability yin Panel II. See main text Table 2 for variable definitions. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Table A.16: Full details of results in Figure A.3, A.4, and A.5

	Polarization ASAP (1)	Polarization NOMINATE (2)	Time on policy development (3)
	Panel I: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID'		
Shift Governor party	-0.035	0.094	0.205
	(0.190)	(0.347)	(0.126)
Polarization ASAP	-0.168	-	-
	(0.177)		
Polarization NOMINATE	-	-1.374 *	-
		(0.749)	
Time on policy development	-	-	-0.0002
			(0.006)
Shift Governor party	0.223 **	-	-
* Polarization ASAP	(0.111)		
Shift Governor party		0.269	-
* Polarization NOMINATE		(0.567)	
Shift Governor party	-	-	0.001
* Time on policy development			(0.005)
N (observations)	367	891	1046
N (Individuals)	323	771	893
	Panel II: Dependent variable 'Shift Party ID (detailed)'		
Shift Governor party	0.131	-0.045	0.083
	(0.218)	(0.326)	(0.120)
Polarization ASAP	-0.142	-	-
	(0.149)		
Polarization NOMINATE	-	0.121	-
		(0.732)	
Time on policy development	-	-	-0.0001
			(0.005)
Shift Governor party	0.108	-	-
* Polarization ASAP	(0.113)		
Shift Governor party	-	0.432	-
* Polarization NOMINATE		(0.501)	
Shift Governor party	-	-	0.004
* Time on policy development			(0.005)
N (observations)	355	813	826
N (Individuals)	312	694	705

Note: The table reports coefficient estimates obtained from ordered logistic regression models. The dependent variable in Panels I and II are *Shift Party ID* and *Shift Party ID (detailed)*, respectively, and the main independent variable is *Shift Governor party* – see note to Table 2 in main text. *Polarization ASAP (NOMINATE)* reflect the ideological distance between both parties in the state and year as inferred from the ASAP and NOMINATE datasets (see main text for details). *Time on policy development* is the (self-reported) share of a respondent's time allocated to policy development tasks (rather than managerial and other tasks). Since there are only very few Independent state Governors (0.56% of the sample), these are excluded throughout the analysis. All models include a full set of survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are between brackets. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.

Appendix B: Simulation procedure and results

This appendix sets out the procedures and results from a simulation exercise to validate the matching procedure used to link respondents across consecutive ASAP survey waves. For all 1,000 simulations, we start by drawing a sample of 10,500 observations (i.e., the number of unique individuals in the ASAP dataset) for a specified number of categorical variables with a specified number of 'answer categories' (more details below). A random selection of 950 of these observations is then duplicated and appended to the dataset (i.e., the number of matches we observe in the ASAP dataset). Subsequently, one half of the resulting 11,450 observations was allocated to a time period 0 (including the 950 observations that were duplicated) and the other half to a time period 1 (including the 950 duplicates that were created). This procedure results in a dataset whereby we know that *only* the 950 duplicated observations re-appear in both time periods. Consequently, we can use this dataset to verify: i) how many of the 950 duplicates can be correctly uncovered (or, reversely, how many false negatives arise), as well as ii) how many false positives are found among the non-duplicated observations.

Following this general pattern, we computer-generated 1,000 datasets with the main characteristics of the ASAP dataset as a guiding structure. All datasets therefore contain information on 11 variables (since we always have more than 10 background characteristics available in the ASAP dataset) with a number of categories as observed in the ASAP dataset (ranging from 2 to 50 depending on the variable). We also impose that the inter-correlations of these variables match those observed in the ASAP dataset (ranging in absolute value from 0.05 to 0.50).[1] The results are reported in Figure B.1, and show that our methodology always correctly captures at least 946 of the 950 matches (i.e., maximum four false negatives). The number of false positives never exceeds six, and is lower than three in 847 of our 1,000 simulations. This implies that the final panel dataset

[1] This relates to the correlation between *pairs* of our categorical variables. That is, given that we simulate eleven variables, we impose a specific correlation between five pairs of these variables, while the eleventh variable is an uncorrelated random draw. We follow this approach since a fully specified correlation matrix across all variables is extremely cumbersome to impose with categorical variables. It requires an exponentially increasing number of constraints to be satisfied simultaneously, which is often practically unfeasible given the number of variables in our simulations. The simulations build on: whuber (2018), *Generating correlated binomial random variables*, accessed last on 05.01.2024 from https://stats.stackexchange.com/q/285008.

would never include more than 0.63% false positives (i.e., 6 out of 956 observations), which is unlikely to create any substantively meaningful bias in our main analysis.

Figure B.1 Simulation results



Note: The figure shows the results from 1,000 simulations applying the methodology of Geys (2023) to computer-generated datasets that have the same characteristics as the ASAP dataset. All simulations start with 10,500 observations, and then add 950 duplicates. The left-hand panel shows the number of simulations (Y-axis) where we correctly retrieve a given number of duplicates (X-axis). The right-hand panel shows the number of simulations (Y-axis) where we obtain a given number of false positives (X-axis).