**Appendix**

Table 1. Fuzzy-set membership scores and raw data[[1]](#footnote-1)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **cases** | **assertiveness** | **discontent** | **casualties** | **divgov** | **nothreat** |
| *set* | *raw* | *set* | *raw* | *set* | *raw* | *set* | *raw* | *set* | *raw* |
| Afghanistan01 | 0.25 | S.J.Res. 23 (2001) | 0 | 79 | 1 | 1843 | 0.75 | PDG (50,4) | 0 | Self-defense subsequent to direct attack on US “homeland” (see Kriner, 2010, p.25) |
| Afghanistan09 | 0.25 | H.R. 3326 (2009) | 0.75 | 45 | 1 | 1843 | 0.25 | UG (56,1) | 0 | Self-defense subsequent to direct attack on US “homeland” (see Kriner, 2010, p.25) |
| Bosnia93-00 | 0.75 | H.R. 2126 (1995) | 0.75 | 46 | 0.25 | 1 | 1 | DG (46,9) | 1 | Peace enforcement mission (see Hendrickson, 2002, p.68) |
| Dronewar09-17 | 0 | no legislation | 0.25 | 58 | 0 | 0 | 0.25 | UG (56,1) | 0 | Targeted killings to fight terrorism (see Ramsey, 2016, p.707) |
| ElSalvador81-83 | 0 | no legislation | 1 | 31 | 0.75 | 22 | 0.75 | PDG (48,6) | 0.25 | Military advisors mission, in order to promote/enhance regional security in the periphery (Weed, 2017, p.10) |
| Grenada83 | 0.75 | H.J.Res. 402 (1983) | 0.25 | 59 | 0.75 | 18 | 0.75 | PDG (46,1) | 0.75 | Democracy promotion: aim was to restore order after a military coup led by communist factions (see Kriner, 2010, p.17) |
| Haiti93-00 | 0.75 | S. 1059 (1999) | 1 | 37 | 0.25 | 4 | 1 | DG (46,7) | 0.75 | Democracy promotion against military regime (see Hendrickson, 2002, p.51) |
| Iraq02 | 0.25 | H.J.Res. 114 (2002) | 0.25 | 57 | 1 | 3481 | 0.75 | PDG (50,4) | 0 | Preventive strike in order to disarm WMDs (see Fisher, 2004, p.211) |
| Iraq07 | 1 | H.R. 1591 (2007) | 0.75 | 45 | 1 | 3481 | 1 | DG (47,4) | 0.75 | Democracy promotion served as the central legitimization after no WMDs were found (see Carothers, 2007, p.8) |
| Iraq91 | 0.25 | H.J.Res. 77 (1991) | 0 | 64 | 1 | 299 | 1 | DG (41,2) | 0.25 | Regional security in Middle East (see Jakobsen, 1996, p. 207) |
| Iraq92-03 | 0 | no legislation | 0 | 62 | 0.25 | 6 | 0 | UG (58.7) | 0.25 | Regional security in Middle East (see Hendrickson, 2002, p.139) |
| ISIS14-17 | 0.25 | H.R. 3979 (2014) | 0.25 | 59 | 0.25 | 3 | 0.75 | PDG (49,6) | 0 | Combat terrorist organization ISIS (see Ramsey, 2016, p.708-711) |
| Kosovo99 | 0.75 | S.Con.Res. 21 (1999) | 0.25 | 53 | 0.25 | 2 | 1 | DG (46,7) | 0.75 | HI to stop possible genocide (see Hendrickson, 2002, p.117) |
| Lebanon82-84 | 1 | H.J.Res. 364 (1983) | 1 | 40 | 1 | 256 | 0.75 | PDG (46,1) | 1 | Peace keeping mission (see Fisher, 2004, p.160) |
| Libya11 | 0.75 | H.Res. 292 (2011) | 0.25 | 53 | 0 | 0 | 0.75 | PDG (47,7) | 0.75 | HI to stop atrocities by Libyan regime (see Murray, 2013, p.146). |
| Libya86 | 0 | no legislation | 0.25 | 59 | 0.25 | 2 | 0.75 | PDG (47,4) | 0 | Retaliation for terrorism (see Fisher, 2004, p.163) |
| Nicaragua83-90 | 1 | H.J.Res. 631 (1982) | 1 | 32 | 0.75 | 70 | 0.75 | PDG (47,4) | 0.25 | Military advisors mission in order to promote/enhance regional security (see Roberts, 1990, p.75) |
| Panama89 | 0.25 | H.Con.Res. 262 (1990) | 0.25 | 52 | 0.75 | 23 | 1 | DG (42,6) | 0.75 | Intervention to change regime of Noriega and reestablish democracy (see Fisher 2004, p.166). |
| Somalia93-95 | 1 | H.R.3116 (1993) | 0.75 | 44 | 0.75 | 43 | 0 | UG (58.2) | 1 | UN peace keeping mission (see Hendrickson, 2002, p.21) |

A. Information on the assignment of fuzzy-set score for outcome “assertiveness”

This section provides additional information on the qualitative and theory-guided calibration of the outcome congressional assertiveness for the fuzzy-set analysis. Table 2 presents thresholds and indicators (also presented in the main text) and Table 3 includes descriptions for each of the cases.

Table 2. Conditions of congressional assertiveness in the politics of military interventions

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Congressional behavior* | *Fuzzy-set score* | *Type* | *Indicator* |
| Assertive | 1 | Restrictive Legislation | Binding legislation restricting presidential war powers |
| 0.75 | Minority Critique | Non-binding legislation, or binding legislation in one chamber criticizing presidential policies |
| Non-assertive | 0.25 | Supportive legislation | Binding legislation supporting presidential policy for the proposed or ongoing intervention |
| 0 | Passivity | No legislative proposals up for vote in neither House nor Senate |

Table 3. Additional information on assigning fuzzy-set values for congressional assertiveness to cases

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **cases** | **assertiveness** |
| *set* | *raw* | *type* |
| Afghanistan01 | 0.25 | S.J.Res. 23 (2001) | Supportive legislation: S.J.Res. 23 issued an binding authorization for “the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. States that this Act is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution.” (P.L. 107-40) |
| Afghanistan09 | 0.25 | H.R. 3326 (2009) | Supportive legislation: The Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2010 provided additional funding to the war in Afghanistan. Thus, this bill can be seen as binding legislation to support President Obama’s Afghanistan intervention policies. |
| Bosnia93-00 | 0.75 | H.R. 2126 (1995) | Minority critique: H.R. 2126, which passed House and Senate, expressed the sense of Congress that funding to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia needed to be specifically authorized, thus criticized the ongoing intervention (see P.L. 104-61).  |
| Dronewar09-17 | 0 | no legislation | Passivity: No specific legislation concerning the authorization of drone strikes (see Weed, 2017, p.44). |
| ElSalvador81-83 | 0 | no legislation | Passivity: No specific legislation concerning the authorization the military advisors mission (see Weed, 2017, p.10f.) |
| Grenada83 | 0.75 | H.J.Res. 402 (1983) | Minority critique: The House adopted H.J.Res. 402, declaring the intervention was subject to the War Powers Resolution’s Section 4a(1). With that, it asserted its constitutional role, since this section triggers the WPR’s 60 days deadline. Thus the resolution, which was not passed in the Senate, can be seen as a critique against the president. |
| Haiti93-00 | 0.75 | S. 1059 (1999) | Minority critique: House and Senate passed binding legislation, which prohibited the use of funding after March 2000. However, US troops were withdrawn from Haiti by the end of January 2000 (see Weed, 2017, p.36). Therefore, this legislation cannot be seen as a binding restriction but rather as a symbolic measure to signal congressional assertiveness. |
| Iraq02 | 0.25 | H.J.Res. 114 (2002) | Supportive legislation: The binding legislation “(a)uthorizes the President to use the U.S. armed forces to: (1) defend U.S. national security against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” (P.L. 107-243) |
| Iraq07 | 1 | H.R. 1591 (2007) | Restrictive Legislation: H.R.1591 included binding restrictions to President Bush’s Iraq policies. While the budget resolution passed both House and Senate, the president vetoed the bill and Congress failed to override the veto. |
| Iraq91 | 0.25 | H.J.Res. 77/ S.J.Res 2 (1991) | Supportive legislation: Both Senate and House passed an “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution” (P.L. 102-1) to provide binding legislation supporting the use of armed forces. |
| Iraq92-03 | 0 | no legislation | Passivity: There is no specific legislation concerning the authorization of the air strikes. Weed (2017, p.24) notes, “Congress endorsed the view that further specific authorization was not required for U.S. military action to maintain the cease-fire agreement.” |
| ISIS14-17 | 0.25 | H.R. 3979 (2014) | Supportive legislation: The budget bill H.R. 3979 included funding for operations to counter ISIS and provided political support for the ongoing operations. |
| Kosovo99 | 0.75 | S.Con.Res. 21 (1999) | Minority Critique: S.Con.Res.21 provided a concurrent resolution authorizing the president to conduct air strikes against Serbia. The resolution passed the Senate, but failed to reach a majority in the House, thus signaling the critique against the mission within the House. |
| Lebanon82-84 | 1 | H.J.Res. 364 (1983) | Restrictive legislation: Congress and the president agreed on a compromise in September 1983 that US armed forces would remain in Lebanon for additional 18 month. With that, Reagan accepted a limitation of his presidential authority regarding the military intervention (see Weed, 2017, p.13). |
| Libya11 | 0.75 | H.Res. 292 (2011) | Minority Critique: H.Res.292 was a non-binding measure, which passed the House. It held that the president “shall not deploy, establish, or maintain the presence of units and members of the United States Armed Forces on the ground in Libya, and for other purposes.” |
| Libya86 | 0 | no legislation | Passivity: There was no specific legislation concerning the authorization of the air strikes (see Weed, 2017, p.14). |
| Nicaragua83-90 | 1 | S.1160 (1985) | Restrictive legislation: S.1160 – H.J.Res. 631 prohibited the use of funds for military operations against Nicaragua (see Weed, 2017, p.12). The amendment was part of binding budget legislation. |
| Panama89 | 0.25 | H.Con.Res. 262 (1990) | Supportive legislation: H.Con.Res. 262 provided ex-post legitimization for the intervention, which was conducted essentially within the 60 days deadline of the War Powers Resolution (see Weed, 2017, p.18). |
| Somalia93-95 | 1 | H.R.3116 (1993) | Restrictive legislation: H.R. 3116 provided to cut-off funds for US military operations in Somalia to ensure the withdrawal of US forces by March 31, 1994 (see Weed, 2017, p.26). |

B. XY-Plots of solution terms



Figure 1. XY-plot of intermediate solution for congressional assertiveness (nothreat\*divgov+nothreat\*casualties\*discontent)



Figure 2. XY-plot of intermediate solution for the absence of congressional assertiveness (~nothreat\*~divgov+~nothreat\*~discontent)

C. Robustness check

To test the robustness of the analysis, we analyze the effect of three alternative calibrations for the conditions of casualties and divided government.

This part of the appendix compares the calibrations (table 4), documents the results of necessity and sufficiency analyses with the two alternative calibration resulting in four different variants (tables 5-14), summarizes (table 15) and interprets the findings vis-à-vis the original calibration.

Table 4. Calibration of fuzzy-set values main analysis vs. robustness check

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Original calibration for main analysis | Alternative calibration for robustness check |
| **casualties** | **casualties2** |
| More than 100 | (1) | More than 1000 | (1) |
| More than 10 | (0,75) | More than 100 | (0,75) |
| Minor casualties: 1-10 | (0.25) | 10-100 | (0.25) |
| No casualties: 0 | (0) | Minor casualties 1-10 | (0) |
|  | **casualties3** |  |
| More than 10 | (1) |
| 1-10 | (0,75) |
| 0 casualties | (0) |
| **divgov** | **divgov2** |
| Divided Government | (1) | Divided Government | (1) |
| Partially Divided Government | (0.75) | Partially Divided Governmentwith less than 50% PPP | (0.75) |
| Unified Government with less than 58% PPP  | (0.25) | Partially Divided Government with more than 50% PPP | (0.25) |
| Unified Government with more than 58% PPP | (0) | Unified Government | (0) |

Table 5. Analysis of necessary conditions for congressional assertiveness (assertiveness) and the absence of assertiveness (non-assertiveness) with alternative calibration (casualties2)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **assertiveness** | **non-assertiveness** |
| Consistency | RoN | Coverage | Consistency | RoN | Coverage |
| discontent | 0.73 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 0.44 | 0.68 | 0.47 |
| ~discontent | 0.49 | 0.62 | 0.45 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 0.75 |
| casualties2 | 0.40 | 0.80 | 0.56 | 0.38 | 0.80 | 0.56 |
| ~casualties2 | 0.68 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.69 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
| divgov | 0.84 | 0.51 | 0.58 | 0.72 | 0.48 | 0.53 |
| ~divgov | 0.32 | 0.83 | 0.52 | 0.44 | 0.90 | 0.74 |
| nothreat | 0.78 | 0.89 | 0.85 | 0.28 | 0.65 | 0.32 |
| ~nothreat | 0.38 | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.81 |

Table 6. Solution terms for analysis of sufficiency with alternative calibration (casualties2)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Conservative solution  | ~casualties2\*divgov\*nothreat + discontent\*~casualties2\*nothreat + discontent\*divgov\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.87, PRI 0.83, cov.r 0.73)~discontent\*~casualties2\*~nothreat +~discontent\*divgov\*~nothreat +discontent\*casualties2\*~divgov\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.93, PRI 0.91, cov.r 0.74) |
| Parsimonious solution | nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.85, PRI 0.81, cov.r 0.78)M1: ~discontent\*~nothreat + ~divgov\*~nothreat 🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.91, PRI 0.87, cov.r 0.74)M2: ~discontent\*~nothreat + casualties2\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.85, PRI 0.80, cov.r 0.74) |
| Intermediate solution | discontent\*nothreat +divgov\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.87, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.76)M1: ~discontent\*~nothreat +~divgov\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.91, PRI 0.87, cov.r 0.74)M2: ~discontent\*~nothreat +casualties2\*~divgov\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.91, PRI 0.87, cov.r 0.74) |

Table 7. Analysis of necessary conditions for congressional assertiveness (assertiveness) and the absence of assertiveness (non-assertiveness) with alternative calibration (divgov2)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **assertiveness** | **non-assertiveness** |
| Consistency | RoN | Coverage | Consistency | RoN | Coverage |
| discontent | 0.73 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 0.44 | 0.68 | 0.47 |
| ~discontent | 0.49 | 0.62 | 0.45 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 0.75 |
| casualties | 0.70 | 0.62 | 0.58 | 0.64 | 0.61 | 0.56 |
| ~casualties | 0.46 | 0.76 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.80 | 0.64 |
| divgov2 | 0.81 | 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.54 | 0.47 |
| ~divgov2 | 0.32 | 0.73 | 0.41 | 0.56 | 0.87 | 0.76 |
| nothreat | 0.78 | 0.89 | 0.85 | 0.28 | 0.65 | 0.32 |
| ~nothreat | 0.38 | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.81 |

Table 8. Solution terms for analysis of sufficiency with alternative calibration (divgov2)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Conservative solution  | divgov2\*nothreat +discontent\*casualties\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.87, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.76)~discontent\*~nothreat +casualties\*~divgov2\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (inlc. 0.88, PRI 0.83, cov.r 0.74) |
| Parsimonious solution | nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.85, PRI 0.81, cov.r 0.78)~divgov2\*~nothreat~discontent\*~nothreat +🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.77) |
| Intermediate solution | divgov2\*nothreat +discontent\*casualties\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.87, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.76)~divgov2\*~nothreat +~discontent\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.77) |

Table 9. Analysis of necessary conditions for congressional assertiveness (assertiveness) and the absence of assertiveness (non-assertiveness) with alternative calibration (divgov2 and casualties2)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **assertiveness** | **non-assertiveness** |
| Consistency | RoN | Coverage | Consistency | RoN | Coverage |
| discontent | 0.73 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 0.44 | 0.68 | 0.47 |
| ~discontent | 0.49 | 0.62 | 0.45 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 0.75 |
| casualties2 | 0.40 | 0.80 | 0.56 | 0.38 | 0.80 | 0.56 |
| ~casualties2 | 0.68 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.69 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
| divgov2 | 0.81 | 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.54 | 0.47 |
| ~divgov2 | 0.32 | 0.73 | 0.41 | 0.56 | 0.87 | 0.76 |
| nothreat | 0.78 | 0.89 | 0.85 | 0.28 | 0.65 | 0.32 |
| ~nothreat | 0.38 | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.81 |

Table 10. Solution terms for analysis of sufficiency with alternative calibration (divgov2 and casualties2)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Conservative solution  | ~casualties2\*divgov2\*nothreat + discontent\*~casualties2\*nothreat + discontent\*divgov2\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.87, PRI 0.83, cov.r 0.73)~discontent\*~nothreat +casualties2\*~divgov2\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.83, cov.r 0.74) |
| Parsimonious solution | nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.85, PRI 0.81, cov.r 0.78)M1: ~discontent\*~nothreat + ~divgov2\*~nothreat 🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.77)M2: ~discontent\*~nothreat + casualties2\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.85, PRI 0.80, cov.r 0.74) |
| Intermediate solution | discontent\*nothreat +divgov2\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.87, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.76)M1: ~discontent\*~nothreat +~divgov2\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.77)M2: ~discontent\*~nothreat +casualties2\*~divgov2\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.83, cov.r 0.74) |

Table 11. Analysis of necessary conditions for congressional assertiveness (assertiveness) and the absence of assertiveness (non-assertiveness) with alternative calibration (casualties3)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **assertiveness** | **non-assertiveness** |
| Consistency | RoN | Coverage | Consistency | RoN | Coverage |
| discontent | 0.73 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 0.44 | 0.68 | 0.47 |
| ~discontent | 0.49 | 0.62 | 0.45 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 0.75 |
| casualties3 | 0.92 | 0.33 | 0.55 | 0.82 | 0.32 | 0.52 |
| ~casualties3 | 0.19 | 0.89 | 0.50 | 0.28 | 0.95 | 0.79 |
| divgov | 0.84 | 0.51 | 0.58 | 0.72 | 0.48 | 0.53 |
| ~divgov | 0.32 | 0.83 | 0.52 | 0.44 | 0.90 | 0.74 |
| nothreat | 0.78 | 0.89 | 0.85 | 0.28 | 0.65 | 0.32 |
| ~nothreat | 0.38 | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.81 |

Table 12. Solution terms for analysis of sufficiency with alternative calibration (casualties3)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Conservative solution  | ~discontent\*divgov\*nothreat+discontent\*casualties3\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.90, PRI 0.87, cov.r 0.76)~discontent\*casualties3\*~nothreat +~discontent\*~divgov\*~nothreat +casualties3\*~divgov\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.91, PRI 0.87, cov.r 0.74) |
| Parsimonious solution | nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.85, PRI 0.81, cov.r 0.78)~discontent\*~nothreat+~divgov\*~nothreat 🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.91, PRI 0.87, cov.r 0.74) |
| Intermediate solution | discontent\*casualties3\*nothreat +divgov\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.87, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.76)~discontent\*~nothreat +~divgov\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.91, PRI 0.87, cov.r 0.74) |

Table 13. Analysis of necessary conditions for congressional assertiveness (assertiveness) and the absence of assertiveness (non-assertiveness) with alternative calibration (casualties3 and divgov2)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **assertiveness** | **non-assertiveness** |
| Consistency | RoN | Coverage | Consistency | RoN | Coverage |
| discontent | 0.73 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 0.44 | 0.68 | 0.47 |
| ~discontent | 0.49 | 0.62 | 0.45 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 0.75 |
| casualties3 | 0.92 | 0.33 | 0.55 | 0.82 | 0.32 | 0.52 |
| ~casualties3 | 0.19 | 0.90 | 0.50 | 0.28 | 0.95 | 0.79 |
| divgov2 | 0.81 | 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.54 | 0.47 |
| ~divgov2 | 0.32 | 0.73 | 0.41 | 0.56 | 0.87 | 0.76 |
| nothreat | 0.78 | 0.84 | 0.85 | 0.28 | 0.65 | 0.32 |
| ~nothreat | 0.38 | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.81 |

Table 14. Solution terms for analysis of sufficiency with alternative calibration (casualties3 and divgov2)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Conservative solution  | ~discontent\*divgov2\*nothreat+discontent\*casualties3\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.90, PRI 0.87, cov.r 0.76)~discontent\*casualties3\*~nothreat +~discontent\*~divgov2\*~nothreat +casualties3\*~divgov2\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.83, cov.r 0.74) |
| Parsimonious solution | nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.85, PRI 0.81, cov.r 0.78)~discontent\*~nothreat+~divgov2\*~nothreat 🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.77) |
| Intermediate solution | discontent\*casualties3\*nothreat +divgov2\*nothreat🡪assertiveness (incl. 0.87, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.76)~discontent\*~nothreat +~divgov2\*~nothreat🡪non-assertiveness (incl. 0.88, PRI 0.84, cov.r 0.77) |

Table 15. Comparison of solution terms (intermediate solution)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Solution term | incl. | PRI | cov.r |  |
| Outcome assertiveness | original calibration | nothreat\*divgov+nothreat\*casualties\*discontent | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.76 | #1 |
| alternative calibration (casualties2) | nothreat\*divgov+ nothreat\*discontent | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.76 | #2 |
| alternative calibration (divgov2) | nothreat\*divgov2+nothreat\*casualties\*discontent | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.76 | #3 |
| alternative calibration (casualties2, divgov2) | nothreat\*divgov2+nothreat\*discontent | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.76 | #4 |
| alternative calibration (casualties3) | nothreat\*divgov+ nothreat\*casualties3\*discontent | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.76 | #5 |
| alternative calibration (casualties3, divgov2) | nothreat\*divgov2+nothreat\*casualties3\*discontent | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.76 | #6 |
| Outcome non-assertiveness | original calibration | ~nothreat\*~divgov+ ~nothreat\*~discontent | 0.91 | 0.87 | 0.74 | #7 |
| alternative calibration (casualties2) | ~nothreat\*~divgov+ ~nothreat\*~discontent  | 0.91 | 0.87 | 0.74 | #8 |
| ~nothreat\*~divgov\*casualties2+~nothreat\*~discontent | 0.91 | 0.87 | 0.74 | #9 |
| alternative calibration (divgov2) | ~nothreat\*~divgov2+ ~nothreat\*~discontent | 0.88 | 0.84 | 0.77 | #10 |
| alternative calibration (casualties2, divgov2) | ~nothreat\*~divgov2+~nothreat\*~discontent | 0.88 | 0.84 | 0.77 | #11 |
| ~nothreat\*~divgov2\*casualties2+~nothreat\*~discontent | 0.88 | 0.83 | 0.74 | #12 |
| alternative calibration (casualties3) | ~nothreat\*~divgov+~nothreat\*~discontent | 0.91 | 0.87 | 0.74 | #13 |
| alternative calibration (casualties3, divgov2) | ~nothreat\*~divgov2+~nothreat\*~discontent | 0.88 | 0.84 | 0.77 | #14 |

Interpretation of robustness check:

The interpretation of the robustness check focuses on the intermediate solution, which forms the basis of analysis in the manuscript.

The alternative calibration of the condition “divided government” does change neither the solutions for congressional assertiveness nor the solution for the absence of assertiveness (#3, #10).

If the 0.5 threshold for casualties is increased from 10 to 100, the solution for assertiveness does not include the condition of casualties anymore (#2, #4). While the first solution term remains unchanged, the second solution term (nothreat\*discontent) now includes the cases Somalia93-95, Bosnia93-00, Haiti93-00, Iraq07, and Lebanon82-84. In view of previous studies on the interventions in Somalia, Iraq, and Lebanon, it seems unlikely that the role of casualties was not an important factor for the response of Congress (see Kriner, 2010, p.193-232; Kriner and Shen, 2014). Even though the absolute number of casualties during the Somalia intervention was relatively low (43 casualties), congressional debates in the aftermath of the “Blackhawk down” incident were influenced by the death of US soldiers (see for example Hendrickson, 2002, p.34).

If the 0.5 threshold for casualties is decreased from 10 to 1 (#5, #6), the solution for assertiveness does not change. However, “casualties3” then becomes a trivial necessary condition. The calibration is also skewed as most cases are then in the set “casualties3”.

Analyzing the outcome of non-assertiveness, the solution terms remain also quite stable (#8, #10, #11, #13, #14). However, the intermediate solution also presents a solution term that combines ~nothreat\*~divgov\*casualties2 (#9, #12).[[2]](#footnote-2) This solution term includes the case of Afghanistan09. This would mean that the high number of casualties contributed together with the other factors (unified government and a clear threat to security interests) to an absence of congressional assertiveness. This however seems rather implausible given the strong theoretical expectation that casualties spark congressional critique.

Thus, while changing the calibration affects the solution terms, the robustness check with alternative calibrations for “casualties” and “divided government” indicate that the original calibrations are well suited for the analysis. This assessment is based on case-specific knowledge and firm theoretical expectations.

D. Case Selection

The case selection employed four sweeps:

*1. Research period*

All instances of US troop deployments abroad from November 1973 (WPR) to January 2017 (end of Obama’s term) were reviewed (based on the comprehensive list of presidential reports on the use of force (compiled by the Congressional Research Service, see Torreon, 2017).

*2. Hostilities*

From the resulting 220 troop deployments, 109 instances involving hostilities were selected.

*3. Exclusion of incidental use of force*

From those 109 cases, we excluded eight instances of incidental use of force (Libya 1981, 1989; Afghanistan/Sudan 1998; Kuwait Tanker Escort), hostage rescue situations (Mayaguez Incident 1975, Iranian Hostage Crisis), and anti-drug missions (Bolivia 1986; Andean Initiative 1989).

*4. Clustering of missions*

The resulting 101 reports can be clustered in 19 individual cases (merging repeated mentioning of ongoing missions) (see the full list of reports below). For the cases of Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-2011), we included two reference points for each war resulting in four fsQCA cases. This differentiation was based on two arguments: First, to account for the altering nature of the interventions. Second, since our research question aims at identifying conditions of congressional deference and assertiveness, changing legislative positioning, as in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, needed to be taken into account.

Table 16. List of missions as mentioned in presidential reports (see Torreon, 2017)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Case for Analysis | Hostilities(yes=1; no=0) | Year | Country of Troop Deployment | Mission as described in presidential report |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2001 | Afghanistan  | Intervention in response to 9/11 |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2001 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2002 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2003 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2004 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2005 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2006 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2006 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2007 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2008 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01** | 1 | 2008 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan01; Iraq02** | 1 | 2005 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
|  **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2009 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2009 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2010 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2010 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2011 | Terrorism | Counterterrorism operation |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2011 | Terrorism | Counterterrorism operation |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2011 | Terrorism | Counterterrorism operation |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2012 | Terrorism | Counterterrorism operation |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2012 | Terrorism | Counterterrorism operation |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2013 | Afghanistan | Antiterrorism |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2013 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2013 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2013 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2013 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2016 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2016 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2016 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2017 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2017 | Afghanistan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1993 | Bosnia | No-fly zone |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1995 | Bosnia | No-fly zone |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1995 | Bosnia | Air strikes |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1995 | Bosnia | air strikes |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1995 | Bosnia | Deployment of peacekeepers |
|  **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1995 | Bosnia  | Deployment of peacekeepers |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1996 | Bosnia | IFOR deployment |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1996 | Bosnia | SFOR deployment |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1997 | Bosnia | SFOR deployment |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1997 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1999 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 1999 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 2000 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
| **Bosnia93-00** | 1 | 2000 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
| **Bosnia93-95**  | 1 | 1994 | Bosnia | Expansion of peacekeeping mission  |
| **Bosnia93-95**  | 1 | 1994 | Bosnia | No-fly zone |
| **Bosnia93-95**  | 1 | 1994 | Bosnia | No-fly zone |
| **Bosnia93-95**  | 1 | 1994 | Bosnia | No-fly zone |
| **Bosnia93-95**  | 1 | 1994 | Bosnia | Air strikes against Serbian bases |
| **Dronewar09-17** | 1 | 2013 | Jordan | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **Dronewar09-17** | 1 | 2013 | Niger | Antiterrorism |
| **Dronewar09-17** | 1 | 2013 | Terrorism/ Afghanistan/ Somalia/ Yemen/ Central Africa  | Antiterrorism |
| **Dronewar09-17** | 1 | 2015 | Cameroon | Antiterrorism |
| **Dronewar09-17** | 1 | 2016 | Yemen | Antiterrorism |
| **ElSalvador81-83** | 1 | 1981 | ElSalvador | Military adviser mission |
| **Grenada 83** | 1 | 1983 | Grenada | Invasion of Grenada |
| **Haiti93-00** | 1 | 1994 | Haiti | Enforcement of UN embargo |
| **Haiti93-00** | 1 | 1994 | Haiti | Regime-change operation |
| **Haiti93-00** | 1 | 1995 | Haiti | Regime-change operation |
| **Haiti93-00** | 1 | 1995 | Haiti | Regime-change operation |
| **Haiti93-00** | 1 | 1996 | Haiti | Begin of phased reduction of forces |
| **Iraq02** | 1 | 2002 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Iraq02** | 1 | 2003 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Iraq07** | 1 | 2007 | Terrorism | Prevention of terrorism (Global War on Terror) |
| **Iraq91** | 1 | 1991 | Iraq | First Gulf War |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1992 | Iraq | No-fly zone |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1993 | Iraq | No-fly zone |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1993 | Iraq | No-fly zone |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1993 | Iraq | Air strikes against anti-aircraft sites |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1993 | Iraq | Air strikes |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1993 | Iraq | Air strikes against anti-aircraft sites |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1998 | Iraq | Air strikes |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 2001 | Iraq | No-fly zone |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1998-1999 | Iraq | No-fly zone |
| **Iraq92-03** | 1 | 1999-2000 | Iraq | No-fly zone |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2014 | Iraq | Anti ISIS operation |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2014 | Iraq | Anti ISIS operation |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2014 | Iraq | Military advisers mission |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2014 | Iraq | Military advisers mission |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2014 | Iraq  | Military adviser mission (ISIS) |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2015 | Iraq | Military advisers mission |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2015 | Iraq/Afghanistan/Middle East | Continuation of ongoing operations |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2016 | Iraq | Anti ISIS operation |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2016 | Iraq | Anti ISIS operation |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2017 | Iraq | Anti ISIS operation |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2017 | Iraq/Kuwait | Anti ISIS operation |
| **ISIS14-17** | 1 | 2017 | Syria | Anti ISIS operation |
| **ISIS14-17; Afghanistan09** | 1 | 2016 | Afghanistan/Iraq/Syria/Turkey/Somalia/Djibouti/Libya/Central Africa/Egypt/Jordan/Kosovo | Antiterrorism |
| **Kosovo99** | 1 | 1999 | Kosovo | Air strikes against Serbia |
| **Kosovo99** | 1 | 1999 | Kosovo | Air strikes against Serbia from deployment in Albania |
| **Kosovo99** | 1 | 1999 | Kosovo | Air strikes and additional humanitarian operations |
| **Kosovo99** | 1 | 1999 | Kosovo | Additional deployments |
| **Lebanon 82-84** | 1 | 1982 | Lebanon | Lebanon peacekeeping mission |
| **Lebanon 82-84** | 1 | 1982-1983 | Lebanon | Lebanon peacekeeping mission |
| **Libya11** | 1 | 2011 | Libya | Humanitarian intervention |
| **Libya86** | 1 | 1986 | Libya | Air strikes |
| **Nicaragua83-89** | 1 | 1983-1989 | Honduras | Exercises and hostilities with Nicaragua |
| **Panama89** | 1 | 1989-1990 | Panama | Regime-change operation |
| **Somalia93-95** | 1 | 1993 | Somalia | Humanitarian intervention |
| **Somalia93-95** | 1 | 1995 | Somalia | Humanitarian intervention |
| emergency | 1 | 1975 | Mayaguez incident | Merchant vessel rescue |
| emergency | 1 | 1980 | Iran | Iranian hostage crisis |
| incidental | 1 | 1981 | Libya | Shot down of Libyan jets |
| **incidental** | 1 | 1989 | Libya  | Shot down of Libyan jets |
| incidental | 1 | 1998 | Afghanistan-Sudan | Air strikes  |
| incidental | 1 | 1987-1988 | Persian Gulf | Kuwaiti tanker reflagging and escorting |
| non-military | 1 | 1986 | Bolivia | Anti-drug operation |
| non-military | 1 | 1989 | Andean Initiative | Anti-drug operation |
|  | 0 | 1974 | Cyprus | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1975 | Vietnam/Cambodia | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1976 | Korea | Reinforcement of Forces in Korea |
|  | 0 | 1976 | Lebanon | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1978 | Zaire | Logistical support to Belgian and French troops |
|  | 0 | 1982 | Sinai | Deployment of observers |
|  | 0 | 1983 | Chad | Logistical support for Chad in operation against Libyan rebels |
|  | 0 | 1983 | Egypt | AWACS deployment |
|  | 0 | 1984 | Persian Gulf | AWACS deployment |
|  | 0 | 1985 | Italy | Intercept of Egyptian airliner |
|  | 0 | 1988 | Panama | Troop increase |
|  | 0 | 1989 | Panama | Troop increase |
|  | 0 | 1989 | Philippines | Assistance in anti-rebel operation |
|  | 0 | 1990 | Liberia | Reinforcement of US embassy and evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1990 | Saudi-Arabia | Deployment of troops |
|  | 0 | 1991 | Iraq | Emergency relief operation for Iraqi Kurds |
|  | 0 | 1991 | Zaire | Logistical support for Belgian and French troops |
|  | 0 | 1992 | Kuwait | Military exercises |
|  | 0 | 1992 | Sierra Leone | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1992 | Somalia | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 1993 | Bosnia | Airdrop and supply relief |
|  | 0 | 1993 | Macedonia | Deployment of peacekeepers |
|  | 0 | 1994 | Haiti | Enforcement of UN embargo |
|  | 0 | 1994 | Macedonia | Deployment of peacekeepers |
|  | 0 | 1994 | Macedonia | Deployment of peacekeepers |
|  | 0 | 1994 | Rwanda | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1996 | Central African Republic | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1996 | Liberia | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1996 | Liberia | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1996 | Rwanda-Zaire | Support of humanitarian operation |
|  | 0 | 1997 | Albania | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1997 | Cambodia | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1997 | Congo-Gabon | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1997 | Sierra Leone | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1998 | Albania | Reinforcement of US embassy |
|  | 0 | 1998 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
|  | 0 | 1998 | Guinea-Bissau | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1998 | Kenya-Tanzania | Disaster assistance |
|  | 0 | 1998 | Liberia | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 1999 | East-Timor | Logistical support mission for UN peacekeeping |
|  | 0 | 1999 | Kenya | Embassy reinforcement |
|  | 0 | 1999 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2000 | East-Timor | Deployment of small number of military personnel for humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2000 | East-Timor | military observer mission |
|  | 0 | 2000 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2000 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2000 | Sierra Leone | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 2000 | Yemen | assistance in the wake of attack against USS Cole |
|  | 0 | 2001 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
|  | 0 | 2001 | East-Timor | military observer mission |
|  | 0 | 2001 | East-Timor | military observer mission |
|  | 0 | 2001 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2001 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2002 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
|  | 0 | 2002 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
|  | 0 | 2002 | Cote d'Ivoire | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 2002 | East-Timor | military observer mission |
|  | 0 | 2002 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2002 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2003 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
|  | 0 | 2003 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
|  | 0 | 2003 | Iraq | Deployment of troops |
|  | 0 | 2003 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2003 | Kosovo | KFOR deployment |
|  | 0 | 2003 | Liberia | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 2003 | Liberia | Provision of humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2004 | Bosnia | Continuation peacekeeping mission |
|  | 0 | 2004 | Haiti | Reinforcement of embassy |
|  | 0 | 2004 | Haiti | Deployment of peacekeepers |
|  | 0 | 2006 | Lebanon | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 2012 | Libya/Yemen | Reinforcement of embassy personnel and protection of US civilians |
|  | 0 | 2012 | Philippines | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2013 | Burundi/Central African Republic | Logistical support for French military |
|  | 0 | 2013 | Jordan | Military exercises |
|  | 0 | 2013 | Philippines | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2013 | South Sudan | Evacuation |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Iraq | Reinforcement of embassy security |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Liberia | Ebola relief mission |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Liberia/Senegal | Ebola relief mission |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Lithuania | Deployment in the wake of Operation Atlantic Resolve |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Poland | Deployment in the wake of European Reassurance Initiative |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Senegal | Ebola relief mission |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Senegal/Liberia | Ebola relief mission |
|  | 0 | 2014 | South Korea | Reinforcement of troops |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Uganda/South Sudan/Democratic Republic of Congo/Central African Republic | logistical support for local anti-terror mission |
|  | 0 | 2014 | Ukraine | Specialist investigating downing of MH17 |
|  | 0 | 2015 | Liberia/Senegal | Ebola relief mission |
|  | 0 | 2015 | South Korea | Reinforcement of troops |
|  | 0 | 2016 | Haiti | Hurricane relief |
|  | 0 | 2016 | South Sudan | Reinforcement of embassy security |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Afghanistan/Syria/Africa | Military advisers mission |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Caribbean | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Dominica | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Egypt | Multinational observers mission |
|  | 0 | 2017 | England | Deployment of deterrence forces in support of NATO |
|  | 0 | 2017 | England | Deployment of deterrence forces in support of NATO |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Europe | Deployment of deterrence forces for support of NATO |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Germany | Deployment of deterrence forces in support of NATO |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Germany | Deployment of deterrence forces in support of NATO |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Germany | Deployment of deterrence forces in support of NATO |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Greece | Deployment of deterrence forces in support of NATO |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Guatemala | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Honduras | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Korea | Reinforcement of troops |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Peru | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Romania | Deployment of deterrence forces in support of NATO |
|  | 0 | 2017 | South Korea | Deployment of antimissile units |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Southwest Asia | unknown mission |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Sri Lanka | Humanitarian assistance |
|  | 0 | 2017 | Uruguay | Humanitarian assistance |
| **Sum troop deployments 1974-2017** | **220** |  |
| **Troop deployments with hostilities** | **109** |  |

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1. Sources for raw data: congress: selected key legislation (see Table 3); discontent: average approval rates, see for Somalia93-95: Klarevas (2000. p.532f.), Iraq02 and Iraq07: Gallup (2013), Kosovo99 and Libya11: Polling Report (2016), ISIS14-17: Pew (2017), Dronewar14-15: Pew (2014), Afghanistan09: CNN (2010), all other see Eichenberg (2005); casualties: ElSalvador81-83: Graham (1996), Nicaragua83-90: UScontrawar.com (2016), Libya86: Ball (2012), Iraq92-03: GlobalSecurity.org (2016), Bosnia94-00: Hedges (1996), Kosovo99: BBC (1999), all others: Department of Defense (2016); divgov: UG=unified government, DG=divided government, PDG=partially divided government (opposition party in control of one chamber), in brackets: PPP= Presidential Party Power, reference point for PPP: year of key decision or in absence of decision begin of conflict, source for party composition of Congress: Senate.gov (2016), House.gov (2016); nothreat: see literature in table. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Multiple valid solution terms are due to multiple, redundant prime implicants of the parsimonious solution. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)