Part I

Supplementary Appendices: Out-Competing Rivals

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A SAMPLING

We define contested municipalities as those where multiple (two or more) of the following armed groups were present between 2015 and 2018: dissidents of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), Clan del Golfo (or Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia), Los Rastrojos, Los Puntilleros, La Constru, Clan Isaza, La Empresa, Los Pachenca, Los Botalones, Los Costeños, Los Caquetaños, Los Acuamanes, and Águilas Negras. These groups include guerrillas, neo-paramilitary or paramilitary successor organizations, factions of demobilized left-wing guerrillas that have continued fighting or remobilized, and organizations dedicated principally to drug trafficking (Table A1). Table A2 provides a list of contested municipalities as well as information about which were selected for surveying and which were eligible for the *Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial* (PDET).

First, we include the ELN. Since its founding in the mid-1960s, the ELN has successfully challenged state authority and governed stretches of the country. While its control and influence have varied over time, in recent years the group has controlled territory in its regions of traditional strength (e.g. El Catatumbo; the middle of Cauca; Arauca; and the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia). But it has also expanded into new areas following the FARC's demobilization (e.g. Vichada), where it began to compete with dissidents of the FARC and the Clan del Golfo (described below), among other actors. The ELN is thought to be composed of nearly 2,000 members, many of whom are also active in Venezuelan territory (Venezuela Investigative Unit 2018; Indepaz 2021).

Second, we include so-called neo-paramilitaries or paramilitary successor organizations. These groups typically do not have a national presence, but rather control territory in particular regions. This includes the Águilas Negras (initially in Norte de Santander, with ties to right-wing elements of the Colombian military); La Empresa (formed out of the partial demobilization of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia's Bloque Calima and its Pacific Front, strongest in Buenaventura) (Álvarez et al. 2017, 62); and La Constru (formed by mid-level commanders ordered to defect from the paramilitary demobilization process in the mid-2000s and strongest in Putumayo) (ColombiaReports 2018; Semana 2018*b*).

Smaller, more localized paramilitary successor groups such as Clan Isaza, Los Botalones, and Los Costeños are also included in our dataset. Clan Isaza began as a local paramilitary group in the Magdalena Medio in the 1970s and was later integrated into the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (Buitrago 2018). The group is dedicated to narcotrafficking, extortion, and sub-leasing of properties for processing cocaine in Antioquia (El Tiempo 2014). The Clan Isaza competes with but sometimes cooperates with the Botalones. The Botalones are geographically limited to the Magdalena Medio and are principally linked to narcotrafficking, extortion, and contract killings. The founders of Los Costeños were leaders of a paramilitary group on the Caribbean Coast, the Bloque Héroes de los Montes de María. The group has a strong presence in the department of Átlantico, especially in Santa Marta, where it engages in extortion, contract killings, and commercialization of illicit drugs. Los Pachenca were created by a former member of the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia and have a limited radius of activity in the department of Magdalena, on the Caribbean coast. According to Álvarez et al. (2017, 82-83), Los Pachenca has a standing, permanently-operating structure while also subcontracting smaller criminal gangs for specific tasks. The group is principally dedicated to extortion, especially in Santa Marta, although

it has also clashed with the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia for control of microtrafficking in another coastal city, Cartagena (Dario Rodriguez 2017).

Not all "remnant" groups are reconstituted right-wing paramilitaries; some partially demobilized left-wing groups have also rearmed including, most prominently, FARC dissidents. Estimates vary as to how many FARC fighters remain in their reincorporation processes and how many have rejoined dissident groups (Indepaz 2021; Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización 2021).[32] We do not include the FARC (the group that negotiated with the Colombian government and ultimately demobilized in 2016) because FARC combatants during this period were already abandoning their traditional areas of influence and heading towards what would become demobilization zones. Another left-wing "remnant group," the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), demobilized in the early 1990s; nonetheless, residual elements continue to operate and clash with other armed criminal and political groups, including the ELN, in areas such as El Catatumbo (Semana 2018a).

We also include organizations principally dedicated to drug trafficking, including the Clan del Golfo (also known as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, the Clan Úsuga, or the Urabeños), which as of 2023 was likely present in nearly 400 municipalities (International Crisis Group 2024). Los Rastrojos, borne out of the Norte del Valle cartel in the early 2000s, was limited to the Valle del Cauca until its expansion into the central coffee-growing region (e.g. Quindío and Risaralda) and the northern-most department of La Guajira. Their strength would wane after multiple leaders were captured and extradited to the United States (e.g. El Tiempo 2016; InSight Crime 2018). La Cordillera is a geographically-limited criminal organization dedicated to micro-trafficking in the departments of Risaralda, Caldas y Quindío, although through alliances with other groups it may have influence in other departments, including Valle del Cauca (Matta Colorado 2018). Los Caquetaños principally serve as intermediaries in the drug production and distribution supply chain. The group runs coca refining laboratories and is primarily active in the Colombian Amazon (El Colombiano 2015). Los Acuamanes were a regionally-limited criminal group in Norte de Santander and Sur de Bolívar—with particular control over neighborhoods in Barrancabermeja—especially dedicated to the trafficking and commercialization of illicit drugs and extortion (e.g. Becerra 2018). In early 2018, many of its members were captured, leading the Attorney General's office to declare the group officially neutralized.

Table A1: Groups Included to Define Contested Municipalities

Insurgents	Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)
Splinter/Remnant Groups	FARC Dissidents
	Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL)
Paramilitary Successor Organizations	Águilas Negras
	La Empresa
	La Constru
	Clan Isaza
	Los Botalones
	Los Costeños
Drug Trafficking Organizations	Clan del Golfo (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia)
	Los Rastrojos
	Los Caquetaños
	Los Puntilleros
	La Pachenca
	Los Acuamanes

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[32] Not all FARC defectors joined the dissidents; some have been recruited into the ELN, the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), or other non-state armed groups.

Table A2: Municipalities and PDET Status

Department	Municipality	PDET	Sampled	Department	Municipality	PDET	Sampled
Antioquia	Anorí	Yes		Chocó	Riosucio	Yes	Yes
Antioquia	Chigorodó	Yes	Yes	Chocó	Sipí	Yes	
Antioquia	Ebéjico		Yes	Chocó	Unguía	Yes	
Antioquia	El Bagre	Yes	Yes	Córdoba	Puerto Libertador	Yes	
Antioquia	Puerto Berrío		Yes	Córdoba	Tierralta	Yes	Yes
Antioquia	Puerto Nare		Yes	Guaviare	San José del Guaviare	Yes	Yes
Antioquia	Puerto Triunfo			La Guajira	Dibulla	Yes	Yes
Antioquia	Remedios	Yes	Yes	La Guajira	Maicao		Yes
Antioquia	San Jerónimo			La Guajira	Manaure		Yes
Antioquia	San Luis			Magdalena	Ciénaga	Yes	Yes
Antioquia	Segovia	Yes	Yes	Meta	Acacías		Yes
Antioquia	Sopetrán		Yes	Meta	Mapiripán	Yes	
Antioquia	Tarazá	Yes	Yes	Meta	Puerto Concordia	Yes	
Antioquia	Valdivia	Yes		Meta	Puerto Gaitán		Yes
Antioquia	Vigía del Fuerte	Yes		Meta	Puerto Rico	Yes	
Antioquia	Yarumal		Yes	Meta	Vistahermosa	Yes	Yes
Antioquia	Yondó	Yes	Yes	Nariño	Barbacoas	Yes	
Antioquia	Zaragoza	Yes		Nariño	El Charco	Yes	Yes
Arauca	Arauquita	Yes	Yes	Nariño	La Tola	Yes	
Arauca	Puerto Rondón		Yes	Nariño	San Andres de Tumaco	Yes	Yes
Arauca	Tame	Yes	Yes	Nariño	Santa Bárbara	Yes	
Atlántico	Malambo		Yes	Norte de Santander	Abrego		Yes
Atlántico	Puerto Colombia		Yes	Norte de Santander	Convención	Yes	Yes
Atlántico	Tubará			Norte de Santander	El Carmen	Yes	Yes
Bolívar	Arenal	Yes		Norte de Santander	El Tarra	Yes	
Bolívar	Cantagallo	Yes		Norte de Santander	El Zulia		Yes
Bolívar	Montecristo			Norte de Santander	Hacarí	Yes	Yes
Bolívar	San Pablo	Yes	Yes	Norte de Santander	La Playa		Yes
Bolívar	Santa Rosa del Sur	Yes	Yes	Norte de Santander	Ocaña		Yes
Caquetá	San Vicente del Caguán	Yes	Yes	Norte de Santander	San Calixto	Yes	Yes
Casanare	Sácama		Yes	Norte de Santander	Sardinata	Yes	Yes
Cauca	Argelia	Yes	Yes	Norte de Santander	Teorama	Yes	Yes
Cauca	Balboa	Yes		Norte de Santander	Tibú	Yes	Yes
Cauca	Guapi	Yes		Putumayo	Villagarzón	Yes	
Cauca	López	Yes		Santander	Barrancabermeja		Yes
Cauca	Toribio	Yes		Sucre	Corozal		
Cesar	Aguachica		Yes	Sucre	Sampués		
Cesar	Agustín Codazzi	Yes	Yes	Valle del Cauca	Bolívar		
Cesar	La Paz	Yes		Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura	Yes	Yes
Cesar	San Martín			Valle del Cauca	Calima		Yes
Chocó	Alto Baudo			Valle del Cauca	Guadalajara de Buga		Yes
Chocó	Bajo Baudó			Valle del Cauca	Riofrío		
Chocó	Carmen del Darien	Yes		Valle del Cauca	San Pedro		
Chocó	El Litoral del San Juan	Yes	Yes	Valle del Cauca	Trujillo		Yes
Chocó	Istmina	Yes		Valle del Cauca	Tuluá		Yes
Chocó	Lloró			Valle del Cauca	Zarzal		Yes
				Vichada	La Primavera		Yes

Note: This table refers to the municipalities that were initially selected. For details about which municipalities were replaced, see Appendix B.

A3

B Enumeration and Adjustment of Sampling Plans

Several municipalities and towns had to be replaced due to safety concerns. When a municipality was replaced, another municipality in the same strata was selected with a probability proportional to its projected 2022 population. If a specific hamlet was deemed unsafe, another hamlet in the same municipality was selected with a probability proportional to its projected 2022 population. If it was impossible to work in *any* hamlets in a given municipality, we sampled more hamlets from another municipality selected for sampling in the same strata.

Before traveling to each municipality to begin enumeration, the survey firm contacted local governmental officials. Enumerators also contacted heads of local Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs) either before or upon arrival. Where these contacts or other sources of information indicated problematic conditions, municipalities were replaced. In total, we replaced 3 municipalities for safety reasons. Teorama was replaced by Convención, Tibú was replaced by El Carmen, and El Tarra was replaced by Hacarí. We also replaced 14 hamlets: one due to a landslide, one due to poor roads, and 12 due to security considerations. Hamlets replaced for security reasons were either cases in which officials or JAC leaders in the municipal capital indicated to the survey company that selected hamlets were unsafe before the enumerators traveled to the hamlets, or cases in which other information indicated that working conditions were unsafe. For example, a rural hamlet in the municipality of Ebéjico had to be replaced when a letter from a police official, JAC president, and government secretary confirmed that it had been recently attacked by the AGC. Our pre-analysis plan did not contain details about replacement.

Another difficulty in enumeration concerned the gender composition of our respondents. Given that many men work outside the home, sometimes even outside of their home municipalities, surveying men turned out to be more challenging than expected. As of July 18, 2022, approximately two-thirds of our 1,529 respondents were women. To rectify this, we temporarily halted data collection on July 18, and made two methodological decisions that constituted deviations from our pre-analysis plan: first, we altered the sampling of respondents within households and, second, we surveyed additional respondents. More specifically, from July 19th onward, men were two times as likely as women to be selected within households. Additionally, at the end of the fieldwork, we conducted 80 additional surveys with men in the 4 municipalities with the largest gender imbalance: Santa Rosa del Sur, Agustín Codazzi, Puerto Berrío, and Remedios. With these changes, 39.9% of our respondents were men and 59.9% were women. The additional 80 respondents were the primary reason we collected surveys from 2,397 respondents, instead of the 2,300 we had planned. The additional 17 respondents were the product of uncertainty surrounding response rates; once individuals were selected, enumerators followed the procedures to survey those individuals, even if the desired or anticipated number of respondents within a given block, municipality, or strata had already been surveyed. Conversely, in some municipalities (San Calixto, Tame, and la Primavera), there were ultimately fewer respondents than originally anticipated due to non-replacement of selected individuals. Table A3 shows how many blocks were sampled and how many surveys were completed in each municipality.

Table A3: Blocks and Surveys by Municipality

Municipality	# of Blocks	# of Surveys	Municipality	# of Blocks	# of Surveys
13670	7	30	54398	5	19
13688	14	50	54498	17	52
18753	10	50	54670	8	32
19050	9	33	54720	10	45
20011	10	40	5579	14	80
20013	14	58	5585	7	37
23807	10	46	5604	11	60
27077	5	18	5736	8	44
27250	6	25	5761	9	37
27615	5	19	5887	16	62
44090	7	33	5893	11	38
44430	10	53	68081	21	88
44560	6	36	70670	6	30
47189	11	56	76109	12	68
50006	26	88	76111	10	48
50568	12	48	76126	5	26
50711	13	38	76828	8	27
5172	12	58	76834	19	82
52250	6	28	76895	8	29
5240	10	36	81065	14	62
5250	13	53	81591	7	30
52835	16	59	81794	11	49
54003	8	31	8433	12	44
54206	13	50	85315	5	27
54245	14	61	8573	6	30
54261	8	32	95001	16	52
54344	10	42	99524	7	28

C MAIN RESULTS

Table A4: AMCEs of Governance Attributes (Main Results)

	Dependent Variable	
	Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")	Rating ("How Negative")
Services & Goods		
Very few		
Medicine	-0.082^{***}	-0.138^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.025)
Roads	-0.100^{***}	-0.178^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.025)
Dispute resolution	-0.071^{***}	-0.152^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.025)
Rules		
No consideration		
Reflect local traditions	-0.051^{***}	-0.100^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Consults with leaders	-0.060^{***}	-0.142^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Support		
Few people		
Community members	-0.011	-0.054^{*}
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Friends and family	-0.016^{*}	-0.053^{*}
	(0.008)	(0.022)
Punishment		
Lots of violence		
Little violence	-0.131^{***}	-0.262^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.019)
Ideology		
No position		
Left-wing	0.018^{*}	-0.017
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Right-wing	0.003	-0.040°
	(0.008)	(0.021)
R^2	.026	.015
N	23,004	23,555
Clusters	2,357	2,376

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Figure A1: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of Governance Attributes, with Alternative Baselines

Note: Numerical results are presented in Table B1.

D DIAGNOSTICS & ROBUSTNESS

D.1 DIAGNOSTIC TESTS

Table A5: Randomization Tests

	Dependent Variable			
	Woman	Education	Age	Income
(Intercept)	0.591***	4.523***	42.481***	2.114***
	(0.011)	(0.049)	(0.359)	(0.024)
Services & Goods				
Medicine	−0.023*	−0.049	0.444	−0.005
	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.306)	(0.020)
Roads	0.000	−0.025	0.532°	−0.007
	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.306)	(0.020)
Dispute resolution	−0.008	−0.037	0.294	−0.001
	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.305)	(0.020)
Rules				
Reflect local traditions	0.005	0.065°	−0.253	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.265)	(0.018)
Consults with leaders	0.010	0.054	0.109	−0.005
	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.267)	(0.018)
Support				
Community members	0.004	−0.001	−0.061	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.265)	(0.018)
Friends and family	0.012	0.015	−0.317	−0.011
	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.266)	(0.018)
Punishment				
Little violence	−0.005	0.008	−0.031	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.217)	(0.014)
Ideology				
Left-wing	0.007	−0.045	0.409	−0.018
	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.266)	(0.018)
Right-wing	0.009	0.027	−0.057	−0.008
	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.265)	(0.018)
R^2	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	23004	23004	23004	22828

$^{***}p < 0.001; {}^{**}p < 0.01; {}^{*}p < 0.05; {}^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Figure A2: Marginal Means by Task and Profile (Carryover & Profile Order Effects)

Note: Numerical results are presented in Tables B2 and B3.

D.2 ROBUSTNESS TO SURVEY WEIGHTS

The survey weights were constructed by *Sistemas Especializados de Información* (SEI) focusing on strata, gender, and age; they take into account non-response at the block, household, and individual levels and reduce the effects of outliers. Table A6 compares key characteristics of the weighted and unweighted sample compared to the universe. Figure A3 presents the main results when using weights.

Table A6: Universe and Sample Demographics

	Universe	Sample Unweighted	Sample Weighted
Female	53%	59%	52%
20-39 Year Olds as % of Adults 20+	49%	45%	44%
40-59 as % of Adults 20+	33%	33%	34%
60+ as % of Adults 20+	17%	21%	23%

Note: "Universe" refers to all municipalities defined as contested (see table A2). Universe data provided by SEI, based on 2018 census.

Figure A3: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of Governance Attributes, with Survey Weights

Note: Numerical results are presented in Table B4.

D.3 Robustness to Multiple Testing Corrections

Table A7: Adjusted P-Values, Forced Choice

Level	1. Original	2. Adjusted, Bonferroni (16)	3. Adjusted, Bonferroni (32)	4. Adjusted, BH	5. Adjusted, Adaptive Shrinkage
Medicine	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Roads	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Dispute resolution	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Reflect local traditions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Consults with local leaders	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Community members	0.176	2.820	5.639	0.196	0.392
Friends and family	0.041	0.651	1.302	0.051	0.353
Little violence	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Left-wing	0.029	0.459	0.919	0.041	0.323
Right-wing	0.757	12.107	24.213	0.757	0.429

Note: We show adjusted p-values (for the main model) based on different approaches for multiple testing (Liu and Shiraito 2023). The Bonferroni correction in column 2 multiplies each p-value by 16 because that is the total number of possible comparisons in the forced choice model; the correction in column 3 multiplies each p-value by 32 because the same comparisons can be made in the rating and forced choice models.

Table A8: Adjusted P-Values, Rating

Level	1. Original	2. Adjusted, Bonferroni (16)	3. Adjusted, Bonferroni (32)	4. Adjusted, BH	5. Adjusted, Adaptive Shrinkage
Medicine	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Roads	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Dispute resolution	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Reflect local traditions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Consults with local leaders	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Community members	0.010	0.163	0.325	0.015	0.039
Friends and family	0.015	0.240	0.480	0.019	0.076
Little violence	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Left-wing	0.410	6.565	13.130	0.410	0.336
Right-wing	0.065	1.033	2.066	0.072	0.298

Note: We show adjusted p-values (for the main model) based on different approaches for multiple testing (Liu and Shiraito 2023). The Bonferroni correction in column 2 multiplies each p-value by 16 because that is the total number of possible comparisons in the rating model; the correction in column 3 multiplies each p-value by 32 because the same comparisons can be made in the rating and forced choice models.

D.4 Robustness to Removing Individuals With Identical Rating Responses

Figure A4: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs), Removing Those Who Respond to Each Rating Question Identically

Note: Numerical results are presented in Table B5.

D.5 ROBUSTNESS TO ACCOUNTING FOR SAMPLING DESIGN

Table A9: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) w/ Sampling Clusters & Stratas

	Dependent Variable	
	Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")	Rating ("How Negative")
Services & Goods		
Very few		
Medicine	−0.082***	−0.138***
	(0.008)	(0.022)
Roads	−0.100***	−0.178***
	(0.009)	(0.025)
Dispute resolution	−0.071***	−0.152***
	(0.008)	(0.029)
Rules		
No consideration		
Reflect local traditions	−0.051***	−0.100***
	(0.008)	(0.019)
Consults with leaders	−0.060***	−0.142***
	(0.008)	(0.020)
Support		
Few people		
Community members	−0.011	−0.054**
	(0.009)	(0.019)
Friends and family	−0.016	−0.053**
	(0.010)	(0.018)
Punishment		
Lots of violence		
Little violence	−0.131***	−0.262***
	(0.008)	(0.020)
Ideology		
No position		
Left-wing	0.018*	−0.017
	(0.009)	(0.023)
Right-wing	0.003	−0.040°
	(0.008)	(0.022)
R^2	.026	.015
N	23,004	23,555
Nested Clusters 1 (Municipalities)	54	54
Nested Clusters 2 (Rural/Urban)	100	100
Nested Clusters 3 (Respondents)	2,357	2,376

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; °$p < 0.1$. There are 100 rather than 108 level 2 clusters as no rural respondents were sampled in some municipalities. We adjust for the sampling design using the 'survey' package (Lumley 2010).

E   SUBGROUP ANALYSES, FORCED CHOICE QUESTIONS

In our pre-analysis plan, we registered the following exploratory subgroup analyses (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2022): gender, racial identity, respondent ideology, attitudes towards the state, prior exposure to violence, and living in an area hard-hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. We test for these and additional subgroup effects here. We find statistically significant subgroup heterogeneity for some variables, as shown in F-tests in Table A10 and discussed in the main text. These are visualized in Figures A2, A5, A6, and A7. Subgroup analyses for the rating outcome are provided in the Additional Supplementary Appendices, Table B15.[33]

Table A10: Nested Forced Choice Model Comparison Test of Preference Heterogeneity

Model comparison	F Statistic	P-Value
Survey Responses		
JAC participation	1.23	.26
Woman	.45	.94
Victim	.80	.64
More than High School Education	4.61	.00
Indigenous	1.40	.17
Afro-Colombian	.68	.76
Left (1-5 on 10-pt scale)	5.59	.00
Distrust between Community and Police	1.19	.18
Police Patrol Once/Month or Less	3.40	.00
State Has Right to Tax	.86	.73
Non-Survey Data About Communities		
PDET	1.45	.14
Rural	17.8	.00
Greater-than-Avg. COVID Municipal Death Rate	1.49	.13
Municipality in Top Quartile State Control (Anders 2020)	.69	.75
Municipality Has 1+ Month Rebel Control (Anders 2020)	1.54	.11
PNCRT	1.19	.29
Conjoint		
Task Number	1.01	.45
Profile	6.89	.00
Services & Goods	6.89	.00
Rules	4.79	.00
Support	1.73	.03
Punishment	41.80	.00
Ideology	1.70	.03

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[33] An alternative approach to examining heterogeneity in conjoint experiments, which we did not preregister, is proposed by Ham, Imai and Janson (2022) and based on the conditional randomization test. Results based on this approach indicate that the most significant interactions with conjoint attributes are: Rural (Goods), More than High School Education (Rules), Distrust between Community and Police (Support), Rural (Punishment), and Left (Ideology). As such, there is strong overlap in the variables identified by the two approaches when it comes to subgroup heterogeneity.

Figure A5: Marginal Means by Rurality and Police Patrol Frequency

Note: Numerical results are presented in Table B6.

Figure A6: Marginal Means by Education and Respondent Ideology

Note: Numerical results are presented in Table B7.

Figure A7: Marginal Means by Conjoint Attributes

Note: Numerical results are presented in Tables B8 through B12.

F PRE-REGISTERED HYPOTHESES ON LEGACIES OF ARMED GROUP RULE

In the pre-analysis plan, we presented additional hypotheses regarding the legacies of armed group rule, which we discuss and evaluate here. Civilians exposed to effective armed group governance may have higher expectations for goods and service provision, imposing higher standards that future would-be governors must live up to (Mampilly 2011). People need not actively support a governing actor for that actor's presence to change their expectations about future governance. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, rebel governance affected people's long-term attitudes about local government institutions in similar ways, regardless of whether they were co-ethnics of the armed actors (Martin, Piccolino and Speight 2022). In Colombia, communities where the FARC historically ruled have witnessed first-hand an armed group that not only provided public goods but also engaged in procedurally coherent governance (Vargas Castillo 2019; Gutiérrez 2021). The FARC was even more likely to engage in procedurally coherent governance in areas where people were opposed to the guerrillas (Arjona 2016).

Moreover, wartime experiences can transform gender roles and norms surrounding women's participation in politics (Wood 2008; Viterna 2013). A strong presence of women in non-traditional roles may have an activating effect on local women regardless of political preferences (Schubiger and Sulmont 2019). In the Colombian case, beginning in the late 1970s, the FARC recruited women into a number of roles within the organization (Sanín and Carranza Franco 2017). Approximately 30% of FARC members were women (Gutiérrez Sanín 2008).[34] We derive the following hypotheses:

> **Armed group rule and goods:** The effect of goods and services is stronger among respondents living in areas once under the sustained control of an armed group that effectively provided public goods [the FARC] than in other areas.

> **Armed group rule and procedural coherence:** The effect of procedural coherence is stronger among respondents living in areas once under the sustained control of an armed group that included local actors in governing institutions [the FARC] than in other areas.

> **Armed group rule and gender:** Female respondents living in areas exposed to non-traditional roles for women through the sustained control of an armed group [the FARC] will be more politically engaged than those living in other areas.

We do not find support for our expectation that individuals subject to FARC rule are more likely to prioritize goods provision or procedural coherence (Figure A8). Omnibus F-tests (Table A10) show no forced choice subgroup differences across PDET and non-PDET respondents. Neither do we find any subgroup effects when using three alternative measures of FARC presence: rebel territorial control in at least a portion of the municipality for at least 1 month (Anders 2020), state territorial control below the top quartile of the sample region (Anders 2020), and municipal participation in the National Policy of Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT)

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[34]The FARC also committed extensive violence against women (Comisión para el Escalarecimiento de la Verdad, la Conviviencia y la No Repetición 2022), and female FARC combatants faced institutional obstacles to advancement (e.g. Schmidt 2020).

program.[35] We illustrate these results in Figures A8 and A9.[36]

We find only suggestive evidence for our expectation that female respondents living in once FARC-controlled areas are more politically engaged than women in areas with no sustained exposure to the FARC. Table A11 indicates that, while women in areas of historical FARC control are no more likely to have voted in the 2022 presidential elections, they may be more likely ($p < 0.1$) to be involved in *Juntas de Acción Comunal*, village boards that are the principal axis for community governance in Colombia, particularly in rural areas (Blair et al. 2022). Given that the FARC worked with JACs (Vargas Castillo 2019; Gutiérrez 2021) but sometimes sabatoged or boycotted elections (Gallego 2018), political socialization may have motivated women to participate only in those realms of politics that the FARC encouraged. However, more research is needed to evaluate this hypothesis.

Table A11: Political Participation

	Dependent Variable	
	Vote 2022	JAC Participation
(Intercept)	0.393***	−0.061
	(0.057)	(0.048)
Woman	−0.019	−0.054*
	(0.030)	(0.025)
PDET	−0.017	0.024
	(0.031)	(0.026)
Education	0.023***	−0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Age	0.005***	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural	−0.022	0.055**
	(0.024)	(0.020)
Victim	0.075***	0.107***
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Ideology	0.000	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income	−0.000	−0.005
	(0.010)	(0.009)
Police Presence	0.010	0.046***
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Woman x PDET	0.006	0.062°
	(0.040)	(0.033)
R^2	0.039	0.094
N	1985	1985

$^{***}p < 0.001;\ ^{**}p < 0.01;\ ^{*}p < 0.05;\ ^{\circ}p < 0.1$

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[35]PNCRT was an aggressive counterinsurgency approach adopted by the Colombian government.
[36]For the rating results, please see Table B15 and Figure B5.

Figure A8: Marginal Means by FARC Presence, PDET & PNCRT

Note: Numerical results are presented in Table B13.

Figure A9: Marginal Means by FARC Presence, Anders 2020 Data

Municipality in Top Quartile of State Control ● 0 ● 1

Rebels Have Control in Municipality For 1+ Months ● 0 ● 1

Note: Numerical results are presented in Table B14.

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Part II

Additional Supplementary Appendices: Out-Competing Rivals

Erica De Bruin, Gabriella Levy, Livia Schubiger, and Michael Weintraub

CONTENTS

I TABLES FOR FIGURES IN SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

I.1 MAIN RESULTS

Table B1: Numerical Results for Figure A1 (AMCEs, Alternative Baselines)

	Dependent Variable	
	Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")	Rating ("How Negative")
Services & Goods		
Dispute resolution		
Roads	−0.029**	−0.026
	(0.009)	(0.025)
Medicine	−0.011	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.025)
Very few	0.071***	0.152***
	(0.009)	(0.025)
Rules		
Consults with leaders		
Reflect local traditions	0.008	0.042*
	(0.008)	(0.021)
No consideration	0.060***	0.142***
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Support		
Friends and family		
Community members	0.006	−0.001
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Few people	0.016*	0.053*
	(0.008)	(0.022)
Punishment		
Lots of violence		
Little violence	−0.131***	−0.262***
	(0.007)	(0.019)
Ideology		
No position		
Left-wing	0.018*	−0.017
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Right-wing	0.003	−0.040°
	(0.008)	(0.021)
R^2	.026	.015
N	23,004	23,555
Clusters	2,357	2,376

$^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05; ^{°}p < 0.1$

I.2 DIAGNOSTICS AND ROBUSTNESS

Table B2: Numeric Results for Figure A2, Left Panel (MMs by Task)

	Task: 1	Task: 2	Task: 3	Task: 4	Task: 5
	Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")				
Services & Goods					
Very few	0.561***	0.574***	0.555***	0.556***	0.561***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Medicine	0.481	0.485	0.496	0.470*	0.480
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Roads	0.443***	0.461**	0.460**	0.477°	0.473*
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Dispute resolution	0.510	0.481	0.487	0.496	0.481
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Rules					
No consideration	0.553***	0.522*	0.543***	0.535**	0.530**
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Reflect local traditions	0.478*	0.491	0.500	0.492	0.474*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Consults with leaders	0.471**	0.486	0.458***	0.474*	0.497
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Support					
Few people	0.492	0.514	0.520°	0.517°	0.500
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Community members	0.510	0.498	0.487	0.490	0.511
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Friends and family	0.498	0.488	0.492	0.492	0.489
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Punishment					
Lots of violence	0.578***	0.579***	0.561***	0.554***	0.553***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Little violence	0.424***	0.422***	0.439***	0.445***	0.448***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Ideology					
No position	0.492	0.486	0.503	0.485	0.500
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Left-wing	0.511	0.508	0.519°	0.518°	0.500
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Right-wing	0.497	0.506	0.479*	0.498	0.500
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
N	4,560	4,608	4,608	4.620	4,608
Clusters	2,280	2,304	2,304	2,310	2,304

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{°}p < 0.1$

Table B3: Numeric Results for Figure A2, Right Panel (MMs by Profile)

	Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")	
	Profile: 1	Profile: 2
Services & Goods		
Very few	0.561***	0.562***
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Medicine	0.506	0.458***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Roads	0.502	0.424***
	(0.009)	(0.010)
Dispute resolution	0.507	0.475**
	(0.009)	(0.010)
Rules		
No consideration	0.551***	0.522**
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Reflect local traditions	0.505	0.468***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Consults with leaders	0.502	0.453***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Support		
Few people	0.520*	0.498
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Community members	0.525**	0.473**
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Friends and family	0.513	0.470***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Punishment		
Lots of violence	0.571***	0.558***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Little violence	0.468***	0.403***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Ideology		
No position	0.516°	0.471***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Left-wing	0.525**	0.497
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Right-wing	0.517*	0.475**
	(0.008)	(0.008)
N	11,502	11,502
Clusters	2,357	2,357

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{°}p < 0.1$

Table B4: Numeric Results for Figure A3 (AMCEs with Weights)

	Dependent Variable	
	Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")	Rating ("How Negative")
Services & Goods		
Very few		
Medicine	−0.091***	−0.225***
	(0.017)	(0.047)
Roads	−0.107***	−0.226***
	(0.017)	(0.047)
Dispute resolution	−0.066***	−0.220***
	(0.016)	(0.047)
Rules		
No consideration		
Reflect local traditions	−0.043**	−0.078*
	(0.013)	(0.035)
Consults with leaders	−0.079***	−0.116**
	(0.013)	(0.036)
Support		
Few people		
Community members	−0.028*	−0.011
	(0.013)	(0.040)
Friends and family	−0.024°	−0.029
	(0.013)	(0.041)
Punishment		
Lots of violence		
Little violence	−0.136***	−0.276***
	(0.014)	(0.033)
Ideology		
No position		
Left-wing	0.013	−0.025
	(0.014)	(0.039)
Right-wing	0.009	−0.000
	(0.014)	(0.036)
R^2	.030	.017
N	23,004	23,555
Clusters	2,357	2,376

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; °$p < 0.1$

Table B5: Numerical Results for Figure A4 (AMCEs Removing People Who Responded Identically to All Rating Questions)

	Dependent Variable	
	Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")	Rating ("How Negative")
Services & Goods		
Very few		
Medicine	−0.081***	−0.151***
	(0.010)	(0.025)
Roads	−0.103***	−0.189***
	(0.010)	(0.026)
Dispute resolution	−0.072***	−0.168***
	(0.009)	(0.025)
Rules		
No consideration		
Reflect local traditions	−0.052***	−0.106***
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Consults with leaders	−0.060***	−0.154***
	(0.008)	(0.022)
Support		
Few people		
Community members	−0.010	−0.065**
	(0.008)	(0.021)
Friends and family	−0.018*	−0.055*
	(0.008)	(0.022)
Punishment		
Lots of violence		
Little violence	−0.132***	−0.282***
	(0.007)	(0.020)
Ideology		
No position		
Left-wing	0.018*	−0.010
	(0.008)	(0.022)
Right-wing	0.002	−0.033
	(0.008)	(0.022)
R^2	.026	.017
N	21,934	22,315
Clusters	2,245	2,252

$^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05; ^{°}p < 0.1$

I.3   SUBGROUP ANALYSES, FORCED CHOICE QUESTIONS

Table B6: Numeric Results for Figure A5 (MMs by Rurality, Police Frequency)

			Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")	
			Police Patrol	Police Patrol
	Rural: 0	Rural: 1	Once/Month Or Less: 0	Once/Month Or Less: 1
Services & Goods				
Very few	0.587***	0.502	0.574***	0.551***
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Medicine	0.465***	0.523*	0.478**	0.486
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Roads	0.450***	0.492	0.451***	0.477**
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Dispute resolution	0.494	0.483	0.494	0.485°
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Rules				
No consideration	0.544***	0.520*	0.533***	0.543***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Reflect local traditions	0.485**	0.490	0.491	0.480**
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Consults with leaders	0.471***	0.490	0.476***	0.477**
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Support				
Few people	0.515**	0.494	0.508	0.511
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Community members	0.488*	0.525**	0.491	0.508
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Friends and family	0.497	0.481*	0.501	0.481**
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Punishment				
Lots of violence	0.587***	0.515**	0.578***	0.546***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Little violence	0.415***	0.485**	0.423***	0.453***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ideology				
No position	0.486*	0.508	0.493	0.492
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Left-wing	0.515**	0.502	0.508	0.520**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Right-wing	0.499	0.489	0.500	0.489
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	16,060	6,944	12,410	9,880
Clusters	1,648	709	1,267	1,011

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Table B7: Numeric Results for Figure A6 (MMs by Education, Respondent Ideology)

	Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")			
	More than High School: 0	More than High School: 1	Respondent Left Ideology: 0	Respondent Left Ideology: 1
Services & Goods				
Very few	0.587***	0.502	0.574***	0.551***
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Medicine	0.465***	0.523*	0.478**	0.486
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Roads	0.450***	0.492	0.451***	0.477**
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Dispute resolution	0.494	0.483	0.494	0.485°
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Rules				
No consideration	0.544***	0.520*	0.533***	0.543***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Reflect local traditions	0.485**	0.490	0.491	0.480**
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Consults with leaders	0.471***	0.490	0.476***	0.477**
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Support				
Few people	0.515**	0.494	0.508	0.511
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Community members	0.488*	0.525**	0.491	0.508
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Friends and family	0.497	0.481*	0.501	0.481**
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Punishment				
Lots of violence	0.587***	0.515**	0.578***	0.546***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Little violence	0.415***	0.485**	0.423***	0.453***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ideology				
No position	0.486*	0.508	0.493	0.492
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Left-wing	0.515**	0.502	0.508	0.520**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Right-wing	0.499	0.489	0.500	0.489
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	17,164	5,840	8,588	11,572
Clusters	1,746	593	872	1,184

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{°}p < 0.1$

Table B8: Numeric Results for Figure A7 (MMs by Conjoint Attributes), Services & Goods Panel

| | Dependent Variable: | | | |
| | Forced Choice (Judged "Worse") | | | |
	Goods: Very few	Goods: Medicine	Goods: Roads	Goods: Dispute Resolution
Rules				
No consideration	0.601***	0.513	0.496	0.534**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Reflect local traditions	0.545***	0.482	0.444***	0.472*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Consults with leaders	0.538***	0.451***	0.449***	0.469**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Few people	0.588***	0.484	0.457***	0.504
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Support				
Community members	0.539***	0.494	0.479°	0.484
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Friends and family	0.556***	0.470**	0.453***	0.485
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Punishment				
Lots of violence	0.622***	0.554***	0.528**	0.554***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Little violence	0.504	0.407***	0.398***	0.429***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ideology				
No position	0.568***	0.458***	0.456***	0.488
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Left-wing	0.569***	0.495	0.476*	0.503
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Right-wing	0.548***	0.494	0.457***	0.483
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
N	5,916	5,669	5,696	5,723
Clusters	2,221	2,193	2,192	2,177

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{°}p < 0.1$

Table B9: Numeric Results for Figure A7 (MMs by Conjoint Attributes), Rules Panel

	Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")		
	Rules: No consideration	Rules: Reflect local traditions	Rules: Consults with local leaders
Services & Goods			
Very few	0.601***	0.545***	0.538***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Medicine	0.513	0.482	0.451***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Roads	0.496	0.444***	0.449***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Dispute resolution	0.534**	0.472*	0.469**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Support			
Few people	0.536***	0.498	0.492
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Community members	0.539***	0.486	0.472**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Friends and family	0.533***	0.476*	0.467***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Punishment			
Lots of violence	0.594***	0.553***	0.547***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Little violence	0.480**	0.419***	0.407***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Ideology			
No position	0.536***	0.467***	0.478*
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Left-wing	0.558***	0.502	0.472**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Right-wing	0.515	0.492	0.481*
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
N	7,660	7,782	7,562
Clusters	2,301	2,313	2,301

$^{***}p < 0.001;\,^{**}p < 0.01;\,^{*}p < 0.05;\,^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Table B10: Numeric Results for Figure A7 (MMs by Conjoint Attributes), Support Panel

	Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")		
	Support: Few people	Support: Community members	Support: Friends and family
Services & Goods			
Very few	0.588***	0.539***	0.556***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Medicine	0.484	0.494	0.470**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Roads	0.457***	0.479°	0.453***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Dispute resolution	0.504	0.484	0.485
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Rules			
No consideration	0.536***	0.539***	0.533***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Reflect local traditions	0.498	0.486	0.476*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Consults with local leaders	0.492	0.472**	0.467***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Punishment			
Lots of violence	0.587***	0.557***	0.551***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Little violence	0.432***	0.441***	0.434***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Ideology			
No position	0.502	0.487	0.490
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Left-wing	0.527**	0.504	0.502
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Right-wing	0.497	0.507	0.483°
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
N	7,740	7,646	7,618
Clusters	2,307	2,298	2,298

$^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05; ^{°}p < 0.1$

Table B11: Numeric Results for Figure A7 (MMs by Conjoint Attributes), Punishment Panel

	Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")	
	Punishment: Lots of violence	Punishment: Little violence
Services & Goods		
Very few	0.622***	0.504
	(0.009)	(0.008)
Medicine	0.554***	0.407***
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Roads	0.528**	0.398***
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Dispute resolution	0.554***	0.429***
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Rules		
No consideration	0.594***	0.480**
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Reflect local traditions	0.553***	0.419***
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Consults with local leaders	0.547***	0.407***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Support		
Few people	0.587***	0.432***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Community members	0.557***	0.441***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Friends and family	0.551***	0.434***
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Ideology		
No position	0.558***	0.429***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Left-wing	0.583***	0.441***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Right-wing	0.555***	0.437***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
N	11,460	11,544
Clusters	2,347	2,352

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Table B12: Numeric Results for Figure A7 (MMs by Conjoint Attributes), Ideology Panel

	Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")		
	Ideology: No position	Ideology: Left-wing	Ideology: Right-wing
Services & Goods			
Very few	0.568***	0.569***	0.548***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Medicine	0.458***	0.495	0.494
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Roads	0.456***	0.476*	0.457***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Dispute resolution	0.488	0.503	0.483
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Rules			
No consideration	0.536***	0.558***	0.515
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Reflect local traditions	0.467***	0.502	0.492
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Consults with local leaders	0.478*	0.472**	0.481*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Support			
Few people	0.502	0.527**	0.497
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Community members	0.487	0.504	0.507
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Friends and family	0.490	0.502	0.483°
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Punishment			
Lots of violence	0.558***	0.583***	0.555***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Little violence	0.429***	0.441***	0.437***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
N	7,696	7,571	7,737
Clusters	2,304	2,298	2,311

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; °$p < 0.1$

I.4 PRE-REGISTERED HYPOTHESES ON LEGACIES OF ARMED GROUP RULE

Table B13: Numeric Results for Figure A8 (MMs by PDET, PNCRT)

	Dependent Variable:			
	Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")			
	PDET: 0	PDET: 1	PNCRT: 0	PNCRT: 1
Services & Goods				
Very few	0.572***	0.552***	0.563***	0.557***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Medicine	0.479*	0.485°	0.482**	0.484
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Roads	0.452***	0.474**	0.462***	0.467**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Dispute resolution	0.495	0.487°	0.492	0.487
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.012)
Rules				
No consideration	0.534***	0.539***	0.535***	0.540***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Reflect local traditions	0.494	0.479**	0.492	0.471**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Consults with leaders	0.471***	0.482**	0.473***	0.490
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Support				
Few people	0.503	0.515*	0.505	0.520*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Community members	0.500	0.498	0.499	0.501
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Friends and family	0.497	0.487*	0.496	0.479*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Punishment				
Lots of violence	0.567***	0.563***	0.566***	0.562***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Little violence	0.433***	0.438***	0.434***	0.440***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Ideology				
No position	0.498	0.488°	0.496	0.484
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Left-wing	0.501	0.521**	0.505	0.530**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Right-wing	0.501	0.491	0.499	0.486
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)
N	11,316	11,688	17,592	5,412
Clusters	1,150	1,207	1,798	559

$^{***}p < 0.001; {}^{**}p < 0.01; {}^{*}p < 0.05; {}^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Table B14: Numeric Results for Figure A9 (MMs by FARC Presence, Anders 2020 Data)

	Dependent Variable: Forced Choice (Judged "Worse")			
	Municipality in Top Quartile of State Control: 0	Municipality in Top Quartile of State Control: 1	Rebels Have Control in Municipality for 1+ Months: 0	Rebels Have Control in Municipality for 1+ Months: 1
Services & Goods				
Very few	0.561***	0.563***	0.549°	0.562***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.006)
Medicine	0.480**	0.480	0.481	0.480**
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.006)
Roads	0.469***	0.452***	0.478	0.463***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.006)
Dispute resolution	0.488°	0.502	0.489	0.492
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.006)
Rules				
No consideration	0.539***	0.532**	0.568**	0.535***
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.005)
Reflect local traditions	0.489°	0.478*	0.473	0.487**
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.005)
Consults with leaders	0.472***	0.489	0.464°	0.478***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.005)
Support				
Few people	0.509	0.494	0.454*	0.508
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.005)
Community members	0.498	0.506	0.526	0.499
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.005)
Friends and family	0.493	0.500	0.522	0.493
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.005)
Punishment				
Lots of violence	0.564***	0.568***	0.569***	0.565***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.004)
Little violence	0.436***	0.434***	0.438***	0.435***
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.004)
Ideology				
No position	0.496	0.494	0.512	0.494
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.005)
Left-wing	0.504	0.516	0.545°	0.505
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.005)
Right-wing	0.500	0.490	0.442*	0.501
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.005)
N	15,108	5,384	1,088	19,404
Clusters	1,550	551	112	1,989

$^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05; ^{°}p < 0.1$

II Subgroup Analyses, Rating Question

Table B15: Nested Rating Model Comparison Test of Preference Heterogeneity

Model comparison	F Statistic	P-Value
Survey Responses		
JAC participation	1.25	.25
Woman	1.19	.29
Victim	4.01	.00
More than High School Education	5.12	.00
Indigenous	2.07	.02
Afro-Colombian	3.37	.00
Left (1-5 on 10-pt scale)	2.98	.00
Distrust between Community and Police	1.23	.14
Police Patrol Once/Month or Less	4.00	.00
State Has Right to Tax	2.09	.00
Non-Survey Data About Communities		
PDET	1.20	.28
Rural	16.90	.00
Greater-than-Avg. COVID Municipal Death Rate	1.69	.07
Municipality in Top Quartile State Control (Anders 2020)	.63	.80
Municipality Has 1+ Month Rebel Control (Anders 2020)	2.17	.01
PNCRT	1.93	.03
Conjoint		
Task Number	2.45	.00
Profile	1.21	.27
Services & Goods	3.64	.00
Rules	3.73	.00
Support	1.80	.02
Punishment	23.8	.00
Ideology	1.68	.04

Figure B1: Marginal Means by Victim Status and Education

Figure B2: Marginal Means by Indigenous and Afro Ethnicity

Figure B3: Marginal Means by Respondent Ideology and Police Patrol Frequency

Figure B4: Marginal Means by Rurality and Belief that State Has Right to Tax

Figure B5: Marginal Means by Rebel Territorial Control for 1+ Month and PNCRT

Figure B6: Marginal Means by Conjoint Attributes