

## POLITICAL THEORY

**Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for Richard J. Bernstein.** Edited by Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 400p. \$80.00 cloth, \$32.00 paper.

— Steven M. DeLue, *Miami University*

This festschrift for Richard J. Bernstein succeeds in celebrating his career, not only through the editors' insightful introduction and the excellent biographical essay by Judith Friedlander but also through 13 significant essays and an excerpt from Shoshana Yovel's novel that speaks with keen philosophical insight on radical evil. As the editors say, one of the distinctive contributions of Bernstein to philosophy is a view of social critique that encompasses normative as well as empirical and interpretive dimensions and that employs a form of pragmatic reason both dialogical in nature and political in its implications (p. xiii). The contributors draw upon Bernstein's approach to salvage what Jerome Kohn, in his fine essay based on Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, understands to be a "common world" that is "fit for human habitation" (pp. 270–74). The latter is the location for self-creation and for the freedom that sustains it. Nonetheless, self-creation is threatened by the totalitarian mind, which is intent upon using its freedom to destroy all freedom. As a counter, the essays in this volume embrace what the editors refer to as Bernstein's "Deweyan view of philosophy as the self-reflection of democratic society" and thereby make self-creation the centerpiece of human flourishing (p. viii).

Jürgen Habermas points out that self-creation answers the question "what ought I, or what ought we, to do?" (p. 32). This question is addressed from either a moral or an ethical perspective. From the former standpoint, I think in terms pertaining to "what lies in the equal interest of everyone and what is equally good for all" (p. 32). But from the ethical viewpoint, I stress my own particular life, as I ask what is best "for me" or "for us" (p. 32). Here, I seek to overcome what fragments my life in the hopes of constructing an identity that embodies "continuity and transparency" (p. 35). As I pursue this course, I become responsible for the person I "would like others to know and acknowledge" (p. 35).

Richard Rorty argues that choices pertaining to self-creation should not be based on "redemptive truth," which is found in both religion and philosophy and which would end the process of reflection on who we are, "once and for all," by forcing all that we know about ourselves and the world to conform to a closed universe of knowledge (p. 7). Instead, he argues that only in literary culture do we capture, with fervid imaginations, a realm filled with expanding possibilities used by free persons in an "ever-living, ever-expanding, fire" of self-construction (p. 12). Geoffrey Hartman adds that the literary culture is heavily influ-

enced by poets such as Emily Dickinson who revolted against the authority of whatever denies the freedom for self-creation (p. 59).

Despite this expansive view of self-creation, the modern self, because it is located in the "empirical-scientific approach to knowledge claims," actually denies, as Charles Taylor rightly points out in his superb treatment of William James, any beliefs not supported by scientific methods (p. 87). This approach leads to unbelief, which causes many to sense that "some level of profound desire [has been] ignored, [and that] some greater reality outside of us has been closed off" (p. 89). The remedy for James is to adopt a "will to believe," by which people resolve to uphold beliefs that are the source of meaning, even if these beliefs cannot be confirmed by the methods of science (pp. 90–91).

Self-creation is possible only when beliefs arise from choice—as opposed to imposition. Yirmiyahu Yovel, in his outstanding discussion of Hegel, writes about "shadows of the dead God" in Hegel's quest for "absolute knowing" (pp. 96, 120). These shadows are the "greatest defect" of Hegel's thought because they suggest a theologically grounded view of history that imposes a fixed way of life designed to make it impossible for individuals to determine their identities (p. 120). For Joel Whitebook, however, Hegel emphasized as central to modernity the "recognition" of each individual's right to forge one's own conception of purpose, independently of traditional norms (p. 246).

Self-creation depends on the recognition from others of the lives we create ourselves. Nancy Fraser provides an exceptional discussion of recognition in which she suggests that it is best attained through the enabling of individuals to participate in groups "as full partners in social interaction" (p. 129). She rejects, as the basis of recognition, an identity politics model because it promotes "separatism and repressive communitarianism" (p. 128). Moreover, she rightly notes that overcoming a loss of recognition requires properly linking policies that remove economic barriers to policies that diminish discrimination against people merely because of their way of life (pp. 132, 141).

Fraser demonstrates that achieving justice as recognition depends on well-done normative theorizing about justice. As Thomas McCarthy emphasizes, this endeavor involves critiquing theories of justice like John Rawls's from an intention to discover if interpretations of universal moral principles "unjustly" exclude consideration of essential concerns like race (pp. 159, 163). This approach especially applies where normatively based, contested understandings of "markets, classes, gender roles, [and] global relations" are recurrent (pp. 165–66). Jacques Derrida pursues this avenue to theorizing justice when he discusses the death penalty in the context of a culture, like ours, in which "mourning *must* be impossible" (p. 216).

This reality suggests a generalized nonconcern for the “dead other,” and thus moots analysis of the death penalty’s legitimacy (p. 216).

The quest for recognition is also found in Seyla Benhabib’s valuable discussion of Hannah Arendt’s “right to have rights” for those who find themselves stateless (p. 175). Benhabib points out that despite the absence of enforcement mechanisms, the universal principles of human rights, while abstract in formulation, may be moving “slowly” from being viewed as mere statements of hopeful purpose to becoming well-established shared norms that can be enforced during the course of dealing with specific cases (p. 189).

Benhabib’s measured optimism exists alongside other writers’ less sanguine views on the “right to have rights” question. Agnes Heller discusses Freud’s view that “instinct, violence and barbarism” are the bases of societies, but on some occasions, these factors can be subordinated to spirituality (pp. 241–42). Still, even this tenuous hope seems beyond reach given the radical evil of twentieth-century totalitarianism that caused millions of people, as Whitebook and Kohn point out in their respective essays, to become superfluous, and thus bereft of humanity (pp. 255, 285). Similarly, Carol Bernstein shows how for Jorge Semprun, the “unbearable” pain of radical evil at Buchenwald was the source of a “fraternal” coming together around the shared experience of savage dying—the consequence of a grotesque Nazi, antihuman world in which self-creation is denied completely (pp. 297, 300–301).

Absent from this volume are focused assessments of liberal democracy’s capacity to avoid the reoccurrence of radical evil by ensuring self-creation and the freedom on which it depends. Given the present tendency to impose what Rorty called redemptive truth, and given Richard Bernstein’s Deweyan view of democracy as a space that is richly endowed with multitudinous possibilities for self-creation, this omission mars what otherwise is a superb testimony honoring Bernstein’s exemplary and truly brilliant career as a teacher, as a scholar, and as a public intellectual of democracy.

**Denaturalizing Ecological Politics: Alienation from Nature from Rousseau to the Frankfurt School and Beyond.** By Andrew Biro. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005.

270p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Kerry H. Whiteside, *Franklin & Marshall College*

Andrew Biro’s dense argument for a “denaturalized ecological politics” should have wide appeal. At one level, it should make political theorists generally—whether or not they consider themselves “ecological theorists”—reflect more systematically on how concepts of nature structure the ideas of canonical thinkers. Political ecology is too often treated like a specialty shop in the theory emporium, a boutique that one enters or not according to the

inclinations of taste. In fact, its insights recast the central concerns of political theory broadly conceived. Just as feminists have uncovered how gendered concepts are woven throughout the entire fabric of political discourse, so ecological political theorists demonstrate how nature in multiple guises (wildness, savagery, emotional connectedness, fecundity, scarcity, etc.) subtly inflects the meaning of notions of rights, justice, and human well-being. In this regard, Biro’s perceptive analyses of Rousseau and Marx—like John Meyer’s reading of Aristotle and Hobbes in *Political Nature* (2001)—add heft to a growing literature that, in the name of environmental concern, wrings new meaning from familiar theorists.

Where Meyer deals with thinkers who either pitted humanity against nature or tried to derive norms for human action from it, Biro locates a distinctive modern strand of theorizing that starts from our *alienation* from nature. By this he means human beings’ self-conscious transformation of their natural environment. Rousseau is the “progenitor” of a denaturalized ecological politics because he realized that, through labor, we irreversibly transform our surroundings and ourselves. The resulting social inequality challenges the theorist to imagine idealized social and educational institutions that forestall the corrupting effects of this process, without aiming to recover some prior, innocent nature. Biro argues that the inadequacy of Rousseau’s solutions stem from an inability to distinguish between the division of labor and the capitalist system of commodity exchange.

This distinction drives Biro’s argument forward to Marx. If it can be shown that not alienation from nature per se, but an historically specific form of production is the source of oppression and social irrationality, then there is hope that the transformation of nature can be made compatible with human freedom. Although Biro concedes that the later Marx dared offer only to minimize the impact of natural necessity in human life, not eliminate it, he thinks that Marx at least foreshadowed an ecologically useful distinction between “basic” and “surplus” alienation.

Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse build on Marx’s achievement. Readers who follow developments in critical theory will appreciate Biro’s work at a second level. He attempts to draw a nondominating approach to nature out of the Frankfurt School. Adorno’s dialectics, argues Biro, redefine “nature” as “the process of ceaselessly recasting relations of identity and difference” (p. 128). Marcuse complements Adorno’s essentially “negative moment” by suggesting that much domination of nature is in fact a *surplus* form of alienation, a naturalized social domination far in excess of anything required by the necessities of human life. In recognizing some unavoidable “necessities,” Biro counterbalances Steven Vogel’s *Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory* (1996), where Marcuse is chided for dreaming of a utopian abolition of work as toil.

Biro does not squeeze direct ecological lessons out of the theorists he interprets. Surprisingly, in fact, he never dwells on Rousseau's quasi-environmentalist pastoral rhapsodies or Marx's occasional observations about pollution and soil depletion under conditions of capitalist production. Green theorists will probably be puzzled to pick up a book on "political ecology," and then be asked to traverse broad expanses of text in which no example of an environmental problem appears at all. What all readers will find, however, is a careful sifting of Marxist, poststructuralist, liberal, and other readings of each theorist in order to show how various interpretive conundrums—Why does Rousseau's solution to alienation from labor invoke illiberal institutions like the legislator? Why does Adorno's radical critique end in politically pessimistic aestheticism?—turn on the theorists' portrayal of the dialectic of human activity and a given world.

At a third level, Biro steps right into the political ecology boutique and criticizes its wares. "Deep ecologists," who aspire to constrain human activity out of respect for nature's intrinsic value, are too quick to attribute a fixed essence to nature and human beings. Antiessentialists, such as Jean Baudrillard and Michel Foucault, on the other hand, make it difficult to appreciate the obdurate, unexpected qualities of a world that are not merely effects of semiotic systems or of power. Antiessentialists also fail to ground any ethical stance in respect to those qualities. "Denaturalized political ecology" is supposed to avoid these shoals by making humanity's self-conscious metabolism with nature its leitmotif. Biro concludes by tentatively suggesting urban ecology as a model. According to this model, meteorological events, for example, become environmental disasters not because humanity has violated nature in some simple sense, but because of inadequate government action and social breakdowns. Hurricane Katrina's devastation was as much a social as a natural disaster. The two are conceptually and practically inseparable.

What precisely does this mean for political ecology? This is where Biro's analysis stands most in need of extension. To agree that humanity can only get at nature by self-consciously transforming it is perhaps to rule out deep ecology, but it does not say whether any particular manifestation of nature merits special efforts of preservation. Is anthropogenic climate change acceptable provided that it is self-conscious? Are the destruction of species or their transformation through genetic engineering only problems if they result from social domination? Some post-Marcuse, Frankfurt School inspired thinkers might shed additional light on these questions. Jürgen Habermas has found favor with theorists such as John Dryzek and Tim Hayward, who seek to ground a democratic political ecology in discourse ethics. Ulrich Beck's influential studies of risk society argue that reflexive modernization eventually provokes opposition to environmental risks that violate

survival norms. Perhaps in his next book Biro can use his penetrating understanding of critical theory to evaluate whether such approaches advance the prospects for a "denaturalized political ecology."

**Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement.** By Stephen Eric Bronner. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 224p. \$29.50.

— Sankar Muthu, *Princeton University*

Stephen Eric Bronner reclaims what he takes to be the genuine spirit of Enlightenment thought from a variety of contemporaneous and historical critics on the Left and Right, but first and foremost from Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (DE) (1947). Bronner contends that many criticisms of Enlightenment thought today can be traced to what he characterizes as Horkheimer and Adorno's brilliant but ultimately inaccurate and misleading analysis. The losses involved are not only scholarly but political, Bronner argues, for progressive activists and intellectuals today can benefit from the ethical orientations and philosophical temperaments that informed Enlightenment thinkers. *Reclaiming the Enlightenment* is also a response to historians of political thought who have too often, in Bronner's opinion, missed the forest for the trees. While the recent historiography of Enlightenment thought has deepened and broadened our understanding of particular figures, themes, and regional variants of eighteenth-century political philosophy, he contends that the contemporary emphasis on multiple Enlightenments can have the effect of obscuring what he takes to be the fundamental ethos of Enlightenment thought.

While Horkheimer and Adorno intended to produce a positive sequel to the negative critique of DE, Bronner argues that it is unsurprising that they did not do so. Given their searing criticism, he seeks to demonstrate that it would have been impossible for them to have reclaimed many theoretical and political resources from Enlightenment thought. Thus, Bronner attempts himself to "rescue"—to use Horkheimer and Adorno's own term from the title of their stillborn sequel, *Rettung der Aufklärung*—a positive political vision that strives to be both an accurate reflection of many eighteenth-century writings and a model for resisting authoritarian and oppressive institutions, practices, and ideas today. Eschewing what he takes to be Horkheimer and Adorno's largely metaphysical and aesthetic analysis, Bronner argues that only a more concrete social and political analysis of Enlightenment ideas and their influence upon later thinkers and movements can come to terms with the genuine spirit of Enlightenment thought.

For Bronner, the central political commitment of Enlightenment thought is to resist and to curb the arbitrary exercise of institutional power. Hence, particular

strands of liberal, socialist, and democratic movements and thought that have sought to do so, in his view, are the offspring—often avowedly—of the Enlightenment ethos. In making such claims, he argues in some detail that the core spirit of Enlightenment thought is anti-Eurocentric and deeply critical of European prejudices and injustices; nonessentialist and, instead, open to revision and self-critique; skeptical and thus often critical of supposedly absolute and final truths; and progressive on a critical understanding of “progress” that rejects closure. It is, moreover, said to be directly political and thus in favor of reforming and using state power, among other means, to address the needs of the oppressed and the vulnerable, yet also highly critical of state power as itself often oppressive; scientific in the sense of perpetually questioning authority and tradition in a spirit of experimentation and innovation; and rationalistic on an understanding of “reason” as a recursively critical capacity that Enlightenment thinkers, in varying and complex ways, deliberately conjoined with sentiment, compassion, and rhetoric. All singular conceptions of Enlightenment thought necessarily foreground particular ideas, but some fail the test of being supportable by a broad range of actual Enlightenment arguments. Given the enormous volume of passages in eighteenth-century letters, pamphlets, proclamations, and books that could be straightforwardly drawn upon to justify Bronner’s conception, his distinctive rendering of the spirit of Enlightenment thought is perfectly plausible.

Bronner seems primarily interested in offering such a portrait of Enlightenment thought in order to contrast it with its self-described enemies and to highlight the oppositional struggles of Enlightenment thinkers and Enlightenment-inspired political activity in the eighteenth century and later. He aims, along these lines, to demonstrate multiple connections among, on the one hand, Counter-Enlightenment writings and ideologies and, on the other, often right-wing, reactionary, and authoritarian political movements in debates ranging from those surrounding the revolutions of 1789 and 1848 to the Dreyfus Affair, and struggles between partisans of the Left and Right in twentieth-century interwar Europe. One of the author’s central claims along these lines is that despite the occasional prejudices and hypocrisies of some of the defenders of enlightened ideas, it was primarily their opponents who fundamentally—and, all too often, violently—denied what he characterizes as the very heart of the Enlightenment intellectual disposition: recognizing the dignity of the other. For Bronner, Enlightenment political theories were fighting doctrines, ones that are worth revising and carrying forward today, not because of their grand successes but rather due to their “protest character” and emancipatory promise (p. 14). He argues that Counter-Enlightenment ideologies historically were fundamentally affirmative doctrines, some of which jus-

tified the kinds of practices and prejudices that Horkheimer and Adorno mistakenly connected to the very logic of enlightened ideas, whereas Enlightenment sensibilities are ultimately critical in spirit—philosophies of resistance for a never-ending struggle against domination and injustice.

Bronner is careful to note that there have been many episodes of self-critical, cosmopolitan, and humanistic thinking by which institutional power was subjected to critique and in light of which the weak, vulnerable, subaltern, and exploited were defended by others or defended themselves. Enlightenment political thought in Europe from 1650 to 1800 at its best offers one key epoch, he argues, of such sensibilities, but there are many others, including Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, Indian, sub-Saharan African, and multiple indigenous traditions that are beginning, he notes, to be given the intensive study that they deserve. In this sense, although he does not characterize his argument in this fashion, he too may well advocate the notion that there exist family resemblances among a plurality of Enlightenments, in this case across multiple centuries and continents. It is precisely in keeping with the recursively critical spirit of such enlightened ideas, he argues, to reconfigure Enlightenment thought today in ways that are attuned to contemporary challenges, yet also in keeping with its core sensibilities.

Bronner paints with a broad brush. In a short study that covers vast themes, his mode of argumentation is necessarily compressed, and he often offers elegant assertions and brief provocative arguments that are given support largely by way of citations of some of the relevant primary and secondary literature. In responding to one-dimensional polemics, he occasionally counters with unsubtle characterizations of his opponents and some polemics of his own. Nonetheless, it is impressive for such a concise study to operate on three levels simultaneously: to treat historic political ideas as they may have been understood at the time, while also attempting both to trace their influences on later ideas, practices, and institutions and to indicate their ongoing usefulness as models or analogies for political theorizing today. Moreover, given that this book is not directed toward scholars of the Enlightenment period, but rather constitutes a kind of public intellectual plea toward those who, in Bronner’s opinion, have turned their backs on the productive resources of this era, its generalizations about Enlightenment thought—most of which would need to be extensively amended and qualified in a specialist’s study—are not unduly problematic for a work of this genre. *Reclaiming the Enlightenment* is a vigorous and thought-provoking book that works well both as a critical commentary upon the specific claims of Horkheimer and Adorno’s DE and as a gloss on some of what Enlightenment thought can offer to progressive political thinkers and activists today.

**Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as Founder.** By

Christopher A. Colmo. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. 210p.  
\$70.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Joshua S. Parens, *University of Dallas*

The thesis of this book is novel and provocative. Christopher Colmo argues that Alfarabi breaks with Plato and Aristotle. In other words, contrary to Leo Strauss and others (among whom I count myself), Alfarabi is not, among other things, a useful guide to the recovery of a forgotten Plato and Aristotle. At his most ambitious, Colmo insinuates that Alfarabi offers a third path between the metaphysically grounded politics of the ancients and the moderns' excessive reliance on philosophic concepts such as human rights (p. 168). This third way is often referred to as the "autonomy of politics" from theory. Although Colmo is tentative about it, like all claims to a third way, it offers the utopian hope of escaping all of the pitfalls of the other two.

Colmo's portrait of ancient political philosophy is the most difficult part of his thesis to accept. (Because Alfarabi never confronted modern political philosophy, Colmo reasonably reserves his conjectures on how Alfarabi might have viewed it until the conclusion.) To show the novelty of Alfarabi's enterprise, Colmo must show that Plato and Aristotle are well worth breaking from. Unfortunately, the bulk of this argument has little to do with the political teaching of either author. Of course, this is not by chance; Colmo argues from the first that Alfarabi abandons the metaphysical foundation of Plato and Aristotle for a new "methodological" ground. Alfarabi is like the moderns in focusing on method. Because of this focus, the two key chapters of the book are Chapters 4 and 9. In Chapter 4, through an analysis of Alfarabi's *Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Prior Analytics,"* Colmo attempts to show that Alfarabi proves Aristotle's demonstrative syllogistic method to be wholly circular—quite an accusation against the father of logic. I leave to another scholar better versed in Aristotelian logic and a review for a different journal the occasion to address the details of this argument. I agree with the view of both Miriam Galston and Descartes that Aristotle's logic was not intended as a method of discovery (p. 140)—that need not make it circular, however. I believe that it was intended primarily to insulate the novice from falling prey to the wiles of sophistry.

In Chapter 9, Colmo attempts to show that Alfarabi adumbrates an alternative to Aristotelian method, though only in the course of giving an overview of the sciences so dependent on Aristotle that it becomes difficult to establish the depth of the break. Colmo argues that in his *Attainment of Happiness* (AH), Alfarabi intends to show that Aristotle believes mistakenly that he can ascend from the principles of instruction to the principles of being. Colmo claims that we are restricted to and will never break free from the principles of instruction. Because Alfarabi's dis-

cussion of these two sets of principles is extremely abstract, the reader should not be frustrated with me for failing to define or exemplify these two sets of principles. Alfarabi barely does, and Colmo hardly does any better. Yet Colmo disagrees with Muhsin Mahdi's understanding of the distinction between these two sets of principles (as Aristotle's distinction between what is first for us and what is first by nature), though the substance of his disagreement is elusive (cf. p. 135 with pp. 139–46). I offer one striking indication that Alfarabi's method in AH can hardly be his consummate method of discovery: When he presents his list of methods in AH, he omits the method (of discovery) Colmo ascribes to him throughout *Breaking with Athens*, namely, "dialectic" (cf. AH, sect. 2, with *Breaking*, p. 132). Even if we were to grant that Alfarabi offers a novel method, we would need from Colmo a clear presentation of how Alfarabi's political teaching, especially in AH, embodies this new method. We get none for AH, though politics is treated at great length there. The closest Colmo comes to such a presentation may be Chapter 6; however, I was unable to determine how the political teaching of Alfarabi's *Book of Religion* constitutes a complete break from the teachings of Plato or Aristotle.

The heart of Colmo's substantive interpretation of Alfarabi as an opponent of the ancients is surely Chapter 5. In this chapter, he attempts to establish that Plato's political philosophy rests upon a metaphysical foundation that is wholly circular. The emblem of this foundation is what he calls the "doctrine" of recollection (p. 58). Now, Colmo is the first to admit that "recollection" is not mentioned in the relevant Alfarabian text, the *Philosophy of Plato* (PP). Yet he claims to find a smoking gun in PP (sect. 22). There, Alfarabi's Plato claims that the philosopher and the king possess the same skill. Through that skill human beings can know their perfection (knowledge of the substance of each of the beings, PP, sect. 3) and their desired way of life or happiness (PP, sect. 2). Above all, the philosopher and king know these "from the outset" (sect. 22). According to Colmo, this claim "from the outset" means that, according to Plato, the philosopher knows all beings and what his own perfection is from the outset of his inquiry or he can never know them at all (pp. 66–67)—a shockingly literal reading of recollection. Colmo abstracts from what dialog or dialogs Alfarabi is discussing here (either *Lovers* or *Laches*, almost certainly the former). As Christopher Bruell has shown so clearly in *On the Socratic Education* (1999), the shorter Platonic dialogs revolve around two themes: youthful belief that without ever having inquired into it, one possesses adequate knowledge of one's own good, and for that matter the good of all human beings, and sophistry. Colmo ascribes to Alfarabi's Plato what Bruell shows the young and excessively ambitious believe about themselves. To confirm this, the reader should consider Colmo's reading of the opening of PP (pp. 58–59). Alfarabi

opens PP with an interpretation of *Alcibiades Major*. According to that opening, we desire perfection that will make us enviable to others. What could better capture the attitude of Alcibiades and a whole host of other young men peopling Plato's shorter dialogs? According to Colmo, Alfarabi intends to ascribe this youthful hubris to the mature Plato or Socrates (p. 59). For one, I am not convinced.

I am the first to admit that Alfarabi makes it extremely difficult to determine where the significant differences between himself and his Greek predecessors lie. Are these differences largely a matter of adapting Plato and Aristotle to fit the setting of a revealed community, as Strauss argues? (In which case, we might learn from Alfarabi, among other things, how better to understand the political teaching of Plato and Aristotle.) Or has Alfarabi made a nearly wholesale break with ancient thought, as Colmo argues? (In which case, Alfarabi might deserve the dubious honor of being the first protomodern—or the true honor of being perhaps the first thinker, to my knowledge, to escape altogether the alternatives, ancient or modern.) In this review, I have tried to show that in key instances, Colmo's claims for Alfarabian novelty are bought at the price of a distorted Plato and Aristotle—a Plato and Aristotle I am not persuaded that Alfarabi seeks to uncover for us.

**Peace Talks—Who Will Listen?** By Fred Dallmayr. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004. 288p. \$40.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

— Matthew Simpson, *Luther College*

In this book, Fred Dallmayr tries to discover what intellectual resources are available for peacemaking today, in a world that he believes to be fundamentally violent. To do so, he scans the world's philosophic and religious traditions to find their arguments on behalf of peace. He takes as his starting point Erasmus, whose *The Complaint of Peace* of 1517 begins with a personification of Peace: *Querela pacis*, "Peace talks." Dallmayr's book starts with an analysis of what Erasmus said about how to make peace, then goes on to survey other such arguments and practices in the world's philosophical and spiritual traditions. The work is remarkably wide-ranging, as it examines in some depth figures as varied as Aristotle, Confucius, Grotius, Kant, Gandhi, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Hannah Arendt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martha Nussbaum.

The book is divided into 10 chapters, each of which (after the first) explores a different source of arguments and practices for making peace. The first chapter explains the author's goal, which, he says, is to "explore Erasmus's *Querela pacis* and its repercussions and intimations during subsequent centuries down to our present time" (p. 12). Chapter 2 is a close reading and defense of Erasmus's writings on peace. Chapter 3 explores the resources for peacemaking in the tradition of natural jurisprudence exem-

plified by Grotius, Kant, and John Rawls. Chapter 4 looks at the tools for peace offered by various kinds of spirituality; Dallmayr first distinguishes "knowledge-oriented" from "erotic-mystical" spirituality and then shows what each offers to the cause of making peace.

The remaining six chapters concern peacemaking in the contemporary world. Chapter 5 examines recent attempts to create peace through a global cosmopolitan ethic, both in the religious work of the Parliament of the World's Religions and in the more secular theory of Martha Nussbaum's "Stoic cosmopolitanism." Chapter 6 favorably analyzes Hannah Arendt's essay "On Violence" (1969) as a diagnosis of the cause of conflict. Chapter 7 offers an interpretation of the theories and activities of Gandhi as a model for a certain kind of peacemaking. Chapter 8 looks at the resources for peace in East Asian societies, especially in the writing of Confucius. Chapter 9 examines the place of education in the struggle for a less violent world. And the final chapter surprisingly holds out the philosophy of Heidegger as a last example of a philosophical model of peacemaking; it concludes with an appendix essay titled, "Lessons of September 11."

This book has great strength but also a few significant shortcomings. The most important service it offers is that it gives both general readers and scholars a sense of the tremendous powers for peacemaking contained in the world's philosophical and religious traditions. This is particularly important today when the dogma of "the clash of civilizations" not only offers a convenient excuse not to listen to what other cultures have to say but also makes violent conflict seem inevitable and therefore justified. Dallmayr shows that such a clash is not inevitable because all of the traditions he discusses offer far more arguments on the side of peace than they do on that of war. He also does an excellent job of arguing that elites tend to benefit from conflict, through increased prestige and war profiteering, while the more general mass of humanity suffers most. This leads him to an interesting argument in Chapter 5 that one important avenue toward peace is "a global democratic praxis."

This great strength of *Peace Talks* is, however, also its weakness. By covering so many figures and traditions, Dallmayr sometimes falls into overstatement and excessive simplification. Part of the problem stems from the general tone of the book, which some readers may enjoy but which I found to be overdone. Most chapters contain such statements as "Wherever one turns hatred, ill will, aggressiveness, and warfare seem to be the order of the day" (p. ix) and "Barely a decade after the end of the Cold War, the fury of violence has been unleashed around the world" (p. 89). While one ought to look squarely at the world's problems, I think that this kind of rhetoric obscures as much as it reveals about the present situation, not the least of which is that it erases the remarkable and sometimes successful work of those now laboring in the name of peace.

The more theoretical and more serious problem is that Dallmayr advocates two mutually exclusive things. On the one hand, he says that the world must be taught to listen to Erasmus's argument for peace; on the other, he offers a robust defense of multiculturalism. The obvious problem is that not all people care equally about peace, and so to get them to care more, one must try to change their beliefs and traditions, and therefore impose oneself on them at some level. He says that one of the problems of moral universalism is that it tends toward "Western bias" or the "de-emphasis of difference" (p. 105). But Erasmus's argument for peace is itself a form of moral universalism in the sense that it says that something, namely peacemaking, is of overriding moral importance.

This problem is particularly serious in Dallmayr's discussion of education. He thinks that one problem with political liberalism is that it does not do enough to encourage peace: "Strengthening the ethical fabric undergirding politics inevitably requires attention to the education and character formation of social agents—in a manner transgressing the boundaries of public (liberal) 'neutrality'" (p. 19). But the purpose of liberal neutrality is precisely to prevent the kind of moral imperialism that he is worried about. I cannot see the point of first saying that liberal neutrality is bad because it does not do enough to strengthen peacemaking and then arguing that we must be careful to be neutral and not impose our opinions on others because in doing so we "de-emphasize difference." The claim that peace is the highest good (or is among a small set of basic goods) is a substantive moral claim of its own that excludes other views. The case for peace is not strengthened by obscuring this point.

Although Dallmayr does not resolve this central tension in an adequate way, the book is extremely interesting and useful. It is a helpful guide through the resources of peacemaking found throughout the world's cultural traditions. And it does a superb job of arguing that while people often pay lip service to the horrors of war, the cause of many conflicts is simply a lazy unwillingness to use our own philosophical and spiritual assets to work for peace. This is worth bearing in mind the next time one hears people say that they did not want to go to war but circumstances forced them into it.

**How Patriotic Is the Patriot Act? Freedom Versus Security in the Age of Terrorism.** By Amitai Etzioni. New York: Routledge, 2004. 224p. \$26.00.

**From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations.** By Amitai Etzioni. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 272p. \$29.95.

— Paul A. Passavant, *Hobart and William Smith Colleges*

In *How Patriotic Is the Patriot Act?* Amitai Etzioni analyzes the United States response to the attacks of September 11,

2001, from the perspective of "responsive" or "new" communitarianism. New communitarianism, according to the author, can be distinguished from authoritarian communitarianism because it seeks a balance between freedom and security or social order (pp. 3–4). According to Etzioni, during the 1960s and 1970s, America "overcorrected" for forms of authoritarian government, such as racial segregation or J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation. As a result, the country experienced "excessive individualism" and "moral anomie." With what he considers to have been an overemphasis on individual rights, certain policies, such as the possibility of a quarantine in the face of bioterrorism or highly communicable disease, have been "stigmatized" as being "beyond the pale" of reasonable discussion (pp. 87–89). By noting, for example, that the United States has allowed for quarantines at earlier junctures in its history and that a quarantine could be set up on a vacation island, he is clearly trying to rehabilitate the quarantine as a policy option. But this is just one policy among many that are emerging post-September 11 in the United States that are correcting the balance between liberty and security, for Etzioni. That is, he understands policies such as the USA Patriot Act, US VISIT (U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology program), CAPPS II (a proposed measure to update the current Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS) airline security program that was subsequently killed in the summer of 2004 because of its burden on civil liberties), national identification cards, and various biometric and facial recognition technologies to be relocating a balance between freedom and security that was apparently lost in the 1960s and 1970s.

In Chapter I, the author argues against those who are concerned that the U.S. response to September 11 is undermining democracy. Although the Weimar Republic is the only case that he considers at any length, he contends that once firmly established, democracies are rarely lost and that when they are undermined (the Weimar example), it is because they did not provide an adequate response to a new challenge. When levels of fear rise with the appearance of a new threat and government reacts firmly to them, fear is eased and support for further actions diminishes; using polling data, Etzioni also finds that support for constitutional democracy is thereby sustained rather than undermined (p. 14).

In Chapters 2 through 5, Etzioni describes a number of policy responses to September 11, as well as a number of technologies that, in his view, are promising possibilities for enhancing collective security. With few exceptions, this section of the book provides an up-to-date overview of a variety of policies and technologies that seek to gather data or to track persons. (Congress passed the Real ID Act after the book was published by tacking it onto "must pass" legislation authorizing money for the Iraq war; as noted, CAPPS II was ultimately rejected, while the

reauthorization, amendment, or sunset of various provisions of the USA Patriot Act is under discussion as of this writing). Against those who are concerned that the government will collect too much data on its people, Etzioni claims that as data collection becomes more reliable, less data will need to be collected and that therefore, persons' privacy will be enhanced by these new technologies and policies (although the programs and technologies he considers do not seem to be substitutes for existing programs but, rather, complements to extend existing technologies and databases).

Chapter 6 argues that nation building, democratization, and economic reconstruction—policies the United States claims to be pursuing in Afghanistan and Iraq—are more difficult than currently recognized; hence, such policies are likely to fail. Deliberate social change is “unnatural” and “difficult to achieve” (p. 133). Because political and economic development is based in culture, which is, in turn, “embedded in personalities” (p. 142), societies are resistant to purposive attempts to change them. Therefore, the author advocates a “restrained approach” that would vaccinate, feed, and educate children while supporting “pacification” to prevent genocides. This approach would not dress these minimal efforts up as something they are not (i.e., they are not democracy per se) and otherwise would “let ‘nature’ take its course” (p. 148). It is unclear how this chapter fits with the others. There is no conclusion.

We have reason to question Etzioni's assumption that post-September 11 policies represent the country's finding a balance between freedom and security. In a section entitled “Crime Rates and Liberty,” he applies his model to developments beyond the emotional example of September 11 by describing crime legislation passed in the 1990s as a similar response to fear that adjusted the earlier “overcorrection” in favor of individual rights (pp. 22–24). His complacent assumption that government will not seek political advantage through the manipulation of fear is contradicted by Katherine Beckett's *Making Crime Pay* (1997). Beckett's careful empirical study of the relationship among crime rates, public perception of crime, and congressional legislation finds that there is not a correlation between crime rates and crime legislation, and she further finds that public opinion on the crime issue follows, rather than leads, legislative initiatives. In other words, politicians have found the crime issue useful for electoral purposes.

Set in this empirical context, we might want more than Etzioni's assurance that the country is striking the right balance between freedom and security (the book gives us no principles by which to define the proper balance, absent his opinions) and instead seek structural checks on governmental power, either from legislation or congressional oversight, or from courts to prevent tyranny and to protect rights. Etzioni realizes that the executive branch is

virtually unchecked in its war on terror, and he believes that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which in its history has denied only one of thousands of requests by executive branch officials for “spy warrants” not subject to the Fourth Amendment, provides an ample check on executive branch overreaching (p. 70). The ultimate source of accountability for the author is public trust in the government, despite the fact that he concedes the public cannot be informed about all the details of the “protective technologies” (those who distrust the government should either “move to another country or fight for an entirely new political system,” p. 75). Scholars concerned about the constitutional implications of the USA Patriot Act, rule changes within the executive branch that make it easier to spy, or the apparent use of spy warrants to circumvent the Fourth Amendment will have to look elsewhere (see, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, “Law in a Time of Emergency,” *Journal of Constitutional Law* 6 [May 2004]: 1–75).

*From Empire to Community* applies Etzioni's communitarianism to the field of international relations and asks whether a new global architecture might be created out of the current American semiempire (as he notes, the United States has an armed presence in 170 out of 200 countries). The answer the book gives is that this is a real possibility, as the world is evolving toward a global synthesis and, ultimately, toward one global nation. Etzioni groups cultures into two opposed categories—the East and the West. What is occurring globally, according to the author, is that Eastern societies are becoming more Westernized, and, in response to September 11, Western societies are becoming more Easternized as they become more oriented to security than to individual rights. This process is producing, according to Part I of the book, a “global synthesis.”

Readers familiar with the more philosophically rigorous communitarianism of Charles Taylor may wonder whether this counts as any synthesis at all. If the capacity to exercise the freedom to choose one thing over another is given by the community that has constituted one's self—one must have substantive grounds to choose one thing over another, and these grounds are completely lacking in an “abstract” self; hence, an abstract self philosophically lacks any reason to choose one thing over another—then there are an infinite number of ways that freedom and solidarity might be synthesized, depending upon the values that constitute the grounds of synthesis. Nor would it take much creativity to conceive of conflicting syntheses constituted from the cultural values of this world.

While Etzioni imagines that this synthesis might emerge through moral dialogues, a number of theorists, such as Chantal Mouffe or Jodi Dean, have made powerful criticisms against this model of politics (Etzioni does not acknowledge this massive critical literature), and these would have to be addressed before a reader could be persuaded of a global consensus emerging through dialogue.

Indeed, the polling data that Etzioni cites elsewhere in the book showing worldwide condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq—even within U.S. allies (cf. p. 98)—as well as unfortunate remarks from President George W. Bush describing the “war on terror” as a “crusade,” or a general’s description of this effort as a battle against “Satan” (p. 91), all raise serious questions regarding Etzioni’s claims for synthesis or consensus. Indeed, the slowness of the United Nations that leads him to consider humanitarian interventions that have not been approved by the UN, or that lead him to suggest that it might be easier to create a new global governing body than to change the UN, might be a result of real political differences that would mean any alternative to the UN would be far more coercive than the present arrangement (impose “consensus”), not truly global (create “consensus” through exclusion), or just as bedeviled by disagreement as the UN is. Finally, there is an equally massive critical literature that questions the usefulness of an East versus the West analytic that social scientists have relied upon in the past (cf. Thomas Gossett’s *Race: The History of an Idea* [1965] or Edward Said’s *Orientalism* [1978]).

Part II constitutes the most interesting part of the book. Here, Etzioni discusses the “antiterrorism coalition.” He describes how 50 nations provide intelligence to the United States and arrest terror suspects at the behest of the country, and how many nations have harmonized changes in domestic laws and have interrogated suspects. The U.S.-led antiterrorism coalition acts as a “world-wide agency, as if it were some kind of global Interpol” (p. 105). Etzioni claims (p. 106) that this coalition has achieved a “fair level of institutionalization” and is a “new global architecture” or “de facto Global Antiterrorism Authority” (GAA) that now serves more than just U.S. interests. (He notes that it also serves the interests of Russia, China, Egypt, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Sri Lanka, all of whom are “also threatened by radical Islamic groups,” p. 107.) This GAA is an example of the East working with the West, and in the future it may take on further responsibilities by evolving into a Global Safety Authority (GSA) that might engage in humanitarian interventions or social missions that go “beyond law and order” (p. 165).

Documenting a growing institutionalization of “antiterrorism” laws and structures in a careful, empirical way would have made for a fascinating book in its own right, and one wishes that Etzioni had chosen this more modest yet potentially significant task. Such a study might have engaged with other recent international relations scholarship that also documents a growing institutionalization of interstate regimes but differs over whether this demonstrates imperialistic power enforced by a dominant state or if this indicates the emergence of an entirely new global form of sovereignty. (Compare Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “Retrieving the Imperial,” *Millennium* 31 [no. 1, 2002]: 109–27, with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri,

*Empire*, 2000.) At times provocative, *From Empire to Community* ranges widely, but sacrifices scholarly depth for breadth.

**The Practice of Liberal Pluralism.** By William A. Galston. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 216p. \$65.00 cloth, \$26.99 paper.

— David Runciman, *Cambridge University*

This book seeks to defend the idea of value pluralism set out in William Galston’s earlier *Liberal Pluralism* (2002) against the various criticisms to which it has been subjected, and to explain the ways that this kind of pluralism can be given practical political application. The first of these tasks is efficiently done (in the final section), and as well as offering Galston the chance to modify some previous overstatements of his position (for example, to tone down his criticism of the idea of personal autonomy), the book provides a useful summary of the current state of various philosophical controversies surrounding the politics of liberalism. However the real interest lies in his attempt to make pluralism a practical political doctrine in its own right. Here, his success is mixed. His argument is most persuasive when he is criticizing excessively “monistic” or, as he calls them, “totalist” conceptions of liberal politics. The problem is that these criticisms often appear unobjectionable precisely because they are only weakly connected to a distinctively pluralist alternative.

For example, Galston understands value pluralism to insist that “there may be no way of judging whether decent polity A has a better form of organization than does decent polity B” (p. 117). We can tell the difference between a good constitution and a bad constitution (good ones must make realistic demands of citizens in a coherent way that does not go against the main current of a community’s public culture), but we cannot know which is the best, nor which values should be given constitutional priority. Yet this essentially pragmatic, negative doctrine stops some way short of insisting that a good constitution must instantiate a pluralist conception of value, by placing the decent demands of any group on a par with the demands that might be made of that group by the state. This more positive conception of pluralism—which has its roots in the English political pluralism of the early twentieth century, something Galston acknowledges (pp. 41–42) but does not discuss in any detail—is much harder to sustain. He talks about the possibility of political and nonpolitical organizations being related “horizontally, not vertically.” The case against excessively vertical (i.e., one-dimensional) forms of liberalism is well made. The problem comes in understanding how a horizontal relationship between state and nonstate organizations would work in practice.

This problem is best illustrated in relation to the role of the state in regulating the affairs of nonstate organizations. Galston rightly argues against the view that liberties

and freedoms of nonstate bodies should be seen as “grants” from the state: “Pluralist politics does not presume that the inner structure and principle of every sphere must mirror those of basic political institutions” (p. 2). But a horizontal conception of this relationship suggests the reverse, that the state must in some sense mirror the structure and principle of all the other spheres, because it has no special claims to priority over and above them. The author does not fully embrace this position (he leaves room for the priority of the state’s claims in times of emergency), but nor does he clearly explain how his own position is distinct from it. It is a large step from rejecting group freedoms as a gift from the state to seeing the state’s claims as comparable to those of other groups. The space in between is occupied by, among others, Hobbes, who recognized that the law might allow groups to acquire their own freedoms in their own way. Galston may be too quick to dismiss, as he does in Chapter 11, the common ground between Hobbesian liberalism and value pluralism.

Galston accepts that his version of political pluralism is best described as intuitionist. Its point is not to fix political arrangements in a particular form but to determine the burden of proof, in order to ensure that the presumption is always against the state encroaching on group life unless very good reasons can be found. So, he argues against those conceptions of liberalism that would allow the state to intervene to prevent the teaching of creationism in schools, on the grounds that the price of this kind of interference is invariably too high. In this respect, the pluralist position embodies an attitude toward this kind of controversy, rather than a definitive resolution of it—a value pluralist will understand that there is merit on both sides of the argument, and recognize that no resolution of it can be without regret for what has been forgone (in the creationist case, presumably, regret for not being able to provide the children concerned with more than a half-decent education).

Because Galston’s pluralism is a question of temperament as much as anything—it depends on a temperamental ability to see both sides of a political argument without being rendered incapable of taking sides—it would have been helpful to hear more about the psychological costs of the position he adopts. *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism* contains an excellent essay on the value of toughness in politics, but it concentrates on the importance of toughness in an electoral context, and not the general wear and tear of political life. Galston does not discuss what damage his pluralism might do to the politicians who find that the burden of proof is always against them, nor how they are meant to sustain the loyalties and even the interest of the general public regardless. He sharply distinguishes between regret (a useful state of mind) and guilt (a destructive one) but does not explain how regret is to be given any political force if it cannot be acted upon. Nor does he explain how the groups that benefit from the reticence of

the state are to manifest their regrets—who is going to insist that the creationists feel some regret for what they are doing, if not the liberal state. Galston’s pluralism is an instinctively plausible doctrine that contains a strong streak of good sense. But the suspicion remains that beyond the good sense, the pluralism itself does not add much, and may take something away.

**Mussolini’s Intellectuals: Fascist Social and Political Thought.** By A. James Gregor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 288p. \$35.00.

— Franklin Hugh Adler, *Macalester College*

A. James Gregor is the leading authority on Italian fascist ideology in the English language. *Mussolini’s Intellectuals* is the conclusion of 40 years of scholarship on fascist intellectuals and the ideology they produced. While specialists will find little if anything new in this volume, the uninitiated will find a cogent presentation of the author’s long-standing claim: that Italian fascism was not simply the violent, irrational, anti-intellectual phenomenon so often misrepresented in the historical and social scientific literature but, rather, a movement with a serious ideological core that responded to the historical failings of the liberal state, as well as to the conjunctural problems of the interwar period. The book’s major strength derives from a firm grasp of the intellectual origins of fascism, particularly the unredeemed promise of the Risorgimento to develop a morally regenerated and unified nation.

Rarely has Giovanni Gentile, fascism’s major intellectual, been presented so authoritatively in such a relatively short, general study. Gregor proceeds to elaborate the major elements of fascist ideology and illustrate how intellectuals such as Gentile, Ugo Spirito, Sergio Pannunzio, Camillo Pellizzi, and Carlo Costamagna responded to challenges the fascist regime confronted, domestically and internationally, during its 20-year reign. Gregor is quite right in holding that Julius Evola was marginal for most of this period, though he dedicates a chapter to him largely because Evola became a primary point of reference for young neo-fascists after the war. Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) leader Giorgio Almirante used to tell them that Evola was “our Marcuse but better.” Any serious scholar willing to wade through such a swamp of opaque dreck—and particularly a scholar with manifest sympathies for Gentile—is to be commended for remarkable tenacity. Gregor effectively situates Evola within the final and most tragic stage of Italian fascism, stopping well short, however, of accomplishing the truly impossible, rendering this cosmically arcane writer fully coherent. Beyond adding new material on Evola, Gregor also dwells briefly on the fascist appropriation of Carl Schmitt, particularly Schmitt’s concept of “extended spaces” (*Grossräumige*). Unfortunately, Gregor does not do much with Schmitt beyond that, and this is regrettable, because there is a paucity of analysis focusing on the

German jurist in the literature on Italian fascism, and because Schmitt has recently generated much interest among political theorists whose insights Gregor might have applied to Italian fascism more generally.

Gregor always has had a penchant for viewing history and politics mainly through the texts of fascist writers, rather than relating texts to unfolding events and to the work of contemporary scholars. Not that events and contemporary scholarship are totally absent, but they remain in the background, called forth only when needed to round out the picture or to sustain claims, sometimes dubious, that stretch well beyond the otherwise exemplary *explication de texte*. Here and in prior work, he treats fascism as a developmental dictatorship, and an anticapitalist one at that. True, there were fascist ideologues who spoke in such terms, including Benito Mussolini himself. The problem is that rhetoric was unmatched with action. It was during the 1930s that the transition had been made from a dictatorship intent upon eliminating all sources of opposition to a distinctively fascist state. Capitalism was hardly eliminated, though there was significant state intervention that led more to bureaucratic stasis than to significant growth; in any case, Confindustria, the industrial peak association, made sure, in the words of their leaders, that *Lo Stato Fascista* stopped at the factory gate, despite the ambition of fascist trade unions, the Ministry of Corporations, and fascist leaders. In fact, there was less growth during this period than during the twenties and no warrant to suspect that whatever development did take place was greater than that which would have been accomplished with a nonfascist government.

Spirito, one of Gregor's cases, argued at an international conference on corporatism held at Ferrara in 1932 that private property should be eliminated and vested in unitary employer-employee corporations. Gregor makes a lot of Spirito's so-called communist thesis, arguing, on the basis of disjointed comments by Mussolini, that Spirito had been influential. The 1932 Ferrara conference has been studied extensively by multiple scholars and from multiple standpoints (those of Confindustria, the fascist trade unions, etc.). Gregor cites virtually none of this literature and relies almost exclusively on Spirito's admittedly fascinating text. Yet Giuseppe Bottai, then minister of corporations, clearly distanced himself and the government from Spirito's intervention. The reader would get no idea from Gregor that Spirito's dramatic thesis went absolutely nowhere and that he had no influence whatsoever on subsequent corporatist development. This is but one example of how and why events and contemporary scholarship are so important, while illustrating the limitation of Gregor's method.

Most disappointing, in light of a wealth of recent scholarship on the fascist turn toward racism in 1938, is Gregor's treatment of anti-Semitism. This he treats as a contingent,

not central, element of fascist ideology, an accommodation to the foreign policy objective of solidifying ties with Nazi Germany. Surprisingly, he regards the Manifesto of Fascist Racism (wrongly attributed to Mussolini) as "a relatively inoffensive document," though it was the political premise that led to legislation that reduced Italian Jews to second-class citizenship and excluded them from public educational institutions and government service. Although Gregor concedes that one of his cases, Costamagna, wrote numerous anti-Semitic tracts, he gives the impression that, like Gentile, most fascist intellectuals were hostile or removed from the new racial policy. In fact, *none of them*, not even Gentile, broke with the regime, or offered even mild public criticism, while some enthusiastically applied anti-Semitic measures against Jewish professors and students, including a ban on all books written by Jewish authors. Gregor suggests that racism was embraced by a few malevolent Jew-haters like Giovanni Preziosi or "outsider" intellectuals like Evola. However, as recent scholarship has shown, those Italians in the cultural and academic worlds demonstrated no solidarity with their Jewish colleagues. Both Renzo De Felice and Emilio Gentile have suggested that there were internally generated sources of fascist racism not reducible to foreign policy concerns. Of these, most important was Mussolini's projected "anthropological revolution" whereby the new totalitarian fascist state would fabricate a new society that, in turn, would fabricate new historical subjects conceived of as a "new race." Here, Jews were portrayed as living incarnations of an antifascist "bourgeois spirit," fatally bound to the corrupt liberal state that had emancipated them, instinctively antithetical to all the unified, imperial, and "proletarian" values that were to mark the New Fascist Man. None of this is even hinted at in Gregor's book, though from 1938 through Italy's collapse in World War II, these themes had become integral aspects of fascist ideology.

Few could quibble with Gregor's book as a general introduction, written for nonspecialists. Unfortunately, as a scholarly monograph it leaves much to be desired, especially as a conclusion to the author's distinguished 40-year engagement with the subject.

**Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar.** By Ellen Kennedy. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. 272p. \$79.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Andreas Kalyvas, *New School University*

Carl Schmitt's 1933 involvement with national socialism constitutes a frequent interpretative entry point into his work. From there, his pre-Weimar as well as his post-World War II writings become logically implicated with his infamous role as the Third Reich's "Crown Jurist." It is the merit of Ellen Kennedy to break away from this dominant, often redundant, trend to offer an original reading of Schmitt's constitutional and political theory. Instead of

debating whether his endorsement of Nazism was a matter of principle, Kennedy boldly shifts direction to address broader, more interesting theoretical issues prompted by his writings. Her main goal is to address the relevance of Schmitt's Weimar-era work for contemporary political and constitutional problems.

Kennedy deftly combines a historical reading that traces the development of Schmitt's thought in the intellectual and political context of its time with a careful textual analysis of his major works. With this dual approach that blends the historical and the textual, the biographical and the theoretical, she distinguishes the enduring from the ephemeral in Schmitt. Her starting point is Schmitt's famous critique of liberalism. Instead of dismissing it as an alarming symptom of his fascist sympathies, she places it at the center of her narrative. She locates its origins and follows its shifting trajectory, probes its content, assesses its character, and reflects on its meaning. Kennedy seeks to demonstrate the relevance of Schmitt's antiliberalism for current debates on pluralism and its limits, political conflict, and rational consensus. Schmitt's critique of liberal constitutionalism, she correctly argues, originated in his early confrontation with legal formalism. He objected to the exclusion of the political dimension of the law and the optimistic belief in the capacity of abstract, formal norms to replace the conflictual nature of politics. He saw liberalism as an antipolitical doctrine of the ordinary, indecisive, and fragile, unable to cope with the exceptional.

This aspect of Schmitt's quarrel with liberalism is noted by most scholars of his work. Where Kennedy's approach differs is in the attention she devotes to some other, equally important aspects of this critique frequently neglected by the secondary literature. Schmitt attached to his critique of liberalism a theory of sovereignty that was not solely linked to states of emergency. He also redefined sovereignty as the constituent power of the people acting prior to and outside the established constitutional order. For him, a constitution is democratically legitimate when it emanates from the popular sovereign, in its higher capacity as the constituent subject. The sovereign is not only the one who decides about the exception but also the one who creates the constitution. As Kennedy notes, in Schmitt's constitutional reflections there is a democratic kernel. This fresh reading of his notion of sovereignty is coupled with an original interpretation of his definition of the political. Kennedy invokes Hegel to argue for elements of recognition in Schmitt's distinction between the friend and the enemy. In her view, Schmitt's conceptualization highlights the fact that the formation of a collective identity implies the construction, in fact the recognition, of a concrete difference. Every political identity is relational. The affirmation of a difference becomes the precondition for the existence of any identity. In his concept of the political, the sense of a common identity is dialectically associated with the recognition of difference and otherness.

For Kennedy, the significance of these insights is not simply interpretative; nor is her only goal to place Schmitt within the canon of Western political thought, although she does this admirably. Her main objective is to demonstrate his enduring relevance. Her argumentative strategy, however, is less compelling. It presupposes a strong correspondence between Germany during the interwar years and the present. She finds in the collapse of the Weimar constitution a generic, emblematic deficiency of liberal constitutionalism as such. I do not agree with this assumption. First, it does not account for the relative stability and steady expansion of the liberal constitutional model over the last six decades and, second, it portrays Schmitt exclusively as a thinker of crisis, relevant in times of political disruption, of constitutional failure.

A more pertinent question, I think, is not how liberalism has sustained a dysfunctional, weak political order but how it has been able to persist in conflicts, crises, and wars. Here, it seems to me, both Schmitt and Kennedy are misguided. They seem captive to a questionable understanding of liberalism. By that, I do not mean Schmitt's much-commented antiliberalism. On the contrary, I think that his understanding of liberalism was idealized and this idealization is shared by Kennedy. They both look at liberalism through the lens of the liberal political discourse(s), seeing liberalism as it wants to be seen—as rational, normative, dialogical, and consensual, thus vulnerable. By falling under the spell of an idealized liberalism, they both underestimate its deeply political nature. It might well be the case that liberalism is not an apolitical doctrine. Rather, it could be political in Schmitt's sense of the term, able to distinguish between friends and enemies, to decide about the exception, even to resort to dictatorship to protect its interests. Do not our own times provide a confirmation of liberalism's political and polemical nature?

Moreover, Schmitt's interpretation on democracy suffers from a serious blunder that Kennedy does not fully investigate. He equated democracy with equality. While liberty is an inherent attribute of liberalism, substantive equality, by contrast, is the defining mark of democracy. He also donated to the liberal tradition the public practice (and value) of speech that, in fact, is co-original with the ancient birth of democracy. These are historical and conceptual errors, which affected his understanding of democracy. For instance, he could not acknowledge the centrality of collective autonomy in democratic politics, the ideal of living freely under one's own laws. This denial of freedom and speech ultimately led him to advocate plebiscitary democracy. Lacking other means to express itself and with no particular passion or desire for liberty to motivate it, Schmitt's popular sovereign is left with nothing more than the passive option of noise and shouts. Kennedy is aware of these problems but does not go far enough to locate them at the heart of his partial, distorted understanding of democracy, a mirror image of his doubtful views of liberalism.

These two last points do not obscure the implications of Kennedy's overall project. This is the most balanced, persuasive interpretation available to date of Schmitt's constitutional and political theory. Kennedy offers an honest, thoughtful engagement with his Weimar writings, doing justice to the complexities and depth of his work while remaining mindful throughout of the controversies surrounding his name. She uncovers the intricate relationship between his political theory and the tradition of constitutional jurisprudence and shows how constitutionalism remained a central concern throughout his Weimar writings. Schmitt's writings represent a unique case in which the constitution is understood in political terms while democratic politics is analyzed in constitutional terms. Kennedy's interpretation recognizes this centrality of constitutionalism to his thought, explores its implications, and considers its legacy. In doing so, she does nothing else than transform our understanding of Schmitt.

**The Idea of Democracy in the Modern Era.** By Ralph Ketcham. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 312p. \$35.00.

— Jason Frank, *Cornell University*

Democracy today suffers from hermeneutic exhaustion in contemporary political contexts. It is regularly proclaimed as both a principle of war and a principle of peace, as a necessary component of free market capitalism and the name of resistance to economic globalization, as that which legitimates the power of the nation-state and that which perpetually threatens to undermine that power. As such, democracy risks becoming one of those worn-out coins that Friedrich Nietzsche invokes, “drained of sensuous force” (*Philosophy and Truth*, 1979, 84).

The stakes, however, are high, and perhaps this proliferation of meaning is not simply an indication of semantic entropy, but adheres to the etymology of democracy itself. After all, the people designates at once the common or the whole *and* that excluded remainder which falls outside of that designation: the poor, the rabble, the vulgar, the low. In *The Idea of Democracy in the Modern Era*, Ralph Ketcham ignores both the paradoxical aspects of democracy's meaning and the historical struggles that speak its name, offering instead an account of how a number of great books have been used to “undergird and justify” the “idea of human self-government” over the past four centuries (p. 1). It is an ambitious task, and one that Ketcham pursues with an educated zeal. The modern “idea of human self-government,” he laments, has advanced “one kind of thinking of democracy (inclusive, equitable, rights protecting)” at the expense of “the active, qualitative life of the self-governing community” (p. 263). He therefore invokes the forgotten guidance of “good government” found in “the deep wisdom and value” of “traditional understandings of the nature of the polity” (p. 148). Not surprisingly, these “traditional understandings” are to be found in the

work of “the ancients.” However, in addition to the usual invocation of Aristotle here, the author takes a comparative turn toward the work of Confucius and East Asian political thought.

Despite this turn, the broad outline of Ketcham's narrative of decline and potential restoration is reminiscent of the work of Leo Strauss. Not only does Ketcham recall the lost wisdom of the ancients and bemoan the lowered aspirations of modern political thought—from the good life to mere life, as it were—but modernity on his account also comes in distinct waves. Beginning with a pious return to the wisdom of the ancients and concluding with a screed against “postmodernism” (about which, more in a moment), the bulk of his study attempts to connect the thinkers of these different waves of “modernity thought” to corresponding stages of democratic development: Locke's empiricism and Newton's affirmation of a mechanistic universe corollate with the early history of the United States (modernity one); Bentham's utilitarianism, Dewey's pragmatism, and Darwin's theory of evolution justify the twentieth-century liberal corporate state (modernity two); the East Asian “appropriation” of these thinkers in writers like Fukuzawa Yukichi and Liang Qichao offers insights into the tutelary states of Singapore, Japan, China, and Korea (modernity three); and “postmodernism” signals the radical fragmentation of identities and a general crisis in democratic thought (modernity four). It does not seem to worry Ketcham that with very few exceptions, the thinkers he engages in this study cannot be easily characterized as democratic or that the “idea of democracy” has been passed on to us largely by its critics. Neither is there any indication that there might be anything but a happy synergy among capitalism, scientific and technological advance, and democracy. The book declares itself against the “decline of grand narratives” thesis in both its form and content.

Within these familiar narrative contours are some surprising exclusions and inclusions. Romanticism, for example, is strangely ignored. More productive, however, are the chapters dedicated to East Asian thought. This turn to non-Western sources is rich with potential. Ketcham's account of how thinkers like Mill, Montesquieu, and Smith were translated and interpreted in East Asian contexts is a compelling read, but it is unclear to me whether or not this particular turn to a non-Western uptake of Western sources in itself qualifies as an exercise in “comparative political theory.” In contrast to the “multiple modernities” thesis defended recently by Charles Taylor (*Modern Social Imaginaries*, 2004), for example, or the dialogue Roxanne L. Euben stages between Islamic and Western critiques of rationalism (*Enemy in the Mirror*, 1999), Ketcham's account of East Asian political thought emphasizes its appropriative character, and works hard to integrate it into a broader Western narrative. What we in the West have to “learn” from the East Asian example, it turns out,

is how to better integrate (our) ancients with (our) moderns, that is, how to get better in touch with ourselves. There is no enemy in the mirror Ketcham constructs, but there is no real stranger either.

The author's bold narrative uniformity also results in occasionally superficial readings of individual thinkers. A danger attending any project of this scope, at times the oversimplification of complex thinkers comes close to caricature, as is the case with much of his lengthy discussion of postmodernism. Here, Ketcham relies on the vague repetition of a handful of postmodern phrases—"will to a system," "presencing of otherness," "grand metanarratives"—to paint a portrait of postmodernism at once all too familiar and unrecognizable. He lines up the usual foreign suspects—Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard—adds some contemporary Americans—primarily Bonnie Honig and Iris Marion Young—and begins firing away with blanketing accusations. These postmodernists are "intent on parts more than the whole" (p. 183), are prophets of particularity who aspire to "voice" (p. 199), standpoint epistemologists who affirm that "the sense of justice remains specific to each group" (p. 204), proponents of a radical toleration that is akin to "uncompetitive Darwinism" (p. 204). Never mind that the thinkers named are all critical of identarian particularism, the self-sufficiency of voice, and the totalizing claims of "situated knowledge," or that in contemporary political theory they are most closely associated with *agonistic* democracy. There is a pervading sense in these chapters that Ketcham is not in control of his material. Moreover, confidence in the reliability of his account is not restored by a look at the footnotes. In an ironic exemplification of the "postmodern" critique of the original or the authentic, he engages the work of these theorists almost entirely through pulled citations and summaries of (critical) secondary sources.

So if postmodernism leads to "subjectivity, reductionism, mere acceptance, meaninglessness, and cynicism—literally nihilism" (p. 263) [*literally* nihilism?], what are contemporary democrats to do? In the book's conclusion, Ketcham focuses his attention on the apparent neglect of virtue in the "festering crisis" of contemporary interest group politics, and calls for the state-led restoration of virtuous citizenship through four primary mechanisms: visionary leadership, occupations that encourage independence, a robust civil society, and civically oriented public education. That these mechanisms seem to correspond to central initiatives of the current administration—Bush's democratic messianism, encouraging small business ownership, funding faith-based initiatives, and assuring that there is "no child left behind"—is left unelaborated. Despite this book's central claims, there is no shortage of contemporary state projects to instill virtue in the polity. Moreover, Ketcham's stalking-horse oppositions between ancients and moderns, virtue and interest, self-government and

good government, are too crude to achieve his wanted "criticism and explication of democratic theory" (p. 3). All of these oppositions veil much that is distinct about democratic politics, such as its capacity to enact a transformative politics reducible to neither the expression of shared values nor the clash of competing interests. A more truly comparative political theory might better engage the theoretical puzzles involved because the "idea of democracy" is not so easily at one with itself as this study suggests.

**Knowledge and Social Construction.** By Andrew M. Koch. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. 174p. \$65.00.

— Stephen F. Schneck, *Catholic University of America*

Epistemology—even more than mathematics—is arguably the paradigmatic science of modernity. Critics of modernity, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida, and Martin Heidegger, have all in one way or another argued against the modern worry over knowing and have recommended instead "doing." In light of this, Andrew M. Koch's *Knowledge and Social Construction* is intriguing. Its inspiration draws from many of modernity's prominent critics. Yet, curiously, as the book's title makes clear, its argument is an epistemological one.

Four models for knowing are outlined: textual exclusivity, textual universalism, inductive universalism, and inductive relativism. Only the fourth model, inductive relativism, is endorsed. Each of the other three models works in some way to foreclose what the author contends ought to be an open, pluralistic, ambiguous, and always-unresolved operation of epistemology. Koch is quick to underscore the political implications of such models, arguing that inductive relativism corresponds well with the ideal of an open society, such as that proposed by Karl Popper (*Open Society*, 1963). The other models, ostensibly, are at variance with such a vision.

Koch's model of textual exclusivity refers to epistemologies for which a sacred text serves as criterion for truth. Citing religious literalism and fundamentalism as versions of the textual exclusivity model, the author has in mind "religions of the book," such as Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism—although parenthetical references are also made to literalistic approaches to written constitutions. The author's elaboration of textual exclusivity by reference to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, though, is burdened with troublesome interpretations of both thinkers. Biblical text is, obviously, of central importance for both Augustine and Aquinas. However, knowledge and truth for these two very different thinkers are not simply a matter of textual reference. For Augustine, a fair account of his epistemology should consider his arguments about the relation of love and knowledge, sin, *credo ut intelligam*, and even (pace Foucault) power and knowledge amid the exigencies of life in Augustine's "earthly city." For Aquinas, one must weigh not only scripture but, equally importantly, reason and reason's

capacity to perceive truths and right in nature. Indeed, every rational creature, Aquinas argued, has true and sufficient knowledge of natural law, regardless of whether scripture is available or not. Overlooking such exegetical potholes, however, Koch's theoretical point is sound. The fixedness and specificity of a closed text sets fast and clear boundaries regarding acceptable and substantive truth. Little quarter is granted for question or wonder.

Textual universalism, the second model, has as its base a narrative about the nature of the human subject. Some aspect of that nature (like reason, freedom, language, competition, or many other possibilities) is then raised up such that it becomes the measure of truth and right. Instead of looking outward to scripture or metaphysical form, in this model the look is inward to find the touchstone of judgment within being human itself. René Descartes's *cogito* seems exemplary, but Immanuel Kant's *Kritik* is also cited by the author as a particularly good example of this model, perhaps because both Descartes and Kant emphasize a process of private, critical rationality as the formal condition for the determination of truth. The author struggles somewhat to squeeze John Locke and David Hume under this model as well, struggling perhaps because these authors emphasized experience of the external world in the formation of the subject. Koch also locates the thinking of Jürgen Habermas under this model, perhaps overstressing Kantian elements while underappreciating the pragmatist and materialist aspects of Habermas's complex theory. Once again, though, the author's theoretical idea of textual universalism is uncontested. To say that human nature is such and such, and then to find in that nature the measure or process of truth itself, surely limits the range of possibilities for what counts as truth and what counts as human. Modern history is, sadly, replete with horrors where this has gone badly.

Inductive universalism, his third model, is Koch's account of the epistemology of modern science. Here, truth is always in progress as new empirical facts are tested for fit in the edifice of accumulated knowledge. Inductive here means that the ends of truth remain open and unresolved, much as Koch prefers. The author balks, however, at the positivist assumption of the universal validity of empirical facts themselves. Citing poststructuralists for support, he contends instead that empirical facts are always a product of relations of power, and are not so much universal as they are contingent. Modern science and its kindred disciplines do not transcend relations of power, the author thinks, but rather are instruments of them. Given this, it is interesting that elsewhere in the study, Koch presents the empirical facts of humankind's material existence (the body) as unproblematically "true." Not true in a universal sense, the apology goes, but true in a local sense—for me, right here, right now. Does this mean that bodily empirical facts somehow escape constitution within the relations of power? That body should be read literally, just like a sacred text, for determining truth?

Inductive relativism, Koch's fourth model, is the one he endorses. The author insists that it is congruent with poststructuralism and deconstruction. Foregrounded in the model is the argument that all truths are local and inseparable from the real conditions of life, meaning that transcendental aspirations and ontological grounds are eschewed. Besides Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida, an effort is made to tuck Karl Marx and Max Stirner under this model, too. Unlike the oppressions of the other epistemological models, this one, we are told, "is an important tool for removing the illusions that legitimate the oppression" and also "creates the epistemological framework to put the future in human hands" (p. 120). Indeed, replacing the oppression of transcendent truth would be what Koch describes as inductive relativism's invocation of "dialogue and discourse" (p. 103).

But is putting matters in "human hands," invoking human "discourse," and thereby overcoming "oppression" really a vision congruent with poststructuralism and deconstruction? Foucault and Derrida would have cautioned against such notions. They argued that appeals to ideals of liberation, like any other teleology, worked inevitably to discipline, normalize, and punish. Relations of power and the oppressions entailed, they argued further, could never be transcended, only critiqued and engaged. Likewise, "discourse and dialogue," though beloved by thinkers like Hans-Georg Gadamer and Charles Taylor, are somewhat worrisome to poststructuralists, for whom famously even words are weapons.

Herein, it seems, a possibly important problem for this interesting study is highlighted. Without appeal to some ground, at the very least to what Stephen White (*Sustaining Affirmation*, 2000) wonderfully labeled "weak ontology," a thoroughgoing antifoundationalism of the sort at the heart of inductive relativism cannot yield a substantive political vision. *Knowledge and Social Construction* is illustrative. At end, only by appeal to such things as human hands, epistemological frameworks, and human discourse does the author move beyond formal epistemological critique to the "doing" of political life. Not surprisingly perhaps, it is in conjunction with such appeals that Koch's book is most compelling and valuable.

**On Populist Reason.** By Ernesto Laclau. New York: Verso, 2005. 224p. \$26.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

**Populism and the Mirror of Democracy.** Edited by Francisco Panizza. New York: Verso, 2005. 288p. \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Margaret Kohn, *University of Florida*

In the wake of Thomas Frank's bestselling book *What's the Matter With Kansas* (2004), scholars and citizens are turning to the concept of populism as a way to make sense of the strength and popularity of the far Right in the United

States. In order to unravel the puzzle of why working-class voters would enthusiastically support a political party that is committed to cutting taxes for the wealthy, dismantling popular social programs, and subsidizing corporate welfare, scholars need to jettison the old Marxist-inspired paradigm that assumes that political identities are products of economic interests. At least that is one of the lessons of Ernesto Laclau's fascinating book.

Laclau's *On Populist Reason* and *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, an edited collection inspired by his approach, do not focus on contemporary American politics. The contribution of these two books, instead, is that they provide a systematic theoretical reflection on the concept of populism, enriched by empirical discussions of Peronism, George Wallace, the new Right in English Canada, the United Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa, the Communist Party in post-World War II Italy, and the British Tories under William Hague. By putting populism in an international, historical, and theoretical context, these two books provide tools not only for analyzing right-wing hegemony in the United States but also for understanding populism as a fundamental political category.

Laclau's starting point is his claim that populism is not an ideology or a type of movement with a particular social base. Rather, it is a political logic, which functions by creating chains of equivalence among heterogeneous identities and interests. In other words, "the people" does not exist prior to the populist movement but instead is constituted as a political subject through the movement. This process has both a positive and negative dimension. The negative moment describes the way that the category of the people emerges through opposition to elites. Laclau describes this as "the formation of an internal antagonistic frontier separating the 'people' from power" (p. 74). Second, the unity of the people emerges through mutual identification with some powerful symbol or ideal. He calls this an empty signifier. The empty signifier is important because it makes it possible to build chains of equivalence between opposed and sometimes contradictory demands.

According to Laclau, the dominant approach to populism in the scholarly literature is misleading because it tries to find some stable social basis for populism. Typically, empirically oriented scholars study several examples of populism and then define it as a movement of disaffected agrarians or urban workers facing modernization. Inevitably, there are numerous cases of populism that fail to meet even the most expansive or flexible list of criteria. This inability to develop a workable typology or definition leads to the conclusion that populism is vague, incoherent, or merely rhetorical. From Laclau's perspective, the apparent incoherence of populism is its most salient characteristic. Populism is the attempt to organize identities on an essentially contested and fluid terrain, the terrain of politics itself. What appears as incoherence is actually a reflection of the logic of politics itself: the fact that the

range of possible alliances (or chains of equivalence) cannot be determined in advance. From this perspective, rhetoric is not something epiphenomenal, but rather the cement that holds populism together. Rhetorical devices such as "freedom" or "justice" (or what Laclau calls empty signifiers) unify diverse groups with different interests and make it possible for them to imagine themselves as a unified collectivity. In other words, the people—the subject of populism—is constituted through rhetoric.

Laclau's approach to populism is both theoretically compelling and useful in thinking about contemporary politics. His writing style, however, may be frustrating for readers without training in linguistics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, or poststructuralist theory. Consider his summary of his study: "I have isolated equivalential relations hegemonically represented through empty signifiers; displacements of the internal frontiers through the production of floating signifiers; and a constitutive heterogeneity which makes dialectical retrievals impossible and gives its true centrality to political articulation" (p. 156). Behind the opacity of this jargon, however, is a compelling message, and one that public intellectuals such as George Lakoff have been spreading to Democratic Party activists through more accessible books like *Don't Think of An Elephant* (2004). Political identities are constituted through narrative frames that incite emotional attachment and give meaning to indeterminate concepts such as fairness and family values.

Does *On Populist Reason* provide a more nuanced and theoretically richer treatment of these issues than the popular version of this argument? I believe that Laclau makes an important contribution to the theoretical debate by exploring the controversial position that populism, as he defines it, becomes almost a synonym for democratic politics. Typically, scholars have treated democracy and populism as opposed to each other. Many populist movements have coalesced around charismatic leaders with little patience for traditional institutions or checks and balances, and this has led to the widespread perception of democracy and populism as antithetical. But Laclau recognizes that the very concept of democracy, understood as popular sovereignty, implies the existence of "the people," a political subject that can only be constituted by building chains of equivalence to unify heterogeneous elements. Thus populism becomes a dimension of the democratic imaginary.

The title of the book *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, a collection of essays edited by Francisco Panizza, seemed to promise further reflection on this intriguing issue. Unfortunately, with the exception of the introduction and the excellent contribution of Benjamin Arditi, "Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics," this promise goes unfulfilled. Arditi concludes that populism is a dimension of modern politics that expresses itself in both democratic and antidemocratic forms. He

calls populism the “internal periphery” because of the way that its attempt to achieve popular sovereignty undermines the institutional forms of democracy. The slippage occurs because of the ambivalent nature of representation. When parliamentary representation is perceived as corrupt or unworkable, the people embrace symbolic representation, an alternative that produces the effect of “virtual immediacy,” an imaginary identification that suspends the distance between citizen and leader. For Arditì, populism can manifest itself as an aspect of democratic rhetoric as well as at the turbulent edges and as the threatening underside of democratic politics.

Most of the other essays in the book apply Laclau’s theoretical framework to the analysis of particular populist movements. These essays treat such varied phenomena as the mobilization of the Greek Orthodox community in opposition to the Greek state’s removal of religion from identity cards (Yannis Stavrakakis) to the nationalist imaginary in Palestine and the former Yugoslavia (Glenn Bowman). The sheer variety seems to confirm Laclau’s suggestion that populism is not an ideology but rather a political logic, or perhaps the logic of democratic politics itself.

Given the constraints of space, it is impossible to even summarize the themes of each of these essays. Instead, I will simply note that the contributions are generally interesting and accessible to the nonspecialist. One virtue of the collection is a higher degree of thematic and theoretical consistency than is usually found in edited collections. The downside of this consistency is that many of the essays start by repeating the same points, particularly the inadequacy of traditional definitions of populism and the superiority of Laclau’s approach.

My main criticism of the collection, however, is the absence of any comparative work that would link the theoretical analysis of the concept with empirical studies of individual cases. After reading about right-wing populism in Canada, Britain, and the United States, I found myself wondering why the same political project became hegemonic in the United States whereas it had mixed success in Canada and Britain. This question is not only an avenue for further empirical research but also a lacuna that raises questions for Laclau’s theory. Laclau repeatedly insists that the articulation of populist identities is best characterized by its contingency. Thoroughly excising his own Marxist roots, he argues that the social composition or economic structure of a society does not determine the outcome of populist mobilization. Nevertheless, it seems worth exploring whether there was something about the social structure of the United States (racial, economic, or otherwise) that made right-wing populism hegemonic when it remained marginal in both Western Europe and Canada. Similar comparative work might be instructive in Latin America, where the concept of populism has been even more important for understanding the cycles of democratic and authoritarian politics. Sin-

gle case studies, however, cannot illuminate this issue very well.

*On Populist Reason* and *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* are interesting because of the insight they provide into contemporary politics. They also draw attention to the way that populism exposes the tension between liberalism and democracy. Over a hundred year ago, Tocqueville made a similar point when he warned of the dangers of democratic despotism. Renewed theoretical reflection on the concept of populism helps deepen our understanding of democracy.

**Torture: A Collection.** Edited by Sanford Levinson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 328p. \$29.95.

— David C. Rapoport, Emeritus, *University of California, Los Angeles*

Seventeen short essays, together with a very detailed Israeli Supreme Court judgment (1999), provide useful discussions of a timely and important subject. Considerable disagreement occurs, and sometimes participants address each other in strong language. Thus, when Ariel Dorfman pleads for “humanity to say no to torture under any circumstance” (p. 17), Judge Richard Posner responds that the statement “is not only overwrought in tone but irresponsible in content” (p. 295).

The reason for these very passionate disagreements is quite clear. “Torture,” Henry Shue notes, “is contrary to every relevant international law. . . . No other practice except slavery is so universally . . . condemned. . . . Yet unlike slavery, torture is widespread and growing” (p. 47). That is because so many contemporaries believe that torture is necessary for dealing effectively with terrorism, he adds. Every contributor here regards torture as repugnant, but only three endorse Dorfman’s position that it can *never* be permitted. Most of the contributors argue that there is a case for exonerating an occasional torture. Michael Walzer, in a republished essay “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” makes the best general case for the occasional need to torture a prisoner. Citing Machiavelli and Max Weber, he observes that the political world requires one occasionally to behave immorally. Yet even when those acts succeed in their purpose by producing good or averting evil, they are still immoral acts.

The circumstance that “permits” torture is normally called the “ticking bomb scenario.” This is a situation in which an interrogator has good reason to believe that a prisoner knows that a bomb is going to explode and that torture is the only way to extract the necessary information in time to prevent the attack. But those persuaded by the power of the ticking-bomb argument disagree strongly on how best to proceed. Should one provide a prior legal authorization, or should one wait for a torture to occur and then prosecute the torturer, exonerating him only if he could demonstrate that the judgment appeared reasonable? Which of these alternatives is likely to produce fewer

and the most appropriate instances of torture? Allan Der-showitz's "Tortured Reasoning" argues for a prior legal authorization, but most of the contributors here who would permit the occasional torture argue that a prior legal authorization would in fact generate more abuses.

John Langbein's "The Legal History of Torture" makes perhaps the most persuasive case against legalization. Langbein points out that torture was used throughout Europe except in England until the end of the eighteenth century. The reason was that those states used Roman law. Those convicted for murder would be put to death; and because "certainty" was required for conviction, judges could not employ circumstantial evidence. The only proof accepted was derived from two eyewitnesses or a confession. Torture had no place in English law; circumstantial evidence was permitted in capital cases and juries were authorized to make judgments about the evidence. Strong efforts were made over centuries to reduce torture abuses on the Continent, but they did not succeed partly because "a constituency" for torture was created and kept growing. Only after the laws of evidence were changed and prison sentences permitted was torture eliminated. But contemporary torture derives from the desire to preempt atrocities, and preemption is the principal theme in very different counterterrorist policies since the 1880s, when modern terrorism began. But no contributor explores the difference or even acknowledges it.

Definitions of torture and the possibility of using interrogation coercion that is not torture (by Sanford Levinson, Jerome Skolnick, John T. Parry, and Fionnuala Ni Aolain) are extensively discussed. The Israeli Supreme Court, which found that torture practiced by Israel's General Security Service (GSS), or Shin Bet, was contrary to Israeli law, offers a vivid, shocking, and comprehensive picture of the various methods Shin Bet used. Finally, Mark Uriel considers the Argentine experience to examine the effect of torture on the torturers.

How effective have decisions to abolish torture been? Oona Hathaway discusses the 1987 United Nations Convention against Torture and provides some surprising conclusions: "Countries that ratify treaties . . . do not always have better torture practices than those that do not. . . . [T]he Convention does not always have the intended effect of reducing torture in countries that ratify, but, in some cases, the opposite might even be true" (p. 201). The picture is different in Ni Aolain's examination of another and earlier major multiparty torture treaty. The European Convention on Human Rights forced Greece, France, and the UK to abandon abusive interrogation policies. The effectiveness of the Israeli Supreme Court decision to abolish torture is not discussed, and while most people familiar with the situation indicate that it has had serious effects, knowledgeable observers believe that some torture still persists.

The major weakness of the volume is that it provides very little material to help us understand if torture is

effective or not in curbing terrorism, a weakness the editor explicitly recognizes. Only Miriam Gur-Ayre ("Can the War against Terror Justify the Use of Force in Interrogations? Reflections in the Light of the Israeli Experience") addresses the problem. She argues that Israeli torture has not been effective, but the alternative view is not articulated and no other case is considered. Levinson's introduction cites others to show that French torture in Algeria (where, incidentally, the ticking-bomb scenario was invented) was effective. But that conclusion is debatable. Torture did help end the "Battle of Algiers" quickly, but it tainted the French reputation at home and abroad, contributing to their defeat. Also, the Algerian circumstances were peculiar. The National Liberation Front (FLN) stopped attacking the French because it needed all of its resources to mobilize a general strike to show the UN which party the Algerian people supported. Those forced to close their businesses were subjected to torture by the French, whereupon their interrogators got the information they needed. At best, the Battle of Algiers is an unclear case for the effectiveness of antiterrorist torture.

There are only a few references to Abu Ghraib in Iraq and to Guantanamo; but the book was put together before the May 2004 revelations, which the editor says precluded a serious discussion of American practices. Still, some explanation of the various possible implications of the Bush administration's announced policy to hold "prisoners of war" without giving them Geneva Convention rights would have been useful.

The book's purpose is to stimulate discussion by the public, which finds the subject so distasteful as to be avoided. No sustained analysis, however, of public attitudes was commissioned. Those of us familiar with the 125-year history of modern terror know that no government collapsed because it used torture against terrorists. On the other hand, a government in Uruguay, the "Switzerland of Latin America," was overthrown because its antiterrorism policies were too limited.

The "torture problem" now is a significant factor in American political debate. In October 2005, the Senate voted 90-9 to ban "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" of prisoners held by the military. The House has not yet voted on the bill, and the president may veto it. If he signs the bill we will probably find, as others have, that the prohibition is often not effective. Surely, the debate will continue, and this collection will be a useful primary source for all interested parties.

**John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic.** By Jeffrey H. Morrison. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. 240p.

— Philip Abbott, *Wayne State University*

In his *The Origins and Progress of the American Revolution*, loyalist Peter Oliver spoke of the New England clergy as

the “black regiment” of the Revolution who, “tinctured with republicanism,” supported the war for independence. John Witherspoon was a New Jersey Presbyterian, but he might well fit Oliver’s description. He brought Princeton University to the side of the Revolution, mentored the first generation of the new regime’s leadership, served in the Continental Congress, signed the Declaration of Independence, and was an active supporter of the Constitution. Yet while Witherspoon was highly praised by his contemporaries, who predicted that he would be honored by later generations of Americans, he instead became a neglected figure with few memorials erected in his name. Somehow, despite credentials that compared favorably to Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton, fame deserted him. Jeffrey H. Morrison’s engaging and enthusiastic study of John Witherspoon attempts to redeem him as a “forgotten founder.”

Morrison attributes Witherspoon’s invisibility to a number of factors, including the destruction of many of his papers, some by British troops and some by his own hand, and possible antipathy to clerics in politics. Most prominent, however, is the later consensus that Witherspoon was an “unoriginal” political thinker “not worth the effort it would take to read through the multivolume *Works*, provided a circulating copy could be had” (p. 18). Morrison struggles with this assertion and devises various approaches to overcome it. First, he suggests that Witherspoon’s contributions to American political thought should be judged through the achievements of his students. He contends, for example, that Madison’s religious views can be traced to the influence of his former teacher. Witherspoon’s defense of religious liberty was advocated by Madison. So too, argues, Morrison, can the notion of a “public religion” respectful of minorities be traced to Witherspoon. His introduction of the principles of the Scottish Enlightenment, particularly moral sense philosophy, is also given extensive treatment. Morrison credits Witherspoon with almost single-handedly carrying its precepts across the Atlantic.

The problem with this approach is that it is very circumstantial. Morrison at one point suggests that Madison’s pessimistic assessment of human nature was derived from Witherspoon’s Calvinism and that one can “feel a reverberation” of Witherspoon’s doctrine of the independence of religion from the state in Federalist #51 (p. 40). In another instance, he notes that Jefferson mentioned the “very same three” exemplars—Locke, Bacon, Newton—as did Witherspoon in his *Lectures on Moral Philosophy*. Given the complexity of relationship between students and teachers generally, perhaps Morrison is correct in Madison’s case to suggest parallel positions as evidence of influence, but this leaves open the question of whether Madison’s views on human nature were derived from other sources as well. The Calvinist dispositions in the *Lectures* were hardly unique in eighteenth-century America, nor was a

profound skepticism about setting up a “theocracy” after the Revolution. Sometimes, too, a mentoring relationship can be just as importantly established through an analysis of the student’s rejection or modification of his teacher’s views. Were Madison’s changing positions on religion and politics a kind of negative influence, an inventive engagement with Calvinist and nascent liberal sensibilities? Similar doubts arise with Morrison’s case for Witherspoon’s influence on the founders through his teachings on the Scottish Enlightenment. Moreover, even granted Morrison’s contention, does it matter that the founders were acquainted with moral sense philosophy? Jefferson used the doctrine to solidify racist sentiments. Morrison believes that moral sense philosophy “inoculated” American revolutionaries from the excesses that later arose in the French Revolution, which if true would place us all in Winthrop’s debt, but plain old Calvinism might have been enough.

Another tactic used by Morrison is his assertion that all Americans were unreceptive to political theory, preferring always to approach issues from the standpoint of the “practical and experimental” (p. 118). This Boorstinism is supplemented by an acknowledgement of liberal, biblical, and republican strands in America, but for Morrison, all of these blend into a melodious “chorus of many voices and many parts” (p. 122). Thus, Witherspoon’s eclecticism and lack of originality are an almost exact replica of American political culture in general: “Perhaps more than any other single founder, Witherspoon embodied all the major intellectual and social elements behind the founding” (p. 127). Morrison treads a fine line between the exceptional and the typical on this point, but he attempts to resolve the contradiction by contending that Witherspoon combined these strands more elegantly than any of his “more verbose brother founders” (p. 3).

A case can be made for Witherspoon, however, that proceeds from almost an opposite direction. What is so intriguing about him is not so much his talents as a synthesizer but his capacity to swiftly embrace and act upon discordant elements of a new political culture. This aspect of his political theorizing is most evident not from his stolid *Lectures* but from his addresses and sermons. When criticized by Scottish authorities for his lack of patriotism in urging his countrymen to emigrate to America, Witherspoon replied that a true patriot works to help his nation’s people. Emigration did threaten the interests of landowners who could no longer command high rents but, as Winthrop wrote in a letter to Scots Magazine, “is this a liberal way of thinking, to say that a man is an enemy to his country when he promotes the happiness of the great body of its people with a small diminution of the interest of a handful?” (Thomas Miller, ed., *The Selected Works of John Witherspoon*, 1990, p. 28). Jefferson could not have written a sharper reply. In his *An Address to the Natives of Scotland residing in America* three years later in 1774, Witherspoon argued that since America

was being created voluntarily and not by the “caprices” of kings, it had the potential to be a unique commonwealth in human history. Two years later, he reiterated a fundamental truth derived from his Calvinist beliefs. Religious and political freedom must both be supported because “there is not a single instance in history in which civil liberty was lost, and religious liberty preserved entire” (Miller, pp. 140–41). In a speech before Congress, “Upon the Confederation,” Witherspoon, risking the conclusion that he had become “visionary and romantic,” suggested that proper constitutional arrangements, such as a “balance of power,” could actually change human nature itself. As president of Princeton, he purged the faculty of conservative elements and transformed the university into a modern institution by introducing English and reducing the study of classics, and encouraging civic obligations (even to the point of collecting revolutionary pamphlets by students). It is perhaps this jerky aspect of his political thought, as well as his ability to move with striking rapidity to new positions rather than any pragmatism and empiricism, that may better explain Witherspoon’s genius as revolutionary and founder.

Assessing the stature of any political theorist, however, is a difficult task, particularly for a neglected one in the American context. Morrison deserves much commendation for his efforts.

**The Postmodern Prince: Critical Theory, Left Strategy, and the Making of a New Political Subject.**

By John Sanbonmatsu. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004. 272p. \$65.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Peter Breiner, *State University of New York at Albany*

As the title suggests, this book has a great and admirable ambition. It seeks to write a version of Antonio Gramsci’s *Modern Prince* for a post–New Left, postmodern era. While it does not actually do this, it does provide a critical settling of accounts both with the legacy of the American New Left and the subsequent appearance of a (largely academic) leftism informed by postmodern theory. More significantly, it tries to suggest, though very sketchily, what a unitary actor with strategic acumen and a leftist program might look like, given the decline of parties of the working class and the fragmentation of emancipatory social movements. Both the criticism and the reconstructive aim are informed by Gramsci’s emphasis on politics as a struggle for hegemony.

John Sanbonmatsu’s book has two parts, a critical narrative of left academic theories and a Gramsci-inspired account of a left political theory that centers on an imagined left political actor and political strategy tied to organic social and economic development. The first part of the book tells a story of the decline of New Left theories in the United States. According to Sanbonmatsu, the early theories of political action rooted in the civil rights movement were something of an ideal political moment. For a very

short time, expressive political actions and political strategy mutually reinforced each other. However, post–New Left theory became purely expressive, trading in an interest in strategy in favor of a focus on disrupting ordinary discourse with the aim of finding a repressed genuine self and recovering organic community. These expressive notions of radical negation of the present were, in turn, replaced by poststructuralist theories of discourse that used rhetorical analysis to demonstrate that organicism and expressive unity of the subject were mere functions of textual strategy.

Sanbonmatsu is particularly unhappy with this last development, arguing that in rejecting the concept of “totality,” “postmodernism represents a disavowal of political strategy” (p. 96). For Sanbonmatsu the poststructuralist (and structuralist) rejection of these fundamentals of previous left political theory leads to a fatal incoherence: On the one hand, poststructuralism claims that undermining the representational and totalistic pretensions of texts is a kind of radical politics; on the other hand, it rejects the possibility of there being anything like a unitary political agent to be emancipated or guided by theory. Worse yet, he argues, in rejecting a concept of political conflict in which unitary actors with total world views struggle for hegemony, for leadership over state, civil society, and economy, poststructuralist theory has proved to be a poor guide to the actual shifts in the political relations of right and left, at least in the United States: “It was the political and religious right, not the left, which was to succeed in mobilizing a transformative hegemonic political project with truly global reach” (p. 154). And it was the failure of the Left to grasp this that provided the Right with this opening.

This practical criticism of poststructuralism becomes the basis for the second part of the book: a defense of Gramsci’s strategic notion of political agency against Michel Foucault’s concept of archaeology and an explication of how Gramsci’s theory of collective agency and hegemony could be applied to a left post-Marxist form of politics. Here the book seeks to make good on the promissory note of its title. In probably the most analytically illuminating chapter in the book, entitled “The Prince and the Archaeologist,” Sanbonmatsu sets up a one-to-one comparison between Foucault’s subject-less, discursive theory of control and strategy and Gramsci’s theory of a unitary collective political subject located in a constantly shifting struggle for hegemony. Not surprisingly, Sanbonmatsu embraces Gramsci’s notion of political foresight, that is, his claim that an analysis of long-run historical tendencies needs to be complemented by a notion of a partisan political strategist who understands that an engaged political will is necessary for us to distinguish the particular conjunctural features of political situations from their durable aspects. Thus, Foucault stands accused of having explicitly abandoned the attempt to

discover how “the oppressed”—however they may be defined under present conditions—can be transformed into conscious willing agents in a political struggle. Further, by valorizing the fragmentation of social movements as microresistances, according to Sanbonmatsu, Foucault, as well as post-Foucaultians, discourage the oppressed from entering the struggle for hegemony over state, civil society, and economy. It is interesting, and problematic, as we shall see momentarily, that Sanbonmatsu intertwines his defense of a Gramscian notion of hegemonic struggle with the phenomenological theory of meaning—the very theory that structuralist and post-structuralist theory sought to overthrow.

We would expect at this point for Sanbonmatsu to provide a Gramscian analysis of the present relations of state, civil society, and economy as viewed by an emerging collective actor. Gramscian theory, after all, aims to reconstruct imaginatively a modern version of Machiavelli’s prince as a collective actor striving by means of a political party to enter the struggle for hegemony. Interpreting Machiavelli’s literary strategy, Gramsci spoke of the modern prince as a “concrete phantasy” organizing a shattered and collective will into a unified whole—a projection of possibility in a time of disaggregated political forces. It is this imaginative leap that Sanbonmatsu would promise us in claiming to provide a “postmodern prince.”

Toward the end of his book, the author finally seeks to make good on this promise. Arguing that in the present the working class organized in a political party cannot be the potential agent leading the struggle for an egalitarian and nonoppressive society, he describes this new postmodern prince, albeit in rather vague terms, as an “organic coalescence” of diverse social movements for human and nonhuman liberation unified into a universal project (p. 160). This coalescence of social movements will be democratic, combine long-term goals with tactical coordination, and embrace a philosophy of life consisting of an ethic of empathy for all those who suffer. Its organizational principle would consist of a collegial coordination of different groups spanning international civil society.

Needless to say, even readers sympathetic with this project would expect a more sharply drawn account of the relation among hegemonic struggle, political agency, and strategy. Instead of providing this, Sanbonmatsu swerves into a metatheoretical defense of the later Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of totality. Here, the modern prince as imagined unitary collective actor is analogized to a field of perception in which different perspectives come together into a perceptual whole—in this case, different perceptions of oppression on the part of particular social movements merge into a total understanding of oppression (pp. 200–201). Sanbonmatsu’s retreat at this juncture into a critical defense of the phenomenolog-

ical notion of multiple perspectives constituting our perceptual horizon signals a curious dilemma that recurs throughout this work—namely, the attempt to rehabilitate phenomenology against the poststructuralist onslaught seems at crucial moments to arrest rather than further the political argument on left political agency. The result is that his argument starts needlessly to depend on whether, say, Foucault’s rejection of the subjective constitution of experience is valid or not.

This problem aside, Sanbonmatsu is often convincing in demonstrating why a Gramscian approach to left political agency has more to recommend it than a poststructuralist one. Nevertheless, an (imaginative) account of the present political field as viewed by oppressed collectivities seeking leadership of state, civil society, and economy is still waiting to be written. Perhaps it is asking too much even of a book entitled *The Postmodern Prince* to provide that.

**The Idea of the State.** By Peter J. Steinberger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 344p. \$75.00.

— John S. Dryzek, *Australian National University*

In the early decades of American political science and its political theory, the state was the main subject matter of the discipline. This book recalls that era (though it is situated mainly in the deeper history of political thought). As the author recognizes, its subject matter is today somewhat unfashionable in political theory. Moreover, the book’s theory is first and foremost metaphysical rather than political, thus reversing the priority that John Rawls and most other contemporary theorists proclaim. To complete his separation from contemporary theoretical currents, the kind of state advocated by Peter Steinberger is “omnicompetent in scope, absolute in authority and organic in composition” (p. xiv).

The bulk of *The Idea of the State* is devoted to making this last jarring claim palatable in an era of liberalism, limited government, and democracy. The initial key lies in the definition of the state itself. Steinberger distinguishes between the state, on the one hand, and the institutions of government, on the other. “The state” is what defines a political community; it is essentially a set of propositions and ideas about political truth that the community shares (and sometimes contests). Institutions for Steinberger are almost exclusively a matter of shared ideas, and the state is no exception. The state is not government, and different kinds of governmental structures and public policies can be consistent with any particular state. However, the state itself, conceptualized in this idealistic form, provides the grounds on which government and policy are justified and contested (p. 32). Thus, the absolute state can happily coexist with, for example, limited government (p. 38).

In these terms, the state is (following Aristotle) “the institution of institutions” (p. 22). Civil society, for many theorists a realm of associational life distinct from the state, is treated here as synonymous with the state (pp. 10–11)—as are old and new concepts such as the body politic, commonwealth, and political community. Given that shared ideas about the state both define a political community and define the state itself, there is no possible escape from the state. Politics can only exist within the state.

Once the state is defined in these terms, Steinberger shows that differences concerning many major political questions are still possible. The absolute state might coexist with either monarchical or democratic government (chap. 2). The omniscient state will have to classify which kinds of practices are tolerable (chap. 4). The absolute state will allow for substantial disagreement about how its core ideas can best be pursued (chap. 5), and even allow civil disobedience if “a law fails to reflect what the state itself desires” (p. 262).

While his claims about the nature of the state are on the face of it startling, close inspection shows that Steinberger has constructed some excellent defenses—if absolutism, omniscience, and organicism look contestable in any given instance, all that shows is that a state does not exist there. The state is defined in ideational terms that are encompassing in the way they define a political community to go along with the state; and anything contestable or seemingly at odds with the three core principles can be allocated to the realm of government rather than the state.

Are there any chinks in this self-referential structure? Three spring to mind, all of which attenuate the applicability of Steinberger’s theory in the contemporary world. The first occurs in the case of deeply divided societies. If one group’s identity can be validated only through suppression of the identity of another group, there is no set of ideas to define a state that they can share. The author does not address this problem; he might respond that each side would have to constitute its own state, but that would fail to get such societies anywhere in practical terms. The second problem is more universal. In an interdependent and occasionally globalizing world, the reality is increasingly that of multiple and overlapping political communities and domains of authority. Steinberger’s state is encompassing, well bounded, and exclusive. As such, it belongs to a world of totally sovereign states that (if it ever really existed) is not the same as our world. The third problem arises to the degree that there are things the state must be by virtue of its location within an international system populated by other states, and within a capitalist political economy. To the degree that such constraints apply, the state looks less like the ideational counterpart of a political community.

Such doubts notwithstanding, Steinberger has crafted a theoretical structure that is striking in its originality, comprehensive in its coverage, bold in its willingness to depart from contemporary currents, and learned in its conversa-

tion with the history of political thought. Its scholarly achievement is substantial.

**Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea.** By Steinar Stjernø. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 406p. \$75.00.

— Peter G. Stillman, *Vassar College*

Steinar Stjernø’s important and fascinating book will be valuable to political theorists and sociologists interested in the idea of solidarity from the nineteenth century through the present, to political historians concerned about the uses of solidarity in the political discourses of left-wing, religious, and fascist parties and movements, and to historians of political thought and of ideas who address methodological questions in their field.

As his subtitle indicates, Stjernø writes the history of an idea. He draws his methodological inspirations from German conceptual history in the hermeneutic tradition and the “Cambridge School” of Quentin Skinner and John Pocock, who study political languages as dynamic structures that are modified and changed. Stjernø studies the specific discourses of solidarity, within their social and political contexts, looking for the conceptual changes in the use and meaning of solidarity. Whereas Skinner and Pocock emphasize individual speakers, the full political context, and concurrent changes in other concepts, Stjernø begins and ends with a few individual theorists (such as Auguste Comte and Karl Marx, Jürgen Habermas and Hans Kung), and his empirical work focuses on the language of political movements and parties, especially their political programs, in order to make possible the study of an extensive span of time and many countries.

To understand differences in solidarity discourses and look for changes, Stjernø analytically distinguishes four aspects of solidarity. What is the “foundation” of solidarity; that is, to what extent and in what ways does the self identify with others? What is the objective or goal of solidarity? How inclusive of others is it? And what is its “collective orientation” or (conversely) how much autonomy does it leave to individuals? As the author points out, these questions are all aspects of the empirical and normative questions of the relation of “I” to “we” and of “we” to “they.” He analyzes individual theorists’ ideas and parties’ programs in terms of these four aspects—and produces about 25 four-columned tables that display theorists’ and programs’ ideas on solidarity in a clear, easily comprehensible, shorthand form that his text both explains and elucidates.

Stjernø follows his introductory methodological chapter with three chapters in which he analyzes three “traditions” of solidarity. One is the classical social theories of nineteenth-century sociology, such as Charles Fourier, Auguste Comte, and Émile Durkheim, who, except for Max Weber, were concerned with trying to produce social harmony or order in the face of nascent capitalism without another revolutionary upheaval. A second tradition

stems from Marx, who focused on class solidarity to realize the interests of the workers in a unified struggle—but who also, Stjernø notes, had an alternative vision of a future society free of capitalism where all could be free members. Later Marxists, like Eduard Bernstein and Lenin, took Marx's concepts of solidarity in differing directions. The third tradition is Catholic and Lutheran ethical teachings, that is, in papal encyclicals and the proclamations of the Lutheran World Federation. In both denominations, Stjernø finds that solidarity has not been used as a term nor stressed as an idea until after World War II, and then particularly in circumstances where the Christians could use it without the taint of Marxist, leftist, or revolutionary ideologies. In these chapters lies a rich, multifaceted presentation of differing meanings of solidarity in social theory, socialist theory, and religious ethics.

Stjernø then asks the more empirical question (p. 89): "How, when and why are these ideas of solidarity *reflected* in the institutional ideologies of social democratic and Christian democratic parties in Western Europe?" The next four chapters take us through the languages of solidarity, beginning with the First International and then the subsequent changes in social democratic parties, the Christian democratic discourse, and their convergences, or not, at the end of the last century and the beginning of this. A fifth chapter treats the historically significant but now eclipsed Marxist-Leninist and fascist solidarity. Of particular interest in these chapters is the author's nuanced treatment of solidarity in Scandinavian countries; his emphasis on the differing languages of socialist and social democratic solidarity in northern Europe, southern Europe, and Britain; and his use of changes in the language of solidarity as a way to trace the transformation of Communist Parties in southern Europe.

In his two final chapters Stjernø asks about the prospects for solidarity in the present day. First, he looks for coherent theoretical statements about solidarity from contemporary social theorists like the American communitarians, socialists like Anthony Giddens, and theologians like Jürgen Moltmann. Then, in an epologic final chapter, he analyzes the multiple threats to solidarity posed by contemporary challenges such as consumerism and globalization.

Because of the breadth of his coverage, any reader can quibble with parts of his work; but I think Stjernø's overall project will stand up well. So I would like to end this review with some questions. It is always difficult to set the boundaries of a concept and to distinguish the history of a concept from the history of a word. Stjernø explicitly excludes liberals and conservatives, even when they use concepts of solidarity (p. 10), and he excludes liberal and conservative ideas of community (except when he discusses American communalism among the contemporary statements of solidarity [pp. 10, 15, 295–98]) from his discussion of solidarity. Those exclusions are, I think, challenges for further studies that would, for instance, look at

liberal and conservative discourses on the idea of community with attention to whether and how they converge with socialist and religious languages of solidarity. In his empirical chapters, he focuses on party programs and does not look at policies (p. 10); that connection, already examined by some scholars in specialized studies, could use further analysis. Similarly, he stresses the need to institutionalize solidarity in the modern world (p. 307) but leaves much work here for others to do. Finally, this study focusing on Western Europe should be followed by a similar analysis of the languages of solidarity (including religious languages) in North America, at both national and state or provincial levels. *Solidarity in Europe*, valuable in itself, can serve as a wise guide for future questions and research.

**Which Rights Should Be Universal?** By William J. Talbott.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 232p. \$35.00.

— Clifford Orwin, *University of Toronto*

A thousand words cannot begin to state a thousand disagreements, or even to summarize the wealth of subtle arguments that provoked them, and so you will just have to read this engaging and audacious book for yourself.

William Talbott's theme is moral justification in general and that of universal human rights in particular. He emphatically rejects what he calls the Truth (or "top down") Model of moral justification, which by leaving morality hostage to the existence of self-evident truths ends up encouraging skepticism and moral relativism. He is friendlier to inductivism (or a "bottom up") model of justification, but finally rests his case on a version of moral equilibrium theory. This he attractively presents as a kind of ongoing dialectic between top-down and top-up approaches to morality. In this he recalls Plato's Socrates, although the resemblance entirely eludes him.

While his debt to John Rawls does not elude him, Talbott is highly dissatisfied with the latter's eventual descent into Rortyism. He offers a scathing critique of the "extreme metaphysical modesty" of "political liberalism": "[N]othing in (Rawls's) account rules out the possibility that the most extremely intolerant . . . moral and political views could be true." Talbott emphatically rejects such bloodless "excuse me" liberalism: "Probably the most implausible claim I have made in this book is the following. With no special equipment other than what is acquired through biological evolution and no special training other than the moral training most people receive in their culture, human beings have the ability to discern universal moral truths. We do this by being able to make reliable judgments about the rightness or wrongness of particular cases that are true universally—that is, true from any point of view" (p. 187).

Moderation in all things, including modesty. Talbott describes his own position as "epistemically modest" but "metaphysically ambitious." Arguing forcefully that epistemic modesty need not imply relativism (nor metaphysical

ambition “moral imperialism”), he follows the early Rawls (but in his own distinctive manner) in seeking to achieve a synthesis of a purified (or expurgated) Kant and an equally purified Mill. He argues that both nonconsequentialist and consequentialist moral thinking equally support his conclusions.

Talbott is bent on doing a lot with a little. While it might seem that the question of his title should read “Whether There Are Universal Human Rights”—first things first—he tries to show that to answer this question is also to answer that of which rights these are. Proclaiming his faith in “an ongoing historical-social process of moral discovery of universal moral principles” (p. 34), he declares that “even if we are not in a position to articulate the fundamental principles of morality . . . building on past successes, we can discern enough of their shape to understand why, in combination with what we know about human beings and human societies, they will require that certain basic human rights be universally respected” (p. 35). These prove to be the rights appropriate to autonomous beings (where autonomy is understood nonmetaphysically again in terms reminiscent of Rawls).

It takes Talbott a brisk nine pages to dispose of the objection that universalism in human rights amounts to “cultural imperialism,” and to skewer the cultural relativism underlying this objection as ultimately self-contradictory and evincing a lack of self-knowledge. Here, making ingenious use of the example of (a highly stylized) Bartolomé de Las Casas—slaveholder turned manumitter, priest, and tireless champion of the rights of the Indians—the author promotes a paradigm of moral education. His purpose is to establish that there is such a thing as a universal moral outlook into which human beings of all cultures are capable of emerging—and which as such refutes the notion that the norms of any culture are immune from rational criticism.

Talbott offers a lengthy discussion of patriarchalism, this in keeping with his view that the emancipation of women offers the crucial paradigm of moral progress through historical evolution. Here, however, he falls into preaching to the converted. Taking gender equality so com-

pletely for granted as he does, he simply dismisses or parodies older views to the contrary, as well as contemporary reservations about the decline of the family.

Skeptical readers will find Talbott’s history of moral progress much too triumphalist, as well as too obviously partisan. Those familiar with *New York Times* editorials will find no surprises in his expansive enumeration of the basic human rights or in his moral positions generally. An allegedly cosmic moral standpoint that so resoundingly and without exception affirms the current opinions of the left wing of the Democratic Party cannot but evoke some suspicion.

Not surprisingly, then, Talbott displays a tin ear in matters of religion, which never figures in his argument except as an outworn example of top-down moral reasoning. Like the author himself, I am leery of moral coercion; otherwise I would sentence him to hard time rereading Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, to say nothing of Plato, his version of whom fails to rise to the level of a straw man.

Although Talbott strives to be up-to-date in canvassing debates within philosophy departments, his optimism about human reason indeed harkens back to Kant and Mill. As he seems largely impervious to criticisms of the emptiness and degradation of contemporary life, so does he to that self-destruction of modern rationalism that poses the biggest theoretical obstacle to his project. While he scorns Richard Rorty’s moral emotivism and scores some effective points against it, he cannot really be said to meet the post-Nietzschean challenge to the hegemony of the liberal worldview.

This book deserves a wide readership. Whatever one’s thousand disagreements with it (and yours will doubtless differ from mine), it is a fascinating exercise in ambitious liberal minimalism. By this I mean that it is not yet another lame attempt to promote a liberalism without universal rational foundations, but rather an effort to supply these as parsimoniously as possible. Whatever our doubts about the feasibility of this project, we are beholden to Talbott for undertaking it, and can all benefit from wrestling with the ingenuity with which he prosecutes it.

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## AMERICAN POLITICS

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### **Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age.** By

Matthew A. Baum. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. 344p. \$39.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Marion R. Just, *Wellesley College*

Most research aimed at understanding television’s influence on citizens’ knowledge and attention to current events

has focused on network news. Yet hard news constitutes only a small fraction of TV programming. The television day is filled with shows that come under the rubric of “soft news”—running the gamut from celebrity gossip to late-night comedy, afternoon talk shows, and prime-time magazines. Matthew Baum’s book fills an important gap in political communication research. Baum asks what people learn about hard news from soft news programs. He argues that watching soft news programs gets people who would otherwise have little interest in foreign affairs to pay attention to international crises.

*Soft News Goes to War* utilizes a variety of research methods to reach its conclusions. It begins with a content analysis to show that foreign policy crises are indeed covered on soft news programs. Like television news in general, however, the coverage is episodic, concentrating on the most dramatic events and giving short shrift to context or development. Not surprisingly, soft news programs generally frame international coverage in terms of human interest. Because some kind of soft news is available throughout the day and night, however, people who turn on their TVs just to be entertained are bound to obtain a regular dose of foreign news throughout the week.

Baum takes a generally sunny view of the audience, a perspective that is still a minority in the field of communications. His public opinion data show that people who watch soft news pay some attention to stories about war and other foreign crises. The book shows that consumers of soft news programming, ranging from *Letterman* to *Hard Copy*, are even more aware of foreign policy crises than they are of high-profile domestic political events. Historically, the rise of soft news correlates with increasing levels of conflict awareness. Attentiveness to the Persian Gulf War was greater than it was to the more costly and drawn-out conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Furthermore, the net gain in awareness of the Gulf War was among the least politically involved members of the public. This is, as Baum himself puts it, “the good news about soft news.”

Finding this increased awareness among soft news consumers begs the question: Does “accidental attention” to news make citizens different kinds of actors in politics? The book presents support for the hypotheses that soft news provides viewers with an entrée into hard news. This finding is in line with previous research, which shows that TV’s dramatic story lines encourage learning about difficult topics (W. Russell Neuman et al., *Common Knowledge*, 1992). In other words, the soft news “gateway” holds promise for a more informed electorate.

Baum further asks about the positions that relatively uninformed, somewhat attentive citizens take in foreign policy crises. His content analysis shows that to make the cut as entertainment in the soft news format, foreign crises must have dramatic and compelling story lines, in which violence and death figure prominently. Small wonder, then, that his survey analysis shows that the consumers of soft news tend to shun foreign entanglement—it is a scary world out there!

The book claims moreover that soft news consumers are more likely than others to “rally round the flag” and support a president who takes them into war—a timely, if disturbing, finding. Baum argues that because Democrats already can count on support from the relatively uneducated soft news audience, Republican presidents are more likely to benefit from a soft news rally. It is fair to note, however, that the rally advantage of Republican versus

Democratic presidents could have alternative explanations, such as the Republican’s “issue ownership” of military and defense policy.

A number of Baum’s conclusions are tentative. He lays out a series of hypotheses in the beginning of the book and puts together different kinds of survey evidence to support these hypotheses. Each analysis raises methodological questions, especially those involving historical comparisons. For example, can we compare the number of “Don’t Know” respondents from face-to-face interview surveys to telephone surveys? In addition, when reaching back in history for parallel examples, the book fails to emphasize the vastly different public and media environments of, say, the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War.

In the contemporary media environment, only a few wars involving the United States can be compared to the Gulf War. Baum’s examples include Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The author demonstrates a progressive attention to foreign crises in soft news based on the greater coverage of Bosnia and Kosovo, compared to the earlier actions in Haiti and Somalia. This difference may represent a progressive impact of soft news, as he argues, but it may also reflect journalists’ lack of access to Haiti and Somalia. The Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts took place in Europe where plenty of freelancers provided stories to a wide variety of news outlets, including 24/7 cable news. The cable audience, which is generally small for any given timeslot, attracts large daily audiences during crises. The initial attack on Baghdad, for example, was covered live on CNN. Is it possible that the “not so interested” soft news consumers checked in with CNN as well as *Oprah*?

Baum’s research was based primarily on 1990s data, and the television world has continued to change. The newsmagazine fad has receded (replaced by even less substantive “reality” programs), while Comedy Central’s *The Daily Show* has become appointment television for younger viewers and has even generated a media satire spin-off, *The Colbert Report*. *The Daily Show*’s popularity suggests that comedy is a powerful way to reach news avoiders. Still, surveys by the Pew Research Center do not show increased knowledge among these audiences.

*Soft News Goes to War* may not go far enough for researchers who would like to know about the impact of soft news on actual learning. A useful extension of this work would include experiments on the amount of learning from soft news shows that Baum only gets at indirectly with survey data. The research could also be extended to local news (often soft) and cable news.

The idea that generally inattentive members of the public can use small bits of low-cost information in making political decisions situates this book in the optimistic camp of public opinion research (e.g., Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter*, 1991; Neuman et al. 1992; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public*, 1992; Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, *The Democratic*

*Dilemma*, 1998). But the findings about what people do with their soft news info-bits—rally round a war president—concludes the book on a pessimistic note. It is not clear whether we should rejoice that politically unsophisticated people have “low information rationality” (Popkin) or whether in wartime, they are as easily manipulated as what Hitler once called a “herd of sheep.” Baum’s data provide comfort to both camps.

**Adaptive Governance: Integrating Science, Policy, and Decision Making.** Edited by Ronald D. Brunner, Toddi A. Steelman, Lindy Coe-Juell, Christina M. Cromley, Christine M. Edwards, and Donna W. Tucker. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 368p. \$79.50 cloth, \$29.50 paper.

**Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management.** Edited by Paul A. Sabatier, Will Focht, Mark Lubell, Zev Trachtenberg, Arnold Vedlitz, and Marty Matlock. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 327p. \$65.00 cloth, \$26.00 paper.

— Zachary A. Smith, *Northern Arizona University*

For almost two decades, alternative or environmental dispute resolution (EDR) has been a hot topic for many scholars and practitioners of environmental and natural resources policy and administration. There are now many books and articles that examine the promises and pitfalls of ERD. For the uninitiated, EDR can include any type of conflict or dispute resolution that falls outside of the normal state or federal judicial or bureaucratic system. This can include everything from negotiation, mediation, and arbitration (commonly used in the legal system—and not typically thought of as EDR) to things with names like collaborative, cooperative, or collective management and adaptive governance. The normally cited prerequisites for ERD are that the negotiations be voluntary, that the parties participate in the process directly, that participants may withdraw from the process at any time, that third-party facilitators have no formal authority to impose a decision, and that the parties agree to whatever is decided. If this sounds like getting people together to talk and work things out, that is because this is what it is.

Most of the books written about EDR (including these two) spend little time on the constraints of the process, and in their enthusiasm seem to ignore the contexts where ERD is not particularly useful. (*Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in Natural Resource Management*, by Julia Wondollock and Steven Yaffee [2000], although an excellent resource for activists and managers, exemplifies this shortcoming; Rosemary O’Leary and Lisa B. Bingham provide a notable exception to the trend in *The Promise and Performance of Environmental Conflict Resolution*, 2003.) Although *Swimming Upstream* gives us a summary of criticisms of collaborative management, it maintains the overall enthusiasm we have come to expect from these works. *Adaptive Governance* is not as introspective and, in fact, is similar in most respects to the earlier work by

Ronald D. Brunner et al. (*Finding Common Ground: Governance and Natural Resources in the American West*, 2002).

The two books under review do basically the same thing. Both start out with a description of the status quo and why it is wanting. *Adaptive Governance* calls traditional means of dispute resolution “scientific management” and describes it as centralized, top-down, based on the best science, and done by experts relying on hard methods with minimal outside participation and without politics when possible. Its description of traditional management seems a bit harsh—federal resource managers are rarely as strict and one-dimensional as depicted here. *Swimming Upstream* describes traditional decision making in somewhat gentler but no less damning terms: technocratic, single agency, and top-down with public participation limited to hearings designed to fine-tune or ratify agency plans. This book focuses on watershed management, whereas in the former, the net is cast wider, covering both watersheds and land areas. For both, the target of reform is the status quo in natural resource management. Both books make the point that ERD should be nonlinear, multidimensional, all-inclusive, and (in the case of *Adaptive Governance*) directed toward the “common interest.” (*Adaptive Governance* is not quite clear how the common interest will always be achieved, and the fact that there are sometimes “winners and losers” seems to be conveniently skirted.)

Both books use case studies to illustrate their points, and the cases are their major strengths. In *Adaptive Governance*, five case studies cover fisheries, management on the Colorado River above Grand Junction, range management in northern New Mexico, range management in southern Arizona and New Mexico, watershed management in Oregon, and on the national level, forest management. *Swimming Upstream* is divided into three parts. The first part provides an overview of watershed management in the United States and the role of collaborative management in that history. In the second part, case studies examine collaborative water management experiences in Oklahoma and Texas. Part III integrates quantitative analyses of stakeholders with various theoretical approaches to collective action in an examination of the factors that impact the success or failure of collaborative watershed management. Concluding chapters in both books summarize and generalize primarily for the benefit of practitioners of natural resources management in order to make recommendations for a transition from “scientific management,” or traditional management, to adapted government or collaborative management. The final chapter of *Swimming Upstream* provides a list of recommendations for practitioners interested in implementing collaborative management, as well as suggestions for researchers in collaborative approaches to management (p. 293).

One of the major obstacles for a wide implementation of EDR has been a lack of understanding of who will

participate and why. Rational political actors will select the means of participating in the policy process that maximize their chances of success. Consequently, EDR will only be followed when it is perceived to be advantageous to conventional means of influencing policy. Much research has been done on the incentives of political actors to follow a particular policy process over another. We know, for example, that parties will attempt to influence the policy process at those points where the resources they possess have the greatest chance of making an impact. For many interested parties, this will not be in face-to-face negotiation. Some of the EDR literature holds out the promise of cooperation without evaluating its constraints. In the international context, this is something like the regime theorist who hopes that the rational self-interested actors will somehow overcome their self-preservation instincts and cooperate for the common good. Such behavior is no more likely in the domestic arena.

It is clear that additional research is needed so that we can develop a better understanding of the incentives actors have to use, or avoid, EDR. There is no doubt that EDR is preferable under certain conditions but clearly not desirable under others, depending upon who you are and what your goals are in the process. Unfortunately, neither of these books sheds much light on this subject.

Although EDR is not the panacea that some would make it out to be, its value, in some contexts, cannot be denied. Both *Swimming Upstream* and *Adaptive Governance* provide excellent case studies and make solid recommendations that will be useful for practitioners. Anyone interested in the use of EDR in environmental and natural resources management, both practitioner and scholar, will find these books useful.

**Apprehending Politics: News Media and Individual Political Development.** By Marco Calavita. Albany: State

University of New York Press, 2005. 285p. \$81.50 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

— Stephanie Greco Larson, *Dickinson College*

Marco Calavita conducted extensive interviews with 15 “Generation X” Americans in order to understand their political ideas and how contextual factors (particularly the news media) influenced these thoughts, feelings, and actions. He wisely prefers the term “individual political development” (p. 6) to “political socialization” because he finds it truer to the complex, dynamic, lifelong experience. He is particularly interested in exploring the role that the news media play in attitude formation, stability, and change.

Calavita concludes that the people he interviewed exhibited both attitude persistence and change and that they had agency and selectivity in negotiating the media (and other contextual influences). The result was that “these Americans have developed their own politics, but they have not developed them just as they please; the biases

and parameters of their environments have proven conducive to some kinds of continuing development and hostile to others” (p. 231). Specifically, he found that the people shared a “new populism” that was cynical toward federal government, liberals, and what they characterized as a “liberal media.” Interpretations of the role of the media in fostering these perceptions are suggestive, relying on quotations from the interviews and Calavita’s own analysis of the news sources they used.

The book includes six chapters and comprehensive methodological appendices. After a brief introduction, the second chapter describes the contemporary political culture, focusing on the “rightward shift” since the 1960s (p. 17) and the increased “disconnection” (p. 43) people feel toward politics. A persuasive case is made that these changes are evident in news content; however, the degree to which the media reflect or cause these changes remains unclear. The next chapter contains long descriptions of each of the 15 people and uses extensive (often fascinating) direct quotations from their interviews. In Chapter 4, Calavita tries to make sense of the “complex interrelationships—the ecology—of individual political development” (p. 127). He does this by describing how the respondents talked about various influences on them (such as family, religion, peers, media) and noting commonalities in their stories and self-assessments. Chapter 5, the strongest chapter, describes the individuals’ political ideologies, focusing on their attitudes about “Class and Power,” “Race,” and “Government” (p. 189). It is here that the “rightward shift” discussed earlier is dramatically illustrated in the way that conservative rhetoric connects with the subjects’ cynicism and commitment to free agency. This is evident among even the more liberal subjects. A short conclusion reviews some general findings.

Certainly, for anyone in the political socialization area, this is a must read. Scholars of public opinion and political communications frustrated by the limitations of polling are also likely to be an eager audience for the book. Although Calavita does not delve deeply into his subjects’ psyches to analyze the origins of their conflicts and consciousness, political psychology scholars should find the interviews intriguing. Sections of the book offer insights to those interested in news bias, ideology, and vote choices made in the 2000 presidential election.

Although cognizant of problems of generalizing from so few subjects, the author is clearly proud of the diversity of his sample. He reminds readers frequently that their race/ethnicity/gender/religion/socioeconomic background, geographical locations, and political affiliations vary. He even includes age as a characteristic of the “richness of that diversity” (p. 57) because they were born between 1966 and 1977. This claim goes hand in hand with his argument that “X”ers are the “embodiment of contemporary America” (p. 9), but seems at odds with the generational effects that he claims to find among the cohort. Some

readers might take issue with these claims and be more troubled than Calavita is that everyone in his sample had attended college, that none were poor, and that their voting in 2000 was in no way reflective of the general electorate. Only one did not vote, only a third voted for Bush, seven voted for Gore and two for Nader (p. 125).

The use of in-depth interviews and the concern for how information influences political thinking and choices puts this book in the tradition of Doris Graber's (1988) *Processing the News* and Robert Lane's (1962) *Political Ideology*. While both are cited, the author does not fully engage either work or build directly on their insights. Also surprisingly missing from the literature review is Lane's (1969) *Political Thinking and Consciousness* and Theodore M. Newcomb et al.'s (1967) *Persistence and Change*. As a result, some observations that seem new to Calavita are, in fact, quite old. For example, it should not be much of a surprise that "only" seven of the individuals talked explicitly about ideology (p. 189) or that there was both stability and change in political attitudes during adulthood. Nevertheless, the book does provide lively contemporary examples of political socialization which students will find easier to relate to than the ones in these classics.

How satisfied readers will be with this book is likely to be evident in their responses to the introductory sentences of the concluding chapter. "There is a blizzard of data presented in this book. As a qualitative study of individuals, based on in-depth interviews, this volume of data is to some extent an end in itself." (p. 223). Those who agree with this statement will find learning about the "frequently eclectic, even incoherent, nature of the participants' ideologies" (p. 221) satisfying and thought provoking. Those who disagree with the statement are likely to be frustrated by learning so much about so few people, will want more help making sense of their thinking, and be disappointed in the overall lack of theory-building.

**Politics in the Laboratory: The Constitution of Human Genomics.** By Ira H. Carmen. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. 324p. \$35.

— Steven A. Peterson, *Penn State Harrisburg*

This book is sure to spark debate among readers. It will also prove to be tough sledding for many biologists and political scientists alike. Political scientists will be challenged by the author's understanding of the language, logic, and findings of genetics and the human genomics (his detailed analysis of techniques of genetic analysis, for instance, will be alien to many political scientists). Biologists will be hard-pressed at times to get a handle on the political side of the book (e.g., throwaway references to "strict scrutiny" may be obscure to biologists not familiar with American constitutional doctrine). Thus, a number of readers may well find it frustrating to launch into this book. The author himself acknowledges this when he says

(p. xii): "The study may be hard going for some political scientists. It will also probably be hard going for genomicists. They are as ignorant of political science as political scientists are ignorant of them."

Nonetheless, because *Politics in the Laboratory* challenges both domains, it forces biologists and political scientists to examine the linkage of these realms—a central purpose, as Ira Carmen notes, for that specialization within political science sometimes termed "biopolitics." As a consequence, this book is worthwhile for readers interested in the interface of genomics and politics; those who "tough it out" will be richly rewarded.

Chapter 1 focuses on what the term "constitution" means in the context of this volume for both politics and genomics (including proffering seven different constitutional politics models and applying these to the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee work [RAC, for short]). Carmen likens constitutions to "rules," which, quoting James March and Herbert Simon, refer to "the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies around which political activity is constructed" (p. 13). Carmen adds the following three elements to elaborate upon the preceding conceptualization; these rules must be fundamental, regularized in application, and legitimate. For some readers, this will be perceived as an idiosyncratic definition; however, this serves as Carmen's starting point.

The second chapter examines some of the individuals involved in the race to identify the components of the human genome, including such major figures as James Watson (of double helix fame), Craig Venter, Bernadine Healy, Reid Adler, and so on. Carmen's personal narrative of the quirky interactions among these figures adds a human dimension to the story; the author serves as an "inside dopester," and the result is compelling. A key aspect of the human genome project was the creation of an "ELSI" perspective, with modest funding going to the "ethical, legal, and social implications" of genomics. Later, Carmen adds a "P," for political, to make it ELSPI, arguing that all these perspectives need to be brought to bear in analyzing implications of the technology and its findings.

Chapter 3 explores further the idea of ELSPI as the basis for the constitutional framework for human genomics. Figure 1 on page 73, by the way, summarizes the issues nicely. In terms of more traditional constitutional concepts, the chapter begins with the American judiciary's perspective on reproductive rights, and then segues to the subject of cloning. An important point that can scarcely be overemphasized is Carmen's statement (p. 104) that in the world of cloning and human genomics, one must have a "firm commitment to the marketplace of ideas; and by marketplace I mean the views of all players with bona fide credentials and interests." In other words, we should not simply refuse to discuss and consider the implications, for instance, of cloning. He forcefully argues against making

certain types of knowledge “forbidden,” by refusing to allow open discussion of them.

The fourth chapter explores gene therapy and the prospects for manipulating the human germline, including the possibilities of intergenerational genetic change. There is sensitive discussion of the obvious legal, ethical, and political implications of this line of inquiry. Chapter 5 moves to a higher level of complexity, with a focus on what Carmen refers to as “sociogenomics,” the effort to “home in on the genetic precursors of human social behavior” (p. 201). Here, the author addresses the possibility of understanding human social and political behavior through the knowledge derived from the study of the human genome (and the genomes of other species as well).

In his final chapter, Carmen urges a position in favor of “consilience” (building on Edward O. Wilson’s well-known book of the same name), based on the notion of a unity of the sciences. In this instance, it is how our knowledge of the life sciences can enhance our knowledge of humans’ social and political behavior. He refers to a growing literature in biopolitics to illustrate the potential of consilience.

This is an ambitious book, as one can tell from the brief summary outlined here. The effort to demonstrate the linkage of knowledge from the areas of biology and political science is a daunting task. Some may be unconvinced by Carmen’s use of what he terms a constitutional approach, since it is different than standard views of this matter. Others may be put off by his dismissal of political science as a discipline. The reader will certainly know the positions that the author is taking; he is straightforward and unequivocal in his stances, and some of his outspoken comments will surely not go down well with a proportion of the book’s readers.

However, those who persevere and take seriously the contention that the worlds of genomics and politics cannot and should not be kept separate will find many thought-provoking arguments and new ways of looking at human genomic research, as well as the roots of human social and political behavior. In the final analysis, *Politics in the Laboratory* will reward those who persist and read it all the way through.

**Cash, Color, and Colonialism: The Politics of Tribal Acknowledgment.** By Renée Ann Cramer. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005. 224p. \$24.95.

— Anne M. McCulloch, *Columbia College, Columbia, South Carolina*

The literature of tribal politics and federal Indian law has largely been the province of law reviews and legal scholars. The subject matter is complicated, confusing, and contradictory. There are more than 500 Indian tribes and native villages that have been acknowledged (recognized) by the federal government, and each of these governments is

unique in its history, heritage, culture, language, and land. Unlike other governments within the United States, tribal governments have no constitutional basis; therefore, they have been treated over the years by the United States as foreign nations (treaties and wars), as wards of the government (reservations and trust status), and as sovereign dependent nations. Federal Indian law is rendered more obscure by the fact that it affects less than 2% of the American population, and that, largely rural, population has the highest rate of poverty and unemployment in the country. All of these factors have led the First Americans to be highly marginalized in American politics, both by politicians and political scientists. This recently changed when the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (1988), allowed gaming on Indian reservations, if the states wherein they were located allowed such gambling even under restricted conditions. The success of Indian gaming establishments has produced a type of Indian Renaissance, but only for federally acknowledged tribes. Indian tribes and communities that are not federally acknowledged have been unable to share in these economic and cultural benefits. Federal acknowledgment is the critical factor in the success of an Indian tribe in maintaining its sovereignty, culture, economy, and land base. Without federal acknowledgment, a tribe is not a tribe and its members are not Indians, regardless of heritage.

In *Cash, Color, and Colonialism*, Renée Ann Cramer deftly disassembles and analyzes the politics of the process of tribal acknowledgment by the federal government. Rather than limiting her discussion to the legal issues surrounding acknowledgment, Cramer has employed the tools of political science to analyze the social and political variables that affect the success or failure of a petitioning tribe to gain acknowledgment.

The first third of the text is devoted to a clear and concise review of the literature and history of federal Indian law and tribal politics. This review is thorough but never pedantic. As a primer on federal/tribal/state relations, it is ideal for both graduate and undergraduate students.

The midsection of the text examines the acknowledgment process and how it has changed over time. The emphasis is on the current criteria, adopted in 1978 and amended in 1988 and 1994, used by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to determine a tribe’s status. While ostensibly objective, Cramer argues, these criteria discriminate on the basis of resources (cash), racial identity and stereotypes (color), and tribal/individual assimilation into the dominant culture (colonialism). Those tribes that do not have the resources to search out their historical, cultural, and genealogical roots, or those tribes whose members do not fit the stereotypical image, that is, red skin, aquiline nose, and high cheekbones, are severely handicapped in achieving acknowledgment. Indians whose ancestors intermarried with African Americans are especially hindered in their quest for recognition.

Although Cramer initially directed her attention to the historical aspects of cash, color, and colonialism, she quickly discovered that Indian gaming has become a critical factor in the acknowledgment process. She argues that gaming has achieved importance because it helps generate the cash needed to document historical tribal claims as well as to lobby the BIA and Congress. At the same time, it is a lightning rod that rallies forces, for and against gambling, into the acknowledgment process. Indians may see gaming as a path out of poverty and dependence, whereas their non-Indian neighbors often view it as a road to debauchery and organized crime. Using data from a variety of governmental, academic, and media sources, Cramer dispels myths surrounding the issue. As she points out, 8 of 198 tribal casinos represent 40% of all tribal gaming profits (p. 102); most tribes make only a modest profit from bingo halls, and that amount is generally funneled back into tribal social welfare services. Nevertheless, as is shown repeatedly throughout the book, image is often more important in politics than reality.

The last part of the text applies the theoretical constructs through two case studies involving tribes that were successful in gaining federal acknowledgment through the BIA process: the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut (recognized 1983) and the Poarch Band of Creeks in Alabama (recognized 1984). Both tribes were acknowledged prior to the passage of IGRA, and both tribes have benefited from gaming, especially the Mashantucket Pequot, who run the largest casino in North America. Cramer demonstrates that although gaming has been significant in the success of these tribes, it was not determinant. The Mashantucket Pequot were successful, while other Pequot tribes have not been, in large part because they could demonstrate continuous residence on the few acres of land remaining from the original colonial land grant to their ancestors. Other tribes assimilated or disappeared from government rolls in order to protect themselves from annihilation. The irony is that the behavior that was intended to save individual lives actually cost the life of the tribe in the eyes of the government.

I highly recommend this book as a text in a Native American studies course, as a supplementary text in a State and Local course, or as reading for anyone interested in understanding the present political and sociological context of Native American tribal governments within federal Indian law.

**The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy.**

By Richardson Dilworth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. 280p. \$49.95.

— Juliet F. Gainsborough, *Bentley College*

In his book, Richardson Dilworth takes the familiar argument that cities use development policy to compete for residents in our fragmented metropolitan areas and flips it

on its head. In Dilworth's account, development policy is an important causal factor in the creation of the fragmented metropolitan areas in which this competition occurs. His detailed historical accounts of how communities in New York and New Jersey in the late 1800s dealt with issues of incorporation, consolidation, and annexation speak to current interest among urban politics scholars in patterns of suburbanization and the politics of regional coordination. By providing interesting accounts of how a good goes from being defined as private to public (e.g., water, gas), this book may also interest public policy scholars more generally.

Through detailed historical analysis of annexation and incorporation campaigns in New York and New Jersey during the late 1800s, Dilworth demonstrates that infrastructure systems played a key role as both motivators and enablers of suburban autonomy. On the one hand, the development of infrastructure (waterworks, gas, sidewalks, roads, sewers) in central cities offered an incentive for surrounding municipalities to agree to annexation to the central city in order to receive similar levels of infrastructure. On the other hand, the process of infrastructure development as it unfolded in central cities worked to foster fragmentation rather than consolidation in two key ways. First, engineering and construction expertise that was developed through work on central-city infrastructure projects was then available to suburban governments that could choose to develop their own infrastructure systems. Technological improvements developed in central cities helped bring infrastructure costs within reach for smaller jurisdictions. Second, infrastructure projects were a rich source of patronage and corruption for machine politicians. Scandals surrounding the use of these public works projects to provide private benefits to local elected officials helped fuel resistance to consolidation on the part of surrounding suburban communities.

After developing this general argument, Dilworth uses the historical case studies to flesh out the evidence and to offer a few important revisions to the central argument. In some instances, corruption and mismanagement problems in the surrounding communities themselves meant that resistance to annexation did not emerge in the same ways that it did in other suburbs. So, for example, Long Island City residents supported annexation to New York (pp. 74–79) and Hudson and Bergen Cities supported annexation to Jersey City (p. 118) because their own machine politicians had generated large debts without developing an adequate infrastructure system.

The example of Newark also provides an interesting addition to the argument. Newark's failure to aggressively pursue a municipal water supply led to development of a private water company. The existence of this private water company then facilitated the independence of surrounding communities, who could obtain water from the East

Jersey Water Company rather than relying on Newark. This deprived Newark of a powerful tool for getting surrounding communities to agree to annexation.

In making the connection between infrastructure development and municipal boundaries, Dilworth's argument focuses on the role of "city officials, residents, and other private actors" (p. 181). However, it is clear from the case studies that state government was also a pivotal actor—both in shaping incorporation/consolidation decisions and in shaping infrastructure development. For example, the New York state government enacted legislation incorporating new cities (Long Island City, p. 76) and consolidating existing ones (Greater New York, p. 90). The New Jersey state government created regional special districts, which reduced the central city's leverage over annexation decisions (Newark and the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission, p. 180); created commissions charged with the task of designing and mapping street systems (Bayonne, p. 132); and passed city charters that granted the power to tax for the purpose of providing infrastructure (Jersey City, p. 114). In his introduction, Dilworth argues that an advantage of his cases is that the cities are spread across two states, allowing him to compare "city infrastructural development . . . across different contexts" (p. 7). Yet he ultimately says very little about these varied state contexts and how they may have impacted the relationship between infrastructure and suburbanization. In addition, he does not say much about how this relationship may have worked outside New York and New Jersey, in states where the timing of infrastructure development and suburban boundary formation may have been different.

Another important dimension in the case studies is the role of ethnicity and class. Dilworth makes two key arguments in this regard. First, he argues that class and ethnicity were not decisive factors in incorporation decisions—in some instances, the need for infrastructure led to acceptance of consolidation, despite class and ethnic differences, and in other instances, existing infrastructure development led to resistance to consolidation, despite class and ethnic similarities (p. 5). Second, he argues that "suburban infrastructural development was vital to the physical separation between city and suburb. The costs incurred in infrastructural development might prove that a suburban municipality was in fact unable to maintain its independence, and suburbanites could thus not afford to express their nativism through municipal boundaries" (p. 178).

Given these arguments and the central role that population characteristics play in most discussions of municipal fragmentation, it would be helpful if Dilworth provided more information about the class and ethnic composition of the communities in his case studies. While he does at times make note of whether towns were similar or different in this regard, I would have liked more

detailed information to assess these claims myself. A key part of his argument is that fear of corrupt machine politicians in the city drove the suburban desire to remain separate. However, it is not always clear whether rejection of the central city was based on actual knowledge of the way in which corruption had characterized infrastructure development in the city or if concerns about corruption were really a shorthand for concerns about immigrants. For example, discussing suburban resistance to consolidation with Newark, Dilworth writes that "suburbanites' nativist fears were probably indistinguishable from fears of central city political machines" (p. 186). Similarly, he argues a number of times that a separate identity fostered by infrastructure development helped fuel the resistance of some suburban communities to consolidation, but again the role of ethnic and class differences in fostering a separate identity has to be considered as well. More systematic attention to the class and ethnic makeup of these communities would help untangle these different influences and strengthen his argument.

Although I would have liked more attention to the role of state governments and class and ethnic differences, Dilworth largely succeeds in making a case for the important role that infrastructure development played in shaping the contemporary metropolitan environment—at least in New York and New Jersey. *The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy* is a thought-provoking book that should be of interest to anyone concerned with the modern-day consequences of suburban development.

#### **Mayors and the Challenge of Urban Leadership.**

By Richard M. Flanagan. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004. 230p. \$34.50.

— Andrew McNitt, *Eastern Illinois University*

At its core, regime theory, which is now the dominant paradigm in urban politics, looks at the changing nature of governing coalitions in urban America. Richard Flanagan modifies regime theory by applying Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek's theory of executive power, which was originally developed to explain presidential politics, to mayors. In particular, Flanagan looks at how temporal factors influence mayoral leadership during regime formation, consolidation, and decay.

Flanagan is interested in the contrast between mayors who exhibit "reconstructive" and "preemptive" leadership. The first group of mayors is successful in replacing vulnerable regimes with new regimes. The second group is able to defeat, but not replace, resilient regimes. Preemptive leaders are forced by the weakness of their electoral coalitions to maneuver in ways that often disappoint their supporters. Consequently, preemptive leaders frequently, but not always, become politically isolated and are often unsuccessful. The author argues that Melvin

Holli's list of "best" and "worst" mayors actually distinguishes between reconstructive and preemptive leaders. In other words, political circumstances, rather than personal abilities, are the primary determinant of mayoral success.

Flanagan uses Holli's list of best and worst mayors to identify four reconstructive mayors—Richard J. Daley, David Lawrence, Tom Bradley, and Robert Wagner—and four preemptive mayors—Sam Yorty, Dennis Kucinich, Jane Byrne, and Frank Rizzo. After conducting case studies of each of these eight individuals who occupy the polar extremes of mayoral leadership, Flanagan then examines a more ambiguous set of mayors, preemptive leaders who in spite of their political difficulties successfully implement some political reforms and policy changes. He argues that Fiorello LaGuardia is the best example of a successful preemptive leader. He classifies LaGuardia as a preemptive leader because, for all of LaGuardia's other successes, he was unable to create a new regime to replace the Tammany coalition that had previously governed New York City. Finally, Flanagan examines four modern mayors—Dennis Archer, Ed Rendell, Rudy Giuliani, and Michael Bloomberg—whom he also sees as relatively successful but inherently more conservative practitioners of preemptive leadership. According to Flanagan, each of these mayors managed by emphasizing market-oriented policies and professional management to improve conditions in their cities, even though none of them was able to realign his city's political regime.

Flanagan's case studies are detailed analyses of the shifting political coalitions that supported each of the mayors he examines. Except for the minor error of misidentifying Chicago Councilman William Singer as black (p. 52), the case studies are thoroughly researched and generally accurate. The most valuable are those of the more recent mayors, Archer, Giuliani, Rendell, and Bloomberg, which summarize the careers of mayors who have not as yet been extensively documented. The most controversial part of his analysis is his argument that Fiorello LaGuardia's historical reputation as the nation's best mayor is overrated. Flanagan does a good job of arguing this position, and his conclusion follows when coalition formation is considered to be the acid test of good mayoral leadership. There is more to good leadership, however, than simply coalition formation. The LaGuardia administration successfully managed the economic dislocations caused by the Great Depression, improved the physical infrastructure of New York City, and created a municipal welfare state. The LaGuardia administration is also usually credited with permanently weakening Tammany Hall's hold over the city. By increasing the portion of municipal employees who had civil service protections, depriving Tammany Hall of control over the city for 12 years and disrupting Tam-

many Hall's connection with the national Democratic administration, LaGuardia so damaged the previous ruling regime as to prevent a return to the status quo ante.

The author's attempt to create a "unified field theory" of executive politics by applying presidential theories to mayoral politics is to be applauded. The three political executives—presidents, governors, and mayors—have a great deal in common. Insights obtained from examining one can fruitfully be applied to explaining the behavior of the others.

Flanagan treats local regimes in much the same way that students of national politics look at party systems. The formation, decline, and ultimate breakup of a majority party system is equated to the formation decline and breakup of an urban regime. National party systems, however, are easier to study. The majority and minority coalitions have formal party labels, and scholars are only interested in electoral results. Urban regimes are harder to measure. The concept of regime includes informal alliances between business interests and political leaders as well as electoral coalitions, and clear labels are often lacking because much of the politics involves intraparty competition and nonpartisan contests.

Nonetheless, explaining mayoral success in terms of the strength and composition of governing coalitions adds a great deal to previous explanations of urban leadership (John Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, *Mayors In Action*, 1974; Alan Shank and Ralph Conant, *Urban Perspectives*, 1975; Douglas Yates, *The Ungovernable City*, 1977; James Svara, *The Official Leadership of the City*, 1990) with their overlapping typologies of mayoral activism, which currently dominate the field. Flanagan adds a political dimension to the previous discussions of the causes of mayoral success. The political conditions a mayor encounters are every bit as important as his or her leadership style. The author's approach in conjunction with earlier work provides a more balance view of urban leadership.

There are relatively few comparative studies of mayoral leadership. While historians have written a large number of mayoral biographies and even several city biographies, political scientists have generally not been willing to conduct comparative analyses of big-city leaders. The mayors of major American cities constitute a unique group of political executives who can and should be examined in a comparative manner. The jurisdictions they govern have populations and budgets that are similar to those of a number of states. Their office, no matter how limited its formal powers, is viewed by the public as the personification of local authority. Political scientists need to do more work that examines how the mayors of multiple major cities function. The great virtue of *Mayors and the Challenge of Urban Leadership* is that it helps to fill this void.

**Patchwork Nation: Sectionalism and Political Change in American Politics.** By James G. Gimpel and Jason E. Schuknecht. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 488p. \$58.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

— Glen A. Halva-Neubauer, *Furman University*

James Gimpel and Jason Schuknecht are on a mission to revive the study of U.S. political geography. In their book, the duo make a compelling case for what party strategists, candidates, and pundits already know: Place matters generally and, sometimes, significantly. The authors, however, take readers far beyond a simplistic “Maryland-is-different-from-Arkansas” viewpoint or a red- versus blue-state dichotomy to a sophisticated and nuanced investigation of sectionalism.

Gimpel and Schuknecht analyze geographical foundations of state electoral systems, finding that regional cleavages are growing in some states and declining in others, with substate sectionalism generally on the rise. To identify political regions (defined as the similarity of political party support among a region’s citizens), they rely on the compositional school of political geography, arguing that regions are the product of various racial, ethnic, class, and ideological groupings. While sensitive to contextual explanations (place has an independent effect beyond demographics), the pair regard contextual effects as secondary to compositional ones in explaining substate sectionalism. They show how sectionalism affects partisan mobilization strategies—noting generally that Republican identifiers are geographically dispersed in more states than are their Democratic counterparts. Consequently, Republicans must spend more to mobilize their faithful. As students of electoral change, the authors use conventional party realignment theory—conversion, mobilization, and generational replacement—to explain substate sectionalism. To this trio, they add population mobility, an explanation well matched to the book’s political geography theme and one that they have explored (James G. Gimpel and Jason E. Schuknecht, “Interstate Migration and Electoral Politics,” *Journal of Politics* 63 [February 2001]: 207–31).

*Patchwork Nation* is a 12-state study (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, and Texas). These states differ in significant ways: size, electoral college importance, geographical locale, political culture, party competition, and socioeconomic makeup. Because the authors study political change from 1928 to 2000, they must employ aggregate election and census data as polling data from the early period do not exist. To formulate generalizations at the individual level and avoid the ecological fallacy problem, they use the ecological inference solution (Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem*, 1997). For the later years, they also utilize polling data to check the reliability of the aggregate data estimates.

From these data come a dizzying array of findings. For example, California became more sectionalized, transforming itself from a north–south division to four regions (north, south, coastal, and central). The forces driving these changes are extraordinary population mobility and racial diversity. Conversion and generational replacement also fueled change in the Golden State’s electorate; nearly all of these factors benefit Democrats. In stark contrast stands Texas, where population mobility coupled with mobilization, conversion, and generational replacement diminished sectionalism. These factors also brought two-party competition and Republican dominance. Each of the 12 states combines population mobility, generational replacement, conversion, and mobilization in unique ways, resulting in a “patchwork” nation.

Despite highly specific state findings, cross-state generalizations emerge. In-migration almost always assists the Republican effort, as citizens who are mobile are more likely to have means, while those with modest resources are less likely to move. In-migration has generally made sectionalism a less important force in state politics as many in-migrants have settled in suburban locations where their Republican predilections run counter to central-city dwellers in the same region. Gimpel and Schuknecht find that mobilization matters most in jurisdictions with significant African American populations; moreover, mobilization of black voters is related to the importance of conversion of white voters.

While the findings demonstrate the importance of electoral geography, the authors gloss over the significance of religion and religiosity in contributing to substate sectionalism. They mention on multiple occasions that religion has been and can still be a source of sectionalism. Although they understand that the conversion of Southern (Texas, Georgia) and working-class (Michigan) whites to the GOP pivots on conservative religious mores and race, they fail to investigate religion systematically. Additionally, a case can be advanced that mobilization of white evangelicals made sectionalism less crucial to state politics. Unfortunately, no attempt is made to assess the impact of religion or, more important, religiosity (what impact does aggregate church membership, for example, have in making some regions distinctive?). Aggregate data on church membership are available for much of the period, albeit not from the U.S. Census (see, for example, *Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States: 2000, 2002*). Moreover, prodigious research has resulted in sophisticated categorization of religion other than the Protestant-Catholic-Jewish trichotomy (John C. Green et al., *Religion and Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front*, 1996). If religion were considered, it might shed light on the growing Republicanism of rural areas and why manufacturing workers in some states behave differently than they do in others.

The book’s lofty ambitions are both a strength and a weakness. The various themes of sectionalism and

political change are not well connected in individual state chapters, making the text difficult for the reader to follow. Because it appears that the state chapters were written to stand alone, a maddening array of redundancy results. Many estimates derived via the ecological inference model are not reliable, making the authors press the data for explanations (for example, estimates for immigrants are unreliable in several states). As a result, their conclusions are filled with caveats.

Nevertheless, the book is important because it does not shy away from empirically interesting but difficult questions. *Patchwork Nation* speaks to a variety of audiences: political scientists, political consultants and commentators, and party officials. It is an accessible volume that could be used in advanced undergraduate courses in state politics and political behavior, as well as in graduate seminars on U.S. politics.

**Why Government Succeeds and Why It Fails.** By Amihai Glazer and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. 224p. \$42.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

— Anne M. Khademian, *Virginia Tech*

In a 1964 book review (“American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory, *World Politics* 16 [4]: 677, 693–715), Theodore Lowi challenged the conventional wisdom that politics determined policy. The causal relationship, he argued, ran in the opposite direction: “[F]or every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship” (1964, 688). In their bold effort to explain why government succeeds (and why it fails), Amihai Glazer and Lawrence Rothenberg again prompt us to examine the relationship between politics and policy, this time by setting the “political machinations” of politicians and interest groups to the side in order to ask: How do economic conditions impact the success or failure of a public policy? To try to determine the success or failure of a policy by examining “only the interaction between politicians and constituencies is like investigating the efficacy of medical treatment by looking only at the motives of physicians and ignoring the biology of different diseases” (p. 2). For Glazer and Rothenberg, an exclusive focus on politics ignores the “biology” (so to speak) of different policies that are best discovered by examining the ways in which rational economic actors respond to government actions. More specifically, they argue that an analysis of public policy based upon four economic constraints—credibility, rational expectations, crowding out or in, and multiple equilibria—will help reveal the kinds of problems that government is most likely able to solve, and why.

To make this argument, the authors examine four policy areas (or government activities) in the first four chapters of the book: macroeconomics, redistribution, regulation, and production. In each chapter, they utilize the afore-

mentioned economic constraints to ask how effective government policy in each of these areas is and might be, and then draw conclusions that cut at conventional wisdom regarding the relationship among political commitment, individual behavior, and effective policy. For example, in the analysis of redistributive policies, the authors argue that there are “trade-offs between developing a credible program (of redistribution) that has a long life and a program that is effective” (p. 71). When a government is committed to redistribution, and that commitment is viewed as credible, the rational expectations of policy recipients may inhibit additional saving, in the case of retirement programs, or the pursuit of work, in the case of employment. Similarly, when the authors examine the question “When can government regulate?” they argue that even in a political era that favors market-based solutions, perceptions of credibility and concerns for the rational expectations of the regulated may push government to prefer command-and-control regulation as a means to encourage investment in the regulatory effort, rather than a free market approach. Again, to focus exclusively on the political dimensions of a policy, such as the high-profile decisions made by central bankers, they argue, is to ignore the impact of rational expectations manifest in decisions made by individuals and firms in reaction to central bank, or other government, actions.

The analysis of how political institutions interact with credibility, rational expectations, crowding out or in, and multiple equilibrium yields some of the most interesting discussion in the book. Drawing upon the work of David Mayhew’s (1991) *Divided We Govern*, for example, the authors discuss the “credibility” associated with public policy established under divided government, in contrast to policy supported by a majority party that could be flipped or changed under a new regime. Similarly interesting discussions surround the interaction of economic constraints with federalism and a series of “good government” measures, such as term limits and government-in-the-sunshine legislation.

And yet, the analysis wavers in its neglect of an extensive literature (referenced briefly on p. 84) that long ago blurred the boundaries between the study of politics, policy, and economics. For several decades, political scientists interested in the functioning and effectiveness of political institutions have adopted the language, assumptions, and models of economics to present what were also often counterintuitive findings about the ability of Congress to control the bureaucracy, about the motivations of legislators to design and pursue good public policy, and about the creation of public agencies designed to fail in the face of political uncertainty and intense political competition. As this literature so richly demonstrates, it is precisely the “economic” behavior or rational expectations of policymakers that often produce policy or institutional dilemmas. In their effort to highlight the types of problems that

government can solve and to improve upon government effectiveness, Glazer and Rothenberg ignore this fundamental finding. “Economic constraints” they argue “will always place limitations and costs on what government can accomplish. Failure to integrate such economic logic into policy analyses will obscure what government can and cannot accomplish” (p. 145). But such economic logic has long been part of the political science discussion as to why government institutions behave the way they do and produce the kinds of policy that they do, and it is precisely the rational behavior of policymakers that can determine what factors matter in the course of developing public policy—and often what matters will have nothing to do with the accomplishment of broadly stated goals.

One other limitation of the book’s predominantly economic analysis of policy is its heavy reliance upon “credibility” as a key factor in policy success or failure. While the credibility of government—the perception “that government will follow through on the actions promised” (p. 6)—clearly has implications for whether or not a firm will invest in pollution-control technology, whether a grocery store owner will monitor the purchase of cigarettes by minors, or whether members of the public will purchase a home when interest rates are low, the demonstration of credibility is very political and, indeed, has been studied extensively in the form of reputation, autonomy, and influence of a leader or government agency.

Nevertheless, *Why Government Succeeds* pricks the reader’s assumptions about the relationship between politics and public policy. Its counterintuitive findings and “lessons” that rub against democratic sensibilities—such as “policy can benefit from ignorance,” and “inefficiency may be efficient”—challenge the reader to consider the normative underpinnings of what constitutes “good” public policy and policy processes, and to consider the methods employed to analyze and improve upon public policy.

**The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen.** By Ange-Marie Hancock. New York: New York University Press, 2004. 216p. \$60.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

— Shelly Arsneault, *California State University, Fullerton*

Even the casual observer of politics knows that the very mention of the word “welfare” elicits a visceral, negative reaction from many (e.g., see Tom W. Smith, “That Which We Call Welfare by Any Other Name Would Smell Sweeter,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51 [Fall 1987]: 75–83). In *The Politics of Disgust*, Ange-Marie Hancock explains that this reaction is a result of the well-ingrained public identity of the welfare recipient, an identity that so marginalizes this group as to lead to their almost complete exclusion from the political process.

By bridging political theory and empirical policy research—an endeavor into which political scientists should increasingly venture—Hancock offers an important con-

tribution to our understanding of the stereotypes manipulated during the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996. There are two additional contributions of her work that are important. First is her intersectional approach to the public identity of the “welfare queen,” a “public identity shaped by inegalitarian traditions of racism, sexism, and classism” (p. 25). Second, and most importantly for democratic theorists, is her model of the politics of disgust by which the public identity of the welfare queen has politically marginalized welfare recipients. Indeed, for those concerned about inequality and democratic theory in America, Hancock’s introduction alone, in which she frames the characteristics of the politics of disgust, makes the book worthwhile.

According to Hancock, the politics of disgust includes four key elements. First is the assignment of a public identity, which perverts democratic attention such that the rights of out-group members are restricted and the group is locked out of the political process. Second, democratic deliberation ceases, as the assigned public identity becomes so pervasive as to resist contestation or counterevidence. Third, under these politics, even well-intentioned policymakers engage in correspondence bias: Not fully understanding the situation of out-group members, they fail miserably at attempts to represent their needs. Last is the lack of political solidarity between imagined allies; in the case of welfare reform, neither feminists nor African Americans in positions of power fought the welfare queen image or proffered adequate policy solutions.

Although Hancock focuses exclusively on the plight of welfare recipients, the four elements of the politics of disgust could easily be applied to members of other out-groups, including the homeless, drug addicts, and “criminals.” For example, see James Q. Wilson’s “Paternalism, Democracy, and Bureaucracy,” in Lawrence Mead, ed., *The New Paternalism*, 1997. Wilson argues that out-group members, including “single mothers claiming welfare benefits,” are properly under government paternalism, that is, control, because “their behavior indicate[s] that they do not display the minimal level of self-control expected of decent citizens” (pp. 340–41). Indeed, following Hancock’s politics of disgust, Wilson argues that out-group members are not worthy of full citizenship rights.

Following the introduction, Chapter 2 traces the history of the public identity of the welfare queen with its two attendant characteristics: laziness and hyperfertility. While important, this chapter is simultaneously too long and repetitive and not quite informative enough. Hancock roots the origins of the stereotypes of laziness and hyperfertility to slavery with little evidence. Many of the problems of African American poverty in modern America stem from slavery, a point clearly examined in Jason DeParle’s *American Dream* (2004). Hancock would have

done well to flesh out this argument for her readers. Particularly useful would have been primary sources to document these historic stereotypes, similar to the evidence provided in Chapters 3 and 4 about the contemporary public identity of the welfare queen. Her account of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), however, is fascinating, offering the one counterexample to the politics of disgust. As she notes, “the NWRO fostered an identity of citizenship and political participation among its members, lessening the sense of stigmatization, alienation, and powerlessness” (p. 46).

Chapters 3 and 4 contain the qualitative and quantitative results of Hancock’s content analyses of the news media and the Congressional Record, respectively. Including the ample appendices, her empirical evidence is compelling. In both the media and in Congress, the welfare queen stereotypes hold, limiting deliberations about both the problems and solutions of poverty and welfare. She concludes, “everyone, no matter race, gender, party identification, or class, is susceptible to the power of public identity under the conditions of the politics of disgust” (p. 115).

In Chapter 5, Hancock gives welfare recipients the power that was withheld from them during passage of the PRWORA: the ability to speak for themselves. In their own words, they discuss the public identity assigned to them, the hardships they face in and out of the system, and the policy solutions—education and living wage employment—most likely to help them attain real self-sufficiency. Hancock’s argument is reinforced by the fact that neither education nor living wages are part of the PRWORA. In fact, as she notes, the opportunities for education were reduced under welfare reform, and there is ample evidence to indicate that welfare leavers have not earned enough to keep their families out of poverty, especially during the recent recession (for some of the most recent research, see Kasia O’Neill Murray and Wendell E. Primus, “Recent Data Trends Show Welfare Reform to Be a Mixed Success,” *Review of Policy Research* 22 [May 2005]: 301–24).

The concluding chapter reiterates Hancock’s most important point: “In a political context of disgust, genuine democratic deliberation falters as public identities long debunked by empirical research persist in the memories of elites and citizens” (p. 150). Finally, the short epilogue shows the durability of the politics of disgust as the welfare queen stereotypes continue to shape the discussion of PRWORA reauthorization. In her conclusion, Hancock suggests that agency in the public sphere is not completely lost for welfare recipients; however, her evidence leaves one less than optimistic. Excepting the successes achieved by the NWRO in its short duration, it is clear that welfare recipients have been *subject* to the political process, rather than *participants* in it. If she is correct about out-groups and the politics of disgust, the implications for democratic citizenship are staggering.

**Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism.** By Marc J. Hetherington. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 208p. \$35.00.

— Amy Fried, *University of Maine*

Fifteen years after the signing of the Social Security Act, this already broad government program was expanded. With the amendments of 1950, an additional 10 million additional people were covered, including some of the poorest—domestic and agricultural workers. By using the payroll tax to support Social Security payments, citizens saw the program as one to which they contributed and from which they should receive. Even in very different times 55 years later, Americans continued to support this approach to public pensions. Despite comparatively low levels of trust in government and decades of antitax and antigovernment movement successes, President George W. Bush’s efforts to privatize Social Security fell flat.

Mark Hetherington’s excellent book helps us understand why Social Security has maintained public support and why other policy endeavors have won or lost favor. In this clearly written, carefully argued work, Hetherington examines the policy implications of trust in government. He provides historical context to public opinion data, draws from social psychological research on priming and considerations, and projects lessons for political leaders and movements.

*Why Trust Matters* makes three important contributions to scholarship on public opinion, policy, and trust in government. First, Hetherington demonstrates how low trust matters for policy. The key thesis of the book is that “declining political trust has played the central role in the demise of progressive public policy in the United States over the last several decades” (p. 3). As trust in government has fallen, so has support for large-scale government endeavors to improve citizens’ lives. Furthermore, levels of distrust provide a better explanation for policy support than does ideology.

At the same time, low trust is associated with less support for such policies only under certain conditions—when citizens view the endeavor as having little risk to them and little sacrifice. These conditions affect how people assess the likelihood of government success. It is when a program is seen as risky in its ability to achieve stated goals and also requires sacrifice without a clear benefit that distrust is associated with a lack of support. In contrast, programs that provide universal benefits, such as Social Security, environmental protection, and anticrime projects, are supported by trusters and nontrusters alike. Although Social Security is the most successful anti-poverty program in American history, it is viewed as benefiting all, and thus it retains citizen support throughout periods of high and low trust.

Second, Hetherington demonstrates that among American whites, racial issues and stereotypes are a critical

element of trust and distrust. Trust is highly related to support for policies to ameliorate racial discrimination and increase racial equality. At the individual level, antiblack stereotypes interact with trust and affect policy support. Race plays a role in conditioning whites' perception of sacrifice and risk. As Hetherington puts it: "Among those carrying negative stereotypes about blacks' industriousness, spending presumably entails risk" (p. 94). When whites disagree with the stereotype that African Americans are lazy and lack a work ethic, levels of distrust are not associated with policy views regarding welfare, food stamps, and spending to assist blacks. With this research, the author has made an important contribution to an understanding of how racial stereotypes intersect with views toward government and policy.

Third, this book spells out some political consequences of trust and distrust. In the final two chapters, Hetherington examines the Clinton health care project through the lens of trust and provides lessons for liberals and conservatives. He points to the importance of the rhetorical environment in priming distrust of government and creating a message of sacrifice in high-risk situations. [Disclosure: Hetherington references research conducted by Douglas Harris and me on distrust and the Clinton health care debate.] With the failure to pass health care legislation leading to the Republican takeover of Congress and a turn by Bill Clinton to the right, low trust in government clearly led to highly significant policy impacts.

Since high levels of trust are associated with support for liberal policies, Hetherington advises progressives to avoid broad antigovernment rhetoric. Instead, liberals should seek to increase trust in government by focusing on policies that are seen as low risk and low sacrifice, to redefine other policies toward those criteria, to remind Americans of successful government endeavors, and to associate themselves with the military and patriotic symbols. In contrast, conservatives can use low levels of trust to shift programmatic responsibilities to the private sector and religious groups and to cement support around security policies. However, as the author warns, "any efforts to privatize programs such as Medicare and Social Security are clearly risky initiatives" (p. 145). His political analysis offers ample grist for research and for discussion.

While *Why Trust Matters* is a valuable addition to the literature, it could be more attentive to how mobilization and institutional action affects political outcomes. Trust and distrust do not, by themselves, have political impacts but, rather, provide a broad message for mobilizing certain publics. In the last several decades, distrust has been used as a political resource for those who wish to limit government's role in managing the economy and ameliorating the injuries of class. If better mobilized than others, people with those views will hold a disproportionate influence. Thus, rising levels of trust may not lead to more liberal public policies. Hetherington contends that levels

in trust rebounded later in Clinton's presidency, but the president did not take the opportunity trust provided to promote liberal policies. Yet it is hard to imagine how that could have happened when Clinton faced a Republican Congress, an investigation, and impeachment proceedings. Distrust early in the Clinton years led to institutional realities that had their own effects. President Clinton's message that "the era of big government is over, but we can't go back to a time when our citizens were just left to fend for themselves" recognized the twin contexts of public views toward government and the limits he faced vis-à-vis Congress. Trust and distrust are part of the political opportunity structure and Hetherington illuminates some crucial aspects of their dynamics.

**Besieged: School Boards and the Future of Education Politics.** Edited by William G. Howell. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 356p. \$19.77.

— Stephen L. Esquith, *Michigan State University*

In college and university towns across the United States, academics are regular fixtures on local public school boards. In search of a way to meet our civic duty, we seem to be drawn naturally to school boards more than other local public institutions. This is a guess, of course, and it is one of the few things one cannot find data on in this collection of essays on the work that has been done *by* and *to* school boards in the last decade. If the intuition that academics tend to romanticize local school boards is only half right, these rigorous, fine-grained essays on one area of education politics will intrigue more than just political scientists.

The essays in *Besieged* may also sober us up, as we hear how districts have increased in size, shrunk in number, and come under pressure, if not attack, from federal and state forces. The contributors are cautious about predicting the future, but the present they describe can only make those of us who still think of education policy as a province for citizen participation very nervous about what lies ahead.

In his introduction, William G. Howell summarizes the framework that holds things together: "This book . . . presents new empirical findings about who participates in school board politics, whose interests school boards serve, whether school boards can be trusted to faithfully implement policy directives from other branches of government, and what possibilities different government reforms hold." (p. 20) The data, as Howell acknowledges, are at times drawn narrowly from particular populations. But they are also carefully culled and felicitously organized. Terry Moe's detailed treatment of teacher union participation in school board elections in California is a good example. Moe takes the reader, step by step, beyond platitudes about local politics to a careful analysis of which factors may and may not limit the *prima facie* influence

that a powerful interest group like a teachers union may have on school board elections. The union's power is substantial but limited by local political culture and the stronger backbones that incumbents seem to develop. Democracy in education politics, he concludes, is still alive, if not as well as we might like it to be (p. 286).

One question raised by findings like these is whether what we find on and around local school boards is politics or civics. More specifically, William Campbell asks, in what ways does this particular place matter for different forms of participation? How do diversity, conflict, and commonality affect participation? His answer rests on a distinction between participation as a Madisonian conflict between competing interests (the kind of politics Moe focuses on) and a more Jeffersonian engagement in common work. Both forms are evident to different degrees in the data from 40 different communities on which he relies (p. 290).

Campbell's suggestive distinction between politics and civics is reprised by Joseph P. Viteritti in the first of the two concluding commentaries on the main essays in the collection. Viteritti uses it as a heuristic device to formulate interesting questions about several of the other contributions to the volume. Perhaps the dominant issue in education politics has been choice (as discussed, for example, in the fine essay on charter schools by Paul Teske, Mark Schneider, and Erin Cassese). As Viteritti says, poor and minority families may be more likely to participate in charter schools because they "understand that such engagement is a more productive use of their energy than politics, which tends to be controlled by stakeholders who do not represent their interests" (p. 319).

Two essays on the representation of minority interests on school boards and the participation of minorities in school board politics also reflect a tacit appreciation of this distinction between politics and civics. Melissa J. Marschall considers data on African American and Hispanic attitudes toward local school boards in four large cities, and Kenneth Meier and Eric Juenke focus on the experiences of Hispanics in Texas. From the former study, it appears that Hispanic electoral candidates for local school board seats have not benefited as much as blacks have from biracial coalitions. Both, however, seem to give school performances high marks where minority representation exists on the school board (p. 195). Meier and Juenke, comparing at-large and single-member districts, find that in Texas districts "at-large elections are associated with fewer Hispanic school board members in districts where Hispanic representatives are significantly influenced by the type of election" (p. 223). This has played itself out at a substantive level in that minorities elected in at-large districts have been less effective in advancing minority hiring in the district.

We learn a lot from this collection about what school board members actually do these days, and it often has

little directly to do with making decisions about educational policy. In the second concluding commentary, Jennifer L. Hochschild observes that most of a board's time is consumed by personnel decisions, budgets, labor relations, public relations, and framing responses to court orders and consent decrees (p. 324). Given these demands, it is perhaps no wonder that school boards have not been forces for greater egalitarian outcomes in student learning or more democratic citizen participation. Local school districts and their boards are not the autonomous democratic fora that some continue to imagine they are. As Robert Briffault writes in his opening essay, the institutions of local public education in our federal system are "creatures" of the state, acting as its "agent" with only the most provisional "delegated" powers (p. 28). New state finance reforms and teacher and student performance standards (in part driven by the federal No Child Left Behind Act) make local autonomy an even more limited affair (p. 52).

In a world in which full-blown military sieges are all too common, "besieged" may be a somewhat overstated way to describe the embattled state of local school boards. Nevertheless, if the authors of this collection are correct, it is hard to cherish much hope that school boards will be able to rise above the chores and challenges Hochschild lists in order to debate such policies as equality of educational opportunity in constructive, deliberative, and democratic ways.

**Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative Professionalism.** By Thad Kousser. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 288p. \$ 70.00 cloth, \$29.99 paper.

— Gerald Benjamin, *SUNY New Paltz*

Thad Kousser is interested in both term limits and legislative professionalism because they effect fundamental changes in the environment in which lawmakers work. Drawing upon Richard Fenno's paradigm, the author assumes that legislators will behave rationally, seeking to maximize their ability to win elections, affect policy, and gain influence in their chambers. How, he asks, do legislative professionalism and term limits alter the ways in which legislators do "transformative" work: 1) change budgets and 2) innovate in pursuance of their goals? And how do the alterations in the "internal power dynamics" of legislatures resulting from these reforms—3) the stability of leadership, 4) the independence of committees, and 5) the capacity for individual achievement—shape members' goal-seeking behavior?

In addition to using comparative statistical analysis based upon existing and newly developed data drawn from all the states, Kousser seeks answers to these questions with detailed case studies of six jurisdictions in which he has done extensive interviewing and for which he has gathered additional data. They are California, Colorado,

Oregon, Maine, Illinois, and New Mexico. On commonly used measures (level of staffing, session length, and salaries), the legislatures in these states cover the entire range of professionalism. For the first four of these states, those with term limits, comparisons are made of carefully selected legislative sessions before and after limits took effect. The remaining two states are employed as controls. For each of the five major areas under study, testable hypotheses are generated from a variety of theoretical models. To enhance accessibility of the text, details of models and supporting methodological and statistical materials are presented in appendices.

Some of the strengths and limits of Kousser's approach are illustrated in his chapter on legislative leadership stability. The author first employs an epidemiological model and finds that leaders who control committee appointments survive longer, though surprisingly, those who last the longest defer to minority leaders in naming out-party committee members. He then develops a series of hypotheses about leadership change from a theory that treats "each election cycle as a chance to overthrow a leader" (p. 76), and he regards leadership fights as turf wars between two teams. These are then tested through a multivariate analysis.

The author's model, which includes several measures of legislative professionalism (but not term limits, which, as expected, clearly shortens leadership tenure), works far better in predicting the easy cases—no change or change resulting from switch in party control—than the harder ones, change resulting from a leader leaving the legislature or being challenged and losing. This is probably because it leaves out a good number of factors that affect the likelihood of a leadership challenge. Some of these factors are extrinsic to the legislature, for example, the governor's support for or hostility toward an incumbent legislative leader of his party. Others are organizational, for example, the difficulty any potential challenger faces in forming an "out team," or communicating with colleagues to gathering strength without leaks that forewarn the sitting leader and allow preemptive action.

Additionally, with the growth of campaign fund-raising and political organization centered in legislative houses, leaders develop individual relationships with members based on past and potential political support that likely make them harder to challenge. It may be that there is a sort of tipping point, a period of consecutive service after which leaders become so entrenched that successful challenge is highly unlikely (but not, of course, in states with term limits).

A similar concern about oversimplification arises from Kousser's assessment of the effects of term limits and professionalism on executive/legislative budget bargaining, based upon a two-player bargaining game. With the singular exception of Nebraska's, American state legislatures are bicameral. Houses within states are likely to differ in

feel, culture, and dynamics. More concretely, they differ substantially in size of membership; the constituencies of members of each body therefore differ as well. Divided partisan control is increasingly common. With all this true, it is likely that executive legislative bargaining is better treated as triadic than as dyadic. These reservations about the model notwithstanding—and perhaps because a number of the legislatures he considers in detail employ joint budget committees, partly overcoming the effects of bicameralism—Kousser's finding that professionalism increases and term limits diminishes legislative effectiveness in budgeting are quite sensible.

The concerns outlined here suggest a number of possible directions for additional research that arise from Kousser's work. Reservations aside, this is a methodologically sophisticated, meticulous effort to assess the effect of structural change upon the inner workings of legislatures and, overall, an important addition to the comparative literature on state government.

**The Political Economy of the Living Wage: A Study of Four Cities.** By Oren M. Levin-Waldman. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. \$69.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

**Fighting for a Living Wage.** By Stephanie Luce. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 288p. \$45.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

— Jerold Waltman, *Baylor University*

While the idea of a living wage is traceable back to concerns about the status of wage earners in a republican political order voiced during the Jacksonian era, the modern history of the movement began in Baltimore in 1994. A coalition of unions, liberal religious groups, and organizations that work with and for the poor persuaded the city council to adopt a policy requiring all firms with city contracts to pay their employees a living wage. From there, the movement has spread to other parts of the country, resulting in about 130 similar ordinances at last count. These two books are the latest in a growing literature covering various facets of this phenomenon.

Stephanie Luce's *Fighting for a Living Wage* is primarily a handbook for activists, although it delves into scholarly analysis at points. Luce's focus is on the implementation of living-wage policies, rather than strategies proponents might take to secure passage of an ordinance. She and her research assistants thoroughly analyzed documents and news reports, made numerous phone queries, and conducted interviews with a wide variety of people from some 91 cities with ordinances through 2002. What they found can only be said to be discouraging, both for advocates of living-wage policies and believers in the principle of legislative supremacy in policymaking.

Only 22 of the cities had any information regarding their ordinances posted on their Websites, and only a little over a third designated a special agency to enforce the law.

Responsibility for enforcement was often tacked onto the tasks of some already existing department (often one with a pro-business orientation, such as a procurement agency) and understaffing was universal. Ignorance was rampant. In Chicago, for example, two years after the ordinance went into effect, the person answering the phone at the relevant department denied the city had any such policy. Moreover, enforcement agencies were customarily given little power (such as the right to examine payroll records), waivers were common, and fines, even when levied, were minuscule. As a result, compliance is spotty at best; at the extreme, in Buffalo two years after the adoption of the ordinance, not a single covered worker had been paid the living wage.

Consequently, Luce urges advocates to pay close attention to implementation and offers a number of helpful tips about how best to do that. These range from trying to secure a place in the enforcement machinery to keeping protests at the ready. One interesting finding she notes is that the more opposition there is to the ordinance when passage is being sought, the better the enforcement. This seems to come from the strengthening of the pro-living-wage coalition during the political battle.

The misfeasance and malfeasance offered up in the case studies, the data, and the anecdotes are, to put it simply, disgusting. In the presentation, however, her ideological proclivities sometimes overwhelm rather than inform the analysis. For instance, she constantly refers to “community” groups, confining the term solely to those that support help for people with low incomes. In fairness, other organizations can surely claim this label as well. More seriously, there is a repeated use of Marxist and quasi-Marxist categories to explain what is happening. At the end of the day, these forays detract from, more than they add to, the argument.

From a political science perspective, the book suffers from two other deficiencies. One is that a critique is offered of the old politics/administration dichotomy, with no notice paid to the mountain of previous writings on the subject. The other comes from an attempt to link the findings to the literature on implementation. The effort, sadly, is rather superficial and unsatisfying.

However, none of these problems takes away from the usefulness of the book for its intended audience. Furthermore, political scientists interested in implementation, particularly at the local level, will find here a bounty of enlightening information.

Oren Levin-Waldman's *The Politics of the Living Wage* is addressed more directly to political scientists. The author utilizes Clarence Stone's regime theory as an organizing device to analyze the experience of four cities that adopted living-wage ordinances: Baltimore, Los Angeles, Detroit, and New Orleans. Concomitantly, he borrows from social theorists who study “social movements” to argue that “a living wage campaign, to the extent that it reflects a grass-

roots movement, represents a social protest movement” (p. 19). His central question is to what degree this alleged social movement has penetrated the regimes of America's major cities.

The groundwork material is quite well done. A chapter on the conjectured effects of living wages, especially the oft-cited but hardly ever supported argument that legally mandated minimum wages of any type lead to unemployment, is the best discussion I have seen on this topic. The coverage of the economic and political factors present in the four cities is informative and clearly presented.

In the last two decades, urban regimes have almost uniformly pursued a search for economic development, while initiating a drive to privatize a wide variety of public services. Economic development policies became necessary, or so city leaders believed, as deindustrialization and the move to the suburbs deprived core cities of their once-robust economic bases. Subsidies and other concessions have been routinely granted to lure or keep business enterprises within a city's boundaries, with the justification that “creating jobs” is good for everyone: “Politicians tend to view economic growth and development as a collective good that contributes to electoral success” (p. 182). Despite the fact that economic development and the policies designed to achieve it are trumpeted as beneficial to everyone, in fact the rewards (and costs) are spread in dramatically uneven ways. Businesses, mostly larger ones, benefit enormously from the array of subsidies and special concessions. Most of the time, though, the jobs that are created carry low wages and offer little opportunity for promotion. Even when high-wage manufacturing jobs are at stake, as when Detroit offered a lucrative package to General Motors, the firm may end up moving elsewhere (as happened here). As a result, income inequality has grown even faster in cities than it has in the country as a whole.

Governing elites often stress that privatization will support pro-growth policies both by lowering taxes and demonstrating that the locale is “friendly to investment.” Since labor costs are the major component of most public services, putting these activities out to competitive bidding drives down wages. The “taxpayers” do save money, in the short run anyway. Again, though, the costs and benefits are spread unevenly, with the main losers being the workers who once held relatively well paying and secure public sector jobs.

Consequently, one group that is a natural supporter of living-wage policies is unions representing public sector workers. By having a city adopt a living-wage ordinance, they can recover the wage levels their members had before privatization, and also forestall further privatization efforts, since the cost savings will disappear. Levin-Waldman lays out all these arguments in convincing fashion. His main thesis, though, is that the living-wage movement is a social movement that is challenging the regimes' pro-growth,

pro-development policies. These citizens, speaking through groups, want a seat at the table when decisions are made: “The bottom classes are organizing in order to attain political voice” (p. 190).

There are two basic problems with this contention. First, the concept of a “social movement” is never defined. It is, as is usual in the literature, employed in such a loose fashion as to lose almost all analytical utility. Second, there is scant evidence that those at the bottom are in reality doing much organizing themselves. While ordinarily a few low-wage workers do become active in living-wage campaigns, they are only a minute fraction of the poor, and the leadership of these efforts is almost always heavily middle class. It is uncontested that the quality of urban life has diminished for many people, especially the poor, and that they are generally unhappy about that; but to move from that proposition to one contending that they blame pro-growth policies for their fate and are turning the search for a living wage into a “social movement” aimed at influencing those policies requires a great deal of evidence. Instead, we get a discussion of Alain Touraine’s ideas of “individuation.” My experience is that those who spend most of their time worrying about how to pay the bills on a meager income do not think like that, and are on the whole disconnected from politics. Personally, I wish the poor were organizing to challenge the pro-growth shibboleths, but I am no more convinced after reading this book than before that this is true or likely to become true.

Nevertheless, in spite of these shortcomings, Levin-Waldman offers a useful discussion of regime theory, an excellent analysis of the dynamics of living-wage policies, a helpful critique of recent urban development policies, and some interesting details regarding living-wage politics in four of our major cities.

**Voting the Agenda: Candidates, Elections and Ballot Propositions.** By Stephen P. Nicholson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 208p. \$35.00

— Caroline Tolbert, *Kent State University*

Many good books are published in political science, but rarely is one so powerful that it restructures the study of politics in multiple subfields. Stephen Nicholson’s *Voting the Agenda* may be such a book, as it forces scholars to reconsider how we study not only voting and elections but also Congress, the presidency, state legislatures, governors, direct democracy, the media, and political campaigns.

The puzzle structuring Nicholson’s research is simple—if voters are relatively uninformed about politics, why would we expect the typical voter to link candidates for office (up and down the ballot) with only the issues they raise in their campaigns, or the institutional responsibilities of their office? Can voters sort out the issues that go with each candidate office even though they know little about politics in general?

Nicholson argues that “elections are bustling affairs involving many different issues floating around with most voters receiving and processing electoral information in a haphazard manner” (p. 9). Although candidates do their best to set the agenda, they often fail in defining the big issues. Especially in low-information elections, candidates regularly must contend with issues not of their making. Controversial ballot propositions are an increasingly important way for interest groups and political parties to set the electoral agenda and to introduce common elements into voters’ candidate judgments. Ballot measures can play a central role in the information environment available to voters. By helping to define the electoral agenda, ballot propositions can cast the election in favorable terms for one political party or another. The author shows us that ballot measures regularly help set the agenda in candidate contests.

Nicholson contends that agendas (and ballot propositions) affect voting behavior, and that this happens because voters do not pay much attention to politics. As relatively indiscriminating consumers of politics, voters use information available at the lowest cost. If abortion is a widely discussed issue in the media, abortion becomes an important issue. Policy issues (from ballot measure contests or candidate campaigns) that receive the most attention define the agenda. Agendas prime voters to evaluate candidates. Priming is the mechanism by which agendas shape political judgments. Spillover effects of the issues to candidate evaluations occur because priming influences political judgments indiscriminately, regardless of whether the issue is related to the candidate. Finally, partisan stereotypes do the “heavy lifting” of linking agenda issues to candidate evaluations. Voters ascribe issue positions to candidates because the Democratic or Republican Parties have reputations based on issues—voters strongly associate parties with solving certain problems or issues. Given these partisanship stereotypes, agendas may shape voting decisions along party lines.

Given the important role of partisanship in the priming effect of ballot measures, it is useful to consider whether the relationship between ballots and candidate choice is exogenous, or whether voting on ballot propositions is endogenous to individual partisanship. In Nicholson’s words, “partisanship stereotypes are so powerful that voters nevertheless assign certain issue positions to candidates based on stereotypes, even when a candidate holds an issue position contrary to that of the party” (p. 16). Yet in a later chapter he says, “I believe that direct legislation triggers popular interest (its effects are exogenous) rather than reflects it (its effects are endogenous)” (p. 39). More research should be done to better understand the causal relationships among partisanship, ballot propositions, and candidate vote choice.

Not all ballot measures are expected to play an important role in candidate races, since not all have strong partisan overtones. For Nicholson, two factors stand out as

accounting for whether ballot propositions achieve agenda status, and thus have a priming effect on candidate races: high levels of campaign spending and media coverage. Both of these factors are usually associated with controversial policy issues. But there may be others, including whether partisan elites have taken long-standing opposing positions on the issue.

Nicholson accurately points out that ballot propositions are rarely considered as a determinant of vote choice in candidate elections: “While research on direct legislation voting typically looks at politics and candidates as cheap sources of information, students of candidate voting seldom acknowledge ballot measures” (p. 33). Scholars lose sight of how voting decisions—low- and high-level offices, as well as issue—belong to a single family by sharing common space on the ballot, the same information environment, and election agenda. The assumption in the field is that the act of voting is largely not comparable across different types of offices, so that organizing the study of voting behavior by office is necessary. But this ignores the spillover effects of issues from ballot measures to candidate races, and how issues from one candidate race affect another.

The empirical analysis is robust, providing strong evidence that ballot measures affect the agenda for congressional candidates (Chapter 4), and prime vote choice in U.S. Senate and House races, as well as gubernatorial elections (Chapter 5), drawing on national survey data. In the latter chapter, we find that nuclear freeze ballot measures (and associated campaigns and media coverage) primed voters to choose various Democratic candidates, occurring across different offices. We also see that ballot measures on abortion and taxes (Chapter 4) and on illegal immigration and affirmative action (Chapter 6) primed voters to choose Republican candidates. Throughout the book, sophisticated empirical data analysis draws on national and state survey data, with probit coefficients converted into probabilities that allow the reader to understand the substantive magnitude of results. One query is why the statistical models do not control for standard demographic factors, such as the age, income, education, or gender of the respondent, which would strengthen the findings even more.

Nicholson has given political scientists much to ponder. However, more empirical research is needed to understand the effects of ballot propositions on candidate elections, especially high-information presidential elections not covered in this research. Future research should also try to isolate the unique priming effects that occur when issues appear on statewide ballots, compared to policy concerns in general, possibly using natural and manipulated experiments. There may also be important interactions or causal processes involving citizen ideology, partisanship, political interest, the media, campaign effects, and exposure to initiatives and referenda to consider.

Scholars like Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Daniel Smith have recently examined the indirect (or spillover) effects of ballot measures on citizen participation and attitudes, showing that individuals exposed to ballot initiatives are more likely to vote, contribute money to interest groups, have confidence in government (political efficacy), and be better informed about politics. Nicholson now shows us that initiatives and referenda can also have spillover effects on candidate elections. His research breaks the mold, opening new avenues of research for scholars of voting and elections of both candidates and issues. This beautifully written book is concise, contains exceptional content (both theoretical and empirical), and is a must-read for anyone interested in American politics and democracy.

**How Management Matters: Street-Level Bureaucrats and Welfare Reform.** By Norma M. Riccucci. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005. 224p. \$26.95.

— Michael Wiseman, *The George Washington University*

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) famously ended welfare “as we knew it”—Aid to Families with Dependent Children—and replaced the 60-year-old AFDC with a new program pointedly called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF. TANF substantially increased state discretion in choosing how to aid families with children, but it also established various process requirements that were intended to increase efforts to move unemployed adult recipients into jobs. The new regulations generally require close interaction between benefit recipients (often disingenuously termed “customers”) and local agency personnel. Presumably, it is in these interactions that recipient understanding of the nature and terms of public assistance is to some extent formed. If it is the objective of welfare reform to change these perceptions, reform must address what happens when those seeking help encounter the system.

*How Management Matters* addresses the questions concerning how what happens in the assistance encounter might be influenced by management, whether management indeed responded to the objectives of the 1996 reforms, and whether these responses worked. The book is drawn from the results of a field research study on PRWORA’s consequences fielded by the Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany, New York, and funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Data for the research were collected in 1998 and 1999, soon after PRWORA’s implementation, in 11 locations in four states: Georgia, Michigan, New York, and Texas. The analysis is based on the study of agency documents; interviews with administrators, managers, supervisors, and front-line workers; a written survey of front-line staff; and direct observation of interaction

between agency staff and TANF applicants and participants in TANF.

Norma Riccucci finds that in practice, the goals of welfare as these states were coming to know it conflicted. While high-level officials commonly cited movement to self-support as a central intent of the TANF system, most interaction between workers and clients involved eligibility assessment and benefits determination. Front-line staff, she found, “rely heavily on professional experience, work norms, and familiar routines in performing their jobs” (p. 77). The result is that welfare as we were coming to know it at the end of the last decade continued to have many features similar to what the author believes to have been true of welfare in the past. One strategy adopted by state officials to counteract the intractability of street-level bureaucrats was to place responsibility for delivering work services in a separate bureaucracy—the state employment services. This, she reports, “sent a clear signal to street-level bureaucrats” (p. 117). “The decision to separate income maintenance services from employment or work-first services is a very compelling explanation for how the welfare system was reformed. And this factor may help to explain the decline in caseloads” (pp. 117–18).

Field studies of this type pose many problems for readers. One is the issue of selection. While the targeted four states may have been “purposely selected to maximize variation in policy, administrative structure, and political culture” (pp. 10–11), the book includes no data on the distribution of these features across all states to help in positioning those under scrutiny. A second is absence of control, real or hypothetical, against which the observed outcome might be measured. What was the welfare we were supposed to have known really like? Given that social assistance always involves some sequence of application, eligibility determination, and service response, where in the assistance process should we look for change, and how will we know when we see it? A third concerns just what is to be expected. PRWORA changed federal financing for welfare from a matching grant to a block grant. As a result, states pay all marginal assistance costs wholly from state funds. Are we surprised that eligibility determination continued to be a major focus of operations, despite the lip service paid to the promotion of self-sufficiency? Does this really reflect the “intractability” of the culture of welfare offices or what we should have expected, given that the federal government no longer pays more than half the cost of each new addition to the rolls?

Beyond a lack of framework for directing attention, readers will suffer at various points from the lack of vital methodological detail. Regressions are reported, for example, with no explanation of the metric or distribution of the dependent variables (p. 72). While the literature on managing street-level bureaucrats is richly covered, available research pertinent to some assertions—for example,

the role of state employment agencies in delivering services to AFDC and TANF recipients—is ignored. The analysis of allocation of caseworker time suffers from a well-known issue in welfare studies: Welfare workers’ attention is never distributed equally across cases. Most effort is devoted to a small, problem-plagued subset. As a result, while time-allocation data provide insight into the agonies of social assistance work, without careful weighting they are unreliable for drawing inferences about the average experience of applicants or established clients. Each caseworker may actually talk about time limits with a client only once a day and spend far more time assessing child support needs, ensuring food stamp receipt, or requesting birth certificates. But if every new applicant is told about time limits at some point during welfare intake, that would be a profound change. The methodology pursued by the Rockefeller Institute tells us a lot about caseworker jobs, but not, in the end, much about the effect of reform on client experience and understanding.

On the other hand, only fieldwork gives us stories. *How Management Matters* includes many fascinating excerpts from the project’s recordings of interactions between those seeking assistance and agency personnel. Despite the various selection biases, when studied with care, the near-verbatim presentation of these episodes has much to offer those who would formulate and reform welfare policy but care to think in advance of the kinds of encounters such reforms are intended to influence.

**Alienated: Immigrant Rights, The Constitution, and Equality in America.** By Victor C. Romero. New York: New York University Press, 2005. 320p. \$42.00.

—Elizabeth Hull, *Rutgers University*

Victor Romero is convinced that the Constitution, properly understood, extends to all people living in the United States, citizens and noncitizens alike, the same constitutional and statutory rights. That is the theme of his book. Romero concedes that the federal judiciary has failed, as often as not, to provide this parity—in part because it vacillates uneasily between the so-called personhood and membership paradigms—between guaranteeing every person, regardless of immigration status, due process and equal protection of the laws, and deferring almost reflexively to the political branches whenever it is confronted with issues involving the admission or deportation of aliens.

In *Alienated*, which is part polemic, part constitutional analysis, and part social science inquiry, the author analyzes immigrant rights from the perspectives of law, tort theory, history, psychology, and personal experience. He relies on many sources, he explains, in order “to provide another side to the story in a way that gives meaning to the law’s effect on the average noncitizen” (p. 6). He recounts the travails he himself experienced as a Filipino

immigrant who struggled first to remain in the United States, and then to become a citizen.

Romero's constitutional analysis and normative prescriptions stem from his commitment to two tenets central to critical race scholarship. The first is "antiessentialism," meaning, in this context, that policymakers should not assume that people are necessarily alike just because they look alike. (The author cites the political historian Angela Dillard, who in documenting the ascendance of so-called multicultural conservatism, observes that in appointing a racially diverse cabinet, President George W. Bush illustrates the conservative Right's habit of co-opting affirmative action by "exploiting essentialist thinking in service of the status quo" [p. 22].) According to the second tenet, "antissubordination," government action is unjust to the extent it reinforces, rather than undermines, the oppressive status quo.

In his historical overview, Romero focuses on the way three groups of noncitizens in United States history—the non-English whites, Chinese, and Mexicans—have alternately been treated as insiders and outsiders, depending upon the extent to which privileged U.S. citizens have identified with them or needed their services. The use of citizenship as a legitimate proxy for what in fact was invidious racial discrimination, he says, has time and again enabled the government to oblige the "entitled" classes and insulate them from clamoring "outsiders." While overt racism is no longer tolerated, public authorities continue to engage in profiling on the basis of citizenship—the more so, he notes, after the 2001 terrorist attacks when citizenship and race again became frequent proxies for "(dis)loyalty." When he shifts to contemporary issues, he focuses on foreign-born adoptees, undocumented immigrants, and foreign same-sex partners of U.S. citizens. He faults a number of present-day policies—the Patriot Act, in particular, inflating as it does government's investigatory powers—for unnecessarily penalizing not just members of these groups but aliens in general.

The author's interests range from grand themes—that is, the extent to which individuals' "personhood" should trump their citizenship status—to considerably narrow questions, such as the following: Should our immigration law recognize state-sanctioned marriages performed in this country between binational homosexual partners, only one of whom is a U.S. citizen? Should the government be allowed to deport noncitizens for criminal activity if it means separating them from family members? Should hard-working undocumented aliens have access to governmental assistance for postsecondary education?

Romero examines several recent federal court cases affecting noncitizens. He points out that in a 1999 case, *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee*, the Supreme Court observed in dicta that the government could not engage in conduct toward aliens that is egre-

gious enough to constitute a constitutional offense, but predicted that such conduct would occur only in the "rare case." Romero is less sanguine, as he makes clear when discussing several alienage cases, including so-called promise-keeping ones, in which immigration officials falsely assure aliens that by cooperating with the government, they will not be deported.

There is a growing body of social science research documenting ways the public can be encouraged to regard noncitizens as "persons" rather than abstract entities. Romero mentions several relevant studies, including those published by critical race theorist Jody Armour and immigrant rights expert Michael Scaperlanda, that discuss measures citizens themselves can use to recognize and guard against negative stereotyping. He also cites research conducted by psychologist Gregory R. Maio and his colleagues showing how information about immigrants (particularly new immigrant groups) can be shaped to convey positive images of them and, in so doing, render the public personally vested in their well-being.

Romero concludes with recommendations, some of them roseate—that is, that federal courts abandon, or at least seriously curtail, the plenary power doctrine, and that citizens demand that their congressional representatives repeal the anti-immigrant provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Other suggestions are more feasible. Even though policy toward aliens is largely the province of the federal government, for instance, he nevertheless calls upon state and local officials to do whatever they can to assist their resident noncitizens, whom they are likely to know as neighbors. Their actions, moreover, can have powerful symbolic impact—as demonstrated by the 300 communities and three states that have passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act and vowing not to enforce any of its anti-immigrant provisions.

*Alienation* is somewhat conflicted in its approach: Its first half is anecdotal, personal, and very reader friendly; its second half, much of which consists of abridged versions of the author's previously published law reviews, is relatively technical and as such more appropriate for legal scholars. The author also devotes considerable attention to topics that are somewhat quixotic—the plight of binational gay couples, for instance, threatened with the noncitizen's deportation. This is an important issue, to be sure, but alongside the serious inequities confronting large classes of noncitizens, it seems a bit rarefied.

Still, the book is well written, compelling, and even pioneering to the extent that Romero, in his quest to protect noncitizens, seeks assistance from many and varied sources. By tempering his idealism with large doses of pragmatism, moreover, he leaves the reader feeling that while his goals are lofty, they are not entirely out of reach.

**This Is the City: Making Model Citizens in Los Angeles.** By Ronald J. Schmidt, Jr. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 192p. \$56.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

— Kenneth E. Fernandez, *University of Nevada, Las Vegas*

Jean Baudrillard once argued that “there is no theory of the media” (*For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, 1981, p. 164). Perhaps one might say the same in regard to a theory of culture, but Ronald Schmidt helps move us toward a better understanding of both. His book helps us recognize the link between the media and political culture. Akin to Baudrillard, Schmidt discusses the rhetoric and images used by the economic and political elite to reinforce the latent social and political hierarchies in society.

Like many books about Los Angeles, Schmidt’s discusses the city’s rich history and culture as well as its dynamic politics. Although most of the characters and events that are described in the text will be familiar to many, the author weaves these familiar elements into a unique story. This story is not just about the city itself but about the ideas, images, and rhetoric that helped shape its politics and culture.

One of the central arguments of the book is that powerful elites attempted to build a utopian metropolis by crafting a particular image of Los Angeles and the role of its citizens. By presenting a “virtuous” image of city life and citizenship to the public, it was hoped that residents would emulate these ideas and behaviors. These ideas and images are presented by local elites as a form of civic education to instill values and to motivate citizens to achieve their untapped potential and “unrealized virtues” (p. 40). Schmidt examines these ideas and images that have permeated the history of Los Angeles, dissects them, and discusses their weaknesses and contradictions. But the author suggests that these models of civic life often represent a scripted demand for reverence for tradition and authority, rather than an example of innovation and excellence.

The book is organized into five sections. The first introduces the mimetic tradition in Los Angeles politics and American political culture in general. For republican democracy to survive, the citizens must be educated in the norms of republican and democratic ideals. Citizens are not born with these ideas but instead must be presented with scripts and role models to emulate. From Arendt to Cicero to Machiavelli, the author illustrates the concept of mimetics. He argues that “citizens engage in intense patterns of imitation and thus transmit the civic culture of their civilization” (p. xxi).

The first and second chapters discuss the role of the media and media moguls in shaping the city’s identity and crafting a model of civic virtue. Schmidt elaborates on the models displayed by Harrison Gray Otis (founder of the *Los Angeles Times*), Louis Mayer (MGM), and the

Warner brothers. From self-made man to small-town morals to rugged individualism, the author suggests a common theme in the messages delivered by the newspapers and films of the time: a conservative promotion of passive imitation, rather than active emulation. Numerous films, such as *Angels with Dirty Faces* (1938), *The Wizard of Oz* (1939), *Life Begins for Andy Hardy* (1941), and *The Maltese Falcon* (1941), are discussed and evaluated in terms of their vision of civic life and the ideal citizen. Although the films are of different genres and offer different visions of society, there are observable themes. One is perhaps best illustrated by Warner Brothers Studio’s motto “Combining Good Picture Making with Good Citizenship” (p. 40).

The next chapter focuses on William Parker and Daryl Gates of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and their attempts to shape both the substance and image of the city. Although not immediately apparent, the discussion of the LAPD fits well with the discussion of the media in the previous chapters. Schmidt elaborates on the LAPD’s creation and use of the Public Information Division, Police Department Intelligence Division, and Parker’s close association with the production of the popular TV show *Dragnet*.

The concluding chapter discusses how difficult it is to escape from these elite narratives and how the adherence to such utopian narratives can lead to dystopias. Schmidt discusses, at some length, the 1982 movie *Blade Runner* as a vision of what imitation holds for citizens, namely “industrial slavery.”

*This Is the City* is by no means a story of elite domination or conspiracy. It goes beyond simply denouncing mass media as a form of manipulation. In the end, the elites fail in their attempts to control the image of Los Angeles. True, they have had an important influence on the local political culture, but the production of meaning, messages, and signs is not an exact science, even for filmmakers and newspaper moguls. The author suggests that perhaps one of the reasons these attempts have failed is due to the contradictions and inconsistencies within the messages put forth by the media. The elite found that a message promoting *emulation* of the founding fathers and self-made men could lead to active competition against the current established hierarchies. The founders of Los Angeles (and the United States) were radically transforming the political, economic, and social system. This transformation is not what the current established elites wanted to elicit from the masses. They wanted, as Hans Magnus Enzensberger might phrase it, “minimal autonomous activity” (*The Consciousness Industry*, 1974). Recognizing this, the elites attempted to create a narrative of civic virtue that instills *imitation*: imitation of a script that reinforces deference to current hierarchies. In a sense, the elite were asking the public to “do what they say, not what they do,” but such contradictions are not lost on the audience.

Imitation, of course, only allows the expression of the values and goals of the established system, not the improvement or reform of the system.

Overall, this is a compelling book that provides a new way to look at how rhetoric and images shape political culture. It is a rich narrative of the elites, media, politicians, and citizens of Los Angeles that will be accessible to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in a political theory, an urban politics, or a media course.

The book does have some limitations. Although there are a good number of primary sources cited, such as newspapers, government documents, and speeches, the author relies heavily on secondary sources. Similarly, he has an occasional habit of linking ideas and arguments to historical figures that help his central point without providing any documentation or evidence. For example, he states that “Otis would argue that the U.S. was in a conflict between the forces of freedom, personified by the self-made man, and the threat of slavery at the hands of all opponents of the emulatory struggle for wealth and power” (p. 6), that “Mayer argued that his homespun heroes would show American audiences the way to ethical citizenship” (p. 34), and that “a model of civic excellence, Joe [Friday] was the sort of citizen Parker argued viewers should be like in whatever walk of life they occupied” (p. 78). All of these statements are interesting and highly relevant to the author’s thesis but require documentation rather than supposition. In addition, the book covers only a few political actors in Los Angeles history (i.e., Harrison Gray Otis, Louis Mayer, Harry and Jack Warner, William Parker, Daryl Gates, Tom Bradley) which leaves the reader wanting more, but to be fair, this is not a history text. It is a book that is furthering our understanding of the development of political culture, the media, and civic education.

### The Supreme Court in the American Legal System.

By Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, and Sara C. Benesh. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 416p. \$75.00 cloth, \$28.99 paper.

— Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., *Georgia Southern University*

If there is any example of a Kuhnian paradigm in political science, it would be the attitudinal model in Supreme Court decision making. Over a half century ago, C. Herman Pritchett boldly showed data that revealed “political” decision making by the justices of the nation’s high court. Harold Spaeth was among the pioneers in this research and is now regarded as its strongest adherent. The justification for the Supreme Court Attitudinal Model, known to friends and foes alike by the acronym “SCAM,” is relatively simple: The preponderance of individual-level decision making can be explained as a function of the attitudes of the justices. Like the ideal model, it is parsimonious and explains a great deal of variance. Even those who have been critical of SCAM concede that the attitudes of the

justices are the most important determinant of individual-level decision making at the Supreme Court level.

This book is a far-ranging examination of the American legal system, ostensibly concentrating on the Supreme Court. It relies heavily on the multifaceted and voluminous research of the three authors and includes new findings. It is designed to be a less methodologically sophisticated analysis and succeeds in achieving that goal. The book combines an historical and analytical perspective that will be a welcome addition for those who teach judicial process, for those outside the academy who want a systematic analysis of the Court, and for prelaw students who want to understand civil procedure. The discussion of the relationships between state and federal courts and jurisdiction is especially strong.

The book is engaging and very well written, even the chapter on civil procedure, which the authors apologize for in a footnote. No one is spared their strong opinions or rapier wit. Proponents of the legal model are criticized because their models are not systematic, cannot be verified empirically, or permit scholars to argue that the model holds, no matter what the results of the case. Congress is referred to as “probably the least efficient and ineffective legislature of any modern nation, one that arguably personifies the concept of kakistocracy (government by the worst)” (p. 37). In *Bush v. Gore*, “the ipsedixitist majority behaved with unconscionable temerity” (p. 307), and “it was a decision that in its unparalleled cynicism surpasses the most disgusting in its history: *Dred Scott v. Sandford*” (p. 308). The authors maintain that prediction requires no particular insight for “the analyst who realizes that justices are wedded to their individual policy preferences—and not nanocerebral nonentities slavishly adhering to the diaphanous fabric of ethereal legal principles and doctrine” (p. 323). They do not even spare each other.

Despite its obvious strengths, though, this will be a book in search of a market. The problems arise from three sources: the authors, the editor, and the reader. In *The Attitudinal Model Revisited*, Jeffrey Segal and Spaeth confronted proponents of the strategic model. This was the latest in a long-standing dialectic. For the past decade, Segal and Spaeth have been under attack by proponents of the legal model, neoinstitutionalists, and those who subscribe to strategic models of decision making. Indeed, the critiques and responses have become a virtual cottage industry on display at national and regional conferences and through an ever-growing literature. Thus, when I received the book, I was expecting the latest version of the “Empire Strikes Back.” For the first two chapters, this seemed to be the case. But then the book suddenly changes without warning into an historical analysis of the Supreme Court and an analysis of civil and criminal procedure, then moves through the state and lower federal courts, with the role of the Supreme Court fading as one goes through the chapters. Ultimately, the authors return to the Supreme Court and the attitudinal model. The chapter on the history is a

good reflection of this problem. The discussion of the Taney Court includes an interesting application of the attitudinal model to the justices on that Court. But that type of analysis is not continued throughout the remainder of the chapter.

One of the major shortcomings of the debate concerning judicial decision making lies in the disconnection between individual and institutional levels of analysis. The attitudinal model relies on individual-level analysis, while many of the legal models are institutional. The book examines the institutional level to a degree, but there is not a direct examination of the disconnection. The authors conclude that justices are rarely influenced by *stare decisis*, while they concede on the institutional level that the Court seldom overturns precedent. The test of attention to precedent returns to the individual level. There is almost no mention of the numbers and percentage of unanimous cases (declining, to be sure), but still evidence of exceptions to the attitudinal model.

As a reader, I find it unfair to hold the authors to a different standard than they intended, but the book does not hang together that well (the use throughout of *Bush v. Gore*, notwithstanding). That is sometimes the consequence of a jointly authored work, but it is magnified here. The separate chapters and sections appear to have been written independently with little attention to molding them into a cohesive unit. Consequently, there is redundancy and little in the way of common themes linking the analyses together. An editor should have been cognizant of this problem. The first clue of this problem was the paragraph that greets the reader before the title page. It explains the use of the word “in” in the title of the book. It appears to be a way of trying to explain why the book covers the waterfront of the legal system though it is ostensibly about the Supreme Court. The material on the lower courts and civil procedure is strong, but not well integrated with the rest of the book. This problem, in particular, would make it difficult to use it as a text or a supplement in an undergraduate judicial process class. The editing also failed in a number of places, for example, where Douglas Ginsburg is identified as Daniel Ginsburg, or where a case that was only mentioned in a footnote a few pages earlier was referenced in the text by part of its name. In the end, despite the obvious strengths of the book, I suspect instructors will opt for a more nuanced treatment of judicial decision making.

**Morality Politics in American Cities.** By Elaine B. Sharp. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. 288p. \$35.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Larry Bennett, *DePaul University*

Elaine Sharp's book examines the political climate and specifics of the local policy debate, authorization, and implementation associated with a number of controver-

sial issues: casino gambling projects and regulation/prohibition of “sex industries,” as well as municipal support for/opposition to gay rights and provision of abortion and addiction services. Using the blanket notion of morality politics to characterize these matters, Sharp looks at local-level political/policy debates in 10 metropolitan areas during the 1990s. With this number of cities available for comparative analysis, she structures her numerous city/issue narratives by way of four independent variables: local cultural climate, local economic climate, municipal institutional structure, and intergovernmental relationships.

While the latter of these variables is employed in an ad hoc fashion—that is, when variations in city-by-city policy adoption seem to be attributable to specific city/state or city/federal interactions—the first three are developed as dichotomous factors: Cities are classified as reflecting conventional or unconventional cultures based on six demographic measures (such as percentage of women in the workforce and percentage of the population unaffiliated with an institutional religion), as experiencing economic growth or decline, and as possessing a reformed or unreformed government structure (which, Sharp concedes, turns out to be a murky distinction). The application of these variables to the many case studies presented in this volume—typically single-city cases, but on occasion two- or three-city comparisons—makes for a fragmentary narrative. There are so many trees here that locating the forest becomes quite a challenge. On many occasions, one encounters such expressions as “a complicated set of unique circumstances” (p. 83), “idiosyncratic problems” (p. 84), or “idiosyncratic factors” (p. 200) when local events do not conform to the analytical structure. At other points, Sharp breaks from the four-variable framework to consider alternative causal possibilities. For instance, at the end of the chapter on abortion politics, she examines the 10 cities' Latino population proportions, concluding that this demographic feature has not affected individual cities' abortion debates. This reads like a snap judgment, given that there is no discussion of the degree of Latino political mobilization across these cities, nor even acknowledgment that the Latino portion of the local electorate might be a more useful measure of Latino political “presence” than percentage of population.

In her concluding chapter, Sharp characterizes her overall findings as “contingent,” making her strongest claims for the following generalizations. In the case of “pure morality” issues—that is, local morality conflicts in which economic interests do not come into play—the local cultural climate is the controlling factor. Communities classified as unconventional tend to support more innovative, less tradition-bound policies. However, policy choice will tend to follow the preferences of strong, mobilized economic interests if the latter are in one way or another affected by alternative courses of action. Sharp characterizes such policy debates as questions of “material morality” (for example,

the tolerance of “gentlemen’s clubs” in cities catering to conventions and trade shows). In the author’s words (p. 197), “subcultural differences are very important for our understanding of morality issues, *unless they are eclipsed by economic considerations.*”

But what are the subcultural differences among these 10 cities? They are six demographic measures that have been associated with attitudinal preferences running along what can be termed a conventional/unconventional spectrum. Sharp scores five of her cities on the conventional side of the spectrum and five on the unconventional side. It is interesting that based on her view that the culture/subculture factor is more than simply a question of local attitudes and particular conditions (and, wishing to preserve the anonymity of sources)—“the emphasis here is on the theoretically relevant context that each city provides rather than the uniqueness of each city” (p. 26)—Sharp disguises the identities of the case study cities. There is a downside to this presentational strategy. From the reader’s standpoint, judging the reliability of the many individual city/issues narratives is impossible. While it is true that all narratives are selective, narratives that can be cross-checked against a backdrop of generally available information are more persuasive. And oddly, although Sharp proposes that she is steering our attention away from the individual cities, she routinely characterizes her locales in this unqualified fashion: “unconventional Hill City,” “conventional Coastal City” (p. 41).

This bracketing of cities and culture, at times, seems curious. What is one to make of “conventional” Lake City, where various forms of sexually oriented business thrive, constituting an estimated \$65 million niche in the local economy (p. 114)? Economic considerations may well affect policy, but is not the substance of this economy—thousands of customers, dozens of local entrepreneurs—also an aspect of the city’s culture? One possibility could be that the conventional/unconventional culture spectrum needs to be reconsidered. One supposes—to use literary/cultural references as markers—that the presumed contrast places Dorian Gray (libertinism) at the far end of unconventionality, with Ward Cleaver (unflagging wholesomeness) at the conventional end. But what if conventionality runs to a terminus represented by Elmer Gantry (public rectitude joined to private backsliding)? The seeming contradiction between Lake City’s ethos and political economy might thus be explained. But even if one chooses not to question the usefulness of scoring local cultures by means of a conventional/unconventional dichotomy, many passages in this study reveal troubling discordance between the quantitative preconception of local cultures and their observed, reported specifics. It is difficult not to conclude that once the 10 cities in this study were classified as conventional or unconventional, no body of additional evidence was going to yield a reconsideration of the original classification choices.

Elaine Sharp very ably demonstrates the significance of a variety of political conflict that, up to this point, has not received much attention from specialists in urban politics. She is less successful in offering a persuasive explanation of the subtle connections linking local demographic variations, the complex attitudinal cross-currents to be found within any city’s population, and the public playing out of political mobilization and governmental action. In *Morality Politics in American Cities*, the conventions of political science sometimes war with the fundamentals of cogent political analysis.

**Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes**

**American Politics.** By James A. Stimson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 206p. \$55.00 cloth, \$16.99 paper.

— William G. Jacoby, *Michigan State University*

The main goal of James A. Stimson’s book is to show how the dynamics of public opinion impinge on the the American political process. This is a broad and potentially difficult task, particularly for such a succinct text. Nevertheless, I believe the book achieves its objectives quite convincingly.

Stimson begins by laying out his central premise: Although individual-level attitudes may be fragmentary and inconsistent, *aggregate* public opinion is both coherent and responsive to external events in the political world. The second chapter presents the basic descriptive evidence, using information from several decades of survey research to show that mass opinions on different issues tend to track one another over time.

In the third chapter, Stimson elaborates upon the preceding description in several ways. First, he uses the concept of issue evolution to explain how new policy controversies move onto the public agenda. Second, he introduces the idea of a broad, general dimension underlying the seemingly separate issues that lie at the center of the political world. Third, he points out that the public’s movement along this dimension precedes, rather than follows, election outcomes and governmental policies. Fourth, he points to “conflicted conservatives” (people who call themselves conservatives but hold liberal positions on specific issues) as a major source of temporal movement in public opinion, since they represent a subset of the electorate that is potentially amenable to appeals from all sides of the political spectrum.

The fourth and fifth chapters consider two elements of public opinion that are, themselves, often the focus of popular scrutiny: the “horse race” that occurs during presidential election campaigns and the ongoing approval ratings of elected officials and of government in general. Both cases are characterized by temporally smooth patterns and predictability, rather than constantly changing shifts that signify responses to idiosyncratic external stimuli.

The final chapter returns to the book's overall theme: The American electorate is engaged in an ongoing, interactive relationship with government; each one reacts coherently to the signals broadcast by the other. But the dynamic elements of the public's role in this process are dominated by a relatively small subset of people. The remainder of the mass public are either too set in their preferences or too disengaged from the political world to evince coherent, significant change over time. Nevertheless, the amount of opinion change that occurs "at the margins" is sufficient to demonstrate that the aggregated shape of public opinion is mirrored in the track of public policy.

There are many things to like about *Tides of Consent*. First, it is very well written. Stimson presents his arguments in a thoughtful and engaging style. Systematic evidence from time series of opinion data is combined very nicely with anecdotal support drawn from specific episodes of recent American politics. The result comprises a narrative that is, quite frankly, fun to read.

Second, the discussion does a great job of integrating a number of influential ideas and concepts from recent research on public opinion. It is a testament to Stimson's stature as a scholar that several of these are drawn from his own work. But, of course, the book also builds upon work from other scholars. And the way it does so leads to what I believe is a third strong feature: the author grounds his arguments and conclusions about aggregate patterns of opinion directly within the vast amount of research that has been aimed at explicating individual-level political orientations. One of the most notable contributions from the book is its perspective that an interactive system of coherent public opinion and responsive government is possible, even if the vast majority of the public is relatively disengaged and inactive.

Of course, the book has a few weaknesses as well. A critic might grumble that some of the discussion is relatively speculative, with only loose connections to direct empirical evidence (e.g., some of the material on the media, pollsters, and consultants in presidential campaigns, presented in Chapter 4). And some of the more ambiguous empirical findings are given fairly quick consideration (e.g., the meaning of the second dimension underlying the

public's issue opinions, discussed in Chapter 3). But too much should not be made of these points. For one thing, there is definitely nothing in the verbal discussion that, in any way, *contradicts* the public opinion data. And at the same time, the book is not really intended for an audience of specialists. Instead, it is aimed at "telling a story for general readers" (p. xviii). Hence, the standards of evidence might be relaxed a bit in order to facilitate the narrative. It should also be emphasized that Stimson freely admits when the available evidence is just not sufficient to point toward any particular interpretation or conclusion. So, taken together, there are no serious substantive problems that detract from the book's strong points.

From a different perspective, this book may not make a similarly positive impression among at least a portion of its intended audience (i.e., people with an interest in American politics, but without specialized academic training in the field). One potential problem is its emphasis on the regular trends and overall long-term predictability of public opinion. This contradicts many of the features that make politics interesting to the lay public—the excitement of the ongoing game, the influential personalities of the actors, the apparent impact of events, the anticipation of the unexpected, and so on. Similarly, Stimson's arguments presuppose that empirical phenomena (like opinion trends) can be divided into a systematic portion and an additional, idiosyncratic, component. While this kind of thinking may be commonplace among the ranks of social scientists, I am just not sure how prevalent it is among people who have had no prior exposure to statistical methods.

Putting aside any questions about its potential audience, *Tides of Consent* is an excellent work. It provides a concise description of the "shape" of American public opinion and makes a convincing argument that opinion really does matter for the course of government and policy in the United States. This book could be used as a textbook in an undergraduate course on public opinion, and it also makes a very good starting point for a graduate seminar on the same topic. Finally, it is simply interesting, thought-provoking, and enjoyable reading material that I would recommend to any political scientist.

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## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

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**Japan's Financial Crisis: Institutional Rigidity and Reluctant Change.** By Jennifer A. Amyx. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004. 408p. \$39.50.

— Yves Tiberghien, *Harvard University*

Recently, the puzzle of the unexpected and never-ending Japanese financial crisis has eluded Japan specialists and

comparative political economists alike. How could the same institutions generate an overperforming economy for more than three decades and a decade-long crisis? How could a system once praised for its ability to handle economic shocks such as the two oil shocks and a massive reevaluation of the Yen suddenly stall and prove unable to adapt to changing conditions? How could the greatest creditor and capital exporter of the planet have such weak financial regulations? Scholars have disagreed on both the diagnostics and the causes of the crisis. While some have

focused on mistakes in fiscal or monetary policy, others have emphasized a systemic breakdown. While some have emphasized domestic political factors (be they interest groups, party politics, electoral system, or bureaucratic dominance), others have focused on external factors.

*Japan's Financial Crisis* is the most systematic and thorough treatment of these questions to date. Building upon Daniel Okimoto's concept of a network state and Masahiko Aoki's work on institutions and Japanese bureaucratic incentives, Jennifer Amyx analyzes the successes and failure of Japanese finance through the lens of bureaucratic policy networks. First, she argues that informal, highly institutionalized, pervasive, and exclusive networks between Ministry of Finance (MOF), on the one hand, and political leaders, banks, and other government agencies, on the other hand, form the defining feature of financial regulation in postwar Japan. These networks generated an efficient and self-enforcing regulatory system in the high-growth period. They lowered moral hazard risks and transaction costs (p. 113). These same networks turned into "paralyzing networks," once key underlying conditions disappeared. Second, Amyx identifies two intervening variables that explain the shift from efficient to suboptimal networks: the amount of information requirements necessary for regulation, and stability in a key network hub, namely, the linkage between MOF and the dominant party of Japanese politics, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). When information requirements increased in the 1980s, the networks proved unable to provide the solution for optimal financial regulation. When the links between MOF and the LDP were disrupted by the LDP's brief loss of power in 1993–94 and its rapid return to power in a coalition with anti-MOF partners, policy networks became detrimental. Internal chaos led to reform inertia.

The book begins by systematically analyzing the overall logic of policy networks, the links between MOF and the LDP, the ties between MOF and the private sector (*amaku-dari*, *ama-agari*, and *MOF-tan*), and the ties between MOF and other ministries. In turn, Amyx unpacks the five key phases of Japanese financial regulation: the miracle period (up to 1984); the bubble period and the oversight failure of policy networks (1985–90); network-managed phase after the collapse of the bubble (1990–94); policy paralysis in the midst of network breakdown and internal infighting (1994–98); and the active reform period beginning in 1998. The last chapter includes the most comprehensive analysis of recent reforms in the Japanese network state to date.

Through both a single parsimonious theoretical model and a thorough process tracing of the entire boom–bust cycle of Japanese finance, Amyx's is arguably one of the first accounts that are able to explain both miracle and crisis. The study develops a novel approach to institutional change in Japan through a focus on policy networks and on the variables affecting these networks. Further-

more, the author is able to take the debate on bureaucratic leadership and a strong state in Japan to a new direction. After retheorizing the strength of the Japanese state as a catalytic or coordinating strength, she shows how such strength can turn into dramatic weakness when underlying conditions disappear. In the face of global change, the Japanese state is split between a bureaucracy that is too weak to regulate and too strong to allow systemic reforms, and a political leadership that remains too weak to take over from the bureaucracy and lead Japan to a new direction.

On the empirical side, the book presents a fascinating narrative of all key steps of the protracted story of financial regulation between 1980 and 2003. Amyx draws upon available sources in Japanese and English, as well as unique primary data on the career paths of all tier-1 MOF bureaucrats during three decades. She also makes use of hundreds of interviews with all key actors involved in the battle, as well as primary government materials and data sets. This book is the most definitive of MOF's internal politics and role in financial politics.

These strengths notwithstanding, the book remains solely focused on Japan's finance and, to a secondary degree, on the paradigm of a financial crisis. In this narrow context, the continued commitment to bank-centered finance and financial intermediation appears puzzling and costly. Absent from the analysis is any reference to the vast literature on types of capitalism, the flag bearer of which has become Peter Hall and David Soskice's (2001) *Varieties of Capitalism*. In this broader comparative literature, financial regulation is but one pole among several interdependent components of a political economic system. The reform of one such pole in the absence of a transformation of all other poles may be problematic and suboptimal. Choices of types of capitalism rely upon social and political compromises and may be deeply embedded. In this context, comparisons between the United States and Japan may not be helpful. In addition, in explaining why the Japanese system veers from an efficient to a paralyzed system, much of the action lies in the two intervening variables. Yet they remain underspecified in the analysis. For example, the analysis of information requirements (pp. 31–32) does not explore the true determinants of what may only be an intermediate variable. What lies behind changes in information requirements? Is it a story of technological revolution or a story of globalization of finance and regulatory competition between noncooperating states?

Furthermore, while the sections on the miracle and on network-based forbearance in the 1990s offer strong explanatory power, the section on the initiation of the bubble may be slightly weaker. The crucial step of the failed banking reforms of 1981 may be more than a case of "the network stalling reform" (p. 135). Rather, it is an extranetwork intervention of banks to the LDP that led to the

weakening of MOF's ability to control the private sector network. One might also surmise that this episode marked an early breakdown between the MOF and the LDP. In addition, it is difficult to explain the bubble without referring to the ill-supervised process of financial deregulation accelerated after 1984 and partially induced from outside. Finally, while the empirical analysis of post-1998 reforms is outstanding, these reforms are not explained by the argument of policy networks. New variables and new actors (political leadership, foreign investors, policy entrepreneurs) are necessary to fully explain this reform period.

Beyond these minor issues, *Japan's Financial Crisis* is a must-read for any reader interested in Japanese political economy or political economy. It will stand out as a classic interpretation of the peculiar Japanese trajectory.

**Learning Democracy: Citizen Engagement and Electoral Choice in Nicaragua, 1990–2001.** By Leslie E. Anderson and Lawrence C. Dodd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 336p. \$24.00.

— Julio F. Carrión, *University of Delaware*

In opposition to the recent trend in democratization studies that sees this process as if the glass is half empty, this study of Nicaraguan democratization argues that the glass is half full. Recent history in Nicaragua includes momentous events, such as the fall of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the triumph of the Sandinista revolution, the subsequent Sandinista electoral victory in the presidential contest of 1984, and their later defeat in 1990, when voters rejected Daniel Ortega in favor of the mild-mannered, conservative Violeta Chamorro. Noting the voters' continuous embrace of what the authors call "democratic conservatism," they conclude that "Nicaragua appears to be evolving into an inclusive, constitutional democracy" (p. 280). How was this possible, especially in a country that exhibited so few of the prerequisites traditionally associated with the successful establishment of democracy? And why did voters, the majority of them poor, reject the Sandinistas in 1990 and later elections, favoring candidates that came to undo most of what the Sandinistas had achieved in terms of social and economic equality? These are the most important questions Leslie Anderson and Lawrence Dodd seek to elucidate in this suggestive and informative book.

In Part I, the authors try to demonstrate that, conventional wisdom notwithstanding, Nicaragua exhibited three key procedural foundations that favored democracy, political space, social class, and party. The authors argue that since colonial times, as well as during the long Somoza years, Nicaragua developed a political space (i.e., instances of protest and contestation), conscious class differences, and strong political parties that allowed it to move quickly into democratization once the Somoza regime fell. They contend that "Sandinismo did not initiate the demo-

cratic foundations of space, class, and party that already existed in Nicaragua prior to the revolution. Instead, the revolution provided specific popular experiences that enabled mass citizen participation, enhanced citizen capacity for reasoned choice, and, through these, fostered democratization" (pp. 52–53). My problem with this view is that these three foundations are pitched at such level of generality as to render them unusable to predict democratic prospects in other places. One can easily identify similar foundations in many of the other Latin American countries, despite their wide variability in democratic achievement.

Part II comprises the heart of *Learning Democracy*. It studies the 1990 election that led to the defeat of the Sandinistas and the advent of democratic conservatism. Why do the authors assign so much importance to the 1990 election? They believe that it produced a regime change from "radical socialism" to "democratic conservatism" (p. 209). Although I do not mean to downplay the importance of this election, I do question the claim that it marked such a momentous regime change. The 1990 contest changed a government, not a regime: Nicaragua in 1990 was already democratic inasmuch as the Ortega administration was the result of free and fair elections conducted in 1984. The authors advance a "theory of reflective voting" to explain the 1990 election. Why do we need another theory of voting? They argue that current theories assume the existence of stable and well-established democracies, and thus the theories ignore that voters "may face more complex considerations when they attempt to reason through retrospection or prospection" (p. 117). Moreover, current accounts of voting do not usually give much attention to election contexts. To remedy these shortcomings, Anderson and Dodd develop a theory that is both dynamic and contextual. It is dynamic in the sense that it views voters as oscillating between prospective and retrospective concerns as the electoral campaign evolves. It is contextual because it takes into account the meager electoral history of developing countries, which makes the traditional choice between retrospection and prospection more complex.

For Anderson and Dodd, neither retrospective nor prospective evaluations taken separately drive the vote choice. Citizens start the electoral campaign with both prospection and retrospection in mind. They look at the incumbent and the opposition and make a "first cut decision" (p. 128). They use retrospective considerations to evaluate the incumbent but "reflective" (their term for prospection and retrospection combined) concerns to assess the opposition. If both the incumbent and the opposition pass this initial cut, voters then move to the second stage of the campaign, the moment of "attitudinal crystallization and differentiation" (p. 128). At this stage, the incumbent is assessed through a reflective assessment, while the challenger—given his or her inexperience—is assessed

primarily though prospection. Moreover, this “reflective voting” also occurs across different elections. In the early stages of democratization, voters engage in reflective choice. As democratization progresses, the electorate moves toward retrospective considerations. Thus, as politics normalize and crises subside, voters in developing nations come to resemble their counterparts in the industrialized world. That is, less-educated voters vote along retrospective lines, while the more educated use prospective considerations (p. 132). They test this theory in Part III of the book.

It is in the application of this theory to the 1990 election that the book demonstrates its greatest weaknesses. The operationalization of retrospective and prospective consideration is not standard. For instance, the authors consider candidates’ images and perceptions of candidate competence as indicators of retrospective and prospective attitudes (p. 179). This is highly debatable since it assumes that the voter’s image of the incumbent is an indicator of retrospection, whereas the voter’s image of the challenger is an indicator of prospection. The implausibility of this assumption is made clear when one considers that the images were measured in response to questions such as “is [the candidate] experienced/ a leader/ prepared/ close to the people/ brave/ patriotic/ respected/ honest?” (p. 141). In addition, the authors interpret the fact that more variables are statistically significant in surveys conducted closer to election day than they were in polls conducted at the beginning of the campaign as an indication that “voters broadened the factors they considered” (p. 180) in deciding their vote. This appears consistent with their theory of reflective voting. However, an alternative and more likely explanation is possible for this pattern: sample size effects. Early surveys had a smaller number of respondents than later ones (the earliest survey had 404 respondents, while the latest had 859). Not surprisingly, it was more difficult for some variables to achieve statistical significance in the earlier surveys than it was in the later ones. Differences in sample size may account for the inconsistency in the performance of retrospective and prospective considerations (emerging as significant in some surveys but not in others), rather than the more elaborate and complex process of “reflective” reasoning that the authors attribute to Nicaraguan voters.

**A New Capitalist Order: Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe.** By Hilary Appel. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004. 248p. \$27.95.

— Mitchell Orenstein, *Syracuse University*

This book provides a valuable analysis of the role of ideology in the development of mass privatization programs in postcommunist countries. Mass privatization was a unique program that defined postcommunist economic transitions in the 1990s and was adopted in numerous

countries. Launched first in the Czech Republic in 1991, this innovative method of privatization was adopted in many other postcommunist countries. The rationale for mass privatization was simple: Since people did not have the money to buy state-owned enterprises, the state could give them away. To distribute ownership widely throughout the formerly expropriated population, the state would distribute shares in state-owned enterprises to millions of small shareholders in exchange for free or nearly free vouchers. Mass privatization would divest the state of thousands of state enterprises, while creating a broad-based class of shareholders after decades of communism.

Hilary Appel’s study aims directly at the idealistic core of the mass privatization idea. The author argues with great clarity and originality that ideology accounted for a large role in the design and impact of the program. While her work makes this seem obvious, it should be remembered that throughout the 1990s, most economists and policymakers did their best to cloak mass privatization programs in well-grounded microeconomic theory. Doing so only revealed major gaps in applied microeconomics, for mass privatization proved a major disappointment. The program proved to be bad for the enterprises privatized by this method, bad for small investors, and bad for corporate governance economy-wide. After being promoted by the most brilliant minds in the modern economics profession and the leading international financial institutions (IFIs), mass privatization soon became a symbol of the hubris of market bolshevism. Today, mass privatization appears to be headed for the dustbin of history.

Appel’s work provides new detail on the course of mass privatization in two leading cases—the Czech Republic and Russia—that later became templates for reform throughout the region. The author provides thorough and well-documented case studies of reform processes in these countries, as well as several theoretical chapters that parse important comparative arguments about the design of mass privatization programs and that draw on the experiences of Poland and Slovakia.

Appel’s underlying argument is surprising and innovative: Despite enormous international enthusiasm and IFI support for mass privatization ideas, the actual design of these programs was determined almost entirely by domestic leaders, ideas, and debates. Appel devotes a full chapter to describing the extensive ideological, technical, and financial support that international financial institutions gave to the spreading of mass privatization ideas. However, her case studies show that despite this international activity, international organizations had very little impact on the design of mass privatization in either the Czech Republic or Russia. Ideas did not travel from international organizations to recipient countries on the backs of well-paid economic advisers, as some have suggested. Rather, such policy designs arose from purely domestic debates between officials and interest groups with strongly held ideological

positions about the road to a capitalist economy. This conclusion is surprising within the context of a new literature on Central and Eastern Europe that emphasizes the influential role of the European Union and other international actors in socioeconomic policy.

*A New Capitalist Order* makes a major contribution to tracing the evolution of mass privatization ideas and debates among policymakers in the Czech Republic and Russia. In the Czech Republic, Appel shows how reform ideas emerged out of communist-era think tanks and dissident circles and then were debated between two major ideological camps after 1989: radical reformers grouped around Finance Minister Václav Klaus and gradualists led by Deputy Prime Minister Valtr Komárek. Appel chronicles the evolution of reform debates within the government and parliament and with business groups. She provides a very useful discussion of debates between the three leading designers of mass privatization in the Czech Republic: Klaus, Dušan Tříška, and Tomáš Ježek. The Russian chapter provides a sweeping review of domestic privatization debates, from the appointment of Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais in 1991 to the loans-for-shares scandal in 1995, the notorious program that enriched Russia's new oligarchs. In these debates, international organizations appear to matter not at all. Rather, the author argues that reform "grew out of its own domestic context and the specific actions of skilled and committed economic liberals" (p. 70).

Appel further argues that different ideological climates in the two countries affected the opportunity structure for material interests to express themselves. In particular, she explores the important question of why managers ended up with much greater power in the Russian privatization than in the Czech version. Her answer is that Czech managers had to contend with greater anticommunist sentiment that discouraged the pursuit of special privileges for former communist managers, while in Russia, managers were able to assert themselves to gain the lion's share of mass privatized assets. Ideology thus structures the ability of material interests to assert themselves.

While both of these arguments are provocative, the study has weaknesses in addressing alternative explanations. Appel makes a strong case for the importance of domestic over international influences in the spread of liberal reform ideas of mass privatization. However, the study provides little specific country-level evidence about international influences in domestic mass privatization debates. Case study chapters barely mention massive aid programs designed to support mass privatization legislative drafting and implementation. In the Russian case, for instance, it would have been interesting to see an assessment of the multimillion-dollar support for Chubais and his team by the U.S. Agency for International Development, since other accounts have suggested that this was critical to the liberals' authority in Boris Yeltsin's government. Similarly, there

is sometimes insufficient attention to the role that material incentives and political power played in the calculations of reform leaders and interest groups.

Despite these issues, Appel's study of the role of ideology in mass privatization provides a crucial launching point for future debate. Its major contribution lies in drawing renewed attention to an increasingly forgotten policy of transition—mass privatization—that was once heralded as the keystone of the new economic order in postcommunist states. This study shows that explaining the design of such programs requires the challenging of prevailing views about the structural, material, and international determinants of postcommunist economic policy and points instead to the elusive power of ideas.

**Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics.** By Yesim Arat. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 150p. \$55.00.

— Frank Tachau, *University of Illinois at Chicago*

Since the advent of competitive politics in Turkey in 1946, Islamist parties have assumed increasing importance. During the 1970s, the National Salvation Party, headed by Necmettin Erbakan, was a participant in a series of coalition governments. The Welfare Party, also led by Erbakan, came in first (barely) in the 1995 election, catapulting its temperamental leader into the position of prime minister. In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) won an overwhelming electoral victory, capturing two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Although the JDP denies that it is an Islamist party, its leader, the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been a leading Islamist politician, including especially his stormy career as mayor of Istanbul, and both its supporters and opponents regard it as such today. The result of this dramatic rise of Islamist political forces in the formally and solidly secular Republic of Turkey has aroused a great deal of controversy. Not least of the questions raised is the popular conundrum of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

Only recently has scholarly literature on these parties begun to appear, particularly studies based on first-hand research, as opposed to electoral analysis or perusal of materials published by the parties. The work under review here is a contribution to this growing literature. It focuses on the role of women activists in the Welfare Party. This is felicitous, as the role of women and the relations between the sexes are perhaps the most sensitive issues confronting modern Islamists. The legal order of the secular Turkish Republic is based on the principle of the legal equality of women and men. Traditional Islam, on the other hand, relegates women to secondary status. This is accentuated in various ways: by allowance of polygamy, unilateral divorce, discrimination against females in inheritance, and most visibly in public segregation of the sexes and prescription of exceptionally modest modes of dress. Modern

Turkish secularism and traditional Islamic values thus appear to embody a clash of opposites. The rise of Islamist parties has therefore generally been interpreted as a threat to the survival of the secular order. This has been the particular concern of the Turkish military, which regards itself as the custodian of the Turkish state and its secular order. There is an uneasy truce between the current JDP government and the military, with public expressions of mutual respect punctuated by occasional appeals by the party to traditional values, such as a short-lived proposal to outlaw adultery.

Yesim Arat is not distracted by this pervasive political polarization. She is interested in what attracts Islamist women to active political participation, how they were recruited, how they recruit others, and what values they manifest. She undertook a series of intensive interviews, most with activist women involved with the so-called Welfare Party in 1998 (i.e., shortly after the party was outlawed). She also interviewed some activists in the Virtue Party, which replaced the Welfare Party.

Most of the interviews were conducted in Istanbul (including then-Mayor Erdogan), the remainder predominantly in Ankara, with one conducted in the provincial city of Bursa. This immediately raises the question of representativeness. Most of the population of Turkey is provincial or rural. While the western regions and the major cities account for a large proportion of the national populace, it cannot be assumed that the views manifested there are necessarily exemplary of the whole country. On the other hand, limited resources undoubtedly played a role in geographically skewing the sample of interviews. In addition, national political power is based in these more developed parts of the country, so that the interviews are valuable in their own right.

Arat raises interesting questions (pp. 9–10): How did these Islamist women carve out their identity? How did they use that identity to “renegotiate power”? “What does it mean to assume an Islamic self and live Islamic lives in a secular context?” “How is an appeal to Islam reconciled with demands of political participation in a democracy?” The subjects of her interviews were all members of the Welfare Party’s Ladies Commissions, specifically organized to mobilize female voters. These commissions existed alongside other organizations similarly designed to support the party, such as youth, professional associations, workers, civil servants, retired persons, and the handicapped. All of them presumably were subordinate to the administrative organs of the party through which power, concentrated at the center as has been true of all Turkish political parties, was exercised. Thus, there was a solid glass ceiling above which women could not rise (although Arat notes wryly that the secular order in Turkey manifests a similar pattern).

Many of the women in this study were raised in a secular environment and deliberately chose a religious life-

style, in some cases against the vehement opposition of family members (one was the daughter of an army officer whose family had vigorously supported the young Bülent Ecevit, a strong secularist and social democrat). Many were well educated (including degrees in law, dentistry, divinity, and literature). All were married and had families. For many of them, the headscarf played a crucial role, in some cases interrupting university studies amid highly charged controversies pitting students against university administrators and faculty. For some, marriage presented problems, substituting a patriarchal husband for parental domination. All of them, however, found ways to assert their independence, step outside the family home, and engage in independent activities under the auspices of the Welfare Party. Thus, party activity became a means of reconciling the modern pursuit of individual fulfillment with the traditional demand for respect of the family and the marriage bond.

This is perhaps the key to the author’s findings. She argues that despite the popular conception of polarization between secularism and Islamism, in fact the two have become intertwined. For example, in discussing the worldviews of these women, Arat finds that “[t]he women with the headscarves who belittled the threat of Islamic fundamentalism insisted on their own version of Islam that was ultimately based on a unique Turkish experience. They did not understand why they could be seen as a threat to the secular state, because their understanding of Islam was shaped with the values and norms of this secular state. They respect the secular or liberal concepts of justice and fairness. . . . [T]he political nature of their headscarves did not mean they were opposed to a secular democratic Republic that upheld respect for the individual. Women who covered their heads and worked for the party wanted to operate within the framework of a secular Republic where religion was allowed to be more publicly visible” (p. 107).

These religious women wanted the headscarf but opposed polygamy; “they wanted an Islamic state because they associated it with a moral secular state” (p. 108). In other words, Islamist women were reinterpreting Islam to make it more compatible with liberalism.

*Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy* is a very useful and informative book. It is hoped that this study will pave the way for more extensive research in the future. It is possible, after all, that Turkey will demonstrate that Islam and liberal democracy can be mutually compatible.

**The Future of the Welfare State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities.** By Francis Castles. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 208p. \$99.00 cloth, \$35.00 paper.

— Salvatore Pitruzzello, *Tulane University*

As Francis Castles observes, quantitative comparative political economy has generated a “cacophony” of explanations

for the welfare state crisis from 1980 to 1998. Political economists have identified causal factors including globalization, de-industrialization, population aging, declining birth rates, weak economic performance, welfare program maturation, political institutions, and partisanship. To Castles, however, these explanations rest on faulty empirical evidence. Methodological problems—in particular, unreliable comparative social expenditure data and overreliance on pooled designs and statistical techniques—have made it impossible to distinguish “crisis myths” from “crisis realities.” His proposed solution is to combine cross-national designs with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s SOCX database on social spending, and he argues that doing so reveals that dominant theories are myths. His sweeping account is a spirited contribution, but it is bound to attract significant criticism.

What are the major claims of crisis of the welfare state? Castles correctly points out that crisis claims are not new. In fact, since the end of the glory days of the 1960s, welfare states appear to have been in perennial crisis. Beginning in the early 1970s, theories of overload charged that democratic politics generated “economically unsustainable” fiscal deficits. In the 1980s, accelerating financial and trade globalization emerged as the mechanisms of crisis. The imperatives of international competition purportedly weakened domestic policy autonomy, blurred partisan differences, forced welfare state retrenchment, and set in motion a “race to the bottom” toward allegedly more efficient liberal-residual welfare states. In the 1990s, de-industrialization, population aging, female labor participation, and low birth rates generated autonomous pressures that contributed to unsustainable budget deficits. These postindustrial phenomena challenged the dominance of globalization as an explanation for the welfare state crisis.

Why does Castles believe that these accounts are myths? The “cacophony” reveals a proliferation of explanatory theories that have not been subject to adequate empirical tests. A fundamental mismatch between supposedly universal theories and extremely narrow empirical evidence fails to distinguish between long-term relations linking historical processes and cross-national differences. In particular, pooled time-series cross-sectional designs do not provide satisfactory accounts of cross-national differences in the causal mechanisms shaping the extent, depth, and form of the crisis. Other evidence marshaled in support of the competing crisis claims tends to be anecdotal, rather than systematic, and tends to be biased toward corroborating preferred theoretical and policy arguments. The empirical evidence emerging from the mismatch leads to mistaken inferences and unwarranted policy prescriptions.

Why does the distinction of crisis myths from crisis realities require a methodological solution? In light of the existing cacophony, properly testing the existing theories would contribute more knowledge than generating new theories. To this end, Castles proposes three methodolog-

ical advances. First is “demystification by measurement.” The harmonization of measures of social spending afforded by the SOCX database for the 1980–98 period enhances cross-national comparability of the extent, structures, trajectories, changes, and reforms of welfare states over the last two decades. Second is “demystification by comparative hypothesis testing.” Castles rejects pooled designs for obscuring cross-national differences, favoring instead pure cross-sectional designs in which countries are the central units. The design requires the compression of time into single points that capture stable temporal properties exemplifying the dynamics of the two historical subperiods (1980–89, 1990–98). Means capture level-shifts; absolute changes, defined in terms of the displacement between the last and the first observation of a given period, capture deterministic trend-shifts. Third is “statistical testing of cross-national hypotheses.” In the univariate dimension, comparisons involve means, trends, and coefficients of variations of welfare states and families of welfare states for the two historical periods. In the multivariate domain, comparisons involve bivariate correlations, “best fit” ordinary least squares regressions, and path analyses.

Univariate and multivariate tests lend support to the author’s claims that some of the most popular explanations are myths. Chapter 2 undermines “race to the bottom” claims. Relatively small changes in aggregate expenditures across periods do not indicate significant decline in welfare spending and deterioration in welfare standards. Chapter 3 challenges the usefulness of aggregate social expenditures. Aggregates obscure movements in the finer meso-structure of social provisions. Disaggregated policies provide richer views of the extent to which politics have made structural changes, downsized existing programs, responded to new demands, and thus altered spending criteria. Chapter 4 questions a regional variant of the “race to the bottom,” namely, whether recent decades have seen the emergence of a European social model different from that of other Western welfare states. Chapter 5 dispels trade globalization as a “paper tiger”: It influences neither aggregate spending nor program priorities. Only Foreign Direct Investment exhibits a negative correlation. Moreover, welfare state downsizing finds no support after controlling for pension generosity. Significant partisan differences in welfare spending refute the “new politics” claims. Chapter 6 challenges the link between population aging and public spending. There are no significant cross-national differences in trajectories from 1980 to 1998. Far from having general applicability, the “old age crisis” is limited to particular countries. Chapter 7 weakens claims of a new crisis stemming from population decline. If a crisis exists, it is the demographic shift to below replacement levels of fertility. Supportive social policy initiatives, however, contribute effectively to the continued vitality of societies. Lastly, chapter 8 speculates on the future of welfare states. Since the recent past reveals little change, major disruptions of existing spending

patterns in the immediate future are unlikely. The absence of a generalized crisis in recent decades suggests that generalized crises in coming decades are also unlikely. Rather, different types of welfare states confront different problems, and hence distinctive dilemmas.

Castles's mastery of the complexity of the debates on the welfare state crisis is superb in its simplicity. His exploration of the richness of the SOCX database is equally superb. But does his sweeping tour de force achieve the objective of demystifying crisis claims? The answer rests on the validity and reliability of empirical evidence, and hence on the appropriateness of his chosen research methodology. The hasty dismissal of pooled designs and statistical techniques because of their alleged inability to properly capture cross-national differences is bound to attract severe criticism. The pooled approach has driven the research in comparative quantitative political economy of the welfare state of the last decade, and it has generated a rich body of theoretical, methodological, and empirical research on the cross-national differences in the evolution of welfare states (e.g., see Duane Swank, *Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Changes in Developed Welfare States*, 2002). Simply stating, without demonstrating, that the pooled approach is deficient—logically, theoretically, and methodologically—in capturing cross-national differences is not justified. Indeed, despite the constraints of a common structure that pooling imposes, welfare state scholars have identified theoretically meaningful cross-national temporal patterns as well as long-term breaks pointing to possible crises. Moreover, the compression of historical periods into single representative data points, as described by the means and deterministic trends, and as required by the pure cross-national design, more likely obscures the cross-national differences in historical evolution.

The critique of Castles's treatment of time can be pushed further by considering that the compression into means (and trends) ignores the implications of nonstationary historical dynamics. Compression aims at capturing modal, or representative, behavior, which identifies stable cross-national differences for two subperiods. Means, however, are meaningful only for stationary historical processes, for which they represent stable equilibria. Because the processes the author investigates are nonstationary, means used to capture stable dynamics are statistically "nonsensical." With nonstationary processes, comparisons of means therefore cannot describe cross-national differences. Variances of nonstationary processes are also not meaningful; they are time-dependent and asymptotically tend to infinity. Accordingly, the coefficients of variation, which require stable means and standard deviations, cannot capture the homogeneity of families of welfare states. Lastly, because means and variances are integral to correlations and regressions, the concept of nonstationarity suggests that multivariate findings may themselves be "spurious." This last critique can be extended

to the pooled research that still relies on OLS regression despite the nonstationarity of historical processes (e.g., see Torbin Iversen, "The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion: Trade Openness, De-industrialization and Partisan Politics," in Paul Pierson, ed., *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, 2001). Co-integration analyses would better determine whether and how nonstationary processes drive the long-run evolution of welfare states as well as breaks in levels and slopes in such dynamics.

Castles's objective to enhance modeling and focus on the comparability of data is a positive advance. However, the question of whether the crisis of the welfare state is real or just a myth remains unanswered. To adequately test whether the cacophony of theories captures myth or reality, quantitative comparative political economy research must confront the theoretical and methodological implications of nonstationary dynamics that appear to drive the evolution of welfare states.

#### **Global Justice Reform: A Comparative Methodology.**

By Hiram E. Chodosh. New York: New York University Press, 2005. 240p. \$45.00.

— Mark Ungar, *Brooklyn College, CUNY*

This book is a greatly needed assessment of the methodologies used to study and implement justice reform. By asking a range of pointed questions on judicial reform whose answers have largely been assumed, Hiram E. Chodosh lays bare basic concepts and debates in order to understand whether they are truly logical, consistent, and useful. The scrutiny with which the author subjects the field of comparative law helps make it much more rigorous, since, as he points out, even an empirically rich comparative framework will result in poor findings if its methodology is inconsistent and its objectives unclear. He carefully explains comparative method, illuminates approaches ranging from cross-national comparisons to intranational comparisons, and analyzes benefits of comparisons, such as the creation of continuums. With this comprehensive and insightful assessment, he criticizes comparative law's failure to adopt a method for objectively assessing the results and value of a comparison that is "flexible enough to grasp a wide variety" of processes and institutions (p. 17). He shows how classifications, prototypes, evaluation mechanisms, and other building blocks of comparative study are often too deterministic or unclear, and how the lack of objective criteria leaves central debates—such as over the wisdom and practicality of transferring a feature of one country's legal system to another—unresolved. "Without clarity of purpose," he concludes, "it is difficult to determine the content of what to report" (p. 16).

The author's extraordinary knowledge of the literature, presented in a way that enriches but never overwhelms the main argument or structure, alone makes the book a valuable resource. He develops classifications of scholarship

centered on a wide range of methods, approaches, and theories, giving the reader an overview of the literature unmatched by any previous work. This review of the field is also central to the book's critique—while the field of comparative law is broad, he says, the choice of criteria in most comparisons seems to be set by “the context and the motivations of the person making the comparison,” rather than scientific method (p. 25).

The application of this critique to the functioning of judicial systems is also extremely valuable. Chodosh takes each stage of justice reform, from planning to outcomes, and lays out its varied weaknesses, outcomes, and analytical shortcomings. He looks at reforms from every angle, pairing them in ways, such as top down versus bottom up and external versus internal, opening up valuable new perspectives. The book's comparison of the different values, features, and aims of a judicial system—such as efficiency, access, accountability, and independence—provides a solid foundation on which to define these features in different contexts, to map their interactions, and, most crucially, to evaluate the impact of specific reforms on them.

Where *Global Justice Reform* falls short, though, is in applying its own framework to actual trends and cases. The author's critique of comparative law's dichotomous frameworks and pat approaches toward international legal unification are accurate, but not always complete. Many international developments, for instance, are based less on “transference” than on combinations of international influences, regional dialogues, national inputs, administrative needs, and societal pressures. Adoption of new criminal process codes throughout Latin America and the use of universal jurisdiction for past rights abuses are two such examples. The book similarly misses a wider analytical process by downplaying how even methodologically challenged studies generate responses that develop and sharpen comparative methodology. Using a Supreme Court's rulings to measure its independence from the executive, for example, often leads to responses that point out weaknesses, such as the failure to account for the importance of the cases to the executive.

More broadly, the book does not delve enough into the great demands that it says democracy places on a judiciary. Analysis of the case studies of Indonesia and India, countries flooded with such demands, is disappointingly limited. The background and current dilemmas of these countries' judicial systems are discussed, from executive controls to case bottlenecks. The book also recognizes the extensive politicization of the judiciary and of judicial reform, from influence by political parties in judges' selection to interference by private interests in specific cases to judicial officials' own resistance to change. But the analogy of “slime,” used to illustrate how “emergent” judicial systems draw on a wide range of influences and stimuli, is too abstract to accommodate historical, political, and societal conditions. It cannot explain why certain problems are

targeted, whether unrealistic reforms are a product of sloppy planning or deliberate maneuvering, or the political and institutional context in which a reformer “simply has to make a value choice of which error is better to avoid in the context of that particular system” (p. 115). The passage on the importance of timing for Indonesia's judicial commission blueprint, for example, should explain how uncertainty created by conditions such as violence and frequent regime change make timing particularly critical in that country.

Such inclusion is not easy, of course, but can be done through a focus on specific issues central to judicial reform. Examples of particular importance to internally diverse democracies like Indonesia and India are ethnicity, decentralization, and mediation. Huge populations of multiple ethnicities, spread out over an extensive territory, usually create pressure for a decentralization that incorporates local needs, traditions, and forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). So how far can government-sponsored ADR go to defuse judicial disputes in different regions? How much should local officials be a part of a nationally directed reform? Focusing on such questions can help provide a template, as the author states, that can incorporate differences. Studies of how new democracies in Europe and Latin America have been institutionalizing indigenous and local legal norms is another possible starting point for a comparative methodology that includes the interactions of actors and institutions.

Focus on such incorporation is less of a criticism of this remarkable book than a way of using the many instruments it forges. Narrowing the distinction between “conceptual approaches” and “political, cultural, and financial considerations” (p. 123) is a way to extend an approach that already advances understanding of justice reform and the policies that implement it. By dismantling and reconfiguring comparative law, this highly original and engaging work also gives that field of study a much-needed boost.

**Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective.** By Jon Elster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 310 p. \$26.95.

— David Roman, *City University of Hong Kong*

This book makes an important contribution to the evolving field of transitional justice on both a theoretical and a practical level. In terms of theory, it ably complements other volumes in this area, such as those written or edited by Neil Kritz, James McAdams, Ruti Teitel and James Gibson, and others. On a practical level, it provides a conceptual framework, analyses, and conclusions from which countries undergoing transition from authoritarian rule, civil war, or violent conflict can draw in order to make informed choices.

Jon Elster defines transitional justice as “the processes of trials, purges, and reparations that take place after the transition from one political regime to another”. In this author’s view, transitional justice is part of an empirical study of *justice*. This distinguishes the book from those approaches that regard transitional justice as an aspect of the empirical study of policy interventions that promote peace, reconciliation, social reconstruction, and/or democratization. The author highlights the retributive dimension of transitional justice, which brings criminal punishment and restitution of properties back into the spotlight. The book, therefore, complements those studies in transitional justice that emphasize issues such as apologies, forgiveness, forgetting, collective memory, truth, truth telling, and social acknowledgment, which find their expression in such institutions as truth and reconciliation commissions, restorative justice programs, and other alternative measures, such as *gacaca* in Rwanda. Elster’s approach is enhanced by his detailed knowledge of transitional justice in the post–World War II era, his analysis of transitional justice in two historical periods (ancient Athens and French restoration), and his ability to understand the complexities of the third wave of transitional justice, especially in former socialist Europe.

The structure of the book is tersely directed towards the author’s objective of offering an analysis of transitional justice, an analysis that addresses anomalies such as why, after some transitions, “wrongdoers from the previous regime are punished severely and in other cases mildly or not at all, and why victims are sometimes compensated generously and sometimes poorly or not at all”. Elster admits that he does not have a theory of transitional justice. This allows him to proceed without an introduction, and to end without a conclusion. He compensates by outlining the plan of the book chapter by chapter as it unfolds. Also useful is the summary that accompanies Chapters 1 and 2. After describing two historical cases of transitional justice and “the larger universe of cases” in the first three chapters, which form Part I, the author proceeds to the Analytics of Transitional Justice (Part II). He delineates his analytical framework in Chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6, entitled “Wrongdoers” and “Victims,” respectively, study the two major parties of transitional justice. They deal with translating the complex notions of wrongdoing and victimhood into the legal and administrative processes of transitional justice. Chapters 7–9 examine (political) constraints, (retributive) emotions, and (party) politics, respectively, as factors of transitional justice.

The author demonstrates excellent analytical ability. His classification of actors, factors, motives, constraints, and so on provides a useful tool for analysis. With this analysis he is able to introduce readers to the changing nature of some categories over time, the persistence of others, and their overlaps or blurred distinctions. It is perhaps due to the limited space of the book that he has to select only

some of the categories for more detailed analysis. The picture that emerges is one of a complexity of moral, political, and legal terms, which may leave readers wondering whether a theory of transitional justice is ever possible. Nevertheless, this categorization/conceptualization provides tools and a framework that can be used for much-needed empirical research on transitional justice.

The case selection is wide—from ancient Athens to the third-wave transitions. It is possible that the book could benefit from the inclusion of other counterfactuals. For instance, measures of active amnesia that were aspects of European peace treaties throughout history (Timothy Garten Ash, “The Truth about the Dictatorship,” *New York Review of Books*, February 18, 1998) may make us wonder why the dogs of transitional justice were not barking for more than a millennium. The strategies adopted by authoritarian regimes in recruiting collaborators may perhaps shed some light on how the dualism between the agency and the structure disproportionately shift from responsibility to excuses. Political justice in reverse transitions, such as those that followed the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, may provide us with other explanations for motives of various actors in (un)doing political justice in later transitions. Periods of “ordinary” justice, such as U.S. reconstruction legislation, dealing with McCarthyism, may make us wonder what the difference between transitional justice and ordinary justice is. Naturally, the volume of relevant historical events provides materials for several other publications and cannot be confined to one book.

One point in the book that may surprise law and society academics is the treatment of law, legal justice, and legal interpretation in “normal times” as value neutral and complete. Legal interpretation can be very contrary, as illustrated in the “Problem of the Grudge Informer” (Lon Fuller, *The Morality of Law*, 1964). The neutral approach provides the author with a platform for the determination of political justice. Given the fact that such a neutral approach to law is hardly possible (as shown by the “Borkation”—type of bickering over Supreme Court appointments, as well as by senators’ efforts to get their predictability of how any nominee would decide specific cases), one may wonder whether we need to distinguish between political “transitional justice” in nascent democracies and “political justice” in advanced democracies. If we do not need to distinguish between transitional justice or political justice, then this would have implications for the selection of a larger universe of cases. We could then include recent policies used by advanced democracies that have responded to terrorist attacks by the introduction of shoot-to-kill policies, torture, and detention without trial. If we do distinguish, then we may wonder whether the extraordinary experience of transitional justice does not bring qualifications for the development of (international) legal standards. For example, the experience of World War II was the driving force behind the adoption of the United

Nations Charter and the General Declaration of Human Rights; the Nuremberg trials were the impetus for limiting the prohibition against retroactivity (e.g., European Convention, art. 7/2; International Covenant of Political Rights, art. 15/2). To be fair, while *Closing the Books* does not make a contribution to public law or international human rights law, it does contribute substantially to comparative politics.

In sum, this book provides interesting and valuable analysis of the “nuts and bolts” of transitional justice, and it fills an important gap in European policies that deal with the past. For scholars and researchers, it provides useful materials and a detailed categorization of concepts and terms that may be used in further research.

### **Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and**

**Germany.** By Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 224p. \$60.00 cloth, \$14.99 paper.

— Anthony M. Messina, *University of Notre Dame*

The central question of Joel Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper’s well-written and highly accessible book—how to explain the disparate political responses to the religious concerns of Muslims in Britain, France, and Germany—is clearly important. Indeed, while the question was pertinent before the tragedy of September 11 in 2001 and the American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, it has become exponentially more urgent since. Although the difficulties of incorporating Muslim populations into the countries receiving them were neither a cause of nor directly connected to the aforementioned events, the negative chain reaction they subsequently precipitated within and outside of the diverse Muslim community within Western Europe nevertheless exposed serious tensions between many of the community’s religious practices and the dominant cultural, social, and political mores of the host societies. In short, the answer to the book’s organizing question very much matters for Western Europe’s political, religious, and social tranquility.

The book’s central argument is that the respective constitutional and legal status of religion in Britain, France, and Germany, along with the historical context through which the institutions of church and state interact, have been critical in shaping how each country has accommodated the religious needs of Muslim groups (p. 13). Fetzer and Soper arrive at this argument after considering the evidence pertaining to each state’s proclivity to accommodate Muslim practices and teaching in the public schools, the public financing of Islamic schools, and the construction of mosques. This evidence in turn is funneled through the respective prisms of four social science paradigms. The first paradigm, resource mobilization, predicts that the state will accommodate the demands of Muslims more or less in direct proportion to the level of the latter’s political resources. The second paradigm, inspired by political

opportunity structure theory, contends that the success of Muslims in extracting policy concessions from the state will vary according to the nature of the inherited domestic political institutions that structure overall group mobilization. Yet a third major paradigm predicts that a country’s “political ideology” and, specifically, its core ideas about citizenship, nationality, and pluralism, will critically influence how the state resolves issues pertaining to immigrant rights (pp. 13–14).

While Fetzer and Soper respectfully acknowledge the usefulness of each paradigm in explaining the different public policy responses to Islam among the British, French, and German states, they ultimately find each one wanting, and thus inferior to a fourth: their theory of church–state relations. According to this theory, and on the strength of the secondary literature, the authors’ numerous interviews with religious and political elites, and their original public opinion survey evidence, the legacy of church–state institutions and relations peculiar to each country points to British policymakers as the most inclined to accommodate the religious policy demands of settled Muslims, French policymakers significantly less inclined, and German policymakers falling somewhere in between their British and French counterparts. With regard to the propensity of the state to allow religious dress in public schools, fund private Islamic schools, and facilitate the construction of mosques, the authors find that France ranks significantly below both Britain and Germany because of the state’s stubborn legal and ideological attachment to a “strict” interpretation of *laïcité*—the historical tradition of separating church and state—an attachment that they conclude is “disastrous” for the integration of Muslims in France.

How convincing is the book’s thesis? Before addressing this question, it is necessary to note that the authors’ dependent variable is not entirely satisfactory. At various junctures in the book, for example, the authors identify the dependent variable as the degree of state accommodation of Muslim religious “practices” (pp. 20, 146), while conversely, at other points, it is specified as the response of the state to the “needs” (p. 6), “concerns” (p. 6), “demands” (p. 6), or “rights” (pp. 7, 150) of Muslims. The vagueness of the dependent variable is problematic if only because the failure of liberal states to accommodate adequately the “concerns” of settled Muslim populations, for example, is a decidedly less serious issue for politics and public policy than is their failure to accommodate the “rights” of this community. One could reasonably argue that it is easier for liberal states to justify normatively and to get away politically with their neglect of the “demands” or “needs” of Muslims than their “rights.”

Having said this, the case study evidence is fairly persuasive. Fetzer and Soper do an impressive job of testing the aforementioned theories against the evidence gathered from each country and building a solid case for the superior

explanatory power of their theory of historical church–state relations. On this score, the evidence supporting the importance of the legacy of *laïcité* in France is particularly compelling, if intuitive (Chapter 3).

While impressive, the evidence supporting their thesis, and hence the thesis itself, are not unimpeachable, however. At least two red flags can be raised in this context. First, the authors could be fairly accused of having been somewhat selective in gathering and presenting their evidence. For example, the evidence pointing to a pattern of enlightened state policy toward Muslims in the British case goes back only a couple of decades or so. In any event, Muslims have been migrating to the UK in significant numbers since the 1960s. If British state policy has been relatively enlightened, why did the government approve the first Muslim state primary school only in 1997?

Second, although the authors' elite interviews and public opinion survey evidence (Chapter 5) generally suggest the conclusions at which they arrive, plausible alternative explanations cannot be ruled out. For example, how do we know that the French state's tortured relationship with its Muslim settlers is a function of *laïcité* and not a legacy of postimperial racism, a possibility that the authors perhaps too quickly dismiss (p. 21)? Could *laïcité* be the formal justification for French state policy, rather than its cause?

Several other challenging queries like these could reasonably be put to the authors. However, none would ultimately diminish the valuable contribution that *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* makes to our understanding of the lingering impediments to the incorporation of Muslims into the societies of Western Europe.

**Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility.** By Neil Gilbert. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 224p. \$39.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

— Daniel Béland, *University of Calgary*

For more than a decade, students of social policy have debated the argument that welfare state development is a path-dependent process that makes radical change difficult (see Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State?* [1994]). From this perspective, existing policy legacies create powerful constraints for policymakers seeking to enact retrenchment measures or to alter the functioning of the welfare state. As a result, most reforms tend to reinforce existing institutional patterns instead of changing them in a strong way. In recent years, authors such as Neil Gilbert have challenged this view. In *Transformation of the Welfare State*, he challenges Pierson's argument through a broad analysis of social policy development in the United States and Western Europe during the 1980s and 1990s.

The book is not a research monograph in the strict sense of the term; it does not feature systematic quantitative analysis or rigorous comparative investigation. What it offers is a stimulating overview of contemporary social policy reform that supports the claim that “the welfare state of advanced industrial nations are undergoing a major transformation. . . . [The] change is from policies framed by a universal approach to publicly delivered benefits designed to protect labor against the vicissitudes of the market and firmly held as social rights to policies framed by a selective approach to private delivery of provisions designed to promote labor force participation and individual responsibility” (pp. 3–4). Gilbert formulates the concept of “enabling state” to distinguish this new policy approach from the traditional—social demographic—model (p. 44). Overall, his is clearly an argument about cross-national convergence triggered by powerful economic and ideational forces discussed throughout the book. Yet Gilbert argues that such convergence is not always easy to perceive at first glance because policymakers and welfare advocates have minimized the true scope of policy change occurring in many advanced industrial societies. Recent scholarship about the discourse on social democracy in Scandinavian countries is supporting that interesting yet controversial idea (Robert H. Cox, “The Path Dependence of an Idea,” *Social Policy & Administration* 38 [2004]: 204–19).

The above-mentioned claim that strong social policy convergence is occurring in advanced industrial countries is even more controversial. Other recent books about contemporary social policy reform suggest that powerful institutional logics inhibit policy convergence (Duane Swank, *Global Capital, Political Institutions and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States*, 2002; Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State*, 2001). Yet, recent quantitative analyses focusing on citizenship rights provide additional support to Gilbert's claim that major change has occurred since the 1980s (Walter Korpi, “Welfare State Regress in Western Europe,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29 [2003]: 589–609). As the debate over the scope and nature of institutional change is still raging, it is hard to take a firm stance in favor of or against Gilbert's central argument. Institutional development is a long-term historical process, and current scholarship about the welfare state could age rapidly, as economic and political shifts may strongly alter the logic of reform in many advanced industrial societies. For that reason, a cautious approach is necessary, and Gilbert's book, although a stimulating account, must be read alongside the above-mentioned contributions, among others. This is especially true because, as suggested here, it offers only limited, non-systematic empirical evidence to back its claims.

To convince readers that strong institutional change has occurred in contemporary welfare states, Gilbert includes chapters about what he perceives as the main

aspects of policy change in advanced industrial societies: the move from social rights to activation policies, the marketization of social policy through the private delivery of social services, and the targeting of social benefits. Beyond these concise empirical chapters, the author formulates a communitarian critique of the “enabling state” grounded in the concept of solidarity. Perhaps for that reason, sociologist and communitarian guru Amitai Etzioni penned a short foreword that advocates a balance between personal and collective responsibility. By and large, the book’s normative contribution is rather limited in scope.

The broad theoretical contribution of the book is quite limited, too. The main issue here is that Gilbert does not formulate a systematic model for understanding policy change. Although he stresses the impact of neoliberal ideas on policymaking, for example, he does not explain when and how ideas matter in welfare state development. Mentioning that “social forces are the product of changing values and norms about the relations between welfare and work and the limits of government intervention” (p. 24) makes for a rather abstract statement that fails to clarify the general relationship among policy ideas, economic forces, and institutional change. This is a traditional shortcoming of the literature focusing on the relationship between ideas and social policy, and more efforts are needed to systematically explore that relationship (see Béland, “Ideas and Social Policy,” *Social Policy & Administration*, 39 [2005]: 1–18). Beyond the discussion about the politics of ideas, other, and more coherent, approaches to policy change have recently been formulated (Jacob S. Hacker, *The Divided Welfare State*, 2002; Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time*, 2004; Kathleen Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve*, 2004).

As compared to such scholarship, Gilbert’s book may lack theoretical sophistication. Yet despite its limitations, *Transformation of the Welfare State* remains an important book that students of social policy and welfare advocates alike should engage with. Arguments about path dependence can become simplistic, and Gilbert is probably right to argue that many scholars, elected officials, and welfare advocates find it convenient to understate the true scope of institutional change taking place in contemporary welfare states. For that reason, this accessible, well-written, and concise book is a provocative contribution to debates that often transcend purely academic considerations to address one of the most crucial political issues of our time: the future of economic solidarity and social protection in advanced industrial societies.

**The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National Policy.** By Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 320p. \$39.95.

— Tuong Vu, *Naval Postgraduate School*

Short of rebelling, how do powerless peasants under a domineering Stalinist state influence policy? Benedict J.

Tria Kerkvliet’s book offers not only a persuasive answer to this question but also a useful theoretical framework for understanding the power of “everyday politics.”

The book studies the politics of collectivization in North Vietnam from the perspective of ordinary villagers. The bulk of the book (Chapters 3 to 6) follows this state project to transform agriculture from the mid-1950s, with the establishment of the first work exchange groups to the massive campaign in the late 1950s to form cooperatives all over North Vietnam, to various government efforts to shore up these cooperatives in the face of wars, falling agricultural production, rampant corruption, and peasants’ widespread discontent in the following two decades. The narrative focuses especially on how peasants expressed, not in words but in behavior at odds with official policy, their ambivalence about, disagreement with, and resistance to collectivization. It was, Kerkvliet argues, due to these surreptitious pressures from peasants that by the late 1970s, various local authorities had secretly allowed cooperatives to contract out farming tasks and land to households. Eventually, central leaders had to legitimize such contracts and abandoned collectivization by the late 1980s. National leaders followed peasants, not the other way around.

Kerkvliet’s main theoretical contribution is on the question of why and how everyday politics matters (Chapter 2). He distinguishes three broad types of politics. “Official politics” centers on what authorities do, whereas “advocacy politics” concerns organized efforts to support or oppose authorities directly. In contrast, “everyday politics” involves ordinary people’s daily struggle to adjust to or contest norms and rules regarding authority over the production and allocation of resources (p. 22). It may or may not involve resistance to authorities, may or may not convey a political message, and requires little or no organization. By everyday politics, Kerkvliet perhaps seeks to improve on James Scott’s concept of “everyday forms of resistance,” which has been criticized as conveying an intentional element not always warranted by such behavior.

While everyday politics may carry no intention to influence policy, Kerkvliet claims that it can feed into advocacy politics and affect official politics. Everyday politics matters for three reasons. First, ordinary people potentially have some power vis-à-vis authorities; peasants in particular have the power of withdrawing their labor. Their power may also be derived from the importance of agriculture in the national economy or from the government’s need for rural political support. Second, some governments may be unwilling or unable to force compliance; furthermore, ordinary people’s deviant behavior by its nature may be difficult for governments to detect and repress. Finally, everyday politics matters because local officials often deviate from national policy, condone deviant behavior, and help spread such deviations.

Everyday politics clearly has its limits. Kerkvliet concedes that the power of everyday behavior to generate

national change depends on whether it is widespread and similar across many communities (p. 30). He notes that everyday politics is especially important in regimes with totalitarian ambitions because official norms cover such a broad range of activities that even everyday behavior may carry political implications (pp. 23–24). Such regimes also maintain a tight leash on their people, making advocacy politics extremely risky (p. 27). Although he suggests that everyday politics may be critical in other contexts, his examples concern all communist regimes, and it is unclear how well his framework would travel beyond these cases.

Kerkvliet also cautions that everyday politics is not the only explanation for the fate of collective farming in Vietnam (p. 33). Other factors at work included foreign aid, Soviet and Chinese influence, wars, and severe economic crises in Vietnam in the late 1970s and 1980s. Because the author does not discuss these factors in detail, one wonders whether his claim for the significance of everyday politics would still hold if they were more fully considered. For example, it may be useful for the book to show how the massive streams of food aid for Vietnam from its communist allies fluctuated over time and may have correlated with certain twists and turns in the collectivization campaign. Furthermore, note that the two decisions to legitimize household contracts in the 1980s were made in contexts when not just collectivization but the very survival of the regime was at stake. A fuller treatment of other factors besides everyday politics may help him identify *when* everyday politics may have the most impact.

By focusing on everyday politics, Kerkvliet rightly challenges the conventional view that the Vietnamese political system is completely dominated by the state, whose power may sometimes be mediated by state-sponsored mass organizations. His proposed alternative is a “dialogical” model of state–society relations that gives an important role to the “dialogue” between the Communist Party and various sectors of society (p. 36). He wishes to emphasize that state power was much less than often thought, which is true, and he acknowledges that whereas the views of authorities were usually public, those of the masses rarely were. Yet the term “dialogue,” which commonly indicates a two-way conversation between more or less equal partners, obscures more than it reveals. Vietnamese peasants were bombarded daily with official exhortations coming from the “ubiquitous public address system” (p. 20), yet for nearly 30 years, their views expressed in various forms were ignored by state leaders while their livelihood steadily fell below subsistence. The dialogue metaphor simply misses the contentious nature of peasants’ struggle for survival and their precarious position vis-à-vis a powerful state as vividly described elsewhere in the book.

Despite these minor quibbles, the persuasiveness of Kerkvliet’s general argument and the usefulness of his theoretical framework cannot be doubted. Overall, the book

makes significant contributions to the theorizing about peasants’ everyday politics and about state–society relations in communist Vietnam. It deserves to be read widely by political scientists and Vietnam specialists alike.

**Welfare State Change: Towards a Third Way?** Edited by Jane Lewis and Rebecca Surender. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 248p. \$99.00 cloth, \$35.00 paper.

—David Coates, *Wake Forest University*

We do occasionally reach moments at which important bodies of academic scholarship have crystallized into a coherent shape, and at which the political practices to which they are addressed have been with us long enough to permit the construction of generalizations of value. Those are the moments at which high-quality stock takings are often essential. We are at such a moment with the literature on the “Third Way” and on its social policy, and in Jane Lewis and Rebecca Surender’s *Welfare State Change* we have just such a stock taking.

This remarkably fine collection of essays explores the origins, content, and consequences of recent social policy reform in advanced industrial economies under center-left political leadership. It focuses on four aspects of welfare provision—state governance, labor markets, the voluntary sector, and the family—and does so in a way that is simultaneously both UK-focused and genuinely comparative. The essays contained here are, to varying degrees, concerned with the extent to which something that might be labeled a “third way” political project is moving us toward a new kind of welfare regime. They are also, to varying degrees, concerned with explaining why the kind of welfare regime that is emerging is differentially labeled: sometimes hailed as quintessentially Third Way in inspiration and character, and sometimes not hailed at all. This twin focus enables the collection to tell us important things both about continuity and change in welfare systems and about the nature of the Third Way project that is supposedly inspiring whatever change is currently underway.

As a collection of essays, there is no complete uniformity of approach and argument across this volume as a whole, and yet its component elements do have important things in common. They share a remarkably high and consistent standard of writing, and an associated willingness to engage with the latest scholarship in their particular subfields. They share a common focus on the UK’s New Labour government, alongside a propensity to situate that government in a wider sweep of comparable center-left experiences: a sweep that stretches from Australia, Germany, and Canada to Sweden and the United States. And in consequence, they share a suitable skepticism about the degree to which New Labour’s social policy initiatives are in any profound sense new, preferring instead to emphasize the similarity of social policy changes across industrial

systems as a whole. Many times in this collection we are told that the rhetoric varies more than the policies do, that “there seems to be much more similarity in what social democrats across the globe are doing than in what they are saying” (p. 62). We are also told that New Labour owes its global reputation “less to its inherent originality than to the aggressive international promotion of the political discourse with which it was ‘marketed’ domestically: the Third Way” (p. 94). Both these things have long needed to be said to many of the existing commentators on the politics of Gordon Brown and Tony Blair. They will make salutary reading for a British Left whose long-established parochialism often leaves its leading practitioners ignorant of equivalent policy trajectories elsewhere.

In a collection of this quality, it is almost invidious to single out individual chapters for special mention. Readers will find information, argument, and reflection of value in each, depending on their interests. But I was struck by the particular quality of Rebecca Surrender’s opening discussion of the issues in play, by Gordon White’s fascinating examination of Third Way attitudes to equality as a policy goal, and by Guiliano Boneli and Martin Powell’s sophisticated discussion of the various ways in which the Third Way project has been, and is being, conceptualized. I was struck, too, by the importance of Mary Daly and Ruth Lister’s differing examinations of family policy and Third Way attitudes to education and children. The limitations of the workerist ethic that is such a feature of New Labour social policy is very evident in what they report here: In the recognition, as Ruth Lister has it (pp. 175–76) that though New Labour ministers give priority to “children, and especially children in poverty,” too often they do so only because they see these children as “future citizen workers,” a subordination of social policy to economic ends in which “the quality of their *childhood* risks being overshadowed.” As New Labour struggles to regain its popularity in the wake of the 2005 general election, its leaders would do well to read these perceptive reflections on the policy changes required to effect a real easing of the work–life balance. For though currently New Labour may not be working, its supporters certainly are! They are working far too much, and so too are their children. Yet as this collection makes clear, encouraging center-left voters to hand their children over to paid caregivers, so that those voters can work even longer and harder, is hardly the best way to enhance the quality of life so central to Third Way social claims—or indeed to keep New Labour permanently in power.

If this collection disappoints at all, it does so only by its caution. There is exposition here, and on occasion muted critique; but there is no overall evaluation of the adequacy of Third Way thinking to the agenda facing social policymakers in the new century. And that is a pity, since in the UK at least, we now have clear evidence—not least from research units as disparate as the Institute

for Public Policy Research and the Institute for Fiscal Studies—that so far at least, the impact of New Labour’s Third Way thinking has been very muted indeed, that for all New Labour’s years in office, inequality in the UK remains entrenched and social mobility remain stuck at its limited postwar level. For that reason if for no other, it would be good to see this collection of scholars put to another task: that of designing policy that could genuinely deliver the social justice that Third Way politicians so regularly promise but fail to deliver. The subtitle of this collection is *Towards a Third Way*. Having read it, I am more convinced than ever that we now need one subtitled “towards a fourth way.”

**Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges,**

**1988–2001.** By Russell E. Lucas. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 185p. \$65.00.

— Laurie A. Brand, *University of Southern California*

As the title suggests, this work seeks to explain the staying power of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. To his credit, Russell Lucas eschews essentialist arguments that rely on religion or culture to explain the staying power of Arab authoritarianism. He opts instead for an institutional approach, examining “regime manipulation of domestic political institutions . . . to quiet discontent caused by unpopular policies” (p. 1). Lucas argues that the regime has focused what he calls throughout the analysis “survival strategies” on three centers of political and civil society: political parties, the parliament, and the press. These strategies have enjoyed varying degrees of success, and the analysis concentrates on three factors—he does not prioritize them or give an indication of how much they explain—that have influenced the success or failure of the survival strategies: “the resourceful use of constitutional rules by the regime; the reinforcement of the opposition’s disunity of collective action [*sic*] against the survival strategy and the regime’s policies, and the attention to not imposing costs on sectors of the regime coalition that could fray its unity” (p. 2).

The main body of the book is then devoted to examining the regime’s interaction with the parties, press, and parliament by focusing on the promulgation of a series of press and electoral laws, as well as a National Pact. The discussions of the regime’s position as well as opposition response to these various documents constitute the real original contribution of the book, and give the reader a good sense of the range of opinions involved, as well as the key points of contention. They also raise the important, but unanswered, question of why some authoritarian regimes are more rule or rule-of-law bound than others.

Conspicuous in its absence is an explanation of why the author chose to focus on the institutions he did. Perhaps it was a function of his desire to look at rule-based venues

of contestation, but a solid case can be made that these are hardly key institutions to regime survival in Jordan. This problem is then related to another that runs throughout the book, that of underspecification of the composition of the “regime coalition,” an entity that is as critical to the analysis as is the opposition (which Lucas does detail in different contexts, though always from an elite perspective). Nowhere is there a serious discussion of who the components of this coalition are. Passing reference is made to the tribes, and it is noted that the Palestinian sector of the population (with the exception of some parts of the business community) has not been a part of the coalition, but this is hardly sufficient. A better understanding of what the regime coalition has been (and there is no reason to assume it is fixed, which he appears to do), would have prompted the selection of different institutions, most notably, the army and the bureaucracy. Few close observers of Jordanian politics would argue that any of the three institutions he has looked at could challenge regime survival. And he has ignored two that truly could, just as he has largely ignored the Transjordanian-Palestinian relationship/rivalry throughout the analysis.

The underspecification of the composition of the regime coalition is related to another problem that plagues the analysis. The author notes the regime’s ability to divide the opposition and reward members of the coalition, and he gives some examples in the detailed discussions of the press and electoral laws. However, he asserts more than illustrates the various carrots and sticks he quite rightly claims the regime uses. There is no real discussion of patronage politics; the only hint we have concerns the electoral law’s setting aside seats for minorities who are then more easily coopted as a result of the perks of office. But certainly it is more complicated than this. The use of the General Intelligence Directorate and its policies of harassment of the press and other civil society actors, as well as changes in treatment of the civil service and the military, need to be detailed in order to make the case for success or failure in co-optation.

Lucas does make clear that there is a relationship between the external challenges Jordan has faced and internal responses by the regime, which have led to a rollback in the early liberalization (1989–93). Indeed, he shows that domestic opposition to Jordan’s role in the “peace process” was a major factor in the resurgence of more authoritarian practices. However, when examining survival strategies (and the term is overused throughout the text, as virtually everything the regime does is portrayed as a survival strategy), he does not seriously engage the kingdom’s relationship with the United States. One could argue that the regime moved to suppress dissent because Jordan’s peace treaty was a *sine qua non* of a strong military and financial relationship with the United States. The rumblings of parliamentarians or writings of unruly journalists pale in importance in comparison with

the impact that the loss of U.S. support could have had on the regime.

Two final points. First, while I am sympathetic to any argument that avoids cultural essentialism, the institutional argument here is often circular: Strategies have been successful because the monarchy has been “prudent” or has used constitutional rules resourcefully (pp. 155–56). The author provides no criteria for judging *ex ante* what would constitute prudence or resourcefulness. The conclusion that authoritarianism will continue as long as rulers can manipulate institutions effectively does not take us very far.

Lastly, the final chapter comprises short presentations on Morocco, Egypt, Kuwait, and Iran. Presumably, Lucas was asked to “broaden his analysis” beyond a single case study, which, unfortunately, is seen by some as inferior. But let us be frank. The presentation of what can only be a superficial analysis in 10 extra pages on four cases, the reasons for the selection of which are not noted, does nothing to extend the applicability of his analysis. The pages would have been better allocated to unwinding some of the argument’s circularity or more carefully defining key terms.

**Crafting Democracy: How Novgorod Has Coped with Rapid Social Change.** By Nicolai N. Petro. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 255p. \$39.95.

— Karen Dawisha, *Miami University*

In examining the reasons why Russia is now having problems making the transition to democracy, many scholars cite the absence of a democratic past. Seeing Russia as a country unremittably ruled by authoritarian leaders, analysts increasingly are viewing Vladimir Putin’s turn away from democracy as “natural” and part of Russians’ yearning for a ruler with a “strong hand.”

What such accounts overlook are the periods of Russian history in which real efforts were made to establish a democratic government on Russian soil. As detailed by Nicolai N. Petro in this fine book, the most important was the 600-year-long flourishing of the Novgorod republic, centered as it was in Velikii Novgorod, or Novgorod the Great, a city that lies two hours southeast from modern-day St. Petersburg. During the period of the Novgorod republic, from the ninth to the fifteenth century, which predated and was ended by the establishment of a Russian state ruled by czars in Moscow, the citizens of Novgorod defined and exercised their rights to “choose among princes.” The elected city council (or *Veche*) employed and fired princes at will, ratified treaties, set taxes, and declared war. The *Veche* even elected its own clergy and bishops, who were only subsequently submitted for ordination by the Orthodox Church. The republic stretched from the Baltic to the northern Urals; its capital, Novgorod, was the easternmost city of the Hanseatic League and was

legendary for its wealth and the extent of its trading ties, which were reputed to have exceeded Venice at that time.

And then in 1471 came Ivan III, who pillaged the city and tried to suppress its democratic institutions. Initially, local nobility had reason to believe that Novgorod's own strong traditions would effect a change in the political culture of the occupiers. However, the subsequent massacres by Ivan IV ("the Terrible") and the building of St. Petersburg by Peter I ("the Great") relegated Novgorod from a bustling and democratic capital to a provincial and obedient backwater.

Yet these efforts by two centralizing czars (of quite different characters, of course) did not have the desired effect. While of course Novgorod never regained its status as the center of an independent republic, history has shown the enduring power of this founding myth. Whenever Moscow's power declined, the citizens of Novgorod sought to revive aspects of the period when "Lord and Sovereign Novgorod the Great," as the republic was called, was at its height. In the dying days of the USSR, when Mikhail Gorbachev introduced *glasnost* and Boris Yeltsin instructed the non-Russian republics to "take as much sovereignty as they can swallow," the local elites in Novgorod lost no time in joining them.

In excellent chapters that form the core of *Crafting Democracy*, Petro details both how the democratic experience of the Novgorod republic was kept alive in Russia's memory and how the Novgorod myth was activated by local elites in the late 1980s. Recalling Thomas Hobbes's apt quotation that "No man can have in his mind a conception of the future . . . but of our conceptions of the past, we make a future" (p. 126), Petro provides a fascinating account of the process by which local intellectual and political elites took charge of making a future. They conducted a protracted public education campaign to revive the myth, with the new chairman of the city soviet (this was still in Soviet times) remarkably stating in his inaugural address that "what a sense of pride those [early] Novgorodians must have had in their contacts, not only with their own countrymen but with the foreigners who came here in large numbers . . . curious about the people who had placed such a rich city among the marshes and decorated it with magnificent cathedrals . . . who knew the value of free speech and who created a unique democratic construct. . . . [T]his phenomenon . . . can and must serve as an inspiration for the tasks before us" (pp. 149–50). Making such a reference to cathedrals when St. Sophia, the oldest cathedral in Russia, was still closed, showed local determination to recapture lost time. Street signs were stripped of their Soviet-era names, educational curricula were changed, independent newspapers were established, and a university was founded that was named after Novgorod prince and lawgiver Yaroslav the Wise. The region's past as a member of the Hanseatic League served as the launching point for a

robust and successful campaign to attract foreign direct investment.

The popular governor of the Novgorod region, Mikhail Prusak, an early supporter of Yegor Gaidar, Gennady Burbulis, and Boris Yeltsin, has been reelected with over 90% of the votes. He has utilized the Novgorod myth by emphasizing the historic principles upon which Novgorod should be guided: "self-government, elections, public accountability of authority, private property, individual liberty" (p. 157). He has lamented that Russia in its past followed the "eastern tradition" and adopted a "starkly centralized model." He has also criticized Putin. Only time will tell whether Prusak's career and Novgorodian independence will survive.

Petro provides other cases in Russia of local political cultures that have not supported the move toward democracy (like Pskov). He also is more cognizant than most of the high cost on local people of Putin's move to a more authoritarian state. But what this fascinating book clearly shows is that when there is political will at the top, there are many regions of Russia with a proud tradition of democracy, an indigenous Russian tradition upon which a law-based state could be built.

#### **Social Movements in India Poverty, Power and Politics.**

Edited by Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005. 320p. \$34.95.

— Jana Everett, *University of Colorado at Denver*

In an era of liberalization, should social movements shift strategies to mirror the state in demoting poverty alleviation as a central concern? In their edited collection on social movements and the Indian state since Independence, Raka Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein examine the complex historical legacy and current conundrums confronting the strategies of social activists and their implications for the poor. While most scholars of Indian politics have focused on the state and economic elites to explain the persistence of poverty in India, Ray and Katzenstein argue that "the picture is incomplete and distorted" (p. 10), without also considering the role of organized social forces that have mobilized constituents and confronted and/or cooperated with the state in ways that have important implications for the success or failure of poverty alleviation. The editors adopt a broad conception of social movements, including labor unions, political parties, mass organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as protest-oriented movements.

The editors acknowledge building on Gail Omvedt's *Reinventing Revolution: New Social Movements and the Socialist Tradition in India* (1993), which explored the emergence of movements in the 1970s that broadened struggles against oppression to include issues of gender, caste, environment, and farmers (which is sometimes characterized as Bharat-versus-India). Omvedt's work does not

address the dramatic changes in Indian politics since the late 1980s. Ray and Katzenstein claim to take a more comprehensive approach that identifies three cohorts of movement activism since Independence that respond to “the shifting master frame of the state” (p. 6): first, the Nehruvian master frame of democratic socialism (1947–66), followed by deinstitutionalization (1967–88), and the more recent dismantling of the Nehruvian frame and its replacement by liberalization and religious nationalism (1989–present). The central questions posed by these essays concern the extent to which social movements in the current era continue to foreground issues of poverty, and the movement strategies to alleviate poverty that are effective when national and international institutions have jettisoned democratic socialism in favor of neoliberalism.

During the first phase (1947–66), the strong hand of the Nehruvian state meant that social movements had to choose commitment to or repudiation of bureaucratic redistributive strategies. Choosing the former, the labor movement was subsumed by the state, and its commitment to redistribution was diluted. Two movements repudiated the Nehruvian master frame, but in opposite ways. The organizational forces of the Hindu Right put forward a cultural nationalist ideology with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) based in vernacular elites in provincial towns, arguing against equality as a Western concept and stressing the spiritual superiority of Hindu unity against outsiders—whom the RSS equated with Muslims and Christians. A tenant-worker-peasant alliance in Kerala, under the leadership of the Communist Party, instituted redistributive reforms far beyond what were undertaken by other Indian states.

The second phase (1967–88) involved the rise of the movements analyzed by Omvedt. Under conditions of institutional fragmentation and rising poverty, diverse groups articulated class-plus frameworks, such as the “red and green” environmental movement. Ray and Katzenstein note that the Nehruvian master frame of democratic socialism endured for two decades after his death in the conscience of these social movements, even as they rejected the top-down approach of the centralized state.

The main contribution of these essays is their analysis of whether and how social movements in the period since 1989 have continued a commitment to redistributive strategies in a climate increasingly hostile to the poor. In essays on movements of women, *dalits*, and farmers, and against genetically modified organisms, Mary John, Gopal Guru and Anuradha Chakravarty, Omvedt, and Ron Herring describe major divisions between opposition to and (qualified) support for liberalization. Amita Baviskar argues that the environmental movement, under the influence of transnational actors, has reconstituted its claims around a romantic notion of indigenous people safeguarding the environment and abandoned the material interests of the poorest people.

The most innovative current approach is the People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning launched in 1996 by the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPM)–led Kerala government. Patrick Heller recounts how the Kerala CPM dramatically shifted from centralized state allocation to redistribution from below, engaging citizens in the planning process with special emphasis on previously excluded social groups. Decentralization involved the allocation of 40% of planning funds by ward-based local assemblies and local elected bodies. The CPM partnered with the People’s Science Movement to mobilize rural populations to participate in these local assemblies. Heller explains the initiative in terms of the history of competitive programmatic parties, horizontal forms of association, and engaged citizenry in Kerala, as well as the failure of centralized bureaucratic redistribution because of the lack of accountability leading to patronage and corruption.

The divided social movements are in disarray, both sides maintaining that their own strategies are the correct way to reduce poverty. Perhaps the social movement initiatives described in this volume with the most potential in addressing poverty currently are those that attempt to follow the Kerala model. They would work by mobilizing local communities marginalized by class, gender, caste, and religion to hold accountable the institutions of local governance—*panchayats* and municipal councils—reconstituted by the 73d and 74th Constitutional Amendments as more powerful and inclusive (with reservations for women, Other Backward Classes, *dalits*, and *adivasis*). Although many states have not devolved sufficient powers and resources to local government, social movements can use the decentralization mantra to pressure states to comply, and then secure benefits for the poor and redistributive policies from local bodies.

The social force that the progressive movements fear the most in the current period is the Hindu Right, which has assumed prominence with its success in demolishing the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 and the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in power nationally from 1998 to 2004. Tanika Sarkar explains the Hindu Right’s compromise with international capitalism through its promotion of liberalization in terms of the attachment of the Hindu Right’s middle-class constituency to the consumer boom brought about by liberalization. In this period of market ascendancy, Nehru’s planned economy and commitments to the poor are dismissed as failures. Instead of poverty alleviation, the Hindu Right offers the poor an enemy to blame and membership in a strong Hindu nation. Not covered in this survey of social movements are current efforts by the Hindu Right to create their own local organizations to influence *panchayats*.

This collection provides a valuable examination of Indian social movements and poverty in historical perspective and asks important questions about the role of social movements in the present, even if the answers are not so clear.

The compelling history of Indian social movements is not as well known in political science as it deserves to be. This work offers scholars interested in such movements in the era of globalization a range of cases with varying implications for poverty, and it invites India scholars to dig deeper to identify the outcomes of current social movement approaches.

**Healthy Democracies: Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea.** By Joseph Wong. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 222p. \$39.95.

— M. Ramesh, *National University of Singapore*

Popular perceptions of social policies in East Asia are terribly out of date. Besides, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have rapidly established social programs that are comparable to those found in Western countries but are often still described as welfare laggards. While public expenditure on social programs is still low, it will rise rapidly as the population ages and programs mature. Commentators on the region are yet to fully grasp the fact that governments there are no longer as single-mindedly focused on economic growth as the stereotypes suggest.

Joseph Wong does a brilliant job describing and explaining the rise of universal health insurance in Korea and Taiwan. *Healthy Democracies* extends the pioneering works on the subject by Dong-Myeon Shin, Huck-Ju Kwon, Kuo-Ming Lin, M. Ramesh, and Yeun Wen Ku by offering new data and a fresh reinterpretation. The book does not refer to some recent publications on the subject, which is possibly the result of delays in publishing the manuscript. It is tightly organized and lucidly written. The first two chapters deal with introductory materials, followed by four solid chapters on the development of health policy in the two countries. The following two chapters, offering an explanation of the policies, form the heart of the book.

Its main strengths are the careful chronicling of policy history, detailed discussion of the policy actors and machinery, and solid analysis of political and ideational factors affecting health policy development in Korea and Taiwan. The author's explanation of the selectiveness of the early policy reforms and the universalism of the later reforms with reference to a deepening of democracy is particularly well done. His explanation of the differences in the health policy reforms in the two countries with reference to different pathways of democratization is also plausible. The book strikes a decisive blow against widespread beliefs that cultural beliefs in Asia are inimical to an expansion of the state's role in health care and social security.

Another strength of the book is its inductive approach, given the abysmal record of deductive approaches in explaining developments in the region. Instead of testing a limited number of propositions, it casts its net widely to develop a comprehensive understanding of the subject. At

the end, it arrives at a conclusion that is not elegant or parsimonious but on the mark and useful. On the downside, the inductive approach limits the explanation's applicability to other countries in the region.

It would have been useful for the author to directly address similar arguments proposed by others writing on the subject. Specifically, Kwon, Ku, and Ramesh pay a great deal of attention to democratic competition in their explanatory works on the subject. Kwon's and Ku's arguments that social policies in Korea and Taiwan were shaped by political crises faced by the respective governments and Ramesh's arguments that social policies in the region are shaped by the regimes' political vulnerability are particularly relevant to the book's central argument but are not adequately dealt with.

Wong's use of democracy and democratization for explaining policy developments is also more problematic than he acknowledges. There are democratic countries in the region and elsewhere where the growth of social policies has been stunted for decades. The key to understanding social policy developments may not be democracy per se but, rather, the level of political competition and, particularly, the government's vulnerability to loss of office. A governing party without serious fear of losing election, for whatever reason, is unlikely to be motivated to launch generous social programs. The absence of a significant expansion of social security in Malaysia and Singapore in the last few decades reflects the ruling parties' confidence in their ability to remain in office.

The role of bureaucracy in social policy changes is also not paid the level of attention it deserves. One of the few elements of Korean and Taiwanese public policy on which most commentators agree is the pivotal role that bureaucracies in the two countries play in the policy formulation process. Wong does a good job describing how democratization forced public managers to pay greater attention to social issues, but they were not mere ciphers carrying out their political masters' orders. Without some innate support for universal social insurance, they would have had ample opportunities to scuttle, or at least delay, the reform proposals. Health ministries in both countries were comfortable with social insurance and found the ruling politicians' reform ideas acceptable. Contrast this to the stalemate over pension reforms in Taiwan where the conflict among different government agencies, in addition to the loggishness between the Kuomintang Party and the Democratic Progressive Party, has made reform nearly impossible despite broad agreement over its need and general direction.

The lack of a bibliography at the end of the book is disappointing. Publishers need to realize that detailed endnotes is not a substitute for bibliography or references. All in all, this is a rigorously researched and well-written book that will be essential reading for anyone working on health policy in East Asia. I recommend it to anyone working on public policy in East Asia.

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**The Network Society.** By Darin Barney. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. 198p. \$57.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

**Democracy Online.** Edited by Peter M. Shane. New York: Routledge Press, 2004. 279p. \$28.50 paper.

— Ernest J. Wilson, III, *University of Maryland*

Political science has a lot to contribute to—and learn from—the study of the politics of information and communications technologies (ICTs). The two books under review illustrate these possibilities and limitations as the academic discourse on “IT” is currently configured.

Both volumes are clearly written and well organized. Both engage systematically with important works relevant to their particular topics within the burgeoning field of ICT studies, as well as with broader social science literatures—with references ranging from Jürgen Habermas and Karl Marx to Thomas Jefferson and Manuel Castells. They display a welcome willingness to take on big issues of democracy, inequality, and justice. At the same time, both are marked by a healthy, scholarly skepticism for the received faux wisdoms of techno-determinism, either in its techno-optimist or techno-pessimist guise. And most importantly, both insist on the embeddedness of technology within social power and legitimacy. Where technology and society meet, the architecture of social power is a far more important determinant of outcomes than, for example, the architecture of the Internet. Missing from each, however, is an adequate theoretical specification of the actors that wield structural or situational power. As I suggest in the following, the problem of agency is under-analyzed, even when it is acknowledged.

*Democracy Online* consists of 18 high-quality chapters that cover a wide range of topics written by law professors, political scientists, communications and environment experts, policy studies scholars, and an impressive number of authors who are also real-world policy practitioners. One sees the forceful hand of a strong editor at work since the authors stay largely on track, complete with conclusions that actually reach conclusions. The editor, Peter Shane, provides a brief but useful review of the essays, making his case for what he terms a “cyberrealist” approach to the possibilities for democracy online.

Unlike some work in this field that gets bogged down in the details of the technology, this collection analyzes the actual or possible intersections of real political institutions, such as legislatures and parties, and currently available hardware or software technologies that may affect the beliefs and behaviors of citizens, voters, and officeholders. Authors devote considerable attention to issues that will be of special interest to political scientists. For example,

several chapters analyze issues of how new technologies do, or should, intersect with institutional design when pursuing social goods, like participation. Authors describe in detail the actual processes that groups go through to develop software programs designed to promote certain kinds of cooperative behaviors and to discourage others, software that is then inserted into institutional rules and repertoires.

The chapters on “Unchat” and “virtual deliberations” make fascinating reading for political scientists and point to some of the difficulties in making cyberspace truly democratic and deliberative, rather than merely informative or distracting. In “Unchat: Democratic Solution for a Wired World,” Beth Simone Noveck demonstrates Lawrence Lessig’s point that software architecture is a form of rules and laws, since software shapes permissible individual and collective behaviors: “[D]esign matters; value choices translate into design choices. . . . [Therefore] if we are to structure the space and procedure for deliberation in cyberspace, we need to be explicit about what the procedures of deliberation ideally comprise” (p. 22).

Like other authors in the volume, Noveck argues forcefully that merely providing “Internet access” will not automatically improve democratic and deliberative practices online. The anarchy of the unmediated chat room is not much better for careful deliberation than the anarchy of a city sidewalk. She describes the evolution of a Yale Law School international cyberlaw discussion group, wherein about 20 technologists, professors, and policymakers from around the world, and law students from Yale, “met” once a week for two hours. They developed a sort of constitution through rules embedded in the software in order to promote a deliberative, mutually respectful discourse. Starting with first principles like accountability, transparency, equality, and responsiveness, they designed a framework that also allowed some experimentation; it gave power to a moderator (rotating) and allowed participants to “speak,” to “shout” (i.e., to jump the queue, for a limited number of times), and to “whisper” to another group member.

In his contribution, “Digital Deliberation,” Thomas Beierle looks at the Environmental Protection Agency and compares online deliberation with other forms of policy engagement, such as public hearings and formal advisory committees, and also finds that online dialogue was informative and reciprocal but not truly deliberative. Like other authors, he too recommends institutional reforms, such as reaching out to demographic and socioeconomic groups “not normally represented in policy making,” which tends to be dominated by particular interest groups, even online.

There are additional essays on how Jeffersonian and other institutional ideals might be designed to enhance the democratic potentials of the Internet and other forms of ICT, such as A. Michael Froomkin’s chapter entitled

“Technologies for Democracy.” These authors are fully aware that institutions must be codesigned if they are to realize even partially the democratic, participatory potentials of the new technologies. The authors implicitly and occasionally explicitly build on Noveck’s and Lessig’s arguments that software code is itself a form of institutional and political architecture that shapes outcomes and power. The more general reflections of the book are complemented with a handful of cases that include local and national institutions, as well as some international bodies like the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.

The scholarly tone of Shane’s collection is also apparent in Darin Barney’s *The Network Society*. He painstakingly guides the reader through a series of models and arguments—of postindustrial society, information society, postmodernism, and so forth—to analyze their strengths and weaknesses in a balanced, scholarly, and compelling way. Even when he turns to his core chapters on network politics, network society, and networked economy, and offers up his own preferred interpretations, he scrupulously provides counterpoints to them from other authors.

While the treatments of network society, technology, and economy are compelling, to the political scientist the value of our discipline is revealed in what the author chooses not to do. Rather than describe the ins and outs of contentious political engagements over the design and deployment of IT where they occur with the greatest frequency and the greatest consequence—local and national levels—the author chooses to illustrate the case of modern network politics by describing transnational and global politics, reviewing such matters as the rise of nongovernmental organizations with global reach and their implications for democracy. Certainly, these are important matters. But the author’s insights on politics in the network society are less compelling for the political scientist than his contributions in the other chapters. He admits that the introduction of new ICT resources seems to have special appeal for dispersed social movements, but he recognizes that other actors like the state also have access, and so the net impact on winners and losers is not obvious. One sometimes wishes that Barney made bolder claims, but since this is a volume in the publisher’s “Key Concepts” series, his balance is warranted.

Here is where Shane’s collection provides a useful complement to Barney, and also where Barney’s macro treatments of global and historical trends add elements missing in Shane. As a careful and useful consideration of things networked, *The Network Society* is a good single volume for a course, and repays reading for the scholar and researcher as well.

At the same time, both books share a similar weakness, which characterizes ICT studies as a whole, whether in political science, sociology, communications, or other fields:

They operate comfortably at the macro, society-wide level, and often at the institutional or group level, but they fail to analyze the micro behaviors, interests, and incentives of real flesh-and-blood individuals who choose to go online or not, to vote or not, to open IT businesses or not, and who use ICTs to repress or liberate their countrymen. There are references in both books to aggregate data that shed some light on individual behaviors, typically polling data on computer or Internet use. However, the authors fail to describe precisely who these actors are. There is a rhetorical commitment to exploring “agency” and some actual speculation about it. But very few agents appear in these pages—neither wild-eyed information revolutionaries nor steely-eyed ICT conservatives; no flesh-and-blood human beings pop up in these pages. And except for some consideration of network culture in Barney, there is little interest in how macro, meso, and micro levels might be tied together theoretically to shed more light on the dynamics of the new networked societies. Yet at the early stages of important political phenomena like the politics of the transition to a networked society, we miss a great deal, and risk misrepresenting a great deal, if we lack a sense of the people behind the technologies and how they fit into the broader picture.

Both books wrestle with what have become classic research questions for scholars on these issues: To what extent do online dynamics and behaviors reproduce offline conditions, or do they vary significantly? What precisely are the dynamics that actually occur online, and how do these new behaviors impact on broader societal conditions? Ultimately, both books agree that much will depend on the “priorities and interests animating the actors and institutions controlling the medium’s development” (Barney, p. 53). Barney also reminds us that our scholarly definitions of important terms like “information society” or “network society” may sometimes affect the ways that citizens and policymakers understand and act on practical matters of politics and public life. Such terms are conceptual tools but are also part of “an ideological discourse that serves a performative, prescriptive function” as well (p. 181).

**United We Stand? Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility.** By Aron Belkin. Albany:

State University of New York Press, 2005. 161p. \$60.00 cloth.

— Dale R. Herspring, *Kansas State University*

This book presents a new thesis that attempts to explain threats to civil–military relations from a different perspective. In the process, it makes a useful, albeit limited, contribution to the civil–military relations literature.

Aron Belkin’s main thesis is that the generally accepted premise in civil–military relations research (what he calls the diversionary thesis)—that political leaders use external threats as a way to avoid coups—is flawed. Instead, he maintains, “when the risk of a coup d’etat is high, leaders

tend to divide their armed forces into multiple organizations that check and balance each other and protect the regime” (p. 3). His point is that instead of striving for unity, the political leader intentionally works to achieve disunity among the services, thereby removing or at least minimizing the threat of unified military action against the regime. How do leaders do this? According to the author, they achieve this end by intentionally working to promote “jealousy and strife among their own forces” (p. 4).

Belkin does not believe that simply promoting differences among the services (and presumably within the services as well) is sufficient. In order to ensure their political security, he maintains, politicians exacerbate service differences by engaging in international conflicts. Why? For the simple reason that conflict will help exacerbate service differences, which will intensify splits among the different branches or services.

To substantiate his two hypotheses, Belkin selected two case studies—Syria under Hafiz al-Assad and post-communist Georgia. While his work is limited to these two polities—and shows considerable research and thought, in this reviewer’s opinion—Belkin makes a major mistake when he states that “my theory is intended to apply to all regimes, regardless of whether they are democratic, authoritarian, military, civilian, praetorian, or post-communist” (p. 4). This is a major overstatement, to say the least. As is unfortunately often the case, in an effort to come up with a new conceptual or theoretical framework, some political scientists often claim more validity and utility for their work than the reality of the situation warrants. An author who does what amounts to two case studies is not in a position to make such a sweeping conceptual generalization.

This is particularly true insofar as Belkin’s second hypothesis is concerned. There is no doubt that political leaders have long used a “divide and conquer” rule in an effort to control their militaries. But it would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that many political leaderships have gone to war to reinforce divisions among the services. Indeed, this reviewer would argue that such argumentation often results in the formulation of tautologies to support such a hypothesis, that is, if there is a question why country X went to war, it must have been to protect the leader from the military.

Permit me to provide some examples. If there was ever a case of a contemporary political leader who feared the potential of the military to carry out a coup it was Boris Yeltsin of Russia. From the very beginning of his time in office, Yeltsin set out to ensure that the Russian military and its leadership would *not* be in a position to threaten him. This was one of the major reasons why he starved the military for funds, put Pavel Grachev in as defense minister, shuffled military leaders, and constantly made promises to the military he knew he would not carry out. So far Belkin’s hypothesis makes sense.

However, to argue, or even suggest, that a major motivating factor behind Yeltsin’s decision to invade Chechnya had something to do with control of the military makes little sense. He was trying to keep Russia unified in the face of the Chechens’ attempt to secede. Besides, the vast majority of the Russian military (and in practice that meant the ground forces) opposed his decision. They were well aware that the armed forces had been starved, that no major training exercises had been conducted for several years, that their equipment was outdated, and that the army was beset by numerous and very serious social problems—from crime, corruption, and poor pay to the infamous *dedovshchina*, or the harassment, of junior soldiers by more senior ones. The generals were furious at Yeltsin because he was sending them off to fight a war that they knew would be suicide for the troops they were leading, and they objected to his political interference in internal military affairs. This is why around 550 officers resigned rather than carry out his orders.

This reviewer is not aware of a single case of interservice rivalry among the various services in Chechnya. There were major problems in coordination, intelligence, competence, training, and so on, but the operation was directed by either the army or the Interior Ministry. In fact, especially during the First Chechen War, the army was a hodgepodge of naval infantry, airborne, regular army, reservists, and just about everything Moscow could throw at the Chechens.

It is true that there were problems between troops from the Interior Ministry and those of the Defense Ministry, but they had more to do with personality differences (on the part of some of the generals), as well as a lack of joint training and interoperability. Yeltsin would later try to play the Interior Ministry against the Defense Ministry, but this kind of action would fit Belkin’s first hypothesis far better than his second one.

The American case also raises very serious questions about both of Belkin’s hypotheses. There have been numerous occasions when presidents have been locked in bitter conflict with the American military—or individual services—but it is far too simplistic to suggest that the president was trying to divide and conquer, or that he resorted to the use of military force to solidify divisions among the services. Indeed, the history of the post-World War II military has been to unify the services, not split them. If the attempted rescue in Tehran, the deaths of the marines in Lebanon, and the invasion of Grenada taught the U.S. national security community anything, it was the importance of unified command and control.

My point is to suggest that scholars like Belkin would be wise to claim less universality for their conceptual frameworks. I suspect that if Belkin had seen civil-military relations from the perspective of a policymaker or a military officer, he might have been less willing to make such generalizations. Humility has its virtues.

**Defensive Internationalism: Providing Public Goods in an Uncertain World.** By Davis B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer.

Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005. 411p. \$65.00 cloth, \$34.95 paper.

— Brett Ashley Leeds, *Rice University*

Davis Bobrow and Mark Boyer address a topic of considerable current importance in both scholarly and policy circles—international cooperation, particularly among advanced industrial democracies—to produce what the authors call “progress,” that is, “improvements in actual and perceived conditions in fundamental terms—physical security, economic prosperity, ecological sustainability, and cultural continuity” (p. 6), and to avoid “regression,” defined as “worsening of those conditions in one or more of those respects” (p. 6). Their stated goal is to understand (in a clever reframing of the famous Harold Lasswell [1936] quote) “who *gives*, what, when, and how” (p. 1), since they believe that understanding this question is key to dealing successfully with a range of current global problems.

Bobrow and Boyer’s primary contribution is a focus on domestic public opinion within advanced industrial democracies, and particularly the links between prevailing citizen beliefs and identities and the willingness of a state to contribute to global efforts. While never dismissing rationalist arguments about the costs and benefits of international cooperation, the authors suggest that rationalist arguments are incomplete—the shared identities of a population and variance in beliefs and identities across the populations of different states help to account for variance in global giving.

In particular, Bobrow and Boyer argue that prevailing views regarding three different issues among domestic populations will affect a state’s contributions to global goods: 1) the extent to which the population views themselves as sharing an identity with others internationally and thinks of a “we” broader than their own state; 2) the extent to which working with others internationally and making a contribution to the world beyond state borders is viewed as a normatively appropriate government role; and 3) the extent to which working through international institutions and making particular types of international contributions are viewed as efficacious and beneficial to state goals.

The bulk of *Defensive Internationalism* offers descriptive statistics of public opinion polls in a variety of advanced industrial democracies and of international contributions to particular global cooperative efforts by states. Bobrow and Boyer present poll data both about internationalism in general and about three of the four specific policy issues that they address in more depth: international development assistance, United Nations peacekeeping operations, and environmental protection. Poll results are compared to descriptive statistics on contributions in each of these areas and in the area of debt management. The methods and language should be easily accessible to undergraduate political

science students, and the authors provide copious tables to allow readers to see variance across countries.

Based on their evaluation of current public opinion and international giving among advanced industrial democracies, Bobrow and Boyer come to a position they term “muted optimism.” They are optimistic that efforts toward greater multilateralism and more international cooperation will continue in the future, but they recognize that identities remain primarily based in nation-states, and giving will thus continue to be dependent on beliefs in the private benefits associated with progress. The authors conclude their book with policy recommendations that they believe will enhance the prospects for increased global cooperation in the future.

This book fits within an increasingly common approach to understanding international behavior. The core idea is that leaders are constrained in their international actions by the expectations, needs, and desires of their domestic constituencies. Bobrow and Boyer write: “To contend otherwise is to assert politicians’ indifference to the risks of political suicide or of draining, avoidable vulnerabilities subject to exploitation by domestic competitors” (p. 53). This is a point that is rigorously developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues in *The Logic of Political Survival* (2003). The broad implication of work in this tradition is that the divide between domestic and international politics is increasingly meaningless; foreign policy and domestic policy are driven by many of the same constraints and imperatives, and the separation of the study of international politics from internal politics is unwarranted and limiting.

The descriptive data provided in *Defensive Internationalism* raises a large number of questions. How can we explain variance in the extent to which populations feel an international or regional identity, view international giving as normatively appropriate, and believe international cooperation to be efficacious? Do these beliefs cause integration into the international system or result from it? To what extent do mass beliefs about the benefits and efficacy of “internationalism” correspond to actual costs, benefits, and effectiveness? If the correlation is high, how can we attribute causality to beliefs about efficacy rather than efficacy itself, and if the correlation is low, why is that the case? Bobrow and Boyer do a good job of laying out the public opinion landscape, but demonstrating convincingly that public opinion is a causal rather than an intervening, endogenous, or spurious variable in explaining international giving is likely to require additional work.

**The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem.** Edited by Paul F. Diehl. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 280p. \$70.00.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 280p. \$70.00.

— Jeffrey Pickering, *Kansas State University*

This volume is dedicated to J. David Singer, and it is designed to be a collective reflection on Singer’s work and

the Correlates of War (COW) research program that he initiated more than 40 years ago. It accomplishes much more than simply revisiting or lauding previous COW research, however. As Paul Diehl (p. xi) notes in the preface, the “collection is one in which leading scholars look back in order to move the study of international relations forward.” Because it is so successful in this challenging task, the volume deserves a wide audience.

The first two chapters use novel approaches to further our understanding of the evolution of war and militarized disputes over the past two centuries. In the first chapter, Claudio Cioffi-Revilla and Manus Midlarsky demonstrate that the magnitude of the most lethal international and civil wars is amenable to modeling with statistical power laws. This potent, systemic model sheds light on an important characteristic of war without delving into state- or individual-level particulars. In Chapter 2, Monica Lagazio and Bruce Russett use the relatively novel and flexible method of neural network analysis to confirm that the variables central to the “Kantian peace” hold across both the pre-Cold War and the Cold War periods.

The next three chapters examine national and sub-national explanations of war. Building from one of Singer’s widely read articles, Zeev Maoz in Chapter 3 compares world leaders’ presumptions about the causes of war and peace, gleaned from speeches at the United Nations Millennium Summit, to the empirical record of conflict behavior. It is somewhat comforting that he finds more convergence between leaders’ assumptions and the actual record than Singer did three decades ago. In Chapter 4, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James Lee Ray provide a lucid rendering of the institutional approach to conflict behavior and then use it to demonstrate the robustness of the democratic peace in comparison to the autocratic peace. Volker Krause builds on earlier COW-related work on the relationship that alliances and defense expenditures have with conflict outcomes in Chapter 5. His results suggest that only a combination of allied and actor capabilities explain war success.

The final four chapters examine dyadic and interactive explanations. In Chapter 6, Douglas Lemke and Patrick Regan return to Singer’s inter-nation influence model to advance Regan’s past work on interventions into civil wars. Their innovative use of this largely overlooked theoretical approach allows them to demonstrate not only that outside interventions supporting rebels tend to be longer than those supporting target governments, but also that they are bloodier and use higher levels of force. In Chapter 7, Errol Henderson dissects Singer’s skepticism about the democratic peace and provides empirical evidence that seems to support such skepticism. Paul Senese and John Vasquez build on earlier COW research on alliances and war in Chapter 8. They show that territorial revisionist policies and alliances increased the likelihood of disputes escalating to war in the pre-Cold War

period and that, under certain conditions, these two explanatory variables can interact to produce war. In the concluding chapter, Daniel Geller provides a compelling discussion of the epistemology that has guided much of the COW research program and an extremely useful summary of the knowledge the program has generated on war onset and severity.

As should be apparent, this is a theoretically and methodologically diverse volume. The different conclusions that Lagazio and Russett (chap. 2) and Henderson (chap. 7) reach on the democratic peace are one example of this diversity. When one considers the longer view the volume frequently takes, however, these conflicting outcomes are also suggestive of the knowledge that is generated from clashing perspectives. Moreover, as Diehl implies in the preface, the variety of approaches that are included in the collection are a reflection of the COW research program more generally. It has grown into a vibrant, varied community of scholars developing and testing a wide range of middle-range theories. The advances the field has made in understanding international conflict are in no small part due to the efforts of members of this community and the rich array of theoretical and methodological approaches they have pursued.

The collection also underscores an often overlooked aspect of the COW research program: its policy relevance. Most of the chapters are explicit on how their findings can inform policy, with the Cioffi-Revilla and Midlarsky (chap. 2), Maoz (chap. 3), Lemke and Regan (chap. 6), and Geller (chap. 9) contributions being notable in this regard. Geller also correctly observes that the knowledge being imparted to the academic and policy communities is increasingly subtle and nuanced. Contemporary empirical research appreciates that complex phenomena like war are the result of multiple, interacting conditions that can develop along numerous distinct causal paths.

Taken together, this collection offers a trove of new or reformulated theories and methodologies that will further invigorate the quantitative conflict literature. Chapter 3 by Maoz and Chapter 6 by Lemke and Regan are illustrative. Both chapters convincingly revisit an underutilized theory or approach. In doing so, they may prompt scholars to reconsider a range of potentially useful theoretical approaches developed in association with the COW program over the past four decades.

The volume does have minor flaws. Some chapters overlook important prior research. For example, Maoz’s discussion of the impact of outside intervention on civil war duration might have incorporated Regan’s work on the subject (such as Patrick Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*, 2000). Bueno de Mesquita and Ray’s contribution might have addressed previous findings that contradict their conclusion, particularly those of Mark Peceny and Caroline Beer, with Shannon Sanchez-Terry (“Dictatorial Peace?” *American Political Science Review* 96 [March 2002]:

15–27). The chapters are also inconsistent in their treatment of selection effects, which raises questions about analyses that do not control for them.

Overall, though, *The Scourge of War* is an impressive volume that stands as a testament to the vitality of the COW research program. It is essential reading for those interested in the systematic study of international conflict, and it will likely become a staple in graduate courses on the subject.

**The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World.** By Ann Florini. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. 271p. \$45.

**The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order.** By Nicolas Guilhot. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 286p. \$18.95.

— Simon Stacey, *University of Maryland, Baltimore County*

Nicolas Guilhot and Ann Florini appear to have hold of rather different parts of the democratic elephant: While the two books are not in direct dialogue with each other, they do provide quite different accounts of some closely related phenomena. Guilhot regards transnational “democracy promotion” and its agents—the World Bank, the U.S. state, nongovernmental organizations, corporations, think tanks—as engaged in the propagation of a neoconservative economic and political agenda around the world. Florini is much more charitably disposed toward a putative global democracy and its proponents, and indeed maintains that unless states, corporations, NGOs, international governmental organizations, and citizens in general are integrated into activism on its behalf (as well as on behalf of other goals), global and national futures look rather bleak.

The Introduction to *The Democracy Makers* lays out Guilhot’s central claim: “Democracy and human rights, once weapons for the critique of power, have now become part of the arsenal of power itself” (p. 8). Democracy activists have become “double agents” with links to both “hegemonic” capitalist formations and progressive causes (though these latter links are thoroughly downplayed), a claim Guilhot asserts equally against conventionally Gramscian analyses that exaggerate the coherence of these formations, and analyses of advocacy networks that become “entirely captive to the viewpoint of the[se] actors” (p. 18) and give undue weight to the power of their ideas.

The six chapters that follow are of varying quality. The first and longest explains contemporary “democracy promotion” in the United States as the second iteration of an earlier (1950s–1960s) collaboration between a liberal internationalist American foreign policy establishment and left-wing anticommunists (the “State Department Socialists”) to found institutions to compete with the communist international. The original fruit of this collaboration, the Con-

gress for Cultural Freedom, founded in scandal in the late 1960s, and Vietnam pushed a temporary wedge between the Left and the U.S. state. But the anticommunist Left—which Guilhot effectively delimits as the acolytes of Max Shachtman—had already begun a “collective conversion” (p. 32) to the Right, so that when the “project of a global democratic campaign . . . resurface[d] in the 1980s” (p. 51), again primarily as an anticommunist tactic, it was primed for collaboration once more.

This is the book’s strongest and most careful chapter, but it is not wholly persuasive. Guilhot seems to think he has identified the roots not only of Reaganite but also of contemporary neoconservative democracy promotion. But even if the members of the anticommunist Left overlapped to some degree with the personnel of the Reaganite version, today’s democracy promoters seem to have quite different and diverse origins, both neoconservative and progressive. And Guilhot’s evidence for even the Reaganite version of the claim is somewhat slight. For instance, he names only six Shachtmanites (three mentioned almost nowhere else in the book) who had anything to do with the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—a crucial democracy promoter, for Guilhot—and too few of the really big names were involved, even those who had earlier been Congress for Cultural Freedom supporters (Sidney Hook, Melvin Lasky, Irving Kristol). One might also question the extent to which any Shachtmanite Reaganites/neoconservatives could really qualify as double agents: By the 1980s, their countervailing progressive affiliation would appear to have become seriously etiolated.

The book contains two institutional histories, one of the NED and one of the World Bank. The choice of the NED makes sense: It was created under Reagan, and it spends money, the federal sourcing of which is not obvious, to promote democracy. Now, it may be true that the NED favors “politicians or groups falling in line with the general purpose of U.S. foreign policy” (p. 85), though I am inclined to think that Guilhot overstates the single-mindedness of the institution, which is composed of several autonomous, even mildly antagonistic, branches. Even so, with an annual budget of “between \$15 and \$35 million” (p. 86), and as “by no means the only or even the most important organization involved in ‘democracy promotion’” (p. 32), it is difficult to see what generalizations can plausibly be made about other U.S. democracy promoters on the strength of his analysis of the NED, never mind their European counterparts (which, inexplicably, get *extremely* short shrift). The World Bank chapter charts the Bank’s apparent retreat from neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus in the nineties, and the adoption of its “good governance” agenda. Guilhot maintains that the turn to good governance remained “tightly connected to the imposition of neoliberal economic orthodoxy” (p. 192), represented mainly a form of structural

adjustment for politics as opposed to economies (p. 210), and enlarged rather than revised the Washington Consensus (p. 214). These claims could well be right, but the parts of the chapter in which they are made proceed at breakneck speed, and they never rise beyond assertions.

Two other chapters review the rise and fall of modernization theory and the emergence of democratization studies. They are designed to show how political science provided intellectual cover for the earlier and later democracy promotion projects, and in turn benefited from increased prestige and access to power and resources, but they are also obviously in part the refashioned residue of the dissertation literature review at which the book began, and fit a little awkwardly into it. Another chapter briefly surveys recent “social constructivist” or “idealist” international relations scholarship on human rights activism, and predictably, finds it simplistic both methodologically—it reifies ideas—and substantively—it fails to recognize that human rights activists and those who study them also perpetuate the hegemonic project. (One could ask this question at almost any point in the book, but it seems particularly apt here: Is every hegemonic project ipso facto a bad one?)

After the fairly dense prose and generally unrelenting abstraction of *The Democracy Makers* (it is no surprise to see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri—separately—provide two of the book’s three blurbs), the clearer writing and concreteness of *The Coming Democracy* is very welcome. At the beginning of the book, Florini lays out the standard globalization-gone-awry and globalization-done-right scenarios, and claims that what will make the difference between them is governance: “all the ways in which groups of people collectively make choices” (p. 5). Unfortunately, she claims, governance practices lag world developments by about 50 years, structured as they are to deal with interstate war between hard states, rather than the more novel, decentralized, global problems facing an increasingly post-Westphalian world. Several possible solutions turn out to be nonstarters: A world state is “a truly bad idea” (p. 11), globalization has progressed too far to allow a resurrection of impermeable nation-states, and market mechanisms face familiar collective action objections. Some “more imaginative” (p. 14) option is required. Florini plumps for some sort of global democratic arrangement for activist cosmopolitan constituents, the accountability of which is guaranteed by a technology-enabled transparency.

The second chapter argues that technological developments have dramatically increased the amount and availability of information about corporations and states, which makes possible their “regulation by revelation” (p. 34)—that is, accountability enforced by fears about the consequences of the disclosure of damaging behavior. Furthermore, Florini suggests that some actors may, to prevent more damaging third-party disclosures about them,

choose to become more transparent, and in so doing establish transparency as a normative expectation for others of their ilk. But, as she notes, unless people actually “interpret and act on the information revealed” (p. 38), transparency will not change state or corporate behavior, and the historical record is not encouraging about the propensity of nation-state citizens to care about events beyond their borders. Hence, Chapter 3’s examination of the potential for a “global we”—a civically minded and cosmopolitan, postnational constituency. In fact, the chapter is composed mostly of short overviews of the findings of evolutionary psychology about human association and theories of nationalism, and only in its closing pages does it present some very scanty evidence for the emergence of such a constituency. Florini clearly believes that the information revolution can transform the world as printing transformed Reformation Europe, but whereas “Europe was ready to be transformed” (p. 2), it is not obvious that our world, and its inhabitants, are similarly ready.

These early chapters constitute the theoretical framework of the book, and much of the rest of it investigates how the duties of governance in a globalizing, potentially transparent world might—as they must—be distributed among governments, corporations, and civil society. These chapters are sometimes unfocused—it is not clear, for example, what the chapter on government’s potted history of the state actually adds to the analysis—and there is a large amount of overlap between them. But they are generally instructive and present a number of useful minicase studies. Florini is quite adamant that all three sectors will have to play roles in globalized governance, and that civil society, sometimes regarded as a panacea, is in fact in need of revelatory regulation itself. Two further chapters provide very sobering assessments of the challenges that the coming democracy will face in the economic and (especially) environmental realms, but also some reasons to think that the sort of broad, transparent cooperative governance the book advocates may provide the necessary solutions. The final chapter is a little disappointing. It presents a conjectural retrospective from the year 2020 of the broad developments that brought about a world in which globalization’s positive form had mostly come to pass. Quite apart from being a little fanciful, Florini seems here to abandon her characteristically clear-eyed realism in favor of some (albeit lightly) rose-colored spectacles.

Ultimately, readers of both books might feel a little shortchanged. Guilhot’s genealogical critique of democracy and human rights promotion fails to show that it is the hegemonic project he claims it to be, and readers looking for the “rules” that the subtitle of Florini’s book promises will find little about them or the nitty-gritty of mechanisms and institutions of global governance in it. Nonetheless, both books make clear that the “making of democracy” is a project that demands our critical attention.

**Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace.** By Virginia Page Fortna. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 264p. \$57.50 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

**At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict.** By Ronald Paris. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 302p. \$65.00 hardback, \$23.99 paper.

— Hemda Ben-Yehuda, *Bar-Ilan University, Israel*

The studies under review focus on the question of what happens once violence ends. As such, they illuminate an important segment of world politics that begins once the guns stop roaring. Though different in theoretical outlook, research orientation, and scientific contribution, the two studies supplement one another. The first, by Virginia Page Fortna, investigates the duration of cease-fires while the second, by Ronald Paris, probes the success of peacekeeping missions. Taken together, the factors both studies highlight and the conclusions they offer add to our growing knowledge on intra/interstate wars and peace in world politics.

The in-depth and comprehensive study by Fortna addresses three queries: 1) What situational factors affect the baseline prospects for peace? 2) How do these factors affect the content of cease-fire agreements? 3) How does the content of cease-fire agreements affect the durability of peace?

*Peace Time* is divided into six chapters. The first chapter focuses on cooperation theory to explain why agreements affect the durability of peace. Chapter 2 spells out the research methods and a summary of the two case study dyads (Israel–Syria and India–Pakistan) selected for in-depth exploration. Chapters 3 and 4 address the “baseline prospects” for peace and the counterargument that agreements are epiphenomenal or spurious. Chapter 5 tests the central hypothesis, regarding stronger cease-fire agreements that yield a more stable peace. The last chapter discusses and evaluates the specific measures used in cease-fire agreements to help peace endure.

In empirical terms, the book covers half a century, from 1947 to 1997, using a cease-fire data set constructed by Fortna. This data set (involving dyads from 22 wars, presented in Appendix A, p. 217) is an important contribution to the field of war and peace studies as it brings together data collected by both the author and other databases (COW 3, MID, ICB, Polity III, and EUGene and the Maoz dyadic MID data set). From a methodological standpoint, the book combines a threefold path of inquiry: quantitative analysis—hazard rate (explained clearly on pp. 44–45 and 85), in-depth case studies, and what the author calls “large N qualitative” analysis. The use of these complementary research methods is a good example of the sound approach Fortna maintains for the collection and use of data at the operational level.

*Peace Time* explores two sets of factors (*situational and peace-enhancing attempts*) to explain the duration period

between wars. *Situational, or structural factors*, over which the belligerents have little or no control, determine the baseline prospects for peace after war's end. Fortna's findings suggest that five baseline variables are particularly important: the decisiveness of the military victory, the cost of war, belligerents' history before the war, the stakes of the conflict, and whether the fighting dyad is contiguous. Elements that appear less important include the regime of the adversaries and territoriality as a core stake in the confrontation (pp. 8–9 and 112–13).

*Deliberate attempts to enhance the durability of peace* involve measures such as the separation of troops, the creation of demilitarised zones (DMZs), monitoring by international observers, guaranties by third parties, confidence-building measures, and dispute-resolution procedures. The findings highlight the effectiveness of DMZs and show that explicit guaranties by outsiders, peacekeeping measures, and monitoring by the international community help but that arms-control measures do not (pp. 9 and 209–10).

Ronald Paris's thorough investigation of post-civil war situations in which peacebuilding missions were established is guided by four research questions: 1) Does political liberalization or economic liberalization contribute to the resurgence of fighting? 2) Does the process of political or economic liberalization ameliorate domestic societal conditions that fuel violent conflict? 3) Does the process foster a movement toward peaceful reconciliation among the formerly warring parties? 4) Does the process exacerbate tensions within the society in a manner that endangers the prospects for a stable and lasting peace?

The main thesis in this interesting work is that while the liberal peace theory serves as the most common (and indeed normative) starting point for peace builders who seek to establish order and stability, the preferable solution is “Institutionalization Before Liberalization” (IBL). The IBL strategy, spelled out by the author, highlights the importance of slow incremental changes in the political and economic spheres, and the need to establish a viable structural setting in failed states to ensure that peace and stability will endure while the peace-building mission operates and long after it leaves.

*At War's End* is divided into three parts: First, Chapters 1 and 2 examine the peace-building record, problems and solutions via the prism of a “Wilsonian” approach. In probing the relationship among liberalization, institution building, and peace in countries that have just emerged from civil conflict, Paris contributes to the growing literature on the liberal peace thesis. He brings together contemporary scholarship and links it to early philosophical thinkers such as John Locke and Adam Smith versus Thomas Hobbes (pp. 46–51), especially considering the existence of viable functioning states and failed states, characterized by virtual anarchy. Second, Chapters 3–8 introduce the methodology and case studies. Third, Chapters 9–11 investigate the shortcomings

of rapid liberalization as a peace-building strategy in the 1990s and introduce a new approach: IBL. Its key elements include waiting until conditions are ripe for elections, designing electoral systems that reward moderation, promoting good civil society, controlling hate speech, adopting conflict-reducing economic policies, and in total—rebuilding effective state institutions (p. 188). After discussing three main critiques of the IBL strategy (endless mission, excessive costs, and cultural-dependency dangers), Paris mentions the need to establish a “new central international agency” (inside or outside the existing structure of the United Nations) that would be dedicated to postconflict peace building. To be effective, this agency should act as a “world policeman” without really being one.

Paris investigates all *major* missions formally approved by the UN Security Council from 1989 to 1998. The findings regarding these 14 cases, in total, show mixed results: Two missions were a clear success (Namibia and Croatia), two were an obvious failure (e.g., Angola and Rwanda), and the remaining operations fell under these two extremes (p. 151). Viewed from an objective standpoint, such a record is hardly a meaningful distribution of success/failure cases to support/reject the liberal peace theory. More than anything else, it calls for additional research, more precise operationalization of concepts and thresholds (levels of success, indexes of political/economic liberalization), and the introduction of control variables (similar to Fortna’s “baseline” elements, characterizing the diverse group of post–civil war cases). In the absence of all these, the value of the theoretical generalizations derived from the study is somewhat subjective.

Indeed, the two studies differ in their theoretical outlook, research orientation, and main contribution to the study of world politics. Fortna combines realist and institutional aspects and addresses a broad range of variables that can help forward the goal of constructing a comprehensive picture on a core puzzle: how to prevent renewed violence once war ends. The distinct theories that relate to this puzzle are overviewed, hypotheses are spelled out, the operational basis for testing them is clearly outlined, and the findings are analyzed in a systematic manner. The choice of a multiapproach in theory (realist and institutional) and a three-mode methodology (quantitative, case study, and “large N qualitative”) enhances the operational level and provides the reader with an interesting, sound, and clear analysis. Yet while Fortna does so much, she fails to provide a comprehensive picture of all the elements together. The grand debate of power politics versus institutionalism remains open, and a broad theoretical-paradigmatic statement is missing in the conclusions on cease-fires and peacetime in world politics.

In addressing core research questions on the processes of liberalization, democratization, and marketization and on reliable remedies for intrastate violence, Paris provides

the reader with an in-depth comparative analysis on more than a decade of peace-building operations. The narrative and analysis of the 11 distinct cases cover a wide range of events and are informative and interesting. The three cases of Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone (and even more so the remarks regarding peace building after the conquests in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003) add to the contemporary nature of the analysis but, to use the author’s own term, this exploration is carried out “in more provisional terms, because of their relative recentness” (p. 9).

The absence of a detailed model, systematic operationalization of all variables, an introduction of controls to account for diversity among cases, and a clear delineation for success/failure of peace missions limits the explanatory value of the study’s conclusions. While its broad empirical scope and descriptive detail represent important contributions, its theoretical and policy implications are much less convincing.

**Bringing Religion into International Relations.** By Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 224p. \$55.00.

— Peter Mandaville, *George Mason University*

With this book, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler offer the most comprehensive meditation to date on the question of religion as a factor in international relations. Stating as their central purpose a desire to “expand the boundaries of international relations theory by the inclusion of religion as a variable in the research of international politics” (p. 4), the authors provide a superbly structured overview of a topic that has been crying out for sustained engagement for some time now. While the questions asked (and many of the answers eventually posited) are by no means wholly original, *Bringing Religion Into International Relations* finally offers IR a systematic baseline of inquiry that subsequent scholarship on religion and international affairs can build upon or challenge.

The opening, and a recurrent, theme in the book relates to the question of why international relations theory has tended to ignore religion in its attempts to explain behaviors and outcomes in world politics. For Fox and Sandler, the answer lies in the Western-centric orientation of IR theory and—more specifically—its internalization of the Enlightenment norms of secularism and rationality. The authors seek to redress this shortcoming by establishing a place for religion as an explanatory variable in IR theory. After an opening that explores religion’s absence from IR, the book proceeds through five chapters that offer distinct and valuable vantage points from which to engage the question of religion and IR. Signaling a welcome preference for analyzing religion primarily as a normative force in international politics, the authors begin by anchoring their argument in the idea of religion as a source of political legitimacy at a variety of levels of analysis. They then

go on to explore the processes of linkage politics that allow seemingly domestic religious conflicts to take on international dimensions—with a particular emphasis on the impact of religion on conflict interventions. We move on to an examination of transnational religion as an ontological phenomenon within the international system in a chapter that focuses in large part on the Muslim world and political Islam.

The final two substantive chapters are also the book's most methodologically rigorous. Fox and Sandel are keen—with good reason—to make the point that their treatment of religion in this volume should not be confused with Samuel Huntington's largely (but only implicitly) religious definition of civilization in his infamous *Clash of Civilizations* thesis (1996). To this end, Chapter 6 of *Bringing Religion* offers an excellent overview of the *Clash* debate and then goes on via a cross-sectional comparative analysis of ethno-religious conflicts to provide further fodder for the empirical refutation of Huntington's theory. A subsequent chapter employs single case study methodology to explain the transformational dynamics whereby a conflict whose origins seem to contain a strong element of religion actually proceeds according to a rather different logic—in this case, focusing on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the role of religion in mobilizing and fostering legitimacy for a dispute whose core causes often more closely resembled those of secular intrastate conflict. The final chapter, tantalizingly entitled "Toward a Theory of International Relations and Religion," proves, unfortunately, to be heavy on the "toward" and rather light on actual theory. After summarizing the key arguments and findings of the book, this concluding section offers a number of suggestions for future research agendas (such as the need for better metrics of religion in quantitative work) and also some reflections on the definitional quandaries posed by religion to IR and the social sciences more widely.

This latter insight provides a good entry point for outlining some of the book's shortcomings. Clearly aware from the very outset of the difficulties inherent in trying to define religion (a point first raised on p. 2), the authors get around the problem by choosing not to define religion. Their stated preference is one that tries to focus "not on what religion is, but what it does" (p. 176)—more specifically, by focusing on religion as a source of worldview, identity, legitimacy, and institutional basis. This approach arguably works for their immediate purposes in this book, but we would do well to hesitate to wade any more deeply into the tides of religion and world politics until we better understand the nature of the former. More specifically, it may well be that any attempt to develop and consistently operationalize religion as simply yet another explanatory variable will fall afoul of the critiques that have long been leveled at those, such as Robert Keohane, who argue similarly about gen-

der and international relations. Indeed, the number of forces in the world that act as sources of identity, worldview, and legitimacy are so numerous that until we say something more specific about the nature of the worldviews and identities inculcated through sacred discourse, we will not get very far.

While this never claims to be the first-ever book on the subject, there do seem to be a number of points throughout the volume where insights offered by earlier writers on religion and IR do not seem to have been covered, critiqued, or even acknowledged in the bibliography. Without wanting to belabor the point or appear to expect that *everything* ever written about religion and world politics should have been included in this book, there are a number of earlier (mainly edited) books on religion and international affairs that might have deserved at least a nod—more specifically, Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson's (eds.) *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (1995) and K.R. Dark's (ed.) *Religion and International Relations* (2000). Susanne Rudolph's (ed.) *Transnational Religion and Fading States* (1997) offers important insights on questions dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5. James Piscatori's *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (1986) and Adeed Dawisha's (1983) edited volume on *Islam in Foreign Policy* were both early and important engagements with the question of Islam's role in the international system. It is also worth pointing out that from within IR itself, scholars working in the vein of critical and poststructural theory have been profitably engaging religion as a source of meaning making for well over a decade now.

Finally, we might reasonably ask whether IR as a disciplinary project is even the best point of departure from which to try to understand the role of religion in world politics. Fields such as sociology and anthropology—often featuring "thicker" engagements (in the Geertzian sense) with the lived experience of religion as a system of world-ordering symbols and practices—have become increasingly sensitive to the transnational and global nature of contemporary life, while avoiding the sometimes stifling analytical constraints of state-centric IR.

None of this, however, should detract from the fact that Fox and Sandler have, with *Bringing Religion*, done the discipline of IR a singular service by giving us a first and desperately needed book-length monograph on religion and international relations—and one that certainly sets a strong standard of scholarship for future work in this increasingly important topic.

**Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World.** Edited by Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 271p. \$57.50 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Mark R. Brawley, *McGill University*

The editors lay out three goals for this book. They wish us to question contemporary understandings of economic

nationalism, to appreciate the importance of identity in shaping economic policy, and to recognize how ideas and identity can be integrated into work in international political economy (IPE). The editors and contributors go a long way toward achieving all three aims, though not with equal success. They are most successful in highlighting the importance of identity in establishing the goals of political action, including economic policymaking, and thus any reader will think more seriously about the possible contributions of constructivism to IPE.

The editors begin by arguing that economic nationalism is not merely realism applied to economic questions, nor is it about state security *per se*. Separation between nation and state is a crucial and obvious distinction rarely explored in IPE. Nationalism can embrace a variety of particular economic strategies, well beyond protectionism in trade or resistance to foreign investment. National aspirations can be described in a variety of ways, and these may lead to the adoption of policies quite the opposite of those consistent with realism. While this thrust of the book is useful, it also raises questions about the utility of the concept of nationalism, given that it is so open to interpretation.

The contributions address particular cases underscoring why we need to rethink the meaning of economic nationalism. In their examinations of the former Soviet bloc, Rawi Abdelal, Andrei Tsygankov, and Maya Eicheler illustrate how nationalism has led some countries to embrace economic openness. Opening up to the international economy was an obvious way for some to escape the grasp of other states, dominated by other national groups. Eric Helleiner explains the stance that Quebec separatists have taken on monetary policy in the same terms. One can question whether national aspirations are more likely to be met in some of these strategies than in others. Will deeper engagement in the global economy necessarily lead to better defense of national identity? Indeed, debates in Quebec over separatists' economic policies hinge on such points. Strengthening economic ties with the United States may make Quebec less dependent on the rest of Canada, but deeper ties with the United States may present greater challenges for the separatists' goal of defending the purity of the French language. Nationalism involves the creation of "insiders" and "outsiders"—and thus there is an inherent tension between international economic liberalization and the maintenance of this division. Are there certain aspects unique to the current international system—it being highly institutionalized and unipolar, with open trade and investment but largely closed to flows of people—that allow nationalists to pursue such strategies?

The chapters by Derek Hall and Klaus Müller turn the equation around by discussing how the postwar economic success of Japan and West Germany reformulated national

identity in those countries. Both also illustrate how an appreciation of nationalism can yield insight into examples of policymaking when citizens and policymakers do not pursue materialistic goals as expected, because they are unwilling to trade off particular values for material gains.

The authors may have gone a little too far out of their way to ignore the role of the state. After all, much of what they describe could be translated into scenarios devoid of nationalism (e.g., claims on other bases of identity, such as a "buy local" campaign pitched at the municipal or state/provincial level). Nationalism gives us a conceptual hook that is missing for local communities. The only contribution to examine lower-level phenomena more closely is Patricia Goff's, which has many themes running through it—her chapter would have been more helpful had the various threads been a bit more disentangled in the conclusion. Surely the prominence of economic nationalism (over economic localism) has something to do with the amount of power vested at the national level. Otherwise, we need to know when and where nationalism trumps other claims to identity.

Jacqui True's chapter on New Zealand is valuable precisely because it addresses the sort of protectionism most would associate with economic nationalism. While True argues that nationalism can be a tool masking individual gain, she also raises some interesting issues about why nationalism is chosen over other possible instruments. Meredith Woo-Cumings provides a wonderful description of the role that societal values played in the economic success of South Korea, but more importantly, she examines the concept of nationalism itself in a bit more detail. In the end, she concludes that the term provides little guidance to the content of policy, though policies cloaked in nationalism often gain legitimacy and support. One wonders whether their position on economic nationalism is merely a restatement of what others describe as an analytical version of liberalism—looking inside countries to determine what goals citizens ask states to pursue. Along these lines, Andreas Pickel cites Harry Johnson's notion of "psychic income" (p. 3). Economic nationalism may be a more specific version of how demands on the state are framed, since Pickel claims that these demands differ by being about the nation's interest (i.e., not individuals' interests).

Helleiner makes two strong points in the conclusion. First, economic policy reflects domestic values, with nationalism one way of establishing what those values might be. Second, constructivism gives us the tools for understanding how identity and values shape policy. The editors and contributors persuasively make the case for deeper discussions between those who study nationalism (or the politics of identity more broadly) and those studying international economic policies. This book is a long step in that direction.

**The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe.** By Wade Jacoby. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 287p. \$70.00 cloth, \$23.99 paper.

— Peter Loedel, *West Chester University*

The enlargement of Europe has proven a lush garden for researchers to cultivate new approaches and theories of international and comparative politics and reengineer older approaches and theories. Many of these studies fit under the larger rubric of the “Europeanization” of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and focus on the external impact of the European Union on the political and economic reforms of the new members of the EU and/or NATO. Good examples include the works of Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier (*The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, 2005) and Milada Anna Vachudova (*Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism*, 2004). Wade Jacoby’s piece fits squarely into this large and excellent body of growing literature—theoretically sophisticated, methodologically sound, and well written.

Impressive in his attention to detail, smooth writing style, and adherence and familiarity to notation and the body of literature, Jacoby brings his rigorous analytical approach to the question of how and why policy elites in CEE countries often emulate or chose (“ordering from the menu”) established Western practices in various policy arenas (regional policy, agriculture, consumer protection, health care, civilian control of the military, and military professionalism). As he notes on page 5, “the book explains two patterns: the kinds of emulation CEE elites attempt and the outcomes of reform that follow from these efforts.” He develops a typology of emulation “modes” that seeks to make sense of what is often a complex, disordered process of borrowing from Western structures. In addition to the modes of emulation, the range of outcomes vary according to the density of the rules involved and the density of the actors involved. For example, high density of actors involves well-established patterns of state and social actors, and the high density of rules implies a large extent of international organization demands. From these typologies, a number of labels are used to describe the emulation modes and outcomes underway in CEE countries.

Some of these labels are more easy to understand than others. Problematic for me was the use of the terms “scaffolding” and “homesteading” as two types of outcomes. Jacoby recognizes some of the problems associated with such labels, but they do demonstrate the inherent complexity and difficulty in coming up with easy-to-understand labels, and they raise some concern about the face validity of these concepts. Whether one agrees or not with the typologies and the various labels, the author is systematic in his approach and application of the model in the rest of the book.

The primary case studies (forming Chapters 2–6) are largely drawn from the Czech Republic and Hungary, although there is some discussion in the last chapter that includes Poland, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. The Introduction and Chapter 1 lay out the analytical and theoretical models that seek to explain the process of emulation. These chapters also help us understand when emulation results in more effective and efficient institutions and when it results in less efficient and effective outcomes. Both areas—following the causal trail of emulation and answering the question of effectiveness—are central to our understanding of the enlargement of the EU and NATO and democratization more broadly.

The strength of the work lies in its focus on the detail of policy arenas that do not always receive as much attention in the Europeanization literature, such as consumer protection and health care. Crossing the border between enlargement of the EU and NATO and drawing out the similarities and differences in this experience (especially noted in the chapters on civilian control of the military and military professionalism) are also helpful to scholars sometimes too narrowly focused on their respective areas (EU Studies, Security Studies, etc.). Jacoby allows scholars from respective area studies both to learn from each other and to draw some generalizable explanations of the process of democratization in differing policy arenas (security policy, social policy, agricultural policy). In a scholarly world often criticized for overly narrow research, in this regard the author opens up the door to communication and dialogue that is very welcome indeed.

Jacoby is cautious in his claims and understands the various limitations to his approach. He is aware of the potential methodological and theoretical pitfalls of his model and the theoretical basis—“embedded rationalism” (the focus of Chapter 2)—employed. In many ways, embedded rationalism relies on older, less complicated concepts of the two-level game and even older versions of the external–internal models employed by Wolfran Hanrieder, James Rosenau, and others in the 1960s and early 1970s. Jacoby notes this point on page 20 in his discussion of embedded rationalism: “CEE elites acted rationally in the face of two kinds of broadly material incentives: from their voters and from the IO’s [international organizations] themselves.” Why do the typologies have to be so complicated in order to reflect this basic interaction? One related and additional concern with this study focuses on the attempt to synthesize various “institutionalist” approaches to come up with an explanation for emulation modes and outcomes. While I commend the attempt to synthesize, at times one gets the sense that the author is theoretically “ordering from the menu” of institutionalist approaches. Is this an “integrated paradigm” (p. 29)? As Jacoby himself admits, he does not seem quite ready to go that far.

The audience for this work is clearly at the advanced graduate level and scholars operating in the field of European studies, international relations, and comparative politics. This study contributes to the enriched conceptual and theoretical debates that focus on Europeanization and institutionalism. Students and scholars familiar with these debates will have much to digest here (especially in the examination of embedded rationality and institutional theories) and likely will have much to pick apart as well. More importantly, this study has illuminated a larger part of the map that is the Europeanization of the CEE countries—a map that still has many unexplored areas to uncover.

**Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power.** By Sanjeev Khagram. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004. 270p. \$45.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

— Kathryn Hochstetler, *Colorado State University*

This is a strong example of recent work in political science that mines the boundary of comparative politics and international relations to identify the complex sources of political change. Sanjeev Khagram draws on an intensive case study of the Narmada Dam projects in India and the increasingly successful transnational protests against them to produce a more general argument about how development visions can be transformed—even by actors who seem powerless. In his broadly constructivist analysis, Khagram traces the impact of changing norms not just on visions but also on concrete global practices of development, especially the sharp drop in the number of dams completed in the last two decades of the twentieth century.

The author argues that understanding both transnational and domestic factors is necessary for explaining when and where dam opponents were able to force this change in development strategy. In terms of transnational factors, transnational norms supporting alternative development visions must come to exist. For dam projects, these included new norms pertaining to the environment, human rights, and indigenous peoples. Transnational coalitions and networks both helped to construct these norms in world politics and later reinforced them through transnational contentious politics. Finally, the norms and principles gain weight as they are institutionalized in the domestic context.

Similar kinds of arguments about the importance of transnational norms and the coalitions and networks that carry them are now common parts of international relations theory. What is less common is Khagram's insistence that these are successful in changing development ideas and practices when they are joined with two additional, primarily domestic, factors. These are the presence of local citizens' groups that can organize and sustain the mobilization of large numbers of people—in this case, in anti-dam advocacy mobilizations—and also the existence of

institutions sufficiently democratic to create openings for those groups' influence on domestic decision makers.

In the theory-generating Indian case, the domestic factors actually came first. Early domestic resistance to dams in the Narmada Valley was comparatively ineffective until the transnational components were added and institutionalized. Only then did the Narmada opposition become the kind of transformative force and allegory of alternative development that it did in the 1990s. In a set of short comparative case studies, the common transnational phenomena generally came first, although this is not important in Khagram's argument, which is about the ways the transnational and domestic characteristics intersect with each other, rather than an argument about sequencing. In Brazil, which also shares the domestic conditions of sustained grassroots anti-dam mobilization and (after 1985) democratic institutions with India, there is some similar success in challenging the big-dam vision and practice of development. China, which has neither, continues to build large dams, albeit with some concessions on environmental and resettlement provisions. Indonesia and South Africa/Lesotho, each with one of the two domestic conditions, present intermediate outcomes. Brief accounts of dam experiences in the United States and Europe also appear in the book.

Finally, the international and domestic are intertwined once more in the book in that changing development norms and practices are traced in both the World Bank and domestic governments. Both are treated as complex actors whose images and practices of development may change over time, and who also have actors inside them who are sympathetic to anti-dam activists all along. The World Bank and domestic governments are also engaged in contesting development practices and norms with each other, partially in response to the pressures each is receiving from anti- and pro-dam activists.

The three empirical chapters that cover what one of them calls "dams, democracy, and development in India" (title of Chapter 2) are likely to become the definitive statement of these issues. Meticulously researched, they draw on a variety and quantity of sources and interviews that tell a compelling story not just of Narmada but of the larger picture of independent India's sustainable and unsustainable development. India's vibrant and obstructive federalism, the development of its domestic environmental institutions, and the critical role of the Supreme Court all are part of the story, offering a specifically Indian context without losing sight of the more general causal processes. The overarching argument about the crucial intersection of transnational and domestic forces seems well supported in this account, which is organized to take a series of chronological snapshots of the balance of forces and outcomes. The other cases covered in the book, with the partial exception of Brazil, serve more as suggestive sketches; they appear to fit the arguments made about them, but warrant additional research.

Theoretically, the real strength of *Dams and Development* is to bring together literatures from different sub-fields of political science and to show in theoretical and empirical detail how they might intersect. The synthesis is most creative in discussing how democracy is a condition of success, while democratization is also one possible outcome of the transnational struggles over dams. This suggests the possibility of a virtuous circle, which fits with the book's insistence on not just the possibility but the actual construction of an alternative development model based on that of anti-dam activists. The grounded theory of this book presents a rich explanation that takes account of considerable complexity. This comes at the cost of some generalizability of the book's optimism. If local activism of the kind present in India and Brazil—each unusually contentious—is really necessary to achieve much development change, for example, this is mostly an explanation of why change is not likely to happen.

One of the book's disappointments is that it takes us only to the creation in 1998 of one of the dam debate's most novel participants, the World Commission on Dams, which actually included representatives of all the forces Khagram discusses in a single body—to discuss dams and their relationship to development. Its unfolding processes, rather than just its creation, would have been a stronger conclusion to the book's arguments and a significant test of them.

**Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid.** By Sarah Kenyon Lischer. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 204p. \$35.00 cloth.

— S. Neil MacFarlane, *The University of Oxford*

The relationship between refugee flows and the incidence of conflict has troubled security analysts and policymakers, as well as the humanitarian aid community, for some time. Although the connection has long been recognized, little systematic work has been done to pick it apart. We know that some refugee communities are conflict prone while some are not; some refugee movements appear to induce substantial regional insecurity while others do not. Why?

The author's argument (pp. 5, 20–34) in explaining this variation highlights the significance of the political context in which these movements occur. First is the character of the refugee population. Situational refugees leave in panic and are not politically organized. Persecuted refugees leave because they are directly persecuted, and may or may not have existing political structures. State-in-exile refugees move as a result of a decision by a political leadership as part of the latter's strategy to prevail in conflict. The three categories together form a low-to-high spectrum of violence proneness.

Second is the nature and response of the receiving state. The capacity of the state to control borders and to supervise refugees within those borders, and the interface between

the political interests of the receiving state and the conflict in the state of origin, are particularly important. Weak states find it difficult—whatever their intent—to contain the propensity of organized refugee groups for violence. Capable states may control, tolerate, or promote the politico-military activities of groups that they host, depending on their larger objectives regarding the sending state.

Sarah Kenyon Lischer has chosen her cases (Afghanistan, Central Africa, and the Bihac Pocket) well. The Afghan war produced two major flows of refugees. In Pakistan, the flow of refugees into Afghanistan laid the basis for prolonged cross-border insurgency. In Iran, there was no significant cross-border military activity. Since both states were comparatively capable, the difference may be explained largely by variation in the policies of the two receiving states toward the conflict in Afghanistan and the consequent degree of restraint they imposed on refugees.

In the Central African case, Lischer's analysis of Zaire yields little that is new. The discussion of flows from Burundi and Rwanda in Tanzania provides considerable value-added. The flow of Rwandan refugees into Tanzania produced little subsequent cross-border violence. That from Burundi was associated with substantial cross-border violence and resulted in significant increases in tension between the two states. Both groups had grievances against their home governments. The host government was clearly capable of controlling cross-border activity in either case. Lischer argues convincingly that the variation was produced by the different nature of Tanzania's political relations with the sending governments.

In short, the author asks a good question, develops a sensible comparative methodology for addressing it, chooses her cases well, and produces a very credible analysis. *Dangerous Sanctuaries* makes a useful contribution in unpacking the ways in which political factors affect the propensity for insecurity associated with refugee movements. As she argues, the analysis here is more nuanced and therefore more useful both analytically and in policy formulation than more generic socioeconomic explanations of refugee-related conflict.

This leads to a few more critical observations. A considerable amount of time is spent in the book debunking the socioeconomic explanations (camp location and size, poverty levels, gender balances within camps, lack of productive activity) for violence. This is overdone. What Lischer has shown is that these factors do not appear to be determining in the cases she analyzes. It remains, however, intuitively plausible that, all other things being equal, these factors are positively related to a community's propensity to conflict. In other words, these factors may have causal significance at a structural level, but by themselves are insufficient to explain specific outcomes. If so, it makes sense as part of a strategy of preventing or mitigating refugee-related violence to address these factors. The instruments of humanitarian agencies are not well suited for

addressing political problems; they are relevant in dealing with these socioeconomic conditions.

The critical analysis of socioeconomic explanations of refugee-related violence is linked to a wider critique of the role of humanitarian actors in fueling violence. This also seems overdone. After all, in the absence of politico-military support in disarming refugee warriors and separating them from noncombatants, and given the reluctance of humanitarians to let people starve on political grounds, there is little they can do about the unintended consequences of their actions. The critique is not new and is widely understood in the humanitarian community. It also confuses the argument. While the author expends considerable effort debunking socioeconomic factors, here she presents a socioeconomic factor (aid) as an important contributor to that violence.

This is linked to a third point. The book gives a monolithic impression of the humanitarian community as unwitting and naive contributors to refugee-related violence (see p.141). In so doing, its record of the humanitarian community takes insufficient account of the relatively high level of humanitarian awareness of the political and conflict contexts in which they work, and of their concern about the impact of their activities on conflict. Humanitarian agencies have come a long way in the past decade in their realization that humanitarian action does not proceed in an apolitical void and that they need to take account of the negative unintended consequences of their work. The author's own account establishes the point (e.g., the withdrawal of some agencies from the camps in eastern Zaire, and the Médecins sans Frontières advocacy of military intervention in Kosovo). A number of the sources she cites (e.g., Fiona Terry, pp. 91–92, 160) in support of her criticism of humanitarian agencies are from humanitarian agencies.

The weakest section of the book is the conclusion. Oddly, given the fact that the core of its argument is about states, political communities, and political processes, the concluding chapter is essentially about what humanitarian organizations need to do about it. Of all the institutional players in these games, humanitarians are the least well equipped to address the politics of refugee-related violence. The onus here lies on the UN Security Council, the regional organizations, and the states themselves. The aid-fuels-conflict dynamic is essentially the result of abdication of responsibility by all of the above.

On the other hand, it is right that humanitarians have their own contribution to make. Many of the book's recommendations are sensible in the abstract, but hardly new and difficult in practice. It seems rather banal to suggest that aid organizations should pressure states and organizations to provide police and military support (p. 143). They do pressure . . . and they are seldom listened to. Or that they should publicize the need for security measures (p. 149). They do . . . and they are often ignored. Or that

they should build security partnerships with local players (p. 151). They try . . . but, for reasons well explained in the book, the locals may be unwilling or unable to deliver. As for the withdrawal of humanitarian assistance to those in need (p. 143), humanitarian organizations do consider it and, on occasion, they do it. It is more difficult for them than for the author, because their commitment is humanitarian and they know that the people they are working with may die as a result of their decision.

These criticisms aside, the core argument and analysis are useful contributions to the growing literature on the relationship between forced migration and security.

**Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force.** By Janice Bially Mattern. New York and London: Routledge, 2005. 303p. \$25.95.

— Itty Abraham, *East-West Center, Washington*

Janice Bially Mattern's impressive first book comes with all barrels loaded. Although her subtitle suggests that she will take on the usual suspects, realist power-politics and neoliberal common-interest approaches, she also includes a critique of the approach closest to her own, namely, constructivism. The book can be read for the strength of its theoretical arguments alone; although the author labels this view a "post-constructivist" approach, it is perhaps better understood as a "linguistic turn." Theoretical arguments are "tested" against the Suez crisis of 1956, in particular the breakdown and reconstitution of the so-called Special Relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.

The author is most concerned with what she sees as a problem facing all three dominant approaches to the study of international politics, namely, their inability to theorize fully international "order," especially the all-important transition from moments of disorder—crises—to a new international order. Order is (rather minimally) defined as "stable, shared expectations and behaviors among states" (p. 5). For the author, the primary source of international order is "identity." Identity is defined in strong relational or intersubjective terms: The variety of relations (including negative ones) states have with one another "endows states with a self-definition" (p. 6). In the course of everyday interaction, states produce and reproduce a shared pool of knowledge about one another, shaping expectations about their (common) future, and thereby mutually constituting themselves and international society. At moments of crisis, identity breaks down; by the same token, so does order. The task is to understand how states reconstitute identity following crises, in other words, how international order is reestablished.

Drawing especially on the work of the French literary and cultural theorist Jean-François Lyotard, Bially Mattern's explanation of how order is reestablished marks her distance from the constructivist approach, which, although

it might deploy some of the same terms (identity, inter-subjectivity), does not have a coherent theory of how identities reform once they have broken down. The post-constructivist view is that during moments of crisis, agents involved in bilateral relations use a variety of *narrative* means to reconstitute mutual identity. Narratives are stories; here, they are the stories that states tell about themselves and each other to each other. Through these stories, identity is made and remade. The author's particular focus is on what she calls the narration of "representational force," a form of "language-power" that leaves the "victims" with little choice but to accept the narrative demands being made of them "or face subjective death" (p. 14). Faced with an offer (identity) they cannot refuse, the subjects of the linguistic threat back down, accept the dominant narrative (while perhaps rewriting it slightly), and thereby reconstitute mutual relations, self-identity, and international order. The centrality of agents, their purposive actions, and the use of power to shape interested outcomes makes a comparison with realist power-politics obvious and is, rather surprisingly, welcomed by the author: "[A] post-constructivist identity turn . . . may end up looking . . . very much like a sophisticated return to the classical realist roots of IR: to a realist or coercive constructivism" (p. 251).

Bially Mattern's empirical chapters analyze the language used by American and British leaders during the Suez Crisis in 1956. The crisis began when the UK, France, and Israel invaded Egypt, hoping to undo Gamel Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. It ended with the United States and the United Nations forcing the invaders home, humbled and publicly shamed, without the use of military force. If the Suez Canal was not geopolitical cause enough, what made this crisis even more significant was that it took place at the same time as the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

The author discusses three "phrases in dispute" (which can be understood as condensed linguistic signs, conveying multiple meanings and contextual references) that became rhetorical axes around which American and British identities broke down and reformed. The British narrative of Betrayal combined an account of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as a false friend whose actions and words were at complete odds with each other with horror that the United States would turn to the United Nations to sanction British behavior. The use of financial pressure to force them to leave the canal was the last straw. The U.S. narrative of British Bellicosity represented Nasser as small fry, his nationalization of the canal as a perfectly legal action with little importance for U.S. national interests, and, most damning, consistent British dissembling to hide the truth of their collusion with the French and Israelis to carry out the invasion.

During the crisis, each of these terms became symbols of the other's perfidy and reflected their lack of mutual

understanding. The crisis ended with the reconstitution of these terms and their meanings, and the production of a new narrative. This new script allowed each party to recognize each other again in the telling, thereby allowing the resuturing of British and American identities and the making of a new international order. Of course, the process was neither obvious nor easy nor equal.

According to the author, what forced the United States to restore order with Britain—and make narrative concessions to British self-esteem—was the ongoing Cold War and the realization that British and American identities were mutually constituted in the representation of a good, moral West pitted against the evil empire of the Soviet East. This idea of the West was not consistent with a British return to imperialism, especially during the Soviet invasion of Hungary. This historical interpretation is not new, but what is valuable is the careful language-based analysis of the reconstitution of the Special Relationship, producing a novel understanding of how states rebuild relations with each other following crises of identity.

The strengths of the epistemological critique and the possibilities manifest in the close-reading method make this study an important addition to the literature. However, perhaps "identity" is being asked to do more work than may be possible, given its simultaneous usage as (self-) identity and (relational) identification. The complexity of resolving multiple, sometimes incompatible, identities competing for dominance within each state is glossed over. Order is defined minimally, occluding the possibility that international "orders" might be inherently unstable or in a permanent state of disequilibrium. The difficulties of discussing identity and order when more than two states are involved is left hanging. It is unclear why certain terms were chosen (e.g., Bellicose rather than Imperial, to describe British behavior) and why Nationalization did not do more work for the British when the United States had just overthrown the elected governments of Guatemala and Iran for precisely than sin. Particularly jarring is the author's opening fantasy of giving statesmen better tools to help shape the world, as if this is the real purpose of theories of international politics. What would Lyotard say?

**Agents of Atrocity: Leaders, Followers, and the Violation of Human Rights in Civil War.** By Neil J. Mitchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 228p. \$35.00.

**Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century.** By Benjamin A. Valentino. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004. 317p. \$29.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

— Matthew Krain, *The College of Wooster*

In the last decade, we have made great progress in recognizing patterns in the use of state-sponsored mass murder and other life integrity violations. As a result of this body of work, policymakers now have better tools with which

to predict massive human rights abuses, and fewer excuses to hide behind when confronted with potential or ongoing atrocities. Yet much more needs to be done. On the policymaking side, mass killings continue unabated, with few international actors willing to address them head-on. On the academic side, we have spent so much time and intellectual capital on the structural factors that allow, encourage, exacerbate, or inhibit atrocities that we have often neglected the role of the perpetrators themselves. The two books reviewed here take on this deficit in the literature. These important new books convincingly argue that in order to understand and address the most egregious human rights violations, we must begin with those responsible for devising and implementing these murderous policies.

Rejecting the structural approach—that factors such as sociopolitical structures and/or upheaval best explain or predict atrocities—each starts from the premise that large-scale human rights abuses on the order of mass killings are policy choices made by a small group of elites. Leaders make rational but horrific calculations about whether to employ such atrocities. These are but one set in an arsenal of tactics that leaders may choose to employ when faced with threats, policy problems, or agendas to implement, and are used when they are deemed “useful” or optimal. From this assumption, each author sets out to understand why such atrocities occur, and begins the process of rethinking how to address them.

In *Final Solutions*, Benjamin A. Valentino examines the “strategic logic” of mass killing. He argues that powerful actors employ mass killing when they come to believe that this particularly abhorrent policy option best resolves a political problem that they face. In most cases, mass killing is used by a small group of decision makers to solidify power, eliminate threats (real or imagined), or advance a political agenda, but only after they have come to believe that alternative options are neither practical nor feasible.

Valentino lays out the strategic logic of mass killing at length and proceeds to examine in separate chapters three different types of cases—communist, ethnic, and counter-guerrilla mass killings—each with its own unique and deadly logic. In each chapter, relevant cases of mass killings are subjected to thorough historical process tracing in order to highlight the role of the elite decision-making calculus. In each chapter, the author also briefly discusses cases in which mass killings did not occur. In the chapters on communist and ethnic mass killings, he finds that radical, exclusionary ideologies that call for leaders to “fundamentally reorganize society at the expense of certain groups” all too often yield mass killing (p.153). In the chapter on counter-guerrilla mass killings, he concludes that counterinsurgency leads to mass killings because the tactic “may appear to offer the last chance for victory at an acceptable cost” to regimes faced with guerrilla insurgents (p. 233).

Valentino notes that the implications of his findings are twofold: First, successful intervention to prevent mass killing is possible; second, intervention to prevent mass killing can be done better than it has been done recently by the international community. He suggests becoming more proactive by monitoring regimes that he identifies as most likely to see mass killing as a viable policy option—those trying to implement radical social changes that dispossess large numbers of people, and those facing guerrilla insurgencies. Ironically, this suggests that some of the findings Valentino had rejected earlier regarding structural factors, in particular the focus on the presence of major sociopolitical upheaval, may not be so easily dismissed after all. Next, he argues that since a small group of elites is responsible for planning and implementing mass killings, interventions to prevent or halt mass killings should focus on removing them from power. Indeed, this conclusion has found support in recent quantitative research on intervention in genocides and politicides, and may be an important point of departure in rethinking how to prevent or react to instances of mass killing.

While an important, well-written piece of scholarship, *Final Solutions* does have some flaws worth noting. The cases of mass killing examined are well researched and expertly process-traced, but the cases where no mass killings occurred are addressed briefly and in far less analytical detail. An exception is the chapter on ethnic mass killings, where murderous regimes are more carefully compared to most similar cases, their immediate predecessors, which were often dramatically less lethal. Unfortunately, the other two case chapters are not nearly as rigorously comparative. Given that one of Valentino’s primary criticisms of the literature is that it has “focused narrowly on a few cases in which mass killing occurred and neglected the many other cases [that] did not lead to mass killing” (p. 7), a more thorough comparative analysis would have strengthened his already convincing argument.

Valentino is rightly eager to make the case for the contribution of the “strategic logic” framework, but he appears dismissive of alternative approaches. While much of his early discussion of the structural approach is on target, he is too quick to dismiss the relevance of this important approach. Yet by the end of the book, it becomes clear that ultimately, structural factors help determine which regimes are at greater risk for mass killing, while perpetrator decisions ultimately determine who among that subgroup will actually choose the murderous policy. Also, in responding to arguments that mass killings on the scale of genocide can only occur if substantial members of the population support or engage in the killing, Valentino argues that evidence from Rwanda suggests that “less than 9% of the male Hutu population over the age of 13” directly participated in the killings (p. 37). Yet when almost 1 out of every 10 males actively engage in the slaughter of their neighbors (not to

mention the large percentage of bystanders), one can hardly argue that leaders act without the support of or murderous action by substantial elements of society. Such evidence calls out for an analysis of both the principals and the agents of mass killing.

These few problems associated with Valentino's otherwise excellent book are addressed at least in part in another important work, Neil J. Mitchell's *Agents of Atrocity*. In this remarkably readable book, Mitchell applies a principal-agent framework to the policy area of massive violence targeted at civilians during civil wars. In doing so, he gives an appropriate nod to the importance of structural factors as context for these murderous choices, while still emphasizing the role of perpetrator decisions and policy implementation.

Mitchell argues that leaders use violence against civilians or prisoners during civil wars because of either "the self-interested pursuit of power" or "the intolerant logic of a divisive belief system" (p. 3)—arguments that echo Valentino's arguments. However, Mitchell reminds us that there is a third motivation for atrocities that is missed if one concentrates only on the principals and ignores the agents. While principals devise the policy, agents do the killing. Thus, we must also consider "the selfish gratification" of those who actually do the killing, as well as the ability or willingness of principals to restrain these agents (p. 5).

Mitchell engages in a more balanced comparative analysis of three cases of civil wars, all severe threats to the regime's existence, but with divergent outcomes. Three carefully documented, historically rich case chapters examine the English and Russian civil wars and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In examining the Russian civil war, the author demonstrates how the exclusionary ideology of the principals, combined with loosed agents, yielded the worst of the three examined sets of atrocities. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, he shows how the Machiavellian pursuit of power and security can lead to serious but less extensive atrocities, and demonstrates how principals can use agents to carry such atrocities out. In the case of the English civil war, Mitchell shows how ideology of the principal and the careful selection and control of agents can limit atrocities, even during a civil war, but only if the principal is committed to restraint.

*Agents of Atrocity* suggests the potential impact of both outside actors and of "tolerators" or "positive" leadership within affected countries. Mitchell's prescriptions involve ensuring that principals can better monitor agents, and using the already-existing international network of human rights nongovernmental organizations to hold both principals and agents accountable for their actions. While perhaps a bit idealistic, his suggestions, coupled with stronger international action suggested by Valentino and others, might just "reduce the odds of bastards being bastards" (p. 189).

### **Democratizing Global Politics: Discourse Norms, International Regimes, and Political Community.**

By Rodger A. Payne and Nayef H. Samhat. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 194p. \$45.00.

— Neta C. Crawford, *Boston University*

Since the September 11 attacks, depending on the month or even the day, one might or might not reply in the affirmative to the question of whether there is an emerging international or even global political order. President George W. Bush justified the United States March 2003 invasion of Iraq as the preservation and enhancing of that order and of the United Nations itself. A few months later, the UN secretary general suggested that the U.S. invasion was illegal. And even if one grants the emergence of a nascent global political order, its character is uncertain: Is it democratic, consensual, and egalitarian, or hierarchical and undemocratic?

Rodger Payne and Nayaf Samhat are convinced that there is an emerging global political community, that it is becoming more democratic, and in particular that its institutions are increasingly rooted in and characterized by norms of participation, inclusiveness, and accountability. Their key contention in *Democratizing Global Politics* is that coercion and self-interest cannot be the basis for sustainable political order (pp. 126–27). Rather, legitimacy is the key: "[W]e call into question the ultimate staying power of international norms, institutions, laws, and regimes that lack legitimacy" (p. 2). And for Payne and Samhat, democratic legitimacy rests less on the substance of the agreement or on who makes decisions than on the *process* of decision making. They do not argue that the global order is already democratic—in fact, they appear to agree with those who argue that many international institutions suffer from what has been called a "democratic deficit." Rather, they are suggesting that there is a trend toward democratization evident in the practices of particular regimes and issue areas.

Payne and Sahat's procedural conception of legitimacy, rooted in critical theory and the work of Jürgen Habermas's theories of discourse ethics, stresses democratic deliberation within the public sphere. Specifically, they argue that "an international regime can serve as a public sphere featuring dialogic processes intended to establish shared rules, norms and principles of governing a specific issue area of world politics" (p. 40). Their most far-reaching claim is that the nature of world politics is changing; the increased democratization of world politics, specifically the growing participation of nongovernmental-organization and social-movement actors, and the institutionalization of accountability marks a shift to an emerging "global polis" (p. 12) based on a "thin universalism" based on (a thick) procedural norm of transparency and participation. Thin universalism is opposed to the thick universalism of shared substantive beliefs and principles.

The theoretical claims of the book are elaborated and substantiated in two empirical chapters, considering, respectively, the deliberative potential of the Global Environmental Facility and the gradual, if incomplete, democratization of the World Trade Organization. They argue, in particular, that the Global Environmental Facility has “unusually open and inclusive decision-making procedures” (p. 81), and that although the WTO is “much less participatory and open than the GEF” (p. 99), it too has been characterized by growing transparency and more inclusive participation. In both cases, they suggest and show that a primary engine of change toward greater openness has been the work of nongovernmental organizations and social movements.

Payne and Samhat are not alone in reflecting on the functions and processes of international institutions and their democratic and democratizing potential. For example, John Dryzek, David Held, and Richard Falk, among others, have labored to analyze and catalyze global democracy for many years. A cluster of new books makes for interesting comparison with Payne and Samhat. For instance, Anne Marie Slaughter argues in *A New World Order* (2004) that routine international interactions, such as those by bureaucrats and other officials, are the stuff of an already existing international order. Closer to Payne and Samhat are two other new books. Ann Florini emphasizes the importance of transparency in *The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World* (2005), and Heikki Patomäki and Teivo Teivainen, who are even more prescriptive than Payne and Samhat, discuss ongoing and proposed efforts to democratize international institutions in *A Possible World: Democratic Transformations of Global Institutions* (2004).

Although I found areas to question and disagree with the authors, on the whole I found this to be an interesting and important book on several levels. First, in their articulation of a theory of emergent global democracy within the practices of international institutions and the nascent global sphere, Payne and Samhat are joining and usefully expanding a growing conversation about the constitution of global political order. As they suggest, “To the extent that legitimate authority is increasingly exercised in global politics through the rules, norms and principles of various international regimes, it is possible to argue that the space of anarchy is, too, increasingly displaced by a system of decentralized governance institutions” (p. 128). By admitting and articulating their commitment to a reflexive political theory, they are also honest about their normative perspective in a way that is refreshing: Their aims are democratization and emancipation; their approach is reflexive in the sense of “deny[ing] the neutrality and objectivity of theory, the theorizer, and the world” (p. 15).

Second, the authors are offering a clear articulation and application of Habermas’s theories of communicative action and discourse ethics to world politics. Again, they are not

alone in suggesting the potential salience of Habermas for theories of an emergent political order, but they may be among the most developed in their analysis.

Third, the case studies of the democratization of the Global Environmental Facility and the WTO are well executed and documented. Indeed, these two chapters would find interesting reading among scholars and observers of both those institutions, even if they were not convinced of Payne and Samhat’s theoretical arguments.

Finally, although they do not stress this element, the book is a useful caution for the advocates and observers of democratization at the global level. The case studies suggest how it is that ostensible transparency can be constructed to be less than full, how inclusion can be limited, and how the criteria for competence can be so narrowly described (e.g., in ideological terms) that participation might ostensibly be wide, but actually be limited to like-minded actors. In the case of the WTO, for example, participation is wide, but limited ideologically to those who share a neoliberal approach to international economics. In a word, as they stress, there is the “possibility” for democratizing global politics. What remains is the institutionalization of democratic procedures across a wide range of international regimes and institutions.

**Cities in the International Marketplace.** By H. V. Savitch and Paul Kantor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 488p. \$65.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Elizabeth Strom, *University of South Florida*

The growing popularity of comparative research is one of the most exciting recent developments in the field of urban politics. Comparison allows urbanists to transcend the local and see cities as part of a national or global system. It helps urban scholars identify which factors derive from the workings of democratic capitalist systems, and which grow from particular national practices and policies. But comparative urbanists have a difficult task as they try to disentangle cities from their national contexts. On the one hand, one can hardly understand, say, education policy in Detroit and Düsseldorf without clarifying local and national roles. On the other, an urbanist eager to highlight what is salient about the local does not wish to make national policy analysis central to his or her research. These special theoretical and methodological challenges confronting the comparative urbanist can be daunting.

Researchers have approached these challenges in a number of ways. In many cases, scholars have published collections in which cases from cities in different countries are presented, and editors use an introductory chapter to tease out some comparative nuggets, but no systematic comparative research has taken place (e.g., see John Logan and Todd Swanstrom, eds., *Beyond the City Limits*, 1990; Chris Pickvance and Edmond Preteceille, eds., *State Restructuring and Local Power*, 1991). In other cases, researchers

have sought to undertake more rigorous comparisons, establishing methods and frameworks that they apply to several cross-national cases (e.g., see Alan DiGaetano and John Klemanski, *Urban Governance in Comparative Perspective*, 1999; Jeffrey Sellers, *Governing from Below*, 2002).

Few urbanists have attempted a rigorous, systematic comparison of many cities in several countries. *Cities in the International Marketplace* is therefore a very welcome addition to the comparative urban politics literature. This study by H.V. Savitch and Paul Kantor follows 10 cities in five nations (New York, Houston, Detroit, Toronto, Glasgow, Liverpool, Paris, Marseilles, Milan, and Naples) over a 35-year period, focusing on their economic development policies and the political institutions that surround them. The authors have gathered a fair amount of economic and demographic data, used primarily to assess the economic health of the cities, as well as qualitative data used to present detailed case studies of policymaking and political change. They have embraced the complexity that such a wide-ranging analysis requires, finding ways to characterize economic variables and political factors on the national and local level, and synthesizing these many variables into a number of “regime types” that are helpful in this study and could facilitate comparisons to other cities.

Savitch and Kantor seek an understanding of how cities with different market positions and political systems have fared as they face the common challenges of global economic transformation. But they want to find an analytical path that recognizes the multiple factors that shape the behaviors of urban officials, making this a complex and nuanced argument. A city’s ability to make development policy, and the goals such policies might aspire to, cannot simply be deduced by the economic challenges at hand. Cities have varied market positions, different roles within their intergovernmental systems, and different political histories and cultures within their own polities, and all of these factors come into play when efforts to shape development are at issue.

Working from Charles Lindblom’s notion that in capitalist democracies there is a division of labor between state and market, Savitch and Kantor see development policies as the outcome of bargaining between local governments and potential investors. Bargaining is defined as “the ability of a city to garner resources in order to maximize its choices and ultimately realize its objectives in the capital investment process” (p. 43). Economic health, intergovernmental aid, and an activist local political culture all become resources that cities can bring to bear in the bargaining process, allowing resource-rich cities (Paris and Toronto are the prime examples) far more latitude in designing and implementing policies that benefit the city and its residents. Resource-poor cities (Detroit is one example) have little ability to control their environments. In this view, cities are not just mindless “growth machines,” unable to make clear policy choices. But their choices are

constrained by economic, institutional, and political factors. In sum, cities are “neither prisoners nor masters” (p. 168).

This massive amount of empirical material and the various analytical categories are all brought together in a very effective chapter entitled “Are Cities Converging?” Much of the comparative literature, among urbanists and others, stresses the convergence of political institutions and policy responses. Convergence theorists assume, according to Savitch and Kantor, that intensified global economic competition forces political systems to adopt more business-friendly policies. The authors admit that they cannot definitively answer the question of whether urban policies are converging, but their research can help shed light on this controversy. Although there is considerable policy diffusion, they note, different political systems still have different ways of handling similar problems. Yes, all governments adopt policies with an eye to remaining economically competitive, but French and Italian cities still believe such policies should include a great deal of national government investment and provide subsidized housing and public amenities. Yes, we see a new generation of “entrepreneurial” mayors, eager to “sell” their cities rather than sit back and wait for investment to flow in—but the mayor of Houston is “selling” low taxes and minimal regulation, while the mayor of Paris is “selling” cultural amenities and good mass transit. Savitch and Kantor aptly note that convergence debates can be complicated by the tendency for similar terms to mean dissimilar things in different national contexts. “Devolution” in France suggests a far less dramatic reduction in national government than it does in the United States; “public-private partnerships” in the United States assume a much larger role for the private sector than they do in France or Italy.

In sum, this is an impressive book that adds considerable empirical evidence and theoretical substance to the growing field of comparative urban politics. It is at times perhaps a bit too complex—at certain points I found the many regime types overwhelming, and the efforts to represent many types and variables graphically, through multi-dimensional figures, more confounding than illuminating. But these problems are probably inevitable given the ambition of this undertaking; efforts to simplify would require elimination of some of the layers that make this work so analytically and empirically rich.

**Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition.** By Hendrik Spruyt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. 305p. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.50 paper.

— M. Anne Pitcher, *Colgate University*

In his latest book, Hendrik Spruyt returns to a long-standing debate among scholars of twentieth-century decolonization: Why did some metropolitan governments

withdraw from their empires fairly quickly, while other imperial powers waged a protracted struggle to retain their overseas possessions, sacrificing men and money in the process? Spruyt not only offers a sophisticated theoretical response to a question of historical significance but also applies it to more contemporary cases of dissolution by examining the breakup of the Soviet Union into 15 independent states and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

At the core of the debate regarding territorial disengagement by twentieth-century imperial powers is an intriguing paradox. On the one hand, powers such as Britain or Russia that appeared to have obtained considerable economic and military benefits from their possessions actually withdrew promptly and without heavy bloodshed once nationalist movements emerged. On the other hand, powers such as France and Portugal that had incurred significant costs managing their empires derived little military assistance to their overall defense from colonial armies, received few economic benefits, and engaged in long, bitter, and ultimately futile wars in an effort to retain their possessions. Contrary to what realists might predict, then, metropolitan executives varied in their abilities to calculate accurately the gains and losses from empire, and consequently, they did not always act in their self-interest when deciding to resist or accept dissolution.

Although changes in the international environment clearly influence the assessments by states about their power relative to other states, as realists would expect, Spruyt argues that the solution to the puzzle of colonial retreat lies not in a realist explanation, but rather in the domestic institutional architecture of the metropolitan power. Building on the work of George Tsebelis (*Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, 1999) and others, Spruyt observes that whether imperial powers opted to withdraw or to remain rested on the degree of institutional access that “veto players” had to the metropolitan government. If institutional arrangements were such that potential hard-liners such as the military, settlers, or business had many opportunities to exercise a veto over policy changes, then it was more likely that metropolitan governments would resist demands for reform emanating from nationalists. Alternatively, if “veto points” were limited as in, for example, unitary states like Britain, then opponents would have had fewer opportunities to block policy changes and leaders would be freer to change the status quo. Institutionally fragmented states tended to produce policy stasis because those who opposed change had more chances to block reform.

Spruyt develops this argument by comparing five historical cases that vary considerably according to regime type, institutional configuration, and relative power in the international environment. He thus includes democratic (Britain, France, the Netherlands) versus authoritarian states (Portugal, Russia); single-party (Britain) versus multiparty (France, the Netherlands) parliamentary systems; hierarchical (former Soviet Union) versus corporat-

ist (Portugal) authoritarian regimes; and major (Britain, France, Russia) versus small (the Netherlands, Portugal) powers. There is variation on the dependent variable also, from cases where states willingly dissolved their empires (Britain, Russia) to those such as France, the Netherlands, and Portugal that forcefully resisted dissolution. Spruyt acknowledges that actors’ preferences clearly played a role in whether policies changed or not, but the generalizability of his claim that institutional arrangements in the metropole (or in Russia’s case, the “center”) can obstruct or facilitate policy change is elegantly and powerfully demonstrated across the five cases, as well as in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Much of the literature on institutional configurations and the role of veto players has focused on single-party versus multiparty parliamentary systems or presidential versus parliamentary democracies. *Ending Empire* extends the analysis to authoritarian regimes such as those which prevailed in Portugal until 1974 and the former Soviet Union until 1991. Spruyt’s explanation of their divergent responses to demands for change is counterintuitive, but it is plausible. Even though both regimes were undemocratic, their institutional arrangements varied considerably. The Soviet Union’s more centralized system actually disintegrated faster than Portugal’s more institutionally fragmented, corporatist, authoritarian system because veto players in the USSR were less able to block policy change.

Despite the elegance of its deductive logic, the explanatory framework has several shortcomings. First, some aspects of the analysis are undertheorized. Key actors (particularly proponents for change as opposed to veto players) are written out of the script because they do not fit the model. For example, the book’s cover illustration (which is based on a poster of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) depicts an arm defiantly wielding a machine gun, but the book downplays the importance of liberation movements, their metropolitan supporters, their rise or decline over time, and their institutional access to political leaders. One of the justifications for the rather one-sided focus on veto players is that they are more “well-organized” (p. 268) than proponents for change, and therefore they are more successful at blocking reform in fragmented regimes. Yet if that is true, it is rather difficult to explain the fact that decolonization eventually occurred in all five cases.

Moreover, in the cases of the two authoritarian regimes, not only did the empires dissolve but also their governments disintegrated. If policy stasis sometimes produces government instability, as Tsebelis claims, then Spruyt needs to explain why both governments collapsed even though their approaches to territorial partition were so different. Of course, the explanation for collapse in the Portuguese metropole or the Soviet center cannot be pinned entirely on imperial troubles. Yet it would seem that part of the answer to the similar fates of these two regimes might be

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found in the way that proponents for change were able to gain more institutional access to these governments or to disable and divide veto players over time.

Lastly, for a theory that depends so completely on the historical evidence, the complexities and contradictions of historical processes are frequently sacrificed to abstract theorizing. The book is very stylized and highly selective in its use of sources. It eschews extensive inclusion of archival work and does not engage with some of the best or most recent historical studies of empire in a few of the cases. There are few sources in the French language, none in Portuguese or in Russian. In the case of Portugal, Spruyt ignored pub-

lished work that might have weakened his claims, as well as material that might have strengthened them.

*Ending Empire* systematically explains why some imperial governments chose to maintain the status quo when confronted with nationalists' demands. The book further illustrates the versatility and flexibility of the veto points approach with regard to a variety of policy issues and within countries with different institutional arrangements. More historically grounded research is needed on the theory's generalizability to other types of regimes and on the connection between territorial policy and government stability or instability.