Supplemental Material for: Conditional Enfranchisement: How Partisanship Determines Support for Noncitizen Voting Rights

Contents

A   NonCitizen Voting Policies

Noncitizens can and do vote in many democracies globally. These electoral rights vary cross-nationally, ranging from full electoral exclusion within any election to the ability to vote in national elections (e.g., Ferris et al., 2020; Schmid, Piccoli and Arrighi, 2019). A growing literature investigates the causes and consequences of these varied practices of noncitizen suffrage in non-experimental settings across liberal democracies often from a top-down, elite perspective. Of the causes, the extension of the right to vote to noncitizens is a function of path-dependent processes of institutional and normative conceptions of belonging (e.g., Finn, 2023; Pedroza, 2019). To this end, immigrant activism in the enfranchising process can be less visible due to institutional hurdles or strategic calculations of immigrants themselves (Wegschaider, 2023). Of the consequences, noncitizen suffrage can meaningfully shape municipal policy and the political integration outcomes of immigrants benefiting from such electoral access (Ferwerda, Finseraas and Bergh, 2020; Munro, 2008; Vernby, 2013). Still, elite party behavior plays a critical role in the process and ultimate implementation of migrant voting rights overall (Cianetti, 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen, Ciornei and Lafleur, 2019).

A.1   Noncitizen Suffrage in the U.S.

Noncitizen voting in the U.S. is not a new phenomenon. From the founding of the Republic until the 1920s, noncitizens voted in 40 states and federal territories in local, state, and national elections (Hayduk and García-Castañon, 2018). Noncitizen residents were enfranchised for different reasons, mostly pragmatic or motivated by politically and economically welfare-maximizing rationales. During the decades of westward pushing of the U.S. frontier line, noncitizen enfranchisement was aimed at attracting migrant settlement to meet the population requirements for admission to the Union and, similarly during Reconstruction, to meet the excess labor demand after the abolition of slavery.

Noncitizens voted in every presidential election until 1925. Yet by 1928, all states had revoked voting rights, possibly due to heightened nationalism triggered by World War I (Raskin, 1993). Still, the Supreme Court has specifically ruled that noncitizen suffrage does not violate constitutional provisions and has consistently upheld the right of states to determine voter eligibility requirements. Consequently, noncitizen suffrage in the U.S. is not a legal question but a political one Earnest (2008). Public opinion is increasingly important for this political (re)expansion of noncitizen enfranchisement as suffrage is often determined by public referendum.

The tables below provide information on noncitizen voting rights in the United States as of November 2023. All tables were compiled by cross-referencing original, secondary, and media sources. Secondary sources include the Immigrant Voting Rights Project,[1] Ballotpedia, and other academic literature (e.g., Harper Ho, 2000; Hayduk, 2004; Kini, 2005). We expanded upon these sources by reviewing public records, locality Charters, ballot initiatives, election office information, and other printed and web-based documentation for every entity of interest. When questions or inconsistencies arose between original and secondary material, we relied on direct communication with local officials. Finally, we cross-referenced

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[1]Project led by Ron Hayduk. `https://www.immigrantvotingrights.com`

each case with local and national news media (see Supplemental Material A.1.1 for a selection of articles in the Dataverse) to ensure full coverage of *de facto* and *de jure* practice of noncitizen voting rights.

Table A.1 first presents the list of current local noncitizen voting rights allowances by state and locality. **Level** refers to the type of election in which noncitizens are enfranchised, and **Legislation** provides the source of their (re)enfranchisement. **Type** indicates how suffrage was won: through a citizen-ballot measure or locality charters. Charter provisions could either be in the original document or occur through Charter Amendments. These were confirmed through direct communication with local officials and indicated by *Amendment* when suffrage required amending the Charter and *Charter* when in the original document. *Amendment–Referendum* indicates if Charter Amendments required a citizen ballot measure. **Approved Date** indicates the year noncitizen voting rights were decided—not enacted. Months are included for those cases with citizen ballot initiatives and the percentage of valid voters who voted in favor of the enfranchising measure. The last column—**Approved %**—presents the percentage of the voting population who voted in favor of ballot initiatives.

In total, 18 localities in seven counties[2] across three states currently allow immigrants the right to vote in local and/or school board elections. The District of Columbia formally enacted legislation in October 2022 enfranchising noncitizens, yet the policy remains currently unenforced due to ongoing litigation. New York City City Council similarly passed legislation permitting noncitizens to vote in local elections in December 2021, which was ruled unconstitutional in June 2022.

Current enfranchising municipalities are overwhelmingly in the Washington metropolitan area. In fact, 13 of the 18 (i.e., 72%) enfranchising jurisdictions are located within just two counties: Montgomery County and Prince George's County. This enfranchisement further resides at the municipal level, with only Oakland and San Francisco restricting noncitizen suffrage to School Board elections. This suffrage, however, is obtained without any direct citizen electoral involvement. Four municipalities—Barnesville, Chevy Chase Section 3, Chevy Chase Section 5, and Martin's Additions—provided the right for noncitizens to participate in the original incorporated Charter. Direct communication with local officials in these localities, however, indicated that the purpose of these Charter provisions may not have been to address noncitizen suffrage. Nine other cases were decided by elected Town, Village, or City Councilmembers.

Together, nearly three-quarters of noncitizen enfranchising provisions did not involve a vote from the general population. This is particularly true in Maryland, where all localities with noncitizen political participation were decided at the Charter or Council-Amendment level. In contrast, the electorate decided noncitizen voting policies in California and Vermont.[3]

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[2]Alameda (CA); San Francisco (CA); Montgomery (MD); Prince's George (MD); Somerset (MD); Chittenden (VT); Washington (VT)

[3]In Vermont, this is in part due to state law governing municipality charter amendments and local elections in general (see 17 V.S.A. § 2645).

Table A.1: U.S. Local Voting Rights by State as of November 2023

State	Level	Legislation	Type	Approved Date	Approved %
Enacted					
California					
Oakland	School Board	Noncitizen Residents Voting Measure	Ref.	Nov. 2022	66.58%
San Francisco	School Board	Non-Citizen Voting in School Board Elections (Prop. N)	Amend.–Ref.	Nov. 2016[a]	54.39%
Maryland					
Barnesville	Local	§ 74- 3	Charter	1918	
Cheverly	Local	Article V, § C-18.1	Amend.	2020	
Chevy Chase	Local	Article IV, § 401	Amend.	2018	
Chevy Chase Section 3	Local	Article III, § 301	Charter	1982[b]	
Chevy Chase Section 5	Local	Article III, § 301	Charter	1982[b]	
Garrett Park	Local	Article 3, § 78-20	Amend.	1999	
Glen Echo	Local	Article 5, §501	Amend.	1997	
Hyattsville	Local	Article IV § C4-1	Amend.	2016	
Martin's Additions	Local	Article III, § 301	Charter	1985[b]	
Mount Rainer	Local	Article V, § 502	Amend.	2017	
Riverdale Park	Local	Article V, § 501	Amend.	2018	
Somerset	Local	Article V, § 83-21	Amend.	1976	
Takoma Park	Local	Article VI, § 601	Amend.	1992	
Vermont					
Burlington	Local	24 App. V.S.A. Chapter 3, § 8a	Amend.–Ref.	Mar. 2023[c]	67.97%
Montpelier	Local	24 App. V.S.A. Chapter 5, § 1501	Amend.–Ref.	Nov. 2018[c]	65.75%
Winooski	Local	24 App. V.S.A. Chapter 19, § 202	Amend.–Ref.	Nov. 2020[c]	71.28%
In Litigation					
New York					
New York City	Local	Int 1867-2020	Legislation	Dec. 2021[d]	
Washington, D.C.	Local	Local Resident Voting Rights Amend. Act	Legislation	Oct. 2022[e]	

[a] Ruled unconstitutional in July 2022. A stay was applied Aug. 2022 & upheld Aug. 2023

[b] Incorporation year

[c] Effective after the Legislature overrode a 2021 Governor veto in January 2023.

[d] Litigation ongoing due to a March 2023 lawsuit seeking an injunction

[e] Ruled unconstitutional in June 2022. An appeal is currently pending at the Appellate Division.

Table A.2 presents the abbreviated text of these locality-specific ballot measures. The text is abbreviated to include the most relevant section of each citizen ballot initiative and is all confirmed in the original source. As viewed here, all ballot measures are clear in that voting 'yes' would mean noncitizens would be able to vote in School Board or local-level elections. There is no apparent obscurity of the purpose of the initiative, with all measures stating noncitizens would be eligible to vote if the citizen ballot measure passes. Put simply, voters participating in the ballot initiatives at the time were likely aware that they were voting on expanding the local or School Board electorate to include noncitizens.

Table A.2: U.S. Local Voting Approval Referendum Text by State

State	Abbreviated Ballot Text
California	
Oakland	Shall the measure to amend the City Charter to...authorize voting by noncitizen residents, who are the parents, legal guardians, or legally recognized caregivers of a child, for the Office of Oakland School Board Director if they are otherwise eligible to vote under state and local law be adopted?
San Francisco	Shall the City allow a non-citizen resident of San Francisco who is of legal voting age and the parent, legal guardian or legally recognized caregiver of a child living in the San Francisco Unified School District to vote for members of the Board of Education?
Vermont	
Burlington	Shall the Charter of the City of Burlington...be further amended to add...: Requirements for Legal Resident Voters Who Are Not Citizens: (a) ...a legal resident who is not a citizen of the United States shall be a legal voter at a local City of Burlington or Burlington School District election if the individual meets the following qualifications: is a legal resident of the United States, is not less than 18 years of age, has taken the Voter's Oath, resides in the City of Burlington...and has registered to vote...
Montpelier	Shall the city amend the city charter by adding Subchapter 15 - Supplemental Voting Registry to Section II allowing non-citizen legal residents to vote on Montpelier city ballot items?
Winooski	Qualified Voters...Any person (including persons who are non-U.S. citizens...may register to vote in any City meeting or municipal election who, on election day: (i) Is a legal resident of the City; (ii) Has taken the voter's oath; and (iii) Is 18 years of age or older.

B   Summary Statistics and Balance across Experimental Conditions

Table B.1 presents a comparison of demographic, partisanship, and attitudinal variables between the convenience samples in the Florida Study and U.S. Study, and nationally representative samples of U.S. registered voters from the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS)

November Voting Supplement (for demographic variables), and the 2020 American National Election Studies (ANES) Time Series Study (for partisanship and attitudinal variables).

The comparison between the characteristics of the Florida Study's sample and the CPS/ANES Florida subsample (which we note is not representative of the state) suggests that although the Florida Study's sample is representative of the state's sample in partisanship and attitudinal variables, it is not representative of all key demographic characteristics, in particular, of the state's college-educated population. Specifically, the share of college-educated respondents in our sample is larger than in the state's sample. It is possible that more educated respondents generally are less responsive to experimental manipulations. This may help explain why the treatment effects are smaller in the Florida Study than in the U.S. Study, as the share of college-educated respondents in the Florida Study is larger than in the U.S. Study. However, we note that the sample in the U.S. Study presents a similar demographic, partisan, and attitudinal profile to the nationally representative CPS and ANES samples, strengthening our confidence in the external validity of our results.

Table B.1: Summary Statistics

	Florida Study		CPS/ANES Florida		U.S. Study		CPS/ANES U.S.	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Male	0.533	0.499	0.475	0.499	0.465	0.499	0.470	0.499
College educated	0.748	0.434	0.494	0.500	0.471	0.499	0.503	0.500
Employed	0.444	0.497	0.537	0.499	0.562	0.496	0.591	0.492
Married or partnership	0.667	0.471	0.524	0.500	0.491	0.500	0.569	0.495
Region: Northeast	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.180	0.384	0.163	0.370
Region: Midwest	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.207	0.405	0.207	0.405
Region: South	1.000	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.451	0.498	0.368	0.482
Region: West	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.162	0.369	0.261	0.439
Race: White	0.878	0.328	0.840	0.367	0.761	0.427	0.831	0.375
Race: Black	0.035	0.185	0.119	0.324	0.156	0.363	0.101	0.302
Race: Asian	0.011	0.106	0.024	0.154	0.029	0.167	0.039	0.194
Race: other	0.080	0.271	0.017	0.127	0.055	0.228	0.028	0.166
Ethnicity: Hispanic	0.109	0.312	0.174	0.380	0.095	0.293	0.083	0.276
Native born	0.837	0.369	0.826	0.380	0.886	0.318	0.919	0.272
Party ID: Democrat	0.319	0.466	0.288	0.453	0.502	0.500	0.362	0.481
Party ID: Republican	0.327	0.469	0.361	0.481	0.498	0.500	0.315	0.464
Party ID: Independent	0.354	0.478	0.351	0.478			0.323	0.468
Strong partisan	0.761	0.426	0.765	0.425	0.627	0.484	0.696	0.460
Attitudes migrants	3.014	1.371	2.935	1.081	2.902	1.368	3.018	1.139
Interest local politics	4.032	0.945			3.798	1.093		

Notes: Comparison of summary statistics (means and standard deviations) between the convenience samples in the Florida and National Studies, and nationally representative samples of U.S. registered voters from the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) November Voting Supplement (demographic variables), and the 2020 American National Election Studies (ANES) Time Series Study (partisanship and attitudinal variables).

In Table B.2, we assess the balance of individual characteristics across experimental con-

Table B.2: Balance of Individual Characteristics across Treatment Conditions

	Mean T_0	Mean T_1	Mean T_2	Diff-in-Means T_0 vs T_1	p-value T_0 vs T_1	Diff-in-Means T_0 vs T_2	p-value T_0 vs T_2
Panel A: Florida Study							
Male	0.524	0.529	0.546	0.005	0.807	0.021	0.247
Race: White	0.869	0.882	0.882	0.013	0.294	0.013	0.301
Race: Black	0.036	0.033	0.037	-0.003	0.609	0.000	0.960
Race: Asian	0.014	0.008	0.012	-0.006	0.104	-0.002	0.679
College educated	0.747	0.755	0.743	0.008	0.634	-0.005	0.780
Hispanic	0.111	0.102	0.114	-0.009	0.435	0.002	0.832
Democrat	0.318	0.324	0.313	0.006	0.719	-0.005	0.782
Strong partisan	0.781	0.761	0.742	-0.020	0.310	-0.039	0.048
Employed	0.467	0.420	0.446	-0.048	0.010	-0.022	0.245
Married or partnership	0.673	0.674	0.654	0.000	0.989	-0.020	0.257
Native born	0.837	0.845	0.829	0.008	0.580	-0.008	0.573
Attitudes migrants	2.984	3.011	3.047	0.027	0.594	0.064	0.217
Interest local politics	4.045	4.028	4.024	-0.017	0.634	-0.021	0.551
N	1430	1430	1471				
Wald statistic					0.703		0.603
Panel B: U.S. Study							
Male	0.480	0.456	0.457	-0.024	0.241	-0.023	0.255
Race: White	0.781	0.738	0.763	-0.043	0.013	-0.018	0.295
Race: Black	0.143	0.167	0.159	0.024	0.103	0.016	0.267
Race: Asian	0.025	0.038	0.024	0.013	0.064	-0.000	0.938
College educated	0.484	0.460	0.469	-0.025	0.226	-0.016	0.442
Hispanic	0.094	0.093	0.097	-0.001	0.918	0.002	0.851
Democrat	0.507	0.518	0.483	0.011	0.588	-0.024	0.246
Strong partisan	0.640	0.609	0.633	-0.031	0.114	-0.008	0.701
Employed	0.575	0.539	0.571	-0.036	0.072	-0.004	0.843
Married or partnership	0.494	0.469	0.510	-0.025	0.215	0.016	0.427
Native born	0.874	0.894	0.889	0.021	0.112	0.016	0.233
Attitudes migrants	2.930	2.896	2.881	-0.033	0.549	-0.048	0.387
Interest local politics	3.829	3.763	3.800	-0.066	0.142	-0.028	0.521
N	1220	1194	1203				
Wald statistic					0.050		0.803

Notes: Compares average individual characteristics across experimental conditions. T_0, T_1, T_2 stand for no-, co-, and counter-partisan conditions, respectively. The p-values correspond to the *t-statistic* of the difference-in-means test across experimental conditions, except for the p-value of the *Wald-statistic* from a permutation test of covariate balance, testing for the hypothesis that all the coefficients from a regression of treatment conditions on the covariates are zero.

ditions for the Florida Study (Panel A) and the U.S. Study (Panel B).[4] The first three

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[4]Note that 35% of participants in the Florida Study are Independents. In the co-partisan condition, Independents read that many noncitizens would likely vote Independent, and in the counter-partisan condition, 50% of the time about likely voting Democratic.

columns present average values for each of the three conditions, and the last four columns present condition-wise values for the difference-in-means and the p-values for the t-statistic of this test. In addition to the difference-in-means test, we assess covariate balance with a permutation test assessing the hypothesis that all the coefficients from a regression of treatment condition on the covariates are zero. The table presents the p-value for the heteroskedasticity-robust Wald statistic of this test.

The difference-in-means tests between experimental conditions show no statistically significant differences between the no- and the co- and counter-partisan conditions with regards to demographic (except for *Employed* and *Race: White* between the no- and co-partisan conditions in the Florida Study and U.S. Study, respectively), partisanship and attitudinal covariates. Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients from the regression of treatment condition on the covariates are zero. The results of these balance tests suggest that the randomization worked as intended. Observing balance across experimental conditions is also reassuring that by including covariates in our regression models we improve our estimates' efficiency without inducing bias due to model extrapolation.

C   Estimation Method

We estimate the effects of the co- and counter-partisan treatments on support for noncitizen voting rights with the following linear model:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{i \in 1} + \beta_2 T_{i \in 2} + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i$$

where Y_i is one of four outcomes measured for participant i. $T_{i \in 1}$, $T_{i \in 2}$ denote i's assignment to treatment ($T_{i \in 1} = 1$ if i is assigned to the co-partisan condition, and $T_{i \in 2} = 1$ if assigned to the counter-partisan condition). For efficiency gains, we control for X_i, a vector of covariate values for participant i, including demographic characteristics and pre-treatment interest in local politics and attitudes toward immigrants. ϵ_i is the error term. $\hat{\beta}_1$ and $\hat{\beta}_2$ capture the average effect of the co- and counter-partisan conditions, respectively, on support for noncitizen voting rights.

# D   Treatment Effect Discussion, Figures and Tables

In this section, we first report and discuss average treatment effects across the two studies, followed by a discussion on partisan treatment effects across the two studies.

D.1   Main Treatment Effects

Figure D.1 displays the distribution of the raw outcomes by experimental condition. The distributions suggest that relative to the control condition, the co-partisan condition moves voters from low levels of support to medium levels, while the counter-partisan condition moves voters from high to low levels of support.

Table D.1, Table D.2 and Table D.3 present estimates of the average treatment effects and their confidence intervals for model specifications without and with covariate adjustment

Figure D.1: Raw outcome distribution by treatment condition

(a) Florida Study

(b) U.S. Study

Notes: Distribution of raw outcomes by treatment condition. Vertical lines indicate the mean value, and bands the standard error.

for the Pooled sample (pooling together the samples of the Florida Study and U.S. Study), and the samples in the Florida Study and U.S. Study, respectively. The estimated coefficients suggest that partisan alignment between U.S. voters and (many) noncitizens increases American voters' support for noncitizen voting rights in local elections. In contrast, in the absence of partisan alignment, support for this same policy decreases. The counter-partisan treatment effect is statistically significant in the Florida Study, the U.S. Study, and in the Pooled sample. The co-partisan treatment effect, on the contrary, is statistically significant in the U.S. Study and the Pooled sample but not in the Florida Study. These differences between studies are also displayed in Figure D.2, which excludes Independent registered voters in Florida to compare similar samples. Figure D.2 suggests that the co-partisan effect in the Florida Study is weaker across the three attitudinal outcomes than in the U.S. Study.

Below, we provide possible explanations for this difference in co-partisan treatment effects across the two studies. However, before we do so, we note that our investigation centers on understanding whether, on average, U.S. voters are principled or pragmatic in their attitudes toward noncitizen enfranchisement, and that as such, *a priori* we did not theorize differences across contexts (or studies), as this differences may not directly inform the question of voters' policy motivations, let alone the endogeneity of contextual factors.[5]

There are at least three possible explanations for finding relatively smaller (and statistically insignificant) co-partisan effects in the Florida Study: First, it is possible that due to the precedent set by the 2020 state constitutional referendum, Florida voters may be less inclined to overrule a public mandate less than two years old. Second, it is also possible that voters in Florida may have more resistance to the experimental manipulations, as voters may have a stronger prior of the stakes involved in expanding the political franchise to noncitizens or about noncitizen vote choices. These priors may have been formed due to exposure to the referendum process and the informational environment around the referendum. Indeed, while in the U.S. Study, 39% of the respondents in the control condition expressed a willingness to learn more about noncitizen voting in other states, only 14% in Florida did so (see the bottom-right panel in Figure 2 in the main text), suggesting that strong priors among Floridians may explain the weaker treatment effects. If voters' strong priors were formed out of their exposure to the informational environment of the referendum, then we would expect that voters in other states with recent referendum processes (Alabama, Colorado, Louisiana, and North Dakota) would exhibit a similar disinterest in learning about noncitizen voting policies. We do not find that this is the case: splitting the U.S. Study sample into states with a recent referendum and states without a referendum, we observe that among respondents in the control condition, willingness to learn more about noncitizen voting is actually slightly higher among respondents in states with a recent referendum: 42% vs. 40% in states without a recent referendum. Although it is possible that a referendum may have established a strong prior about the stakes of noncitizen voting, the data is not strongly consistent with such a possibility. Third, it is also possible that the co-partisan effects in the Florida Study are smaller in magnitude than in the U.S. Study because the Florida sample over-represents the college-educated: 75% of respondents have a college degree compared to 50% of the population (see Table B.1). Therefore, this sample may be more representative

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[5]We note that for this reason, we did not pre-register hypotheses contrasting treatment effect magnitudes across the two studies.

of a sophisticated rather than the average voter represented in the U.S. Study, and as such, may have had more awareness of the experimental manipulations, responding less to them.

Figure D.2: Support for noncitizen local suffrage by treatment groups (excluding Independent registered voters)

Notes: Displays mean responses by treatment group and 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes Democratic and Republican registered voters in Florida and nationally (U.S. Study).

Table D.1: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights in Pooled sample

| | vote US | vote own | gov dec | more info | vote US | vote own | gov dec | more info |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	2.710*	2.765*	2.753*	0.271*	1.653*	1.688*	1.835*	0.109*
	[2.649; 2.771]	[2.703; 2.826]	[2.691; 2.814]	[0.254; 0.289]	[1.472; 1.835]	[1.507; 1.869]	[1.650; 2.019]	[0.049; 0.169]
co-partisan	0.121*	0.109*	0.102*	−0.012	0.133*	0.119*	0.113*	−0.011
	[0.035; 0.207]	[0.023; 0.195]	[0.015; 0.189]	[−0.037; 0.013]	[0.064; 0.203]	[0.050; 0.189]	[0.041; 0.184]	[−0.035; 0.013]
counter-partisan	−0.359*	−0.380*	−0.370*	−0.023	−0.349*	−0.371*	−0.362*	−0.022
	[−0.442; −0.275]	[−0.463; −0.296]	[−0.455; −0.286]	[−0.048; 0.001]	[−0.417; −0.281]	[−0.440; −0.303]	[−0.432; −0.291]	[−0.046; 0.002]
college					−0.063*	−0.045	−0.048	−0.046*
					[−0.123; −0.004]	[−0.105; 0.015]	[−0.110; 0.013]	[−0.067; −0.025]
male					−0.107*	−0.123*	−0.145*	−0.038*
					[−0.163; −0.050]	[−0.180; −0.066]	[−0.203; −0.086]	[−0.057; −0.018]
white					−0.129*	−0.127*	−0.144*	−0.102*
					[−0.212; −0.047]	[−0.208; −0.045]	[−0.227; −0.060]	[−0.131; −0.073]
latino					0.110*	0.100	0.080	0.015
					[0.009; 0.212]	[−0.003; 0.203]	[−0.022; 0.183]	[−0.021; 0.050]
republican					−0.793*	−0.765*	−0.752*	−0.018
					[−0.862; −0.724]	[−0.834; −0.695]	[−0.823; −0.682]	[−0.041; 0.004]
strong partisan					0.170*	0.151*	0.161*	−0.001
					[0.111; 0.230]	[0.091; 0.211]	[0.100; 0.222]	[−0.021; 0.020]
employed					0.141*	0.112*	0.139*	0.044*
					[0.083; 0.198]	[0.054; 0.169]	[0.080; 0.198]	[0.024; 0.063]
married/partner					−0.103*	−0.104*	−0.118*	−0.025*
					[−0.162; −0.044]	[−0.164; −0.044]	[−0.179; −0.056]	[−0.045; −0.004]
attitudes migrants					0.437*	0.452*	0.427*	0.033*
					[0.413; 0.461]	[0.428; 0.476]	[0.402; 0.452]	[0.026; 0.041]
native born					0.080	0.079	0.040	0.017
					[−0.007; 0.168]	[−0.010; 0.168]	[−0.051; 0.130]	[−0.012; 0.046]
interest politics					0.021	0.018	0.008	0.045*
					[−0.007; 0.050]	[−0.011; 0.047]	[−0.021; 0.038]	[0.036; 0.055]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R^2	0.017	0.018	0.017	0.000	0.339	0.340	0.312	0.045
Num. obs.	7704	7703	7704	7425	7704	7703	7704	7425

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for the Pooled sample (pooling together the Florida Study and U.S. Study). The sample includes Democratic, Republican and Independent (for Florida Study only) registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table D.2: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights in Florida Study

	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	2.608*	2.679*	2.663*	0.148*	1.913*	1.975*	2.147*	0.116*
	[2.525; 2.692]	[2.595; 2.764]	[2.578; 2.747]	[0.128; 0.167]	[1.620; 2.207]	[1.682; 2.268]	[1.846; 2.447]	[0.039; 0.194]
co-partisan	0.045	0.024	−0.031	−0.017	0.049	0.026	−0.028	−0.016
	[−0.073; 0.163]	[−0.096; 0.143]	[−0.151; 0.089]	[−0.043; 0.010]	[−0.043; 0.140]	[−0.066; 0.118]	[−0.124; 0.068]	[−0.042; 0.011]
counter-partisan	−0.270*	−0.305*	−0.303*	−0.004	−0.286*	−0.321*	−0.317*	−0.003
	[−0.383; −0.156]	[−0.420; −0.189]	[−0.419; −0.186]	[−0.031; 0.023]	[−0.379; −0.194]	[−0.414; −0.228]	[−0.414; −0.220]	[−0.030; 0.023]
college					−0.010	−0.012	0.042	−0.010
					[−0.098; 0.078]	[−0.101; 0.078]	[−0.051; 0.135]	[−0.035; 0.015]
male					−0.113*	−0.142*	−0.178*	−0.027*
					[−0.189; −0.037]	[−0.219; −0.065]	[−0.258; −0.097]	[−0.049; −0.005]
white					0.015	−0.010	0.035	−0.058*
					[−0.115; 0.145]	[−0.142; 0.122]	[−0.097; 0.166]	[−0.096; −0.019]
latino					0.096	0.108	0.062	0.009
					[−0.045; 0.237]	[−0.035; 0.251]	[−0.079; 0.203]	[−0.029; 0.048]
republican					−1.113*	−1.131*	−1.064*	−0.059*
					[−1.231; −0.995]	[−1.249; −1.013]	[−1.185; −0.943]	[−0.091; −0.026]
independent					−0.574*	−0.573*	−0.578*	−0.028
					[−0.690; −0.459]	[−0.690; −0.457]	[−0.696; −0.459]	[−0.060; 0.004]
strong partisan					0.073	0.083	0.063	−0.020
					[−0.016; 0.162]	[−0.007; 0.172]	[−0.028; 0.154]	[−0.044; 0.005]
employed					0.040	0.014	0.053	0.000
					[−0.038; 0.117]	[−0.064; 0.092]	[−0.029; 0.134]	[−0.022; 0.022]
married/partner					−0.067	−0.046	−0.092*	0.003
					[−0.150; 0.015]	[−0.130; 0.037]	[−0.179; −0.005]	[−0.021; 0.026]
attitudes migrants					0.431*	0.444*	0.400*	0.021*
					[0.397; 0.465]	[0.410; 0.477]	[0.365; 0.435]	[0.011; 0.030]
native born					0.001	0.040	−0.034	−0.002
					[−0.113; 0.115]	[−0.076; 0.155]	[−0.153; 0.085]	[−0.033; 0.029]
interest politics					−0.002	−0.008	−0.020	0.020*
					[−0.043; 0.039]	[−0.050; 0.033]	[−0.064; 0.023]	[0.009; 0.031]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R^2	0.008	0.009	0.007	−0.000	0.364	0.372	0.318	0.023
Num. obs.	4135	4135	4135	3920	4135	4135	4135	3920

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for the Florida Study. The sample includes Democratic, Republican and Independent registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table D.3: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights in U.S. Study

	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	2.826*	2.862*	2.855*	0.407*	1.828*	1.859*	1.921*	0.034
	[2.736; 2.916]	[2.772; 2.951]	[2.765; 2.945]	[0.379; 0.435]	[1.578; 2.077]	[1.607; 2.110]	[1.670; 2.173]	[−0.057; 0.124]
co-partisan	0.211*	0.210*	0.257*	−0.005	0.220*	0.219*	0.266*	0.001
	[0.087; 0.334]	[0.087; 0.333]	[0.133; 0.381]	[−0.045; 0.034]	[0.121; 0.319]	[0.120; 0.319]	[0.167; 0.365]	[−0.037; 0.039]
counter-partisan	−0.459*	−0.464*	−0.446*	−0.040*	−0.415*	−0.420*	−0.402*	−0.033
	[−0.581; −0.337]	[−0.586; −0.342]	[−0.569; −0.323]	[−0.080; −0.001]	[−0.513; −0.317]	[−0.518; −0.321]	[−0.501; −0.303]	[−0.071; 0.005]
college					0.048	0.072	0.047	0.050*
					[−0.035; 0.130]	[−0.011; 0.155]	[−0.036; 0.131]	[0.018; 0.082]
male					−0.023	−0.024	−0.030	−0.026
					[−0.104; 0.059]	[−0.106; 0.058]	[−0.112; 0.052]	[−0.057; 0.006]
white					−0.103	−0.093	−0.107	−0.021
					[−0.212; 0.005]	[−0.199; 0.014]	[−0.216; 0.002]	[−0.063; 0.020]
latino					0.203*	0.168*	0.172*	0.058*
					[0.058; 0.347]	[0.024; 0.313]	[0.029; 0.316]	[0.002; 0.115]
republican					−0.985*	−0.911*	−0.963*	−0.110*
					[−1.088; −0.882]	[−1.015; −0.808]	[−1.067; −0.860]	[−0.147; −0.073]
strong partisan					0.049	0.007	0.033	−0.009
					[−0.036; 0.134]	[−0.078; 0.093]	[−0.052; 0.118]	[−0.042; 0.024]
employed					0.163*	0.133*	0.131*	0.011
					[0.079; 0.247]	[0.049; 0.217]	[0.046; 0.216]	[−0.021; 0.043]
married/partner					−0.027	−0.058	−0.018	0.018
					[−0.111; 0.056]	[−0.142; 0.027]	[−0.103; 0.067]	[−0.014; 0.050]
attitudes migrants					0.364*	0.383*	0.379*	0.038*
					[0.328; 0.401]	[0.346; 0.419]	[0.343; 0.416]	[0.025; 0.051]
native born					0.104	0.053	0.044	−0.017
					[−0.029; 0.236]	[−0.082; 0.188]	[−0.090; 0.178]	[−0.068; 0.033]
interest politics					0.069*	0.070*	0.061*	0.084*
					[0.030; 0.109]	[0.030; 0.110]	[0.021; 0.101]	[0.070; 0.098]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R^2	0.032	0.033	0.035	0.001	0.363	0.355	0.363	0.084
Num. obs.	3569	3568	3569	3505	3569	3568	3569	3505

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for U.S. Study. The sample includes Democratic and Republican registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

D.2 Partisan Treatment Effects

Figure D.3 shows the distribution of the raw outcomes by experimental condition in the U.S. Study separately for Democrats and Republicans.

Figure D.3: Raw outcome distribution by treatment condition and partisanship in the U.S. Study

(a) Democrats

(b) Republicans

Notes: Distribution of outcomes by treatment condition. Vertical lines indicate the mean value and bands the standard error.

Table D.4, Table D.5, Table D.6, Table D.7, Table D.8 and Table D.9 present estimates of the average treatment effects and their confidence intervals for model specifications without and with covariate adjustment for 1) the Pooled sample (pooling together the samples of the

14

Florida Study and U.S. Study) separately for Democrats and Republicans, 2) the sample in the Florida Study separately for Democrats and Republicans, and 3) the sample in the U.S. Study separately for Democrats and Republicans. The sign of the estimates suggest that Democrats and Republicans appear rather pragmatic about their attitudes toward noncitizen enfranchisement: voters increase their support for noncitizen suffrage when they read that many noncitizens would vote for their party, and decrease their support when noncitizens would vote for the other party. Such a pragmatic motive is particularly evident from the negative estimate of the counter-partisan treatment effect among Democrats and the positive estimate of the co-partisan treatment effect among Republicans.

These estimate tables also suggest that the magnitude of the treatment effects is different for Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Study (and in the Pooled Sample). Particularly, the positive co-partisan treatment effect is larger among Republicans, and the negative counter-partisan treatment effect is greater (in absolute terms) among Democrats. We note that we neither pre-registered hypotheses related to these differential treatment effects nor pre-registered a power analysis that accounted for such differences in estimates. However, we consider a possible explanation for differences in treatment effect magnitudes across Democrats and Republicans.[6]

This explanation relies on two assumptions. First, voters in the control condition may generally expect that many noncitizens would vote for the Democratic Party, and second, that voters respond more strongly to the experimental manipulation when their expectations contradict the framing in the experimental vignettes. If the first assumption is true, then the expectations of Democratic voters are more dissimilar from the experimental manipulation framing in the counter-partisan condition (i.e., that many noncitizens vote Republican) than in the co-partisan condition (i.e., that many noncitizens vote Democrat). Similarly, the manipulation framing is most different for a Republican voter in the co-partisan condition (i.e., that does not generally align with a voter's expectation) than in the counter-partisan condition (i.e., that is generally consistent with a voter's expectation). If both assumptions are true, Democratic voters would respond most strongly to the counter-partisan condition, whereas Republican voters would respond most strongly to the co-partisan condition.

The magnitude of the treatment effect coefficients indeed suggests this. For example, among Democratic voters in the Pooled sample, the co-partisan treatment effect is equivalent to a 6% increase in support for noncitizen voting relative to the control condition, and the counter-partisan treatment effect is equivalent to a 40% decrease (see Column 5 Table D.4). In contrast, among Republican voters, the co-partisan treatment effect is equivalent to a 14% increase, whereas the counter-partisan treatment effect is equivalent to a 12% decrease (Column 5 Table D.5).

This explanation is also consistent with the observation of the smaller co-partisan treatment effect in the Florida Study compared to the U.S. Study (see Table D.2 and Table D.3). As mentioned above, the co-partisan treatment generates a stronger response among Republicans, possibly because it alters their expectations about noncitizen vote choices to a greater degree. It is possible that the expectations of Republican voters may have been affected to a lesser degree in the Florida Study as the share of the immigrant-origin population supporting the Republican Party is larger in Florida than nationally (see Supplemental Material A.1.3

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[6]We provide this explanation in response to the three anonymous reviewers.

in the Dataverse). In other words, many in the control condition may have consequently expected noncitizens to vote Republican. As such, Republicans respond with less intensity to the co-partisan manipulation in the Florida Study (a 2.7% increase in noncitizen voting support, see Column 5 in Table D.7) than in the U.S. Study (a 26% increase, see Column 5 in Table D.9).

Overall, this explanation for the differences in treatment effects across Democrats and Republicans is consistent with a characterization of voters as pragmatic. Voter support for noncitizen voting rights is based on the policy's expected partisan gains. When voters generally expect noncitizens to vote for the Democratic Party, pragmatic Democratic voters should not meaningfully adjust their level of support in the co-partisan condition as the expected gains from the policy are more or less the same as in the control condition. In contrast, pragmatic Republican voters greatly increase their support for noncitizen voting in the co-partisan condition as the expected gains from the policy are higher than those in the control condition. Below we assess whether the differences in treatment effects across Democrats and Republicans can be explained instead by ceiling and floor effects. We do not find strong evidence that this is the case.

D.2.1 Ceiling and Floor Effects

Support for noncitizen voting rights in the control condition is, on average, larger among Democratic voters than Republican voters (see the vertical lines in Figure D.3). This baseline difference in support for noncitizen voting rights across Democrats and Republicans may explain the difference in the magnitude of the treatment effects across Democrats and Republicans. For example, the co-partisan treatment effect among Republicans may be larger than among Democrats because Republican voters start from a lower level of baseline support and, therefore, may have more room than Democrats to increase their support. Similarly, the counter-partisan effect on Democratic support may be larger (in absolute terms) than among Republicans because Republicans have less room to decrease their support, given that they start at a lower level.

We do not find, however, strong evidence of ceiling effects among Democrats in the co-partisan condition or floor effects among Republicans in the counter-partisan condition. Particularly, we follow Liu and Wang (2021) in estimating a t-statistic from a two-independent-samples t-test of difference in means, computed with estimates of means and variances which account for possible ceiling/floor effects. Contrasting such a t-statistic with a t-statistic with the actual means and variances, we do not find differences across them. In fact, in the case of the difference in means test among Democrats contrasting the co-partisan and control conditions, we find that the adjusted t-statistic is *smaller* than the actual t-statistic—disputing the presence of ceiling effects. Moreover, in both cases, we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of means across treatment groups. Similarly, when we contrast the t-statistics among Republicans that result from comparing the means across the counter-partisan and control conditions, we find that the adjusted t-statistic is smaller (or about the same size, depending on the outcome) than the unadjusted statistic. This contradicts the presence of floor effects in the actual data. We therefore reject the null of difference in means with both statistics, consistent with the reported treatment effects.

Table D.4: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights among Democrats in Pooled sample

	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	3.700*	3.754*	3.735*	0.376*	1.645*	1.648*	1.711*	0.124*
	[3.618; 3.782]	[3.673; 3.835]	[3.652; 3.818]	[0.346; 0.406]	[1.376; 1.914]	[1.380; 1.915]	[1.437; 1.985]	[0.028; 0.221]
co-partisan	0.050	0.011	0.008	−0.024	0.100	0.063	0.056	−0.023
	[−0.064; 0.164]	[−0.102; 0.125]	[−0.109; 0.124]	[−0.066; 0.018]	[−0.005; 0.204]	[−0.041; 0.166]	[−0.051; 0.164]	[−0.065; 0.018]
counter-partisan	−0.669*	−0.691*	−0.679*	−0.028	−0.664*	−0.686*	−0.676*	−0.032
	[−0.790; −0.548]	[−0.811; −0.571]	[−0.802; −0.556]	[−0.071; 0.014]	[−0.777; −0.551]	[−0.798; −0.574]	[−0.790; −0.561]	[−0.074; 0.010]
college					0.035	0.085	0.038	−0.034
					[−0.060; 0.131]	[−0.011; 0.181]	[−0.060; 0.136]	[−0.071; 0.003]
male					−0.022	−0.013	−0.036	−0.023
					[−0.112; 0.068]	[−0.103; 0.077]	[−0.128; 0.057]	[−0.058; 0.011]
white					−0.098	−0.090	−0.095	−0.088*
					[−0.204; 0.007]	[−0.195; 0.014]	[−0.203; 0.012]	[−0.128; −0.048]
latino					0.088	0.101	0.126	0.031
					[−0.053; 0.229]	[−0.041; 0.244]	[−0.016; 0.268]	[−0.022; 0.085]
strong partisan					0.209*	0.201*	0.152*	−0.027
					[0.105; 0.313]	[0.097; 0.304]	[0.047; 0.257]	[−0.066; 0.012]
employed					0.246*	0.224*	0.237*	0.057*
					[0.155; 0.337]	[0.133; 0.314]	[0.143; 0.331]	[0.023; 0.091]
married/partner					−0.023	−0.023	−0.039	−0.012
					[−0.115; 0.070]	[−0.115; 0.070]	[−0.135; 0.056]	[−0.047; 0.022]
attitudes migrants					0.435*	0.442*	0.434*	0.008
					[0.389; 0.480]	[0.397; 0.488]	[0.387; 0.481]	[−0.008; 0.024]
native born					0.067	0.071	0.052	0.042
					[−0.066; 0.200]	[−0.063; 0.204]	[−0.082; 0.187]	[−0.006; 0.091]
interest politics					0.043	0.042	0.052*	0.069*
					[−0.005; 0.091]	[−0.006; 0.089]	[0.003; 0.101]	[0.053; 0.086]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R^2	0.053	0.054	0.049	0.000	0.189	0.195	0.177	0.033
Num. obs.	3105	3104	3105	2994	3105	3104	3105	2994

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for the Pooled sample (pooling together Study 1 and Study 2). The sample includes Democratic registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table D.5: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights among Republicans in Pooled sample

| | vote US | vote own | gov dec | more info | vote US | vote own | gov dec | more info |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	1.807*	1.845*	1.854*	0.214*	1.457*	1.595*	1.744*	0.117*
	[1.734; 1.880]	[1.770; 1.920]	[1.778; 1.930]	[0.188; 0.239]	[1.173; 1.742]	[1.313; 1.876]	[1.454; 2.034]	[0.016; 0.217]
co-partisan	0.221*	0.254*	0.247*	0.004	0.208*	0.240*	0.238*	0.006
	[0.114; 0.328]	[0.145; 0.363]	[0.137; 0.357]	[−0.032; 0.040]	[0.107; 0.309]	[0.137; 0.343]	[0.133; 0.343]	[−0.030; 0.042]
counter-partisan	−0.160*	−0.165*	−0.147*	−0.007	−0.169*	−0.176*	−0.154*	−0.005
	[−0.259; −0.061]	[−0.267; −0.064]	[−0.251; −0.043]	[−0.043; 0.028]	[−0.262; −0.077]	[−0.270; −0.082]	[−0.252; −0.056]	[−0.040; 0.030]
college					−0.093*	−0.095*	−0.092*	−0.038*
					[−0.175; −0.010]	[−0.178; −0.011]	[−0.178; −0.006]	[−0.068; −0.008]
male					−0.049	−0.079	−0.084	−0.026
					[−0.129; 0.031]	[−0.160; 0.003]	[−0.169; 0.000]	[−0.055; 0.003]
white					−0.153	−0.165	−0.162	−0.072*
					[−0.323; 0.017]	[−0.334; 0.004]	[−0.335; 0.011]	[−0.134; −0.011]
latino					0.020	0.038	−0.033	0.002
					[−0.159; 0.199]	[−0.143; 0.219]	[−0.212; 0.146]	[−0.059; 0.064]
strong partisan					−0.161*	−0.163*	−0.117*	−0.039*
					[−0.249; −0.073]	[−0.253; −0.074]	[−0.208; −0.026]	[−0.072; −0.007]
employed					0.132*	0.106*	0.122*	0.040*
					[0.052; 0.212]	[0.025; 0.187]	[0.037; 0.206]	[0.011; 0.069]
married/partner					−0.119*	−0.139*	−0.144*	−0.021
					[−0.204; −0.034]	[−0.226; −0.052]	[−0.234; −0.054]	[−0.052; 0.010]
attitudes migrants					0.273*	0.292*	0.258*	0.035*
					[0.237; 0.309]	[0.256; 0.329]	[0.222; 0.295]	[0.023; 0.047]
native born					0.067	0.020	−0.033	−0.013
					[−0.065; 0.200]	[−0.117; 0.157]	[−0.177; 0.110]	[−0.061; 0.035]
interest politics					0.007	−0.005	−0.019	0.039*
					[−0.033; 0.046]	[−0.046; 0.035]	[−0.060; 0.023]	[0.025; 0.053]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R^2	0.016	0.019	0.016	−0.001	0.124	0.136	0.107	0.030
Num. obs.	3136	3136	3136	3050	3136	3136	3136	3050

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for the Pooled sample (pooling together Study 1 and Study 2). The sample includes Republican registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table D.6: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights among Democratic voters in Florida Study

	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	3.726*	3.833*	3.795*	0.195*	1.758*	1.786*	1.778*	0.051
	[3.604; 3.848]	[3.712; 3.954]	[3.669; 3.920]	[0.157; 0.233]	[1.246; 2.270]	[1.280; 2.292]	[1.251; 2.306]	[−0.090; 0.192]
co-partisan	0.075	0.027	−0.119	−0.029	0.128	0.078	−0.071	−0.027
	[−0.099; 0.249]	[−0.146; 0.201]	[−0.302; 0.064]	[−0.081; 0.024]	[−0.034; 0.290]	[−0.083; 0.239]	[−0.245; 0.102]	[−0.080; 0.025]
counter-partisan	−0.687*	−0.747*	−0.758*	0.013	−0.634*	−0.690*	−0.717*	0.015
	[−0.870; −0.505]	[−0.929; −0.565]	[−0.947; −0.570]	[−0.042; 0.067]	[−0.808; −0.460]	[−0.864; −0.515]	[−0.899; −0.534]	[−0.040; 0.070]
college					0.031	0.059	0.109	−0.000
					[−0.142; 0.203]	[−0.119; 0.237]	[−0.077; 0.294]	[−0.055; 0.054]
male					−0.054	−0.068	−0.079	−0.037
					[−0.192; 0.084]	[−0.207; 0.070]	[−0.226; 0.069]	[−0.081; 0.007]
white					−0.048	−0.021	0.031	−0.074*
					[−0.278; 0.182]	[−0.255; 0.213]	[−0.213; 0.275]	[−0.144; −0.003]
latino					−0.131	−0.074	−0.004	−0.005
					[−0.366; 0.104]	[−0.314; 0.166]	[−0.248; 0.239]	[−0.072; 0.061]
strong partisan					0.266*	0.302*	0.181	0.000
					[0.084; 0.449]	[0.118; 0.487]	[−0.009; 0.372]	[−0.053; 0.053]
employed					0.211*	0.209*	0.210*	−0.013
					[0.071; 0.351]	[0.069; 0.350]	[0.061; 0.359]	[−0.056; 0.031]
married/partner					−0.038	0.013	−0.059	0.014
					[−0.180; 0.105]	[−0.131; 0.156]	[−0.211; 0.093]	[−0.031; 0.060]
attitudes migrants					0.463*	0.460*	0.426*	0.020
					[0.385; 0.541]	[0.381; 0.538]	[0.344; 0.509]	[−0.003; 0.044]
native born					−0.138	−0.090	−0.126	0.027
					[−0.332; 0.055]	[−0.285; 0.106]	[−0.328; 0.076]	[−0.031; 0.085]
interest politics					0.001	−0.012	0.034	0.029*
					[−0.079; 0.081]	[−0.092; 0.068]	[−0.051; 0.119]	[0.007; 0.052]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R^2	0.059	0.064	0.051	0.000	0.176	0.181	0.142	0.007
Num. obs.	1317	1317	1317	1244	1317	1317	1317	1244

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for Florida Study. The sample includes Democratic registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table D.7: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights among Republican voters in Florida Study

	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	1.612*	1.626*	1.658*	0.078*	1.569*	1.741*	1.906*	0.039
	[1.511; 1.713]	[1.526; 1.726]	[1.552; 1.764]	[0.052; 0.104]	[1.137; 2.000]	[1.316; 2.167]	[1.452; 2.359]	[−0.080; 0.158]
co-partisan	0.069	0.106	0.097	0.015	0.043	0.079	0.089	0.016
	[−0.073; 0.211]	[−0.037; 0.249]	[−0.053; 0.247]	[−0.022; 0.053]	[−0.095; 0.180]	[−0.060; 0.218]	[−0.059; 0.236]	[−0.022; 0.054]
counter-partisan	−0.119	−0.110	−0.074	0.013	−0.153*	−0.150*	−0.100	0.010
	[−0.255; 0.018]	[−0.247; 0.027]	[−0.223; 0.075]	[−0.025; 0.050]	[−0.285; −0.021]	[−0.282; −0.019]	[−0.247; 0.047]	[−0.028; 0.048]
college					−0.006	−0.014	−0.005	−0.019
					[−0.127; 0.115]	[−0.140; 0.112]	[−0.137; 0.127]	[−0.054; 0.015]
male					−0.009	−0.034	−0.077	0.006
					[−0.121; 0.102]	[−0.147; 0.079]	[−0.200; 0.045]	[−0.025; 0.038]
white					0.050	−0.051	0.153	0.002
					[−0.176; 0.276]	[−0.294; 0.192]	[−0.073; 0.379]	[−0.066; 0.069]
latino					0.001	0.103	−0.047	0.036
					[−0.231; 0.233]	[−0.140; 0.347]	[−0.282; 0.188]	[−0.032; 0.104]
strong partisan					−0.183*	−0.121	−0.062	−0.014
					[−0.325; −0.041]	[−0.260; 0.019]	[−0.207; 0.083]	[−0.055; 0.028]
employed					0.024	−0.002	0.045	0.026
					[−0.089; 0.137]	[−0.116; 0.113]	[−0.079; 0.170]	[−0.007; 0.059]
married/partner					−0.053	−0.079	−0.141	0.000
					[−0.181; 0.075]	[−0.208; 0.050]	[−0.283; 0.002]	[−0.035; 0.035]
attitudes migrants					0.182*	0.197*	0.133*	0.019*
					[0.128; 0.235]	[0.143; 0.250]	[0.077; 0.190]	[0.004; 0.033]
native born					0.033	0.029	−0.084	−0.038
					[−0.151; 0.216]	[−0.157; 0.215]	[−0.290; 0.122]	[−0.090; 0.015]
interest politics					−0.053	−0.077*	−0.099*	0.009
					[−0.113; 0.007]	[−0.138; −0.017]	[−0.166; −0.031]	[−0.007; 0.025]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R^2	0.004	0.005	0.002	−0.001	0.055	0.062	0.033	0.008
Num. obs.	1355	1355	1355	1295	1355	1355	1355	1295

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for Florida Study. The sample includes Republican registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table D.8: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights among Democrats in U.S. Study

	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	3.681*	3.697*	3.692*	0.503*	1.444*	1.472*	1.416*	−0.056
	[3.571; 3.791]	[3.589; 3.806]	[3.582; 3.803]	[0.463; 0.544]	[1.112; 1.776]	[1.141; 1.802]	[1.084; 1.749]	[−0.178; 0.067]
co-partisan	0.031	0.000	0.099	−0.023	0.082	0.052	0.152*	−0.013
	[−0.120; 0.183]	[−0.151; 0.151]	[−0.052; 0.249]	[−0.080; 0.034]	[−0.055; 0.219]	[−0.084; 0.187]	[0.016; 0.288]	[−0.068; 0.042]
counter-partisan	−0.656*	−0.652*	−0.621*	−0.052	−0.679*	−0.673*	−0.642*	−0.054
	[−0.818; −0.495]	[−0.811; −0.492]	[−0.783; −0.458]	[−0.110; 0.006]	[−0.828; −0.531]	[−0.820; −0.526]	[−0.790; −0.494]	[−0.110; 0.003]
college					0.110	0.152*	0.105	0.067*
					[−0.010; 0.231]	[0.033; 0.272]	[−0.014; 0.224]	[0.020; 0.115]
male					−0.007	0.017	−0.011	−0.030
					[−0.125; 0.111]	[−0.100; 0.134]	[−0.128; 0.106]	[−0.076; 0.016]
white					−0.085	−0.093	−0.068	0.002
					[−0.210; 0.039]	[−0.215; 0.029]	[−0.192; 0.056]	[−0.046; 0.051]
latino					0.226*	0.218*	0.205*	0.066
					[0.050; 0.402]	[0.040; 0.395]	[0.031; 0.379]	[−0.006; 0.137]
strong partisan					0.190*	0.148*	0.161*	−0.010
					[0.063; 0.317]	[0.022; 0.274]	[0.036; 0.286]	[−0.060; 0.040]
employed					0.223*	0.197*	0.188*	0.035
					[0.099; 0.346]	[0.075; 0.320]	[0.065; 0.310]	[−0.013; 0.082]
married/partner					0.017	−0.027	0.023	0.023
					[−0.107; 0.140]	[−0.149; 0.096]	[−0.100; 0.146]	[−0.024; 0.071]
attitudes migrants					0.434*	0.441*	0.464*	0.038*
					[0.377; 0.492]	[0.384; 0.498]	[0.406; 0.522]	[0.017; 0.060]
native born					0.198*	0.172	0.155	−0.001
					[0.013; 0.383]	[−0.013; 0.357]	[−0.026; 0.337]	[−0.071; 0.068]
interest politics					0.068*	0.074*	0.070*	0.097*
					[0.008; 0.129]	[0.015; 0.134]	[0.010; 0.129]	[0.076; 0.118]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R²	0.048	0.046	0.049	0.001	0.204	0.206	0.214	0.066
Num. obs.	1788	1787	1788	1750	1788	1787	1788	1750

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for U.S. Study. The sample includes Democratic registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

Table D.9: Treatment effects on support for non-citizen local voting rights among Republicans in U.S. Study

	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info	vote US	vote own	gov dec	more info
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
constant	1.949*	2.005*	1.997*	0.310*	1.318*	1.410*	1.595*	0.098
	[1.848; 2.051]	[1.900; 2.110]	[1.892; 2.101]	[0.272; 0.347]	[0.947; 1.690]	[1.040; 1.779]	[1.222; 1.967]	[−0.042; 0.237]
co-partisan	0.365*	0.397*	0.390*	0.008	0.363*	0.395*	0.386*	0.012
	[0.215; 0.515]	[0.245; 0.550]	[0.238; 0.543]	[−0.046; 0.062]	[0.221; 0.506]	[0.250; 0.540]	[0.241; 0.530]	[−0.041; 0.065]
counter-partisan	−0.190*	−0.205*	−0.200*	−0.020	−0.168*	−0.182*	−0.179*	−0.014
	[−0.328; −0.053]	[−0.348; −0.063]	[−0.342; −0.059]	[−0.073; 0.032]	[−0.295; −0.042]	[−0.312; −0.052]	[−0.309; −0.049]	[−0.065; 0.037]
college					−0.024	−0.010	−0.024	0.031
					[−0.136; 0.088]	[−0.124; 0.104]	[−0.138; 0.091]	[−0.012; 0.074]
male					−0.056	−0.077	−0.069	−0.026
					[−0.168; 0.055]	[−0.190; 0.037]	[−0.184; 0.045]	[−0.069; 0.018]
white					−0.256*	−0.197	−0.332*	−0.116*
					[−0.488; −0.025]	[−0.420; 0.027]	[−0.567; −0.097]	[−0.201; −0.030]
latino					0.144	0.084	0.076	0.024
					[−0.121; 0.408]	[−0.177; 0.344]	[−0.187; 0.339]	[−0.069; 0.117]
strong partisan					−0.102	−0.138*	−0.111	−0.008
					[−0.216; 0.012]	[−0.255; −0.020]	[−0.228; 0.005]	[−0.053; 0.036]
employed					0.125*	0.088	0.095	−0.014
					[0.014; 0.237]	[−0.025; 0.201]	[−0.020; 0.209]	[−0.057; 0.030]
married/partner					−0.086	−0.101	−0.074	0.011
					[−0.198; 0.026]	[−0.216; 0.013]	[−0.189; 0.041]	[−0.033; 0.054]
attitudes migrants					0.303*	0.329*	0.307*	0.035*
					[0.256; 0.350]	[0.281; 0.376]	[0.260; 0.355]	[0.019; 0.051]
native born					0.012	−0.074	−0.071	−0.032
					[−0.177; 0.200]	[−0.272; 0.124]	[−0.268; 0.127]	[−0.108; 0.043]
interest politics					0.058*	0.054*	0.040	0.071*
					[0.006; 0.110]	[0.001; 0.108]	[−0.013; 0.093]	[0.052; 0.090]
cov	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adj. R²	0.031	0.035	0.034	−0.000	0.159	0.171	0.160	0.044
Num. obs.	1781	1781	1781	1755	1781	1781	1781	1755

Presents estimates of average treatment effects and heteroskedasticity-consistent 95% CIs without and with covariate adjustment for U.S. Study. The sample includes Republican registered voters who answered covariate and outcome questions. * Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval.

D.2.2 Partisan Treatment Effects By Open Immigration Support

This section further demonstrates that voters are pragmatic rather than principled in their attitudes toward noncitizen enfranchisement. We assess whether the decreased Democratic support for noncitizen enfranchisement in the counter-partisan condition is larger among voters supporting *more* open immigration and whether the increased Republican support in the co-partisan condition is larger among voters supporting *less* open immigration. However, we note that this analysis is not pre-registered and only offers suggestive evidence consistent with our characterization of voters as pragmatic.

Figure D.4: Support for noncitizen local suffrage by treatment group and support for open immigration

Notes: Displays mean responses by treatment group and support for open immigration, and 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes Democratic and Republican registered voters in both studies.

Figure D.4 compares the mean support for noncitizen voting by treatment group separately for Democrats and Republicans across voters who do not support open immigration or whose support for open immigration is *low* (that is, voters who think that the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the U.S. to live should be left the same as it is now, decreased a little or decreased a lot), and voters who support open immigration or whose support for open immigration is *high* (that is, voters who think that the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the U.S. to live should be increased a little or increased a lot).

A theory of principled partisans would suggest a pattern specific to immigration attitudes. If partisans were principled, Republicans with exclusionary immigration attitudes would respond less positively to the co-partisan treatment, and Democrats with inclusionary attitudes would respond less negatively to the counter-partisan treatment.

Figure D.4 illustrates evidence contradicting this principled thesis. First, among Republicans, the positive difference in means between voters in the co-partisan and control conditions is larger for voters who do not support open immigration relative to that difference among voters who do support open immigration. Among Democrats, the negative difference in means between voters in the counter-partisan and control conditions is similarly larger for voters who support open immigration relative to that difference among voters who do not support open immigration. These two patterns suggest that partisans are more pragmatic than principled regarding opening the franchise to noncitizens.

The second key point illustrated in Figure D.4 is that support for open immigration and support for noncitizen local voting rights are positively correlated. However, such a positive correlation does not uniquely explain our treatment effects. If a general dislike of foreigners entirely explained our results, the co-partisan treatment effect would have increased with inclusionary immigration attitudes. This is not the case among Republicans. Moreover, we would have expected the counter-partisan effect to negatively increase with exclusionary immigration attitudes. This is not the case neither among Republicans nor Democrats.

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