Gender, Race, and Interruptions at Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings

Online Appendix

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1. Confirmation Hearing Transcript Excerpts Referenced in Main Text

In this exchange, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) questions nominee Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson about her service as a public defender for detainees at Guantánamo Bay and her positions on national security issues. Interruptions are identified by a long dash (——).

> **Senator GRAHAM.** . . .Of the five men we released from Gitmo as part of a prisoner swap for Sergeant Bergdahl. Here's what -- here's where they're at. Mohammed Faizal was appointed deputy minister of defense, Noor was appointed acting minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs, Rosicky was appointed as acting intelligence director, Zakir, again, acting Minister of Information Culture Defense, Omar was appointed as the new governor of the southeastern province of Khost.
>
> These were five people that we had in our control. They're now helping the Taliban run the country. Would you say that our system in terms of releasing people needs to be looked at?
>
> **Judge JACKSON.** Senator, what I'd say is that that's not a job for the courts in this way, that——
>
> **Senator GRAHAM** As an American does that bother you?
>
> **Judge JACKSON.** Well, obviously Senator, any repeated criminal behavior or repeated attacks acts of war, bother me, yes, in America——
>
> **Senator GRAHAM** Well, it bothers me. While I will not hold it against you, nor should I, the fact that you represent Gitmo detainees, I think it's time to look at this system, new folks. When 31 percent of people are going back to fight to kill Americans and now running the Taliban government, we have gone wrong somewhere. Are we still at war?
>
> **Judge JACKSON.** So the AMUF, the authorization for military force, is still in effect. Congress has authorized the use of force against people in -- in this way.
>
> **Senator GRAHAM** But do you personally believe that al Qaeda, ISIS type groups are still at war with us?
>
> **Judge JACKSON.** I think, yes -- I mean I think we——
>
> **Senator GRAHAM**: So we're still in a state of war with certain elements of radical Islam to this very day?[1]

Graham's repeated interruptions of Jackson allow the senator to dominate the direction of the exchange and disrupt the nominee's ability to finish her points.

In this next exchange, nominee Judge Brett Kavanaugh repeatedly interrupts Senator Mazie Hirono (D-HI) in a conversation about Kavanaugh's record regarding underdogs in the legal system. This inhibited the senator's ability to make her point about patterns in Kavanaugh's voting behavior.

> **Senator HIRONO**: Judge Kavanaugh, why do you rarely dissent on behalf of consumers, workers, or the powerless? And please, don't talk to me about all the times that you were with the majority or where you joined other majorities.

[1] Jackson transcript (Day 2), questioning by Senator Graham (R-SC) at 30.

Judge KAVANAUGH: Well, Senator, I've ruled for workers many times. I've ruled for environmental interests many times in big cases that involve clean air regulation, particulate matter regulation, affirmative defense for accidental emissions, the California Clean Air Law over a dissent by a fellow judge.

Senator HIRONO: So, Judge Kavanaugh, I cited -- how many studies did I enter into the record -- in these four studies that indicate that there is a pattern to your dissents and your pattern is that you do not favor basically regular people——

Judge KAVANAUGH: Well, I -- well, I wrote a -- it -- one of my most important dissents, Senator, was in United States v. Burwell. That was a criminal case, an in-bank case for a convicted drug distributor. The question was whether he had been sentenced to a 30-year mandatory minimum permissibly. And I, joined by Judge Tatel, who's an appointee of President Clinton, ruled that the jury instructions were flawed.

I was in dissent for him because mens rea requirement had been omitted from the jury instructions. And I wrote a very lengthy dissent about that, that -- that ——

Senator HIRONO: ... I ——

Judge KAVANAUGH: ... is someone -- that's one of my most important dissents, and that was on behalf of a criminal defendant.

Senator HIRONO: Judge Kavanaugh, the thing about patterns is that there are exceptions to the pattern. So, all of these studies that I cite to, we're not talking about the exceptions to the pattern; we are talking about the exceptions to the pattern, we aren't talking about the existence of a pattern - you know, it kind of bothers me for - I would expect a judge to follow the law.

In fact, I think you started off several times saying that you are a - how did you describe yourself, in terms of following the law? You said several times——

Judge KAVANAUGH: Independent and pro-law.[2]

2. Data and Variable Details

The primary data for this project focus on the transcribed text of the nominee-specific question-and-answer portion of every public Supreme Court confirmation hearing held before the Senate Judiciary Committee during which a nominee testified and took unrestricted questions (1939-2022).[3] The nominee-centric question-and-answer focus of the data means that senator statements or dialogue with one another are not present in the data, nor are opening statements and proceedings involving witnesses other than the nominee. Within the data, each statement (by a senator or a nominee) is an observation. A statement ends (and thus an observation in the data ends) when a speaker change occurs or the session concludes. In total, our data include 37,872 unique senator and nominee statements.

[2] Kavanaugh transcript (Day 2, part 2), questioning by Senator Hirono (D-HI) at 95-96.

[3] There were some nominations from 1939-1955 in which the nominee did not testify before the committee (Douglas (1939), Murphy (1940), Stone (1941), Byrnes (1941), Rutledge (1943), Burton (1945), Vinson (1946), Clark (1949), Minton (1949), and Warren (1954)) (Collins and Ringhand 2013). Additionally, the nominations of Miers (2005), D. Ginsburg (1987), and John Roberts (to replace O'Connor as an Associate Justice; 2005) were withdrawn prior to a confirmation hearing. The 2016 nomination of Garland also never proceeded to a confirmation hearing. These nominations are, by necessity, excluded from this project.

For these data, we utilize Collins and Ringhand's (2013) *U.S. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings Database,* which covers hearings held from 1939-2010 and are coded from the transcripts of hearings. Where available, the data were coded from the Senate Judiciary Committee's official transcripts published by the U.S. Government Printing Office in the congressional record.

Since the Collins and Ringhand data end in 2010, this project fully extends the data collection through 2022 to include the hearings for Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and K. Jackson. Our data extension also incorporates the special session confirmation hearings for Thomas and Kavanaugh to address allegations of sexual misconduct, since neither was included in the original Collins and Ringhand data.[4] These special sessions are treated as distinct hearings within the data. Without official Judiciary Committee transcripts available for Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and K. Jackson, we turned to *CQ Transcriptions* from CQ-Roll Call, Inc. (aka *Congressional Quarterly*) for the full transcripts of the hearings. Daily *CQ Transcriptions* of Supreme Court confirmation hearings are available through *LexisNexis* and are used as the source of reliable congressional transcriptions by respected media outlets.[5]

The presence or type of interruptions during the confirmation hearings were not coded in the Collins and Ringhand data and thus are original to this project. Interruptions are identified in official and unofficial transcripts with a dash followed by a change in speaker. The official transcripts consistently use a long dash (——) to mark interruptions whereas the unofficial transcripts utilize double dashes (--). To code the presence of interruptions, we (student coders as audited by authors) identified the marking of all interruptions within the transcripts. For older transcripts (pre-1971), we conducted this identification by hand rather than through text searches to avoid missing dashes due to potential text OCR errors or keystroke errors in the transcripts. All speaker statements ending with an interruption were coded as such in our data.[6]

Once we had identified the presence of interruptions, we turned to coding them as intrusive or backchannel in nature. Our statistical models focus on intrusive interruptions—those intended to takeover the conversational floor. These differ from backchannel interruptions. Intrusive interruptions are disruptive and generally make the original speaker stop or change the course of his or her discussion. In contrast, backchannel interruptions are short utterances that demonstrate active listening and typically show enthusiasm and agreement with the original speaker (Anderson and Leaper 1998).[7] With backchannel interruptions, when a speaker steps in to complete a sentence, she or he does so to be helpful and does not continue talking after the brief utterance. Within Supreme Court confirmation hearings, demonstrations of active listening via backchannel interruptions are generally are not intended to disrespect the speaker. We provide examples of intrusive interruptions in transcript excerpts above. The following exchange between nominee O'Connor and Senator Hatch (R-UT) is a backchannel interruption since Hatch does not take over the conversational floor or cause O'Connor to change the course of her answer. Instead, Hatch encourages O'Connor to correct the record.

> **Judge O'CONNOR.** Senator, if I could correct some of the statements on that—
>
> **Senator HATCH.** Yes.

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[4] As with the rest of our data, our data continue to focus exclusively on the nominee and senator exchanges during the Thomas and Kavanaugh special session hearings. This means that questioning of Anita Hill and Christine Blasey Ford conducted by senators and the senators' proxy (in the case of Republican senators' use of Rachel Mitchell to question Blasey Ford) is excluded from the data. For an empirical examination of the content of the questions and answers during the Hill and Blasey Ford portions of these, we direct readers to [REDACTED].

[5] For example, *Washington Post* printed the CQ Transcription of the Sotomayor hearing. *https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/sotomayor_openingstatement_071309.html*

[6] The Senate provides pdf files of the transcripts beginning in 1971 (https://www.senate.gov/committees/SupremeCourtNominationHearings.htm). Official pre-1971 transcripts were obtained from Mersky and Jacobstein (1977).

[7] While our main statistical analysis focuses on intrusive interruptions only, supplemental analysis presented below includes backchannel interruptions.

> **Judge O'CONNOR.** I did, indeed, serve on the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service for an interval of time by Presidential appointment. That commission did have occasion to consider a variety of the statutes and regulations governing women in the service.[8]

To assess the reliability of our coding of interruptions as intrusive versus backchannel in nature, an independent coder re-coded a sample of interruptions. Intercoder reliability was very high.[9] With every interruption identified and coded as intrusive or backchannel, we were then able to calculate our interruption-based dependent variable as described in the main text and detailed in the alternative below.

Online Appendix Figure 1 provides information on our dependent variable, broken down by the gender and race of the nominee and senators, as well as their shared or different party affiliation. These graphs illustrate strong descriptive support for our key hypothesis. That is, female nominees and nominees of color from the opposite party of the questioning senator are much for frequently interrupted than any other nominee type. Likewise, female senators and senators of color are much more frequently interrupted by nominees as compared to every other type of senator. Indeed different party female nominees/senators and different party female senators/senators of color see more than one in ten of their statements go interrupted, which is almost twice as often as their white and male different party counterparts.[10]

[8] O'Connor transcript, questioning by Senator Hatch (R-UT) at 88.

[9] We conducted separate intercoder reliability analyses on the presence and type of interruptions in the transcripts by having a separate rater code a random sample of the data. For the presence of interruptions, we extracted a random sample of 126 lines of transcript statements, which gives us 95% confidence with a 5% margin of error given that the population percentage of interruptions is 9%. We read each corresponding transcript statement and coded whether it involved an interruption. We had 100% agreement on the presence of interruptions (Kappa = 1.0). For the type of interruptions, we extracted a random sample of 145 lines of transcript statements involving interruptions, which gives us 95% confidence with a 5% margin of error given the population percentage of 89% intrusive interruptions. We coded each interruption as backchannel or intrusive. We had 99.3% agreement on the type of interruption (Kappa = 0.96). We also identified a single instance in which a statement was originally identified as an interruption that was not, in fact, an interruption.

[10] The empty set in the lower left graph pertains to Stephen Breyer who did not interrupt female, Democratic senators during his confirmation hearing. Although Democratic senators interrupt nominees more than Republican senators, Republican senators exhibit more racial and gender bias in their interruption patterns. Nominees appointed by Republican presidents interrupt senators slightly more than Democratic appointees, and exhibit more racial and gender bias than Democratic appointees. However, we are hesitant to draw firm conclusions on nominee partisanship due to the relatively small number of female senators from the Republican Party on the Judiciary Committee.

Online Appendix Figure 1: Intrusive Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1939-2022



As detailed in the main text, our primary independent variables combine gender or race of the participants in a senator-nominee speaking pair and their partisanship (shared or opposite party). For senator speakers, their partisanship is assigned based on their party affiliation while serving in the Senate at the time of the confirmation hearing. That means that senators, like Arlen Specter, who switch party affiliations over the course of their service in the Senate will be assigned different party affiliation over time within our data. Nominees are assigned the party affiliation of their appointing president.

To code senator gender dichotomously, we utilize Senate-provided resources which identify the list of women senators over that chamber's history. We then match the full list to the senators who have served on the Senate Judiciary Committee during Supreme Court confirmation hearings. The senators coded as women in our data include: Feinstein, Moseley Braun, Klobuchar, Hirono, Harris, Blackburn, and Ernst.

We code senator race and ethnicity dichotomously, comparing white, non-Hispanic senators to those who are senators of color. This includes Black senators, Hispanic senators, and Asian-American or Pacific Islander senators. We again utilize Senate-provided resources for this coding, turning to that institution's following lists of senators: African-American senators, Hispanic senators, and Asian American, Pacific Islander, and Native Hawaiian Senators. The following senators serving on the Senate Judiciary Committee during Supreme Court confirmation hearings were coded as people of color: Fong, Moseley Braun, Hirono, Cruz, Harris, Booker, and Padilla.

Online Appendix Figure 2 plots, for the years of our data, the historical trends in the gender and racial/ethnicity composition of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The figure overlays each individual Supreme Court nomination to provide additional context on the membership of the Judiciary Committee relative to the nominee under consideration.

Online Appendix Figure 2: Number of Female Senators and Senators of Color Serving on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1939-2022



Note: Supreme Court nominees are plotted by year of their confirmation hearing across the top axis for reference.

For nominee gender and race/ethnicity, we again code these variables dichotomously. We adopt the coding of Epstein et al. (2023) to identify female, male, white, and person of color (Black or Hispanic) nominees. Within our data, the nominees coded as women include: O'Connor, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and K. Jackson. The nominees coded as people of color include: T. Marshall, Thomas, Sotomayor, and K. Jackson.

We include several control variables in the statistical models to capture factors other than gender, race, and party that might shape interruptions by both nominees and senators. Below, we explain why these variables were chosen for inclusion, how they were coded, and the potential directional effects they may have. Due to the novel nature of some control variables as they relate to interruption patterns, we, at times, offer potential competing expectations for their effect.

- *Nominee Qualifications* captures a nominee's perceived qualifications based on the work of Cameron, Cover, and Segal (1990; updated by Epstein et al. 2023), where higher scores indicate more qualified nominees. We expect that nominees rated more qualified—which includes assessments of their temperament—will interrupt less and be interrupted less.
- *Prior Judicial Experience* indicates whether the nominee served previously as a judge. This variable is coded using information available in Epstein et al. (2023). We believe that current or former judges, used to being in control of their work environment, will more frequently interrupt senators. A nominee with prior judicial experience may also face higher rates of interruptions from questioning senators since their background may drive a more combative exchange between themselves and the senators.
- *Partisan Replacement* is scored 1 if the nominee is replacing an outgoing justice from a different political party then the president who nominated them. This variable is coded using information available in Epstein et al. (2023). We offer competing expectations for this control variable. One possibility is that partisan replacement nominees will give greater deference to the Committee owing to the relatively high stakes of the hearing and thus will interrupt senators less. In turn, these senators will interrupt nominees less. Alternatively, the presence of a partisan replacement nominee could

result in a wholesale increase in the contentiousness of the hearing, with interruptions being more likely of both the nominee and the questioning senators.

- *Nominee Scandal* dichotomously captures whether a nominee faced a scandal accusation prior to their hearing's commencement. Following prior work (Cameron, Segal, and Key 2010; Cameron, Kastellec, and Park 2013; Cameron and Kastellec 2023a; Cameron and Kastellec 2023b), a scandal accusation is deemed present when media outlets report on a nominee's alleged "unethical or judicially improper behavior" (Cameron, Kastellec, and Park 2013, 286), even if that allegation later proves to be unfounded. "Examples include a nominee who allegedly tried cases in which he had a financial interest, made racist statements, created or belonged to a racially exclusionary club or avowedly racist organization like the KKK, sexually harassed a subordinate, or engaged in extreme partisan actions seen as judicially improper, such as harassing minority voters at the polls" (Cameron, Kastellec, and Park 2013, 286). Given our focus on confirmation hearing behavior, we exclude any scandal accusations that did not emerge against a nominee until during or after a nominee's hearings. This means, for example, that the allegations of sexual impropriety against Thomas and Kavanaugh, which each emerged after the nominee's original confirmation hearing had concluded, are coded as 0 for *Nominee Scandal* for their original hearing but coded as 1 for the special session hearing. We believe this variable will be positively signed in the models of senator interruptions, indicating that senators will feel more empowered when a nominee is facing scandal allegations and interrupt them more. Conversely, we expect this variable will be negatively signed in the models of nominee interruptions based on the idea that nominees facing allegations of scandals will endeavor to present themselves as calm and even tempered.
- *Ideological Extremism* indicates the extent to which the nominee can be thought of as ideologically extreme. Following Cameron and Park (2009), this variable is the absolute value of the nominee's NOMINATE-scaled perceptions scores, with higher values indicating more ideologically extreme nominees. We believe this variable will be positively signed in the models of senator interruptions, indicating that senators will be more willing to interrupt nominees they perceive to be ideologically extreme in an effort to parse whether their views are within the constitutional mainstream. Conversely, we expect this variable will be negatively signed in the models of nominee interruptions because nominees perceived to be ideologically extreme may make conscious efforts to present themselves as patient and courteous.
- *Committee Chair* indicates whether the senator was the Judiciary Committee Chair (as identified in the hearing transcript). Chairs may opt to lead by example and interrupt nominees less than other senators. Alternatively, as the senior most member of their party on the Committee, these chairs may be incentivized to push nominees for answers on their tough questions, with interruptions serving as a tool to accomplish this. We expect that nominees will interrupt chairs less, either due to reverence for that position or as a strategy to ensure a smoother hearing given the chair's power over the proceedings (Miller and Sutherland 2023).
- *Seniority* captures how many years the senator has served, as compiled from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress.[11] We believe more senior members of the Judiciary Committee will interrupt nominees more because they become accustomed to the interruption environment at hearings (Miller and Sutherland 2023), and be interrupted less by nominees, who will pay them greater deference.
- *Majority Party Member* indicates whether the senator was a member of the majority party (as identified in the hearing transcript). Miller and Sutherland (2023) find that majority party senators are less likely to be interrupted than those senators belonging to the minority party at the time. If this finding extends to the Senate Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearings, it would result in fewer nominee interruptions of majority party senators. As with the *Committee Chair* variable, we offer two alternative hypotheses for how majority party members may behave in their own interruptive behavior. On one hand, these senators may interrupt less since they generally control the fate of the nomination

[11] https://bioguide.congress.gov/

already. However, majority party senators may interrupt nominees at higher rates to further their efforts to assert control over the proceedings and the direction of the nominee's answers.

- *Special Session* is scored 1 for the special sessions held to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct by Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh. We believe that nominees will interrupt more during such special sessions owing to the nature of the allegations and their perceived need to defend themselves. However, we have less certainty over senator interruptive behavior during these special sessions. While it could be that senators will interrupt less given the high profile and sensitive nature of such hearings (in a sense, to avoid seeming overly aggressive given the public attention), we might also see senators increasing their interruptive behavior because of the incredibly high stakes and salience of the proceedings.
- *Committee Polarization* captures ideological polarization on the Senate Judiciary Committee and is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the mean Committee Democrat and the mean Committee Republican, following Cameron, Kastellec, and Park (2013), based on first dimension NOMINATE Scores available from https://voteview.com/articles/party_polarization. We multiply this variable by 10 to make graphic interpretation easier. We expect this variable will be positively signed in all models, indicating that interruptions will be more frequent from both senators and nominees during periods of high Committee polarization, owing to the conflictual environment polarization creates.

3. Full Statistical Results

The tables below report the full statistical results corresponding to Figures 1 and 2 in the main text.

Online Appendix Table 1. Intrusive Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1939-2022

	Interruptions by Male Senators	Interruptions by White Senators	Interruptions by Male Nominees	Interruptions by White Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	0.810		0.300	
	(1.210)		(1.988)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	4.537*		6.851***	
	(2.128)		(1.639)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	3.810***		3.748**	
	(0.909)		(1.346)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		-1.171		-1.381
		(1.012)		(0.777)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		6.497***		5.616***
		(1.665)		(1.336)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		3.138***		3.196**
		(0.784)		(1.123)
Nominee Qualifications	-3.403*	-2.773	-1.341	-1.878
	(1.575)	(1.487)	(1.462)	(1.425)
Prior Judicial Experience	-3.111**	-3.471**	0.666	-0.530
	(1.134)	(1.229)	(0.861)	(0.779)
Partisan Replacement	-0.651	-0.667	-1.948	-1.098
	(0.789)	(0.730)	(1.107)	(0.974)
Nominee Scandal	-2.268**	-2.061**	-0.990	-0.676
	(0.817)	(0.733)	(0.753)	(0.713)
Ideological Extremism	2.280	2.185	0.358	1.611
	(2.770)	(2.392)	(2.617)	(2.548)
Committee Chair	-1.346	-1.454	1.010	0.955
	(0.944)	(0.909)	(0.968)	(0.966)
Seniority	0.0270	0.0289	-0.0220	-0.00186
	(0.0548)	(0.0552)	(0.0243)	(0.0211)
Majority Party Member	-2.605**	-2.564***	-1.205	-1.010
	(0.986)	(0.729)	(1.341)	(1.072)
Special Session	-0.941	-1.828	7.882*	7.550*
	(1.535)	(1.434)	(3.270)	(3.439)
Committee Polarization	1.469***	1.405***	0.480	0.607**
	(0.393)	(0.328)	(0.246)	(0.200)
Constant	0.937	1.593	0.958	0.275
	(3.126)	(2.896)	(2.813)	(2.478)
N	479	482	378	432
Adjusted R^2	0.233	0.247	0.275	0.269

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the percentage of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

4. Equality of Coefficients Tests

Online Appendix Table 2 reports the equality of coefficients tests discussed in the main text. The comparisons to the baseline category in each model (Male Nominee, Same Party; White Nominee, Same Party; Male Senator, Same Party; and White Senator, Same Party) are based on the results from the statistical models. The remaining comparisons are based on equality of coefficients tests between the two variables of interest (e.g., Paternoster et al. 1998). Asterisks denote that the differences in interruption rates for each comparison group is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).

This table should be read by each row from left to right. For instance, the first cell with coefficients entered (column two) indicates the percentage point difference in intrusive interruptions for female nominees from the same party as the questioning senator, as compared to male nominees from the same party as the questioning senator. This is the coefficient from the statistical model.

The equality of coefficient tests appear in columns three and four. These are calculated by subtracting the coefficient corresponding to the nominee type in the first column from the nominee type in the third or fourth column, and statistical significance results are based on equality of coefficients tests, which allow us to examine whether these differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (which are indicated by asterisks).

For example, the cell comparing *Female Nominee, Different Party* to *Female Nominee, Same Party* indicates that female nominees from the opposite party of the questioning senator are interrupted 3.73 percentage points more than female nominees from the same party as the questioning senator. However, this difference is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In contrast, in the model that examines intrusive interruptions by white senators, there is a statistically significant difference in the rates in which senators interrupt different party nominees of color as compared to same party nominees of color.

Online Appendix Table 2. Equality of Coefficients Tests

Intrusive Interruptions by Male Senators

	Male Nominee, Same Party (Coefficients Reported in Modeling)	Female Nominee, Same Party (Equality of Coefficients Tests)	Female Nominee, Different Party (Equality of Coefficients Tests)
Female Nominee, Same Party	0.81		
Female Nominee, Different Party	4.53*	3.73	
Male Nominee, Different Party	3.81*	3.0*	0.72

Intrusive Interruptions by White Senators

	White Nominee, Same Party (Coefficients Reported in Modeling)	Nominee of Color, Same Party (Equality of Coefficients Tests)	Nominee of Color, Different Party (Equality of Coefficients Tests)
Nominee of Color Same Party	-1.17		
Nominee of Color, Different Party	6.49*	7.66*	
White Nominee, Different Party	3.13*	4.30*	3.36†

Intrusive Interruptions by Male Nominees

	Male Senator, Same Party (Coefficients Reported in Modeling)	Female Senator, Same Party (Equality of Coefficients Tests)	Female Senator, Different Party (Equality of Coefficients Tests)
Female Senator, Same Party	0.30		
Female Senator, Different Party	6.85*	6.55*	
Male Senator Different Party	3.75*	3.45*	3.10*

Intrusive Interruptions by White Nominees

	White Senator, Same Party (Coefficients Reported in Modeling)	Senator of Color, Same Party (Equality of Coefficients Tests)	Senator of Color, Different Party (Equality of Coefficients Tests)
Senator of Color, Same Party	-1.38		
Senator of Color, Different Party	5.62*	7.0*	
White Senator, Different Party	3.20*	4.58*	2.42†

* Indicates that difference is significant at the 0.05 level or less (two-tailed). † Indicates that difference is significant at the 0.10 level or less (two-tailed).

5. Collinearity Diagnostics

The highest correlations in the models are between the *Nominee Scandal* and *Nominee Qualifications* variables (r = 0.55 in the senator and nominee models) and between the *Partisan Replacement* and *Ideological Extremism* variables (r = 0.65 in the nominee model, r = 0.53 in the senator model). Although these variables are relatively highly correlated, the variance inflation factors for these models indicates that multicollinearity is not a major concern in the models (the variance inflation factor does not exceed 3 in relation to these variables and their inclusion or exclusion does not change the core conclusions in the manuscript).

Committee Polarization is highly correlated with time (r = 0.93 for the year of hearing and *Committee Polarization* variable), which is, in turn, correlated with increasing gender and racial representation on the Supreme Court and the Judiciary Committee, and with the appointment of ideologically extreme

nominees (Cameron, Kastellec, and Park 2013, 295). Including the *Committee Polarization* variable in the models raises the variance inflation factor above 3 for the gender model of nominee interruptions.

When we exclude *Committee Polarization* from the models, our key findings regarding gender and racial differences in interruption patterns get stronger, including larger coefficients on the key variables of interest and stronger levels of statistical significance in both the regression models and equality of coefficients tests. These results are reported in Online Appendix Table 3. In terms of the equality of coefficients tests, the key differences are that the *Nominee of Color, Different Party* variable is larger than the *White Nominee, Different Party* variable at $p < 0.01$; and the *Senator of Color, Different Party* variable is larger than the *White Senator, Different Party* variable at $p < 0.05$.

Online Appendix Table 3. Intrusive Interruptions by Senators and Nominees Excluding *Committee Polarization*, 1939-2022

	Interruptions by Male Senators	Interruptions by White Senators	Interruptions by Male Nominees	Interruptions by White Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	4.755**		1.016	
	(1.452)		(1.982)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	8.221***		7.364***	
	(2.342)		(1.698)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	3.593***		3.730**	
	(0.949)		(1.348)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		0.557		-1.193
		(1.225)		(0.771)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		8.509***		6.417***
		(1.938)		(1.342)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		2.690**		3.043*
		(0.834)		(1.126)
Nominee Qualifications	-7.366***	-5.127**	-2.407	-3.593*
	(1.824)	(1.667)	(1.474)	(1.698)
Prior Judicial Experience	-0.717	-1.494	1.810*	0.422
	(1.092)	(1.251)	(0.806)	(1.041)
Partisan Replacement	-2.157*	-2.384**	-2.917*	-1.692
	(0.862)	(0.713)	(1.172)	(1.083)
Nominee Scandal	-3.438***	-3.242***	-1.453	-1.633
	(0.871)	(0.783)	(0.834)	(0.849)
Ideological Extremism	5.915*	3.043	0.701	2.733
	(2.475)	(2.354)	(2.737)	(2.512)
Committee Chair	-1.950*	-2.428**	0.830	0.488
	(0.841)	(0.884)	(0.966)	(0.960)
Seniority	0.0586	0.0688	-0.0131	0.0159
	(0.0596)	(0.0616)	(0.0243)	(0.0223)
Majority Party Member	-2.621*	-2.715**	-1.188	-0.997
	(1.093)	(0.915)	(1.337)	(1.068)
Special Session	1.033	0.413	8.680*	8.442*
	(1.612)	(1.362)	(3.347)	(3.779)
Constant	9.610***	11.10***	3.957	4.510
	(2.548)	(2.483)	(2.829)	(2.760)
N	479	482	378	432
Adjusted R^2	0.174	0.166	0.271	0.249

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the percentage of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

6. Alternative Dependent Variables: All Interruptions

In the main text, our dependent variables focus on intrusive interruptions made by senators and nominees—those interruptions intended to take over the conversational floor. As we further describe above, these differ from backchannel interruptions, which are signs of active listening common in Supreme Court confirmation hearings (Anderson and Leaper 1998). An alternative way to constitute our dependent variables is to include both intrusive interruptions and backchannel interruptions, as is common in the literature (e.g., Feldman and Gill 2019; Jacobi and Schweers 2017; Miller and Sutherland 2023).

Online Appendix Table 4 reports the results of using these alternative dependent variables, which are correlated with the dependent variables used in the main text (that focuses exclusively on intrusive interruptions) at the 0.98 level for senators and 0.94 for nominees. As one would expect, the size of

coefficients increases (because we add backchannel interruptions to the dependent variables), but, most importantly, the substance of our conclusions does not change.

Online Appendix Table 4. All Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1939-2022

	Interruptions by Male Senators	Interruptions by White Senators	Interruptions by Male Nominees	Interruptions by White Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	1.543		-0.439	
	(1.291)		(1.976)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	5.370*		6.954**	
	(2.245)		(2.101)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	3.919***		3.917**	
	(0.951)		(1.363)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		-0.321		-1.902**
		(1.178)		(0.683)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		7.740***		6.769***
		(1.886)		(1.732)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		3.262***		3.192**
		(0.816)		(1.133)
Nominee Qualifications	-2.843	-1.694	-1.812	-2.544
	(1.623)	(1.602)	(1.675)	(1.628)
Prior Judicial Experience	-3.576**	-4.154**	0.550	-0.833
	(1.165)	(1.272)	(1.157)	(0.915)
Partisan Replacement	-0.124	-0.00271	-2.061	-0.797
	(0.800)	(0.745)	(1.310)	(1.049)
Nominee Scandal	-1.865*	-1.659*	-1.058	-0.724
	(0.886)	(0.810)	(0.860)	(0.819)
Ideological Extremism	3.287	2.842	-0.127	1.899
	(2.884)	(2.577)	(2.966)	(2.806)
Committee Chair	-1.613	-1.670	1.202	1.163
	(0.991)	(0.973)	(1.061)	(1.077)
Seniority	0.0255	0.0178	-0.0322	-0.00410
	(0.0555)	(0.0562)	(0.0231)	(0.0231)
Majority Party Member	-2.579*	-2.587**	-1.617	-1.277
	(1.040)	(0.785)	(1.368)	(1.093)
Special Session	-1.705	-2.576	7.762*	7.133*
	(1.498)	(1.420)	(3.278)	(3.452)
Committee Polarization	1.658***	1.749***	0.464	0.613*
	(0.413)	(0.350)	(0.317)	(0.237)
Constant	-0.749	-0.926	2.850	1.665
	(3.214)	(3.056)	(3.628)	(3.150)
N	479	482	378	432
Adjusted R^2	0.247	0.269	0.244	0.237

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the percentage of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

7. Limiting the Time Frames Under Analysis

The models in the main text correspond to every open, public Supreme Court confirmation hearing held before the Senate Judiciary Committee, which covers the 1939-2022 time frame (Frankfurter to Jackson). An alternative way to consider racial and gender effects is to limit the time frame to the period in which the first person of color was nominated (1967-2022) and the first woman was nominated (1981-2022), as suggested by Boyd, Collins, and Ringhand (2018). These results appear in Online Appendix Table 5.

These results corroborate those in the main text, with two exceptions. In the 1981-2022 model focused on interruptions of nominees by male senators, female, different party nominees are not interrupted more frequently than male, same party nominees. In the 1981-2022 model of male nominees as interrupters, the difference between interruptions by female and male different party nominees is no longer statistically significant according to equality of coefficients tests ($p = 0.65$). However, each other model provides substantively similar conclusions regarding gender and racial bias in interruption patterns as the models in the main text.

Online Appendix Table 5. Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1981-2022 and 1967-2022

	Interruptions by Male Senators	Interruptions by White Senators	Interruptions by Male Nominees	Interruptions by White Nominees
	1981-2022	1967-2022	1981-2022	1967-2022
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	-0.446		1.377	
	(1.323)		(2.449)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	1.517		6.185**	
	(2.308)		(1.467)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	5.749***		5.507*	
	(1.206)		(1.949)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		-1.105		-1.181
		(1.031)		(0.860)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		6.019***		6.114***
		(1.552)		(1.336)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		3.658***		3.473*
		(0.766)		(1.298)
Nominee Qualifications	-2.278	-3.225*	-3.840	-1.711
	(2.560)	(1.519)	(3.844)	(1.491)
Prior Judicial Experience	-9.055***	-5.345***		-1.361
	(2.102)	(1.260)		(0.908)
Partisan Replacement	-1.823	-0.993	-6.532	-1.426
	(0.962)	(0.706)	(4.636)	(1.084)
Nominee Scandal	-0.886	-1.279*	-3.262	-0.322
	(0.980)	(0.639)	(3.004)	(0.799)
Ideological Extremism	-1.674	1.877	-11.06	1.631
	(4.084)	(1.986)	(10.24)	(2.973)
Committee Chair	-2.102	-1.819	1.168	0.462
	(1.401)	(1.003)	(1.118)	(0.860)
Seniority	0.0178	0.0310	-0.00181	-0.000267
	(0.0571)	(0.0553)	(0.0202)	(0.0218)
Majority Party Member	-4.322***	-3.154***	-2.307	-1.440
	(1.105)	(0.672)	(1.869)	(1.202)
Special Session	-2.685	-3.274*	10.26*	7.150*
	(1.490)	(1.363)	(3.905)	(3.151)
Committee Polarization	2.377***	2.135***	0.266	0.786**
	(0.407)	(0.295)	(0.985)	(0.248)
Constant	2.561	-1.292	12.88	-0.250
	(3.667)	(2.885)	(15.82)	(3.044)
N	300	413	210	367
Adjusted R^2	0.327	0.367	0.336	0.289

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the percentage of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

The year 1981 marked the first time that Supreme Court confirmation hearings were televised. This change altered the behavior of senators who took advantage of gavel-to-gavel coverage by asking more questions, making the hearings longer (Collins and Ringhand 2016). Online Appendix Table 6 reports the results of models that focus only on the 1981-2022 time frame. With the two exceptions noted above involving interruptions of nominees by male senators and interruptions of senators by male nominees discussed previously, the results corroborate those reported in the text using the 1939-2022 time period. We suspect that the modest differences with respect to the models corresponding with the full time period and the 1981-2022 time period may be due to a rise in interruptions owing to televising the hearings, the diversification of the Supreme Court and Judiciary Committee, and growing polarization in the post-1980 time period. For example, the average percentage of interruptions by senators prior to 1981 was 2.2%, compared to 8.3% beginning in 1981; for nominees this is 2.0% prior to 1981 and 5.3% beginning in 1981.

Online Appendix Table 6. Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1981-2022

	Interruptions by Male Senators	Interruptions by White Senators	Interruptions by Male Nominees	Interruptions by White Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	-0.446		1.377	
	(1.323)		(2.449)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	1.517		6.185**	
	(2.308)		(1.467)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	5.749***		5.507*	
	(1.206)		(1.949)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		-0.945		-1.788
		(1.440)		(1.136)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		7.498***		6.452***
		(1.813)		(1.406)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		3.900**		3.843*
		(1.169)		(1.524)
Nominee Qualifications	-2.278	-2.801	-3.840	-1.361
	(2.560)	(2.347)	(3.844)	(2.155)
Prior Judicial Experience	-9.055***	-8.939***		-3.019*
	(2.102)	(2.224)		(1.184)
Partisan Replacement	-1.823	-1.413	-6.532	-2.772
	(0.962)	(0.931)	(4.636)	(1.784)
Nominee Scandal	-0.886	-0.423	-3.262	0.346
	(0.980)	(0.729)	(3.004)	(1.149)
Ideological Extremism	-1.674	3.904	-11.06	-0.224
	(4.084)	(2.695)	(10.24)	(6.313)
Committee Chair	-2.102	-2.261	1.168	1.160
	(1.401)	(1.318)	(1.118)	(1.109)
Seniority	0.0178	0.0313	-0.00181	0.0191
	(0.0571)	(0.0624)	(0.0202)	(0.0223)
Majority Party Member	-4.322***	-3.360***	-2.307	-1.308
	(1.105)	(0.891)	(1.869)	(1.478)
Special Session	-2.685	-3.613*	10.26*	7.078*
	(1.490)	(1.406)	(3.905)	(2.611)
Committee Polarization	2.377***	1.850***	0.266	1.035
	(0.407)	(0.354)	(0.985)	(0.605)
Constant	2.561	2.940	12.88	-0.298
	(3.667)	(3.101)	(15.82)	(3.803)
N	300	311	210	273
Adjusted R^2	0.327	0.326	0.336	0.300

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the percentage of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

8. Expanding the Sample of Senators and Nominees in the Data

The models in the main text are focused on male senators and nominees in the gender-specific analyses and white senators and nominees in the race-specific analyses. We opted to pursue this strategy since it provides for a direct test of how in-group senators and nominees treat out-group nominees and senators (where members of the in-group are white and male senators and nominees and members of the out-group are female and people of color senators and nominees). An alternative modeling strategy is to include all senators and nominees in the statistical analyses, the results of which are reported in Online Appendix Table 7.

These alternative results corroborate that the gender and racial differences in interruptions revealed in the main text apply to all senators and nominees. The primary difference in the models is that the equality of coefficients test comparing nominee interruptions of female, different party senators to male, different party senators falls slightly out of statistical significance ($p = 0.08$ in the revised model, compared to $p < 0.05$ in the original model).

Online Appendix Table 7. Interruptions by All Senators and Nominees, 1939-2022

	Interruptions by Senators	Interruptions by Senators	Interruptions by Nominees	Interruptions by Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	0.507		0.855	
	(1.129)		(1.329)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	4.450*		5.416**	
	(1.961)		(1.570)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	4.168***		3.147**	
	(0.824)		(0.926)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		-0.781		-1.102
		(1.023)		(0.828)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		5.728***		4.364**
		(1.609)		(1.500)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		3.802***		3.138**
		(0.790)		(0.958)
Nominee Qualifications	-4.153**	-3.821*	-0.700	-0.653
	(1.557)	(1.499)	(1.575)	(1.527)
Prior Judicial Experience	-3.325**	-3.404**	-0.457	-0.478
	(1.108)	(1.183)	(0.712)	(0.703)
Partisan Replacement	-0.808	-0.770	-0.935	-0.892
	(0.704)	(0.719)	(0.919)	(0.923)
Nominee Scandal	-2.422**	-2.327**	0.142	0.128
	(0.781)	(0.764)	(0.809)	(0.776)
Ideological Extremism	2.270	2.087	0.588	0.621
	(2.742)	(2.299)	(2.115)	(2.097)
Committee Chair	-0.926	-0.982	1.568	1.543
	(0.942)	(0.947)	(0.951)	(0.956)
Seniority	-0.00154	-0.0000730	-0.0142	-0.0162
	(0.0527)	(0.0545)	(0.0203)	(0.0205)
Majority Party Member	-2.963**	-2.808***	-0.749	-0.802
	(0.907)	(0.741)	(0.926)	(0.927)
Special Session	-1.030	-0.998	7.118*	7.120*
	(1.493)	(1.510)	(3.353)	(3.429)
Committee Polarization	1.556***	1.583***	0.739***	0.793***
	(0.358)	(0.318)	(0.197)	(0.196)
Constant	1.819	1.607	-1.223	-1.468
	(3.095)	(3.005)	(2.716)	(2.713)
N	510	510	496	496
Adjusted R^2	0.275	0.278	0.244	0.242

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the percentage of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

9. Alternative Modeling: Shared Gender and Race

Because our primary focus in the manuscript is examining the interruption behavior of male nominees/senators and white nominees/senators toward female nominees/senators and nominees/senators of color, we have set up our statistical models to make these comparisons directly. While less precise from a theoretical perspective (see Section 12 below), an alternative strategy is to set up our regimes so they focused on the shared (or different) gender/race and party affiliation between the nominees and senators. For instance, in the model of gender interruptions below, we include three regime types: *Same Gender, Different Party; Different Gender, Same Party*; and *Different Gender, Different Party*. The baseline for comparison is *Same Gender, Same Party*. We then examine the interruption behavior of all senators and nominees in these models (and do the same for our models of racial differences).

Online Appendix Table 8 reports these results. By and large, these results corroborate those in the manuscript, largely because the variables are being driven by dominance of white men as both Supreme Court nominees and Judiciary Committee members. For instance, the largest coefficient in the model of interruptions by senators corresponds to different gender, different party nominee-senator pairs. In the model in the main text, the largest coefficient corresponds to female nominees from the opposite party as the questioning male senator. In fact, with the exception of the gender model of interruptions by nominees, the largest coefficients in the models correspond to different party gender/race nominee and senator pairs, which is what we find in the model reported in the manuscript.

Online Appendix Table 8. Alternative Models of Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1939-2022

	Interruptions by Senators	Interruptions by Senators	Interruptions by Nominees	Interruptions by Nominees
Same Gender, Different Party	4.002***		3.531**	
	(0.864)		(1.252)	
Different Gender, Same Party	1.418		0.844	
	(1.148)		(1.540)	
Different Gender, Different Party	5.786**		2.918*	
	(1.779)		(1.296)	
Same Race, Different Party		3.121***		3.202**
		(0.778)		(1.108)
Different Race, Same Party		-1.670		1.396
		(0.958)		(1.129)
Different Race, Different Party		7.901***		5.080***
		(1.790)		(0.682)
Nominee Qualifications	-4.579**	-3.530*	-0.919	-0.832
	(1.515)	(1.443)	(1.549)	(1.407)
Prior Judicial Experience	-3.137**	-3.243**	-0.501	-0.543
	(1.091)	(1.192)	(0.775)	(0.794)
Partisan Replacement	-0.743	-0.734	-1.007	-1.019
	(0.782)	(0.742)	(0.945)	(0.819)
Nominee Scandal	-2.459**	-2.137**	-0.00136	0.000533
	(0.789)	(0.723)	(0.797)	(0.629)
Ideological Extremism	3.258	2.319	0.725	1.025
	(2.573)	(2.268)	(2.157)	(2.089)
Committee Chair	-0.980	-1.229	1.638	1.538
	(0.928)	(0.912)	(0.939)	(0.939)
Seniority	0.00105	0.0149	-0.0190	-0.0131
	(0.0527)	(0.0550)	(0.0185)	(0.0198)
Majority Party Member	-2.766**	-2.515***	-1.126	-0.737
	(0.935)	(0.699)	(1.241)	(0.952)
Special Session	-1.024	-1.086	7.295*	7.461*
	(1.510)	(1.480)	(3.528)	(3.400)
Committee Polarization	1.422***	1.474***	0.784**	0.703***
	(0.334)	(0.320)	(0.225)	(0.176)
Constant	2.059	1.614	-1.153	-1.155
	(3.006)	(2.982)	(2.759)	(2.393)
N	510	510	496	496
Adjusted R^2	0.279	0.298	0.242	0.248

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the percentage of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

Because our primary focus for this project is to examine the research question of whether majority group members (white men) interrupt women and people of color speakers more than they do fellow majority group members, we prefer the modeling strategy used in the manuscript. The fact that these alternative modeling results overwhelmingly correspond to the results in the manuscript supports that decision. Further, our modeling decision is supported by the reality that, as shown in Online Appendix Figure 2, white men have dominated membership on the Supreme Court and the Judiciary Committee. Thus, as a matter of statistical fact, white men make up the vast majority of nominees and senators, with women and people of color being a minority of nominees and senators. In other words, white men make up the bulk of the underlying data in the "different gender" and "different race" regimes, which accounts for these similar findings. Additional models focused on women and people of color as interrupters can be found in Section 12 below.

10. Alternative Unit of Analysis

In the main text, we use the senator-nominee dyad as the unit of analysis, meaning that each observation corresponds to each senator-nominee pairing during each hearing. This allows us to code the dependent variables as the percentage of the time the senator or nominee interrupted the nominee or senator they were interacting with. We believe this is the most appropriate unit of analysis for two reasons. First, the length of each confirmation hearing varies over time, and not in a uniform or linear manner. Rather, the amount of time allotted to each senator and the number of questioning rounds is set by the Committee Chair, in consultation with Committee members (Collins and Ringhand 2013). The difference in hearing length is depicted in Online Appendix Figure 3, which reports the number of words spoken at each hearing. Even when one ignores the special session hearings of Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh, it is evident that the

length of each hearing—even after they were first televised in 1981 and became generally longer—varies quite substantially. By using the senator-nominee pairing as the unit of analysis, we are able to account for this reality by standardizing the dependent variable as a percentage of time a speaker interrupts the individual they are speaking with. This allows for an apples-to-apples comparison among nominees. Second, the diversity of membership on the Supreme Court and the Judiciary Committee varies over time, as depicted in Online Appendix Figure 2 above. This means that the participation of women and people of color in hearings (as both nominees and senators) is related in part to length of hearing, which is difficult to account for absent standardizing the dependent variable in the manner we employ. This means that alternative units of analysis—such as that discussed below—may mask important gender and racial dynamics owing to variations in the length of a given hearing.

Online Appendix Figure 3. The Number of Words Spoken at Each Hearing, 1939-2022



An alternative to our approach is employed by Miller and Sutherland (2023) in their analysis of a different set of congressional hearings. They refer to this unit of analysis as the "chunk."

Returning to the interaction between Senator Graham and Judge Jackson above, the following exchange represents two chunks, and thus two observations in data that uses the chunk as the unit of analysis.

> **Senator GRAHAM.** . . .Of the five men we released from Gitmo as part of a prisoner swap for Sergeant Bergdahl. Here's what -- here's where they're at. Mohammed Faizal was appointed deputy minister of defense, Noor was appointed acting minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs, Rosicky was appointed as acting intelligence director, Zakir, again, acting Minister of Information Culture Defense, Omar was appointed as the new governor of the southeastern province of Khost.
>
> These were five people that we had in our control. They're now helping the Taliban run the country. Would you say that our system in terms of releasing people needs to be looked at?
>
> **Judge JACKSON.** Senator, what I'd say is that that's not a job for the courts in this way, that—

There are two main differences between using the senator-nominee dyad as the unit of analysis as compared to the chunk. First, this calls for different dependent variables. In the main text, our models focus on explaining why a senator or nominee interrupts the nominee or senator they are paired with a higher percentage of the time, which allows us to control for differences in the length of each hearing. Models that use the chunk as the unit of analysis are focused on predicting the occurrence of an interruption since this dependent variable is coded as the presence or absence of an interruption, and do not account for differences in hearing length among nominees. Second, the number of observations changes dramatically since the senator-nominee dyad is an aggregate of each chunk. Thus, models using the chunk as the unit of analysis will have vastly more observations. For instance, the senator models appearing in Online Appendix Table 7 have an N of 510. These same models using the chunk as the unit of analysis have an N of 18,941.

Online Appendix Table 9 reports the results of the models that use the chunk as the unit of analysis. We followed Miller and Sutherland (2023) and added three additional control variables in the model that are suited to this unit of analysis.[12] *Interrupted* indicates if the speaker's previous statement was interrupted. We expect that this variable will be positively signed, indicating that the speaker is more likely to interrupt if they were interrupted. *Length* is length in words of the previous statement (divided by 100 to make the coefficient more manageable in terms of interpretation). The expectation is that this variable will be positively signed since long-winded statements may trigger interruptions. *Timing* is the sequential order of the statement within each senator-nominee interaction (divided by 100 to make the coefficient more manageable with respect to its interpretation). We expect this variable will be positively signed, indicating that an interruption will be more likely as the interaction progresses owing to time constraints or impatience.

Online Appendix Table 9 reports the coefficients from logit models along with their robust standard errors, clustered on the nominee-senator dyad. These results correspond to the models in the main text, with two notable exceptions. That is, in the models of nominee interruptions of senators, there is no longer a statistically significant difference between the probability of interrupting female, different party senators and male, different party senators; and opposite party white senators and senators of color. As discussed above, we believe these differences are at least partially attributable to the "chunk" approach's failure to account for the sometimes large differences in the length of hearings among nominees.[13]

[12] These control variables are ill-suited to our main text "dyad" unit of analysis since they would each be measured from the same senator-nominee dyad and speaker behavior in that dyad as we utilize for our dependent variable (by contrast, the "chunk" approach allows these control variables to be generated from past behavior).

[13] In an effort to account for the variation in the length of hearings in the logit model using the chunk as the unit of analysis, we cluster the logit models on the senator-nominee dyad. We opted to cluster on the senator-nominee dyad (as opposed to, for example, the speaker) because, although the length of each hearing varies, the time allotted to each senator to question a nominee is standardized within a hearing.

Online Appendix Table 9. Alternative Unit of Analysis of Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1939-2022

	Interruptions by Senators	Interruptions by Senators	Interruptions by Nominees	Interruptions by Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	0.0904		0.220	
	(0.227)		(0.409)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	0.627**		0.586**	
	(0.210)		(0.209)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	0.562***		0.705***	
	(0.130)		(0.120)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		-0.176		-0.318
		(0.249)		(0.513)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		0.723***		0.676**
		(0.171)		(0.259)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		0.480***		0.682***
		(0.129)		(0.119)
Nominee Qualifications	-0.725**	-0.699**	-0.107	-0.0976
	(0.271)	(0.256)	(0.229)	(0.227)
Prior Judicial Experience	-0.511**	-0.577***	-0.0786	-0.0864
	(0.176)	(0.174)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Partisan Replacement	-0.131	-0.114	0.0316	0.0248
	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.128)	(0.129)
Nominee Scandal	-0.345*	-0.348*	0.279*	0.285**
	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Ideological Extremism	0.386	0.471	0.689	0.633
	(0.522)	(0.489)	(0.416)	(0.411)
Committee Chair	0.342	0.330	0.159	0.149
	(0.190)	(0.185)	(0.196)	(0.195)
Seniority	0.00180	0.00204	-0.00186	-0.00166
	(0.00428)	(0.00425)	(0.00467)	(0.00496)
Majority Party Member	-0.455***	-0.468***	-0.0810	-0.0634
	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.114)
Special Session	-0.145	-0.137	0.454	0.450
	(0.266)	(0.265)	(0.238)	(0.238)
Interrupted	0.607***	0.604***	0.739***	0.740***
	(0.0899)	(0.0902)	(0.0950)	(0.0956)
Length	-0.194***	-0.193***	-0.541***	-0.541***
	(0.0436)	(0.0436)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Timing	0.0255	0.0279	0.00715	0.00852
	(0.0457)	(0.0446)	(0.0378)	(0.0373)
Committee Polarization	0.206***	0.207***	0.150***	0.149***
	(0.0458)	(0.0404)	(0.0328)	(0.0332)
Constant	-2.846***	-2.807***	-4.582***	-4.546***
	(0.638)	(0.650)	(0.461)	(0.454)
N	18941	18941	18931	18931
Pseudo R^2	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on nominee-senator dyad. The unit of analysis is the chunk.

The dependent variable is whether the speaker intrusively interrupted the individual they were speaking with.

Online Appendix Table 10 reports the results of using this alternative unit of analysis and limiting the time frame to the period in which confirmation hearings were televised: 1981-2022. These results correspond to the models in Online Appendix Table 6 (although the coefficient on the *Female Nominee, Different Party* variable is no longer larger than the coefficient on the *Male Nominee, Different Party* variable. However, this difference was not significantly significant in Appendix Table 6).

Online Appendix Table 10. Alternative Unit of Analysis of Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1981-2022

	Interruptions by Senators	Interruptions by Senators	Interruptions by Nominees	Interruptions by Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	0.0805		0.273	
	(0.232)		(0.405)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	0.559*		0.589**	
	(0.235)		(0.220)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	0.598***		0.719***	
	(0.144)		(0.145)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		0.0207		-0.307
		(0.270)		(0.596)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		0.882***		0.731**
		(0.179)		(0.277)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		0.485***		0.692***
		(0.145)		(0.142)
Nominee Qualifications	-0.810**	-0.728*	0.0118	0.0216
	(0.293)	(0.286)	(0.274)	(0.269)
Prior Judicial Experience	-0.772***	-0.968***	-0.0820	-0.0931
	(0.219)	(0.225)	(0.204)	(0.204)
Partisan Replacement	-0.278*	-0.254	-0.0164	-0.0325
	(0.141)	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Nominee Scandal	-0.297	-0.284	0.177	0.180
	(0.177)	(0.172)	(0.135)	(0.134)
Ideological Extremism	0.117	0.751	0.645	0.548
	(0.515)	(0.546)	(0.493)	(0.484)
Committee Chair	0.204	0.217	0.250	0.228
	(0.232)	(0.226)	(0.232)	(0.230)
Seniority	0.00341	0.00347	0.000500	0.00105
	(0.00412)	(0.00408)	(0.00458)	(0.00491)
Majority Party Member	-0.445**	-0.468**	-0.122	-0.0929
	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.137)	(0.136)
Special Session	-0.297	-0.241	0.600*	0.594*
	(0.282)	(0.272)	(0.257)	(0.255)
Interrupted	0.597***	0.591***	0.720***	0.721***
	(0.0925)	(0.0930)	(0.0978)	(0.0985)
Length	-0.236***	-0.233***	-0.601***	-0.602***
	(0.0448)	(0.0451)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Timing	0.0625	0.0549	-0.00797	-0.00451
	(0.0477)	(0.0446)	(0.0477)	(0.0471)
Committee Polarization	0.195***	0.190***	0.129**	0.124**
	(0.0432)	(0.0389)	(0.0452)	(0.0467)
Constant	-2.276***	-2.418***	-4.419***	-4.324***
	(0.608)	(0.650)	(0.609)	(0.597)
N	15088	15088	15079	15079
Pseudo R^2	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on nominee-senator dyad. The unit of analysis is the chunk.

The dependent variable is whether the speaker intrusively interrupted the individual they were speaking with.

11. Alternative Modeling Approach: Tobit and Fractional Probit Models

In the main text, we estimate ordinary least squares regression models. Online Appendix Table 11 reports the results of an alternative Tobit models. These models are consistent with the results in the manuscript with respect to the key variables of interest, and the coefficients on these variables are larger in the Tobit models. Online Appendix Table 12 reports the results of fractional probit models that use the proportion of interruptions as the dependent variables. These results largely corroborate those in the manuscript, with the exceptions that, in the model of nominee interruptions of senators, the variables corresponding to different party female senators and senators of color are no longer statistically significantly different from those of same party female senators and senators of color according to equality of coefficients tests.

Online Appendix Table 11. Alternative Tobit Models of Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1939-2022

	Interruptions by Male Senators	Interruptions by White Senators	Interruptions by Male Nominees	Interruptions by White Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	1.256		-38.06***	
	(2.001)		(6.924)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	6.834*		9.666***	
	(3.058)		(2.361)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	5.859***		6.668**	
	(1.416)		(2.214)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		-2.207		-8.017
		(1.874)		(5.103)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		8.988***		8.288***
		(1.855)		(1.844)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		4.611***		5.597**
		(1.367)		(1.899)
Nominee Qualifications	-4.797*	-3.638	-1.343	-2.226
	(2.358)	(2.035)	(3.507)	(3.356)
Prior Judicial Experience	-3.229	-4.018*	1.928	-1.400
	(1.918)	(1.946)	(2.304)	(1.985)
Partisan Replacement	-1.475	-1.167	-2.530	-1.554
	(1.296)	(1.275)	(2.173)	(1.908)
Nominee Scandal	-1.510	-1.130	0.128	0.604
	(1.208)	(1.109)	(1.444)	(1.499)
Ideological Extremism	2.505	2.931	3.546	3.978
	(5.600)	(4.643)	(5.840)	(5.506)
Committee Chair	-0.803	-0.842	2.018	1.650
	(1.436)	(1.391)	(2.025)	(1.935)
Seniority	0.0717	0.0716	-0.0555	-0.0114
	(0.0692)	(0.0710)	(0.0469)	(0.0413)
Majority Party Member	-2.220	-2.428*	-0.604	-0.628
	(1.543)	(1.214)	(1.840)	(1.545)
Special Session	-4.284	-5.106*	6.513*	6.227*
	(2.226)	(2.098)	(2.836)	(2.967)
Committee Polarization	2.431***	2.304***	1.403*	1.589**
	(0.576)	(0.454)	(0.582)	(0.498)
Constant	-9.304	-7.964	-13.27*	-11.68*
	(5.208)	(4.804)	(5.648)	(5.941)
N	479	482	378	432
Pseudo R^2	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.06

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the percentage of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

Online Appendix Table 12. Alternative Fractional Probit Models of Interruptions by Senators and Nominees, 1939-2022

	Interruptions by Male Senators	Interruptions by White Senators	Interruptions by Male Nominees	Interruptions by White Nominees
Female Nominee/Senator, Same Party	0.118		-2.659***	
	(0.110)		(0.379)	
Female Nominee/Senator, Different Party	0.376**		0.505***	
	(0.140)		(0.0768)	
Male Nominee/Senator, Different Party	0.311***		0.454***	
	(0.0794)		(0.112)	
Nominee/Senator of Color, Same Party		-0.111		-0.680
		(0.129)		(0.352)
Nominee/Senator of Color, Different Party		0.455***		0.461***
		(0.0867)		(0.0900)
White Nominee/Senator, Different Party		0.236**		0.404***
		(0.0783)		(0.102)
Nominee Qualifications	-0.233	-0.170	-0.0978	-0.141
	(0.127)	(0.112)	(0.179)	(0.174)
Prior Judicial Experience	-0.241**	-0.294**	0.188	-0.0598
	(0.0936)	(0.102)	(0.141)	(0.118)
Partisan Replacement	-0.0534	-0.0428	-0.196	-0.0812
	(0.0616)	(0.0636)	(0.120)	(0.108)
Nominee Scandal	-0.131	-0.119	-0.0632	-0.0104
	(0.0761)	(0.0702)	(0.0874)	(0.0889)
Ideological Extremism	0.284	0.288	0.112	0.262
	(0.304)	(0.254)	(0.363)	(0.378)
Committee Chair	-0.187*	-0.196*	0.116	0.132
	(0.0945)	(0.0946)	(0.128)	(0.128)
Seniority	0.00233	0.00267	-0.00290	-0.000618
	(0.00354)	(0.00376)	(0.00274)	(0.00242)
Majority Party Member	-0.148	-0.153*	-0.0346	-0.0344
	(0.0787)	(0.0664)	(0.102)	(0.0956)
Special Session	-0.108	-0.176	0.484***	0.419**
	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.139)
Committee Polarization	0.114**	0.111***	0.0631	0.0867**
	(0.0372)	(0.0305)	(0.0339)	(0.0270)
Constant	-2.154***	-2.090***	-2.494***	-2.551***
	(0.315)	(0.290)	(0.323)	(0.308)
N	479	482	378	432
Pseudo R^2	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.08

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on speaker. The unit of analysis is the senator-nominee dyad.

The dependent variable is the proportion of interruptions made by senators and nominees during their interaction with each nominee and senator.

12. The Interruption Behavior of Women and People of Color

Although our primary goal in the manuscript is to investigate potential patterns of gender and racial bias in interruption behavior among majority group members (white men), readers may be interested in the interruption patterns of non-majority group members—i.e., female senators/nominees and senators/nominees of color.[14] Accordingly, we provide this information in Online Appendix Figure 4. As this figure demonstrates, some of the in-group/out-group dynamics

[14] Unlike our clarity of expectations regarding majority group members' likely interruptive behavior toward in-group versus out-group members, there is not the same scholarly consensus about how non-majority group members will behave as potential interrupters. We might expect non-majority group members to behave in a way that shows same-group favoritism. Alternatively, it could be that for non-majority group members, there is little difference in how they behave toward or interrupt others. The "status characteristics" literature suggests that it is majority group members who perceive societal status to matter in how they interact with and perceive others in ways that, consciously and unconsciously, give room for bias to operate (e.g., Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Christensen, Szmer, and Stritch 2012). A third possibility might also exist: since women and people of color serve in low numbers in our study (universally, but for Judiciary Committee senators in particular through the mid-2010s), they may serve in more "token" roles. As the tokenism research tells us, these severely underrepresented individuals may end up "underlining rather than undermining majority culture" (Kanter 1977, 976). If something like this operates in our context of study, it may lead to women and people of color, just like their majority group member colleagues, interrupting fellow women and people of color at higher rates than other speakers. In short, then, the theory is complicated when it comes to how we might expect non-majority group members to behave and thus beyond treatment in the main text of our current study.

we observe with respect to white male senators and nominees also apply here. For instance, the top left graph indicates that female senators interrupt male, different party nominees more than female nominees, although not as much as male senators interrupt female, different party nominees (as seen in Online Appendix Figure 1). This pattern holds for interruptions by senators and nominees of color, but not female nominees.

Online Appendix Figure 4. Interruptions by Women and People of Color, 1939-2022



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