

Corruption and Cooptation in Autocracy:  
Evidence from Russia

**Supplementary Appendix**

David Szakonyi  
George Washington University

April 18, 2024

**Contents**

<b>A</b>	<b>Descriptive Statistics</b>	<b>APP-1</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>Data Construction: Hidden Assets and Income</b>	<b>APP-5</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>Robustness Checks: Shirking</b>	<b>APP-10</b>
<b>D</b>	<b>Robustness Checks: Varying Kompromat Measures and Standard Errors</b>	<b>APP-14</b>
<b>E</b>	<b>Robustness Checks: Subsets and Interactions</b>	<b>APP-17</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>Robustness Checks: Mechanisms and Re-election</b>	<b>APP-19</b>

## A Descriptive Statistics

**TABLE A1: LITERATURE ON RETURNS TO PUBLIC OFFICE**

Paper	Country	Government	Office Type	Data	Years
<a href="#">Mahzab (2020)</a>	Bangladesh	Local	Elected	Disclosures	2009-2020
<a href="#">Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, and Terviö (2017)</a>	Finland	National and local	Elected	Disclosures	1970-2008
<a href="#">Peichl, Pestel, and Siegloch (2013)</a>	Germany	National	Elected	Disclosures	2005-2009
<a href="#">Fisman, Schulz, and Vig (2012)</a>	India	State	Elected	Disclosures	2003-2012
<a href="#">Olejnik (2020)</a>	Poland	State	Elected	Disclosures	2010-2018
<a href="#">Klašnja (2015)</a>	Romania	Local	Elected	Disclosures	2008-2012
<a href="#">Jung (2020)</a>	South Korea	National	Elected	Disclosures	2004-2016
<a href="#">Berg (2020)</a>	Sweden	Local	Elected	Household data	1991-2006
<a href="#">Eggers and Hainmueller (2009)</a>	UK	National	Elected	Estate records	1950-1970
<a href="#">Querubin and Snyder Jr (2013)</a>	USA	National	Elected	Census records	1850-1880
<a href="#">Fahey (2018)</a>	USA	State	Elected	Disclosures	1995-2014
<a href="#">Eggers and Hainmueller (2014)</a>	USA	National	Elected	Disclosures	2004-2008

**Notes:** This table lists literature on the returns to public office, either analyzed as an outcome variable or analyzed as a predictor of other policy outcomes.

**TABLE A2: REQUIRED INFORMATION IN RUSSIAN DISCLOSURES**

Type of Asset or Income	Description	What Information is Made Public?
Income	Broken out by source: employment, investment, etc.	Total income
Expenses	Both assets and source of income used to purchase	
Real Properties	Type, address, square meters, leased or owned	Type, square meters, country location, leased or owned
Transportation	Make/model and registered location	Make/model
Bank Accounts	Currency, balance, flows	
Company Shares	Equity name, address, share	
Short-term Liabilities	Creditor, term, balance	
Sales of Real Property and Transportation	Buyer(s)	

**FIGURE A1: EXAMPLE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, ORIGINAL RUSSIAN**

Фамилия и инициалы лица, чьи сведения размещаются	Должность	Объекты недвижимости, находящиеся в собственности				Объекты недвижимости, находящиеся в пользовании			Транспортные средства (вид, марка)	Декларированный годовой доход (руб.)
		вид объекта	вид собственности	площадь (кв.м)	страна расположения	вид объекта	площадь (кв.м)	страна расположения		
ОСАДЧИЙ Николай Иванович	член комитета Государственной Думы					квартира	80,10	Россия		9581810,44
						квартира	107,21	Россия		
супруга		квартира	индивидуальная	107,21	Россия	квартира	80,10	Россия	автомобили легковые: TOYOTA RAV-4	412875,03
		квартира	индивидуальная	52,30	Россия					
		гаражный бокс	индивидуальная	20,90	Россия					

**Note:** This figure gives a original version of one of the public available disclosures for a State Duma deputy in Russia from 2020.

**FIGURE A2: EXAMPLE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE, TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH**

Last Name, First Name, Patronymic	Position	Real Estate Ownership				Real Estate in Use			Transportation Assets (make, model)	Declared income
		Type of Property	Ownership	Sq. meters	Country	Type of Property	Sq. meters	Country		
OSADCHY Nikolay Ivanovich	Committee member, State Duma					apartment	80,10	Russia		9581810,44
						apartment	107,21	Russia		
spouse		apartment	individual	107,21	Russia	apartment	80,10	Russia	passenger car: TOYOTA RAV-4	412875,03
		apartment	individual	52,30	Russia					
		garage box	individual	20,90	Russia					

**Note:** This figure gives a translated version of one of the public available disclosures for a State Duma deputy in Russia from 2020.

**TABLE A3: DEPUTIES UNDER INVESTIGATION**

<b>Deputy</b>	<b>Year Indicted</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Crime</b>	<b>Found guilty?</b>	<b>Punishment</b>
Vladimir Bessonov	2012	Communist Party	Use of violence against a public official causing minor injury to health	Yes	Sentenced in absentia to 3 years in a minimum security penal colony
Gennady Gudkov	2012	Just Russia	Illegal entrepreneurial activity	No	
Konstantin Shirshov	2012	Communist Party	Attempted fraud	Yes	5 years in a minimum security penal colony
Oleg Miheev	2013	Just Russia	Large scale fraud and obstruction of justice	On the run	
Aleksey Mitrofanov	2014	Just Russia	Large scale fraud committed by an organized group	On the run	
Nikolay Parshin	2014	Communist Party	Fraud committed by a group of persons	Yes	Sentenced in absentia to 3 years of imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 roubles
Ilya Ponomarev	2015	Just Russia	Aiding and abetting embezzlement	On the run	
Vadim Belousov	2018	United Russia	Bribe-taking by an organized group	Yes	10 years in a strict regime penal colony
Nikolay Gerasimenko	2019	United Russia	Violation of traffic rules resulting in significant harm to victims	Yes	Deprived of the right to drive a vehicle for 1 year and six months
Valery Rashkin	2021	Communist Party	Illegal hunting	Yes	3 years suspended sentence with 2 years probation

**Note:** This table lists the 10 deputies who served during the analysis period (2010-2021) and were deprived of their parliamentary immunity in order to face criminal investigations.

**TABLE A4: CHANGES TO FEDERAL DISCLOSURES POLICIES OVER TIME**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Policy Change</b>
May 2009	All ministers, Federation Council members, and Duma deputies as well as other federal and regional officials are now required to publicly report data on the entirety of their incomes and assets.
January 2010	A condensed version of the disclosures for each official must be made available on the government website for the agency or institution where they work.
January 2011	President Medvedev orders the Tax Service and Prosecutors Office to check all disclosures previously collected over the past two years within three months.
November 2011	Punishments for failing to submit disclosures or reporting inaccurate information are strengthened.
April 2012	The leadership of the Central Bank, Pension Fund, Fund for Social Insurance, and many state-owned companies are now required to report.
January 2013	All officials are now required to report their large expenditures, in addition to their income and assets (land plots, real estate, cars, equities, or other financial instruments) if the asset exceeded their income for the previous three years.
August 2013	Officials can no longer have any foreign bank accounts.
November 2015	Officials can be removed if they do not submit their disclosures on time. Prior to this no punishment mechanism was in place. Also all deputies serving on a part-time basis in regional and municipal legislatures are now required to report.
July 2019	Punishments for municipal deputies that submit inaccurate disclosures are weakened. A warning, rather than removal, is considered sufficient punishment.
April 2022	A new information service Poseidon is set up to centralize the collection and analysis of disclosures within the federal government
December 2022	Regional and municipal deputies serving on a part-time basis are no longer required to submit disclosures, but have to report large purchases.
February 2023	Duma deputies and Federation Council members no longer have to publicly declare income and assets. Although they still will report them to authorities, the only information made public will be in generalized form.

**Note:** This table lists the major changes in disclosures law since 2009. Dates in some cases are approximate since they are based on media reporting of changes in enforcement or coverage.

## B Data Construction: Hidden Assets and Income

The first red flag looks at assets that were not reported by deputies in their disclosures. To verify the disclosures data (as well as uncover unreported luxury cars), I first used a list of 129 million 17-digit vehicle identification numbers (VIN) registered in Russia that was leaked online from the Russian traffic agency in May 2020. The unknown leaker claimed the dataset covered approximately 95% of the entire car registration database for the country; several journalists analyzed random samples and confirmed its accuracy.<sup>1</sup> Importantly, this dataset only contains information on car registration numbers and characteristics, rather than owners.

To learn about car ownership, I ran each VIN number through the online portal of the Russian Union of Auto Insurers which allows drivers and government agencies to check the validity of their insurance, for example after car accidents or other traffic disputes. These insurance records include information from nearly every insurance company active in Russia. Because insurance is mandatory, this dataset covers the driver and owner of the vast majority of vehicles driven in Russia.<sup>2</sup> Any person can enter a VIN number and date of interest into the portal, and receive back partially anonymized information about the name of the owner, the person(s) insured to drive it, the insurance provider, policy number, and location of registration (region).<sup>3</sup>

Separate queries for each VIN were run using December 31 of each year from 2011-2019 to see ownership over time. Because of the significant costs of running these queries, I limited the analysis to just the 19 luxury brands included in the list from the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade (covering 2,742,113 unique VIN numbers); hiding luxury, rather than economy, cars should be a stronger indicator of corruption.<sup>4</sup> For example, accessing ownership data on all makes and models of cars in Russia would cost over \$1 million, an impossible sum for social science researchers. I also identified any cars that deputies owned using leaked data on 43 million entries of car ownership from 2010-2020 from the Moscow and Moscow

---

<sup>1</sup>Kinyakina, and Yekatyerina Angyelina Kryechyeva “V otkritom dostoopye okazalas’ baza dannih rossiyskih avtovladyel’tsyev” *Vedomosti*, May 14, 2020. Lenta.Ru “Bazoo dannih rossiyskih avtovladyel’tsyev vistavili na prodazhoo v darknyetye” *Lenta.ru*, May 15, 2020.

<sup>2</sup>Stepanov, Dmitriy. “V Rossii zarabotala infosistyema avtostrahovshshikov, pyeryepisannaya za 2 milliarda «s noolya»” *cnews.ru*, June 29, 2020

<sup>3</sup>Owners are partially anonymized in that the only the first name, middle name (patronymic), first letter of the last name, and the birthdate are given. Individuals only own on average only 1.43 luxury cars from 2011-2019.

<sup>4</sup>The brands are Aston Martin, Audi, Bentley, BMW, Cadillac, Ferrari, Genesis, Hummer, Infiniti, Jaguar, Lamborghini, Land Rover, Lexus, Lincoln, Maybach, Maserati, Mercedes, Porsche, Rolls Royce, and Volvo.

Oblast GIBDD<sup>5</sup>. As a validation check, I was able to locate 81.2% of deputies' reported cars in either the insurance or the GIBDD data, a positive sign that together these two leaked datasets have strong coverage of the automobile market in Russia.

For the second red flag, I calculated the ratio of total income earned by a deputy and his or her family each year to the total imputed market value of disclosed cars, using the methodology outlined in the main text. One concern with using this approach to identify illicit income is that deputies may be able to obtain car loans to finance their luxury car purchases. The red flag would then be mischaracterizing deputies with such access to finance as having kompromat. According to the Russian website Autostat.ru, indeed roughly one-third of Russian car buyers used a loan to finance their vehicle purchases from 2010-2021.<sup>6</sup>

To address this concern, I collected data on whether car buyers used a loan using publicly available information. One all-too-common problem on the used car market in Russia happens when a buyer purchases a vehicle, only to later learn that there is still an outstanding loan on the car or that the car is being used as collateral for another loan. Sellers often hide information about the outstanding loan and accept the money for the vehicle without paying it off, leaving buyers to deal with the financial institution which wants to be paid back. There are many stories in media covering this common type of fraud and types of civil cases that banks initiate against both past and current owners to get repaid.<sup>7</sup> Many online services in Russia now allow potential car buyers to check the histories of their vehicles to ensure there are no outstanding loans.

In 2017, the Russian government set up a publicly available "Register of Collateral of Transportation Assets". Like the insurance register used to identify car drivers, this service allows anyone to freely inquire whether a vehicle is being used as collateral (either because of an initial loan to purchase it or because a 'personal car loan' being taken out on it where the owner receives cash). Banks enter information about both types of loans immediately, and the register allows any user to query based on the name and birthdate of any individual to inquire about their car-related credit history, with data going back to January 2013.

To detect whether deputies were buying cars using loans, I queried this register for each of the 1,034 individual deputies using their full name and birthdate. In all, just 8 deputies purchased a car from 2013 to 2021 using a car loan. The banks listed on the entries include "Toyota Bank" and "Mercedes Benz Bank Rus", indicating that these buyers obtained their loans directly from the dealer; the VIN numbers on the loan listed match to the data from the disclosures. Thus, deputies do not appear to be using car loans as

---

<sup>5</sup>GIBDD translates to the 'General Administration for Traffic Safety' and parallels the Department of Motor Vehicles in the US.

<sup>6</sup>Autostat "Skolko avtomobiley rossiyaneye pokupayut v kredit?", October 21, 2020

<sup>7</sup>Natalya Kozlova "VS RF: Chto delat, yesli kuplennaya mashina okazalas v zaloge" Rossisskaya Gazeta, August 11, 2019

frequently as the general public. All the results in the paper include an indicator for whether a deputy ever took out a loan to buy a car, as well as a control for the number of real estate assets owned, which would be used as collateral for any car loans. The results are robust to removing the kompromat designation from any deputies who ever used a loan to buy a car.


Second, car loans in Russia, like in many Western countries, are on average of a duration of three years. Even if the collateral-based measure above was missing some financing arrangements, we should expect deputy income to be sufficient over the course of those three years to fully pay off the cars purchased. Take an example of deputy earning the equivalent of \$100,000 in 2014. If she was to buy a car worth the same amount that year using a three-year loan at a 12% interest rate and 10% down payment, she would owe a total of \$117,614.36 over the three years, or just under 40% of her annual salary of \$100,000 each of those years. It is unclear whether banks would even lend based on that debt to income ratio. In addition, I account for salary raises by looking at the ratio of income over car values over an entire term. Given the lending example above, that threshold may even seem conservative. I also show in Appendix Table D2 that the results are robust to using a continuous measure of income to car values, suggesting that deputies that drive even fancier cars on low income are more likely to behave in line with the hypotheses.

**TABLE B1: BALANCE TABLE**

<b>Kompromat Deputy:</b>	No	Yes	Difference	
	Mean	Mean		
Age (log)	3.947	3.882	-0.064	*
Member: United Russia	0.661	0.639	-0.022	
Member: Communist Party	0.154	0.108	-0.046	
Member: LDPR	0.087	0.173	0.085	*
Member: Just Russia	0.098	0.080	-0.017	
Attended Top University	0.150	0.139	-0.011	
Died in Office	0.011	0.006	-0.005	
Female	0.170	0.074	-0.096	*
Committee Leader	0.390	0.321	-0.069	*
Fraction Chair	0.052	0.062	0.010	
SMD Deputy	0.184	0.102	-0.082	*
Years in Office	5.806	5.802	-0.003	
Celebrity	0.071	0.083	0.012	
Significant Business Interests	0.331	0.392	0.060	
Health Care	0.013	0.000	-0.013	
Pensioner / Unemployed	0.014	0.015	0.002	
Civil Society	0.071	0.049	-0.022	
Education	0.046	0.040	-0.006	
Government	0.702	0.719	0.017	
Blue Collar Worker	0.009	0.003	-0.006	



**FIGURE B1: DEPUTY IDEAL POINTS BY PARTY AND CONVOCATION**



**Note:** This figure plots the ideal points for deputy-convocations in the analysis database, using the United Russia fraction leader as the reference point. Each color represents members of the four political parties with representation during 2010-2021, which random noise introduced across the x-axis to better illustrate variation. Greater scores indicate closer voting affinity with United Russia leadership.

**TABLE B2: PREDICTORS OF KOMPROMAT MEASURE**

	Kompromat Deputy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Constant	1.48*** (0.370)	1.21*** (0.393)	
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.038* (0.023)	0.033 (0.023)	0.029 (0.023)
Age (log)	-0.272*** (0.071)	-0.224*** (0.076)	-0.222*** (0.076)
died	-0.052 (0.092)	-0.051 (0.092)	0.023 (0.087)
Female	-0.114*** (0.034)	-0.116*** (0.034)	-0.116*** (0.034)
Committee Leader	-0.055** (0.024)	-0.057** (0.024)	-0.067*** (0.024)
Fraction Chair	0.006 (0.064)	0.010 (0.064)	0.016 (0.065)
SMD Deputy	-0.104*** (0.027)	-0.111*** (0.027)	-0.026 (0.033)
Years in Office	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.026 (0.031)	-0.021 (0.031)	0.059* (0.035)
Celebrity	0.063 (0.061)	0.062 (0.062)	0.070 (0.062)
Significant Business Interests	0.015 (0.036)	0.010 (0.037)	0.010 (0.036)
Health Care	-0.176*** (0.043)	-0.182*** (0.045)	-0.149*** (0.047)
Pensioner / Unemployed	0.052 (0.103)	0.055 (0.103)	0.044 (0.099)
Civil Society	-0.070 (0.053)	-0.064 (0.054)	-0.043 (0.053)
Education	-0.018 (0.060)	-0.015 (0.061)	-0.008 (0.060)
Government	0.010 (0.039)	0.006 (0.039)	0.017 (0.039)
Blue Collar Worker	-0.144 (0.095)	-0.158 (0.096)	-0.133 (0.096)
Member: United Russia		0.051 (0.046)	0.047 (0.046)
Member: Communist Party		-0.017 (0.058)	-0.011 (0.058)
Member: LDPR		0.125* (0.071)	0.141** (0.071)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.052	0.059	0.075
Observations	1,410	1,410	1,410
Convocation fixed effects			✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table analyzes the predictors of being flagged as a kompromat deputy based on either of the two red flags. The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models use OLS with standard errors are clustered on the deputy level.

## C Robustness Checks: Shirking

**TABLE C1: CORRUPTION AND SHIRKING, PARTY HETEROGENEITY**

	Absenteeism (all)		Bills (ihs)		Questions (ihs)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Kompromat Deputy	0.024 (0.279)	2.05** (1.01)	-0.050 (0.035)	-0.170 (0.110)	-0.171 (0.174)	-0.149 (0.216)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.122 (0.257)	0.505 (0.758)	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.008 (0.066)	-0.178 (0.109)	-0.153 (0.174)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.333 (1.80)		-0.050 (0.085)		-0.381 (0.703)	
Age (log)	-0.498 (0.690)	-1.57 (2.49)	-0.051 (0.065)	-0.335 (0.243)	0.153 (0.304)	-0.445 (0.454)
died	10.1** (4.02)	6.97** (3.51)	0.094 (0.142)	-0.369** (0.173)	-0.916** (0.364)	-0.375 (0.801)
Female	-0.913*** (0.338)	-0.624 (1.28)	-0.063* (0.034)	-0.196 (0.151)	0.203 (0.144)	0.497 (0.312)
Attended Top University	0.196 (0.432)	2.48** (1.10)	0.052 (0.066)	0.113 (0.108)	0.381* (0.204)	-0.070 (0.256)
Committee Leader	-0.572** (0.253)	-0.513 (0.944)	0.064** (0.032)	0.128 (0.082)	1.09*** (0.120)	0.257 (0.181)
Fraction Chair	-1.93*** (0.563)	-2.76** (1.33)	0.027 (0.095)	0.323* (0.177)	0.829** (0.358)	1.50*** (0.299)
SMD Deputy	1.51** (0.690)	-2.79 (2.04)	-0.016 (0.044)	0.113 (0.209)	0.035 (0.174)	0.592** (0.262)
Years in Office	0.223*** (0.049)	0.125 (0.094)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.010 (0.022)
Number of Votes (log)	0.146 (0.656)	0.344 (1.72)	-0.090* (0.048)	0.123 (0.111)	1.08*** (0.150)	0.731*** (0.206)
Celebrity	1.34** (0.607)	3.11* (1.88)	0.037 (0.072)	0.038 (0.145)	-0.964*** (0.239)	-0.397 (0.401)
Significant Business Interests	0.074 (0.355)	2.97*** (1.13)	0.031 (0.039)	0.060 (0.131)	-0.626*** (0.167)	-0.767*** (0.265)
Member: Communist Party		4.72*** (1.10)		-0.102 (0.105)		-0.299 (0.278)
Member: LDPR		14.2*** (1.17)		0.161 (0.134)		0.156 (0.295)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.322	0.394	0.035	0.126	0.241	0.205
Observations	925	485	925	485	925	485
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-0.12	1.93	-19.34	-5.68	1.56	4.33
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation, subset by whether the deputy is the member of the ruling party United Russia (odd columns) or a systemic opposition party (even columns). Absenteeism is the percentage of all votes a deputy missed during the convocation. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the weighted number of bills initiated by deputy, and Columns 5 and 6 measure the number of questions asked during debates. The reference category for the party member predictors in the even columns is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE C2: CORRUPTION AND SHIRKING, UNTRANSFORMED OUTCOMES**

	Bills (alone)		Questions		Bills (alone, log)		Questions (log)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.192 (0.121)	-0.187 (0.121)	-20.1** (8.27)	-19.5** (8.66)	-0.062* (0.034)	-0.061* (0.034)	-0.237* (0.129)	-0.191 (0.123)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.074 (0.078)	-0.088 (0.079)	-15.6*** (5.34)	-14.5** (5.95)	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.262*** (0.086)	-0.177** (0.085)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.209 (0.135)	-0.220 (0.141)	13.0 (40.4)	16.5 (39.6)	-0.078 (0.076)	-0.081 (0.072)	-0.235 (0.718)	-0.187 (0.676)
Age (log)	-0.284 (0.202)	-0.350 (0.217)	40.5** (17.5)	4.56 (17.3)	-0.101 (0.062)	-0.130* (0.068)	0.417* (0.242)	0.015 (0.229)
Member: United Russia	-0.711*** (0.211)	-0.636*** (0.208)	-60.1*** (15.4)	-38.2*** (13.0)	-0.282*** (0.062)	-0.251*** (0.060)	-0.901*** (0.195)	-0.754*** (0.177)
Member: Communist Party	-0.428* (0.231)	-0.345 (0.225)	4.77 (25.9)	19.3 (25.3)	-0.137* (0.073)	-0.109 (0.071)	-0.280 (0.257)	-0.254 (0.234)
Member: LDPR	0.747* (0.429)	0.768* (0.419)	20.5 (26.2)	33.8 (24.3)	0.136 (0.104)	0.148 (0.101)	0.144 (0.255)	0.235 (0.241)
died	-0.123 (0.157)	-0.111 (0.207)	-55.0*** (18.3)	-49.6*** (17.2)	-0.017 (0.088)	-0.035 (0.100)	-1.31*** (0.410)	-0.774** (0.350)
Female	-0.277*** (0.091)	-0.262*** (0.091)	-2.21 (9.33)	-2.11 (9.12)	-0.092*** (0.035)	-0.092*** (0.035)	0.358*** (0.127)	0.244** (0.121)
Attended Top University	0.135 (0.153)	0.123 (0.154)	4.73 (13.3)	2.31 (12.2)	0.059 (0.048)	0.053 (0.048)	0.232 (0.157)	0.190 (0.148)
Committee Leader		0.313*** (0.096)		28.2*** (7.93)		0.079*** (0.028)		0.695*** (0.093)
Fraction Chair		0.370 (0.268)		120.6*** (33.3)		0.155* (0.085)		1.15*** (0.208)
SMD Deputy		-0.072 (0.120)		1.50 (10.4)		-0.022 (0.041)		0.161 (0.135)
Years in Office		-0.009 (0.011)		1.89** (0.938)		-0.002 (0.004)		0.002 (0.012)
Number of Votes (log)		0.109 (0.121)		36.2*** (6.45)		-0.002 (0.042)		0.835*** (0.109)
Celebrity		0.067 (0.128)		-39.9*** (15.1)		0.027 (0.052)		-0.725*** (0.181)
Significant Business Interests		0.181 (0.144)		-9.63 (9.45)		0.030 (0.039)		-0.602*** (0.127)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.099	0.121	0.079	0.167	0.114	0.136	0.099	0.237
Observations	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-5.82	-6.18	13.45	11.94	-7.72	-8.17	5.47	3.45
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓

**Note:** \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$  This table shows results using different measures of legislative shirking as the outcome variables. The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. Columns 1 and 2 analyze the number of bills initiated by deputy, and Columns 3 and 4 measure the number of questions asked during debates. All outcome measures are untransformed, unlike the main text which applies an IHS transformation. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE C3: CORRUPTION AND ABSENTEEISM, BROKEN OUT BY VOTE**

	Absenteeism (all)		Absenteeism (1st)		Absenteeism (2nd)		Absenteeism (3rd)		Sessions Attended (%)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Kompromat Deputy	0.894** (0.451)	0.742* (0.438)	0.902** (0.423)	0.787* (0.412)	0.863 (0.590)	0.712 (0.580)	0.997** (0.458)	0.832* (0.443)	-0.555* (0.319)	-0.414 (0.304)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.638** (0.318)	0.383 (0.333)	0.483* (0.282)	0.335 (0.298)	0.886** (0.427)	0.451 (0.446)	0.508 (0.337)	0.211 (0.352)	-0.310 (0.189)	-0.106 (0.197)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.181 (1.99)	0.202 (1.84)	-0.707 (1.94)	-0.852 (1.89)	1.97 (2.03)	2.09 (1.68)	1.16 (2.39)	1.33 (2.18)	-1.66 (2.28)	-1.98 (2.08)
Age (log)	0.574 (0.803)	-0.376 (0.920)	0.505 (0.719)	-0.430 (0.817)	0.385 (1.12)	-0.090 (1.25)	0.531 (0.873)	-0.163 (1.00)	-0.560 (0.517)	-0.059 (0.567)
Member: United Russia	-2.82*** (0.791)	-2.90*** (0.805)	15.5*** (0.820)	15.5*** (0.838)	-23.3*** (0.826)	-23.6*** (0.843)	-21.6*** (0.805)	-21.9*** (0.805)	1.79*** (0.567)	1.93*** (0.579)
Member: Communist Party	3.51*** (0.951)	3.38*** (0.973)	5.11*** (0.956)	4.98*** (0.972)	2.27** (1.02)	2.25** (1.05)	1.08 (0.982)	0.880 (1.00)	3.15*** (0.607)	3.19*** (0.621)
Member: LDPR	14.2*** (1.23)	14.3*** (1.19)	11.4*** (1.20)	11.4*** (1.17)	25.7*** (1.64)	25.9*** (1.58)	8.00*** (1.20)	8.01*** (1.13)	1.87*** (0.674)	1.75*** (0.645)
died	9.74*** (3.22)	8.89*** (3.17)	7.64*** (2.60)	6.86*** (2.60)	9.90*** (3.70)	9.13** (3.67)	8.64** (3.45)	7.66** (3.39)	-6.55* (3.85)	-5.74 (3.70)
Female	-0.614 (0.441)	-0.524 (0.455)	-0.344 (0.400)	-0.240 (0.422)	-0.680 (0.580)	-0.624 (0.597)	-0.963** (0.442)	-0.932** (0.452)	0.918*** (0.304)	0.959*** (0.317)
Attended Top University	1.32** (0.583)	1.15** (0.566)	1.37** (0.547)	1.21** (0.529)	1.21 (0.742)	1.06 (0.723)	0.950 (0.603)	0.787 (0.585)	-0.429 (0.380)	-0.305 (0.351)
Committee Leader		-0.766** (0.384)		-0.454 (0.364)		-1.09** (0.518)		-1.04*** (0.386)		0.853*** (0.236)
Fraction Chair		-2.76*** (0.826)		-2.23*** (0.743)		-3.22*** (1.13)		-3.27*** (0.799)		1.28** (0.548)
SMD Deputy		0.801 (0.716)		-0.478 (0.602)		2.80*** (1.06)		1.83** (0.848)		-2.17*** (0.656)
Years in Office		0.168*** (0.045)		0.142*** (0.040)		0.173*** (0.056)		0.160*** (0.051)		-0.099*** (0.038)
Number of Votes (log)		0.475 (0.901)		0.495 (0.903)		0.285 (1.25)		-0.053 (0.845)		0.444 (0.460)
Celebrity		1.94*** (0.744)		1.37* (0.709)		2.58*** (0.860)		2.43*** (0.823)		-2.04*** (0.642)
Significant Business Interests		1.05** (0.457)		0.842** (0.421)		1.34** (0.594)		1.11** (0.481)		-0.651** (0.326)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.412	0.432	0.450	0.465	0.771	0.780	0.745	0.756	0.347	0.384
Observations	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	3.94	2.66	46.94	13.56	1.3	1.03	10.63	5.58	-1.95	-1.72
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 The unit of analysis is the deputy-convocation. Absenteeism is the percentage of all votes a deputy missed during the convocation, with models breaking out all votes and then by the reading. The reference category for the party member predictors in the even columns is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE C4: LEGISLATIVE HETEROGENEITY**

	Budgets (1)	Constitutional Issues (2)	Defense / Security (3)	Economic Policy (4)	Social Policy (5)
Kompromat Deputy	0.007** (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0005 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.0009)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.028*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.010*** (0.002)
Age (log)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.006)	0.0003 (0.003)
Member: United Russia	0.238*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.002)	0.059*** (0.002)	0.097*** (0.003)	0.121*** (0.003)
Member: Communist Party	-0.095*** (0.009)	-0.090*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.091*** (0.007)	-0.049*** (0.004)
Member: LDPR	0.157*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.066*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.003)
died	0.016 (0.013)	0.016** (0.007)	0.011* (0.006)	0.025** (0.012)	$1.88 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.005)
Female	-0.003 (0.004)	$5.15 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Attended Top University	-0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.0009 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Committee Leader	0.015*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)
Fraction Chair	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.0006 (0.003)	0.0002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.003)
SMD Deputy	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)
Years in Office	-0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0007** (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.003 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.003)
Celebrity	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.002)
Significant Business Interests	$-1.65 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.003)	0.0006 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.834	0.703	0.656	0.617	0.868
Observations	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410	1,410
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table looks at degree of deputy voting support for government-sponsored bills, broken down by issue type based on committee assignment. Bills involved treaty ratifications are omitted. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

## D Robustness Checks: Varying Kompromat Measures and Standard Errors

**TABLE D1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS WITH ERRORS CLUSTERED ON PARTY-CONVOCAATION**

	Absenteeism (all) (1)	Bills (ihs) (2)	Questions (ihs) (3)	Govt Bills (all) (4)	(5)	Ideal Point (6)	(7)	Re-elected (8)
Kompromat Deputy	0.742* (0.404)	-0.079** (0.034)	-0.202 (0.123)	0.007 (0.017)	0.603** (0.260)	0.012 (0.015)	0.278** (0.097)	-0.117*** (0.024)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.383 (0.323)	-0.017 (0.025)	-0.199** (0.070)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.112)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.021 (0.045)	0.012 (0.018)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.202 (0.952)	-0.105 (0.072)	-0.267 (0.498)	0.032 (0.035)		-0.058 (0.037)		0.195* (0.108)
Age (log)	-0.376 (0.880)	-0.167** (0.071)	-0.008 (0.133)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.225 (0.642)	0.011 (0.013)	0.071 (0.242)	-0.341*** (0.060)
Member: United Russia	-2.90** (1.21)	-0.323*** (0.045)	-0.798*** (0.126)					0.354 (0.355)
Member: Communist Party	3.38 (2.28)	-0.138** (0.059)	-0.372 (0.263)		-3.76** (1.39)		-3.57*** (0.533)	0.071 (0.293)
Member: LDPR	14.3* (7.06)	0.185 (0.108)	0.202 (0.168)		5.38*** (1.26)		1.47** (0.488)	0.033 (0.202)
died	8.89*** (2.48)	-0.049 (0.192)	-0.897** (0.369)	-0.058* (0.017)	1.68 (1.03)	-0.109 (0.054)	0.985* (0.460)	
Female	-0.524 (0.710)	-0.117** (0.040)	0.355*** (0.109)	0.008 (0.006)	0.877** (0.336)	0.014 (0.019)	0.244 (0.152)	-0.037 (0.058)
Attended Top University	1.15* (0.600)	0.069* (0.036)	0.319 (0.180)	-0.031* (0.008)	0.251 (0.142)	-0.018 (0.011)	0.135** (0.057)	
Committee Leader	-0.766 (0.655)	0.100** (0.034)	0.857*** (0.171)	0.004 (0.011)	0.242 (0.185)	0.005 (0.014)	-0.034 (0.052)	0.186*** (0.032)
Fraction Chair	-2.76** (1.03)	0.201* (0.101)	1.32*** (0.356)	0.029 (0.011)	-0.157 (0.380)	0.081 (0.055)	-0.114 (0.141)	0.334*** (0.059)
SMD Deputy	0.801 (1.29)	-0.029 (0.028)	0.164 (0.152)	-0.016*** (0.001)	-0.541 (0.420)	-0.046*** (0.001)	-0.137 (0.279)	0.015 (0.041)
Years in Office	0.168* (0.084)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.011)	0.0005 (0.0009)	-0.007 (0.028)	-0.009** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.014*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	0.475 (1.01)	-0.005 (0.066)	0.992*** (0.173)	-0.012 (0.039)	0.262 (0.382)	0.924*** (0.030)	-0.258 (0.191)	0.032 (0.055)
Celebrity	1.94* (1.01)	0.036 (0.049)	-0.818*** (0.147)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.155 (0.306)	-0.005 (0.047)	0.053 (0.073)	0.128** (0.042)
Significant Business Interests	1.05* (0.563)	0.037 (0.023)	-0.712*** (0.168)	0.002 (0.003)	0.184 (0.276)	0.009** (0.001)	0.180* (0.085)	0.071** (0.026)
Ideal Point								-0.033 (0.048)
Absenteeism (all)								0.004 (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.037* (0.018)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.432	0.136	0.227	0.192	0.831	0.920	0.883	0.134
Observations	1,410	1,410	1,410	925	485	925	485	1,340
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	2.66	-8.33	3.08	-1.61	1.84	0.92	2.16	-17.95
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the party-convocation level rather than the deputy level as shown in the main text.

**TABLE D2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING CONTINUOUS MEASURE OF CAR EARNINGS**

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Kompromat: Ratio of Cars to Income	0.316 (0.253)	-0.044** (0.022)	-0.098 (0.081)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.307*** (0.104)	-0.010 (0.019)	0.141*** (0.047)	-0.094*** (0.017)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.721* (0.369)	-0.036 (0.033)	-0.366*** (0.114)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.055 (0.179)	-0.013 (0.019)	0.024 (0.073)	-0.004 (0.024)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.465 (1.98)	-0.206*** (0.046)	-0.765 (0.586)	0.026 (0.020)		-0.053 (0.050)		0.157 (0.168)
Age (log)	-0.184 (0.970)	-0.213** (0.107)	0.115 (0.316)	-0.026 (0.026)	0.120 (0.578)	0.028 (0.047)	0.096 (0.232)	-0.276*** (0.081)
Member: United Russia	-2.93*** (1.00)	-0.360*** (0.090)	-0.796*** (0.230)					0.398** (0.189)
Member: Communist Party	2.95** (1.18)	-0.126 (0.108)	-0.204 (0.288)		-3.68*** (0.292)		-3.59*** (0.123)	0.043 (0.124)
Member: LDPR	14.5*** (1.33)	0.179 (0.143)	0.106 (0.316)		5.60*** (0.281)		1.55*** (0.109)	0.064 (0.075)
died	7.46** (3.74)	-0.159 (0.135)	-0.489 (0.395)	-0.041 (0.026)	2.25* (1.16)	-0.112 (0.107)	1.04 (0.674)	
Female	-0.080 (0.556)	-0.125*** (0.047)	0.207 (0.160)	0.011 (0.011)	0.897** (0.375)	0.001 (0.022)	0.207 (0.135)	-0.039 (0.048)
Attended Top University	1.25* (0.651)	0.106 (0.071)	0.434** (0.198)	-0.029** (0.012)	0.088 (0.249)	-0.027 (0.028)	0.129 (0.109)	
Committee Leader	-0.988** (0.430)	0.085** (0.040)	0.991*** (0.129)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.056 (0.268)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.121 (0.103)	0.183*** (0.033)
Fraction Chair	-2.64** (1.09)	0.240* (0.133)	1.26*** (0.269)	0.030** (0.013)	-0.038 (0.396)	0.078** (0.030)	-0.125 (0.140)	0.361*** (0.062)
SMD Deputy	0.736 (0.800)	-0.031 (0.061)	0.182 (0.180)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.132 (0.688)	-0.039* (0.021)	-0.017 (0.250)	0.021 (0.052)
Years in Office	0.192*** (0.050)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.0008 (0.0009)	-0.011 (0.029)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.009)	0.013*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	1.21 (0.810)	-0.047 (0.066)	0.862*** (0.158)	-0.0006 (0.042)	0.776** (0.325)	0.923*** (0.024)	0.080 (0.125)	0.019 (0.053)
Celebrity	2.19** (0.860)	0.012 (0.062)	-0.913*** (0.234)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.092 (0.424)	$9.92 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.034)	0.122 (0.151)	0.121** (0.056)
Significant Business Interests	0.935* (0.504)	0.074 (0.057)	-0.568*** (0.167)	0.0008 (0.008)	0.203 (0.305)	0.011 (0.015)	0.224** (0.104)	0.097*** (0.036)
Ideal Point								-0.038 (0.026)
Absenteeism (all)								0.004* (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.044* (0.023)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.442	0.158	0.241	0.176	0.830	0.919	0.890	0.144
Observations	1,105	1,105	1,105	734	371	734	371	1,048
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	1.42	55.68	2.63	-2.02	0.44	0.88	0.42	0.98
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office using a continuous measure to identify kompromat deputies. This measure is the ratio of the total value of reported cars to the total family earnings the kompromat measure. The predictor shown has been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.



**TABLE D3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS USING CHANGE IN INCOME RATHER THAN KOMPROMAT**

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Change in Income Over Term	-0.068 (0.160)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.042 (0.042)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.110** (0.051)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.066*** (0.024)	-0.013 (0.010)
Deputy Income, First Year (log)	0.078 (0.168)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.201*** (0.069)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.080 (0.139)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.056 (0.052)	0.059*** (0.013)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.442 (0.302)	-0.003 (0.029)	-0.112 (0.108)	-0.009* (0.005)	0.060 (0.173)	0.014 (0.011)	0.036 (0.070)	-0.010 (0.022)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.655 (1.67)	-0.097 (0.078)	-0.362 (0.730)	0.027 (0.026)		-0.048 (0.046)		0.185 (0.162)
Age (log)	-0.636 (0.860)	-0.142 (0.089)	0.099 (0.279)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.138 (0.543)	-0.004 (0.036)	-0.091 (0.228)	-0.313*** (0.070)
Member: United Russia	-3.02*** (0.846)	-0.296*** (0.078)	-0.676*** (0.209)					0.374** (0.162)
Member: Communist Party	2.85*** (0.985)	-0.098 (0.093)	-0.238 (0.273)		-3.88*** (0.270)		-3.68*** (0.108)	0.057 (0.102)
Member: LDPR	15.0*** (1.25)	0.242* (0.133)	0.230 (0.287)		5.40*** (0.278)		1.45*** (0.108)	0.015 (0.070)
died	11.0** (5.25)	0.159 (0.206)	-0.594 (0.584)	-0.095** (0.039)	-0.343 (0.369)	-0.103 (0.092)	-0.590*** (0.145)	
Female	-0.519 (0.453)	-0.088* (0.047)	0.334** (0.144)	0.0003 (0.009)	0.954*** (0.351)	0.023 (0.018)	0.249* (0.128)	-0.012 (0.039)
Attended Top University	0.949* (0.554)	0.087 (0.064)	0.376** (0.180)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.260 (0.237)	-0.014 (0.026)	0.119 (0.098)	
Committee Leader	-1.14*** (0.376)	0.131*** (0.035)	0.949*** (0.112)	0.002 (0.007)	0.103 (0.245)	0.012 (0.015)	-0.091 (0.096)	0.177*** (0.029)
Fraction Chair	-3.24*** (0.918)	0.208* (0.117)	1.30*** (0.273)	0.035*** (0.012)	-0.224 (0.382)	0.089*** (0.027)	-0.205 (0.139)	0.340*** (0.048)
SMD Deputy	0.867 (0.708)	0.010 (0.053)	0.114 (0.164)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.565 (0.629)	-0.047** (0.019)	-0.119 (0.252)	0.022 (0.046)
Years in Office	0.197*** (0.045)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.016)	0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.009)	0.014*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	2.93*** (0.764)	0.052 (0.058)	1.21*** (0.188)	-0.070*** (0.015)	0.345 (0.420)	0.946*** (0.024)	-0.156 (0.213)	0.047 (0.057)
Celebrity	1.80** (0.813)	0.031 (0.068)	-0.758*** (0.232)	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.132 (0.371)	-0.0007 (0.032)	0.037 (0.144)	0.123** (0.054)
Significant Business Interests	0.730 (0.481)	0.041 (0.050)	-0.607*** (0.157)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.274 (0.292)	0.010 (0.015)	0.180* (0.104)	0.042 (0.034)
Ideal Point								-0.037* (0.022)
Absenteeism (all)								0.004* (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.020 (0.022)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.456	0.141	0.231	0.230	0.833	0.931	0.886	0.148
Observations	1,325	1,325	1,325	878	447	878	447	1,288
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	2.1	-5.77	8.13	-1.95	2.28	0.83	2.31	16.84
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results related to shirking, regime loyalty, and turnover in office using change in deputy income over their time in convocation rather than the indicator used in the main text for kompromat. Change is calculated as a deputy's income in their first full year in office subtracted from their income in their last full year in office, divided by the first year income. The predictor shown has been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

## E Robustness Checks: Subsets and Interactions

**TABLE E1: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS WITH GENDER INTERACTIONS**

	Absenteeism (all)	Bills (ihs)	Questions (ihs)	Govt Bills (all)		Ideal Point		Re-elected
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Female	-0.621 (0.477)	-0.121** (0.050)	0.338** (0.149)	0.004 (0.010)	0.633** (0.316)	0.018 (0.020)	0.165 (0.117)	-0.030 (0.041)
Kompromat Deputy	0.678 (0.464)	-0.082* (0.047)	-0.213 (0.160)	0.005 (0.010)	0.487** (0.205)	0.016 (0.024)	0.241*** (0.090)	-0.113*** (0.034)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.387 (0.334)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.198* (0.103)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.161)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.021 (0.066)	0.011 (0.021)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.214 (1.84)	-0.105 (0.092)	-0.265 (0.764)	0.033 (0.021)		-0.059 (0.044)		0.194 (0.160)
Age (log)	-0.347 (0.926)	-0.166* (0.087)	-0.003 (0.274)	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.336 (0.552)	0.009 (0.037)	0.036 (0.219)	-0.343*** (0.071)
Member: United Russia	-2.90*** (0.806)	-0.323*** (0.077)	-0.798*** (0.210)					0.355** (0.158)
Member: Communist Party	3.38*** (0.974)	-0.138 (0.091)	-0.372 (0.276)		-3.72*** (0.246)		-3.56*** (0.100)	0.070 (0.099)
Member: LDPR	14.3*** (1.19)	0.185 (0.128)	0.204 (0.283)		5.39*** (0.259)		1.47*** (0.100)	0.032 (0.065)
died	8.90*** (3.17)	-0.049 (0.127)	-0.896** (0.420)	-0.057** (0.025)	1.67** (0.675)	-0.110 (0.078)	0.983** (0.427)	
Attended Top University	1.15** (0.566)	0.069 (0.061)	0.320* (0.178)	-0.031*** (0.011)	0.243 (0.218)	-0.018 (0.025)	0.133 (0.092)	
Committee Leader	-0.764** (0.384)	0.100*** (0.035)	0.857*** (0.111)	0.004 (0.007)	0.238 (0.238)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.036 (0.089)	0.186*** (0.029)
Fraction Chair	-2.76*** (0.828)	0.201* (0.109)	1.32*** (0.243)	0.029** (0.012)	-0.150 (0.334)	0.082*** (0.026)	-0.112 (0.115)	0.334*** (0.051)
SMD Deputy	0.796 (0.716)	-0.029 (0.052)	0.163 (0.159)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.513 (0.585)	-0.046** (0.019)	-0.129 (0.235)	0.015 (0.046)
Years in Office	0.169*** (0.045)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.015)	0.0005 (0.0008)	-0.002 (0.024)	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.0002 (0.008)	0.014*** (0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	0.477 (0.902)	-0.005 (0.055)	0.992*** (0.135)	-0.012 (0.034)	0.249 (0.417)	0.924*** (0.022)	-0.262** (0.130)	0.032 (0.048)
Celebrity	1.94*** (0.745)	0.036 (0.067)	-0.817*** (0.223)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.118 (0.361)	-0.005 (0.029)	0.065 (0.129)	0.128** (0.052)
Significant Business Interests	1.05** (0.457)	0.037 (0.050)	-0.711*** (0.155)	0.002 (0.007)	0.206 (0.266)	0.009 (0.014)	0.187* (0.097)	0.071** (0.032)
Female × Kompromat Deputy	0.760 (1.23)	0.027 (0.097)	0.134 (0.362)	0.027 (0.022)	2.24* (1.33)	-0.036 (0.036)	0.720** (0.347)	-0.058 (0.093)
Ideal Point								-0.033 (0.021)
Absenteeism (all)								0.004* (0.002)
Bills (ihs)								-0.037* (0.022)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.432	0.136	0.227	0.193	0.832	0.920	0.884	0.134
Observations	1,410	1,410	1,410	925	485	925	485	1,340
Party Subset	None	None	None	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	None
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	2.74	-8.21	3	-1.62	1.86	0.92	2.17	-17.52
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows the main results on shirking and loyalty with the kompromat measure interacted with whether the deputy is female. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE E2: CORRUPTION AND REGIME LOYALTY: PARTY HETEROGENEITY, CLOSE VOTES**

	Govt Bills (all, close)		Govt Bills (1st, close)		Govt Bills (2nd, close)		Govt Bills (3rd, close)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Komproamat Deputy	0.018 (0.044)	2.94** (1.18)	0.019 (0.040)	3.14*** (1.19)	-0.007 (0.025)	3.38** (1.52)	0.015 (0.044)	2.89** (1.29)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	-0.035 (0.028)	-0.780 (0.781)	-0.007 (0.028)	-0.923 (0.807)	0.006 (0.013)	-0.984 (1.00)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.809 (0.868)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.384*** (0.085)		0.170*** (0.048)		0.040* (0.023)		0.189** (0.075)	
Age (log)	-0.069 (0.097)	1.25 (2.71)	-0.066 (0.085)	2.55 (2.94)	-0.075 (0.051)	1.14 (3.58)	-0.153 (0.093)	1.35 (2.92)
died	-0.409* (0.222)	9.02* (5.45)	-0.237 (0.374)	9.37* (5.17)	0.031 (0.022)	9.66 (6.96)	0.098 (0.200)	9.85 (6.17)
Female	-0.006 (0.049)	3.01** (1.53)	-0.013 (0.057)	2.79* (1.64)	-0.013 (0.027)	4.10** (1.95)	0.030 (0.045)	3.20* (1.77)
Attended Top University	-0.167*** (0.063)	-0.423 (1.27)	-0.178** (0.079)	0.062 (1.37)	-0.072 (0.045)	-0.930 (1.66)	-0.098* (0.054)	0.019 (1.37)
Committee Leader	-0.041 (0.038)	-0.840 (1.14)	-0.092** (0.039)	0.480 (1.24)	-0.006 (0.025)	-1.50 (1.45)	-0.047 (0.037)	-0.436 (1.30)
Fraction Chair	0.066 (0.071)	-0.737 (1.64)	0.100** (0.044)	0.840 (1.68)	0.007 (0.039)	-1.16 (2.20)	0.057 (0.035)	-1.16 (1.92)
SMD Deputy	-0.063 (0.058)	-0.541 (3.43)	-0.004 (0.074)	-2.23 (3.79)	-0.008 (0.032)	-0.439 (3.90)	0.003 (0.062)	-0.495 (3.59)
Years in Office	0.007 (0.004)	-0.041 (0.100)	0.0001 (0.005)	-0.150 (0.128)	0.0009 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.113)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.065 (0.109)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.190 (0.124)	3.45* (1.95)	0.042 (0.095)	0.510 (2.90)	-0.032 (0.026)	4.99 (3.18)	0.277 (0.292)	3.22* (1.74)
Celebrity	0.041 (0.056)	0.465 (1.60)	0.070 (0.056)	1.69 (1.68)	0.009 (0.041)	0.216 (1.75)	-0.029 (0.062)	1.02 (1.86)
Significant Business Interests	0.005 (0.038)	1.09 (1.28)	0.072 (0.044)	0.934 (1.42)	0.016 (0.025)	0.900 (1.55)	-0.042 (0.039)	1.32 (1.39)
Member: Communist Party		-24.9*** (1.36)		-28.4*** (1.51)		-25.6*** (1.64)		-26.6*** (1.55)
Member: LDPR		28.0*** (1.43)		28.8*** (1.55)		34.4*** (1.93)		26.6*** (1.55)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.340	0.813	0.061	0.819	0.018	0.766	0.073	0.789
Observations	925	485	925	484	925	484	925	485
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	-3.61	0.98	1.17	1.02	-4.23	0.76	1.01	0.8
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows results using different measures of loyalty to the regime as the outcome variables. Only votes on government-initiated bills which received less than 90% are included. The Govt Bills column measures the percentage of government-initiated bills that deputies voted for during the convocation, either altogether (Columns 1-2) or broken out into 1st, 2nd or 3rd readings. The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

## F Robustness Checks: Mechanisms and Re-election

**TABLE F1: CORRUPTION AND LOBBYING**

	Lobbies for Federal Gov			Lobbies for Regional Gov			Lobbies for Other Org		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Kompromat Deputy	0.035 (0.047)	0.021 (0.056)	0.077 (0.092)	0.035 (0.047)	0.021 (0.056)	0.077 (0.092)	0.004 (0.034)	0.007 (0.035)	0.038 (0.084)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.029)	0.080 (0.055)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.029)	0.080 (0.055)	-0.034** (0.017)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.048 (0.041)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.140*** (0.044)	-0.149*** (0.055)		-0.140*** (0.044)	-0.149*** (0.055)		-0.062 (0.044)	-0.070 (0.046)	
Age (log)	-0.037 (0.080)	-0.107 (0.098)	0.165 (0.141)	-0.037 (0.080)	-0.107 (0.098)	0.165 (0.141)	-0.091 (0.065)	-0.071 (0.075)	-0.211 (0.156)
Member: United Russia	0.115 (0.071)			0.115 (0.071)			-0.045 (0.070)		
Member: Communist Party	0.006 (0.077)		-0.026 (0.085)	0.006 (0.077)		-0.026 (0.085)	-0.119 (0.079)		-0.159* (0.095)
Member: LDPR	0.030 (0.086)		0.049 (0.091)	0.030 (0.086)		0.049 (0.091)	0.0003 (0.088)		-0.056 (0.097)
Female	0.034 (0.046)	0.029 (0.050)	-0.028 (0.087)	0.034 (0.046)	0.029 (0.050)	-0.028 (0.087)	-0.014 (0.033)	0.0001 (0.038)	-0.121* (0.062)
Committee Leader	0.101*** (0.038)	0.124** (0.048)	0.058 (0.049)	0.101*** (0.038)	0.124** (0.048)	0.058 (0.049)	-0.014 (0.030)	0.005 (0.033)	-0.059 (0.065)
Fraction Chair	0.033 (0.082)	0.034 (0.148)	-0.005 (0.075)	0.033 (0.082)	0.034 (0.148)	-0.005 (0.075)	0.071 (0.084)	0.047 (0.121)	0.062 (0.133)
SMD Deputy	-0.084*** (0.032)	-0.094** (0.040)	-0.030 (0.056)	-0.084*** (0.032)	-0.094** (0.040)	-0.030 (0.056)	-0.048* (0.025)	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.112** (0.055)
Years in Office	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.006** (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.009 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	0.092*** (0.027)	0.111*** (0.037)	0.059 (0.038)	0.092*** (0.027)	0.111*** (0.037)	0.059 (0.038)	0.124*** (0.030)	0.100*** (0.035)	0.178*** (0.058)
Celebrity	-0.004 (0.058)	-0.087 (0.061)	0.267* (0.145)	-0.004 (0.058)	-0.087 (0.061)	0.267* (0.145)	-0.021 (0.056)	-0.051 (0.058)	0.104 (0.132)
Significant Business Interests	0.041 (0.036)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.082 (0.069)	0.041 (0.036)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.082 (0.069)	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.027 (0.032)	-0.013 (0.086)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.071	0.087	0.191	0.071	0.087	0.191	0.105	0.105	0.184
Observations	470	352	118	470	352	118	470	352	118
Party Subset	All	UR	Non-UR	All	UR	Non-UR	All	UR	Non-UR
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table examines whether deputies in the 7th convocation were classified by TI-Russia as lobbying for the interests of other federal government agencies not working in security (Columns 1-3), the interests of regional governments (Columns 4-6), and the interests of non-government organizations such as churches, unions, and environmental groups (Columns 7-9). For each outcome, results are shown first using all deputies and then broken out by ruling party or systemic opposition. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE F2: CORRUPTION AND DEPUTY REQUESTS**

	Publicly Shares Deputy Requests	
	(1)	(2)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.052*	-0.050*
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.008	0.010
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Ever Had Car Loan	-0.096***	-0.093***
	(0.037)	(0.035)
Age (log)	-0.165**	-0.160**
	(0.071)	(0.071)
Member: United Russia	0.049	-0.017
	(0.051)	(0.123)
Member: Communist Party	0.057	0.042
	(0.059)	(0.077)
Member: LDPR	-0.007	-0.063
	(0.056)	(0.107)
Female	0.0007	0.003
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Committee Leader	0.023	0.017
	(0.033)	(0.034)
Fraction Chair	0.057	0.043
	(0.066)	(0.071)
SMD Deputy	0.034	0.032
	(0.029)	(0.030)
Years in Office	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Number of Votes (log)	0.038	0.033
	(0.039)	(0.042)
Celebrity	-0.036	-0.035
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Significant Business Interests	0.020	0.020
	(0.039)	(0.039)
Govt Bills (all)		0.008
		(0.009)
Absenteeism (all)		-0.0002
		(0.002)
Bills (ihs)		0.038
		(0.027)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.060	0.065
Observations	430	430
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table examines whether deputies in the 7th convocation had subpages on their personal websites on www.duma.gov.ru that make available their deputy requests in PDF form. The sample is limited to only deputies serving in the 7th convocation who were in office on January 27, 2021 when the new site format was introduced and encouraged by Chairman Volodin. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE F3: CORRUPTION AND RE-ELECTION, PARTY HETEROGENEITY**

	Ran for Re-election		Re-elected	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.124*** (0.038)	-0.077* (0.044)	-0.138*** (0.037)	-0.089* (0.049)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.037 (0.026)	0.006 (0.026)	0.008 (0.028)	0.001 (0.030)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.057 (0.157)		0.177 (0.155)	
Age (log)	-0.341*** (0.079)	-0.307*** (0.102)	-0.335*** (0.082)	-0.270** (0.116)
Female	0.036 (0.043)	-0.126** (0.059)	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.138** (0.065)
Committee Leader	0.223*** (0.035)	0.176*** (0.036)	0.198*** (0.036)	0.222*** (0.045)
Fraction Chair	0.233*** (0.082)	0.109** (0.045)	0.353*** (0.071)	0.245*** (0.074)
SMD Deputy	-0.076 (0.052)	0.102 (0.085)	-0.017 (0.051)	0.085 (0.107)
Years in Office	0.008** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.004)
Number of Votes (log)	0.050 (0.065)	0.057 (0.049)	0.042 (0.066)	0.022 (0.066)
Celebrity	0.049 (0.060)	0.112 (0.070)	0.079 (0.064)	0.225*** (0.073)
Significant Business Interests	0.087** (0.037)	-0.039 (0.046)	0.066* (0.037)	0.083 (0.052)
Govt Bills (all)	0.002 (0.153)	0.013* (0.007)	-0.125 (0.150)	0.033*** (0.008)
Absenteeism (all)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.002)
Bills (ihs)	-0.013 (0.037)	-0.0010 (0.021)	-0.025 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.026)
Member: Communist Party		0.097 (0.059)		0.345*** (0.062)
Member: LDPR		-0.091 (0.063)		-0.061 (0.069)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.125	0.165	0.134	0.315
Observations	916	480	916	480
Party Subset	UR	Non-UR	UR	Non-UR
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	112.17	17.05	-34.68	49.72
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table looks at deputy re-election rates broken out by whether the deputy was a member of the ruling party (Columns 1 and 3) or the non-systemic opposition (Columns 2 and 4). The reference category for the party member predictors is Just Russia. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.

**TABLE F4: CORRUPTION AND POST-DUMA CAREERS**

	Found Another Job		Worked Again in Gov.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	0.097** (0.043)	0.076* (0.044)	-0.002 (0.059)	-0.004 (0.060)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.019 (0.027)	0.036 (0.027)	0.037 (0.036)	0.047 (0.037)
Member: United Russia	0.183 (0.207)	0.177 (0.203)	-0.185 (0.326)	-0.178 (0.325)
Member: Communist Party	-0.109 (0.124)	-0.072 (0.122)	0.310* (0.187)	0.308* (0.185)
Member: LDPR	0.033 (0.094)	-0.033 (0.096)	0.109 (0.145)	0.081 (0.143)
Female	0.012 (0.048)	0.0005 (0.048)	0.031 (0.076)	0.027 (0.076)
Committee Leader	-0.0005 (0.040)	0.002 (0.039)	0.008 (0.067)	0.007 (0.067)
Fraction Chair	0.084 (0.122)	0.092 (0.124)	-0.145 (0.162)	-0.128 (0.155)
SMD Deputy	0.076 (0.051)	0.082 (0.050)	-0.092 (0.123)	-0.081 (0.121)
Years in Office	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.0005 (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)	0.011 (0.007)
Number of Votes (log)	-0.267*** (0.068)	-0.257*** (0.067)	-0.179** (0.082)	-0.176** (0.083)
Celebrity	0.186** (0.080)	0.144* (0.081)	-0.213* (0.127)	-0.231* (0.129)
Significant Business Interests	0.015 (0.042)	-0.014 (0.042)	-0.032 (0.069)	-0.043 (0.071)
Ideal Point	-0.028 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.028)	0.040 (0.048)	0.038 (0.048)
Absenteeism (all)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Bills (ihs)	0.022 (0.030)	0.010 (0.030)	0.037 (0.049)	0.033 (0.048)
Age (log)		-0.357*** (0.095)		-0.176 (0.157)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.100	0.120	0.107	0.114
Observations	707	707	225	225
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table looks at deputy post-convocation career outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 use as an outcome whether the deputy ever worked again after leaving the Duma in a formal position based on data from RuPEP, a database of biographical information for Russian elites. Columns 3 and 4 code up all positions for deputies who did find a job after leaving the duma, with the outcome being an indicator for whether that job was in any governmental position (federal, regional, or municipal). All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.


**TABLE F5: DEPUTY ACCOUNTABILITY**

	Elected (SMD)		List Number (PR)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kompromat Deputy	-0.024 (0.049)	-0.029 (0.049)	-0.077 (0.254)	-0.109 (0.256)
Family Real Estate Assets (ihs)	0.015 (0.032)	0.017 (0.032)	0.052 (0.155)	0.033 (0.155)
Ever Had Car Loan	0.119** (0.048)	0.123*** (0.045)	-2.55*** (0.305)	-2.41*** (0.329)
Age (log)	-0.017 (0.086)	-0.009 (0.088)	-0.409 (0.595)	-0.329 (0.592)
Member: United Russia	0.715*** (0.069)	0.447*** (0.172)	2.82*** (0.252)	2.04*** (0.445)
Member: Communist Party	-0.016 (0.080)	0.078 (0.099)	0.396 (0.287)	0.721** (0.346)
Member: LDPR	0.020 (0.080)	-0.143 (0.141)	-0.578* (0.301)	-1.28*** (0.376)
Female	0.093 (0.058)	0.085 (0.058)	0.122 (0.342)	0.127 (0.345)
Committee Leader	0.036 (0.034)	0.026 (0.034)	0.140 (0.201)	0.071 (0.203)
Fraction Chair	0.069 (0.106)	0.072 (0.109)	-1.06*** (0.289)	-1.08*** (0.290)
Years in Office	0.012** (0.005)	0.013** (0.005)	-0.063*** (0.021)	-0.062*** (0.021)
Number of Votes (log)	0.053 (0.051)	0.066 (0.054)	0.099 (0.287)	0.119 (0.293)
Celebrity	0.028 (0.106)	0.029 (0.107)	-1.29*** (0.405)	-1.29*** (0.408)
Significant Business Interests	-0.007 (0.036)	-0.017 (0.037)	-0.065 (0.235)	-0.086 (0.234)
Govt Bills (all)		0.036* (0.021)		0.092** (0.037)
Absenteeism (all)		-0.003 (0.003)		0.011 (0.013)
Bills (ihs)		-0.006 (0.022)		0.137 (0.112)
Spot on PR Common List			4.46*** (0.495)	4.42*** (0.481)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.664	0.668	0.332	0.339
Observations	361	361	729	729
Oster's $\delta$ for $\beta = 0$	0.55	0.68	-3.33	-3.33
Convocation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Note:** \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 This table shows results about the different channels of deputy accountability. Columns 1 and 2 analyze the outcome of whether a deputy was elected from a single-member district; the sample only includes those that ran. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the placement of each deputy on the party list, with lower numbers indicating a higher likelihood of receiving a seat in the Duma. All models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the deputy level.




**FIGURE F1: COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP OF KOMPROMAT DEPUTIES**



**Note:** This figure plots mean number of more kompromat deputies by committee across the three convocations. Committee names reflect the main issue(s) around which the committee convenes since the exact titles and responsibilities can change over time.

**FIGURE F2: COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP OF KOMPROMAT DEPUTIES**



**Note:** This figure plots mean number of leadership positions held by kompromat deputies by committee across the three convocations. Committee names reflect the main issue(s) around which the committee convenes since the exact titles and responsibilities can change over time. Committee Leadership positions include Chair, First Deputy Chair, and Deputy Chair.

## References

- Berg, Heléne. 2020. "On the returns to holding political office (Is it worth it?)." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 178: 840–865.
- Eggers, Andrew C, and Jens Hainmueller. 2009. "MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics." *American Political Science Review* 103 (04): 513–533.
- Eggers, Andrew C, and Jens Hainmueller. 2014. "Political capital: Corporate connections and stock investments in the US congress, 2004-2008." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* pp. 2012–26.
- Fahey, Kevin. 2018. "The Perks of Being a Lawmaker: Returns to Office as a Legislative Goal." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 43 (1): 37–68.
- Fisman, Raymond, Florian Schulz, and Vikrant Vig. 2012. "Private Returns to Public Office." *Journal of Political Economy* 122 (4): 806–862.
- Jung, Hoyong. 2020. "Examining Politicians' Wealth Accumulation in South Korea." *Asian Survey* 60 (2): 290–322.
- Klašnja, Marko. 2015. "Corruption and the incumbency disadvantage: Theory and evidence." *The Journal of Politics* 77 (4): 928–942.
- Kotakorpi, Kaisa, Panu Poutvaara, and Marko Terviö. 2017. "Returns to office in national and local politics: A bootstrap method and evidence from Finland." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 33 (3): 413–442.
- Mahzab, Moogdho. 2020. "Dishonest Politicians and Public Goods Provision." *Job Market Paper* .
- Olejnik, Łukasz Wiktor. 2020. "Why ruling politicians grow rich faster—Rent-seeking or selection bias?" *Society and Economy* 42 (1): 74–97.
- Peichl, Andreas, Nico Pestel, and Sebastian Sieglöch. 2013. "The politicians' wage gap: insights from German members of parliament." *Public Choice* 156 (3-4): 653–676.
- Querubin, Pablo, and James M Snyder Jr. 2013. "The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by US Congressmen, 1850-1880." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8 (4): 409–450.