**Appendix B. Core Organizations in the Koch Political Network**

***Ideas***

**CATO INSTITUTE** (1977—): Libertarian think tank.

**MERCATUS CENTER** (1980 –): Based at George Mason University to sponsor libertarian research and education.

**CHARLES G. KOCH FOUNDATION** (1980 –): Funds research and educational endeavors.

***Policy Advocacy***

**CITIZENS FOR A SOUND ECONOMY** (1984-2004): Lobbying and public advocacy.

**60 PLUS ASSOCIATION** (1992 –): Advocacy group promoting Social Security privatization, free-market health programs for seniors.

**AMERICAN ENERGY ALLIANCE** (2008 –): Advocacy group opposing cap and trade, promoting Keystone, carbon fuels.

**CENTER TO PROTECT PATIENT RIGHTS/ AMERICAN ENCORE** (2009 –): Advocacy against ObamaCare, health programs; later a general political funding conduit.

***Donor Coordination***

**KOCH SEMINARS** (2003 –): Twice-yearly gathering of donors who support Koch strategies.

**FREEDOM PARTNERS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE** (2011 –): Raises and directs political funding; now runs Koch seminars.

***Constituency Mobilization – for both policy battles and elections***

**AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY/ AFP FOUNDATION** (2004 –): Cadre-led federation for advocacy/elections/constituency mobilization.

**GENERATION OPPORTUNITY** (2011 –): Promotes libertarian policies to young people; runs issue ads.

**LIBRE INITIATIVE** (2011 –): Does civic and voter outreach in Latino communities; runs issue ads.

**CONCERNED VETERANS FOR AMERICA** (2012 –): Does constituency outreach and promotes privatization of veterans’ programs.

***Utilities***

**THEMIS/ i360** (2010 –): Non-profit and for-profit voter data bank and vendor.

**AEGIS STRATEGIC** (2013 –): consulting firm to find and advise pro-free market GOP candidates.

**Appendix C: Public Opinion, AFP Advocacy, and 2011 Retrenchment of Public Sector Union Bargaining Rights**

To analyze the role of public opinion and Koch network advocacy in the 2011 efforts to restrict public sector union bargaining rights, we proceeded in three steps. First, we estimated state-by-state public attitudes towards collective bargaining in the public sector using multi-level regression and post-stratification (MRP). MRP has been successfully applied to studies estimating a range of state policy attitudes, including gay rights and support for health reform (Kastellec et al. 2010).

To do this, we searched the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research database for nationally representative surveys that included at least one question about respondents’ attitudes towards the right of public sector workers to collectively bargain with state governments. In all, we identified four such surveys fielded on nationally representative samples of adult Americans between February and March of 2011. There were 4,007 valid responses to public sector union questions in the merged dataset. The surveys and questions are summarized in the table below. The main variable of interest is a binary indicator if a survey respondent expressed a desire to eliminate the right of public sector labor unions to bargain collectively with state governments.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Date** | **Survey** | **Size** | **Question Text** |
| Feb-11 | NBC/WSJ | 1,000 | Support for: Eliminate public employees' right to collectively bargain over health care, pensions and other benefits when negotiating a union contract. |
| Feb-11 | CBS/NYT | 984 | Do you favor or oppose taking away some of the collective bargaining rights of these unions? (If Favor/Oppose, ask:) Do you favor/oppose that strongly or somewhat? |
| Feb-11 | Gallup/USA | 1,000 | As you may know, one way the legislature in Wisconsin is seeking to reduce its budget deficit is by passing a bill that would take away some of the collective bargaining rights of most public unions, including the state teachers' union. Would you favor or oppose such a bill in your state? |
| Mar-11 | Gallup | 1,027 | As you may know, Wisconsin and other states have been in the news because of disputes between the governors and state employee labor unions over collective bargaining policies and the state’s budget. In states where there are such disputes, would you say you agree more with? |

Pooling the four polls together, we then modeled public opinion about public sector labor unions as a function of various individual and state level characteristics. We then weighted each type of respondent (varying across the individual and state predictors) by the known shares of each respondent type from Census data.

For the individual model we estimated public sector union attitudes as a function of respondent income, education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, race, age, sex, union membership, state, and state-by-income groups. We also included Obama’s 2008 vote share and public union density as state-level predictors. The table below shows the first-stage regression results, fitted in R with lmer. The proportion of adults supporting restricting the ability of public sector unions to bargain with the state ranged from 31% to 46%, with a median and mean of 40%.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Random Effects** | |  |
|  | **Variance** | **Std. Dev.** |
| Income State Groups | 0.0000 | 0.0001 |
| State | 0.01 | 0.11 |
| Region | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Age Race Groups | 0.12 | 0.35 |
| Income | 0.17 | 0.41 |
| Education | 0.01 | 0.11 |
| Race | 0.18 | 0.43 |
| Hispanic | 0.02 | 0.15 |
| Age | 0.04 | 0.21 |
| Sex | 0.08 | 0.28 |
| Union | 0.37 | 0.61 |
| **Fixed Effects** | |  |
|  | **Estimate** | **Std. Error** |
| Obama 2008 Vote Share | -0.025 | 0.009 |
| Public Union Density | 0.007 | 0.004 |

With these state-level predictions of public attitudes in hand, we then correlated state-level attitudes towards public sector collective bargaining in 2011 with actual legislative activity on this issue. In all, fifteen state legislatures passed measures to restrict the ability of public sector unions to bargain and organize, according to data from the National Conference of State Legislatures.

We found that the strength of AFP state organizations was a much better predictor of actual legislative activity restricting public sector union bargaining rights than did public opinion – or even other economic state characteristics. In the logistic regressions presented below, we show that the presence of an AFP paid state director is highly correlated with restrictions to public sector bargaining in 2011, even with the addition of other political and economic factors.

Note that all models restrict analysis to states where public sector bargaining was not already limited at the start of 2011.

Regardless of the specification, AFP strength was highly related to public sector union restrictions. Apart from that factor, Democratic control of veto points was also related to public sector union restrictions; states with greater Republican control were more likely to enact restrictions than states under Democratic control. The predicted probability results reported in the main text come from Model 2.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** |
| Paid AFP State Director | 1.65\*\* | 1.84\*\* |
|  | (0.74) | (0.90) |
| Dem. Veto Points (0-3) |  | -0.95\*\* |
|  |  | (0.39) |
| Union Density |  | 0.05 |
|  |  | (0.09) |
| Unemployment Rate |  | -0.08 |
|  |  | (0.25) |
| Public Opinion |  | -0.15 |
|  |  | (0.21) |
|  |  |  |
| N | 45 | 44 |
| Adjusted R-Squared | 0.10 | 0.25 |

*Notes*: Logistic regression results. Significance levels: \*\*\* *p*<0.01, \*\* *p*<0.05, \* *p*<0.10. Model 2 excludes non-partisan Nebraska legislature.