APPENDIX of Muddying the Waters: How Perceived Foreign Interference Affects Public Opinion on Protest Movements

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**A1: Pretest Survey Instruments**

Our main survey vignette treatment selection relied on several results obtained from prior pretest surveys fielded in July of 2020 for the U.S. survey and in February of 2021 for the Canadian survey. We used Lucid’s online platform to recruit 301 (413) American (Canadian) adult citizens. The pretests primarily used survey responses to determine our selection of protest group, size of protest, and the identity of interfering foreign country. Overall, the results indicate that group size does not systematically matter (we settled on the modal number). Protest group type differs by respondent perceptions of race among racial/indigenous and environmental groups. Thus, the pretest results strongly suggest that our main surveys should differentiate countries that are perceived favorably among Americans (Canadians) from those countries perceived unfavorably. To see the full range of pretests, please see the extended appendix found in the online supplemental materials section.

Figure A1.1: Protest Size Considered as Significant Support



Figure A1.1 shows the distribution of responses regarding what protestersize respondents consider significant for average US (blue) and Canadian (red) communities. The horizontal axis shows protest sizes from 100 to 2 million. The vertical axis shows the percentage of respondents selecting each size as significant. There is no discernible pattern, but three modal responses: 100, 1,000, and 5,000 protesters. Of these, 5,000 received the highest response rate: 24 (27) percent for Americans (Canadians). Given the random variation in perceptions of significant size, we selected 5,000 protesters for our survey and did not vary protest size.

Figure A1.2: Single Choice Common Racial Category by Protest Group



Figure A1.2 compares the public perception of various U.S. and Canadian civil rights and environmental organizations. In the top half of the figure, three U.S. civil rights groups —Black Lives Matter (BLM), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and a Native American Group—are contrasted with three environmental groups: Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth. The bottom half of the figure repeats this for Canada, comparing three notable Canadian indigenous groups (Indigenous Groups 1, 2, 3).

The figure displays the percentage of respondents associating each organization with a specific racial or ethnic group. The horizontal axis represents the percentage of different racial or ethnic groups, while the vertical axis shows the percentage of respondents who identified a particular group as the most commonly associated with each civil rights or environmental organization. For instance, in the top-left of the figure, 84 percent of respondents associate BLM with Black Americans. The NAACP, positioned to the bottom-right of the BLM figure, is associated by a diverse racial grouping, with 63 percent identifying it with Black Americans. On the other hand, 76 percent of respondents primarily associate the Native American Group with Native Americans (shown in the right-corner). The environmental-specific groups—Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth—are all predominantly associated with White Americans (67, 64, and 65 percent respectively). The pattern is similar in Canada, where environmental groups are overwhelmingly perceived as white (73 percent for Nature Canada, 86 percent for Greenpeace, and 82 percent for Environmental Defence Canada), while Indigenous Groups 1 and 2 are perceived as 86 and 83 percent Indigenous (or Aboriginal) respectively. Interestingly, Indigenous Group 3 is predominantly perceived as white. These findings suggest that public perceptions of a group’s racial/ethnic composition, which might be influenced by media exposure, play a critical role in shaping how individuals discern in-group/out-group status.

Figure A1.3 builds on Figure A1.2, presenting a comparative analysis of respondents’ perception of the racial distribution within various organizations. The top figure illustrates the American pretest results (blue), while the bottom figure presents the Canadian pretest results (red). This comparison checks the consistency of perceptions of racial distributions when respondents are given a choice of five racial category options, as opposed to a single, unique answer. The vertical axis represents the percentage distribution of racial groups associated with each organization, while the horizontal axis enumerates different racial/ethnic groups.

In the American pretest, a majority identified all six civil and environmental groups with a single racial category. However, the comparison between Figures A1.2 and A1.3 reveals that having respondents select a single category might have skewed the racial membership distribution, as evidenced by the near-identical distributions for BLM and NAACP in the top-left and top-middle of Figure A1.3. Similarly, Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth in the lower half of the top figure are associated with a smaller percentage of white Americans (around 47 percent compared to 65 percent in Figure A1.2).

Together, Figures A1.2 and A1.3 suggest that perceptions of the racial makeup of environmental and civil rights groups vary among respondents. For our research, environmental groups are seen as more diverse, whereas BLM and NAACP are perceived as predominantly Black. This perception aids in identifying representative groups for the in-group/out-group difference. The bottom figure for Canada exhibits broadly similar patterns between Figures A1.2 and A1.3.

Following the analysis in Figures A1.2 and A1.3, as noted in the main text, we chose Greenpeace and Sierra Club (in the U.S. experiment) or Nature Canada (in the Canadian experiment) as our in-groups, and BLM and NAACP for the U.S. experiment and Indigenous groups 1 and 2 for our Canadian experiment as our out-groups.

Figure A1.3: Perceived Racial Distribution of Protest Groups



We opted to randomize between multiple in-group and out-group movements to ensure our results were not unduly influenced by any specific group’s public reputation. Greenpeace[[1]](#footnote-1), for instance, seems to carry a somewhat negative reputation among some American and Canadian respondents, unlike Sierra Club and Nature Canada.[[2]](#footnote-2) Including these two groups as additional in-groups in the U.S. or Canadian survey experiments respectively, mitigates the potential for any negative reputation of Greenpeace to skew our results.

**A2: Survey Sample Demographics**

Table A2.1: Survey Sample Demographics for the U.S. and Canada

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **U.S.** | **Canada** |
| **Gender** | **Gender** |
| Male | 46.6 | Male | 48.72 |
| Female | 53.4 | Female | 51.28 |
| **Age** | **Age** |
| 18-29 | 20.8 | 18-29 | 19.44 |
| 30-44 | 25.8 | 30-44 | 26.32 |
| 45-64 | 33.3 | 45-64 | 32.47 |
| 65+ | 20 | 65+ | 21.77 |
| **Race/Ethnicity** | **Race/Ethnicity** |
| Hispanic/Latino | 16.4 | Indigenous | 3.01 |
| Non-Hispanic White | 65.9 | White | 79.08 |
| Black/African American | 9.91 | East Asian | 6.54 |
| Asian/Pacific Islander | 4.68 | South Asian | 2.52 |
| Other/Native-American | 3.08 | [[3]](#footnote-3)Black/Middle Eastern/Other[[4]](#footnote-4) | 8.87 |
| **Region** | **Region** |
| Midwest | 18.7 | Alberta | 12.16 |
| Northeast | 17.4 | British Columbia | 13.21 |
| South | 39.3 | Manitoba | 3.75 |
| West | 24.5 | New Brunswick | 2.03 |
|  | Newfoundland and Labrador | 1.65 |
|  | Nova Scotia/Nunavut/Northwest Territories | 3.12 |
|  | Ontario | 38.74 |
|  | Prince Edward Island | 0.71 |
|  | Quebec | 20.83 |
|  | Saskatchewan | 3.72 |
|   | Yukon | 0.08 |

The main text displays results from two survey experiments. The samples of both experiments were recruited via Lucid Marketplace where we employed a quota sampling method on their auction system. Here, we used the platform to solicit survey companies to randomly send requests to respondents with needed target population characteristics such as age, gender, etc. In doing so, this methodology generally produces a more diverse and representative sample of the American and Canadian public. Coppock and McClintock (2019) find that Lucid’s samples far more closely adheres to U.S. voting populations in comparison to MTurk and are, as a result, increasingly used by scholars interested in getting representative samples of the US population. Our target sample is broadly similar in age, gender, and regional characteristics for both the U.S. and Canadian population (see Table A2.1). While our survey samples are nationally representative, Lucid does not provide us with a probability sample. Yet this pattern may not matter much as the gold standard of random digit dialling has not performed better leading many traditional pollsters to shift to fully online polling.[[5]](#footnote-5) Finally, with regards to online convenience samples, using unweighted datasets from such services are found to be more representative of the overall population along relevant dimensions (Miratrix, Sekhon, Theodoris, and Campos 2018). Thus, weighting samples, particularly if such weights are unknown, may lead to lower data quality compared to the unweighted data.[[6]](#footnote-6) Indeed, the use of weights over the past few years by many major polling companies have not addressed the population representation problem in sampled polls.

Figure A2.1: Power Test for Sample Size Selection



Figure A2.2 uses existing sample data mean and standard deviation to conduct a power test with an 80 percent power to determine minimum sample size for mean differences between the foreign interferent treatment and control of no interference. The left-hand figures use the concession outcome measurement while the right-side uses the repression outcome measurement for the U.S. (top figure) and Canadian (bottom figure) sample. In general, the minimum sample size required for the most conservative power test measure is a sample size of 800 for satisfying a power of 80 percent. For the concession measure, which has a smaller mean difference, total sample size of 1600 is needed before the 80 percent threshold is satisfied for the U.S. and Canadian sample. This implies a sample size of 800 for the control and treatment sample sizes. In contrast, for the repression measure, a sample size of 1,000 and 600 is needed to satisfy 80 percent power for the U.S. and Canadian sample, respectively. Given that each of our hypotheses employs a minimum sample size of 800 for each treatment subgroup, we contend that the null results found in some of our hypotheses are driven by a lack of statistical power.[[7]](#footnote-7)

**A3: Ethics Discussion**

Our survey, endorsed by an ethics board for human participant studies, was administered via Lucid’s marketplace platform. Respondents, paid at rates exceeding the national minimum hourly wage of the U.S. and Canada, were anonymous, with codes assigned for identification. Participation was voluntary, with a prerequisite understanding of the consent form and an age limit set at 18 years and above. This survey was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Hong Kong (see EA2003050).

Despite ethics board approval, our research design’s use of real-world names or likenesses of Indigenous groups without consent raises ethical considerations. While our hypothetical scenario uses Indigenous names, we note that according to current Research Ethics Boards (REB) guidelines, consent is not strictly necessary as the board aims to limit harm to participants—in this case, a nationally representative sample of Canadian respondents.

However, these practices may not fully encompass aspects on the use of Indigenous likeness and property. The Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS) advocates for research aligned with Indigenous values and traditions, mostly concerning the use of Indigenous biological data, historical artifacts, or artistic works. But a less explored area is subject appropriation, defined as “one culture represents aspects of another” (Young and Haley 2009). The central ethical question raised here is whether the use of real-world names of well-known Indigenous groups in our scenarios could inadvertently harm these communities by perpetuating stereotypes or stigmatizing these communities (Wolfe 2006). While research on this topic is limited, parallels can be drawn with ongoing discussions on artistic style appropriation. For instance, Canada’s First Nations have argued that such appropriation distorts the authentic cultural voice where public display and dissemination of the appropriated artistic style can potentially alter public perception (Ibid, 309-310).

In the context of our ‘subject appropriation’ ethical concern, public exposure of Indigenous group identities could carry real-world implications for the concerned tribe. Orr, Sharratt, and Iqbal (2019) had similar apprehensions when their survey experiment about Native Americans in Oklahoma paralleled a case in the Oklahoma courts.

In response to these concerns, we have taken two measures to minimize potential public harm. First, we specify in our survey design that the hypothetical scenario is set in the future, specifically 2025. This makes it significantly less likely for Canadian respondents in our survey experiment to associate the actions or behavior of our protest groups with their real-world counterparts.

Second, we use pseudonyms in the manuscript while using real names in the experimental vignettes. This approach is meant to be a balance between minimizing potential harm to Indigenous groups and maintaining the experimental realism necessary for consistent treatment effects (Bird-Naytowhow et al. 2017; Lavallée 2009).

As discussed in the main text, the use of salient—using well-known and plausible—actors enhance experimental realism. This reduces cognitive burden, improves treatment recall (MacDonald 2019; Brutger et al. 2022), and lessens the difference between hypothetical and real-world treatment effects (Croco, Hanmer, and MacDonald 2021). Thus, by using real-world names in our survey experiment, we can provide insights into potential government targeting strategies of indigenous protest movements in Canada, contributing to the protection of Indigenous rights and the formulation of strategic responses to government abuse.

**A4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects**

Figure A4.1: Heterogeneous Marginal Treatment Effects (Concede)



Notes: These figures depict the marginal treatment effect of foreign interference conditional on respondent environmental preferences (a through d) and nationalism (e through g) for Americans (blue) and Canadians (red). For point estimates and standard errors from this figure, see Table A4.1.

Figure A4.1 shows how foreign interference influences public support for governments conceding to protesters’ demands, depending on respondents’ environmental and nationalist views. For all figures, the vertical axis displays the marginal effect of foreign interference. The vertical the average marginal treatment effect of responses for Americans (blue) and Canadians (red). As in the main text, we find foreign interference reduces public support for protesters by lowering acceptance of concession, especially among environmentally and patriotically inclined respondents. For example, foreign interference decreases concession support from -3 (-3) to -7 (-8) percent for environmentally minded (80th vs. 20th percentile) respondents, suggesting they are less willing to support protesters fighting for environmental causes. Nationalism also decreases concession support. An increase from 20th to 80th percentile nationalism lowers “Strongly Agree” with concession from 3 (4) percent to 8 (4) percent for Americans (Canadians). These effects are weaker than the repression responses in Figure 6 in the main text, possibly because concessions influence fixed environmental views more than punitive views of suspicious protesters.

Table A4.1: Heterogeneuos Treatment Effects (Concede & Repress)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | 1. Concede
 | 1. Repress
 |
|  | USA | CAN | USA | CAN | USA | CAN | USA | CAN |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Foreign | -0.25\*\*\* | -0.26\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* | -0.25\*\*\* | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* | 0.45\*\*\* |
| Interference | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Environment | 0.52\*\*\* |  | 0.49\*\*\* |   | -0.82\*\*\* |  | -0.61\*\*\* |   |
|  | (0.06) |  | (0.06) |   | (0.07) |  | (0.06) |   |
| Interference X | -0.10 |   | -0.05 |  | 0.19\* |   | 0.07 |  |
| Environment | (0.07) |   | (0.08) |  | (0.08) |   | (0.08) |  |
| Nationalism |  | -0.25\*\*\* |  | -0.15\* |  | 0.89\*\*\* |  | 0.24\*\* |
|  |  | (0.07) |  | (0.07) |  | (0.08) |  | (0.08) |
| Interference X  |  | 0.02 |  | -0.03 |  | 0.13 |  | 0.11 |
| Nationalism |  | (0.08) |  | (0.09) |  | (0.09) |  | (0.09) |
| Log-likelihood | -3887.63 | -3970.12 | -4178.34 | -4247.95 | -3725.70 | -3609.66 | -3972.20 | -4062.19 |
| Observations | 2525.00 | 2541.00 | 2659.00 | 2658.00 | 2533.00 | 2548.00 | 2659.00 | 2658.00 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\* <.001 |

Table A4.1 displays the tabular results of the heterogeneous effects for concede displayed in Figure A4.1 in the Appendix A4 (A4.1a) and the heterogeneous effects for repress in Figure 7 in the main text (A4.1b).

**A5: Robustness Checks**

Figure A5.1: Foreign Interference and Public Support for Protest, by Attention Level



*Notes*: Figure A5.1 displays the the marginal treatment effects of foreign interference for the US (top figure) and Canadian (bottom figure) sampale. For point estimates and standard errors from this figure, please see Tables A5.1 below.

Figure A5.1 displays the results in Figure 2 in the main text, the effect of accusations of foreign interference on public support for protesters. Consistent with findings from Ternovski and Orr (2022), the less attentive respondents, while exhibiting similar directional effects, are more likely to display attenuation bias with respect to the main treatment effects. In both the U.S. and Canadian samples, less attentive respondents (blue) exhibited larger standard errors, leading to statistical insignificance for the concede outcome measurement. However, the repress measure, the results are nearly identical albeit with lower substantive impact. Together, these results suggest that while the Lucid sample had inattentive respondents, the results remain qualitatively identical between inattentive and attentive respondents. Table A5.1 displays the point estimates and corresponding standard errors with additional details on sample size breakdown between high and low attention respondents.

Table A5.1: Foreign Interference and Public Support for Protest, by Attention Level

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | U.S. Sample | Canadian Sample |
|  | Concede | Repress | Concede | Repress |
| Attention Level | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **Interference** | **-0.16** | **-0.36\*\*** | **0.30\*\*** | **0.36\*\*** | **-0.18** | **-0.35\*\*** | **0.35\*\*\*** | **0.55\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.10)** | **(0.11)** | **(0.10)** | **(0.11)** | **(0.10)** | **(0.11)** | **(0.10)** | **(0.11)** |
| Log Likelihood | -2209.6 | -1784.3 | -2122.1 | -1776.2 | -2448.2 | -1813.8 | -2335.7 | -1760.4 |
| N | 1421 | 1129 | 1418 | 1126 | 1526 | 1138 | 1526 | 1138 |
| Standard errors in parentheses \* p<0.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\*p<0.001 |

Table A5.2 shows that the sample characteristics between inattentive and attentive respondents are not all that different. In the U.S./Canadian sample, there were more inattentive than attentive respondents with roughly 56/57 percent inattentive and 44/43 percent attentive. As this data show, age differences did not differ much with respect to attention level, but there was a slight difference in gender where more self-identified women were likely to be in the high attention group. However, as noted earlier, the less attentive sample generated greater noise into the data, which was more pronounced for the concede outcome variable and less so for the repression outcome measurement.

Table A5.2: Sample Characteristics, by Attention Level

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | United States Sample | Canada Sample |
| **Age** |
| Attention Level | Low (56%) | High (44%) | Low (57%) | High (43%) |
| 18-29 | 20.24 | 21.59 | 20.48 | 18.06 |
| 30-44 | 27.15 | 24.16 | 25.84 | 26.96 |
| 45-64 | 32.31 | 34.6 | 31.59 | 33.63 |
| 65+ | 20.31 | 19.65 | 22.09 | 21.35 |
| **Gender** |
| Attention | Low | High | Low | High |
| Male | 49.69 | 42.65 | 50.85 | 45.87 |
| Female | 50.31 | 57.35 | 49.15 | 54.13 |

Figure A5.2: Foreign Interference and Public Support for Protests, by Foreign Country



*Notes*: Figure A5.2 displays the the marginal treatment effects of foreign interference for the US (blue) and Canadian (red) sample. For point estimates and standard errors from this figure, please see Tables A5.5 and A5.7 in Appendix A5 for US and Canadian, respectively. For model specification with respondent demographic covariates, see Table A5.6 and A5.8.

Figure A5.2 displays the average marginal treatment effect of foreign interference on public support for conceding to protesters (A5.2a to A5.2c) and repressing protesters (A5.2d to A5.2f). Regardless of whether they are allied democracies (Norway), autocratic and controversial allies (Saudi Arabia), or autocratic adversaries (Russia), accusations of foreign interference systematically reduce public support for government concessions and increase public support for repressive responses.

Table A5.3: Foreign Interference and Public Support for Protest Movements

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | United States Survey Sample | Canada Survey Sample |
|  | Concede | Repress | Concede | Repress | Concede | Repress | Concede | Repress |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **75% Intel** | **-0.22\*** | **0.37\*\*\*** |  |  | **-0.36\*\*\*** | **0.59\*\*\*** |  |  |
|  | **(0.09)** | **(0.09)** |  |  | **(0.09)** | **(0.09)** |  |  |
| **100% Intel** | **-0.30\*\*\*** | **0.43\*\*\*** |  |  | **-0.31\*\*\*** | **0.61\*\*\*** |  |  |
|  | **(0.09)** | **(0.09)** |  |  | **(0.09)** | **(0.09)** |  |  |
| **Pooled Intel** |  |  | **-0.26\*\*\*** | **0.40\*\*\*** |  |  | **-0.33\*\*\*** | **0.60\*\*\*** |
|  |  |  | **(0.08)** | **(0.08)** |  |  | **(0.08)** | **(0.08)** |
| Age | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.07 | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.07 | -0.40\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | -0.40\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Female | -0.03 | -0.47\*\*\* | -0.02 | -0.47\*\*\* | 0.20\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* | 0.20\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Democrats (Liberals) | 0.54\*\*\* | -0.26\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* | -0.26\*\* | -0.08 | 0.16 | -0.08 | 0.16 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.11) |
| Republicans (Conservatives) | 0.02 | 0.65\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.65\*\*\* | -1.03\*\*\* | 0.94\*\*\* | -1.03\*\*\* | 0.94\*\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Education | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.08\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.08\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.05 | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.05 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Environment | 0.43\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Nationalism | 0.05 | 0.74\*\*\* | 0.05 | 0.74\*\*\* | -0.05 | 0.27\*\*\* | -0.05 | 0.27\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Protest Attitudes | -0.66\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* | -0.66\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* | -0.41\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* | -0.41\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| NDP |  |  |  |  | 0.14 | -0.29\* | 0.14 | -0.29\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Green Party |  |  |  |  | 0.60\*\*\* | -0.43\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | -0.43\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Constant | 0.69\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* | 0.69\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* | 0.13 | 1.90\*\*\* | 0.13 | 1.90\*\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.18) |
| Log Likelihood | -3549.76 | -3390.12 | -3550.17 | -3390.33 | -3824.20 | -3685.78 | -3824.40 | -3685.80 |
| Observations | 2512 | 2520 | 2512 | 2520 | 2598 | 2598 | 2598 | 2598 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\* <.001 |  |  |  |  |  |

Table A5.3 displays the ordinal logistic regression table associated with control variables. Here, when examining the control variables, we observe the expected relationship for partisanship, race, gender, environmental preferences, and protest attitudes. Democrats (Liberal Party) are more likely to prefer that the government acquiesce to protester demands while Republicans (Conservative Party) exhibit a strong preference for responding to protester action with repressive actions.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Table A5.4: Foreign Interference and Public Support for Protest Movements

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | United States Survey Sample | Canada Survey Sample |
|  | Concede | Repress | Concede | Repress | Concede | Repress | Concede | Repress |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **75% Intel** | **-0.19\*** | **0.29\*\*** |  |  | **-0.31\*\*\*** | **0.47\*\*\*** |  |  |
|  | **(0.09)** | **(0.09)** |  |  | **(0.08)** | **(0.08)** |  |  |
| **100% Intel** | **-0.30\*\*\*** | **0.36\*\*\*** |  |  | **-0.19\*** | **0.41\*\*\*** |  |  |
|  | **(0.09)** | **(0.09)** |  |  | **(0.08)** | **(0.09)** |  |  |
| **Pooled Intel** |  |  | **-0.25\*\*\*** | **0.32\*\*\*** |  |  | **-0.25\*\*\*** | **0.44\*\*\*** |
|  |  |  | **(0.07)** | **(0.08)** |  |  | **(0.07)** | **(0.07)** |
| Log-Likelihood | -4004.93 | -3942.29 | -4005.79 | -3942.64 | -4266.54 | -4103.14 | -4267.47 | -4103.32 |
| N | 2550 | 2557 | 2550 | 2557 | 2664 | 2664 | 2664 | 2664 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses \* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001 |

For respondent political attitudes, we find that respondent support for concessionary and repressive responses depend on environmental and protest attitudes. Specifically, participants with more environmentally supportive attitudes favor greater concessions and less repressive action against protesters while those with anti-protest attitudes and with white nationalist sentiment (higher ethnocentrism) support fewer concessions and Table A5.4 displays the point estimates and accompanying standard errors that were used to produce the marginal treatment effects displayed in Figure 2 in the main text.

Table A5.5: Conditional Effects of Foreign Interference (U.S. Survey)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | Concede | Repress |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **Foreign Country** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Norway | -0.22\* |  |  |  | 0.31\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| Russia | -0.23\* |  |  |  | 0.41\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| Saudi Arabia | -0.29\*\* |  |  |  | 0.24\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| **Timing of Interference** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Before |  | -0.18\* |  |  |  | 0.33\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |
| After |  | -0.31\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.31\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.08) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |
| **Type of Foreign Support** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Financial |  |  | -0.31\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.33\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |
| Training |  |  | -0.18\* |  |  |  | 0.32\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |
| **In-group/Out-Group Effects** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interference |  |  |  | -0.19 |  |  |  | 0.30\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.11) |
| Outsider |  |  |  | 0.21 |  |  |  | 0.05 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.12) |  |  |  | (0.12) |
| Interference x Outsider |  |  | -0.11 |  |  |  | 0.04 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.15) |  |  |  | (0.15) |
| Log Likelihood | -4005.59 | -4004.75 | -4004.66 | -4003.73 | -3941.45 | -3942.60 | -3942.63 | -3942.01 |
| Observations | 2550 | 2550 | 2550 | 2550 | 2557 | 2557 | 2557 | 2557 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses \* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001 |  |  |  |

Table A5.5 displays the conditional effects without additional covariates other than the interference treatment effect. This table is the basis for the construction for the U.S. data part of Figure 3 in the main text. Table A5.6 repeats the analysis in Table A5.5 with added control variables. With the exception for type of aid, which is no longer significant for training, the remaining results are qualitatively identical between Table A5.5 and A5.6 for the U.S. data.

Table A5.6: Conditional Effects of Foreign Interference with Controls (U.S. Survey)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | Concede | Repress |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **Foreign Country** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Norway | -0.25\* |  |  |  | 0.38\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| Russia | -0.29\*\* |  |  |  | 0.53\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| Saudi Arabia | -0.23\* |  |  |  | 0.29\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| **Timing of Interference** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Before |  | -0.23\* |  |  |  | 0.47\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |
| After |  | -0.28\*\* |  |  |  | 0.34\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |
| **Type of Foreign Support** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Financial |  |  | -0.35\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.42\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |
| Training |  |  | -0.17 |  |  |  | 0.39\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |
| **In-group/Out-Group Effects** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interference |  |  |  | -0.21 |  |  |  | 0.43\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.11) |  |  |  | (0.11) |
| Outsider |  |  |  | 0.17 |  |  |  | 0.09 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.12) |  |  |  | (0.13) |
| Interference x Outsider |  |  | -0.10 |  |  |  | -0.05 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.15) |  |  |  | (0.16) |
| Age | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.07 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Female | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.48\*\*\* | -0.48\*\*\* | -0.47\*\*\* | -0.47\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Democrats  | 0.54\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* | 0.54\*\*\* | -0.26\*\* | -0.27\*\* | -0.26\*\* | -0.26\*\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Republicans | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.65\*\*\* | 0.65\*\*\* | 0.65\*\*\* | 0.65\*\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Education | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.08\*\* | 0.08\*\* | 0.08\*\* | 0.08\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Environment | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* | -0.42\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Nationalism | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.75\*\*\* | 0.74\*\*\* | 0.74\*\*\* | 0.74\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Protest Attitudes | -0.67\*\*\* | -0.66\*\*\* | -0.67\*\*\* | -0.66\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Log Likelihood | -3549.98 | -3549.97 | -3548.17 | -3548.89 | -3387.91 | -3389.21 | -3390.28 | -3390.03 |
| Observations | 2512 | 2512 | 2512 | 2512 | 2520 | 2520 | 2520 | 2520 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses \* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001 |  |  |  |

Table A5.7: Conditional Effects of Foreign Interference (Canada Survey)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | Concede | Repress |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **Foreign Country** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Norway | -0.29\*\* |  |  |  | 0.37\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  |
| Russia | -0.24\*\* |  |  |  | 0.47\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| Saudi Arabia | -0.21\* |  |  |  | 0.48\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| **Timing of Interference** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Before |  | -0.21\* |  |  |  | 0.44\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.08) |  |  |  | (0.08) |  |  |
| After |  | -0.29\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.44\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.08) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |
| **Type of Foreign Support** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Financial |  |  | -0.27\*\* |  |  |  | 0.51\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.08) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |
| Training |  |  | -0.23\*\* |  |  |  | 0.38\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.08) |  |  |  | (0.08) |  |
| **In-group/Out-Group Effects** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interference |  |  |  | -0.36\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.47\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |
| Outsider |  |  |  | 0.02 |  |  |  | -0.24\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.12) |  |  |  | (0.12) |
| Interference x Outsider |  |  | 0.22 |  |  |  | -0.04 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.15) |  |  |  | (0.15) |
| Log Likelihood | -4267.10 | -4267.03 | -4267.36 | -4263.25 | -4102.64 | -4103.31 | -4102.18 | -4095.95 |
| Observations | 2664 | 2664 | 2664 | 2664 | 2664 | 2664 | 2664 | 2664 |
| Standard errors in parentheses \* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001 |  |  |  |

Table A5.7 displays the conditional effects of foreign interference on public support for protests without controls.

Table A5.8: Conditional Effects of Foreign Interference with Controls (Canada Survey)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | Concede | Repress |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **Foreign Country** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Norway | -0.40\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.53\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| Russia | -0.35\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.66\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| Saudi Arabia | -0.24\* |  |  |  | 0.61\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.10) |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |  |
| **Timing of Interference** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Before |  | -0.29\*\* |  |  |  | 0.59\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |
| After |  | -0.38\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.60\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |
| **Type of Foreign Support** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Financial |  |  | -0.36\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.66\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |
| Training |  |  | -0.31\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.54\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.09) |  |  |  | (0.09) |  |
| **In-group/Out-Group Effects** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interference |  |  |  | -0.45\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.64\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.11) |  |  |  | (0.11) |
| Outsider |  |  |  | 0.07 |  |  |  | -0.28\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.12) |  |  |  | (0.13) |
| Interference x Outsider |  |  | 0.22 |  |  |  | -0.06 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.15) |  |  |  | (0.15) |
| Age | -0.40\*\*\* | -0.40\*\*\* | -0.40\*\*\* | -0.40\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.18\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Female | 0.21\*\* | 0.20\*\* | 0.20\*\* | 0.20\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* | -0.35\*\*\* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Liberals | -0.95\*\*\* | -0.94\*\*\* | -0.95\*\*\* | -0.95\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.79\*\*\* | 0.79\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Conservatives | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.21 | -0.45\*\*\* | -0.45\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| NDP | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.12 | -0.28\* | -0.29\* | -0.28\* | -0.26 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Green Party | 0.61\*\*\* | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* | -0.42\*\* | -0.43\*\* | -0.44\*\* | -0.43\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Education | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.09\*\*\* | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Environment | 0.32\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* | -0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Nationalism | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.05 | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Protest Attitudes | -0.41\*\*\* | -0.41\*\*\* | -0.41\*\*\* | -0.40\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* | 0.36\*\*\* | 0.36\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Log Likelihood | -3823.22 | -3823.87 | -3824.23 | -3818.77 | -3685.07 | -3685.79 | -3684.82 | -3675.85 |
| Observations | 2598 | 2598 | 2598 | 2598 | 2598 | 2598 | 2598 | 2598 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses \* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001 |  |  |  |

Table A5.8 includes the analysis with controls. Both tables display the Canadian sample for the results found in Figure 3 regarding the identity of the foreign countries.

Figure A5.3: Foreign Interference, Protest Support, by Protest Group



*Notes*: Figure A5.3 displays the support for protesters by US (top) and Canadian (bottom) respondents’ attitudes split by protest group (see color label). Point estimates and standard errors from this figure, please see Tables A5.9.

Figure A5.3 displays the influence of in-group/out-group dynamics on how foreign interference affects public support for government concession (shown in left subfigures) and repression (displayed in right subfigures). The figure is split between U.S. (top half) and Canadian (bottom half) surveys, which are further differentiated by protest groups. The vertical axis shows the marginal treatment effect of foreign interference on respondents’mean agreement concerning whether the government should concede to or repress the protesters.[[9]](#footnote-9) Figure A5.3a and A5.3b suggests that foreign interference generally decreases respondent support for concessions and increase support for repression towards all groups with slightly stronger effects in the case of the NAACP (although not for BLM).

 The Canadian survey shows potential signs of social desirability bias in both the concede and repress outcome measurements. Figure A5.3c reveals that the marginal effect of foreign interference leads to significant disapproval of environmental groups, particularly, Nature Canada (7% increase in strongly disagree and 6% decrease in strongly agree to concede) but not the indigenous groups. Indeed, Figure A5.3d lead to further support for indigenous groups where respondents are less inclined to support repression applied against indigenous groups 1 and 2 compared to the environmental groups with Indigenous group 2 being statistically insignificant at the 95 percent level. Generally, Canadian respondents express some sympathy for indigenous groups, as they consistently receive lower repression ratings regardless of whether they receive foreign aid or not. These somewhat inconsistent results suggest the presence of public sympathy for specific groups (beyond in-group/out-group dynamics) or a social desirability bias.

Table A5.9: Foreign Interference and Protest Support, by Protest Group

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|   | U.S. Survey Sample | Canada Survey Sample |
|  | Concede | Repress | Concede | Repress |
|   | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Foreign Interference | -0.18 | 0.17 | -0.32\* | 0.63\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.15) |
| Sierra Club / Nature Canada | 0.17 | 0.16 | -0.03 | 0.21 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| BLM / Indigenous Group 1 | 0.33\* | -0.15 | -0.00 | -0.23 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| NAACP / Indigenous Group 2 | 0.09 | -0.10 | 0.03 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.18) |
| Interference X Sierra Club | -0.07 | 0.01 | -0.08 | -0.32 |
| Interference X Nature Canada | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.20) |
| Interference X BLM | -0.17 | 0.33 | 0.18 | -0.06 |
| Interference X Indigenous Group 1 | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.21) |
| Interference X NAACP | -0.03 | 0.27 | 0.18 | -0.34 |
| Interference X Indigenous Group 2 | (0.20) | (0.22) | (0.20) | (0.21) |
| Log Likelihood | -4002.98 | -3939.27 | -4262.82 | -4093.87 |
| Observations | 2550.00 | 2557.00 | 2664.00 | 2664.00 |
| Robust standard errors in parentheses \*p <0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001 |  |

Table A5.9 displays the ordered logit regression results displayed in Figure A5.3. As this is a non-linear model, direct interpretation of the interaction effects by protest group is not possible, which is why Figure A5.3 allows for a more obvious interpreation of the interaction between protest group and foreign intereference.

**A6: Causal mediation sensitivity tests**

Table A6.1: Foreign Interference Mediators and Public Support for Protest

|  |
| --- |
| Protestor Commitment Mediator |
|  | Concede (USA Sample) | Repress (USA Sample) |
|  | Estimate | 95% CI | Estimate | 95% CI |
| ACME | -0.03 | (-.05, -.01) | 0.01 | (.01, .03) |
| ADE | -0.15 | (-.25, -.05) | 0.22 | (.11, .32) |
| Total Effect | -0.18 | (-.28, -.08) | 0.23 | (.13, .33) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.18 | (.08, .43) | 0.06 | (.02, .15) |
| Observations | 2509 | 2509 |
|  | Concede (CAN Sample) | Repress (CAN Sample) |
|  | Estimate | 95% CI | Estimate | 95% CI |
| ACME | -0.03 | (-.05, -.01) | 0.03 | (.02, .05) |
| ADE | -0.17 | (-.27, -.06) | 0.31 | (.21, .42) |
| Total Effect | -0.19 | (-.30, -.09) | 0.35 | (.25, .45) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.15 | (.07, .35) | 0.09 | (.05, .16) |
| Observations | 2601 | 2601 |
| National Security Mediator |
|  | Concede (USA Sample) | Repress (USA Sample) |
|  | Estimate | 95% CI | Estimate | 95% CI |
| ACME | -0.01 | (-.02, .00) | 0.04 | (.003, .07) |
| ADE | -0.17 | (-.26, -.07) | 0.19 | (.09, .29) |
| Total Effect | -0.18 | (-.28, -.08) | 0.23 | (.13, .34) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.06 | (.01, .16) | 0.16 | (.02, .34) |
| Observations | 2509 | 2509 |
|  | Concede (CAN Sample) | Repress (CAN Sample) |
|  | Estimate | 95% CI | Estimate | 95% CI |
| ACME | -0.01 | (-.03, .02) | 0.01 | (-.03, .04) |
| ADE | -0.19 | (-.29, -.09) | 0.34 | (.24, .44) |
| Total Effect | -0.19 | (-.30, -.09) | 0.34 | (.25, .44) |
| Proportion Mediated | 0.02 | (-.14, .16) | 0.01 | (-.10, .11) |
| Observations | 2601 | 2601 |

Table A6.1 displays the mediation coefficients and 95% confidence intervals found in Figure 4 in the main text where the top two tables correspond to the commitment mediator found in the top half of Figure 4 while the bottom two tables correspond to the national security mediator located on the bottom half of Figure 4.Figure A6.1: Causal Mediation Sensitivity Tests (U.S. Sample)

Figure A6.1: Causal Mediation Sensitivity Tests (U.S. Sample)

**Protester Commitment Mediator**



**Energy Security Mediator**

****

Figure A6.1 displays the U.S. sensitivity analysis associated with Figure 4 in the main text. This figure displays the sensitivity tests for the concession dependent variable (A6.1a and A6.1b). The horizontal axis displays the sensitivty parameter (ρ), which shows the degree to which the mediation results are robust to violations of the sequential ignorability assumption. The larger mediating effects from protester commitment on the impact of foreign interference on government concessions (A6.1a) is reflected in the sensitivity analyses. Here, the average causal mediating effect (ACME) is robust to confounding if the unmeasured protester commitment measure explains less than roughly 20 percent of the variance between the mediator and the outcome. For the energry security mediator, the ACME is robust if unmeasured compassion explains less than approximately 10 percent of the variance between the mediator and outcome (A6.1b).

Figure A6.2: Causal Mediation Sensitivity Tests (Canadian Sample)

**Protester Commitment Mediator**



**Energy Security Mediator**

****

Figure A6.2 displays the sensitivity analyses for the Canadian sample associated with Figure 3 in the main text. The ACME is robust if the unmeasured protester commitment and national security mediators explain less than roughly 25 percent (commitment) and 8 percent (national security) of the variance between the mediator and outcome. However, the commitment mediator is more robust compared to energy security as this measure is more robust to larger departures to $ρ$. While the commitment mediator is robust to larger departures of $ρ$ (see A6.2a and A6.2a), the same cannot be said for the energy security mediator. This result makes sense since energy security itself is not influenced by foreign interference (statistically insignificant at 95 percent level). In sum, the results suggest that perceived commitment or genuineness of protesters explains how foreign interference reduces public support for protest movements.

**Appendix A7: Structural Topic Modeling Diagnostics**

Figure A7.1: Open-ended Topic Frequency Associations with Closed-ended Responses

1. Energy Security (b) Protester Commitment

 

Figure A7.1 displays the point estimate topic correlation between close-ended questions that respondents selected and the open-ended comments regarding that specific topic. In Figure A7.1a, there is a positive association between the close-ended question where greater agreement for respondents on the importance of energy independence, but the relationship is relatively weak. In contrast, the association between the close-ended commitment question and open response comments that question the motives of protesters display a strong and negative relationship: that is, respondents who rated protest groups as more committed (higher values) were significantly less likely to question the motives of these groups (see Figure A7.1b). In fact, for respondents who rated protester commitment level as “1” were 2.2 times more likely to mention doubts about the genuineness of protest groups compared to respondents who rated their commitment as a “7”. This provides some evidence that some close-ended questions are fully consistent with the thinking process of our resopndents while others are unable to fully capture respondent logic and thinking. For this reason, a multi-method approach that includes both deductive (close-ended) and inductive (open-ended) approaches to uncovering mechanisms is important.

Table A7.1: Representative Responses for Related Topics

1. Concede Open Responses (b) Repress Open Responses

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Procedural Legitimacy** (Topic proportion: 6%) | **Environmental Protection** (Topic proportion: 6%) |
| We are a nation of laws. We elect politicians to support these laws. Until there is a change in law, people who break it must be held accountable for their actions.Unlawful actions should not be tolerated. This project was approved and has been underway.We are a country of law and order. If the government capitulates it will undermine the due democratic approval process. | They are trying to protect the environment which we all have a responsability to do for future generations.They are protecting our land, it's not always about the $$$. Invest in solar and wind farms instead of oil. Not to mention the future is electric vehicles.I think that would be too severe of justice for a people trying to protect there home and environment. |
| **Nationalism/Energy Security** (Topic proportion: 5%) | **Treason** (Topic proportion: 6%) |
| Because if the government concedes, it will have to continue to do so in other areas of the country. We need to continue to harvest and develop our natural resources, to the best of our ability, to be competitive and support Canadian industry. We still need to do this in a sustainable way that does not, or has a low impact, on the environment.These protesters are foreign actors who want to attack our freedom and or economy from the inside of our country, we can't let them win. The Canadian economy will only get stronger with this project and it needs to happen.We need the natural resources to be used. We shouldn’t be using foreign sources.  | Once the connection of foreign actors with interest in the subject as a competition to our national interest then this will be collusion.They are not true protesters if a foreign power is coordinating the efforts and should be treated as a foreign force trying to undermine Canadian sovereignty.Same reason as above you cannot join forces with a foreign country and plan against your own country. This is treason and the violators, even and including First Nation Members, should be jailed and treated as any one committing treason. The protestors are being influence by foreign powers to hinder the national interests of the country.  |
| **Protester Commitment** (Topic proportion: 5%) | **Right to Protest** (Topic proportion: 13%) |
| Because it’s really suspicious, like it has a high chance of the Saudi Arabian government doing this to make no one dominate his spot.If it was just local protesters maybe over tribal land, it would be different. but if they are sure it is Russia, then I would not concede.If the protest was genuine then the concerns should be checked but since it is just a make work project financed by the Saudi government the protested should be sent home and all trade with the Saudis should stop. We really don't need any sand or camels. | Because protesting is not illegal. they have the right to protest. and what they are protesting about is a matter of health and safety.Protesters have right to protest and their action is reasonable. they have right to protest and they are protected by canadian law.Freedom and Rights of Canadians. It is an essential right to protest.The government should not step in because the protesters have the right to protest, peacefully.  |

Table A7.2: Open-ended Topic Frequency and Closed-ended Responses

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Energy Security
 | 1. Protester Commitment
 |
| Foreign Interference | 0.003 | 0.0003 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| National Security | 0.004\* | -0.004\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Protester Commitment | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Intercept | 0.051\*\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) |

 Standard errors in parentheses \*p <0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

Table A7.2 displays the regression results displayed in Figure A7.1. Column (1) displays the coefficients related to energy security in Figure A7.1a while Column (2) displays the coefficients related to protester commitment found in Figure A7.1b.

**Appendix A8 Preregistration Description**

The two survey experiments in this paper were conducted during a significant transition in political science towards new norms of pre-registering hypotheses and research designs. New regulations introduced in 2021 by several journals emphasized the importance of preregistration for survey experiments. As a result, the preregistration practices for our two studies varied.

We did not preregister the U.S. survey conducted in August 2020, as it took place prior to these norm changes. However, we did preregister the Canadian survey on February 25, 2021 at the Open Science Framework before its launch in March 2021. Given the identical design across studies, this preregistration effectively established transparency for both. This approach helped us avoid concerns over post-hoc theorizing or analysis and ensured that we stayed closely aligned with our initial research plan and hypotheses. We followed this preregistration protocol closely during our subsequent analysis of the data from the Canadian survey experiment.

That said, there are two minor discrepancies between our preregistered and final study. First, we did not preregister explorations of potential mediation mechanisms or open-comment responses, which were included in the final study. Our narrow goal in preregistration was specifying key hypotheses and treatment/outcome variables rather than potential mechanisms, an oversight we aim to avoid in the future. Second, the pre-analysis plan specified block randomization in case the Canadian survey lacked sufficiently large sample sizes for some groups (e.g., Canadian provinces or age). However, once we began data collection, the quotas filled groups to target levels. This ensured treatment balance across groups (see Table 2.3A), thus invalidating the need for block randomization.

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1. See for example Burke Danita Catherine Burke 2020. “Re-establishing legitimacy after stigmatization: Greenpeace in the North American North.” *Polar Record* 56(e26): 1–12.; Aleen Brown “The Green Scare: How a Movement That Never Killed Anyone Became the FBI’s No. 1 Domestic Terrorism Threat” *The Intercept* March 23, 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See for example a 2012 Associated Press-NORC Energy Issues Survey ([03/29/2012 - 04/25/2012] roper archive) in which 69% of the U.S. public trusted moderately or completely Sierra Club and Nature Canada “History” accessed August 9, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Due to their relatively small population in Canada, Hispanics/Latinos are classified under the “other” category. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For this pattern, see “What our transition to online polling means for decades of phone survey trends,” *Pew Research Center* accessed at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/27/what-our-transition-to-online-polling-means-for-decades-of-phone-survey-trends/. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Silver, Nate. “The Death of Polling Is Greatly Exaggerated,” *FiveThirtyEight* 2021 March 25 at https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-death-of-polling-is-greatly-exaggerated/. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See the discussion in Figure A2.3 and accompanying Tables A2.2a to Table A2.2e for specific subgroup samples in the extended appendix on Harvard Dataverse (insert link). In general, all four hypotheses had a minimum of 800 observations per treatment group analyzed when sample size for groups were pooled together. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For presentational purposes, the Canadian counterpart to the American parties are displayed in parentheses as their responses are similar. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. In the main text, our out-group measure is constructed by pooling BLM and NAACP treatment groups while our in-group measure pools Greenpeace and Sierra Club for the U.S. sample. The Canadian sample pools Indigenous groups 1 and 2 as the out-group, and Greenpeace and Nature Canada are classified as the in-group. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)