# Supplementary Information for Cory McCartan, Jacob Brown, and Kosuke Imai. "Measuring and Modeling Neighborhoods." 

## Summary of the survey samples

Each of our surveys were approved by the Harvard Institutional Review Board (IRB-20-0938). Neighborhood survey respondents were recruited via e-mail using a list of email addresses attached to registered voter records. We randomly sampled a total of $1,514,612$ potential respondents from this list within each city (533,333 in Miami, 476,605 in New York City, and 504,674 in Phoenix). We sent an email invitation to the sampled registered voters on non-holiday weekdays between December 21, 2020 and February 19, 2021. The invitation informed the potential respondent of the purpose of the survey, that they would be asked to draw their neighborhood on a map, and provided information on the researcher's affiliations and contact information. Of these e-mails, $38.5 \%$ failed to be delivered to the potential respondent's inbox, due to the email address either being invalid or the receiving email server rejecting the email. In total, 930,839 voters received survey invitations (329,624 in Miami, 275,449 in New York, and 325,766 in Phoenix). The Phoenix sample exhibited a higher response rate than the Miami and New York City sample, with a $0.5 \%$ response rate in Miami and New York and a $1.3 \%$ response rate in Phoenix. Although our survey tool is publicly available, we are not able to publicly release our survey data to protect the privacy of respondents.

Here we present summary statistics describing the demographics of the first survey sample (Table S1), the overall demographics of the cities in our sample (Table S2) and the demographics of the city council survey sample (Table S3).

Table S1 shows the overall summary statistics and those broken out by city for our first survey. The demographic comparison across cities also may inform the differences in response rates across cities. The higher response rate in Phoenix is likely due to higher quality of email lists in this city than in New York or Miami and due to an older sampling population being more likely to respond to the surveys.
Comparison of Table S2 to Tables S1 and S3 gives a sense of the representativeness of the sample relative to the adult population of the three metropolitan areas of the study. We find that our sample is more predominantly white, wealthier, educated, and more likely to be a homeowner than the population of each of the cities in our sample.

Table S1: Survey Sample Summary Statistics - Full Sample

|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Miami } \\ (\mathrm{n}=473) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { NYC } \\ (\mathrm{n}=450) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Phoenix } \\ (\mathrm{n}=1,585) \end{gathered}$ |  | Pooled$(\mathrm{n}=2,508)$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Avg. | St. Dev. | Avg. | St. Dev. | Avg. | St. Dev. | Avg. | St. Dev. |
| Democrat | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0.44 | 0.50 |
| Republican | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.50 |
| Vote Biden 2020 | 0.57 | 0.50 | 0.65 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.50 |
| Age | 61.78 | 14.16 | 60.13 | 13.37 | 64.11 | 12.98 | 62.89 | 13.41 |
| Female | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.50 |
| White | 0.65 | 0.48 | 0.72 | 0.45 | 0.86 | 0.34 | 0.79 | 0.41 |
| Income ( $1,000 \mathrm{~s}$ ) | 104.91 | 49.35 | 117.30 | 48.35 | 110.88 | 48.03 | 110.91 | 48.59 |
| College | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0.68 | 0.47 | 0.62 | 0.48 | 0.64 | 0.48 |
| Years Residence | 17.47 | 53.24 | 23.70 | 58.59 | 19.11 | 58.29 | 19.57 | 57.30 |
| Homeowner | 0.86 | 0.35 | 0.74 | 0.44 | 0.90 | 0.30 | 0.86 | 0.34 |
| Married | 0.60 | 0.49 | 0.60 | 0.49 | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 0.48 |
| Children in Home | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0.27 | 0.45 | 0.31 | 0.46 |

Table S2: Metropolitan Region Population Demographics. Proportions are out of adult census population in each metropolitan region, except for Democrat and Republican, which are out of total registered voters.

| City | Miami | NYC | Phoenix |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| College | 0.413 | 0.455 | 0.389 |
| Homeowner | 0.608 | 0.449 | 0.641 |
| Median Income | $\$ 66,944$ | $\$ 85,267$ | $\$ 71,421$ |
| Registered | 0.650 | 0.614 | 0.656 |
| White | 0.348 | 0.420 | 0.587 |
| Black | 0.197 | 0.181 | 0.046 |
| Hispanic | 0.416 | 0.263 | 0.295 |
| Democrat | 0.450 | 0.587 | 0.313 |
| Republican | 0.247 | 0.148 | 0.343 |

Table S3: Survey Sample Summary Statistics - City Council Survey

|  | Email |  |  | Meta |  |  | Pooled |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Avg. | St. Dev. |  | Avg. | St. Dev. |  | Avg. | St. Dev. |
| Democrat | 0.71 | 0.45 |  | 0.78 | 0.41 |  | 0.75 | 0.44 |
| Republican | 0.20 | 0.40 |  | 0.11 | 0.32 |  | 0.16 | 0.36 |
| Eric Adams | 0.34 | 0.47 |  | 0.17 | 0.37 |  | 0.26 | 0.44 |
| Age | 56.95 | 13.72 |  | 41.19 | 18.59 |  | 49.63 | 17.97 |
| Female | 0.49 | 0.50 |  | 0.31 | 0.46 |  | 0.41 | 0.49 |
| White | 0.64 | 0.48 |  | 0.77 | 0.42 |  | 0.70 | 0.46 |
| Income | 114,008 | 49,553 |  | 103,972 | 52,130 |  | 109,001 | 51,076 |
| College | 0.48 | 0.50 |  | 0.41 | 0.49 |  | 0.44 | 0.50 |
| Years Residence | 16.10 | 8.71 |  | 9.00 | 9.42 |  | 12.82 | 9.71 |
| Homeowner | 0.50 | 0.50 |  | 0.27 | 0.44 |  | 0.39 | 0.49 |
| Married | 0.50 | 0.50 |  | 0.32 | 0.47 |  | 0.42 | 0.49 |
| Children in Home | 0.37 | 0.48 |  | 0.19 | 0.39 |  | 0.28 | 0.45 |

For the city council survey, a total of 490,000 registered voters were sampled from voter lists and sent an email invitation on non-holiday weekdays between December 22, 2022 and January 25, 2023. Similar to the previous survey, the bounce rate for the email invitation was $43.3 \%$.

## Additional descriptive statistics of drawn neighborhoods

## First survey

Table S4: Treatment Effect on Usable Neighborhoods

|  | Dependent variable: |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Usable Neighborhood |  |
|  | Miami | New York City | Phoenix |
| Party Condition | $\begin{gathered} 0.034 \\ (0.052) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.081 \\ (0.057) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.035 \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ |
| Party Placebo Condition | $\begin{gathered} 0.066 \\ (0.055) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.037 \\ & (0.058) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.004 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ |
| Race Condition | $\begin{aligned} & -0.004 \\ & (0.056) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.093 \\ (0.058) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.050 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ |
| Race Placebo Condition | $\begin{gathered} 0.081 \\ (0.054) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.026 \\ (0.058) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age | $\begin{gathered} -0.005^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.004^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| College | $\begin{gathered} 0.021 \\ (0.043) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.053 \\ (0.050) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.045^{*} \\ & (0.027) \end{aligned}$ |
| Democrat | $\begin{aligned} & 0.119^{*} \\ & (0.064) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ (0.077) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.053 \\ (0.047) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female | $\begin{gathered} 0.011 \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.011 \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ |
| Homeowner | $\begin{gathered} 0.017 \\ (0.051) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.080^{*} \\ (0.048) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030 \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ |
| Income | $\begin{gathered} 0.0004 \\ (0.0004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.002^{* * *} \\ & (0.0004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0004 \\ (0.0003) \end{gathered}$ |
| Married | $\begin{gathered} 0.047 \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.063 \\ & (0.043) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ |
| Republican | 0.142** | -0.010 | 0.021 |
| Vote Biden | $\begin{aligned} & 0.110^{*} \\ & (0.062) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.078 \\ (0.063) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.098^{* *} \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ |
| Years Residence | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{aligned} & 0.260^{* *} \\ & (0.114) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.157 \\ (0.134) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.401^{* * *} \\ (0.083) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 1,468 | 1,193 | 4,028 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.0004 |
| Adjusted R ${ }^{2}$ | 0.005 | 0.001 | -0.001 |
| Residual Std. Error | $0.467(\mathrm{df}=1463)$ | $0.485(\mathrm{df}=1188)$ | 0.490 ( df = 4023) |
| F Statistic | $2.735^{* *}(\mathrm{df}=4 ; 1463)$ | $1.366(\mathrm{df}=4 ; 1188)$ | 0.430 ( $\mathrm{df}=4 ; 4023)$ |

Note:
${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.05 ;{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$


Figure S1: Racial demographics for respondent neighborhoods by respondent race (first survey)


Figure S2: Party demographics for respondent neighborhoods by respondent party (first survey)
City council survey


Figure S3: Racial demographics for respondent communities of interest by respondent race (city council survey)


Figure S4: Party demographics for respondent communities of interest by respondent party (city council survey)

## Computational details

As shown by Equation (1), the model can be expressed as a Bernoulli GLMM with complementary log-log link function. In this setup, every block that is included the neighborhood, as well as those blocks at the boundary of the neighborhood which could have been included ( $C_{i}=1$ ) but are not, becomes a separate GLMM observation. As a result, even moderate respondent sample sizes lead to many more block-level observations, although these block-level observations are of course dependent. In our data, for example, 309 respondents in the control group from Phoenix translate to 57,242 block-level observations.
The large number of block-level observations means that estimates will generally be precise for coefficients which vary at the block level and are shared across all respondents. At the same time, it can create computational efficiency problems for traditional Bayesian posterior sampling methods. Consequently, for our analysis we use a Normal approximation corrected by importance resampling, as implemented by the Stan modeling package Rstan. This approximation centers a Normal distribution at the posterior mode with covariance matrix the inverse of the curvature of the log posterior density at the mode. It subsequently samples 1,000 draws from this Gaussian approximation and performs importance resampling so that the draws better approximate the posterior.

## Variable descriptions and model specifications

Table S5: Variable description and model specification.
$\left.\begin{array}{llll}\hline \text { Variable } & \text { Description }\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l}\text { Baseline } \\ \text { only? }\end{array}\right]$

| Variable | Description | Interaction(s) | Baseline <br> only? |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| Fraction same <br> education | Fraction of block with same education as <br> respondent | Education | $*$ |
| Education | Respondent education; either "college" or "no <br> college" | Fraction same <br> education, Income | $*$ |
| Income | Logarithm of median income of block group | Education | $*$ |
| Age | Respondent age group: 0-40, 41-55, 56-65, 66-75, <br> or 76+ |  | $*$ |
| Retired | Whether respondent is retired  <br> Tenure Square root of how long respondent has lived in <br> current residence  |  | $*$ |

## Full and baseline model estimates

## First survey

Tables S6 and S7 contain posterior summaries for all model coefficients on the original model scale. These models were fit using data from a random sample of 400 survey respondents from the control group, consisting of 78,771 individual block-level observations.

Table S6: Full model estimates.

| Coefficient | City | Mean | Std. Dev. | Q5 | Median | Q95 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| (Intercept) | Miami | -6.59 | 9.52 | -22.30 | -6.44 | 8.89 |
| (Intercept) | NYC | -5.37 | 7.56 | -17.36 | -5.29 | 6.43 |
| (Intercept) | Phoenix | -9.30 | 6.36 | -19.82 | -9.17 | 0.51 |
| Church | Miami | -0.04 | 0.07 | -0.16 | -0.04 | 0.07 |
| Church | NYC | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.19 |
| Church | Phoenix | 0.14 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.21 |
| Distance | Miami | 0.00 | 0.02 | -0.03 | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| Distance | Miami | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.18 |
| Distance | NYC | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.15 |
| Distance | NYC | 0.01 | 0.03 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 |
| Distance | Phoenix | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.09 |
| Distance | Phoenix | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.19 |
| Park | Miami | -0.06 | 0.09 | -0.21 | -0.05 | 0.08 |
| Park | NYC | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.23 |
| Park | Phoenix | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.13 |
| School | Miami | 0.39 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.39 | 0.62 |
| School | NYC | -0.15 | 0.12 | -0.34 | -0.15 | 0.06 |
| School | Phoenix | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.16 | 0.27 |
| Children | Miami | 0.53 | 3.10 | -4.48 | 0.57 | 5.39 |
| Children | NYC | -0.77 | 2.79 | -5.15 | -0.78 | 3.73 |
| Children | Phoenix | -1.09 | 2.05 | -4.35 | -1.14 | 2.39 |
| Same block group | Miami | 0.08 | 0.07 | -0.04 | 0.08 | 0.19 |
| Same block group | NYC | 0.21 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.21 | 0.35 |
| Same block group | Phoenix | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.13 |


| Same tract | Miami | -0.17 | 0.09 | -0.33 | -0.17 | -0.04 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Same tract | NYC | 0.06 | 0.12 | -0.14 | 0.06 | 0.26 |
| Same tract | Phoenix | -0.09 | 0.10 | -0.27 | -0.09 | 0.07 |
| Same road region | Miami | -0.49 | 0.05 | -0.57 | -0.49 | -0.41 |
| Same road region | NYC | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.20 |
| Same road region | Phoenix | -0.09 | 0.03 | -0.14 | -0.09 | -0.04 |
| Population | Miami | -0.22 | 0.26 | -0.66 | -0.22 | 0.21 |
| Population | NYC | -1.21 | 0.20 | -1.53 | -1.21 | -0.90 |
| Population | Phoenix | -1.18 | 0.16 | -1.43 | -1.19 | -0.89 |
| Area | Miami | -0.37 | 0.08 | -0.51 | -0.37 | -0.24 |
| Area | NYC | -0.14 | 0.11 | -0.32 | -0.14 | 0.03 |
| Area | Phoenix | 0.00 | 0.04 | -0.06 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| Fraction same race | Miami | -0.30 | 0.06 | -0.39 | -0.30 | -0.21 |
| Fraction same race | NYC | -0.12 | 0.05 | -0.21 | -0.12 | -0.04 |
| Fraction same race | Phoenix | -0.28 | 0.03 | -0.33 | -0.29 | -0.24 |
| Fraction same party | Miami | -0.26 | 0.09 | -0.41 | -0.26 | -0.12 |
| Fraction same party | NYC | -0.23 | 0.08 | -0.35 | -0.23 | -0.10 |
| Fraction same party | Phoenix | -0.29 | 0.07 | -0.41 | -0.29 | -0.18 |
| Fraction same ownership | Miami | -0.24 | 0.15 | -0.48 | -0.24 | 0.02 |
| Fraction same ownership | NYC | -0.27 | 0.13 | -0.49 | -0.27 | -0.07 |
| Fraction same ownership | Phoenix | -0.28 | 0.12 | -0.47 | -0.28 | -0.10 |
| Fraction same education | Miami | 0.25 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.48 |
| Fraction same education | NYC | -0.53 | 0.10 | -0.70 | -0.53 | -0.35 |
| Fraction same education | Phoenix | -0.94 | 0.08 | -1.07 | -0.95 | -0.82 |
| Income | Miami | -0.12 | 0.05 | -0.21 | -0.12 | -0.03 |
| Income | NYC | -0.13 | 0.05 | -0.21 | -0.13 | -0.06 |
| Income | Phoenix | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.19 |
| Age | Miami | 0.01 | 0.16 | -0.25 | 0.00 | 0.28 |
| Age | NYC | 0.01 | 0.13 | -0.20 | 0.01 | 0.23 |
| Age | Phoenix | -0.01 | 0.11 | -0.17 | -0.02 | 0.17 |
| Education $=$ no college | Miami | -2.20 | 3.20 | -7.44 | -2.23 | 3.13 |
| Education $=$ no college | NYC | 0.06 | 2.83 | -4.59 | 0.09 | 4.72 |
| Education $=$ no college | Phoenix | -0.33 | 2.26 | -4.02 | -0.28 | 3.31 |
| Retired | Miami | 0.50 | 3.10 | -4.57 | 0.51 | 5.29 |
| Retired | NYC | 0.44 | 3.03 | -4.71 | 0.51 | 5.28 |
| Retired | Phoenix | 0.11 | 2.44 | -4.01 | 0.20 | 4.11 |
| Tenure | Miami | -0.10 | 0.96 | -1.71 | -0.09 | 1.52 |
| Tenure | NYC | -0.12 | 0.89 | -1.55 | -0.14 | 1.39 |
| Tenure | Phoenix | 0.24 | 0.77 | -1.01 | 0.21 | 1.53 |
| Party $=$ ind | Miami | -0.52 | 4.32 | -7.78 | -0.57 | 6.71 |
| Party $=$ ind | NYC | 0.41 | 4.73 | -7.33 | 0.30 | 8.66 |
| Party $=$ ind | Phoenix | 0.08 | 3.53 | -5.81 | 0.15 | 5.90 |
| Party $=$ rep | Miami | -0.07 | 2.76 | -4.57 | -0.02 | 4.36 |
| Party $=$ rep | NYC | -0.27 | 2.60 | -4.45 | -0.30 | 4.09 |
| Party $=$ rep | Phoenix | -0.11 | 1.81 | -3.08 | -0.14 | 2.88 |
| Minority | Miami | -0.46 | 3.14 | -5.62 | -0.47 | 4.53 |
| Minority | NYC | 0.03 | 2.69 | -4.47 | 0.04 | 4.59 |
| Minority | Phoenix | -0.15 | 2.57 | -4.28 | -0.16 | 4.00 |
| Homeowner | Miami | -0.11 | 4.93 | -8.35 | 0.02 | 7.57 |


| Homeowner | NYC | -0.43 | 2.91 | -5.14 | -0.38 | 4.46 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Homeowner | Phoenix | -0.48 | 3.64 | -6.24 | -0.42 | 5.40 |
| School * children | Miami | -0.35 | 0.22 | -0.70 | -0.34 | 0.01 |
| School * children | NYC | 0.39 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.39 | 0.66 |
| School * children | Phoenix | 0.24 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.42 |
| Children * distance | Miami | -0.03 | 0.05 | -0.11 | -0.03 | 0.05 |
| Children * distance | NYC | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.15 |
| Children * distance | Phoenix | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.16 |
| Same tract * same road region | Miami | 0.02 | 0.10 | -0.15 | 0.02 | 0.19 |
| Same tract * same road region | NYC | -0.24 | 0.13 | -0.45 | -0.23 | -0.02 |
| Same tract * same road region | Phoenix | -0.37 | 0.10 | -0.53 | -0.37 | -0.20 |
| Fraction same race * minority | Miami | 0.25 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.40 |
| Fraction same race * minority | NYC | 0.27 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.27 | 0.46 |
| Fraction same race * minority | Phoenix | -0.31 | 0.22 | -0.66 | -0.31 | 0.04 |
| Fraction same party * party = ind | Miami | -0.12 | 0.20 | -0.43 | -0.12 | 0.20 |
| Fraction same party * party = ind | NYC | -0.04 | 0.32 | -0.57 | -0.05 | 0.49 |
| Fraction same party * party = ind | Phoenix | 0.22 | 0.14 | -0.02 | 0.22 | 0.45 |
| Fraction same party * party = rep | Miami | -0.31 | 0.14 | -0.54 | -0.31 | -0.07 |
| Fraction same party * party = rep | NYC | -0.04 | 0.13 | -0.25 | -0.04 | 0.17 |
| Fraction same party * party $=$ rep | Phoenix | 0.10 | 0.08 | -0.02 | 0.10 | 0.23 |
| Fraction same ownership * homeowner | Miami | 0.52 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.53 | 0.83 |
| Fraction same ownership * homeowner | NYC | 0.42 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.42 | 0.67 |
| Fraction same ownership * homeowner | Phoenix | 0.26 | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.26 | 0.47 |
| Fraction same education * educ $=$ no college | Miami | 0.44 | 0.25 | 0.05 | 0.44 | 0.85 |
| Fraction same education * educ $=$ no college | NYC | 1.41 | 0.21 | 1.05 | 1.41 | 1.77 |
| Fraction same education * educ $=$ no college | Phoenix | 0.57 | 0.21 | 0.24 | 0.57 | 0.91 |
| Income * education = no college | Miami | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 0.33 |
| Income * education = no college | NYC | -0.10 | 0.09 | -0.24 | -0.10 | 0.04 |
| Income * education = no college | Phoenix | 0.05 | 0.08 | -0.07 | 0.05 | 0.18 |
| Alpha | Miami | 1.42 | 0.05 | 1.34 | 1.42 | 1.50 |
| Alpha | NYC | 1.46 | 0.05 | 1.38 | 1.46 | 1.55 |
| Alpha | Phoenix | 1.50 | 0.03 | 1.46 | 1.50 | 1.54 |

Table S7: Baseline model estimates.

| Coefficient | City | Mean | Std. Dev. | Q5 | Median | Q95 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| (Intercept) | Miami | -7.72 | 1.12 | -9.62 | -7.71 | -5.84 |
| (Intercept) | NYC | -8.05 | 1.12 | -9.91 | -8.07 | -6.27 |
| (Intercept) | Phoenix | -8.82 | 0.89 | -10.30 | -8.83 | -7.30 |
| Church | Miami | -0.04 | 0.07 | -0.15 | -0.04 | 0.07 |
| Church | NYC | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.21 |
| Church | Phoenix | 0.18 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.24 |
| Distance | Miami | 0.00 | 0.02 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| Distance | Miami | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.15 |
| Distance | NYC | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.16 |
| Distance | NYC | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.08 |
| Distance | Phoenix | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.11 |


| Distance | Phoenix | 0.20 | 0.01 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.23 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Park | Miami | -0.02 | 0.09 | -0.17 | -0.02 | 0.12 |
| Park | NYC | 0.18 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.26 |
| Park | Phoenix | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.15 |
| School | Miami | 0.26 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.26 | 0.43 |
| School | NYC | 0.05 | 0.09 | -0.11 | 0.05 | 0.20 |
| School | Phoenix | 0.29 | 0.06 | 0.20 | 0.29 | 0.39 |
| Same block group | Miami | 0.07 | 0.07 | -0.04 | 0.07 | 0.19 |
| Same block group | NYC | 0.17 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.32 |
| Same block group | Phoenix | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.14 |
| Same tract | Miami | -0.16 | 0.08 | -0.29 | -0.16 | -0.01 |
| Same tract | NYC | 0.14 | 0.12 | -0.06 | 0.14 | 0.34 |
| Same tract | Phoenix | -0.06 | 0.10 | -0.21 | -0.06 | 0.11 |
| Same road region | Miami | -0.51 | 0.05 | -0.58 | -0.51 | -0.43 |
| Same road region | NYC | 0.16 | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.22 |
| Same road region | Phoenix | -0.13 | 0.03 | -0.17 | -0.13 | -0.08 |
| Population | Miami | -1.23 | 0.23 | -1.60 | -1.23 | -0.84 |
| Population | NYC | -1.74 | 0.18 | -2.03 | -1.74 | -1.46 |
| Population | Phoenix | -2.44 | 0.15 | -2.68 | -2.45 | -2.17 |
| Area | Miami | -0.30 | 0.08 | -0.42 | -0.30 | -0.17 |
| Area | NYC | -0.08 | 0.11 | -0.26 | -0.08 | 0.10 |
| Area | Phoenix | 0.02 | 0.04 | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.08 |
| Same tract * same road region | Miami | 0.00 | 0.09 | -0.15 | 0.01 | 0.15 |
| Same tract * same road region | NYC | -0.32 | 0.13 | -0.54 | -0.32 | -0.11 |
| Same tract * same road region | Phoenix | -0.43 | 0.10 | -0.60 | -0.43 | -0.28 |
| Alpha | Miami | 1.42 | 0.05 | 1.34 | 1.42 | 1.49 |
| Alpha | NYC | 1.38 | 0.05 | 1.31 | 1.38 | 1.47 |
| Alpha | Phoenix | 1.51 | 0.03 | 1.46 | 1.51 | 1.55 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## City council survey

Tables S8 and S9 contain posterior summaries for all model coefficients on the original model scale. These models were fit using a training sample of 500 survey respondents (out of 627 ), consisting of 94,349 individual block-level observations.

Table S8: Full model estimates.

| Coefficient | Mean | Std. Dev. | Q5 | Median | Q95 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| (Intercept) | -6.03 | 3.24 | -11.11 | -5.97 | -0.99 |
| Church | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.12 |
| Distance | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.07 |
| Distance | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
| Park | 0.19 | 0.02 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.22 |
| School | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.12 |
| Children | 0.03 | 1.71 | -2.89 | 0.02 | 2.78 |
| Same block group | 0.25 | 0.06 | 0.14 | 0.25 | 0.35 |
| Same tract | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0.33 |
| Same road region | -0.22 | 0.02 | -0.25 | -0.22 | -0.19 |


| Population | -1.18 | 0.07 | -1.30 | -1.18 | -1.07 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Area | -0.52 | 0.12 | -0.71 | -0.52 | -0.32 |
| Fraction same race | -0.32 | 0.03 | -0.37 | -0.32 | -0.28 |
| Fraction same party | -0.22 | 0.03 | -0.26 | -0.22 | -0.18 |
| Fraction same ownership | -0.11 | 0.04 | -0.18 | -0.11 | -0.03 |
| Fraction same education | -0.27 | 0.04 | -0.34 | -0.27 | -0.20 |
| Income | -0.11 | 0.02 | -0.14 | -0.11 | -0.08 |
| Age | 0.01 | 0.06 | -0.09 | 0.00 | 0.10 |
| Education = no college | -3.58 | 1.96 | -6.75 | -3.60 | -0.30 |
| Retired | -0.14 | 2.25 | -3.66 | -0.20 | 3.63 |
| Tenure | 0.02 | 0.54 | -0.85 | 0.03 | 0.87 |
| Party $=$ ind | -0.23 | 2.75 | -4.73 | -0.21 | 4.26 |
| Party $=$ rep | 0.15 | 2.05 | -3.30 | 0.14 | 3.50 |
| Minority | 0.10 | 1.66 | -2.61 | 0.08 | 2.79 |
| Homeownerother (please specify) | 0.08 | 3.35 | -5.40 | 0.13 | 5.49 |
| Homeownerrenter | 0.17 | 1.64 | -2.56 | 0.14 | 2.76 |
| School $*$ children | -0.20 | 0.07 | -0.32 | -0.20 | -0.08 |
| Children $*$ distance | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.06 | -0.02 | 0.01 |
| Same tract * same road region | -0.40 | 0.09 | -0.55 | -0.40 | -0.25 |
| Fraction same race * minority | 0.16 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.15 | 0.25 |
| Fraction same party $*$ party $=$ ind | 0.12 | 0.13 | -0.09 | 0.12 | 0.33 |
| Fraction same party $*$ party $=$ rep | -0.53 | 0.15 | -0.77 | -0.53 | -0.27 |
| Fraction same ownership $*$ homeownerother (please specify) | 0.00 | 0.13 | -0.22 | 0.01 | 0.22 |
| Fraction same ownership * homeownerrenter | 0.14 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.14 | 0.24 |
| Fraction same education $*$ educ $=$ no college | 0.79 | 0.11 | 0.62 | 0.79 | 0.97 |
| Income * education $=$ no college | 0.27 | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0.27 | 0.34 |
| Alpha | 1.39 | 0.02 | 1.35 | 1.39 | 1.42 |

Table S9: Baseline model estimates.

| Coefficient | Mean | Std. Dev. | Q5 | Median | Q95 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| (Intercept) | -7.13 | 1.48 | -9.57 | -7.11 | -4.64 |
| Church | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.12 |
| Distance | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.08 |
| Distance | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| Park | 0.20 | 0.02 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.22 |
| School | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.05 | -0.01 | 0.05 |
| Same block group | 0.22 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.22 | 0.32 |
| Same tract | 0.23 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.23 | 0.38 |
| Same road region | -0.27 | 0.02 | -0.29 | -0.27 | -0.23 |
| Population | -1.79 | 0.07 | -1.90 | -1.79 | -1.68 |
| Area | -0.24 | 0.10 | -0.41 | -0.24 | -0.07 |
| Same tract * same road region | -0.45 | 0.09 | -0.60 | -0.45 | -0.30 |
| Alpha | 1.39 | 0.02 | 1.36 | 1.39 | 1.43 |

## Aggregate-level prediction



Figure S5: For each respondent, we compare the posterior mean of the fraction white in their predicted neighborhoods between the full and baseline models. Positive values indicate that using demographic information (full model) leads to a predicted neighborhood that is more white, on average. These differences in neighborhood fraction white are broken out by tercile of local area diversity and by the race of the respondent. Section S5 of the SI contains the full results tables for the full and baseline models.

Here we demonstrate how, in aggregate, the modeled relationship between co-racial and co-partisan demographics and census block inclusion produces predicted neighborhoods with different racial and partisan makeups across voters of different races and parties. Figure S5 presents boxplots showing the median and interquartile ranges of the change in proportion White in predicted neighborhoods, comparing the baseline model to the full model. The full model considers demographic information, while the baseline model does not, so the difference between the two is evidence of how much more homogeneous subjective neighborhoods become when demographics are considered.

This comparison is plotted separately by tercile of local racial diversity, to illustrate that, when voters live in areas where it is plausible to include or exclude out-group neighbors, they tend to do so. We measure local racial diversity as the standard deviation in the White percentage of each block within a fixed radius of a voter's residence. Since respondents must include or exclude whole blocks, measuring diversity according to block-level statistics is appropriate. Higher standard deviations indicate more block-level variation in racial composition and thus more opportunity to exclude out-group neighbors. Figure S 6 shows the variation in local diversity across respondents.

Three quarters of White respondents' predicted neighborhoods contain greater proportions of White residents under the full model compared to the baseline model, with the disparity increasing as neighborhood diversity increases. We further see evidence, in the most mixed neighborhoods, of predicted neighborhoods for Black and Asian respondents with lower numbers of White residents, further evidence of the impact of demographics on subjective racial neighborhoods. Figure S 5 shows the results for a one-mile radius, but the results are robust to different specifications.

In Figure S7, we plot the same comparison for partisan demographics, showing the boxplots of the difference in proportion Democratic between the full and baseline models across terciles of partisan diversity. Boxplots are shown separately by the self-reported partisan identification of the voter, ranging from strong Republican to strong Democrat.
On average, predicted neighborhoods for Democrats are slightly more Democratic in the full model compared to the baseline model, although the interquartile ranges overlap with zero across diversity terciles. Predicted neighborhoods for Republicans, on the other hand, are noticeably less Democratic in the full model compared to the baseline model, and the largest disparity is seen for strong Republicans, where the gap reaches 0.37


Figure S6: Local partisan and racial diversity for each respondent, as measured by the block-level standard deviation of the respective variables for blocks within a $0.5,1.0$, and 2.0 -mile radius. Terciles are indicated by vertical lines and bold labels.


Figure S7: For each respondent, we compare the posterior mean of the fraction of Democrats in their predicted neighborhoods between the full and baseline models. Positive values indicate that using demographic information (full model) leads to a predicted neighborhood that is more Democratic, on average. These differences in neighborhood fraction Democratic are broken out by tercile of local area diversity and by the party identification of the respondent. Section S5 of the SI contains the full results tables for the full and baseline models.
percentage points in the most politically diverse areas. Similar to the racial comparison, the degree of difference is increasing with partisan diversity, and thus the potential to draw neighborhoods more differentiated by partisanship.

For both race and partisanship, the changes in neighborhood composition as a result of factoring in demographics are small in magnitude. This reflects, we believe, the overwhelming influence of residential segregation and sorting. Voters' preferences for homogeneous neighborhoods are already reflected in their choice of residence; all that we measure here is the marginal predictive effect of this preference on their subjective definition of neighborhood, given that residence.

## Predictive performance compared to ZCTAs




Figure S8: Posterior median of the difference in F1 scores between a neighborhood predicted by the model prediction and a census ZCTA. The boxplot shows the variation in this median difference accros the respondents included in the model fitting (left plot) and excluded from the model fitting (right plot). Section S5 of the SI contains the full results tables for the full and baseline models.

## Additional model fits

## Model fit with urban-suburban indicator

We fit the full model specification again, but include an indicator for whether a block belongs to the primary city in each metro area. This indicator is also interacted with the same-tract indicator, and the fraction-same-race variable.

These additional model coefficients are summarized in Figure S9. Results are mixed for the direct effect (which affects the size of the neighborhood) and same-tract interaction. In all 3 cities, the same-race preference is slightly stronger in the urban area compared to suburban areas. The main same-race effect (corresponding to the coefficient for suburban voters) remains positive for both white and minority voters. Thus while there is some evidence of urban-suburban heterogeneity, directionally the results are consistent with the overall findings.


Figure S9: Full model estimates for urban indicator variable and interactions. The full coefficient estimates for this model are available in CSV format as part of the APSR Dataverse files.

## Model fit with home prices

We fit the full model specification again, but include the (log of the) median home value in each block group. The home value covariate is also interacted with the same-race and same-party variables, and with the
respondent's educational group (the indicator for not having attended college).
These additional model coefficients are summarized in Figure S10. Both the direct effect and interaction terms are relatively small. In New York and Miami, there is some evidence that non-college respondents are more likely to include a region if it has higher home prices. Overall the main conclusions about party and race in-group preference remain unchanged.


Figure S10: Full model estimates with home prices control. The full coefficient estimates for this model are available in CSV format as part of the APSR Dataverse files.

## Model fit with community centers and other cultural institutions

We fit the full model specification again, this time only on the sample from New York City, where we acquired data on other types of cultural institutions besides churches and schools. These include: youth centers, senior centers, libraries, community centers, and other cultural institutions. We include an indicator for the presence of any of these buildings in a census block. We estimate the full model specification with this indicator as an additional covariate. Figure S11 reports the results, demonstrating the robustness of the original variables to the inclusion of this covariates. We further see that community centers and other cultural institutions exert a similar effect as churches on inclusion in subjective neighborhoods, with the present of any of these making it less likely a place is included.


Figure S11: Full model estimates for community center indicator variable. The full coefficient estimates for this model are available in CSV format as part of the APSR Dataverse files.

## Model fit with turnout and party interactions

We fit the full model specification again, but include interactions between party and fraction same race in each census block. We do this for the both surveys, the subjective neighborhoods survey and the city council survey. Figure S12 and S13 report the same race coefficients for Democrats and Republicans. We find that, among whites, that while respondents of both parties prefer census blocks with more same race residents, this preference is stronger for Republicans than for Democrats.

We also fit the full model to the city council survey including an interaction for whether or not the respondent reported that they voted in the 2021 mayoral election. We do not fit the equivalent model to the subjective neighborhood survey because self-reported 2020 turnout was too high ( $>95 \%$ ) in the sample to estimate this interaction in every city. Figure S14 reports the results, showing that voters who voted in the 2021 mayoral election also gave greater preference to racial similarity when drawing their communities of interest. We see a similar disparity for voting and preferences for partisan homophily among Republicans but not for Democrats, where Democrats who do not vote are slightly more influenced by party demographics when defining their communities of interest.


Figure S12: Subjective neighborhood survey: Selected full model coefficient posteriors, scaled to show the percentage point change in probability of a block's inclusion for a baseline probability of $50 \%$. Plotted are $90 \%$ and $50 \%$ credible intervals, with posterior medians displayed to the right of each interval. The full coefficient estimates for this model are available in CSV format as part of the APSR Dataverse files.


Figure S13: City council survey: Selected full model coefficient posteriors, scaled to show the percentage point change in probability of a block's inclusion for a baseline probability of $50 \%$. Plotted are $90 \%$ and $50 \%$ credible intervals, with posterior medians displayed to the right of each interval. The full coefficient estimates for this model are available in CSV format as part of the APSR Dataverse files.


Figure S14: City council survey: Selected full model coefficient posteriors, scaled to show the percentage point change in probability of a block's inclusion for a baseline probability of $50 \%$. Plotted are $90 \%$ and $50 \%$ credible intervals, with posterior medians displayed to the right of each interval. The full coefficient estimates for this model are available in CSV format as part of the APSR Dataverse files.

## Model fit on Email versus Meta survey



Figure S15: City council survey: Selected full model coefficient posteriors, scaled to show the percentage point change in probability of a block's inclusion for a baseline probability of $50 \%$. Plotted are $90 \%$ and $50 \%$ credible intervals, with posterior medians displayed to the right of each interval. The full coefficient estimates for this model are available in CSV format as part of the APSR Dataverse files.

## Survey representativeness

To assess the sensitivity of our main effects to any unrepresentativeness of the survey, we fit the full model specification, this time adding interactions between race and party homophily variables and respondent race, homeowner status, retirement status, and college education. Figure S16 summarizes these interaction coefficients. While the effects can vary by these variables, in almost every case we still observed an overall positive effect of partisan and racial homophily on inclusion (i.e. even negative interaction coefficients are not large enough to switch the sign of the overall effect). This is remarkable given the relatively small sample sizes for some demographics, and the high amount of individual heterogeneity observed for other aspects of the drawn neighborhoods.
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Figure S16: Full model estimates for interactions with race, homeownership, retirement, and college. The full coefficient estimates for this model are available in CSV format as part of the APSR Dataverse files.

## Time spent drawing maps

## First survey

Figure S17 shows that respondents which drew valid neighborhoods spent more time on average with the drawing tool, as would be expected. The results show that respondents who drew usable neighborhoods on average spent 4.17 minutes on the map (median 2.54 minutes). The subsequent table reports associational measures between various covariates and the time spent drawing the map, which is measured in seconds, binned into three categories, and reported in the table columns. Time spent on the map is not well correlated with individual characteristics or neighborhood features.


Figure S17: From the subjective neighborhoods survey. Distributions plotted separately for valid and empty neighborhoods.

Table S10: Descriptive statistics by total time spent drawing neighborhood (minutes)

|  | $(0,1](\mathrm{N}=1328)$ | $(1,2](\mathrm{N}=1556)$ | $(2, \operatorname{Inf}](\mathrm{N}=2732)$ | p value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| usable |  |  |  | $<0.001^{1}$ |
| FALSE | 1133 (85.3\%) | 833 (53.5\%) | 1068 (39.1\%) |  |
| TRUE | 195 (14.7\%) | 723 (46.5\%) | 1664 (60.9\%) |  |
| group |  |  |  | $0.004^{1}$ |
| C | 293 (22.1\%) | 308 (19.8\%) | 518 (19.0\%) |  |
| P | 237 (17.8\%) | 307 (19.7\%) | 611 (22.4\%) |  |
| PH | 287 (21.6\%) | 277 (17.8\%) | 490 (17.9\%) |  |
| R | 240 (18.1\%) | 316 (20.3\%) | 558 (20.4\%) |  |
| RH | 271 (20.4\%) | 348 (22.4\%) | 555 (20.3\%) |  |
| city |  |  |  | $0.052^{1}$ |
| miami | 322 (24.2\%) | 342 (22.0\%) | 549 (20.1\%) |  |
| new-york | 241 (18.1\%) | 266 (17.1\%) | 466 (17.1\%) |  |
| phoenix | 765 (57.6\%) | 948 (60.9\%) | 1717 (62.8\%) |  |
| party |  |  |  | < $0.001^{1}$ |
| dem_strong | 298 (22.4\%) | 423 (27.2\%) | 763 (27.9\%) |  |
| dem_lean | 194 (14.6\%) | 308 (19.8\%) | 561 (20.5\%) |  |
| independent | 153 (11.5\%) | 162 (10.4\%) | 209 (7.7\%) |  |
| rep_lean | 288 (21.7\%) | 305 (19.6\%) | 547 (20.0\%) |  |
| rep_strong | 395 (29.7\%) | 358 (23.0\%) | 652 (23.9\%) |  |
| age |  |  |  | $<0.001^{2}$ |
| Mean (SD) | 59.950 (13.861) | 62.715 (13.057) | 64.484 (13.028) |  |
| Range | 18.000-105.000 | 21.000-105.000 | 18.000-105.000 |  |
| gender |  |  |  | $0.178{ }^{1}$ |
| N -Miss | 28 | 16 | 14 |  |
| female | 611 (47.0\%) | 674 (43.8\%) | 1255 (46.2\%) |  |
| male | 689 (53.0\%) | 866 (56.2\%) | 1463 (53.8\%) |  |
| education |  |  |  | $<0.001{ }^{1}$ |
| N-Miss | 34 | 23 | 34 |  |
| no_hs | 11 (0.9\%) | 1 (0.1\%) | 2 (0.1\%) |  |
| some_hs | 5 (0.4\%) | 16 (1.0\%) | 16 (0.6\%) |  |
| hs | 85 (6.6\%) | 109 (7.1\%) | 183 (6.8\%) |  |
| some_coll | 258 (19.9\%) | 240 (15.7\%) | 478 (17.7\%) |  |
| grad_2yr | 130 (10.0\%) | 164 (10.7\%) | 269 (10.0\%) |  |
| grad_4yr | 427 (33.0\%) | 512 (33.4\%) | 892 (33.1\%) |  |
| postgrad | 378 (29.2\%) | 491 (32.0\%) | 858 (31.8\%) |  |
| retired |  |  |  | $<0.001^{1}$ |
| No | 834 (62.8\%) | 824 (53.0\%) | 1320 (48.3\%) |  |
| Yes | 494 (37.2\%) | 732 (47.0\%) | 1412 (51.7\%) |  |
| race |  |  |  | < $0.001^{1}$ |
| N -Miss | 83 | 42 | 64 |  |
| aapi | 34 (2.7\%) | 34 (2.2\%) | 57 (2.1\%) |  |
| black | 63 (5.1\%) | 49 (3.2\%) | 95 (3.6\%) |  |
| hisp | 190 (15.3\%) | 177 (11.7\%) | 276 (10.3\%) |  |
| indig | 12 (1.0\%) | 14 (0.9\%) | 9 (0.3\%) |  |
| multi | 32 (2.6\%) | 26 (1.7\%) | 52 (1.9\%) |  |
| white | 914 (73.4\%) | 1214 (80.2\%) | 2179 (81.7\%) |  |
| homeowner |  |  |  | $0.052^{1}$ |
| No | 204 (15.4\%) | 214 (13.8\%) | 335 (12.3\%) |  |
| Yes | 1124 (84.6\%) | 1342 (86.2\%) | 2397 (87.7\%) |  |

## City council survey

Figure S18 shows that respondents which drew valid communities of interest spent more time on average with the drawing tool. The following table reports correlations between various covariates and the time spent drawing the map, which is measured in seconds, binned into three categories, and reported in the table columns.


Figure S18: From city council survey. Distributions plotted separately for valid and empty neighborhoods.

Table S11: Descriptive statistics by total time spent drawing neighborhood (minutes)

|  | $(0,1](\mathrm{N}=326)$ | $(1,2](\mathrm{N}=393)$ | (2,Inf] ( $\mathrm{N}=659$ ) | p value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| usable |  |  |  | < $0.001^{1}$ |
| FALSE | 270 (82.8\%) | 90 (22.9\%) | 50 (7.6\%) |  |
| TRUE | 56 (17.2\%) | 303 (77.1\%) | 609 (92.4\%) |  |
| group |  |  |  | $0.759^{1}$ |
| N-Miss | 84 | 50 | 37 |  |
| C | 52 (21.5\%) | 65 (19.0\%) | 122 (19.6\%) |  |
| P | 49 (20.2\%) | 73 (21.3\%) | 124 (19.9\%) |  |
| PH | 48 (19.8\%) | 71 (20.7\%) | 117 (18.8\%) |  |
| R | 39 (16.1\%) | 69 (20.1\%) | 137 (22.0\%) |  |
| RH | 54 (22.3\%) | 65 (19.0\%) | 122 (19.6\%) |  |
| city |  |  |  | $<0.001^{2}$ |
| new-york | 326 (100.0\%) | 393 (100.0\%) | 659 (100.0\%) |  |
| party |  |  |  | $<0.001^{1}$ |
| N-Miss | 66 | 37 | 22 |  |
| dem_lean | 164 (63.1\%) | 275 (77.2\%) | 495 (77.7\%) |  |
| independent | 41 (15.8\%) | 30 (8.4\%) | 51 (8.0\%) |  |
| rep_lean | 55 (21.2\%) | 51 (14.3\%) | 91 (14.3\%) |  |
| age |  |  |  | $0.155^{3}$ |
| N-Miss | 77 | 44 | 29 |  |
| Mean (SD) | 50.040 (17.841) | 47.585 (17.655) | 50.605 (18.152) |  |
| Range | 18.000-105.000 | 18.000-89.000 | 18.000-105.000 |  |
| gender |  |  |  | $0.155^{1}$ |
| N-Miss | 84 | 56 | 47 |  |
| female | 115 (47.5\%) | 127 (37.7\%) | 246 (40.2\%) |  |
| male | 127 (52.5\%) | 210 (62.3\%) | 366 (59.8\%) |  |
| education |  |  |  | $0.002{ }^{1}$ |
| N-Miss | 85 | 47 | 35 |  |
| no_hs | 2 (0.8\%) | 1 (0.3\%) | 0 (0.0\%) |  |
| some_hs | 8 (3.3\%) | 4 (1.2\%) | 7 (1.1\%) |  |


|  | $(0,1](\mathrm{N}=326)$ | $(1,2](\mathrm{N}=393)$ | $(2$, Inf $](\mathrm{N}=659)$ | p value |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| hs | $22(9.1 \%)$ | $26(7.5 \%)$ | $28(4.5 \%)$ |  |
| some_coll | $36(14.9 \%)$ | $29(8.4 \%)$ | $80(12.8 \%)$ |  |
| grad_2yr | $21(8.7 \%)$ | $17(4.9 \%)$ | $28(4.5 \%)$ |  |
| grad_4yr | $70(29.0 \%)$ | $128(37.0 \%)$ | $216(34.6 \%)$ |  |
| postgrad | $82(34.0 \%)$ | $141(40.8 \%)$ | $265(42.5 \%)$ | $0.119^{1}$ |
| retired |  |  |  |  |
| N-Miss | 79 | 45 | 30 |  |
| No | $184(74.5 \%)$ | $288(82.8 \%)$ | $479(76.2 \%)$ |  |
| Yes | $63(25.5 \%)$ | $60(17.2 \%)$ | $150(23.8 \%)$ |  |
| race | 109 |  |  |  |
| N-Miss | $13(6.0 \%)$ | 65 | $12(3.7 \%)$ | $20(3.4 \%)$ |
| aapi | $37(17.1 \%)$ | $23(7.0 \%)$ | $41(6.9 \%)$ |  |
| black | $45(20.7 \%)$ | $35(10.7 \%)$ | $69(11.6 \%)$ |  |
| hisp | $2(0.9 \%)$ | $2(0.6 \%)$ | $4(0.7 \%)$ |  |
| indig | $5(2.3 \%)$ | $13(4.0 \%)$ | $23(3.9 \%)$ |  |
| multi | $115(53.0 \%)$ | $243(74.1 \%)$ | $440(73.7 \%)$ | $0.506^{1}$ |
| white |  |  |  |  |
| homeowner | 84 | 48 | 34 |  |
| N-Miss | $97(40.1 \%)$ | $133(38.6 \%)$ | $247(39.5 \%)$ |  |
| Homeowner | $6(2.5 \%)$ | $14(4.1 \%)$ | $37(5.9 \%)$ |  |
| Other (please specify) | $139(57.4 \%)$ | $198(57.4 \%)$ | $341(54.6 \%)$ |  |
| Renter |  |  |  |  |

## Support for new housing construction analysis

We also collect respondent attitudes on the construction of new housing in their neighborhoods and test how opposition to new housing intensifies is related preferences. We do so by creating an indicator variable for whether respondents support a ban on the construction of new housing in their neighborhood and interacting it with the fraction same race and fraction same party in each census block. We further interact the homeowner variable with these terms to see how this varies across homeowners and renters. We then report the influence of race and party demographics for respondents who do and do not support a housing ban, separately for homeowners and renters. Figure S19 reports these coefficients, showing that the influence of homophily by race or party does not substantially vary by whether the respondent supports new housing in their neighborhood.


Figure S19: Selected full model coefficient posteriors, scaled to show the percentage point change in probability of a block's inclusion for a baseline probability of $50 \%$. Plotted are $90 \%$ and $50 \%$ credible intervals, with posterior medians displayed to the right of each interval.

## Neighborhood trust analysis

Next, we conduct a similar exercise for the measures of whether respondents express trust in their neighbors. Figure S20 reports the effects of fraction same race and party separately for respondents who are above the median level of expressed neighbor trust (median calculated from sample of respondents in each city). Again, we find that the effects on race and party demographics are generally consistent across these comparisons.


Figure S20: Selected full model coefficient posteriors, scaled to show the percentage point change in probability of a block's inclusion for a baseline probability of $50 \%$. Plotted are $90 \%$ and $50 \%$ credible intervals, with posterior medians displayed to the right of each interval.

