

## POLITICAL THEORY

**No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children and What Society Owes Parents.** By Anne L. Alstott. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 272p. \$27.50 cloth.

— Alice Hearst, *Smith College*

By any account, the United States lags far behind other industrialized nations in providing positive support for child rearing. Politicians utter maudlin paeans to the sanctity of the American family while shredding income-support programs for poor mothers and children, while on the popular front, advocates of “childfree” living bemoan the “culture of parental privilege” (Elinor Burkett, *The Baby Boon*, 2000). Anne Alstott makes the case for state support of families by examining the well-being of caretakers rather than dependents. She argues that society imposes a “No Exit” obligation on caretakers, and it is the increased vulnerability of caretakers flowing from that obligation that provides the foundation for the analysis.

Alstott’s theoretical focus on the loss of caretaker autonomy is novel and thought provoking. She begins by noting that what is of critical importance in rearing children is not that caretakers love them, but that caretakers provide *continuous* care—18 years at a minimum and longer for children with special needs. Continuity of care provides the emotional grounding that children need to grow into responsible adults, and societies both need and require caretakers to assume that obligation. That obligation entails, in essence, a No Exit requirement reflected in laws and conventions that reinforce parental authority to assure that caretakers assume their responsibilities and impose significant costs on those who abandon them.

The No Exit duty, Alstott asserts, significantly constrains the autonomy of caretakers and imposes costs that far exceed the ordinary costs that individuals in a free society ought to be expected to assume, even when the life choices that individuals make are voluntary. Indeed, because women currently continue to assume most of the caretaking responsibilities for children inside and outside of marriage, the costs of the No Exit obligation fall in a heavily gendered fashion, increasing women’s economic vulnerability. The scope of the No Exit obligation is extraordinary, she argues, and it is unfair to impose the whole burden of that obligation on individual caretakers. Alstott’s is not an argument that society should share in the costs of raising children because children ultimately benefit society as a whole by becoming consumers and wage earners whose earnings redound to the benefit of prior generations. The issue, rather, is one of a mutual obligation between caretakers and society: Caretakers have an obligation to provide continuous care imposed, in part, by the state; the state thus has an obligation to care for caretakers’ lost opportunities. Alleviating the burden asso-

ciated with providing such continuous care with a public subsidy designed to protect and preserve the present and future autonomy of parents, while at the same time insuring that children are raised in conditions that optimize their chances of growing into healthy adults, is a laudable public goal. Thus, a good and just society must underwrite that obligation.

To this end, Alstott proposes the establishment of two kinds of support programs. The first is a caretaker resource account, which would provide a grant of \$5,000 per year to any caretaking parent who has a child or children under the age of 13. The grant can be used to pay for child care, education, or retirement savings in the current year or in any future year. The author limits the grants to these particular uses because they enhance parents’ long-term earning capacities, either by allowing them to work while children need care or by educating themselves and thus moving ahead in the market, making up for opportunities lost while engaged in child care, and/or lessening some of the risks of assuming caretaking responsibilities by providing a retirement income. She considers a number of counterarguments, especially those that would view such a program as simply a windfall for well-off parents, but argues that because the purpose of the program is to defray the *ordinary* autonomy burden that parents assume, no means testing is appropriate. She does not, however, dismiss the argument that additional programs might be appropriate for caretakers whose needs are greater than normal.

This latter circumstance is addressed with her proposal for life-planning insurance, a publicly funded insurance program that would provide both income support and services to parents of severely disabled children in both acute and chronic situations. The argument here is that although parents may take a risk in having children, the burdens imposed by a child who has a very severe disability are often overwhelming and unduly restrict some caretakers’ life options altogether. This is an important proposal that could provide a lifeline to parents who face the severe financial and emotional stress caused by a child whose needs place extreme demands on caretakers.

Alstott’s proposals should strike a familiar chord for those acquainted with her earlier work as coauthor, with Bruce Ackerman, of *The Stakeholder Society* (1999), in which the authors proposed that every American should receive an \$80,000 grant upon graduation from high school to give young individuals an immediate and tangible stake in society. This book is likely to encounter many of the same criticisms. Nonetheless, her argument is well supported and thoughtful. She is attentive throughout to the range of objections that are likely to arise, from the libertarian “you-made-a-choice-so-don’t-expect-any-help” position to feminist concerns that such a program would continue to trap women in caretaking roles and that a better approach would be to transform the workplace into a more child-friendly environment. She notes, for

example, that while workplace accommodation is a desirable goal, the costs to businesses are often so burdensome as to make them politically impractical, and in any event, those costs are ultimately shifted to workers, particularly women. That response is perhaps insufficient, as it takes for granted the liberal notion that the existing workplace structure is efficient so that other kinds of family-friendly reforms are considered unworkable, but her suggestions may be more politically palatable than current workplace reform strategies. Alstott also spends considerable time thinking through the problems of equity between parents, and she makes a convincing case for favoring primary caretakers over nonprimary caretakers in allocating the subsidy.

Overall, this is a challenging argument and the ideas are radical. It is not clear that the argument will convince die-hard members of the childfree movement or their less antichild but libertarian colleagues; her proposals are likely to generate significant opposition from across the political spectrum. Its focus on the vulnerability of caretakers, however, is compelling, and *No Exit* should open up a useful dialogue.

**Homelessness, Citizenship, and Identity:  
The Uncanniness of Late Modernity.** By Kathleen R. Arnold.  
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 212p. \$40.00.

— John Schwarzmantel, *University of Leeds*

This study focuses on the problem of homelessness, though it is not an empirical study designed to propose particular policies to tackle the plight of the homeless and the dislocation of immigrants. The issue of homelessness is used to illustrate some deep-seated difficulties in the modern concept of citizenship and the political identity offered by the contemporary nation-state. The core argument of the book is that modern citizenship rests on a two-fold criterion of work and national identity. Citizens are those who contribute productively through their work and thus can claim to be economically independent. Citizenship is also dependent on membership of a national community. The ideal citizen thus has a home, in both a literal and a metaphorical sense: Such citizens are economically independent through their work, and have a home in a more abstract sense of being part of a territorially based nation-state.

The interesting and critical argument of the author is to “deconstruct” and criticize this concept of citizenship, and to show that “the nation-state offers an ideal of membership that cannot be realized” (p. 48). This task is done with considerable skill and theoretical sophistication. The norms of citizenship that are exemplified by membership in the national community and by the criterion of economic independence are achieved at the cost of exclusion and construction of an “Other.” It is the figures of the homeless and the immigrant or stateless person who rep-

resent this “Other,” excluded from the community of citizens. Kathleen Arnold uses Freud’s concept of “the uncanny” (*das Unheimliche*) to good effect to suggest that the homeless are those by definition who do not have a proper home. In that sense they are the opposite of those who are *heimlich*, who do have a home of their own. Yet *heimlich* also means “secret,” so that the homeless represent the secret or uncanny face of contemporary citizenship in the nation-state. The homeless are assimilated as objects of state policy, at the expense of their autonomy as full citizens. Alternatively, they are criminalized, deprived of whatever property they have, or merely expelled from one city or area to another. In both cases, the homeless become objects of the “prerogative” power of the modern state, which is incompatible with notions of democratic politics and full citizenship. They have lost full citizenship rights. This is a matter of the utmost significance, since loss of one’s home in the sense of full membership of a national community means dehumanization and a lack of the identity necessary for survival in contemporary society.

Modern citizenship thus rests on a false binary divide, between “home,” conceived in idealized terms as a conflict-free sphere of harmony, opposed to what is seen in equally monolithic terms as the dangerous Other of the homeless, or the immigrant. These figures are seen as the antithesis of the ideal citizen. The homeless person is presented as parasitic, as owing a debt to society. Arnold makes much of the notion of *Schuld*, meaning both debt and guilt. Early liberal thought, she suggests, contained the idea of society as a whole owing a debt to those in poverty, to ensure subsistence for all. Yet this has been inverted, and the homeless are seen as indebted to, or dependent on, those who have a home and are full citizens. This in turn makes it easier for the homeless to be stereotyped as feckless individuals who are themselves responsible for their situation, so that homelessness is presented as an individual problem and not the social problem that it really is. The homeless are subjected to the kind of disciplinary surveillance evoked by Michel Foucault in his model of “Panopticism.”

These are all interesting and challenging ideas, which make this a stimulating study. However, the discussion is often presented at a very abstract level. The theoretical “tool kit” of *Homelessness, Citizenship, and Identity* uses ideas of Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Giorgio Agamben, and Freud, among others, but they are often presented in quite condensed form. There are also some problems with the concluding arguments, which seek to offer an alternative to contemporary concepts of citizenship and identity, which are seen as defective because of the exclusions to which they give rise. Arnold argues that the alternative has to involve recognition of difference and the Other without seeking either to essentialize difference or to assimilate or criminalize those who are different. But how is this to be done, in concrete terms? A number of suggestions are

offered, in line with the author's argument that "modern citizenship must be transcended for a more open type of political identity" (p. 19). What is offered towards the end of the book is a rather diverse list of ideas, which include a form of cosmopolitan politics and what is called an "agonistic patriotism," though it is not really made clear what this latter would involve. Arnold calls for recognition of "multiple attachments and identities" (p. 159), and it is suggested that the global city, rather than the nation-state, could be the basis for these more open and cosmopolitan forms of political identity. Ideas of democratizing borders and decentering the nation-state are thrown in, but without much discussion of what that might mean in practice. Some of the allusions to European politics (p. 158) seem very sweeping. The reference to "the constant protests, strikes, and marches in European cities" suggests that these cities witness citizens constantly out on the streets, which is hardly the case.

Arnold may well be right to call for recognition of multiple attachments and identities, and to argue that the logic of the nation-state may not be very open to such recognition, but there is little discussion of what kind of institutional reform could open the way to recognizing difference without "essentializing" it. Some of the key ideas in the books are repeated too often, without being developed and explored at sufficient length. But it is an important and suggestive study, which brings together a wide range of ideas in a powerful critique of modern concepts of citizenship.

**The Deconstitutionalization of America: The Forgotten Frailties of Democratic Rule.** By Roger M. Barrus, John H. Eastby, Joseph H. Lane, Jr., David E. Marion, and James F. Pontuso. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004. 174p. \$70.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

— Emily R. Gill, *Bradley University*

In this short but provocative book, the authors argue that Americans' interest over the last century in expanding democratic responsiveness to the popular will has resulted in a diminution of representative institutions. Only the latter can refine and enlarge public opinion and provide the safeguards that are the essence of constitutionalism. The triumph of democracy is not inevitable. We are in danger of forgetting, the authors suggest, "its intrinsic and characteristic deficiencies, which must be counteracted if it is to function properly" (p. 7). In the first four chapters, Roger Barrus and his coauthors concentrate on American statesmen whose writings and actions played crucial roles in shaping the current context.

For James Madison, the Constitution's moral purpose of instituting freedom rendered it more than an apparatus for public decision making. The book's authors emphasize Madison's recognition of the usefulness of enlisting passions and prejudices in support of weaker reason. By Abra-

ham Lincoln's time, they suggest, the passions were arrayed against reason. The Gettysburg Address calls for a new birth, not a rebirth, of freedom: "And equality, instead of being a self-evident truth, was a proposition—a theorem that had to be proved by the action of the American people" (p. 45). But by redefining equality as a moral principle that makes moral demands, rather than as a self-evident reality or axiom, Lincoln introduced the ideal of equal justice as a transcendent goal, and therefore, to the authors, the possibility of big government.

Woodrow Wilson's agenda, the authors explain, was grounded on his commitment to an organic rather than a literary Constitution, one that is discovered, not constructed. He advocated political growth that would allow a unified public policy to be based on the opinions and needs of the people, a development that in his view would be "not deconstitutionalizing but constitution-fulfilling" (p. 64). The Great Depression inspired Franklin Roosevelt to change people's expectations of government. When he added freedom from want and freedom from fear to the traditional freedoms of speech and religion, these new freedoms "were to be defined by the ever-changing desires of the people for well-being" (p. 74).

In their discussion of current institutions and policies, the authors first argue that progressive political thought and accompanying changes in political expectations have enormously increased Congress's legislative authority. While these developments have fulfilled Wilson's preference for majoritarian control, the loser has been the ideal of limited government. Candidates' messages are "no longer filtered through the principles of party"; instead, candidates rely on public opinion, which rewards what is popular rather than what is wise. Presidents rule "informally" (p. 108) or in a deconstitutionalizing mode, as in the authors' example of Bill Clinton's bypassing Congress to add land to national parks by executive order, and, I might add, as in George W. Bush's using executive orders to implement his faith-based initiative in Cabinet departments when Congress would not pass the legislation he backed.

Barrus et al. begin consideration of the judiciary with Benjamin Cardozo's message that judges should be sensitive to the welfare of society. This has been interpreted, in New Deal style, to mandate not simply the pursuit of happiness but the attainment of happiness by all. In their view, the Supreme Court's responses to reapportionment and to sexual harassment and bullying cases ignore practical politics; its responses to reproductive freedom, expressive activity, and religion cases all demonstrate "a willingness to shrink what the government may do in the name of preserving or protecting an 'American way of life'" (p. 119). Although they find it "hard to quarrel" with *Brown* (p. 122), too often the Supreme Court "defines the common good in terms of the accumulation of satisfied individual and group claims" (p. 117), as the judicial process converts

citizens who must engage in lobbying and coalitional politics into subjects who need merely file petitions. The authors conclude with two brief chapters on foreign policy and on the inception of the National Performance Review in 1993. Overall, “[s]elf-government is not possible without the ability to understand the threat of dangers such as seeking immediate gratification of preferences at the expense of the long-term interests of society” (p. 146).

The authors of *The Deconstitutionalization of America*, then, would seem to favor what Federal Appeals Court Judge Douglas Ginsburg has called the Constitution in Exile. As described by Jeffrey Rosen (“Supreme Mistake: How the Election Affects the Court,” *New Republic* 231 [November 8, 2004]: 18–23), the expansive interpretation of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce that began with the New Deal has until recently been too deferential to the regulatory state. A revival of the Constitution in Exile would reemphasize federalism and resurrect constitutional limitations on the regulatory state. Barrus et al. make a provocative case for a constitutional interpretation that limits even majoritarian governmental power.

I wonder, however, whether a newly ascendant Constitution in Exile, or something like it, would truly serve their purpose. First, as Madison explains at length in *Federalist* #10, it is not simply national majorities but also—and especially—local majorities that may seek immediate gratification and threaten liberty. If government is overly responsive to popular opinion, altering the locus of decision making may simply render government responsive to a *different* popular opinion.

Second, if devolving more authority to local majorities may help to preserve an American way of life whose weakening the authors deplore, who has the authority to decide what this way of life comprises in substance? Are greater reproductive and expressive freedom and greater protection for minority religious viewpoints truly in conflict with the American way of life? Michael Walzer has argued that the nature of political society is not fixed at one moment in time, but instead emerges as the product of ongoing negotiation, which over time represents “the gradual shaping of a common . . . political life” (“Response to Kukathas,” in Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, eds., *Ethnicity and Group Rights: Nomos XXXIX*, 1997, p. 108). In my view, continuing discussion and debate about what is constitutive of the American way of life is central to our common purpose. Therefore, I agree with the authors that the common good cannot be defined simply by an accumulation of satisfied individual and group claims. Making claims, however, may be a legitimate vehicle for entering into productive debate.

Finally, I would like to suggest that citizens are politically engaged not only when they lobby and form coalitions to influence the making of public policy, but also when they indirectly through the courts engage in debate about what constitutes the American way of life. Sanford

Levinson, for example, suggests that supporting the Constitution “commits me not to closure but only to a process of becoming and to taking responsibility for constructing the vision towards which I strive, joined, I hope, with others. It is therefore less a series of propositional utterances than a commitment to taking political conversation seriously” (*Constitutional Faith*, 1988, p. 193). I share the authors’ desire that public policy not be grounded simply on the desire for immediate gratification. They have mounted a persuasive defense of one way of avoiding this outcome. Although I may disagree that rolling back the regulatory state is the proper way to accomplish it, taking political conversation seriously is a commitment on which I am sure that we all agree.

**The Law Most Beautiful and Best: Medical Argument and Magical Rhetoric in Plato’s *Laws*.** By Randall Baldwin Clark. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 192p. \$55.00.

**A Journey into Platonic Politics: Plato’s *Laws*.**

By Albert Keith Whitaker. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004. 254p. \$39.00.

— Michael S. Kochin, *Tel Aviv University*

Plato’s *Laws*, his longest and most comprehensive work on politics, is a conversation about the purposes and limits of legislation among three old men: an Athenian Stranger, Megillus, a Spartan, and Kleinias, a Cretan. The three speak while ascending to the cave-shrine of Zeus where Kleinias hopes to receive the blessing of the god for his appointed task of drawing up a law code to govern a new colony. Until recently, the *Laws* was very little read, and there is still relatively little useful secondary literature on it, especially when compared to the ocean of scholarly treatments available on the far better known *Republic*.

Albert Keith Whitaker and Randall Baldwin Clark write from similar perspectives but with very different purposes. Whitaker’s book is primarily a contribution to pedagogy: a guide to Plato’s longest and most comprehensive work for beginning undergraduates. Clark’s is primarily a contribution to scholarship: Clark puts Plato’s arguments about persuasion and compulsion in the context of Greek medical, magical, and rhetorical writings. Both books approach Plato’s *Laws* with an orientation determined by Leo Strauss (*The Argument and the Action of Plato’s Laws*, 1975) and Strauss’s student Thomas Pangle (*The Laws of Plato*, 1980). Both writers interpret not only the arguments of the principal interlocutor of the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger, but also take note of the way those arguments are shaped to respond to the Athenian’s two elderly conversants. For both writers, Plato is not a political idealist, neither in the *Laws*, with its second-best regime of private families, private property, and the rule of law, nor even in the *Republic*, in which Socrates propounds a best regime of communism of the

family and property ruled over by philosopher-kings. For both Whitaker and Clark, as for Strauss, Plato is a critic of the thoroughgoing application of ideals to politics. Yet both of these books dissent from the rationalist ethics upheld by Strauss and (more explicitly) Pangle. Whitaker's and Clark's Plato is not only a critic of the aspiration to rationalize political life; he is also a critic of the individual's aspiration to rationalize his or her own life.

Whitaker's handbook is organized according to the 12 books of Plato's *Laws*, with highly valuable study questions and an outline appended. The result is not *Cliff's Notes*: Whitaker does not aspire to give his readers a readily digestible big picture, but he does the more useful work of pointing the committed student to the major turning points of Plato's argument. Whitaker's work would make it possible to teach the *Laws* to first-semester undergraduates, though the book is priced about triple the cost of the usual such supplementary text.

Despite its form as a commentary, *A Journey into Platonic Poetics* does present an overarching argument. Whitaker begins by repudiating reason as the sole or principal guide to human life; reason, in his view, can do no more than assist us in sifting the traditions that we have inherited from our fathers and mothers (pp. ix–x, cf. 193–95). Thomas Paine and Ronald Reagan notwithstanding, we do not have it in our power to begin the world all over again. Whitaker accepts the initial and fundamental claim of Plato's *Laws* that the rule of law requires religious sanction and the proper regulation of religious life. He is committed either to the notion that theocentric politics is possible for us—or even less plausibly, that there is no major difference between Plato's speakers' quest for a divinely supported law and our contemporaries' quest for a law authorized by some combination of secular naturalistic reason and popular consent.

Whitaker therefore rejects the rationalist Plato of Strauss and Pangle and their acceptance of the Socratic “paradox” that virtue is knowledge and vice, ignorance. This is not unrelated to Whitaker's other principal departure from Strauss and Pangle: His claim that the philosopher—the one who would subject every aspect of his or her life to rational criticism—is required in virtue of his or her activity as a philosopher to seek to better the community in which he or she lives (pp. 150–51). Strauss and Pangle, for their part, contend that the philosopher seeks primarily to better his own life, and acts to reform the community only insofar as is necessary to secure or improve the conditions for philosophizing. As Whitaker puts it: “If a philosopher believed that all men pursue only their self-interest [as they understand it] . . . then his desire to ‘cure’ his fellows—beyond his wish to avoid harm from them—would make no sense” (p. 159).

Perhaps the most striking bit in Whitaker's commentary is when he contrasts the Athenian Stranger's three accounts of education (pp. 24–30). Is education learning

to live with one's fellow citizens in the best way possible, learning to love and hate the pleasures and pains that ought to be loved and hated, or learning to delight in or be pained at that which our law teaches ought to be delighted in or ought to be pained at? He attempts to harmonize the three accounts by positing the possibility of a best law under which one could be a perfect citizen (p. 29). Yet in the light of the critiques of the rule of law in Plato's *Statesman* and *Laws*, one wonders if in order to appreciate fully the seeming differences between these accounts, one must be both less sanguine about the possibilities of law and more sanguine about the possibilities of reason than is Whitaker.

For Clark in *The Law Most Beautiful and Best*, the *Laws* is not a defense of adhering to the wisdom of the fathers but a dialogue with the old, intended to be overheard by the young (pp. 8–9), in which the rightful authority of the paternal, of the aged, of the revered, is shown to be much less than the old would believe. In speaking to the old, the Athenian Stranger adopts the language of therapy, Clark shows, not only the rationalistic language of Hippocratic medicine but also the magical language of apotropaic wizardry, and the priestly language of prayer and sacrifice for the sake of bodily or mental cures. Plato's Athenian Stranger sophisticates the rationalist prescriptions of the Hippocratics with the charming language of witches, root-gatherers, priests, and Gorgianic orators. Plato thereby indicates the need to supplement the rational inquiry into the nature of human bodies and the natural forces that impinge on them with the dubious arts of wizardry or rhetoric in order to secure compliance with law. As Clark puts it, speaking in terms of the Athenian Stranger's therapeutic analogue to politics: “Because the sick are resistant to force but incapable of reason, they can only be healed by doctors whose words resemble reason even as they partake of force” (p. 133). Coercive law is needed, Clark's Plato shows, insofar as human beings are incapable of appreciating or accepting the reasons behind the law. Yet since law as such must be general, willing the sacrifice of some for the good of others, and occasionally sacrificing the good of some for the sake of a general and unchangeable legal formula, one must keep in mind the disanalogy between legislators who look out for the whole citizenry and physicians whose concern is solely for the well-being of their individual patient (see my “Plato's Eleatic and Athenian Sciences of Politics,” *Review of Politics* 61 [1999]: 57–84, esp. 79–80). For Clark, the rational inquiry into nature requires the assistance of magic, drugs, and rhetoric to stabilize politics because the soul, on which speech impinges, is not natural but other than, and potentially defiant of, nature, even as Socrates' prescriptions for communism of the family and of property in the *Republic* are not natural but prescriptions for the freedom of the rational soul to impose rational order on nature (pp. 90–91, 93).

While both books engage with a fair range of scholarship (Clark's more formally and fully than Whitaker's, in keeping with their distinct aims), neither makes reference to the massive and complex work on the *Laws* by another of Strauss's students, the late classicist Seth Benardete (*Plato's Laws: The Discovery of Being*, 2000). Nor does either book make real use of the most valuable recent work on the *Laws* outside of the Straussian orientation, the series of papers by André Laks (including "The Laws" in the *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, 2000; and "Legislation and Demiurgy: On the Relationship Between Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*," *Classical Antiquity* 9 [1990]: 209–29). Nonetheless, both books, like the text they exposit, open the reader up to fundamental philosophical questions about the relation between soul and body and the place of human beings in the natural order. Both discuss the ways these questions erupt into our life together in the interaction or conflict between social norms and the "erotic necessities" of sexuality (homo- as well as hetero-). Whitaker, in addition, shows how for Plato, political life must not only contain within it a view of the divine; at its highest, it makes possible the rational inquiry into the divine, or divine science. It is the very distance between that understanding and our own that threatens, despite the efforts of Whitaker and Clark and the labors of those scholars who preceded them, to make reading the *Laws*, for all the book's manifest difficulties and hidden beauties, no more than antiquarian tourism.

### **Deliberative Democracy and the Plural Polity.**

By Michael Rabinder James. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 240p. \$35.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

— Simone Chambers, *University of Toronto*

Michael Rabinder James addresses one of the most pressing problems facing liberal democracies: how to deal fairly and justly with group conflict and identity-based political claims. Although a normative theorist at heart, James understands the problem as both a question of stability and of justice. Prudence can tell us that reducing antipathy and mistrust between groups is a good thing, but in reducing tensions between groups, we also need to be sensitive to the legitimate claims and calls for justice on behalf of groups. His normative approach is refreshingly pragmatic and empirically well informed. But as mentioned, he is at heart a normative theorist, and at the heart of this book is a normative concept of deliberation that focuses on the way dialogue and conversation between groups can promote mutual understanding, reduce tension, enhance stability, and address deep-seated justice claims.

The first step in negotiating the treacherous terrain of identity politics is to foster understanding between groups. Understanding, or what James calls deliberative reciprocity, is a prerequisite to legitimate and stable conflict and

dispute resolution. At the most general level, his concept of deliberative reciprocity does break new ground within the now very large field of deliberative democracy. Where *Deliberative Democracy and the Plural Polity* makes its mark is in fleshing out both the conceptual and institutional infrastructures necessary to be able to understand and explain when, where, and why deliberative reciprocity is likely (or unlikely) to take place. Here James has something new to say.

In the first place, the book brings together an impressive array of literatures. Not only does James straddle a number of divides within political theory by covering identity theory, deliberative theory, justice theory, and rational choice theory but he also introduces the empirical research analysis of comparative politics and electoral and public opinion research to the mix. Although deliberative democratic theory is becoming more concrete and focused on intuitional and policy design, it is rarely well versed in empirical research. James uses empirical research to great effect in his analysis. The book is both rich in empirical detail and effective in integrating theoretical models, such as empirically based models of identity construction, with normative theory, for example, justice between groups theories. But more generally, the empirical component is used to highlight the complexity of real world cases and the ways in which contemporary normative theory has failed to address that complexity.

There are three areas in which James argues that deliberative democratic theory, in particular, has failed to acknowledge dimensions of complexity that have significant impact on the prospect of deliberation. The areas in question are identity formation, motivational and incentive structures, and electoral design. When one tries to think through the possibility of groups addressing their differences and resolving their conflicts through deliberative procedures, each of these dimensions can introduce complicating factors that must push the theorist into an ever-narrower contextualist approach.

With regard to identity politics, James insists that it is impossible to generalize about the nature of group identity and the justice claims that can be sustained by that identity. No two identity-based claims are identical because no two identities are identical. People gain, reject, adopt, inherit, and are saddled with identities in many different ways. Although he appeals to four general empirical models of identity formation, even within these categories there is a great deal of variation. As an illustration of complexity, James discusses four American "identities": Native American, Asian American, Hispanic American, and black American. The literature appealed to here is very broad and the discussion very rich. He concludes that political claims that emerge from these identities must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis but within an overarching framework of fair deliberation, or what he calls plural deliberation. Indeed, while appealing to broad procedural

categories that are a fixture within deliberative democratic theory, James returns over and over again to a contextual account.

Connected to identity formation is the question of motivational and incentive structures in which groups find themselves. These frameworks can both explain and give us insight into why some groups might pursue a strategy of reciprocity while others not. James has no problem borrowing the framework of strategic action in explaining why groups might adopt the normative-based perspective of reciprocity. Indeed, if we want people to act nonstrategically, we have to create the proper incentives. In illustrating how incentive structures can inhibit deliberative reciprocity, he appeals to a comparison between northern and southern Jews with regard to their attitude toward the African American Civil Rights movement. Many Jewish groups in the North developed solidarity with southern blacks and pursued a policy of deliberative reciprocity. This attitude was not as evident among southern Jews, who were at times hostile toward African American justice claims. The explanation cannot be found within Jewish identity but rather in the relative security of northern Jews compared to southern Jews. The insecurity that southern Jews felt with regard to their own place within the white world led to an affirmation of their place within that world, which was largely hostile to Civil Rights claims, instead of leading to solidarity with other insecure groups. The author's larger point with this illustration is that understanding the motivational dynamics produced by incentive structures is an important step in thinking through how to overcome intergroup divides.

James's final innovative contribution to debate on deliberative democracy centers on the insight that different institutional contexts offer different opportunities and risks for pressing identity claims. While his discussion of civil society and the public sphere is informative, it does not contribute as much to the deliberative democracy debate as his discussion of electoral systems. Formal institutions like parliaments are limited in their flexibility and create different incentives than, say, the free-wheeling debate of an election campaign. While very familiar to empirical research, electoral design has been sadly neglected in normative theory. The question of how different electoral designs might structure debate and create incentives or disincentives to engage in deliberative reciprocity is undertheorized in deliberative democracy. The author has tackled this issue with admirable sophistication. He comes out tentatively in favor of an STV system (single transferable vote) at the state and local level and of increasing the number of districts at the national level. Whether or not these reforms are feasible, the contribution of this chapter is really in charting a comprehensive account of the connection between electoral design and deliberation between groups.

As with all contextual approaches, there is a risk that the center will not hold, that by the end of the book the

reader is left with a series of interesting and informative vignettes but nothing permanent to hold onto. James escapes this fate. This is a noteworthy achievement. The complexity and sheer messiness of real-world identity formation and group conflict is not smoothed over or simplified for the sake of neat normative conclusions. Nor does he fall back on deep description when faced with complexity. Although rich in empirical detail and case studies, the analysis remains rigorous and systematic.

**Max Weber's Politics of Civil Society.** By Sung Ho Kim. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 224p. \$60.00.

— Duncan Kelly, *University of Sheffield, UK*

The idea that a healthy and vibrant civil society provides an essential basis for democratic politics has become a mainstay of contemporary political theory. The so-called civil society argument has been put forward as transcending a rather blunt dichotomy between liberal individualism and Marxian collectivism. Current interest in this area engages the intersection between what Ernest Gellner referred to as the “modal” self of the modern age, and the neo-Tocquevillian concern with the institutional and character-forming elements of associational life. Fitting Max Weber—typically viewed as either founding father of sociology, nationalist apologist, or aristocratic liberal—within these positions is an engaging project that requires a keener awareness of the overall subtlety of his thinking than normally presented, as Sung Ho Kim recognizes (p. 17). Reconciling Weber's concern for the ethical presuppositions of action with his understanding of the difficulties of maintaining a sense of individuality in an increasingly rationalized and bureaucratic world suggests a very particular vision of civil society. It is a sphere that ties together a concern with “statecraft,” on the one hand, and “soulcraft,” on the other, both in terms of the particular concerns of legitimate political rule, but also in terms of the requirements of personality more generally.

For Weber, the only chance of giving meaning to one's life is to meet the demands of the everyday by choosing a vocation and recognizing the particular requirements of the specific “order of life” that this choice engenders. Such structural and soulful concerns gave rise, of course, to his most famous portraits of those men of vocation, the scientist and the politician, though the requirements of personality (*Persönlichkeit*) within particular life orders (*Lebensführung*) are of more general concern, applying as much to the religious and the erotic spheres as to the intellectual and political. For civil society, this account produces a contestatory model of interaction, where the social realm becomes a site where individuals struggle to find their vocation. This can be examined by a genealogical reconstruction of the particular type of character both formed by, and formative of, contemporary modern society, the “sect-man” (*Sektenmensch*) of Puritan origin.

At first, such a construction seems puzzling. As Kim rightly argues, for many, the dour and individualist Puritans would appear to be an unlikely set of characters out of which the seeds of a sociable civil society could be expected to blossom. Yet, in a detailed reconstruction of Weber's essays on the Protestant ethic, the author suggests that in attempting to reconcile subjective values and objective rationality Weber identified the notion of a person in a calling, a character with a *Beruf*, and thereby highlighted the important relationship among rationality, modernity, and freedom. The Puritan, famously, "wanted" to work in a calling, but we moderns are in some sense "forced" to do so, says Weber. But the reason the Puritan wanted to work in a calling, according to Kim, was not because of some radically individualist Calvinist reworking of Lutheran piety. Instead, it was because of the Puritan capacity for socially cohesive behavior that enabled individuals to become personalities in their own right, a theme noticeably bound up for Weber with more contemporary reflections on the German tradition of self-cultivation, or *Bildung*, and its relationship to specialization (pp. 124 ff.). Importantly, too, Kim asserts the politically active tradition of Puritan communities that can be seen in such contexts as the English civil war and Revolution, for it is precisely its formation as a sect community (*Sektengesellschaft*) that renders its political and social potential so explosive (pp. 71 ff.).

Tying his interpretation of the transformation of a voluntary sect into a sociable community has important implications not only for the account of the Protestant ethic. Its importance within Weber's oeuvre can also be illustrated by his contemporaneous account of Protestantism after his trip to the St. Louis World's Fair and around America in 1904. What struck Weber most forcefully, apart from the traditional response of the high-cultured European to both American dynamism and American vulgarity, was the religiosity of American society. And this religiosity, he supposed, was largely due to the foundation of sociable American society out of a community of sects.

Critically comparing church and sect in North America, Weber contrasted the compulsory institutional form (*Anstalt*) of the church with the free and voluntary association of the sect. Such vibrancy as one could find in contemporary sect life also provided an illuminating contrast with European and specifically German associations. The university fraternity, for example, was a key comparative indicator for Weber; and while American societies were premised on the assumption that this was a training ground for commercial and civilizational advance, German fraternities remained rather too much like old-boys clubs and insurance societies (p. 74). For Weber, the disjunction between the two was symptomatic of a wider cultural and intellectual malaise, related to something Kim does not discuss more fully, namely, the issue of academic freedom that also perplexed Weber during the years in

which he was recovering from his first major mental crisis. America could not long remain in such a state, though; Weber thought it was destined to succumb to European-style bureaucratization.

Overall, however, predicating modern sociability upon particularistic, voluntary, associational membership for Weber was beneficial because of the charisma of both leaders and members of sects; they had to be charismatic precisely because membership of a sect is not universal. Civil society here, then, is both "disciplining and formative," where "certain moral traits and civic virtues are cultivated via collective achievement and ethical qualities" (pp. 67 ff., 80, 83). It is this sort of argument that renders Weber's arguments in part quite Kantian in inspiration, Kim thinks, because of the connection between principled and self-disciplined moral action in the mature individual, which is broadly teleological in terms of finding meaning in action through the duty to act according to a calling. Here, by virtue of our very disenchantment, we are in fact continually able to find reenchantment and meaning renewed (pp. 96, 105).

Such antifoundational and nonutilitarian ethics are revealed in Weber's discussion of the worthy politician and the intellectual integrity of the scientist. And although Kim thinks that Weber's ethical project fails, it does not fail for broadly Straussian reasons. The sectlike dynamism of civil society resembles, in fact, Michael Oakeshott's "enterprise association" model of the European state, but the attachment to both Nietzschean heroism and Socratic agnosticism is too much to bear for everyday life; in effect, the Weberian calling demands too much of us, even though it relies upon a heterogeneous, rather than a homogeneous, pluralist model of society (pp. 163–70, 179, 186). Such a conclusion chimes well with contemporary political theory in its recognition of the tragic character of all political action and the tense relationship in particular between liberalism and group rights. This is an engaging attempt to bring Weber to bear, so to speak, on issues of contemporary concern that pays attention to textual interpretative issues in Weber scholarship, as well as widening out key issues to discuss political thought more generally. The life led politically, nevertheless, remains a goal to come to terms with for all who take Weber's teachings seriously.

**Modern Peoplehood.** By John Lie. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 394p. \$49.95.

— Bernard Yack, *Brandeis University*

This book is a valuable addition to the literature on social identity and modern politics. In the manner of historical sociologists, John Lie synthesizes a vast body of scholarly literature—the book has a 100-page bibliography—in order "to illuminate and sublimate the categories of modern peoplehood" (p. ix).



Lie develops two major arguments in this book: the priority of the modern state in shaping the primary forms of group identity in modern political life and the destructive effects of racialized social identities. These two arguments do not cohere quite as neatly as he would have us think, since, as it becomes clear in the last chapters, racialized identities develop in a much broader context than the drive of modern states to develop a corresponding sense of social identity or peoplehood. But each theme is pursued with intelligence and great erudition. And the analysis of the relationship between the modern state and social identity at least clears the decks of many misconceptions that keep us from understanding the nature of race-based social identities, even if we have to go beyond that analysis in the end.

Lie's syntheses of the arguments against treating shared language, religion, race, and culture as the foundation of modern peoplehood will be especially helpful for most readers. The author subjects each of these supposed bases of modern social identity to a thorough analysis and critique. In their place, he suggests that a "common consciousness" shaped by the "anti-entropic forces of the modern state" is responsible for creating the thin but powerful social identities that come to the fore in modern times (p. 42). "Modern peoplehood," he declares, "is the product and predicate of the modern state, becoming a regulative ideal that governs political, intellectual, and scientific disciplines." Everywhere the modern state has gone, it has sought to transform "a population . . . into a people" (p. 99).

Lie's main point is that the sense of belonging to a people is a product of the drive of modern states to extend their authority evenly throughout given territories. Like Ernest Gellner and many other "modernist" students of national identity, he ridicules the "intensely Whiggish" historical discourse that informs the theory and practice of nationalism (p. 115). The peoples that we see today are the products, rather than the creators, of modern states. Without the "anti-entropic forces of the modern state" to keep them within neat boundary lines, social identities would develop in much thicker, overlapping patterns—like Kokoschka abstracts rather than Mondrians, as Gellner once said. Recognizing this fact "vaporizes the seeming solidity of past peoples" (pp. 41–42).

There is a great deal to learn in this book about the impact of the modern state on modern social identities. But the argument remains incomplete because it does not give a full enough account of the relationship between the modern state and the variety of sources of social identity that it encounters. That incompleteness is registered in the vagueness of the concept "common consciousness" that Lie uses to define modern peoplehood. What exactly is common about common consciousness? Are we talking about an entirely new kind of mutual connectedness or a new form of something we have seen before? A people, it

seems, is a group that is conscious of their peoplehood. In that case, what exactly are they conscious of? Lie cites Ernest Renan's famous description of the nation as "a daily plebiscite" to defend his reliance on a purely subjective criterion for defining modern peoplehood. But Renan pointedly insisted that *two* things make a nation: consent and the rich legacy of shared memories and historical artifacts that its members affirm as their common heritage. Lie is not suggesting that modern peoples simply affirm their shared participation in particular states—indeed, his goal is to unmask the way in which we have come to treat shared race and language and culture as the foundation of our common consciousness. So he needs to give a better account of the nature and sources of shared consciousness more generally and how modern states have come to deal with them. How else, for example, can we begin to make sense of the problem that lies at the core of so many communal conflicts in the modern world: the bad fit between existing state boundaries and the existing boundaries between peoples (p. 145)?

No doubt, we cannot make sense of modern peoplehood without looking closely at the peculiar role of the modern state in our lives. Indeed, I would agree with Lie that the modern state is the catalyst that transforms the problems of social identity in the modern world, thereby giving rise to wholly novel social problems like nationalism and ideological genocide. But if the state is a catalyst that brings life to new social combinations, then we cannot understand its effect on the world until we understand the forces it catalyzes. In other words, in order to make sense of the modern state's role in the transformation of social identity and its problems, we need a solid understanding of the general phenomenon of social identity and of the particular forms that the modern state has confronted. If it is common consciousness that defines modern peoplehood, then we will not understand the latter very well until we develop a much richer understanding of the generic and specific forms that common consciousness takes in human life.

We especially need such an understanding if we seek, as Lie does, "to sublimate" as well as illuminate the concept of peoplehood. Why should recognizing the way in which the modern state has shaped the materials of common consciousness into the molds of modern peoplehood undo the bonds of mutual connection we feel? No doubt, it might free us of some of the illusions that we have developed about how deep the chasms are that separate one people from another. But if the modern state catalyzes our shared heritages in ways that produce strong but thin social identities, it will not stop doing so simply because we become more aware of the process. On this point, Lie seems a little more naive—if more humane—than other modernist students of nationalism, like Gellner or Benedict Anderson. Perhaps, however, his greater optimism stems from his focus on race, which modern states have

had much more trouble bending to their efforts to create a common consciousness among its subjects.

In the end, *Modern Peoplehood* provides an excellent account of one half of the story about modern social identities. And while it downplays the other half, it still provides a very useful introduction to the problems of social identity within modern states.

**Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns.** By Domenico Losurdo. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. 400p. \$89.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— David A. Duquette, *St. Norbert College*

This is a sustained defense of G. W. F. Hegel against his critics, in particular the liberal and conservative critics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This defense focuses on issues in social and political thought, especially on the role of the political state in securing the rights of citizens, including interventions in the economic sphere to ameliorate the conditions of the disadvantaged and the poor. The controversy about Hegel, whether he was a liberal or a conservative, a radical or a reactionary, is longstanding, and Domenico Losurdo attempts to contribute to the debate by situating it historically and concretely in the social and political conditions of Hegel's time, in Europe and in England. Moreover, he argues that these political categories must be understood in terms of how thinkers identified themselves in relation to others, which often was motivated by specific political commitments in particular political environments, particularly in France, Germany, and England.

The author's contextual approach is exhibited in the very first chapter of the book where under the theme of the "search for the authentic Hegel," he addresses the issue of censorship and self-censorship in Germany during this period. Part of the problem with determining whether Hegel was a reactionary conservative, who idolized and deified the state, or a progressive liberal willing to criticize the status quo has to do with how he presented himself in his written work and whether others interpreted its political implications carefully in an environment of state censorship. More specifically, there is the question of the authenticity of Hegel's main political work, the *Philosophy of Right* (Berlin, 1821), which provides a defense of constitutional monarchy and a strong state and which was viewed by many as a conservative justification of the Prussian state. The answer, generally, requires not only an appreciation for the "calculated ambiguity" of Hegel's texts but also for the way particular interpretations are motivated by the perceived political stakes.

Among the several controversial motifs in Hegel that Losurdo discusses, two of the more prominent are the thesis from the Preface to his *Philosophy of Right* that "[w]hat is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" (p. 10 in the T. M. Knox translation, 1967) and the power that

Hegel gives to the sovereign monarch in his constitutional conception. On the first point, we see that for Hegel, "actuality" (*Wirklichkeit*) was not the same as transitory existence or empirical immediacy and, thus, that the rationality of the actual is not a rejection of change but "its anchor to the objective dialectic of the actual" (p. 36). On the second, while Hegel does give strong symbolic significance to the monarch's representing the unity and personality of the nation-state, does not remove it totally from the legislature, and rejects elective monarchy in favor of the right of birth and inheritance, nonetheless Hegel's monarch, who basically functions in "crossing the t's and dotting the i's," is as a particular person clearly subordinated to a political and institutional role. Moreover, Hegel supports constitutional monarchy "in a period in which often the courts or the government take a more progressive stance than the representative bodies" (p. 40).

According to Losurdo, the question of whether Hegel was a liberal or a conservative rests upon a false dilemma, a way of dividing up political positions into categories that are less than historically accurate. The author seems to suggest that because Hegel eludes categorization, he too easily can be seen through the lens of different ideological positions, depending on the particular issue. Overall, Losurdo's conclusion is that there is a strong thread of coherence and continuity in Hegel's thought, especially regarding support for the sort of changes required for modernization: the centrality of political institutionalization, specifically constitutionalism and shared power; the role of the state in fostering and guiding progressive reform; the importance of a concrete universalization of the rights of citizenship; and the need for the state to provide the means to redress poverty and material want in order that the realm of freedom and equality be inclusive of all social classes, and the likelihood, perhaps inevitability, of revolutionary change when the forces of reactionism and traditional privilege block progressive transformation.

Historically, the forces standing in the way of the actualization of modern freedom are not only those of political reactionism and attachment to feudal privilege but also, paradoxically, the "liberalism" that advocates freedom of the individual but does not accept full political equality and, instead, is wedded to the preservation of property, social distinctions, and privilege for the worthy. Hence, Hegel's "legitimation" of modernity troubles conservatives and liberals alike. It is seen as "philistine," "servile," and socialist. At the center of the suspicion is Hegel's defense of the French Revolution, which both in concept and in historical consequence expresses the "march of universality" in the modern world. It is not in the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition, whose authors are mostly opposed to the Revolution, but rather in the classic German philosophy of thinkers like Kant, Fichte, and Hegel "that the French Revolution finds its theoretical expression" (p. 305). Moreover, the forces of radicalization grow out

of real problems in the relation of modern politics and economics.

As indicated at the outset, Losurdo's book is aimed at situating ideological controversies surrounding Hegel in concrete historical context, and it succeeds well in doing so. It is also very wide ranging in surveying the views of the most important thinkers in Europe and England in regard to modern developments between roughly 1700 and the middle of the nineteenth century and in making comparisons to Hegel. One comes away from the work with a good understanding of why Hegel's views were considered so controversial from a variety of different ideological perspectives and also how it could happen that Hegel could be interpreted in opposite and contradictory ways. However, on the other hand, it is difficult not to suspect that the author, while advocating for a balanced treatment of Hegel, has failed to be evenhanded with some of Hegel's liberal critics, such as Constant and Tocqueville. For Losurdo, early modern liberalism is basically about the protection of property and bourgeois privilege, and that founding thinker of natural rights, John Locke, is (as C. B. Macpherson argued) essentially an apologist for "possessive individualism," which is likely a one-sided assessment.

*Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns* is a translation from the Italian, and although it is readable enough, it does have some organizational defects. The author's preface to the Italian edition reduces largely to bibliographical comments regarding Hegel's works, both in German and in Italian translation, along with a brief explanation of the composition of the book. The first six chapters are taken from another book in Italian by the author entitled *Hegel, Marx and the Liberal Tradition*. Chapters 7 through 10 are based on several published articles and essays (in Italian and in German), while the last three chapters were previously unpublished. Overall, while the sequencing of chapters makes sense (and the breakdown of each chapter into numbered subheadings is helpful), there is a fair amount of repetition, in some cases a reproduction of quotations and phrases that seems unnecessary. Moreover, it would have been of great service to the reader for the author or the translators or an editor to provide an introduction to the book. At the back is a fairly lengthy and useful bibliography of works and a reasonably thorough index.

**The Hand of Compassion: Portraits of Moral Choice During the Holocaust.** By Kristin Renwick Monroe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 392p. \$29.95.

— James M. Glass, *University of Maryland*

Kristin Monroe interviews several non-Jewish rescuers during the Holocaust to get at their moral psychology and motives in rescuing Jews imperiled by the Nazis. Her extensive notes and transcripts provide an intimate and powerful glance into how rescuers viewed their own actions and

how they discerned their own motives. For most "it just seemed the right thing to do." Monroe's Rousseauian argument is intriguing both in the presentation of the narratives and in her careful, systematic analysis of the moral psychology behind the rescuers' action. She moves in a very different direction than, say, Frantz Fanon's analysis in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) where he sees the emotions of rage and revenge as central to the resistance of the colonized. These two powerful emotions I found to be the primary dynamic behind rescue in the narratives of Jewish resisters and rescuers (Glass, *Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust: Moral Uses of Violence and Will*, 2004). The gentle rescuers Monroe interviewed rarely spoke of their anger or rage toward the Germans. Rather, the action of rescue arose through an empathic connection with the victims, for example, Margot: "You have either compassion with these people or you think 'I couldn't care less when they drop dead'" (p. 20).

Part of the power of this book is the dialectic, the back-and-forth quality, the literal feeling of being in the same room as Monroe and her interviewees. The narratives pull you down into the action and the decision making itself, into the risks associated with the rescuers' moral position. Otto, for example, who was married to a Jew, maintains that if his wife had not been threatened he would not have acted; but then he says, "When it happened [rescue], then I had absolutely a compulsion to do it. The hand of compassion was faster than the calculus of reason" (pp. 90–91), an intuitive, almost instinctual set of actions. But why Otto, Margot, and not others? Why did so few rescue while the vast majority of Germans either acquiesced to the genocide or had an active hand in its many bureaucratic, military, scientific, and academic functions? These questions haunt Monroe's analysis, but in this volume, she focuses on rescuer motives, not the bystanders' unwillingness to act. Here she is concerned with the moral psychology that set the rescuers apart from the "others."

Otto speaks of the "categorical imperative," the moral laws, duty, an instinctive sense of what needed to be done. It is almost as if these rescuers embody a voice of sanity, a common humanity, destroyed, culturally and politically, through the madness of collaboration and annihilation; the rescuers' action reminds us that a universal moral realm exists, a common human decency, a benchmark for moral sanity. Much in the rescuer narrative suggests that action, as John puts it, embodied a "natural reaction from the inside" (p. 112). Is Monroe arguing for a moral, psychological version of natural law? Not exactly, although there are moments in the narratives when it appears that the rescuers' moral theory moves in that direction. She asks John, "what did you learn mostly out of this war?" John answers, "principles . . . some people are born with a better notion of what is right and wrong . . . there is human nature, and there are principles" (pp. 123, 131).

It was not choice, reason, or religion, Monroe argues, that motivated the action of rescue. The action itself was intimately bound up with identity. To paraphrase: “I am a person who, because of who I am, cannot refuse to act.” The author describes this action as “spontaneous and reflexive.” The actions of rescue, then, “were not considered agonistic moral choices so much as the natural steps” determined by the self’s identity and its innate sense of rightness (p. 210). She argues persuasively for the notion that moral behavior derives from an innate moral psychology that is not learned, that is not a function of socialization or religion or reason, but that lies at the very foundation of the nonrational self.

The link between recognition and action is not rational; it is emotional, an argument reminiscent of Rousseau’s theory of the first emotion of nature, compassion. Rousseau’s “natural man” never thinks about compassion; it is, to use Monroe’s words, a “spontaneous and reflexive” action at the sight of the dead and dying. An innate sense of what is right, derived from a natural empathy with the other, the ability to connect with the other’s suffering, overwhelms the self with the knowledge that rescue is a categorical necessity. It would be unthinkable to do otherwise. And that sense of rightness is filled with compassion and the natural human capacity to project one’s self into the emotional and situational orbit of the suffering other.

Monroe turns to social psychology, particularly work on self-esteem and the continuity of self imagery, “to explore the relationship between identity and moral action” (p. 222). If the rescuers did not act, what would be at risk “was their very sense of self, their core identity.” One had to act, because not to act was unthinkable and a violation of the very foundations of identity. Our self-coherence, the continuity and solidity of our core self, is closely tied up with how we perceive ourselves “at the moment of action” (p. 226). The action of rescue then depends not on character, socialization, or rational choice but on an innate and altruistic grasp of what the situation, defined by suffering, demands immediately. Caring for others was so deeply integrated into the rescuers’ “self-concept” that it transformed into “a moral imperative requiring [the rescuers] to take action. . . . [T]he suffering took on a moral salience” (p. 236). Ethical actions rather than deriving from “conscious choice” emerged from “deep-seated instincts, predispositions and habitual patterns of behavior that are related to our central identity.” This “instinctual moral sense . . . can be more powerful than any conscious calculus” (p. 241).

Where Monroe resembles Rousseau is that the critical moral issue is not only that we “just feel empathy, concern or sadness at the plight of others” but also that “we take action to help,” or altruism, because we all possess a shared humanity and that by virtue of being human, “all are entitled to decent treatment” (p. 242). It is a “felt relevance . . . seeing another’s need is a critical part of moral

salience. But so is the recognition that another’s need is of direct concern to me” (p. 248).

Monroe’s commitment to basic human values and the universal right to decent treatment is a complex and rich mixture of empirical research and psychological and political analysis. *The Hand of Compassion* is a compelling and powerful read, a terrific book filled with moving narratives of risk, loss, and sadness, and at the same time, the rescuers’ affirmation that all human beings deserve the right to decent treatment. It is an analysis that takes social and political theory out of the text and places the reader in the midst of human suffering and courage. It is also a treatise that shows how important narrative analysis is in understanding critical political, moral, and philosophical concepts.

**The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought.** By Eric Nelson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 320p. \$65.00.

— Alan Houston, *University of California, San Diego*

In the United States today, the top 20% of families receive approximately 50% of the nation’s aggregate income; the bottom 40% of families receive less than 14%. Nearly 36 million Americans—12.5% of the population—live in poverty. These facts are well known. But what do they mean for politics? Do inequalities of wealth distort the political process? Do they contribute to—or constitute—injustice? Is the pursuit of wealth itself corrupting? Does greed distort the soul and damage the polity? Eric Nelson explores affirmative answers to these questions in this impressive first book.

The “Greek tradition,” first articulated by Plato and revived in the early-modern era by Thomas More, asserts that “men achieve their greatest happiness and fulfillment when they are part of a rationally ordered state in which the best men rule” (p. 183). Inequalities of wealth pose formidable obstacles to the creation and preservation of a just polity. Hence, Greek theorists pay special attention to schemes for the elimination or redistribution of private property.

The book is framed as a contribution to the historiography of republicanism. In the 1960s, historians and political theorists uncovered a republican language of virtue and corruption that appeared to be distinct from and in tension with the liberal logic of rights and interests. In J. G. A. Pocock’s influential formulation, republicans embraced the Aristotelian claim that man is by nature a political animal whose self-realization occurs through active participation in public life. During the next two decades, the concept of “classical republicanism” spread like wildfire. Many—including, on occasion, Pocock himself—assumed a basic congruence of ideas among the writers of classical antiquity. But in the 1980s, Quentin Skinner constructed a counternarrative in which early-modern republicanism was cast in distinctly Roman garb. Skinner’s

“neo-romans” did not embrace the *vita activa*; they conceived of liberty as nondomination, and virtue as the qualities of character needed to sustain a free state.

Nelson follows Skinner’s lead and makes the next move. If Machiavelli and his followers were neo-roman, and if Greek and Roman traditions diverge, then it ought to be possible to identify a separate Greek tradition. And so it is. For neo-romans, freedom is nondomination; for Greeks it is living according to nature. For neo-romans, the highest end of life is glory; for Greeks it is happiness. For neo-romans, virtue requires civic participation; for Greeks it culminates in contemplation. For neo-romans, justice entails the protection of private property; for Greeks, property is a communal resource that ought to be distributed “in such a way as to advance some normative vision of human nature” (p. 17).

*The Greek Tradition in Republican Thought* unfolds in six chapters devoted to key figures and pivotal moments. More’s Utopians, following Plato, “take it as axiomatic that justice requires the rule of the better over the baser” (p. 42). Because private property indelibly corrupts the souls of men, and because its effects cannot be regulated, it must be eliminated. Few embraced More’s communism, but all who came after him in the Greek tradition held that “the central challenge confronting political theory” was the task of mitigating the effects of wealth (p. 48). James Harrington “makes clear from the very outset that *Oceana* is a book about greed” (p. 88). Montesquieu urges that “the chief agent responsible for promoting the passions at the expense of justice turns out to be wealth” (p. 155). By the American Revolution, Greek ideas had transmuted into a “vibrant” set of claims regarding the efficacy of agrarian laws and the importance of regulating inheritance (p. 199). The denouement of the Greek tradition did not come until the nineteenth century, in the writings of de Tocqueville.

Nelson writes with verve and erudition. Each chapter is based on a comprehensive study of primary and secondary sources. The book is intentionally provocative; almost every page presents familiar texts in a new and challenging light. Specialists will find plenty to argue with. Is it true that Harrington embraced the Platonic view that virtue was “the result of a justly balanced soul aligned with the cosmos through contemplation” (p. 125)? Or that Montesquieu took Plato as “an authoritative political guide” (p. 170)? The sheer quality of Nelson’s arguments and evidence will make these and similar engagements fruitful and rewarding.

Three worries. First, are the ideas Nelson isolates sufficiently distinct and coherent to constitute a tradition, and if so, do they capture all that was significant about the early-modern reception of Greek political ideas? Hobbes famously complained that it was by reading “Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romans,” that men had “gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of

favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their Sovereigns.” What should we make of this claim?

Second, in what sense are these ideas republican? Pocock’s republicans articulated a positive conception of liberty. Skinner’s neo-romans argued that individual liberty was possible only in a free state. Nelson’s Greeks seem unconcerned with questions of participation or representation. They “advocated the redistribution of wealth so that they could institute and preserve a particular structure of rulership: a structure in which a few elect, virtuous men rule, and all the rest are ruled” (p. 233). Can the concept of republicanism be stretched to include the Greek tradition, yet retain sufficient precision to do explanatory or analytic work?

Finally, how should we assess these ideas? Were theorists in the Greek tradition astute observers of their world? Were they ever confused or opaque? Did contemporaries find their arguments compelling, meretricious, or beside the point? How did they weigh and balance the claims of Greek theorists against alternative accounts of greed or economic inequality? How did the emergence of commercial economies in the late seventeenth century affect the plausibility of Greek ideas? *The Greek Tradition* does not attempt to answer these questions. It does, however, bring them to the fore, and in so doing helps focus our attention on the complex dynamics of wealth and virtue in early-modern political thought.

**Privacies: Philosophical Evaluations.** Edited by Beate Rössler. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 231p. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Linda C. McClain, *Hofstra University*

This fine collection of essays on privacy crosses disciplinary and national boundaries, bringing together 13 scholars from law, philosophy, political theory, and film studies to consider “various aspects of the problematic of the private.” As the editor, Beate Rössler, explains this “problematic,” current debates about the value and limits of privacy—such as the reach of information technology or the private lives of public figures—pose afresh more fundamental philosophical questions about privacy: What is the normative grounding for a right to privacy? How does such a right relate to identity and integrity? What is the demarcation in persons’ lives between the private and the public? And why should privacy be valued?

The collection approaches these questions by presenting “dialogical pairs” of essays on common topics, in which the second takes the first as its starting point. Just as the definitions of privacy are multiple, so too are the approaches taken by the scholars in this volume concerning how best to frame critical questions about privacy. Rössler provides a helpful overview of these questions. The essays are short and accessible, yet take the reader through a refreshing diversity of topics and locations. A strength of the book is

the way each author situates discussion of privacy in a particular context. Thus, principal authors and their commentators ponder “the problematic of the private” as it bears on sexual harassment in the workplace (Jean Cohen and Maeve Cooke), autobiographies by Western philosophers and an indigenous Australian woman (Moirra Gatens and Wendy Brown), the dynamic of justice and affection in modern families (Axel Honneth and Herlinde Pauer-Studer), the need of the elderly for a personal space of their own (Iris Marion Young and Krishan Kumar), and the risks posed to privacy and identity by information technologies (Jeffrey Reiman and Gertrud Koch).

The contributors recognize that norms specific to particular legal and political cultures shape answers about the definition and value of privacy. Anita Allen notes the puzzle that the United States is “extraordinary” in the prevalence of its privacy regulation, as compared to similar Western nations, and yet does not have enough privacy law (for example, inadequate protection of same-sex intimate association and of consumer’s transactions on the Internet). Nicola Lacey argues that in some legal systems (such of England’s), concern for privacy has to be read “between the lines,” but also illustrates how local circumstances (for example, public reaction against intrusive paparazzi), as well as international human rights norms, may inspire a more explicit embrace of privacy.

Many lively debates run through the volume. Here I will note just one. How inviolate must the domain of privacy be to foster such goods as ethical competence, agency, freedom, and a creative, critical self? Reiman explains the value of privacy by reference to a private space within the self—an inner personal core to which one can retreat and engage in criticism of convention, be creative, rebel, and find renewal. Cohen links privacy to ethical competence: being free to make, for oneself, intimate decisions. Young depicts the home as a crucial space for forming and protecting identity, precisely because of the capacity to control access to it and shape it in one’s own image. By contrast, Cooke counters that to construct identity, the self needs rational accountability. Persons must come out of their private space to be challenged by others to evaluate their view of the good life. Kumar, similarly, contends that the retreat to the home may signal a significant loss of the opportunity for experience, moral learning, and public life.

One limitation of *Privacies* is that the authors (particularly the commentators) must encapsulate theories of privacy they elaborate in other work (endnotes readily direct the reader to such work). And even some of the principal essays leave questions unanswered. Thus, Rössler’s own substantive contribution to the volume revisits familiar feminist critiques of liberal accounts of privacy to clear the path for a feminist, egalitarian conception of privacy that would build upon John Rawls’s idea of the equal value of liberty. Jean Cohen addresses the paradox that

both regulation and nonregulation of intimacy pose harms, respectively, to autonomy and equality, arguing that the paradox derives from an anachronistic paradigm of law. She offers a third paradigm, a “reflexive/procedural” legal paradigm, and suggests what this new paradigm portends for the law of sexual harassment. This paradigm relates to fostering self-regulation within social institutions—“the application of procedures (procedural norms and principles of fairness) to procedures of conflict resolution (reflexivity)” (pp. 88–89). Cohen contends that sexual harassment law is reflexive to a point, using incentives, procedures, norms, and principles to spur self-regulation, but that it leads to repressive and intrusive regulations and to arbitrariness and underenforcement. I would have liked to have Cohen’s analysis of whether the Supreme Court’s several opinions on employer procedures and affirmative defenses have taken the law closer to or farther from the paradigm she advocates and the goals of fostering “learning, voice, communication, and cooperation solutions” (p. 92).

Other essays appeal to a “reflexive” paradigm, intimating—without elaborating—its import. Discussing the interplay of justice and affection within families, Honneth contends that it is only in “discursive exchange” that family members can explore for themselves whether and how to translate universal principles of justice into the domain of family relations. Pauer-Studer aptly observes that to leave the question of the proper balance of affection and justice within the family solely to families to decide for themselves surely goes too far: Justice is both a private and public virtue. When the public virtue of justice is at stake, government may aim to foster principles of justice in the family.

Nonetheless, the disadvantage of being left wishing for more elaboration in these pages is amply balanced by the advantage of having ready access, in one place, to such a rich and stimulating array of perspectives.

### **Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of**

**Time.** By William Scheuerman. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 312p. \$42.00.

— Kam Shapiro, *Illinois State University*

While the political ramifications of social acceleration have preoccupied thinkers in a variety of disciplines at least since the Industrial Revolution, and contemporary works by such thinkers as Paul Virilio, David Harvey, James Der Derian, and William Connolly have highlighted various modes of speed, many in political science have been slow to pay heed. William Scheuerman’s book aims to redress this lag in the discipline, taking up the theme of social acceleration from these and other authors and using it to frame a wide-ranging assessment of transformations to liberal democratic legal and political institutions.

Scheuerman's study builds on his previous work dealing with Carl Schmitt's critique of liberal democracy and emergency law. Updating Schmitt's earlier diagnoses, Scheuerman presents a "discouraging story" about the unbalancing of the separation of powers resulting from increasing demands for flexible, rapid political responses to social change. As Schmitt demonstrated (in both theory and practice), such requirements favor expanded executive discretion and "motorized lawmaking" over the deliberative procedures and stable public norms of parliamentary legislation. While the resulting erosion of popular accountability and the rule of law in the twentieth century has been widely underestimated by both scholars and publics, Scheuerman suggests, representative institutions might be reformed in such a way as to catch up with other institutions and processes, especially those associated with the global capitalist economy. His interdisciplinary ambitions and empirically broad scope inevitably yield mixed results. Rather than a comprehensive analysis of acceleration—which operates throughout as more a supposition than the testable hypothesis he claims—Scheuerman's valuable contributions are his reconstruction of temporal suppositions of classical liberalism and especially his detailed demonstration of their incompatibility with institutional changes in the twentieth century. His well-documented account of the blurring of normal and emergency legislation, domestic and foreign policy, and political and economic rule are all very timely. The result is an impressive and sobering overview of challenges that accelerated politics pose to popular participation, as well as some intriguing, if largely hortatory, suggestions for further research and possible reforms.

Scheuerman frames his project as a series of "grand" speculations regarding the likely effects of social acceleration on the separation of powers (Chap. 2), followed by an empirical evaluation of actual change (Chaps. 3–5). Given the retrospective character of these speculations, the latter is something of a conceit, though one followed through in an earnest manner. The discussion of social acceleration itself (Chap. 1) is the most problematic, as indicated by his defensive repudiation of "categorical mushiness" in favor of "empirical" rigor (p. 23). Scheuerman himself provides a fairly cursory taxonomy of technological, social, and experiential acceleration and then goes on to attribute change broadly to capitalist production and interstate conflict (drawing especially on David Harvey, Anthony Giddens, and Virilio). By treating various modes of social acceleration as so many factors of a "relatively autonomous" dynamic (p. 18)—a notion credited to Hartmut Rosa—rather than analyzing their reciprocal effects, Scheuerman invites charges of reification, and is led at times to tautological formulations: ". . . if we are correct to postulate that speed inevitably breeds the need for more speed, then it would make sense that modern society tends to experience ever more intense forms of social acceleration" (p. 22).

By contrast, the author's exposition of temporal aspects of the separation of powers—distinguishing legislative, executive, and judiciary rule by their prospective, momentary, and retrospective temporalities, respectively—makes for an instructive discussion. He draws out these themes from texts by Locke and Mill, showing how they set the stage for the subsequent expansion of executive power. Speed favors the executive branch, classically understood as the proper site of "energetic" government (p. 49). As he shows in Chapters 3 and 4, it also transforms other branches, leading to increased judicial activism and open-ended statutes that allow for extensive administrative discretion. Rapid change poses particularly severe tests for the least mutable legal norms, namely, constitutional law, the subject of Chapter 3. Taking off from Schmitt's 1950 discussion of emergency lawmaking, Chapter 4 describes the "motorization" of ordinary legislation, whereby careful deliberation and broad participation give way to hurried decisions and extensive delegation of authority to nonlegal agencies. Here Scheuerman highlights the expansion of emergency powers in response not so much to military but to economic crises, an often underappreciated "bedfellow" of neoliberalism for which he provides an instructive genealogy (p. 109).

This last argument, along with the subsequent reconstruction of temporal factors dictating the legal requirements of market forms and their mutual transformation (Chap. 5), comprise the best parts of the book. In the latter, Scheuerman offers a powerful retort to the common equation of free markets and the rule of law. As organized capital's pace increased, it left behind its dependence on prospective, stable legislation, and called forth new modes of flexible or "soft" legal control, and now often dispenses with legal regulation altogether in favor of administrative "self-regulation" (pp. 159–60). He writes, "In an astonishing historical reversal discretionary authority for the sake of global business now threatens the liberal democratic nation-state, whereas international business often gains directly from nongeneral, irregular regulations" (p. 169). He also marshals extensive research on the growth of the "imperial presidency" in the realm of economic policy. However, while these developments appear logical given classical assumptions, executive authority may itself not be well suited to fast-paced decision making, given the bureaucratic complexity of modern administrations. Scheuerman thus argues that the bias in favor of executive action or judicial autonomy and against popular modes of legislation is itself anachronistic. Under severe time pressure, bureaucratic agencies are themselves prone to haphazard decisions, and often fall prey to transnational economic organizations.

While convincing, these discussions render Scheuerman's emphasis on acceleration per se, rather than specific (especially economic) mechanisms, questionable. Indeed, in Chapter 5, capitalism becomes the prime motor of social

acceleration itself (p. 158). Further, it is particularly economic government that challenges representative processes. Other conflicts, he suggests, are by contrast at least partially subject to new global legal norms, such as those embodied in human rights law (p. 182). A similar problem attends his separation of “social” speed from legal responses to it. By rejecting Schmitt’s attribution of normative decay to positive law in favor of an emphasis on acceleration, Scheuerman sets up something of a false alternative—Schmitt himself linked positivism to free trade—as his discussion of legal reforms in the final chapter implies. There, Scheuerman dismisses conservative calls for social deceleration in favor of “temporal reformism,” exploring possibilities for accelerated forms of deliberation and lawmaking that might keep pace with social change and thus facilitate some degree of popular sovereignty. Along these lines, he cites a number of imaginative proposals for reforming the regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, breaking up corporate media, de-commercializing the Internet, and providing for electronic direct democracy, and he explores in some detail the potential application of “reflexive law” on the global level. All of these proposals lead to the paradox that such

reforms (aimed at facilitating increased popular control over immense capitalist enterprises) themselves require broad and effective popular pressure (and the time for it), as he recognizes (p. 223). This is the only place where he seriously confronts the limits of his focus on formal institutions. As he notes, “Speed cries out for transnational governance while simultaneously undermining normatively acceptable forms of it” (p. 226). Yet, by subsuming other avenues of political action in a somewhat one-sided account of “social acceleration,” Scheuerman is left with what he has shown are relatively marginal resources for deliberative norms and representative legislation. His defense of the rule of law, unlike his analysis of its erosion, is therefore more principled than practical, though his concluding discussion of “reflexive law” as a route to de-centralized deliberative democracy is very intriguing.

However, if Scheuerman leaves us facing many of the dilemmas posed by Schmitt, this remains an important contribution. As he rightly insists, many still need to be provoked to fully confront current trends toward authoritarian economic and political rule and formulate creative responses.

---

## AMERICAN POLITICS

---

### **Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability.**

By R. Douglas Arnold. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 304p. \$35.00.

— Robert Klotz, *University of Southern Maine*

R. Douglas Arnold sets an ambitious goal: “This book is the first large-scale study of how local media outlets cover members of Congress” (pp. 3–4). His ultimate success exemplifies how content analysis can illuminate a subject with empirical and systematic findings.

The book is a clinic in the application of the interdisciplinary research technique of content analysis. In general, the measurement stage of content analysis begins by choosing what media outlets to study. Next, the population of stories (Websites, or other cases) must be defined using objective criteria. Finally, the stories are coded based on a defined list of characteristics. Presented with a methodological challenge, Arnold describes and defends the choices that he makes.

A transparent methodology underlies his primary data set. Arnold chooses to study the local newspaper as the medium with the greatest potential for covering individual members of Congress. Dividing the nation’s daily newspapers into categories based on circulation, he randomly samples each category to identify 25 local newspapers whose archives were available in the Data Times or Lexis-Nexis

databases. After random sampling to identify one member of Congress for newspapers whose primary circulation area has multiple members, he defines a population of stories by a computerized search for the names of the 25 representatives in the 25 local newspapers between January 1, 1993, and November 8, 1994. After retrieving all 8,003 unique stories and opinion pieces mentioning the 25 representatives, he codes for 68 characteristics. Coding objective measures, such as whether the story was filed by a District of Columbia reporter, lays the groundwork for more subjective measures about emphasis and valence.

To increase confidence in his primary data set and to broaden the research, Arnold constructs three additional data sets. A second data set brings together the data from six newspapers having competing newspapers in the same city, with additional parallel data from six competitors. A third data set includes 61,084 article citations for a broader range of newspaper-representative pairs. Finally, a fourth data set links the amount of newspaper coverage of the representative in the locality with 675 of 1,795 cases in the 1994 National Election Studies data set.

The impressive range of data allows Arnold to draw some conclusions about accountability. He begins with the premise that a “rich informational environment increases the chances that citizens will have an evidentiary basis for determining whether they approve or disapprove of a representative’s performance in office” (p. 12). His central argument, then, becomes that the best local newspapers do make an important contribution to holding



members of Congress accountable for their performance in office.

In exploring accountability, Arnold offers a variety of perspectives. He begins by examining the volume of coverage of representatives. Using regression analysis, he explores how characteristics of the member of Congress and the local newspaper affect the quantity of newspaper coverage. Utilizing his primary data set of 25 representatives and 25 local newspapers, he then provides a systematic portrait of the content of news coverage. Next, he seeks to explain the reasons for differences in coverage of the same representative by looking at competing papers in the same city. Finally, he offers a “fledgling attempt” (p. 261) to demonstrate impact with data showing a positive relationship between citizen knowledge and the quantity of local newspaper coverage of the representative.

This exploration constitutes a significant contribution to our understanding of Congress and the news media. The book extends knowledge about local media coverage of members of Congress with systematic data about many newspaper-representative pairs over a sustained period of time. One encouraging finding is that congressional elections have substantially less horse race coverage than presidential elections. Arnold is less encouraged by coverage of policymaking beyond the roll-call vote: “The lack of regular coverage of hearings, markups, and coalition building makes it much easier for representatives to avoid the heavy lifting that is required to make things happen on Capitol Hill” (p. 254). The book reveals local news coverage as an overall advantage for incumbents but also as a potential counterbalance to incumbent advantage. In particular, the author finds that criticism of a member of Congress is much more likely in letters to the editor (40%) and editorial/op-ed columns (26%) than in regular news stories (6%).

Although the temporal backdrop is the end of an era, *Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability* has a timeless feel. It examines newspaper coverage of the 1993–94 Congress, after which 40 consecutive years of Democratic control of the chamber would end. Consistent with the goal of a more timeless work, Arnold chooses not to address the 1994 Republican takeover, except for the empirical finding that the Republican Contract with America was largely ignored in local news coverage of representatives. That I count only 10 of the 25 primary data set’s representatives remaining in the House of Representatives or serving in the Senate (Richard Baker, Michael Crapo, Bob Filner, James Inhofe, Peter King, Jim Kolbe, Jon Kyl, Jim McDermott, John Spratt, Albert Wynn) when the 109th Congress began in January 2005 suggests that it was a wise decision not to dwell on substantive points related to individual members. Rather, the book’s focus is on measuring concepts that are timeless, such as whether news coverage emphasizes policymaking, interacting with con-

stituents, or electioneering. The timeless quality seems to guarantee that readers will be learning from this book well into the future.

**The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century.** By Richard Franklin Bensel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 320p. \$65.00 cloth, \$23.99 paper.

— John C. Green, *University of Akron*

Richard Bensel has written a fascinating book on a timely subject, the nature of polling places in the United States at the juncture between the second and third party systems. His cogent description of how balloting actually took place raises provocative questions about the interpretation of nineteenth-century elections, the development of modern democracy, and the dilemmas inherent in electoral institutions.

This book is based on the records of 48 disputed congressional elections between 1850 and 1868, including more than 16,000 pages of testimony by the losing and winning candidates, party and government officials, and ordinary voters. Although not a representative sampling of period elections, these disputes are reasonably diverse, being, for example, roughly divided between free and slave states. Bensel is well aware of the inherent limitations of this kind of information but makes a persuasive argument that it reveals common electoral practices and not just controversial ones. These cases certainly contain a rich view of electioneering at the grass roots.

Bensel stresses the “sheer physicality” of voting during this period. Polling places were mostly set up in private buildings, ranging from farms and churches to lively stables and saloons. The ballot box and election judges were set apart, connected to the outside world by a constructed “voting window” and anterior platform. Voters presented themselves on the platform, and if judged eligible to vote, passed their tickets through the window to be put into the ballot box. However, the area outside the window and around the platform was unregulated. Typically filled with boisterous crowds, it was the province of party agents, who dispensed tickets, whisky, and petty bribes, and organized voter intimidation. Voting was a thoroughly masculine activity, and participants were expected to have enough “ordinary courage” to endure the regular mayhem.

Under these circumstances, the sociological context of a polling place had a strong influence on the outcome. Ethnic and religious identities were central to this spectacle, which regularly influenced voters’ choice of tickets, whether they attempted to vote, and officials’ judgments of their eligibility. Here Bensel describes four kinds of sociological contexts for the polling place: settled rural areas (where the personal histories of individuals were paramount); dense urban areas (where ethnic and religious stereotyping were common); the thinly settled frontier (where federal employees and improvisation were

critical), and the special role of the army in voting during the Civil War (when loyalty to the Union was a crucial factor).

The author draws an ambivalent conclusion from these cases. On the one hand, such polling places were very *undemocratic* in that they regularly excluded unpopular minorities and substituted material incentives for purposive ones. But on the other hand, such polling places were quite *democratic* in that they allowed illiterate and impoverished men to participate in the choice of leaders and to have the same standing as the wealthy and powerful. This comment from the book's conclusion neatly captures the mixed assessment: "There was thus an independent, almost autonomous sociology to the American polling places in the mid-nineteenth century. Viewed from above, it constituted an underworld of small-time intrigue, petty scandal, and parochial gossip. But when seen from below, the American polling place was a rich brew of community norms, traditions, customs, and contestation—a place where popular culture met and was transformed by great political economic forces and interests" (pp. 296–97).

Bensel uses his case studies to raise some provocative questions about the literature on American political development. He notes that many interpretations of nineteenth-century elections assume that vote totals reflect the policy preferences of the electorate. In fact, the results may be contaminated by the biases of the sociological context and the machinations of party workers. Likewise, students of modernization argue that this kind of electoral politics was a necessary stage in the development of contemporary democracy, establishing national identity, socializing the masses, and providing political stability. These cases cast some doubt on the validity of these claims. And Bensel offers a solution to the much-commented-upon disjunction between the fierce policy debates in party platforms and the bitter ethno-religious conflict in campaigns during this period: Party agents were the crucial mediators between elite policy concerns and mass political consent.

Some readers may find Bensel's insights incompletely developed and thus unsatisfying. For example, if the sociological context of elections has contaminated election results, then how can an understanding of the context produce a more accurate assessment of the meaning of the vote? If the riotous nineteenth-century polling place was not a necessary step in the development of modern democracy, then what were the alternative paths? And did the mediating functions of party agents have an impact on policy debate and implementation? Perhaps his next book will address these kinds of questions more fully.

I read this book in the midst of worries about the contemporary polling place in the run-up to the 2004 election. The contrast between now and then starkly illustrates the dilemmas inherent in electoral institutions. The nineteenth-century polling place was largely in private hands, with some undemocratic consequences. The con-

temporary polling place is largely in public hands: Ballots are created by official authorities, the space around the polling place is free of electioneering, and voter eligibility is determined by bureaucratic processes. Even with its imperfections, this polling place is a far cry from the one Bensel describes so vividly. And yet this greater public role has had its costs as well. The official ballot limits voters' choices, elections are less likely to excite voter enthusiasm, and eligibility rules reduce voter participation. In short, the present polling place has some undemocratic consequences as well. This fine study demonstrates that even the type of polling places is not a neutral matter, revealing just how political politics really is.

**Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America.** By Adam J. Berinsky. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 224p. \$35.00.

— David Niven, *Florida Atlantic University*

Polls, Adam Berinsky warns, are flawed. The source of this flaw is what he labels "exclusion bias," defined as "the exclusion of the preferences of the sometimes sizable portion of the public who say they 'don't know' where they stand on the issues of the day" (p. 2).

What would happen, Berinsky asks, if those people who said "don't know," whether for lack of an attitude or because they declined to express one, chose a side? He is prepared to answer the question. "The key to this empirical enterprise," Berinsky writes, "is to ascribe interests to people who do not provide answers to survey questions" (p. 36). Using statistical inference, essentially regressing various demographic variables on the preferences of those who did express an opinion, then applying the coefficients to the "don't knows," he estimates the underlying opinion of every don't-know respondent in several polls. The implications, he asserts, are great. By ignoring don't-know respondents, "under certain circumstances opinion polls may subvert the communication of the public's preferences" (p. 51).

Berinsky casts this effort in language of inclusion: "I ask what would happen if we did not draw the firm line between question-answerers and question-abstainers—what would happen if we assumed that everyone, no matter how muddled their political voice, should be heard as part of the democratic process?" (p. 49). The short answer, regardless of the statistical sophistication of the effort, is that we would put words in their mouths, words that reflect thoughts they do not have and may never have. Indeed, in the author's scheme, there is no such thing as genuinely not having a preference for any survey question ever asked.

Berinsky first explores responses to racial issues using a series of National Election Studies questions on school integration—centered on whether "Washington" should

create equal racial balance in local schools. He suggests, as have many previous studies, that some respondents will feel uncomfortable expressing negative responses and will therefore offer what amount to false don't knows.

Limiting his attention to white respondents in the 1990s, the author finds that a majority who answered were opposed to the racial balance notion, but that many respondents offered a don't-know response. The don't knows were not a random assemblage of respondents; thus, he posits that their nonresponse likely changed the overall tilt of the survey result. Indeed, estimating the opinions of those who did not respond ultimately produces a 4% increase in the size of the anti-integration majority.

Berinsky attempts to validate his model by testing it against a poll relating to a known outcome. Using a New York City mayoral race that pitted a white candidate against an African American candidate, he applies his don't-know correction to a preelection poll showing the African American candidate 13% up in a race he would win days later by less than 2%. His model reduces the African American candidate's margin by 1.4%. In other words, the model narrowed the mistake of the poll but was still 10% off reality. He takes this improvement as vindication for his model, but one must be cautious given the sizable remaining disparity.

One of the curiosities of *Silent Voices* is that for all of his attention to false don't knows, Berinsky has little interest in false directional responses. Surely false answers, not just false nonanswers, occur when social desirability is a factor. Similarly, he has little interest in people who completely refuse to participate in polls or cannot be reached by pollsters.

The author next applies his model to questions on social welfare policies in the 1990s and on the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Here, he theorizes not a wariness to express one's opinion but a difficulty in forming an opinion as the source of nonresponse. Again he finds that nonresponders were not a random group. Although they leave Berinsky unfazed, the variables he finds most associated with nonresponse (lack of ideology for social welfare questions, lack of information about Vietnam for war questions) serve to solidify the impression that there is such a thing as legitimate nonresponse. That is, it would seem that there are people who are not on the cusp of expressing a preference that is lurking within them but who are truly without a preference. Nevertheless, after applying his model to correct for all don't knows, he finds that the social welfare and Vietnam War poll results exaggerated the size of conservative majorities by between .5% and 2%.

Berinsky notes that larger effects are visible beneath the national level. For example, with the use of 1996 NES data, opinion on social welfare questions shifts 6% among Arkansas residents when don't knows are assigned positions. Although he does not directly mention this fact, the 1996 NES had 24 respondents in Arkansas—including

11 who took no position on social welfare. This is not to make too much of what is by any measure a quite minor observation in the book—but it goes to the very point of what he's arguing. The reason Berinsky says we need to pay attention to don't knows is that individuals are being left out, skewing the results of polls away from what the people really believe. The overstatement of a majority position by half a percent not being terribly compelling, he is left touting such things as the unexpressed beliefs of 11 Arkansans.

Nevertheless, Berinsky argues that the problem of uncorrected nonresponse “serves inadvertently to disenfranchise individuals of a particular ideological or political type” (p. 140), creating “the potential to fracture the ongoing communication between representatives and their constituency [that], in the process, may subvert effective political representation” (p. 83).

One is left to wonder when that could ever happen. Surely it has not in the context of the three areas Berinsky examines—where by his estimation, if don't knows had expressed opinions, the size of the majority would have been only marginally changed.

Berinsky has a legitimate concern that something is lost when many respondents choose “don't know,” but neither his notion of the scope of the problem nor his response to it seem particularly realistic. Public opinion scholars will benefit from considering his arguments under the heading of a theory of survey nonresponse, a small corollary to John R. Zaller's (1992, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*) theory of survey response.

**Expressive Politics: Issue Strategies of Congressional Challengers.** By Robert G. Boatright. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2004. 280p. \$44.95.

— Thomas L. Brunell, *University of Texas at Dallas*

In an era in which fewer and fewer congressional elections are competitive, why do candidates emerge at all to challenge entrenched incumbents who typically preside over very safe districts? In this book, Robert Boatright provides us with an explanation for this phenomenon. Not all challengers think they have a chance at beating the incumbent; in fact, most are quite aware that they will almost certainly lose and lose big in the general election. Furthermore, because these candidates are not running to win the election, they tend to run different campaigns, many of which are focused on highlighting certain issues and expressing certain political points of view. This is what the author means by “expressive politics.”

While I must admit that initially I was quite suspicious of an entire book examining losing candidates and their campaigns, I can now say that I found it interesting from start to finish and am very pleased that the author has provided us with a theoretical groundwork for understanding these candidates. Boatright's arguments are based upon

dozens of interviews he personally conducted with challengers during the 1996 and 2000 election cycles. Using quotations and simple data analysis based on these interviews, the author is able to make a clear and convincing argument as to why long-shot challengers engage in a very different kind of campaign than what we might expect on the basis of positive theory.

Many modern congressional districts are drawn in such a way that one of the major parties has a clear advantage over the other. This makes for relatively dull general elections insofar as the incumbent will be from the dominant party in that district. After one or two terms, an incumbent should be able to consolidate power and fend off any serious general election competition. Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz call this phenomenon “strategic entry,” which is to say that any high-quality candidates from the party out of power are unlikely to emerge since their chances of winning the general election are slim to none. The single best predictor for how close a general election will be rests upon the quality of the challenger. In these districts then, other kinds of candidates emerge, and they have decided to campaign for office largely for reasons other than winning the election itself. This is quite important because it affects election outcomes: Incumbents’ margins of victory are much higher than they would be otherwise; longshot campaigns rarely go negative against the incumbent and this allows the campaign to remain artificially civil. The author captures many of these sentiments in the dozens of interviews that he conducted. Some candidates run just so that the incumbent does not go unopposed in the general election. Others run to force the candidate to address certain issues or to spend more time in and attention on the district. These candidates also gauge their “success” in these elections not necessarily by the votes they garner but by the perception that they affected how the incumbent behaves on Capitol Hill or in the district.

Those challengers who have virtually no chance of beating the incumbent are those who engage in “expressive politics.” They will run to address issues that they think are important. Thus, they are consciously not competing for the median voter, as Anthony Downs would have us believe. This is not irrational for the author; quite the contrary. Boatright is extending the model to include an explanation for why they run and why they campaign on the issues that they do. For instance, through his interviews, he finds that those challengers who are competitive (the ones who end up either beating the incumbent or narrowly losing) are likely to move their issue positions toward the center during their campaign and never away from the center. On the other hand, many long-shot candidates do move away from the center of the district in terms of issue positions that they stress in their campaigns.

The author also considers the role that parties play in these elections and the challengers’ view of the parties.

Not surprisingly, most of these candidates did not receive help with money from the national party organizations since they were all but a lost cause. The competitive candidates who did receive money were typically quite grateful. But through the interviews, Boatright also asks about what other roles the parties played (at the national, state, and local levels). For instance, did the party exert pressure on the candidate to take certain policy positions to make winning the election more likely? For the expressive campaigners, the answer is usually “no,” although sometimes there are pressures, particularly from local party organizations, to toe the party line.

While I understand that Boatright is interested primarily in explaining electoral competition among the two major parties, I do feel that he missed an opportunity to incorporate some of the literature about third party candidates in American congressional elections. These people, even more so than hopeless major party challengers, run for expressive reasons. From the outset, they know that their chances of winning a seat in Congress are nil, yet not only do they run, but oftentimes they also face other serious obstacles in their campaign, such as getting their names on the ballot in the first place.

Up till Chapter 7, all of the analyses are based upon interviews of candidates from four midwestern states in the 1996 election. Chapter 7 is based on 14 interviews of candidates from four mid-Atlantic states in the 2000 election. I suspect that this was added to give the book some basis for comparison, but it came off as a bit forced and I am not sure how much more we learn from this chapter.

Despite these small quibbles with *Expressive Politics*, I think Boatright has made a strong contribution to the congressional elections literature. It provides us a better understanding about why folks choose to run in districts with no chance of winning, and why they choose to run campaigns that do not fit nicely with our notions of competition for the median voter.

**Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists.** By Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 232p. \$65.00 cloth, \$23.99 paper.

— Frederick J. Boehmke, *University of Iowa*

The study of durations in political science has been on the rise over the last decade and a half. Their application spans major research questions in virtually every field, including the duration of parliamentary governments, international conflict, policy adoptions in the U.S. states, and issue emergence in campaigns. Testing theoretical arguments regarding these and other questions involving durations has led political scientists to learn about and rely upon statistical models for durations, often referred to as event history models. Perhaps more than models for other classes of data, learning about event history models, particularly

those for continuous-time data, presents a formidable task. This is partly due to the unique language of the models (e.g., terms like “spell,” “failure,” “frailty,” and “hazard”) that developed through their application in other disciplines, but also because of the new concerns that they involve. For example, how should one control for duration dependence? Is the proportional hazards assumption met?

For too long, political scientists seeking answers to these and related questions about duration analysis have had to rely on a handful of older (e.g., Paul D. Allison’s *Event History Analysis*, 1984) or brief (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Jones’s “Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science,” *American Journal of Political Science* 41 [1997]: 1414–61) treatments of this method within the field, or on short discussions in commonly used social science methodology books (e.g., J. Scott Long’s *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*, 1997). Into this major gap steps Box-Steffensmeier and Jones’s eagerly anticipated book, which provides a thorough and in-depth introduction to duration analysis for political scientists and for social scientists in general. This book will instantly become the go-to guide for most political scientists interested in event history analysis, and it should become a staple on syllabi for graduate methods courses for years to come.

Given the dearth of social science books on this topic, it is fortunate that *Event History Modeling* covers the topic as thoroughly as it does. The authors cover a broad range of important topics, employing a combination of mathematical detail and verbal discussion; important concepts are illustrated with examples using political science data that readers can download. The book is generally clear and should be accessible to analysts with a broad range of methodological skills, though the level of the book is most appropriate for readers who have taken a few methods courses—anyone with a basic understanding of probit or logit should be able to follow most of the mathematical discussion interspersed throughout the discussion.

Starting out with a brief introduction to the use of event history models in political science, the book then moves on to an introduction to the essential structure and mathematical terminology of event history models. The following three chapters lay out the basic continuous and discrete-time event history models. I found the presentation of the flexible Cox model to be particularly clear. While the authors advocate using the Cox models to control for duration dependence in most situations, they follow the presentation of the various models with a chapter devoted to the choice between competing controls for duration dependence.

The subsequent chapters delve into a variety of important topics, including model diagnostics, time-varying covariates, repeated events, and competing risks. All of these topics are increasingly prevalent in empirical studies

and should become even more so as political science moves forward in its adoption of event history analysis. Analysts familiar with the basics of event history models will find these chapters particularly valuable. In addition, there is also an appendix describing the various statistical packages available for estimating event history models.

While the strength of the book is that it covers so many topics, this has the consequence of making it a bit dense at times. While the authors do a commendable job of balancing math with discussion and explanation, more time could have been spent on discussion in a few areas, particularly in the first few chapters. Chapter 2 covers the mathematical presentation of the event history approach quite quickly, moving from densities through hazards, survivor functions, and censoring to a likelihood function in a few pages; the “nonstandard” (p. 17) discussion of censoring and truncation is a bit confusing and could be clearer if more fully explained. Spending a bit more time working through the basic duration models in Chapters 3 to 5 would be helpful, especially for readers seeking an introduction to event history techniques, as the major hurdle in learning event history analysis is mastering the basic terminology and functional forms; once this is accomplished, tackling the advanced techniques is generally less cumbersome.

Overall, later chapters do a better job of balancing equations with intuitions and providing extensive citations for readers interested in extended discussions. These chapters explain a variety of issues that are likely to arise in political science applications. In particular, the potential for repeated events raises important considerations about the risk set and the independence of multiple failures by the same unit. In this section, as in others, the authors make clear recommendations about the approaches that are likely to be appropriate for political scientists. Given the increasing importance of modeling this type of heterogeneity, however, I think many readers would have benefited from a more extended discussion of the alternative approaches.

While the authors’ recommendations are generally appropriate and backed up with statistical arguments, the consequences of incorrect choices could be more clearly documented. They frequently illustrate competing models using political science data, but the resulting estimates often exhibit relatively minor differences. Perhaps they could have supplemented these examples with Monte Carlo analysis to more explicitly underscore their points. For example, readers interested in drawing substantive conclusions about duration dependence parameters must choose between the many competing parametric models that estimate duration dependence. As the authors note, though, choosing the wrong model can lead to incorrect inferences about the effect of substantive variables. A Monte Carlo analysis that illustrated and demonstrated the severity of incorrectly specifying duration dependence based

on a known data-generating process would have provided some context and offered visual evidence for these concerns.

These are mostly matters of taste and space constraints, however. In the end, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones have written an invaluable resource for political scientists interested in learning and expanding their knowledge of duration analysis. For a book on statistical methods, *Event History Modeling* is quite readable, and the authors do a commendable job of presenting a great variety of issues and making clear recommendations.

**After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School**

**Desegregation.** By Charles T. Clotfelter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 216p. \$24.95.

**Boom for Whom? Education, Desegregation, and Development in Charlotte.**

By Stephen Samuel Smith. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 246p. \$86.50 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Richard A. Pride, *Vanderbilt University*

Charles Clotfelter was moved to write his book because he discovered that his students at Duke had no real appreciation of the intense struggle to end racial isolation in public schools begun by the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision. He felt some urgency in laying out the historical record since there were strong indications that contemporary schools were becoming resegregated. *After Brown* focuses on “interracial contact,” the physical proximity of the races in schools, because it is the necessary intermediary for all other potential benefits, including educational achievement, self-esteem, attitudes, and long-term social and economic success.

After a brief historical narrative, Clotfelter lays out the changes in interracial contact and segregation over the 50-year period following *Brown*. Gary Orfield did the basic work in this area and called attention to the resegregation of the nation’s schools, and in this book, Clotfelter extends backward the trend analysis done by Orfield and uses newly calculated measures for more recent years. This is a significant contribution to the field. By region and in selected districts, Clotfelter shows the incremental decline in racial isolation after *Brown*, and its sharp decline in the South after the *Swann* decision in 1971, but he gives special emphasis to the harmful effects of the *Milliken v. Bradley* decision in 1974. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that courts could not reach beyond existing school district lines in fashioning a remedy. Predictably, since *Milliken*, the data show that while there were increases in interracial contact within districts, overall racial isolation grew as whites moved from city to suburb, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest.

Clotfelter cites other studies to show the dynamics of white flight from desegregation, but he pays particular attention to “white avoidance” of neighborhoods. If whites

prefer to avoid racially mixed schools, desegregation will be accompanied by a decline in housing prices in areas served by such schools, and that is what Clotfelter found in his own analysis. Moreover, he found that whites with school-age children were more likely than other whites to move from neighborhoods served by racially mixed schools. In this chapter as in others, Clotfelter is reluctant to say why many whites prefer to avoid blacks. He offers two possibilities for “white avoidance,” assessments of educational services unrelated to race and racial prejudice. He cites other scholars’ views on these likely causes, but, disappointingly, he offers no clear position based on his own authority.

When segregation patterns between private and public schools are taken up, Clotfelter shows that private schools’ enrollments were increased by public school desegregation programs, a manifestation of white avoidance, but he also argues that private schools’ contribution to the growing resegregation of the country is modest. In Table 4.4, he displays the segregation index scores for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties by region and nationally, and he shows that 62% of total segregation in recent years can be attributed to differences between school districts, 22% to disparities within school districts, and only 16% to differences among private schools (p. 121). Metropolitan districts in the Northeast showed the greatest contribution of private schools to total segregation.

The analysis of within-school segregation is hampered by lack of extensive data, but Clotfelter assembles original data from four North Carolina school systems to show that in recent years, there was significant within-school segregation due largely to academic tracking, especially at the high school level. A similar pattern was found in a study during the 1970s. Here again, he stops short of deep interpretation. He says that such patterns could be motivated by racist sentiments, but he also allows that active lobbying by concerned parents or prudent decisions by administrators anxious to hold high-status whites in the public schools could lead to the racial disparities he noted.

Clotfelter’s data and analysis of interracial contact is extensive, and it is an important summary of this important aspect of the nation’s most ambitious attempt to change its racial practices. Still, his caution mutes its impact. He tells us in the introduction: “Documenting changes in interracial contact is one thing. Assigning causation is another. . . . I generally sidestep the question of causation” (p. 6). And he does. One wonders if this helps his students.

Stephen Samuel Smith has taken another approach in *Boom for Whom?* Unlike Clotfelter’s aggregate statistical summary, Smith gives us a single important case where school desegregation rose and receded over the same post-*Brown* decades. Regime theory, not pluralist theory, is used as the lens by which meaning is made in this account. In

regime theory, the focus is not so much about how urban political power is used by one actor to control another (power over) as about how it is produced to accomplish goals (power to). The production of power is facilitated especially by privately controlled investment and the capacity to build and sustain coalitions. The theory also asserts that governance is not an issue-by-issue process, as pluralism suggests, but a continuing interrelated patchwork (p. 11).

The story Smith tells is compelling, and it cannot be recounted faithfully here. Selected elements can be stated, though, to give the gist. Prior to and after the *Brown* decision, business interests directed, if not controlled, Charlotte's path. Economic development was their civic glue. African-Americans in Charlotte, as in much of the South, had little political power because of at-large elections. When changing national policy stimulated local racial protest in 1963, the business-oriented mayor called black leaders and said, "Let's do lunch." While not exactly co-opted, black leaders' common cause with business interests provided the political support necessary to undertake major change. This became the hallmark of Charlotte's image both to itself and others—racial progress supports economic development. When busing for racial balance was forced on Charlotte by the federal courts in the *Swann* decision, business interests became active again. In the 1972 election, three of the four candidates they actively supported were elected to the school board, and they guided the formation of the new busing plan. The economic development of Charlotte was so important that busing was made to work, and Charlotte became an icon to progressive leadership. It was rewarded when banking interests, among others, chose to make Charlotte their home. In time, though, development goals undermined the plan. When executives of a newly arrived business complained, adjustments were made to the plan. Taxes were not raised to support programs. Roads were built, school sites selected, and zone lines established to support economic development, notwithstanding that they also tended to resegregate the schools even before the court declared the system unitary and returned full authority to the school board in 1999. Today, parental choice among magnet-school options and an end to mandatory busing for racial balance have tended toward racial separation in the schools.

Politics matters in Smith's telling of the Charlotte story. Men and women act in specific ways at specific times, and clearly, civic capacity was enhanced by the strong and durable business-black coalition. Development accelerated. But while the schools' high-profile success aided that general movement, in the end the schools were put on the back burner. Smith asserts that the benefits promised to African Americans by school desegregation were not honored, and there is a certain bitter sadness as subtext in this account. Smith owns up to it, though. In the preface, he tells us that his own (white) children were bused when

they lived in Charlotte and now have witnessed the near complete resegregation of their childhood school, a one-time desegregation showcase. And he pointedly asks, "Would not the upcoming fifty-year commemoration of *Brown v. Board of Education* more appropriately be called the last rites for much of that ruling's landmark promise?" (p. x).

Both books address school desegregation, the most important racial policy of the last three generations, with care and detail, and both are noteworthy scholarly assessments, using different approaches, as we take stock of what happened then and now. However much researchers may come to value Clotfelter's data and analysis, and we will, Smith's theory-embedded narrative is clearly the more teachable book.

**Jailbait: The Politics of Statutory Rape Laws in the United States.** By Carolyn E. Cocca. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 228p. \$59.50 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Donald P. Haider-Markel, *University of Kansas*

In her book, Carolyn Cocca takes on an ambitious topic of a relatively sensitive nature—the politics of sexuality, gender, and morality in the context of statutory rape laws. Cocca recognizes the nature of her task from the start. She opens the preface with a discussion of the reaction of others to her research—comments by colleagues questioning her own beliefs about the topic and the implied notion that her interest must somehow be inherently political or personal. Such is the reaction of most social scientists to those who study the politics of sexuality.

Cocca seeks to explain how statutory rape laws have been defined and redefined over time in the United States as a means for understanding how these laws tend to reflect cultural narratives of female sexuality, children, race, social welfare programs, and homosexuality. She employs a traditional state politics theoretical framework but expands this framework to incorporate elements of morality politics, as well as other theories of the policymaking process. In Chapter 1, she provides a qualitative historical analysis of the narratives surrounding statutory rape policies, moving to qualitative and quantitative analysis of state adoption and revision of these laws from the 1970s through the 1990s in Chapters 2 to 4. Chapter 2 is focused on age revisions to statutory rape laws, Chapter 3 emphasizes revisions that incorporate gender-neutral language, and Chapter 4 examines the 1990s phenomena of linking statutory rape laws to broader social welfare policies, the politics of teen pregnancy, race, and deadbeat fathers. Each of these chapters is also peppered with discussions of the enforcement of these laws, with some emphasis placed on how the laws have frequently not benefited those they were intended to benefit and have disproportionately targeted some sexual activities over others, such as homosexual relations.

Cocca fluidly outlines the historical process by which different cultural narratives were linked to statutory rape laws. Beginning with colonial America, she describes how statutory rape laws were primarily an attempt to regulate sex outside of marriage, to reinforce cultural narratives concerning female sexuality, and to protect the chastity of (white) females in the law as property. These goals were accomplished in the law by not covering African American women and by allowing for the defense that “impure” or sexually experienced females could not have been raped. The first set of revisions to these laws began in the 1890s and was largely focused on raising the age of consent. White middle-class women, as part of a larger social reform movement, pushed to protect the morals of working-class females by raising the age of consent. In addition, reformers framed the issue as one where upper-class men were taking advantage of poor, young women, and measures had to be taken to protect these “victims.” Thus, early policy change reinforced cultural stereotypes concerning passive female sexuality and the notion of females as weak. Nevertheless, the language requiring that victims had to be female and of “chaste character” remained, while African American women were excluded on the basis of a stereotype that their sexuality was automatically impure.

The second period of reform occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. Cocca argues that it was feminists who pushed for reform during this period. Feminists were not uniform in their views, but the main drive for reforms focused on changing the laws so that the language was gender-neutral and on creating age-span provisions whereby teenagers close in age would not be prosecuted at all or at least not to the full extent of the law. In sum, feminists hoped to make the laws more empowering for females and at the same time protect males. Gender-neutral language was adopted in all states by 2000. In the latest wave of revisions, conservatives linked teen pregnancy and welfare reform to statutory rape laws in the 1990s. This push came from both conservative religious interest groups and Republicans, and was facilitated by national and state welfare reform legislation. Conservatives argued that teen pregnancy contributed to the high costs of social welfare programs, declining respect for marriage, and a culture of free handouts. This more recent wave also served to reinforce the notion of young people as helpless victims, even when the victims were male.

In each period of reform, Cocca makes it clear that attentive publics, usually in the form of organized interest groups, were the main impetus for revising existing laws. Although public opinion regarding sex outside of marriage has become slightly more liberal over time, her empirical analysis suggests that public opinion played only an indirect role in these periods of policy change, often diffused through the mobilization of interest groups and policy entrepreneurs.

Although I can praise *Jailbait* on several levels, and I believe it would be a nice supplement to many undergraduate and graduate-level policy courses, I also believe that Cocca comes up short at points. In particular, she overstates her case in terms of her challenge of traditional state politics research and morality politics research. For example, she deems statutory rape laws as morality politics. However, she argues that these policies are mostly only salient to active publics and not the broader public, which is supposed to be a key indicator of morality politics. In addition, morality politics researchers argue that in morality politics, at least one side must define the issue in terms of first principles, most often in terms of a religious-based morality. But as Cocca points out, religious-based morality has not always been a key component of debate in the waves of statutory rape law reforms.

Likewise, the author argues that her findings concerning the importance of interest groups in the policy process, relative to the role of public opinion, challenges previous research findings. To some extent I do think she is right in arguing that previous morality politics studies have downplayed the role of groups and emphasized the influence of public opinion. However, given her relatively weak and time-invariant measures of these concepts, she may overstate the case in the other direction. She also insists that the morality politics literature characterizes compromise as impossible in the policy process when first principles are at stake. Again this argument is overstated, and most scholars in the area would likely counter that compromise is less likely in morality politics relative to traditional policy areas, but not impossible. One merely needs to review policymaking on abortion to uncover a multitude of policy compromises. Finally, although I appreciate the relegation of methods and data discussion to the appendix, for some reason elements of the theory were also placed in the appendix, and this makes some of the arguments in the text appear out of context.

With these fairly minor criticisms aside, Cocca has written a thoughtful and engaging book that connects a variety of theoretical perspectives and makes use of multiple methodological approaches in a coherent manner. Although not all policy scholars would automatically see *Jailbait* as relevant to their research or courses, I would ask them to take a second look. I believe they would be impressed by the scope of Cocca’s work.

**Reviewing Delegation: An Analysis of the Congressional Reauthorization Process.** By James H. Cox. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. 176p. \$49.95.

— Adam L. Warber, *Clemson University*

A core debate in the bureaucratic politics literature concerns the extent to which the president and Congress can exert control over the federal bureaucracy in order to shape the direction of public policy. James Cox’s book analyzes



congressional reauthorization power across numerous federal agencies to expand scholarly knowledge about congressional control of the bureaucracy. Reauthorization is a policy tool that allows Congress to reassess the status of existing policy. Theoretically, this tool allows Congress to prevent the president and the federal bureaucracy from drifting away from the original intent of legislation. However, Cox explains that Congress often proceeds with extreme caution when deciding whether to use this policy tool, because limited resources prevent it from monitoring all of the implementation activities of federal agencies. Therefore, Congress must consider the numerous costs and benefits associated with providing a federal agency with permanent or temporary authorization.

Congress often delegates authority to the bureaucracy regarding the specifics of public policy implementation. Cox argues that “enacting coalitions” that are responsible for the passage of legislation have a vested interest in protecting their policy achievements during the implementation stage. However, these enacting coalitions are limited in their ability to control policy implementation because they can encounter varying degrees of conflict and uncertainty within the political environment. As a result, there is a “trade-off” that influences the decisions of enacting coalitions regarding whether they should provide federal agencies with temporary or permanent authorization. Specifically, these coalitions seek to reduce the level of conflict and uncertainty that exists among their own members. Enacting coalitions also go to great lengths in attempting to prevent bureaucratic agencies from implementing policy in a manner that strays from their own policy preferences.

Cox uses a transaction cost framework to develop four hypotheses to determine the types of conditions that must exist in the political environment in order for Congress to provide federal agencies with temporary authorization. According to Cox, “enacting coalitions design governance structures as a way to reduce enforcement costs of legislative agreements” (p. 105). Reauthorization authority refers to just one type of governance structure. The core findings of his study indicate that Congress is less willing to use temporary authorizations when there is an increase in political conflict, especially when there is conflict within a specific congressional committee. However, Congress is likely to use temporary authorizations to counteract attempts by presidents that seek to influence the direction of implementation in agencies, especially with respect to foreign and defense policy (pp. 124–26). In sum, Congress weighs the costs and benefits of using reauthorization authority, and if the political costs are too high, the members will likely refrain from using temporary authorization (p. 81).

Cox’s findings also demonstrate that since 1960, Congress has been more active in providing temporary authorizations for new federal agencies than between 1947 and 1960. The 1970s and 1980s marked the time period when

Congress was the most active in providing new federal agencies with temporary authorizations; however, this trend started to decline during the 1990s (p. 56).

A major weakness of the book is that there is a lack of rigor in both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. For example, the author uses a case study method in Chapter 5 to analyze 16 federal agencies that Congress changed from a permanent to a temporary authorization. These case studies are not very rich in contextual details because the analysis focused on too many agencies in a short amount of space, rather than providing an in-depth discussion of a smaller set of agencies. For example, the Coast Guard was analyzed within a space of a few sentences (p. 71). The use of 16 agencies allows Cox to search for patterns of congressional reauthorization activity across multiple agencies. However, I found it difficult to understand how he reached some of his conclusions on the basis of the thin details that he provides in these case studies.

The quantitative sections also suffered from a lack of rigor because there were several important details that Cox left out of his research design when analyzing congressional reauthorizations. For example, he fails to explain why he chose a set of laws that the 100th and 101st Congresses (as opposed to more recent Congresses) passed in order to test his hypotheses. We do not even know if laws included in the analysis reflect a representative sample that would allow him to reach tentative generalizations about reauthorization authority. Furthermore, in Chapter 6, he classifies federal agencies as either very successful, somewhat successful, or unsuccessful according to whether Congress passed an agency’s reauthorization legislation (p. 85). This section of the analysis is very unclear because the author does not adequately differentiate between these three categories. As a result, the reader is left in the dark about the details of the criteria that he used to classify federal agencies into these categories.

*Reviewing Delegation* is very readable, and it provides scholars with a useful overview of the strategic nature of reauthorization power. The existing literature on congressional control of the bureaucracy often emphasizes the importance of oversight and budget powers as the key mechanisms that Congress has at its disposal to control policy implementation. Cox reminds scholars that congressional reauthorization authority is another viable and powerful tool in the congressional arsenal for controlling the federal bureaucracy.

**Affirmative Action Is Dead; Long Live Affirmative Action.** By Faye J. Crosby. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. 352p. \$30.00.

— Frederick R. Lynch, *Claremont McKenna College*

Through an informative professional literature review, Faye Crosby intends to educate affirmative action critics and a skeptical public about the real-life operation of and

continuing need for a largely misunderstood social policy. Her book's key question is "why does the policy of affirmative action which appears reasonable to many social scientists attract so much negative comment?" (p. 22). Despite confusion with illegal quotas and with the Supreme Court's newly minted diversity justification, Crosby is convinced that social science studies prove that properly implemented affirmative action is largely beneficial and still necessary to overcome overt or subtle in-group prejudice, discrimination, and exclusion.

According to the author, "classical affirmative action" in employment and then in higher education was largely passive and nonthreatening. It simply involved organizational self-monitoring of race and gender statistics mandated for federal contractors and voluntarily enacted by other institutions. Federal enforcement was lax and sanctions infrequent. Why, then, do critics and the public see affirmative action as generating injustice, reverse discrimination, quotas, waste, and corruption?

Crosby argues that Americans have simplistic and idealistic views of equity and justice. This obscures taken-for-granted organizational procedures that appear to treat everyone equally but do not—especially minorities and women. She wishes that the public would turn its skepticism of affirmative action toward the testing industry. She discusses numerous studies demonstrating the hidden biases and unfairness in the employment and education tests, as well as attempts to revise and supplement such restrictive concepts and measures of merit. (Outreach and "extra efforts" in this regard, she properly notes, generate little dissent.)

In her chapter on "Semantics Versus Substance," Crosby examines evidence indicating that the public does not know much about how affirmative action really works and that it readily assumes that the programs entail gross preferences and illegal quotas. She also examines data on the role of self-interest, personal experience, and different worldviews in shaping perception and understanding of affirmative action.

Another factor giving affirmative action a bad image is the presumption that costs vastly outweigh benefits. Much empirical research points to the contrary. Federal contractors required to have affirmative action programs generally increased the percentage of women and minorities at a greater rate than did noncontractors. After initial start-up efforts, compliance expert Jonathan Leonard estimates that costs are equivalent to providing employees with an annual holiday turkey. Reverse discrimination lawsuits and complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) are exceedingly rare. Economists Harry Holzer and David Neumark find no negative impact of affirmative action upon organizational performance. And experimental psychology studies using student subjects, as well as more limited research in the workplace, suggest that, by and large, the "medicine does not kill the patient"

by producing stigma or self-blame among women and minority beneficiaries.

Insofar as professionals or the public think affirmative action is passé because racism and sexism have waned, Crosby reviews studies showing continued discrimination against women in pay and occupational sex segregation, as well as underlying sexism toward affirmative action. Likewise, the overwhelming extent of ethnic disparities in occupations, education, health, and other areas, though often the result of a combination of factors, still indicates endemic overt or covert racism. Indeed, Crosby cites Samuel Gaetner's findings that subtle "aversive racism" can affect thinking even of those allegedly devoted to egalitarian principles.

In her concluding chapter, the author finally confronts affirmative action's chief nemesis: Changing demographics have hopelessly muddled the black–white race relations focus of the 1960s that gave rise to affirmative action. She briefly ponders the illogical inclusion of some immigrant groups in affirmative action (most Hispanics) but not others (most Asians and Middle Eastern groups). She wishes to preserve affirmative action by a "pragmatic adjustment" to these new realities. She fails to see that, in both theory and practice, affirmative action already has been absorbed and supplanted by a new "managing diversity" policy apparatus attuned to twenty-first-century demographics. The new rationales incorporate much of her affirmative action defenses (that racism/sexism continue and that equal treatment is not, necessarily, fair treatment) but positively recast ethnic and cultural diversity as an institutional asset, rather than as a negative, regulatory remedial burden.

Crosby's tilt towards psychological research leaves analytical gaps regarding law and organizational realities. The most glaring flaw is her failure to mention—much less discuss—the twin mechanisms that converted affirmative action into proportional formulae, that is, "quotas." The first was the "goals and timetables" feature of standard affirmative action plans, metrics designed to correct "underutilization" of women and an expanding list of minority groups. The second factor was the "disparate impact" legal doctrine that placed the burden of proving nondiscrimination on personnel selection procedures. Failure to hire percentages of women and minorities as reflected in applicant pools could seriously damage an organization in court or in regulatory proceedings. Fears of being found "guilty by the numbers" led to widespread quota-style solutions through use of secret (now illegal) "race-norming" of test scores, contracting set-asides, and "targets of opportunity" positions reserved for minorities—a practice hardly unknown in universities. Thus, the public's presumption that affirmative action entails quotas is quite understandable.

Crosby and other affirmative action researchers are up against two formidable obstacles: methodological and ideological. She pointedly tries to present "balanced" views

and not misrepresent data. She elicited criticisms of drafts from students and one well-known policy foe. But the best intentions and social science methodologies collide with the research-resistant, multiple realities of a controversial top-down policy revolution. Moral posturing, public relations sensitivities, official duplicity, and legal shell games wrought by shifting political winds and constitutional currents make affirmative action assessments difficult, if not impossible. Informal rules enhance or subvert official law and policy. Rhetoric and reality are hard to differentiate, much less quantify. (For example, Crosby and other researchers are unaware that EEOC data on reverse discrimination complaints is all but useless because of agency rules shielding employers with valid affirmative action plans.)

And then there is the political minefield. Crosby recognizes that until legal challenges in the 1990s, there was a dearth of journalistic and social science investigations on these 40-year-old policies. But she does not ask why. Nowhere does she acknowledge that criticism of affirmative action in thought, word, or research risks the label of “racist” and professional oblivion. To her credit, she is careful about inferring racism or sexism on the part of critics and the skeptical public. But needless “adjective” advocacy occurs throughout the text. The few policy critics are almost always labeled as “conservative”—a pejorative in many academic circles. Proponents or studies with positive findings are not politically identified but are too often heralded as “towering above the rest” (John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971), as an “eminent jurist” (Derek Bell), as “a critically acclaimed, monumental study” (Derek Bok and William Bowen’s *The Shape of the River*, 1998), or as “rigorous quantitative studies” (Patricia Gurin’s diversity research). Indeed, Crosby ignores equally “rigorous” published critiques of both *The Shape of the River* and Gurin’s studies.

Crosby achieves a core goal of providing a current bibliography, and she clearly discusses complex issues on a difficult topic. Although the chapters sometimes veer into “filing cabinet social science” (serial summaries of other people’s studies), *Affirmative Action Is Dead* provides a scholarly platform for further debate and research of understudied—though still treacherous—policy terrain.

### **Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America.**

By George C. Edwards III. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. 224p. \$26.00.

— Paul Schumaker, *University of Kansas*

George Edwards has filled the breach created by the recent death of Lawrence Longley as a powerful voice within political science opposing the electoral college. In the foreword, Longley’s longtime associate, Neal Peirce, notes that one of the great puzzles of the 2000 presidential election was that it failed to prompt a massive public outcry against

the system that elevated George W. Bush to the presidency, despite Al Gore’s 539,893 positive margin in popular votes. Another great puzzle is the lack of any consensus among political scientists on the issue, as described in *Choosing a President* (2002), edited by Burdett Loomis and myself.

In *Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America*, Edwards does not address either of these puzzles. Instead, he deepens them. Drawing on massive historical and contemporary evidence and applying clearheaded logic, he provides a compelling prosecutor’s case against the college. The evidence is fairly familiar, and the logic is not complex. Perhaps the public can be forgiven for not understanding the issue and its importance. But how can political scientists—whose professional status cannot help but be tarnished by an inability to provide consensual advice on so basic a question as this—be ambivalent and even widely supportive of this deeply flawed method for determining the most powerful political leader in the world?

Edwards begins his case by describing the college with all its complexities, showing how they provide ample opportunities for enormous mischief and malfunction. He then proceeds to a meticulous discussion of how the college violates the most fundamental democratic norm: that all votes count equally. He reminds us that the winner-take-all feature effectively disenfranchises most voters (everyone not living in competitive states and those in the minority within competitive states), that voters in small states are advantaged by the allocation of electoral votes among the states on the basis of their representation in the House and the Senate, that voters have more clout if they live in states with lower voter turnout, and so forth. He shows why these are not trivial inequalities, as they enable the college to achieve outcomes contrary to the popular vote alternative that counts all votes equally. In the 10 reasonably close elections since 1828, the college elected the loser of the popular votes four times: in 1876, 1888, 1960, and 2000, and Edwards describes each of these cases in rich detail, such as why Richard Nixon probably received more popular votes than John Kennedy in 1960. Edwards also considers how the failure of any candidate to get a majority of electors would necessitate a House contingent election, and how such a process would further jeopardize democratic norms. Harrowing accounts are provided of how the country was spared such contingent elections in the “near misses” of 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1976.

Returning to the origins of the electoral college, Edwards shows that the founders were animated neither by animosity toward citizens nor by any coherent theoretical design. Instead, the existing system was patched together out of desperation and expediency. He then presents his new contributions to this age-old debate: how the arguments that have been concocted to defend this relic are either lacking credible evidence or are based on slipshod logic.

While advocates of the electoral college claim, for example, that it protects the interests of states with small populations and the interests of racial majorities, Edwards concludes that the college provides opportunities for any cohesive special interest to have disproportionate power, but that there is no evidence that it has protected either small states or racial minorities. He finds equally flawed the argument that the college protects against fraud and the need for massive recounts throughout the country after a very close election, as a direct popular election provides better inoculation against these problems. He argues that the college does not help winners achieve mandates and is irrelevant to the capacity of presidents to govern successfully. He also concludes that the college is neither an important factor in maintaining the two-party system nor protection against the fragmentation that can arise from third parties.

The evidence that Edwards provides in support of these claims is impressive, as he demonstrates command of both the historical record and contemporary political research pertaining to these claims. His logic is also impressive, as he repeatedly reveals the underlying premises of supporters' arguments and how they are factually inaccurate (e.g., that small states have cohesive interests that are different from those of large states), are conceptually misguided (e.g., that federal principles are implicated in the college), or contain normative judgments that few would defend (e.g., that we should be more concerned with protecting special interests than responding to broader national concerns when evaluating procedures for selecting the president).

So is there something about making prescriptions about how to choose a president that leads political scientists to be wary of the prosecutor's case that Edwards has so eloquently laid out? Two possibilities come immediately to mind. First, the internal logic and evidence may not be as ironclad as Edwards asserts. For example, he finds little possibility that a popular plurality alternative would facilitate the election of extremist candidates, because "polarized parties reflect rather than cause public opinion" (p. 142). Many political scientists would likely dispute this important but undemonstrated assertion. Second, considerations beyond those invoked by Edwards may remain important. The participants in our Choosing a President project returned time and again to the concept of "unanticipated consequences" when thinking about how previous reforms, like the democratizing of the Democratic Party after 1968, had deleterious effects that escaped the evidence and logic that led to the reform. And reform options beyond those considered by Edwards—such as "the instant runoff"—may also seem better than the popular plurality system he favors. Of course, such considerations lead political scientists into the realm of speculation that Edwards abhors, but such matters seem inevitably to color professional judgments about how to choose a president.

**Passing the Buck: Congress, the Budget, and Deficits.** By Jasmine Farrier. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004. 296p. \$40.00.

— Lance T. LeLoup, *Washington State University*

Has Congress, in recent years, repeatedly transferred its budgetary powers to the president in response to huge deficits and other fiscal challenges? Jasmine Farrier argues forcefully that it has. Looking at a number of case studies of congressional budget reform since 1974, she claims that Congress has delegated significant constitutional authority to the executive branch. In particular, she examines the legislative histories of the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act, the 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings), the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act, and the 1996 Line-Item Veto Act to make her case. Torn between constituent demands for federal funds and their obligation to make responsible national budget policy, Farrier concludes, members have attacked their own branch, giving away power, begging to "stop us before we spend again."

Farrier chooses a conceptual framework based on delegation of authority to guide her analysis, rather than other alternatives found in the congressional literature. She considers delegation as electoral and policy strategy using principle-agent and transaction cost models, but concludes that "a new look at the delegation question is needed because recent rational choice-based explanations do not deeply question the significance of this institutional trend" (p. 216). Judgments about congressional delegations are based on her normative balancing test: "achieving policy results along the lines of its objectives while retaining as much debate and oversight as possible for Congress in the reforms' provision and use" (p. 24). Part I of the book also provides a brief history of congressional budgeting, including recent unsuccessful structural budget reforms, such as the balanced budget amendment.

The main part of the analysis is contained in Part II, which includes the four detailed case studies. The 1974 Budget Act, the author argues, reflected strategic delegation to internal agents and the regulation of external agents. It increased majority party spending power through the creation of new budget committees and the Congressional Budget Office, and it reduced the president's impoundment powers. Reformers rejected spending caps and ceilings that would have reduced their prerogatives in favor of softer targets.

Ten years later, however, Congress began its pattern of attacking deficits *and* itself. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) mandatory deficit reduction plan and its revised version two years later (GRH II) were launched in a chorus of anti-Congress rhetoric. By eventually handing over power to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to score congressional actions, Farrier believes, Congress delegated away valuable congressional powers and adopted

deficit ceilings and rules that “further mitigated majority party power” (p. 126). The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 was not much better. Although it essentially scrapped the unworkable GRH targets and process, the BEA was a set of self-imposed restrictions on what Congress could and could not do with the budget. The 1996 Line-Item Veto Act culminates the analysis: A partisan Republican Congress passes a bill that would give the Democratic president historic powers to selectively rescind spending items and tax breaks in their legislation. The author believes this provides convincing evidence of the pervasive trend of a self-loathing Congress delegating budget authority to the presidency in order to curb members’ uncontrollable profligacy.

While the line-item veto case supports Farrier’s thesis better than the other cases, it was largely a symbolic, partisan exercise of little import in shaping or reducing a \$2 trillion budget and was immediately overturned by the courts. The more critical story of 1995–96 was the budget battle with Bill Clinton and government shutdowns. The main problem with the book is the misleading impression of congressional weakness that it leaves. The reality is that budget reforms, even if adopted in an orgy of institutional self-criticism, have empowered majority party leaders in both House and Senate with new budget tools and institutions. Reconciliation, omnibus bills, restrictive rules, limitations on amendments and debate, and disciplined voting have all contributed to giving Congress unprecedented capacity to formulate and enact a budget at the macro-level. Majorities can challenge and go to a summit with a president of the opposite party, or ensure the success of the program of a president of the same party.

The framework of delegation of authority is insufficient, as applied here, to explain congressional budgeting. Perhaps the more important delegation in budgeting has been from the rank and file to party leaders, suggesting that partisan models might be essential to consider. Although Farrier has the poles correct on her delegation continuum (the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, briefly mentioned, as the most significant delegation to the executive, and the 1974 Budget Act as most significant in protecting and restoring congressional prerogatives), I believe she has miscast both GRH and the BEA within that continuum. Enhancing enforcement provisions constrains both executive and legislature. Such enforcement rules enhance congressional power in high-level negotiations with the presidency. As silly as GRH may have been, “delegation to a device” is not the same as delegation to the executive. If anything, GRH represented a greater threat to Ronald Reagan’s defense buildup than congressional policy priorities, inasmuch as Democrats managed to exempt some 75% of domestic spending (including entitlements) from sequestration. The quotation included from OMB Director Jim Miller (p. 104) says as much.

In the author’s defense, her thorough research of the historical record often includes excerpts and quotations that support an alternative explanation, and she does discuss the counterview that BEA did not reduce congressional authority. Unfortunately, the book tries too hard to sell its case, using language such as “abdication” or “extreme delegation” or “extraordinary new limits” in describing actions that look very different through another theoretical lens. It is important to recognize the difference between members’ rhetorical attacks on the institution and real actions that weaken the institution.

Despite these major concerns about its explanation and interpretation of congressional budgeting, *Passing the Buck* is worth reading and will contribute to scholarly discourse. It is well written and researched and raises interesting questions about delegation of authority in congressional research, as well as the history of congressional budgeting. The conclusion is more balanced, expressing concern with excessive delegation of budgetary authority, but more realistically characterizing Congress as “ambivalent” in its record of budget reforms. Although greater congressional “self-confidence” may not be the answer, Jasmine Farrier’s wish for members of Congress to be more honest in explaining the tension between excessive constituent demands and scarce resources rings true.

**Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy.** By Archon Fung. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 336p. \$39.50.

— Richard A. Couto, *Antioch University*

The United States harbors the hope that participation can improve policy. In January 1865, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton discussed with General William Sherman how to resettle tens of thousands of freed people on the abandoned plantations of the Sea Islands, near Savannah. They included 20 African American religious and civic leaders in their deliberations that produced the short-lived 40-acre policy. Stanton suggested that the process of this decision, as well as its content, would “electrify the nation.” David Lilienthal suggested that the Tennessee Valley Authority was a brand new method of government in the manner in which it included the “grass roots” in the process of electrification. The War on Poverty brought with it an emphasis on maximum feasible participation that Daniel Moynihan explained was part third rail and part poorly devised policy.

Archon Fung writes in this tradition. He finds hope for reinventing urban democracy harbored in the 1990s initiatives of the Chicago Board of Education and the Chicago Police Department. His book offers six cases, in varying degrees of detail, to suggest a new and better means of formulating and conducting policy—accountable autonomy—to address vexing urban problems—effective public schools and safe streets—of the United States.

In its examination of these cases and their background, the book masterfully dissects terms and rebuts claims of the unfeasibility or inadequacy of public participation in policy. In the discussion of autonomy, for example, we learn that it may entail independence of central authority or the capacity of local actors to achieve their own ends. Accountable autonomy stresses the latter and springs from civic engagement, pragmatism, and deliberative democracy. The book's central and controversial argument is the salutatory effect of participation brought about in a top-down manner. The book invokes central authority, in a reconstructed relationship with local groups, as an aid in overcoming problems of inequality, parochialism, and group-think. Not just any central authority, however. Empowered participation and accountable autonomy are possible only where departments have transformed themselves "in substantially participatory-democratic directions" (p. 4).

Yet, as a good scholar, the author includes enough information to raise questions about his assertions. Strong grassroots organizations seem to explain why agencies became more participatory and democratic. But the book offers ample evidence that the police department maintains the upper hand. It ends its contract with a community group, which effectively trained local residents for meetings and interaction with police officers, and decides to do that work itself. The associational strength of the public schools' environment, on the other hand, remains strong; the school board balances an array of interest groups. They have little apparent accountability to the parents of school children, however.

The book is a bit more cognizant about other unresolved dilemmas. However much the agencies may have been transformed, they still waver between participatory and insular management styles (p. 28). Discussions about top-down and bottom-up accountability come out in favor of the former despite contrasting this form of management with a hierarchical style. In two instances, school and police officials point out that local residents are accountable for the plans they made with officials. The book also endorses "structured deliberation." Agency officials, who need or want something from local residents, may coax them to be "free" (p. 79). Thus, the book implicitly invokes, to a degree, Rousseau's solution to those who will not follow the general will on their own. Most importantly, however, associational strength appears as a key variable in accountable autonomy because "sophisticated nongovernmental organizations leveraged popular discontent to advance a reform agenda that focused on neighborhood involvement" (p. 27). Yet, the book makes them a backdrop to the central/peripheral relationship, rather than a central mechanism of bottom-up accountability.

The author takes pains to defend the possibility of empowered and other forms of participation. Again, he

seeks to provide hope and is very precise and detailed in his examination of the likely arguments of five theoretical frameworks against empowered participation. Happily, rational choice is beaten back, although not entirely. On other fronts, the selective nature of the argument's evidence undermines the intended defense. The central concerns that inequality might undermine deliberative democratic practice are reduced to the rate of women's participation. Most troubling of all, the concerns that power may impede genuine deliberative democracy and participation are ignored. Indeed, power has one index entry, and that has to do with a motive for participation, a backdoor to rational choice.

Political empowerment necessarily entails a transfer of resources and changed status. Whatever their shortcomings, one can find increased civil rights and improved public services for previously marginalized groups in the programs of Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Great Society. In this book's cases, however, we find ambivalence about a transfer of political power. It binds "empowered deliberation" to the "competencies of the institution that confers power and hosts deliberation" (p. 76).

Clearly, the cases entail innovative participatory methods, and clearly, at one time they achieved some change in terms of resources. But the book stops at inputs and it is not at all clear what people got out of them and what difference they made. Citywide data offer inadequate measures that empowered autonomy made a difference in the schools and neighborhoods of the six cases. The author offers little evidence, such as before and after measures of student performance or crimes and the longevity of the reforms, that accountable autonomy makes a difference.

*Empowered Participation* suggests a modest hope for addressing part of the social structure of the underclass nature of some portions of Chicago, which William J. Wilson told us about. Any help is of course welcome, and we learn what agencies can do, especially when under pressure from organized community groups. In this sense, the book offers some evidence for the hope it seeks to inspire.

**The 2000 Presidential Election and the Foundations of Party Politics.** By Richard Johnston, Michael G. Hagen, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 216p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.99 paper.

— Jan P. Vermeer, *Nebraska Wesleyan University*

The 2000 presidential election in the United States provides Richard Johnston, Michael Hagen, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson with a "natural experiment" to investigate the dynamics of support for George W. Bush and for Al Gore over the course of the campaign. As we all know, the 2000 election gave somewhat contradictory results: a popular majority for one candidate and an Electoral College

majority for the other. Further, the campaign had two distinct elements that these researchers capitalize on for their work—the nationwide news coverage provided by the mass media and the campaign ads running on television chiefly, if not exclusively, in the battleground states. Given the difference between the forecasts provided by previously reliable models of presidential campaigns and the actual outcome of the 2000 contest, Johnston et al. ask whether campaign dynamics may account for the disparity.

Using the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), the authors attempt to “unite two research traditions” (p. 1), conventional political science approaches dealing with economic factors, incumbency, partisanship, and so forth, and political communication, which pays attention to campaign messages and their effects. The authors lay out the phases in candidate support over the course of the campaign that their data allow them to identify. Major demographic factors (party, gender, ideology, race, union family, religion) account for some of the variation in vote choice, but they cannot account for the changes in vote choice over time. Johnston et al. then use interest in the news (and therefore exposure to it) and living in the media market that received broadcast campaign ads, indexed to the volume of ads actually aired, in order to examine campaign effects. They conclude that although fundamental forces affect election outcomes, strategy and campaign dynamics, chiefly involving communication strategies, necessarily influence voters’ choices.

If campaign dynamics and strategy make a difference, the data should show differing effects in contested states, compared to states conceded to one candidate or another. If campaign communications make a difference, the data should show short-term responses to campaign strategies, a support for an online model of information processing. The evidence supports both of these suppositions. Had Gore adopted a different strategy in presenting himself and his campaign to voters, he might have made the economy more relevant to voters’ thinking. Had the number of advertisements in crucial states in the last weeks been more equal, instead of heavily weighted in Bush’s favor, it is likely that Gore’s position on Social Security reform would have strengthened his support. It is the campaign, the authors conclude, that makes some factors more relevant to voters than others, and candidates favored by the fundamental forces political scientists normally concern themselves with will not win if they do not make voters aware of those considerations.

The authors pack a great deal into relatively few pages. As a result, *The 2000 Presidential Election and the Foundations of Party Politics* must be read like a journal article, because much is said in few words. The anecdotal material frequently found in works of this nature is virtually absent:

no references to open-ended responses by survey subjects, for instance. That absence is not a shortcoming; it is indicative of the nature of the evidence relied on and the elimination of the marginally relevant. It does, however, put the conclusion about online processing of information by voters in a different light. The conclusions are drawn on the basis of overall patterns in the data, but they are not buttressed by descriptions, in voters’ own words, of their thoughts or their deliberations.

Some interesting findings from these data include the conclusion that Bush was able to place himself close to the center on the question of Social Security reform and that in states where news and not ads dominated voter attention, subjects responded less favorably to Bush’s proposals. Another finding was that data support the conventional wisdom about Gore’s dilemma: identifying with the Clinton administration’s accomplishments, especially in the economic realm, while distancing himself from the Lewinsky affair. A third was the authors’ dissection of the process whereby questions about Gore’s honesty were first raised, then emphasized in ads, and finally left to the news media as a frame for their coverage of Gore. These and other findings form a string of pearls worth treasuring.

The necklace is not without flaws, however. Two spring immediately to mind. One deals with the assumption that the election forms a natural experiment, an assumption derived theoretically from the notion that the competitive states lie in the center of the continuum, that “the hard-fought states were a microcosm of the whole electorate” (p. 13). That may be so. But it would have been nice to see some data on that point from the surveys, specifically comparing respondents in battleground states with those in the noncompetitive states. The “natural experiment” argument would carry a great deal more weight with such supporting evidence. The other flaw is less consequential. I admit that having finished reading the book, the title reference to the “foundations of party politics” still mystifies me. Perhaps there is a sense in which the authors are using the phrase that I have missed. But a reader looking for a discussion of Democratic and Republican Party bases will not find it here. I presume that the authors are actually referring to the traditional political science explanations of partisan differences in voting. It would help to have said so.

On balance, this book is one that serious scholars must read. Its data analysis is detailed, conscientious, and insightful. The authors are especially careful not to interpret beyond the bounds of their data, and they frequently point out the areas where other scholars have taken other approaches. Given these findings, one cannot help wondering whether candidates respond to voter preferences or whether candidates form those preferences in their efforts to get elected. This work, and the NAES itself, will be widely used and cited.

**The Paradox of American Unionism: Why Americans Like Unions More Than Canadians Do, but Join Much Less.** By Seymour Martin Lipset and Noah M. Meltz with Rafael Gomez and Ivan Katchanovski. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 240p. \$32.50.

— Stephen Amberg, *University of Texas at San Antonio*

This short book asks excellent questions and presents interesting results from a survey of Canadian and U.S. attitudes toward unions, as well as useful data on union membership, but its explanation of the contrasting trajectories of organized labor on either side of the border is unconvincing. The core problem is Seymour Lipset and Noah Meltz's cultural theory that the two countries have different political and social value foundations—"social democratic" Canada and "libertarian" America—which do not change but explain the post-1964 divergence of union membership in the two countries.

Canada's rate of union membership in 2001 was about the same as it had been 30 years before, almost triple the current U.S. rate. The U.S. rate in the private sector has dropped to a level not seen since the Wagner Act in 1935. Lipset and Meltz analyze the decline of union membership in the United States in a comparative context not only with Canada but also with other highly developed countries, and they assess a variety of factors that have been used to explain cross-national patterns. The Canada-U.S. comparison is especially useful because the countries seem to have many similarities, namely, language (Quebec aside), social norms that do not support equality (p. 62), substantial economic integration, and capitalist authority (rather than corporatism and planning) (pp. 24, 62). The authors find that the factor most strongly associated with greater union membership is the extent of "left-party" participation in government. The "primary source" for Canadian-U.S. union differences after 1960 is the parties that were in power—social democratic parties in Canada and libertarian ones in the United States. This difference, in turn, reflects the underlying values in each country (pp. 27–28, 75). Union growth in the United States from the 1930s to the 1960s was an "anomaly" associated with the crisis of the Great Depression.

The authors' theory, which has deep roots not only in previous comparative studies from Lipset's distinguished career but in consensus theory in American politics and labor studies, is hobbled by a sharp distinction between values and facts, which makes it impossible to link broad values to specific historical developments. This leads them to make ad hoc arguments and unsupported assertions. The general characterization of the United States as libertarian or "laissez-faire" (p. 64) has to accommodate 150 years of slavery and white supremacy, which is a major component of the party and electoral systems that the authors advert to as explanatory variables, the constraints on working-class agency in the common law, extensive regulation (though not public ownership) of industry, and

the primacy of managing U.S. world power after World War II, among many other complications. In contrast, one might follow Karen Orren's *Belated Feudalism* (1991) and consider the Wagner Act's protection of workers' rights of association the culmination of laissez-faire, rather than a social-democratic detour.

But there is another puzzle. Lipset and Meltz find that American workers today are significantly more positive toward union membership than are Canadians, and yet they join at a much lower rate. What is the source of "frustrated demand (supply-side barriers)" (p. 96) for union membership? Their answer is that collective action is limited by "American" culture values that emphasize "individual freedom," reinforced by congressional government, debilitating legal regulation of unions, and an election system that makes it difficult to change labor policy (p. 6, Chap. 4). Pro-union attitudes do not change cultural values or government policy, except when they do, apparently, as in the 1930s. Would it not be just as plausible and testable to hypothesize that some Americans are effectively denying others their freedom of association? Might there not be conflicts over employment and income security in the United States? After all, the Human Rights Watch report on the United States, *Unfair Advantage* (2000), documents widespread employer interference with workers' liberties. Lipset and Meltz consider the hypothesis of managerial hostility, but dismiss it by reporting their data that American managers are less likely to have anti-union attitudes than Canadian managers (pp. 59, 83). They anticipate that readers will object that "attitudes" are not as important as anti-union actions, but they argue that it is society's values that make anti-union actions effective, rather than the degree of manager anti-unionism (pp. 86, 92). As with the New Deal, they do not consider that there is more than one way that values may be deployed to respond to a crisis or that workers might gain as well as lose the political power to act.

Consider a road mentioned but not taken. The Quiet Revolution in Quebec contributed to an increase in union membership in Canada in the 1960s (p. 48). The liberation of French-speaking workers from domination by English speakers and the Catholic Church was associated with union mobilization. Nothing like this happened in the United States, they observe. What about the black workers in the American South at the same time? The comparison did not escape Quebecois militants, as suggested by Pierre Vallières's famous book, *White Niggers of America* (1971). Was not Martin Luther King assassinated while helping striking black workers? What happened to Bayard Rustin's multiracial social-democratic coalition? Should an explanation of union decline not inquire why blacks gained their civil rights but not their union rights? The bypass is odd because Lipset and Meltz present data on American union membership by state, which shows a pronounced regional pattern to the "frustrated demand"



(pp. 103, 115). It is hardly sufficient to answer that “the U.S. emphasis on individual freedom” (p. 175) accounts for all outcomes.

A useful comparison can be based on national culture that examines the specific national political context of each case. Yet the book skims American political development (Chapter 3), with slight attention given to cross-cutting issues and values, the employment and welfare consequences of the policies that sustain the unique position of the United States in world markets and politics, the determination of Reagan Republicans to roll back the New Deal’s social-democratic achievements and substitute a “values” agenda, the huge increase in incarceration of working-class black men, the denial of workers’ rights to many immigrant workers, and so on. Despite a lot of interesting information, the analysis in *The Paradox of American Unionism* is disconnected and unfinished.

**The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change.** By David Lublin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 272p. \$35.00.

— Charles Prysby, *University of North Carolina at Greensboro*

David Lublin’s book attempts to describe and explain partisan change in the South. It examines the growth of Republicanism across the full range of elected offices, from president down to county officials, and investigates the role that issues, elites, and electoral arrangements have played in the political transformation of the South. This is an ambitious agenda for a book of fewer than 280 pages, but for the most part the author pulls it off. Lublin’s success in covering such a broad topic is accomplished in part by relying on previously published work (some of which is his own). Thus, the book is partly a synthesis of existing work, but it also includes new data and analysis.

One key theme is that Republican gains were less than what they could have been because the party often was unable to recruit candidates for office. In investigating this topic, Lublin presents data on the extent of Republican contesting of congressional, state, and local offices over time. Since state legislative and local elections have received little attention in the literature on southern politics, the focus on these lower-level offices is a valuable contribution. However, it is unclear whether the growing ability of Republicans to recruit candidates is the reason why Democratic dominance ended, as the author suggests (pp. 75, 93), or the result of the erosion of Democratic loyalties in the electorate. Attributing the Republican lack of success to a failure to run candidates seems to contradict the “strategic politicians” perspective that Lublin employs in the book (pp. 70–72), a perspective that argues that candidates will come forward when the perceived likelihood of winning is sufficiently high. This argument suggests that when a Democrat ran unopposed, it was because potential Republican candidates thought that the

chance of defeating the Democrat was low. It also suggests that conservative Democratic officeholders would not switch parties unless they felt that the time was right.

A possible answer to the question of what causes what is that even running an unsuccessful candidate for office benefits a party, both by increasing party visibility to the electorate and by creating a set of potential candidates for future office who have campaign experience, even if that experience was a losing one. These are collective and indirect benefits that might not motivate a strategic politician to run, but they are reasons why the party might attempt to vigorously recruit candidates for races where there is little chance of victory. This explanation is hinted at in the book, but it is not fully developed.

Lublin also examines electoral arrangements that have contributed to Republican success. Since he has previously written a great deal about redistricting, it is not surprising that this topic receives considerable attention. The central question here, as it has been in many other studies, is whether creating majority-minority districts has benefited Republicans. The author’s analysis of state house races is particularly interesting. He estimates that of the 105 state house seats lost by Democrats between 1990 and 1994, 60 would have been lost even if no redistricting had taken place; these losses were simply due to shifting voter behavior. That leaves 45 seats that represent Republican gains produced at least indirectly from the post-1990 redistricting, certainly a substantial number.

Lublin argues that redistricting affects candidate recruitment. First, the presence of a Democratic and/or a Republican candidate is influenced by the racial composition of the district. Republicans are less likely to run in districts that are disproportionately black, for example. Redistricting and shifting partisan loyalties also affect candidate recruitment by affecting the composition of the primary electorate. Increasingly, the Democratic primary is likely to produce a liberal candidate. All of this contributes to a growing polarization of the parties, a phenomenon that has been reported in a number of studies.

Another topic that receives substantial attention is the role of issues in southern elections. Lublin argues that Republican voting stems from conservative orientation among whites on a variety of issue dimensions—economic, social, and racial (we probably could add foreign policy and defense issues to the list). Among white partisans, differences in orientation between Democrats and Republicans have steadily increased over the past quarter century on all three issue dimensions. Lublin’s investigation of this topic rests on limited data, as he examines responses to only three items (government job guarantee, affirmative action, and abortion) from white southern respondents to the American National Election Studies (a small n drawn from a limited number of sampling points for each year). Nevertheless, his findings are consistent with those of other studies, and so his conclusions seem sound (e.g., see Earl

Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans*, 2002, pp. 241–67; Jonathan Knuckey, “Ideological Realignment and Partisan Change in the American South, 1972–1996,” *Politics and Policy* 29 [June 2001]: 337–60).

*The Republican South* is a rich study that contains many observations and conclusions about partisan change in the region. Those who are interested in southern politics will find much to think about. Given the scope of the analysis, it is not surprising that many of the ideas put forth could be investigated more, and so it is likely that this book will stimulate further research by scholars interested in southern politics. The book could have been improved by including a bibliography or reference list. I found it difficult to track down references, especially because subsequent references to a publication receive only an abbreviated citation. Thus, for example, one finds a reference to “Jacobson 2001” at the bottom of p. 77. It took me considerable searching through earlier footnotes to find the full citation for this publication. Similarly, I searched at length for the full citation for “Sundquist 1993” (bottom of p. 217) but never found it (I suspect that it should have been 1983). This may seem like a very picky criticism, but in a book that synthesizes so much existing literature, it would be helpful to be able to easily obtain the full citations for items.

#### Politics, Persuasion, and Educational Testing.

By Lorraine M. McDonnell. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 264p. \$45.00.

— John F. Witte, *University of Wisconsin-Madison*

People who are experts in policy areas, but attempt to write for a broader audience in their home discipline, often write primarily a policy tract, then add a little something from their home field. Although Lorraine McDonnell is one of the top experts in the country on education policy, especially large-scale educational reform, she has written this book truly from the perspective of political science. In her career, she has written many other articles and books concentrating on policy issues and evaluations, but *Politics, Persuasion, and Educational Testing* is set within the discourse of policy theory and focuses on the politics of educational standards, assessment, and testing.

Although the original data go back to the 1990s in Kentucky, North Carolina, and California, the implications of this book for the current controversies over the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation are significant. NCLB represents the most important national education legislation since the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965. The author relegates that discussion to the last chapter, but the political lessons learned for both designing policy instruments and implementing and reforming legislation once it is enacted is one of the many reasons for recommending this book.

Following a somewhat confusing opening section in which the central arguments are presented, the writing and analysis become crystal clear. Chapter 2 presents an excellent and nuanced description of the literature on varying types of policy instruments. McDonnell places educational standards and assessment policy in the category of hortatory policy instruments for which information, values and beliefs, and persuasion are the principal policy levers to induce requisite behavior in the policy “targets.” A parallel example would be food labels to induce nutrition in consumers. She contrasts this type of policy instrument with mandates, inducement systems, capacity building, or major system change.

One of the author’s main arguments for why educational standards and assessment should be thought of in terms of persuasion through information and changing beliefs is that education is a process that depends on what happens in classrooms; classrooms have often defied external efforts to change behavior using other methods. That argument faces the reality that the “target” of reform is ultimately teachers. And they may well have considerable autonomy and protections, and thus mandatory policies or inducements may simply not work very well to produce reform.

What is important in this book for advancing the hortatory theory is that McDonnell also carefully lays out the necessary causal assumptions for the policy instrument to work. These include requirements that information be clearly understood, that underlying values be broadly accepted, that there must be sufficient incentives and capacity to change, and that responses must be consistent with the basic policy goals. What this belies, and what she acknowledges, is that the hortatory approach will not work well by itself in education reform. At the very least, it must be combined with inducements and capacity. She also argues that while not absolutely necessary, the best chance for success will occur when costs are low and the hortatory approach is linked to and reinforced by other policy instruments.

Following the chapter on policy theory are three detailed chapters on the politics of enacting and implementing standards and assessment systems, first at the state and then at the local level. Because the three states were early entrants into what is now required of all states by NCLB, their policy histories are particularly relevant for what has happened since at the national level.

At the state level in all states, there was a degree of resistance and change, with the most dramatic changes coming through the tumultuous school politics in California. Also in all three states, there was a general shift from a policy of inducements, with relatively low stakes, to a mandatory policy regime that attached high stakes to both schools (failing school sanctions and successful school rewards) and students (graduation test requirements, retention in grade). In some states, there were also proposals to

reward teachers on the basis of individual student performances on standardized tests in each classroom.

The detailed state-level case studies are followed in Chapters 4 and 5 by analysis of implementation problems and controversies in districts and then schools. In each of the California districts studied, significant opposition arose from parents and external groups. The issues ranged from confusion over the purpose and content of the tests to parent and student beliefs that the tests personally probed family situations. Although there was also support by parents in these districts, the depth of opposition will never be known because the state terminated the test and assessment system for five years after a brief introduction.

Chapter 5 addresses the important topic of whether these standards and assessment systems actually produce changes in what teachers do in the classroom. Although the results of McDonnell's research and the research of others that she reviews do indicate that some teachers reform their behavior in accord with the standards and testing processes in all three states, the results are at best mixed. And the methods are suspect. There are few "change studies," for instance, observing classroom behavior prior to imposition of standards and then after. And the observational data that do exist show weaker degrees of behavioral conformity to the new approaches than survey studies that ask teachers if they had changed. And all of this is highly subject to Hawthorne or experimenter effects in that the teachers probably well understood what conforming behavior would be. This is a critical area of future research because now all 50 states must be engaged in the type of transformation envisioned in these three states. And one suspects that what McDonnell and her colleagues found—that professional development with regard to the new systems was sparse at best—will be even more true of states and districts not as well prepared or as self-motivated to comply.

The final chapter provides lessons learned and describes what is necessary for the standards and assessment approach to be successfully implemented. I read the list as much harder to accomplish than McDonnell does, but I encourage the readers to make their own judgments. The chapter also includes a discussion of what must be accomplished to make a hortatory policy instrument succeed. Here I part company with McDonnell because I have never thought about the standards and assessment reforms as anything like a hortatory regime. As it has developed, in these states and certainly in NCLB, it appears to me as much more like a command-and-control mandatory system, with inducement and sanctions attached. It is not simply providing information and discussing values, as one would in encouraging healthy eating and providing food labels with the percent of daily salt intake. This conclusion may be tainted because I am applying a retrospective focus to a book about the beginning of a reform movement. But in the year 2004, the standards and assess-

ment movement hardly looks like a mildly persuasive policy instrument. So perhaps one of my strongest conclusions is that people interested in both the politics of education and education reform should read this book for relevance on what is happening today in 14,000 school districts across the country.

**Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy.** By Julie A. Mertus. New York: Routledge, 2004. 320p. \$75.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Srinivasan, *Clark University*

In her timely book, Julie Mertus argues that the United States is one of the world's leading architects and promoters of international human rights. However, the United States, much like an unscrupulous car dealer, "uses its wealth and influence to mislead other states about its commitment to the human rights framework, appearing as universalist when actually it is applying double-standards" (p. 210). In other words, the United States relies on one set of human rights standards for itself and another set of standards to judge other states. Mertus starts out her project hoping to discover that human rights norms have become "deeply embedded," "institutionalized," or "internalized" into the U.S. foreign policy framework. Instead, she finds that both the executive branch and the Defense Department routinely override human rights concerns in favor of instrumental foreign policy gains. This American exceptionalism or exemptionalism of excusing itself from institutions and norms that it establishes and purports to follow has prevented human rights norms from fully embedding themselves into U.S. foreign policy. Mertus points to an inherent ambivalence and structural inability of the United States to actually follow through on its very own human rights goals. She finds some evidence to suggest that it indeed does respect and value human rights, but there is strong counterevidence to suggest that it is not able to actually translate human rights aspirations to meaningful policies.

The book is divided into five chapters, of which the middle three chapters seek to establish the main argument by examining the post-Cold War human rights policies of three U.S. presidents, the new humanism of the U.S. military, and the role of civil society in influencing the human rights agenda. All of the chapters are extensively researched and copiously documented. The author draws upon interviews with leading human rights practitioners and policymakers conducted over a three-year period, a written survey of 150 respondents, selected primary documents, and field notes from her research in the former Yugoslavia.

In Chapter 2, Mertus analyzes the independent steps taken by the U.S. military to institutionalize human rights norms into both its operation and culture. Based on first-hand interviews and surveys, this chapter discusses how

military lawyers were extensively consulted while air targeting lists against Serbia were being prepared during the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts in order to avoid collateral damage and prevent any violation of international humanitarian law. She argues that human rights norms “have had an impact on military identity and behavior,” but at the same time she also finds that operational limitations have reduced the ability of the military to fully pursue its newfound humanism (p. 129). The fourth chapter rounds out the book by focusing on the role and influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in affecting U.S. human rights policy. Through her survey research, Mertus finds that the motivations and expectations that guide both career military officers and human rights activists are not radically different, but that their techniques and perceptions significantly vary. By relying on some nifty case studies, this chapter shows how NGOs have shaped the human rights agenda through persuasion. But the author is cautious about overemphasizing the impact of NGOs; she finds that their influence remains inconsistent and incomplete because they are treated as outsiders by the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

The author contends in Chapter 2 that despite using different human rights buzzwords and rhetoric and some external variations in policy, all three post–Cold War American presidents were ultimately “driven by the common theme of American exceptionalism” (p. 73). Disconnect between policy and rhetoric was particularly egregious during the presidency of Bill Clinton, who, unlike his predecessors, expressed a genuine concern for human rights and closely identified his presidency with moral idealism. For instance, Mertus points out, the Clinton administration was highly selective when it came to issues of international justice, tribunals, and accountability because the media and public opinion heavily influenced the policies. In contrast, she characterizes George H. W. Bush’s policies as pragmatic, managerial, and nondoctrinal, with greater stress on Cold War triumphalism that emphasized electoral democracy, market reforms, and institution building. She reserves her strongest criticism, as many others have done, for the administration of George W. Bush for unilaterally overturning international treaties, for trying to muzzle the United Nations, and for its policies on torture and treatment of foreign detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

All of the empirical chapters principally aim to expose how the double standard of American exceptionalism works to prevent human rights norms from becoming embedded into U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, Mertus never really tells us what American exceptionalism is and what are its theoretical and empirical referents. American exceptionalism is equated with the common tendency of U.S. policymakers to exempt themselves from the constraints of human rights norms when it does not suit their objectives. However, if this is indeed the definition of American exceptionalism, then almost every country is guilty of such

exceptionalism. Maybe it is simply not a question of U.S. national interests periodically interfering to prevent genuine norm institutionalization but that the superpower status structurally limits American policymakers from pursuing human rights ideals. What is lacking is an examination of the deeper normative foundations of American exceptionalism.

The book, however, is chock-full of rich empirical material, which is enlightening. Much of the focus is on process issues, that is, on how and why human rights have not become deeply embedded into U.S. foreign policy actions. Although the author indicates that the book is motivated by constructivist theory, very little space is devoted to broader theoretical issues. In all fairness, the goal is not about reinterpreting or advancing international relations theory. The aim is to provide a readable account that is accessible to policymakers and academics; in that regard, the book succeeds enormously. Overall, *Bait and Switch* makes a valuable contribution to the growing literature on human rights, and it will also serve as a nice reader for any course on human rights policy.

**Politics from Anarchy to Democracy: Rational Choice in Political Science.** Edited by Irwin L. Morris, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Karol Edward Soltan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 256p. \$55.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

— Howard Margolis, *University of Chicago*

This is a collection of papers from a lecture series sponsored by the Collective Choice Center at the University of Maryland’s Department of Government and Politics. What makes the book different from the usual volume of papers is that the editors have sought to turn the papers into a kind of text for an introductory courses on rational choice political theory, and it seems to me with a good deal of success. The papers are organized under three headings dealing with origins of the state, design of institutions, and conditions for democracy. But before the lecture-based papers, two of the editors provide an extensive Introduction surveying the field (Irwin Morris and Joe Oppenheimer). The editors then also provide separate introductions to the three groups of papers, which comment on the papers in the wider context of comment on related work by authors not directly represented. The volume concludes with a survey discussion by the third editor (Karol Soltan), commenting on recent debates over the defining characteristics of rational choice theory and indeed over the very idea of rational choice political theory. The technical level is modest (some simple algebra and geometry), which is entirely right for the occasion: not too demanding and not too trivial. But the individual papers often reference work and employ terms and notions that go well beyond what is explicitly developed in the introductory materials. An instructor using the volume needs a confident command of the literature.

The papers are from Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak (on rational evolution of social institutions); Robert Bates, Avner Greif, and Smita Singh (on how kinship societies work); Russell Hardin (on an “Austrian” view of rational choice political philosophy); Gary Miller and Dino Falaschetti (on the problem of designing incentive-compatible governance, where the governors are not tempted to severely exploit the governed); Arthur Lupia (on voter competence as contingent on political institutions); Barry Weingast (on constructing conditions for a stable democracy in post-Franco Spain); and Jack Knight and Lee Epstein (on the role of courts).

The papers are good, but few or none are likely to become a standard reference. (Of course, how many such papers can there be?) This yields the downside of the project, since the volume has to compete with anthologies of leading papers and also with more conventional textbooks. But as a complement to both, or as a good collection of papers with some interesting auxiliary material, this volume surely warrants a positive report.

**Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial Review in a Separated System.** By J. Mitchell Pickerill. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. 208p. \$74.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

— Jasmine Farrier, *University of Louisville*

J. Mitchell Pickerill’s richly layered book shows the possibilities and limits of “constitutional deliberation” in Congress, defined as “reflection and debate over the scope of federal powers under the Constitution in the context of legislation” (p. 11). Pickerill says that such institutional introspection is rare until Congress is confronted with activist majorities on the Supreme Court, as witnessed in the beginning and end of the twentieth century. But even when using constitutional deliberation to rescue stricken laws and protect future ones, Congress incorporates, rather than “overrides,” the latest judicial doctrine on the proper balance of power between the federal government and the states. He compares the use and specter of judicial review to a presidential veto and concludes that such Congress–Court dynamics show bargaining and compromise. However, interpretive equality is not necessary in this view of a healthy separation-of-powers system.

Pickerill’s premise is that Congress does not have the Supreme Court’s institutional perspective and incentive to be deeply interested in constitutional interpretation. He prefers an active judiciary to long stretches of legislative free rein, which one subheading calls “Legislating in the Darkness of Judicial Deference” (p. 98). Even as he uncovers Congress’s surprisingly high rate of response to unfavorable Court decisions, Pickerill’s case studies and concluding theory of “judicial primacy” place him more toward the scholarly camp of judicial supremacy than coordinate construction. While others have emphasized impor-

tant moments of constitutional interpretation outside the Court, as well as Congress’s mini-rebellions against landmark holdings, including *Roe v. Wade* and *INS v. Chadha*, he argues that these exceptions prove the general rule of congressional accommodation.

Pickerill offers two central points on Court–Congress interaction in the twentieth century through a jurisprudential history of the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment, mixed with in-depth case studies highlighting instances of constitutional deliberation, as well as its absence.

First, judicial restraint through the post–New Deal “substantial effects” interstate commerce test removed Congress’s incentive to engage in constitutional deliberation, until *US v. Lopez* in 1995. During this period, only highly charged and innovative uses of federal power, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prompted visible debates in Congress over Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Pickerill’s examination of pre-*Lopez* legislation in the early 1990s, such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in that case, Violence against Women Act, and the Brady Bill, confirm his theory that Congress did not consider constitutional limits to its powers because it did not perceive any judicial review threat. After *Lopez*, the Court struck these bills, in whole or part, on Commerce Clause or Tenth Amendment grounds.

Second, when Congress faces a mix of judicial activism and restraint, constitutional deliberation increases as members parse the latest holdings to anticipate and respond to review, as seen during the 1890s–1930s Court and current Rehnquist era. Pickerill’s cases include a fascinating account of the Child Labor Act of 1916, in which supporters painstakingly, but ultimately unsuccessfully, tied this expansion of federal power to precedents *Champion v. Ames* and *Hoke v. US*. Pickerill observes similar deliberation in post-*Lopez* Congresses, as members modified the stricken Gun-Free School Zones Act to comply with the holding and invoked the issues surrounding *Lopez* to shape other policies, including the Hate Crimes Bill. Pickerill argues that these examples of deliberation are neither “deep” nor “independent” because they show deference to the Court’s rulings, but “deliberation motivated by the threat of judicial review is better than no deliberation, or deliberation motivated only by public policy or public opinion” (p. 130).

Either way, it is unclear from Pickerill’s book whether such moments of constitutional deliberation really protect Congress’s policy goals more than simply having at least five justices on the bench who are predisposed to favor federal power. *Hammer v. Dagenhart* struck down the Child Labor Act despite its author’s attention to precedent, and the Civil Rights Act was upheld despite being more controversial. Pickerill’s work would be bolder if it analyzed this comparison more deeply to confront the reigning “attitudinal” model of judicial behavior, which would say that Congress could not actually slip one past the justices without predetermined sympathy on the Court.

Along these lines, his case studies and larger data set detailing Congress's legislative reaction to unfavorable Court decisions from 1955 to 1997 (see Chapter 2 and Appendix A) can be reexamined to show how the Court responds to what might be called legislative rematches when the Congress modifies a stricken bill by using the majority's holding.

These remaining questions do not detract from Pickerill's overall point about the Court-centered nature of constitutional awareness in Congress, when members care about such issues at all. His concluding chapter highlights dozens of interviews of people close to the legislative process and is a sobering reality check to those who champion Congress's coequal place in constitutional interpretation. The consensus of his respondents was that members "did not believe that the Constitution was an important consideration in Congress when legislation was drafted and considered" and that constituents prefer "common sense" to questions of constitutionality (p. 134).

Pickerill does not tackle the larger ramifications of this so-called political reality, despite its absurdity. Congress's lack of attention to the Constitution can indeed be very harmful to its ability to represent, legislate, and provide oversight. So the reverse of the book's thesis is just as important: What is not on the justices' constitutional radar screen will not be on Congress's either. This fact partially undermines Pickerill's main premise as he makes his argument for judicial primacy. He assumes that Congress is greedy for power and becomes moderated under the Supreme Court's spotlight (pp. 27–28).

But at the same time that Congress pushes for more *federal* power, it often drastically reduces *congressional* power, and the justices do not seem to mind. Congress has continually delegated crucial legislative powers from budget making to war to the president, yet on the rare occasion of Court scrutiny, the justices often miss this larger point in favor of formalistic technicalities. So if the Court is ignoring important constitutional questions, or getting the answers wrong, then it is indeed a problem that Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) is one of the few members of Congress fluent in Constitutionese. Even as Pickerill discounts coordinate construction, *Constitutional Deliberation in Congress* indirectly makes the argument for it to leap from the realm of scholarship into the halls of Congress.

**Gambling Politics: State Government and the Business of Betting.** By Patrick A. Pierce and Donald E. Miller. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 240p. \$35.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Denise K. von Herrmann, *University of Southern Mississippi*

The traditional wisdom regarding the decision to adopt a lottery was that state policymakers turned to lotteries in an effort to avoid raising taxes. Yet at least one seminal study (Frances Stokes Berry and William Berry, "State

Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 84 [1990]: 395–415) suggests that such adoptions are most likely when the fiscal health of the state is relatively strong, among other things. These findings present some interesting and somewhat perplexing questions for those who study the gambling industry. If fiscal health of the state does not have a substantial impact on gambling adoptions, why then are the political battles surrounding those adoptions so often framed in terms of revenues? The revenues generated by even the most successful state lotteries and casinos are relatively small when compared to traditional taxes, such as sales and income tax (with the noteworthy exception of Nevada casinos, which have historically generated substantial portions of that state's total revenue). An important area for policy research is whether casinos are being viewed by states primarily as revenue generators or in some other terms. In the case of casinos, much of the discussion in some states has centered on the economic development possibilities of the casino industry.

Patrick A. Pierce and Donald E. Miller provide some important answers to these questions about the spread of legal gambling specifically, but their findings also provide updates to existing theories about the spread of state policy generally, and about the roles played by various political actors as policy innovations occur. For this reason, their book has a relatively wide appeal even among those who do not study the gambling industry.

The theoretical underpinning of the book is sound; Pierce and Miller have built a model that begins with the literature on morality politics in the tradition of Kenneth J. Meier's (1994) *The Politics of Sin: Drugs, Alcohol, and Public Policy*. They have substantially extended the basic morality politics model, however, to account for "the roles of policy entrepreneurs, policy typologies, the mass public, interest groups, and public officials in producing the politics of lotteries and casinos" (p. 5). They show how existing policy (in this case, typically the existence of an established lottery in a state or the successful implementation of corporate casino gaming in a neighboring state) affects the new policy under consideration.

Implicit in the theory behind the book is its strong attachment to the policy innovation literature and its notion that many types of groups will be involved in the process. Pierce and Miller are careful to draw distinctions between the rationale and motives of general interest groups (in this case exemplified by religious groups opposed to gambling on moral grounds) and the more narrow and specific interests of industry groups (such as the pro-casino interests of gaming corporations or the anti-casino interests of many in the horse race industry). They note: "Legalized casino gambling may also affect seemingly unrelated industries. Casinos do not simply offer the opportunity to strike it rich at the roulette wheel. . . . [C]asinos routinely 'comp' food—provide it

free of charge—for their patrons. No restaurant owner can be happy with this competitive situation with casinos” (p. 48). In their attempt to move beyond the basics, the authors show the evolution of political strategies that provide so much interesting detail for the policy analyst. Their format and method could be easily copied by others studying very different policy arenas.

The book’s layout is straightforward and relatively easy to follow. It provides an enjoyable read for the novice (someone with little to no prior knowledge of lottery and casino politics), while offering some interesting insights that should prove valuable to those well versed in the industry and its politics. Beginning with some historical information about various forms of gambling and a chapter outlining the theoretical foundations of the text, the authors move quickly to an examination first of state lotteries and then casino gambling.

It is here that the book bogs down somewhat under the sheer weight of the subject matter. While important distinctions exist between corporate and Indian casino gaming, both in terms of the legal framework under which adoption can occur and the potential gains in revenue or economic development to the state, Pierce and Miller appear to have made little effort to flesh out those distinctions or to consider their impacts upon the complex quantitative models they employ. They fail to address these concerns or state whether their overall statistical model of casino adoption includes or excludes Indian gaming. Likewise in the lottery and casino chapters, the authors provide very brief “postscripts” that unfortunately whet the reader’s appetite for information that is never provided. These and similar flaws of omission are only minor distractions, however, from what is overall a sound review of the politics shaping lottery and casino policy.

Among the great strengths of the book is its methodology. Combining full-blown quantitative analyses, such as their event history models of gambling adoptions with carefully researched case studies of adoption attempts in Illinois and in Florida, provides both explanatory power and rich detail.

Pierce and Miller have written a solid and readable piece of scholarship to add to the growing body of literature dealing with the politics of the gambling industry. They conclude that as public morals have shifted—particularly as soon as government became involved in the “sin” business of lotteries and casinos—citizen groups and objections on moral or public health grounds faded away amid the growing noise of interest group lobbying. This key finding has ramifications for the many morality policy questions of the day; as governments recognize gay marriages, for example, or legalize euthanasia, policy analysts may look for similar patterns of policy evolution to occur. That possibility makes *Gambling Politics* an important read for all students of the policy process.

**Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise.** By Andrew Rich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 270p. \$65.00.

— James G. McGann, *Villanova University*

Scholars and parishioners interested in public policy and the nature and quality of decision making in Washington will find Andrew Rich’s first book to be an interesting and valuable contribution to the field. While the book focuses on an often-overlooked set of institutions—public policy research organizations—it also explores the current state of policy advice in Washington. These independent, non-profit organizations have served our nation well by conducting research, analysis, and debate on a wide range of complex public policy issues. Think tanks such as the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the RAND Corporation have helped shape the thinking of policymakers for almost a century. Rich contends that their unique role in the policymaking process is now in peril, and he sets out to document how the sea change that has taken place in American politics is reflected in the changing dynamics in the policymaking community in Washington.

Rich traces the origins of the problem to the late 1960s, when think tanks became more like marketing organizations than policy research institutes and began to adopt a strategy and structure that resembled interest groups rather than universities. He effectively incorporates the earlier contributions on this subject made by Donald Abelson, “From Policy Research to Political Advocacy: The Changing Role of Think Tanks in American Politics,” *Canadian Review of American Studies* 25 (1966): 93–126; James G. McGann, *The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence in the Public Policy Research Industry*, 1995, and *Think About the Future of Think Tanks*, 1999; David M. Ricci, *The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington and the Rise of Think Tanks*, 1993; and R. Kent Weaver “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 22 (1989): 563–78.

According to Rich, think tanks have become organizations that turn experts into advocates and policy information into ammunition. Paradoxically, his research suggests that as the number of think tanks has grown and they have become more ideological and marketing oriented, their influence has not expanded proportionately to their numbers. He contends that for much of their history, these organizations provided expert advice that was “thought of as neutral, credible and above the fray of the rough and tumble of policy making” and the politics in the nation’s capital (p. 2). Rich observes that a major shift has taken place in recent years as a result of some think tanks (mostly conservative ones) that no longer “maintain detached neutrality” and now behave like “advocates” that aggressively promote “ideas and ideologies.” He goes on to say that this new breed of policy

experts is “highly contentious as well” and has served to erode the credibility of the entire think tank community.

Rich’s thesis is a compelling one that is based on 135 in-depth interviews with officials at think tanks and those in the policymaking and funding organizations that draw upon and support their work. These interviews with the producers of policy research are placed against the backdrop of the results from a survey he conducted of congressional staffs and journalists and a set of detailed case studies he developed on the role of experts in health care and telecommunications reform debates in the 1990s and tax reform in 2001. He effectively utilizes the data he collected to assess the ideology, influence, credibility, and visibility of some of the leading think tanks in the United States. The result is a convincing argument that has been carefully developed and supported by systematic analysis and a wealth of evidence. His conclusion is that “the trend for think tanks to become more ideological and more aggressively marketing oriented is rooted in ideological and in structural changes in American politics” that became manifest during the last election (p. 205).

My only reservation about the book is that it lays the blame for the current state of policy advice on a few institutions and a narrow set of variables. I only wish that he would have considered the full range of environmental forces (partisan politics, growth of liberal and conservative advocacy groups, restrictive funding policies of donors, growth of specialized think tanks, narrow and short-term orientation of Congress and the White House and the 24/7 cable news networks) that all have impacted the ability of think tanks to provide independent analysis and advice. Despite these limitations, *Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise* is a must read for any student or scholar who wants to understand the radical transformation that has taken place in think tanks, politics, and public policy in the United States.

#### **Political Competition: Theory and Applications.**

By John E. Roemer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 352p. \$60.00.

—Sven E. Feldmann, *Northwestern University*

John Roemer sets out to slaughter a golden calf of positive political theory: the Downsian model of electoral competition and its famous implication, the median voter theorem. Roemer contends that not only is the premise of the Downsian model—political parties seeking election without policy objectives of their own—historically incorrect, but it also leads to implausible predictions. Throughout political history, he postulates, parties have represented disparate interests and have advocated divergent policies; thus, a model that is premised on the opposite and predicts convergence as the only equilibrium—provided an equilibrium even exists—cannot be the right tool for analyzing politics.

Roemer presents a broad set of models illustrating that the one-dimensional Downsian model is by far not the only game in town and should not be adopted as if by default; the right model needs to be carefully chosen on the basis of context and the phenomenon to be explained. The presentation of the models follows a typology that represents the eight permutations of three independent dichotomies: office-motivated (Downs model) versus policy-motivated parties (Wittman model), perfect information versus uncertainty about the electorate, and one versus multiple policy dimensions.

This typology reflects a choice, as other aspects of the electoral competition are held constant throughout. Specifically, parties in the models can commit to the policies they adopt; the models are static, concerned only with one-shot elections without primaries; there is no uncertainty about the parties’ goals or preferences; and voters turn out and vote without being strategic (this behavior is optimal provided the election is not repeated, voters are fully informed, and voting is costless).

The first four permutations considered do not hold many surprises: So long as policy resides on a single dimension, parties convergence in equilibrium both in the Downs and in the Wittman model under complete information. With uncertainty, parties continue to converge in the Downs model but diverge in the Wittman model. In an example, Roemer shows how dramatically the predictions of the Downs and Wittman models can differ: In a model of purely redistributive taxation, policy-oriented parties may diverge completely and adopt extreme policies, while of course Downsian parties would converge.

The presentation throughout the book is rigorous and not for the mathematically faint of heart. But Roemer also illustrates the nature of the results and the differences between the models with a wealth of examples that are instructive in their own right. These models are either solved explicitly or parametrized—even parametrized to reflect the U.S. political economy—and solved numerically. The examples examine the theme of class struggle over the tax to finance public goods or one that is purely redistributive.

In some of the most interesting models, party preferences are determined endogenously. Roemer calls a polity a “purely representative democracy” if parties adopt the preferences of their (voting) constituency. In the simplest case, the party’s preference is a weighted average of its supporters’ policy preference. In the more compelling case, which Roemer terms a Condorcet-Nash equilibrium, the party selects via majority rule a citizen-candidate among its base who represents the party in Wittman-style electoral competition; that is, the candidate competes by maximizing his or her expected utility from policy. In the Condorcet-Nash equilibrium, the median voter of each party chooses the candidate who best represents him or her. Interesting, and reflecting the theme of equilibrium



policy divergence, is the possibility that each party's candidate may be more extreme than the party's median voter.

A radical departure from the standard modeling approach is introduced with the "party unanimity Nash equilibrium" (PUNE) concept, which is Roemer's most original contribution in the book. Substantively, the PUNE concept stipulates that parties are composed of heterogeneous factions that differ not only in their policy preference but also with regard to their "attitudes" about political strategy: Militants within the party derive utility from the policy for which the party stands, irrespective of whether or not this policy is apt to win an election; reformists are Wittman-style voters who want the party to maximize their expected utility from policy; and finally, opportunists are Downsian voters who want their party to win regardless of the policy it adopts.

The PUNE concept deliberately leaves the intraparty bargaining among the three factions undetermined, postulating instead that no coalition of factions other than the grand coalition can change the party's platform (hence, the name). This has the technical consequence that any given policy qualifies as the party's best response unless there is a policy available that is (weakly) preferred by all three factions. Since some policies are always Pareto undominated, an equilibrium easily exists. This is Roemer's stroke that cuts the Gordian knot of nonexistence of Nash equilibrium in multiple dimensions.

One may wonder whether the PUNE concept does not impose *too much* stability by causing parties to respond too sluggishly and leading to large equilibrium sets. In fact, in the one-dimensional setting, with uncertainty any policy pair between the two parties' ideal points constitutes a PUNE, and consequently the concept has virtually no predictive power. In the multidimensional setting, however, the size of the PUNE-set depends on the specific model, and in several extensive examples examining redistributive policy and class politics, Roemer shows that PUNEs can predict and illustrate relevant phenomena.

*Political Competition* makes its mark along several dimensions. First, it offers a coherent framework for thinking about a large class of spatial models, their strengths and weaknesses, and their relationships with one another. Through numerous detailed examples, it demonstrates how each one of these models may be put to work in a specific context. There could not be a more explicit reminder that the one-dimensional Downs model is but one in a large class of models of political competition, and that its usefulness in a specific context needs to be compared to that of these other models. Second, the book offers a real alternative for modeling spatial competition in multiple dimensions, an enterprise usually stymied by the lack of equilibria in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. Third, the book provides a thorough analysis of the political economy of taxation and redistribution, ranging from a simple one-dimensional analysis of a public goods model to the historic class struggle in interwar Europe.

**Is Separate Unequal? Black Colleges and the Challenge to Desegregation.** By Albert L. Samuels. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 240p. \$34.95.

— Joseph Stewart, Jr., *University of New Mexico*

Does the "affirmative duty" to desegregate, which the Supreme Court found in the public elementary and secondary school cases, extend to higher education systems? If so, what is to be the status of historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs)? The focal point of this book is the case, *United States v. Fordice* (1992), in which the Court first addressed this issue. Prior higher-education desegregation cases had dealt with the rights of individual blacks to attend previously all-white state institutions. The author of this valuable volume, Albert Samuels, notes that "the *Fordice* ruling probably raised more questions than it answered" (p. 3). This book is an erudite exploration of some of these unanswered questions.

A major theme is how the "cultural icon" (p. 12), *Brown* (1954), with its incorporation of the atomistic, Lockean individualism of the American Creed, ignores, or at least obscures, the uniqueness of the black experience in America. If the values of the American Creed apply in the post-*Brown* era, are HBCUs important, or constitutional? Samuels argues that "if *Brown* is interpreted as prohibiting the state from constraining the educational choices of blacks, one can reconcile black insistence on equal access to traditionally white institutions with the desire to maintain and strengthen black universities" (p. 7). If, however, "separate educational institutions are inherently unequal," HBCUs are constitutionally suspect. Ultimately, is it segregation per se or the state's mandating of segregation that is the target of *Brown*? In more theoretical terms, "can the apparent contradiction between the ideal of a 'color-blind society' and 'race-conscious' politics be reconciled under the umbrella of Lockean individualism?" (p. 10).

Furthermore, the American Creed incorporates a distrust of federal government action, and this distrust "has historically not served African Americans very well" (p. 8). Thus, even if federal judges or justices were to look beyond the precedents set in the elementary and secondary cases to fashion a remedy, they would confront a philosophical opposition to federal judicial "intrusion" into the politics of higher education.

Samuels also shows how the NAACP's litigation strategy incorporates, consciously, the values of Lockean individualism, which ultimately leads it to be an instrument for calling into question the existence of HBCUs. Exacerbating this problem is the sequence of attacking segregation in graduate and professional schools to lay the groundwork for *Brown*, which required highlighting the shortcomings of the HBCUs and opposing remedies that would have invested in, and presumably improved the quality of, these institutions. Ironically, then, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), having argued that the HBCUs are inferior

institutions in its path to *Brown*, becomes part of the problem in using the courts to address this issue. Eventually, the LDF winds up on the opposite side of the issue from the National Association for Equal Educational Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO)—an association of the presidents of black public and private colleges.

Black nationalists provide an alternative perspective by borrowing some core concepts from the Lockean tradition and combining them with the idea of black exceptionalism to allow for blacks to choose to attend majority black institutions of higher education. *Brown*, according to this view, addresses compulsory racial segregation (presumably in institutions with mandatory attendance laws), rather than voluntary choices (regarding attendance in institutions where attendance is not mandatory).

For readers who are most interested in the case and how the Supreme Court deals with it, two chapters are devoted to the development, context, and specifics of the *Fordice* case in Mississippi and in the context of presidential politics, as well as the opinion itself. The Court's "answer" in *Fordice* makes the infamous *Brown II* (1955) ukase for "all deliberate speed" seem to be the model of clarity and guidance. The Court ruled that the state of Mississippi had not met its constitutional responsibilities by enacting non-discriminatory admission and hiring policies in its colleges and universities. Compliance with the Constitution requires elimination of policies traceable to the segregated system that continue to have segregative effects to the extent practical and to the extent that the elimination of such policies is consistent with sound educational principles. No further clarification of how much elimination is practical or which educational principles are "sound" is proffered. The state is told what is not enough, but not what else to do. As was the case after *Brown II*, lower courts, lacking clear guidance, reacted in different ways.

Samuels concludes his book with an argument about the "limitations of the American Creed" and an Afterword about higher education politics in Mississippi. Painting with a broad historical brush, he reviews the American Creed while specifically considering the position of blacks, noting the lack of reasoned development behind either the conclusion that "separate is inherently unequal" or the black/liberal positions on the role of the state. This leads to a consideration of the bluntness of law and courts as instruments for achieving goals, perhaps especially educational equality. Many will find points with which to quibble or even debate vigorously, but there is no shortage of ideas in the conclusion of this work.

The University Press of Kansas is well known for producing quality books in which the stories of Supreme Court cases are told and the constitutional issues and judicial politics are elucidated. *Is Separate Unequal?* is not so easy to categorize; it accomplishes these tasks—and more. The reader will also find critiques of the American Creed, the liberal perspective on desegregation, the utility of law as

an instrument of social change, and the ability to generalize from *Brown* into other policy arenas. There are also important lessons about black politics, particularly interest group politics, and higher education politics (particularly in Mississippi). In short, Samuels has produced a valuable, broad-ranging volume that deserves a broad readership. Readers with a wide variety of interests will find something of value here.

**The City at Stake: Secession, Reform and the Battle for Los Angeles.** By Raphael J. Sonenshein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 328p. \$39.50.

— Richard M. Flanagan, *College of Staten Island, CUNY*

Unlike any other city in recent years, Los Angeles has been the subject of grand theorizing in urban studies, so much so that many write of an "L.A. school" of urban theory. With its sprawl, smog, postindustrial economy, and postmodern architecture, this California city is often presented as an ideal-type representation of urbanized, globalized dystopia. While some of the studies of the L.A. school are useful, they are too often impressionistic and imprecise, pitched at an unsatisfying level of abstraction. In contrast, Raphael Sonenshein's detailed and empirical study is a useful and refreshing antidote, and when paired alongside his 1993 book, *Politics in Black and White*, serves as the definitive account of the city's political history since the 1970s.

Sonenshein takes up the question of the meaning of urban reform in the complicated modern world of Los Angeles. In its traditional Progressive Era sense, municipal reform meant the victory of rationalistic upper-class WASPs, with their blueprints for efficient executive power and the authority of bureaucratic experts, over the ethnic political machines. Los Angeles, in this understanding, is a triumphant reform city, with a weak mayor, weaker local political parties, and a bureaucratized style of politics. But all of this is quite obvious. The more interesting point that Sonenshein raises in *The City at Stake* is that reform is the terrain on which all the political battles are fought; put differently, the rhetoric and symbolism of reform are used by all political coalitions vying for power in modern Los Angeles. This is an even more complicated matter because of the emergence of a sizable Latino electoral coalition in recent decades that disrupted the stable divide of the era of Mayor Tom Bradley, which pitted white liberals and African Americans against white conservatives.

Sonenshein examines the politics surrounding the ratification of charter changes in Los Angeles in 1999, a document that had not been overhauled in any substantial degree in more than 70 years. Charter reform arose on the issue agenda for two reasons. First, the city's establishment viewed charter reform as an instrument to relieve some of the tensions in the San Fernando Valley section when a serious secessionist movement began there. Second, charter reform was viewed as a line of attack for the

---

aggressive new mayor, Richard Riordan, to pursue his agenda to increase mayoral power.

Initially, the city council appointed a commission to recommend charter changes to be put before voters, but Mayor Riordan refused to play ball with the council. Instead, the mayor supported an elected commission to make charter recommendations. The two commissions went about their work independently. The chairs of both commissions soon realized that issuance of separate recommendations would doom reform, since two blueprints would cancel each other out. So the commission chairs worked hard and successfully to reconcile differences and present a single, revised charter to city voters. In this important opening, the two charter commissions were able to seize command of the symbols of reform and force charter changes onto the ballot that most of the political establishment in Los Angeles might have otherwise avoided. The city's voters endorsed the changes.

The unified charter commission responded to the mayor's claims that he needed greater managerial authority. Power shifted from the city council to the mayor. The charter changes also established neighborhood and regional representational structures that the commissions hoped would salve wounds in the San Fernando Valley.

The development of charter reform was circuitous, but Sonenshein was fortunate to hold a front row seat, serving as executive director of one of the charter reform commissions. He was able to chart every twist and turn.

He does so dispassionately, demonstrating the power of the participant-observer technique in an able researcher's hands. He is particularly adept at mapping the strategic maneuvering of the different groups and players in the charter reform process.

Sonenshein also employs ecological regression techniques to demonstrate the increasingly complicated, fluid nature of coalition building in Los Angeles. He finds that liberal Jews, white conservatives, and Latinos joined to support charter reform, but that these groups moved in opposite directions when confronting other important votes in this same era, including the defeat of a measure to allow the San Fernando Valley to break away from Los Angeles.

After skillfully winning greater formal power in his city, Riordan, the driving force behind the changes, saw his informal power sink. He had angered the unions and city council in his quest for charter changes. The strange creation of two charter commissions, which seemingly made the prospects for charter change impossible, created an opening that allowed the two commissions to merge their power and, for a brief time, control the reform agenda in the city. Such are the ironies of political power and the unintended consequences of change that grand theories of urban politics often neglect. Sonenshein's careful study of political power in Los Angeles reminds us of the importance of urban leadership in the shaping of cities, and of the likelihood that Los Angeles politics will be increasingly dynamic and unpredictable in the future.

---

## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

**Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared.** Edited by Christopher K. Ansell and Giuseppe di Palma. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 316p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.99 paper.

— Mike Geddes, *University of Warwick, UK*

This interesting and thought-provoking book, based on a cross-national research project involving both U.S. and European scholars, provides a sustained meditation on the "restructuring of territoriality" in both the United States and the European Union. From initial starting points, such as John Ruggie's "unbundling of territoriality" and other writing on the challenges to the modern state system, from domestic privatization to globalization, the authors focus on the contemporary challenge to the sovereignty of the nation-state and the rebundling of territoriality associated with the development of the EU, reflecting a central concern with how the relationship between territory and governance is changing.

Key theoretical perspectives are provided in the chapters by Stefano Bartolini and Sidney Tarrow. The former,

drawing on Stein Rokkan on the territorial structuring of European states and Albert Hirschman's concept of voice and exit, argues that the increase in exit options for social, economic, and political interests challenges the state's authority: "While subnational regionalization disorganizes functional interests and identities from below, European integration disorganizes them from above" (p. 10), leading to the reemergence of center-periphery tensions. Tarrow, in contrast, draws upon Alessandro Pizzorno's model of dynamic "political exchange" and Charles Tilly's relational approach to political contention in order to analyze the increasing role of subnational territories in the EU. A strength of the book is the way in which other contributors take up such perspectives: in relation to welfare provision in Europe (Maurizio Ferrara), the American experience of state building (Sergio Fabbrini), immigration policy (Bruce Cain), and democracy (Giuseppe di Palma). Other contributions, while not necessarily within these conceptual frameworks, also contribute to the wider discussion of the challenge to nation-state sovereignty and the rebundling of territoriality: James Casparo and Joseph Jupille on the impact of the expanding legal authority of the EU; Alberta Sbragia on air pollution policymaking; Alec Stone Sweet on private commercial law, Gary Marks

and Ian Down on left support for the EU and NAFTA. Referring also to other work by some of these authors, the book very successfully becomes a lively and complex debate across the Atlantic divide. To the extent to which broad conclusions emerge, these are to point up that “territorial sovereignty is institutionally fragmented” on both sides of the Atlantic, but that the American experience is instructive for the current trajectory of the EU.

It is, hopefully, a strength, not a weakness, of the book that it prompts a number of critical reflections. Firstly, while the importance of the context of “globalization” is acknowledged at various points, the concrete meaning of this is often not pursued very far—for example, the impact of neoliberalism (a word that does not feature in the index) on state policy and on the perceived scope and focus of state action and intervention. It would have been interesting to see some of these authors, writing from a political science tradition, engage with, say, some of the contemporary work of geographers, such as Neil Brenner and Nick Theodore in the United States and Ash Amin and others in the UK, on the restructuring of space under neoliberalism, for whom the recasting of political territoriality is very much a part of the reshaping of contemporary capitalism. Much of this work offers critical confirmation of the significance of the “rebundling of space” but not necessarily of the increasing importance of subnational spaces, while some recent work is more critical of the “dominant scalar discourse” and argues for a perspective that emphasizes network forms of organization that resist spatial categories.

Secondly, this book is primarily concerned with the *territorial* restructuring of the state. But this dimension of state restructuring is merely one part of the contemporary restructuring—“modernization”—of the state, and indeed of the so-called shift from government to governance, the increasing involvement of actors from outside the state in the governance process, and the increasing porosity of the boundaries among state, market, and civil society. These processes are briefly recognized here from time to time, but I wonder whether they need to be given more prominence than they are. In my own country, the UK, important territorial restructuring processes, such as the establishment of elected regional assemblies in Scotland and Wales, can only really be understood in terms of this modernization of the state.

Finally, and this is an inevitable feature of the publication process, the book largely cuts off before the recent—and ongoing—enlargement of the EU toward Central and Eastern Europe, and its engagement in this area beyond its boundaries—in the Balkans, for example. These recent events prompt a number of reflections on the book’s themes, in the first place, about the great variety of “states” within the EU from, on the one hand, the long-established, large, powerful states (the UK, Germany, France, etc.) to, at the other extreme, the three small,

weak, and impermanent Baltic states. Estonia, for example, has a population of 1.4 million, which is likely to decline significantly as Russians leave. It is several times smaller than the average “region” in the UK. Of course, there have always been tiny and weak states—Andorra, Liechtenstein—in the EU, but not of the strategic significance of the new entrants, and those on the margins of the EU, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, with whose fragile “sovereignty” the EU is intimately concerned. The sovereignty relationship between such “statelets” and the EU is bound to be qualitatively different from that between the Union and the major and long-established member states.

It would be interesting to hear the authors compare this situation with the differential architecture of the states of the United States. The accession or potential accession to the EU of states that were formerly part of the USSR (or satellite states, such as Yugoslavia) also points to differences in the formation of the United States and the EU. Europeans, as the French filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard once said, are the children of Marx and Coca-Cola. The EU lay, and still arguably lies, between two empires, and its trajectory is profoundly shaped by the relative fortunes of the two. Moreover, the EU now lies at the boundary of “the West” and “Islam” (a porous boundary that itself resists spatial categories as a result of the large Muslim populations within the EU), and issues such as the potential accession of Turkey make religio-cultural aspects of territorial restructuring a key concern. As a locus of semisovereignty, these dimensions of the history of the EU tend to differentiate it significantly from that of the United States.

Such comments, however, reflect the fertile seeds of thought that *Restructuring Territoriality* promotes. The authors, and the editors particularly, are to be congratulated on a significant contribution to what needs to be an ongoing debate.

#### **The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and**

**Democratization.** By Ariel C. Armony. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 312p. \$55.00.

— Anirudh Krishna, *Duke University*

Ariel Armony’s work provides a useful corrective to some of the more extravagant claims made on behalf of civil society, associationism, social capital, and “the third sector.” In particular, the crude claim that is sometimes made—namely, that high membership in voluntary associations leads uniquely to a higher quality of democracy—is roundly and justly criticized. “Civil society may or may not lead to democracy,” the author claims, “because what matters is the context in which people associate, not because association is inherently and universally positive for democracy” (p. 2).

In defense of this assertion, Armony introduces evidence from Weimar Germany, the United States, and Argentina, and he shows how organized civil society groups in these contexts have often acted not in support of democracy but in distinctly antidemocratic ways, supporting the rise of the Nazi Party in the first case, putting up barriers to desegregation in the second case, and upholding the activities of a dictatorial state in the third case. Whether civil society groups work for or against democracy depends, the author claims, on the *context* within which civil society is given birth within any particular country.

Two aspects of context are particularly important for him: the rule of law and socioeconomic inequalities, respectively. These two aspects are related. “Socioeconomic inequalities impinge on the rule of law,” he asserts, “which affects civic engagement and, in turn, its impact on democracy” (p. 4). The implication is that the higher the degree of inequality in any country, the less civil society groups will support ends that are democratic in nature.

Armony turns on its head the usual connection between civil society and the macrocontext. The arrows point in his case from macrocontext to civil society: Context, in particular the extent of inequality in a country, matters for what civil society organizations do. Civil society, in turn, does not matter so much for the macrocontext.

The trouble with this thesis, as with much of the civil society and social capital literature, in general, lies with establishing convincingly the precise nature of the micro-macro links. Proponents of the social capital and civil society hypotheses are not entirely clear about how patterns of social relationship at the microlevel travel upward to affect results at the macronational level.

Armony, who argues the opposite viewpoint, is equally unconvincing about the mediating links. His thesis about socioeconomic inequalities and the rule of law can explain why groups of white Americans organized patently anti-democratic activities in order to forestall desegregation. But it does not explain why Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights movement organized at the *same* time and in the *same* context to seek democratic objectives in more democratic ways.

“The capacity of political institutions to process diverse demands and the overall effectiveness of the rule of law *shape* attitudes in society,” Armony states, asserting a unique link between macrocontext and civil society (p. 207). However, in the same society, experiencing the same set of political institutions, different civil society groups can thrive, simultaneously pursuing both pro-democracy and anti-democracy ends. The Mafia exists in Italy alongside all of those other, pleasanter groups identified by Robert Putnam. White racist groups worked in 1960s America but also Freedom Riders. Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela organized civil society groups for democracy and against repressive regimes, but other, less democratic and more violent groups also worked at the same time in the same countries.

In reversing the “positive and universal link between civil society and democracy” (p. 200), the author proposes an equally unviable thesis. He is correct to assert that no one-to-one association can run from the micro- to the macrolevel but incorrect to claim that such a one-to-one association does, in fact, run in the opposite direction.

A more relevant question to examine concerns why within the same macrocontext both pro-democracy *and* anti-democracy organizations are active at the same time. Armony presents some hints in this respect when he refers to diverse channels, links, and interaction mechanisms that variously connect different civil society groups with the state. In any given country, different types of such mediating links can exist—and they can channel civic groups’ actions in different directions, strengthening democracy in some cases while undermining it in others. Political parties and other forms of mediating agency can provide these middle-level links between organized citizens and the state, but so can local governments, non-profit organizations, ethnic associations, and religious congregations. The goals that civil society groups choose for their collective actions depend to a large extent upon the information, access, and interpretations that mediating agency makes available to them.

Neither civil society organizations nor political institutions are individually all-important. What matters in practice is the nature of interactions between them. Focusing on the character of such mediating links helps us get away from making ultimately untenable statements proposing deterministic links of either a top-down or bottom-up kind (e.g., see my *Active Social Capital*, 2002).

Armony’s concern with inequality is refreshing, and his definition of democracy is more encompassing than most. Democracy is, for him, not simply equivalent to some particular set of political institutions; it is as well “a system in which significant segments of the population are [not] de facto excluded from the full benefits of democratic citizenship” (p. 12). He is justifiably concerned that even as democracy has been formally established, in many countries “the capacity of individuals (largely the poor and marginalized) to exercise many of these rights has remained unchanged or has even diminished” (p. 55).

In seeking to rectify this situation, however, Armony is guided by some incautious analysis. He asserts, for example, that the poorer any individual is, the less trusting he or she is likely to be (p. 212). The only evidence he offers in support of this surprising assertion is composed of differences in answers provided by “lower-income” and “higher-income” respondents in 28 countries to two very broad questions about generalized trust. The average difference observed is negative in all countries, which is proof enough to the author that lower-income individuals are less trusting everywhere. But what is this evidence worth exactly? Look more carefully at these numbers, and you find that the opposite conclusion is also supported: The

difference in trust between lower-income and higher-income respondents is highest in more equal societies, including Norway and Denmark, and it is lowest in more unequal societies, including Brazil and Mexico. Increasing inequality should lead, if these numbers are to be believed, to spreading trust more evenly within a society.

In general, the cross-national data analysis (in Chapter 5) is not of the same standard as the carefully compiled case studies presented in other empirical chapters. For example, from observing that social trust and inequality are closely associated in regression analysis conducted for 26 countries, the author infers that inequality is a *cause* of low trust. However, cause and effect could as well go the other way; for example, high social trust could lead citizens to support measures that reduce inequality.

Armony presents an important corrective to expansionist views about civil society and social capital. His reversal of the causal connection is not, however, entirely convincing. To the extent that it helps restore more balance between civil society and state institutions, *The Dubious Link* is an important book to read.

**Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards.** Edited by Henry E. Brady and David Collier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 384p. \$72.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

— Kurt Weyland, *University of Texas at Austin*

This essay collection is an exceptionally important book that establishes a pluralistic vision of social science methodology. Until a few years ago, the discipline equated methods with quantitative methods and formal modeling; qualitative research was often seen as lacking precision and rigor and therefore as undeserving of the “methods” label. How things have changed—and for the better! The American Political Science Association now has a flourishing section on Qualitative Methods, which has attracted a rapidly increasing membership.

The volume edited by Henry Brady and David Collier provides a comprehensive, sophisticated, and evenhanded methodological justification for this striking reassertion of qualitative approaches. It demonstrates convincingly that case studies and small-*n* comparisons are not inherently inferior to statistical analyses; they have great strengths of their own and suffer from less severe weaknesses than a number of quantitatively oriented scholars have claimed. At the same time, quantitative methods themselves stand on shakier ground than is often assumed. Since qualitative and quantitative approaches both have significant advantages and disadvantages, they should be seen as equally legitimate procedures for social scientific inquiry. Rather than continuing to engage in a battle for superiority, advocates of these “diverse tools” should converge on “shared standards,” as the volume proclaims in its programmatic subtitle.

With this crucial message, Brady and Collier take aim at the influential volume by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (1994). In that book—aptly summarized and systematized in Chapter 2 of the present collection—a leading quantitative methodologist and his coauthors offered to help out their inferentially challenged qualitative brethren, who were crippled by such problems as the difficulty of sorting out a large number of variables with a small number of cases. The advice of King and his colleagues, explicitly drawn from a statistical template, was to mainstream qualitative research by making it as similar as possible to quantitative studies; this is evident in the frequently repeated recommendation to increase the number of observations.

Yet *Designing Social Inquiry*, which initially increased the pressure in the discipline on qualitative scholars, soon triggered a revival of qualitative methodology, which demonstrated the inherent value of this approach and revealed quantitative claims to superiority as methodologically unjustified. Brady and Collier reprint more or less updated versions of several important essays that evaluated those claims (Chapters 5–6, 9–11) and add a number of original chapters. The introduction and the two concluding chapters are especially wide-ranging and useful; they successfully pull together the discussion. An extensive glossary makes the volume accessible to nonspecialists. While somewhat disparate, the book is impressive in the intellectual caliber of its contributors and the diversity of their methodological orientation; the cooperation among qualitatively oriented scholars and outstanding statistical researchers Henry Brady and Larry Bartels (the author of Chapter 3) gives the collection’s pluralistic message special legitimacy. This is not a flaming manifesto of qualitative die-hards, but a balanced assessment of different yet complementary methodological approaches, guided by a quest for shared standards.

In this spirit, the volume demonstrates that some of King, Keohane, and Verba’s claims to quantitative superiority rest on problematic assumptions. For instance, they suggested that large-*n* studies were similar to experiments in their randomization strategies, which allowed researchers to isolate the impact of causal variables; by contrast, small-*n* research was plagued by severe selection problems and the impossibility of sorting out causal effects with few cases. Yet Brady and Collier insist on the fundamental difference between experiments, which allow for the true randomization of causal treatments, and observational studies that analyze given cases; the latter category includes both large-*n* and small-*n* analyses. Qualitative and quantitative research therefore confronts similar problems of inference, such as the danger of endogeneity; large-*n* analysis is not by nature superior. Several authors in the collection, especially in Chapter 6, also show that warnings by King et al. about selection bias in qualitative research were exaggerated. “Selection on the dependent variable,” often

depicted as a cardinal sin, does not invalidate all inferences. In fact, causal heterogeneity—that is, the divergent operation of causal factors in variegated contexts—can justify the truncation of samples.

The Brady and Collier volume also demonstrates the serious trade-offs that following the advice of King et al. can entail. For instance, the constant exhortation to increase the number of observations may push researchers to trespass the bounds of causal heterogeneity and to engage in conceptual stretching. By concentrating primarily on problems of causal inference, the previous authors overlooked other essential issues, such as how to attain conceptual validity. Since qualitative research is much more attentive to these conceptual and theoretical questions, it has important advantages over statistical methods in some respects. In fact, the Brady and Collier volume diverges from the correlational approach to causal inference that underlies the earlier book; they introduce the notion of causal-process observations to argue that much of the information on causal mechanisms and their operation that qualitative researchers unearth does not fit into quantitative data sets, but nevertheless sheds decisive light on cause-and-effect relations (pp. 252–71). Thus, qualitative research makes crucial contributions that go far beyond the confines of quantitative analysis.

Most of the Brady and Collier volume is fully convincing. Its emphasis on the complementary strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative approaches and its rejection of claims of inherent superiority hold great promise for overcoming the methodological wars in our conflictual discipline and for creating agreement on methodological pluralism.

But pluralism does not mean uniformity. Perhaps these editors go too far in their search for common ground. Is it really feasible to find “shared standards” (subtitle)? By confronting the methodological trade-offs aptly analyzed in Chapter 12, qualitative and quantitative researchers have always prioritized divergent standards—generality versus accuracy, parsimony versus depth of understanding, operationalization versus conceptual validity, and so forth. While some attention to competing standards could improve both strands of research, they are interested in different aspects of this hypercomplex reality called politics. In fact, divergent standards may derive from different views on “how the world works.” In the statistical worldview, variables affect given cases in regular, fairly uniform, objectively observable ways; by contrast, qualitative scholars see shifting combinations of causal factors operating differently in different contexts. Quantitative and qualitative methods reflect these divergent worldviews and are especially appropriate for analyzing those aspects of politics that each worldview highlights. The demand for shared standards may therefore make it difficult for both sides to use their special strengths to the greatest advantage. Instead, quantitative and qualitative approaches may best be seen as

complementary: They both add crucial—yet different—facets to a complex, multidimensional picture.

Notwithstanding this question, *Rethinking Social Inquiry* is one of the most important methodological contributions published during the last decade. It should be required reading for all political scientists. In fact, one hopes that the authors will follow up on this abstract analysis of methodological principles, flesh out the specific advice offered especially in Chapters 7 and 8, and soon produce a pluralistic equivalent to the King, Keohane, and Verba volume—a comprehensive, “practical, down to earth, simple, and above all, reliable” (Brady, p. 53) guide on how to do good qualitative research.

**Gender and Human Rights Politics in Japan: Global Norms and Domestic Networks.** By Jennifer

Chan-Tiberghien. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 240p. \$45.00.

— Takashi Inoguchi, *University of Tokyo*

This is an admirably constructed book. It is clear, concise, and forceful, with good evidence and examples that illustrate observations and arguments. It is also a book that challenges many of the conventional paradigms of the study of Japanese politics. One of the tenacious tenets of the paradigms is that Japanese society, Japanese politics, and Japanese culture are resistant to forces coming from outside and that they try to keep their organic whole with cohesion and consistency. Jennifer Chan-Tiberghien says no, at least not always yes, to this conventional wisdom.

The issues the volume focuses on are the pill, sexual harassment, military sexual slavery, domestic violence, and child prostitution. The models the author attempts to refute in explaining those five issues are those of bureaucratic dominance, party politics, interest groups, and network state/triumvirate. The model the author proposes in explaining the policy changes on the five issues as revealed in the 1990s is called “the model of embedded network state.” By that she means that the Japanese state has been embedded in global human rights norms and that the social agents at home that digest and diffuse those global human rights norms have been vigorous and tactful in transforming ideas and passions into policy legislation and eventually the start of good social practice.

As the author notes, the five global conferences concerning global norms, including gender and human rights, that were held in the mid-1990s were not necessarily vigorously attended to by Japanese government officials. But by the middle of the current decade, the global norms such conferences upheld have been more or less accepted by Japan not only at the grassroots level, as evidenced by the extraordinary growth of nongovernmental and quasi-governmental organizations and their movements on such issues (Adam Schwartz and Susan Pharr, eds., *The State of Civil Society in Japan*, 2000) but also at the high level of

legislators and bureaucratic leaders of various agencies, as evidenced by a number of laws to enhance the practice of global norms in these areas. In other words, Japan joined a global epistemic community of gender and human rights issues in the 1990s.

As I was reading the book, I vividly recalled what I myself experienced in connection with gender issues. While working as assistant secretary general of the United Nations assigned to carry out the programmatic activities of the United Nations University (UNU) in the mid-1990s, I had a brief but important conversation with my counterpart who directed the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), an agency which specializes in gender issues. One of the common features of both agencies is that they do not necessarily enjoy a good funding position. My colleagues and I bemoaned it. We felt that we could somehow coordinate our voices to enhance our budgetary situations whenever occasions arose. I then muttered rhetorically and sotto voce that the UNIFEM deals with a straightforward single issue, whereas the UNU has to deal with a multitude of issues that affect humankind. To my great regret and distress, however, this sentence triggered her vigorous refutation to the effect that the UNIFEM deals with the multitude of issues that affect all of humankind, that the agency deals with them from the gender angle and that the gender angle permeates all of humankind. I immediately retracked my last sentence and surrendered. Although it would be too much to generalize from one individual's encounter with global gender and human rights issues to national political changes, I may as well surmise that more than a few Japanese citizens came to grapple with gender and human rights issues in the critical period of the 1990s.

To explain the growing acceptance of global norms in gender and human rights, the author gives a good account of a number of social changes that helped the state and society to move in that direction. First is the steady weakening of collectivism and the growth of the individual. Her own accounts, as well as other survey data including the AsiaBarometer (Takashi Inoguchi et al., eds., *Values and Life Styles in Urban Asia*, 2005), give a strong testimony to this observation. Second is the steady deemphasis on the informal, often extralegal, and not necessarily transparent ways of resolving conflicts of interests and the concomitant steady but slow increase in using law and law professions to handle social conflicts. On this trend of Japanese society, the projected number of newly established law school students and those who are likely to enter law professions, tripling of the current size in ten year's time, offer strong evidence. Third, the metamorphosis of the nature of social networks from largely hierarchical to increasingly horizontal must be pointed out. The author's own accounts, as well as a number of empirical and experimental data (Toshio Yamagishi, *The Structure of Trust*, 1998; Takashi Inoguchi, "Broadening the Basis of

Social Capital in Japan," in Robert D. Putnam, ed., *Democracies in Flux*, 2000), attest to this proposition. Fourth, the intensely territorially national setting of Japanese society has been loosened somewhat by the tide of globalization. Evidence can be found in the importance of national identity in Japan in comparison with that of other Asian countries. Two-thirds of Japanese respondents designate national identity as their primary identity, whereas approximately 85% of Korean and Thai respondents place their national identity as primary (*Values and Life Styles in Urban Asia*). Postnational, postmodern, and postmaterialist respondents have increased in number.

This reviewer's positive evaluation of the book may be mildly qualified by one methodological reservation. The author makes skillful use of interviews, especially with those working in nongovernmental organizations with advocacy missions. Since the expansion and empowerment of various civil society organizations were remarkable in the 1990s (Yutaka Tsujinaka, ed., *Civil Society and Interest Group Organizations in Japan*, 2002), this approach has been successfully and deftly deployed. Yet one cannot underestimate the tenaciously resilient power of bureaucratic agencies and the increasingly critical intervention made by the Prime Minister in creating new niches of his own vis-à-vis bureaucracy, the governing party, and public opinion.

To sum up, *Gender and Human Rights Politics in Japan* is a neat book that challenges conventional paradigms with a very solid assemblage of evidence.

**The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United States.** By Pradeep K. Chhibber and Ken Kollman. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2004. 272p. \$50.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Lynda Erickson, *Simon Fraser University*

The question of the role institutions play in party aggregation has tended to be dominated by discussions of the role and effects of different electoral systems. In a refreshing change from this preoccupation with electoral systems, Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman turn our attention to the impact of federalism, or, more appropriately, the degree of centralization or devolution of power in governmental systems, on the fragmentation of party systems. Their focus is dynamic: They are interested in the formation of national party systems and in how party systems change over time with respect to their extent of nationalization and in relation to the migration of political authority to the center or from the center to states, provinces, or regions. Highly nationalized party systems are ones in which parties receive similar vote shares across different levels of vote aggregation: district, regional, and national. Conversely, in weakly nationalized party systems, parties are differentially competitive across levels.



The authors have chosen to examine their questions about national party systems using four countries that share a similar electoral system—the single member plurality system—for elections to their lower houses, but that have had different histories with respect to centralization and “provincialization.” Their data for measuring the nationalization of party systems are district returns for lower-house elections from the outset of democratic elections in Canada, India, and the United States and from 1885 for Britain. Analyses of the centralization/decentralization trends in governing across the four countries are based on a (necessarily) eclectic mix of data on government activities and secondary sources on federal/provincial/regional government relations and activities. The focus of their study is mainly directed toward looking at differences within each country over time, although they also refer to some differences across the countries, especially why American politics is dominated by two national parties while this is not true of the other three countries in their study.

The analysis begins by looking at Maurice Duverger’s two-party prediction for single member plurality systems and examining whether it holds at the district level. Although the discussion of Duverger’s law and the formal theoretical models that have followed from it, as well as the findings both with respect to the extent of and limits to two-party competition at the local level, are interesting, they are less than central to the primary concern of the book, which is the degree of similarity in party support across levels, and not the number of competitive parties.

In Chapter 3, the authors elaborate their theory of party aggregation, which is based on the incentives that exist for voters and candidates to make links across districts. They argue that when national governments centralize authority and create policies that routinely affect peoples’ lives, because they want to influence the direction of these policies, candidates and voters have incentives to create and support nationwide linkages in the form of national parties. On the other hand, with decentralization, where state or provincial governments enact important policies, it becomes “more likely that there will be an increase in voting for parties with regional, state or provincial labels” (p. 80). With this focus on the authority of state or provincial governments in accounting for voting support for regional parties, what is missing is any discussion of the possibility that voters and candidates may link up in regional parties because of regionally based interests that are affected by national government policies.

Chapter 4 describes how the principle that national parties are formed to influence policymaking at the national level worked historically in each of the four countries, tracing the movement among legislators from notables to party members. Chapter 5 then details shifts in government centralization in each country, categorizing periods as centralizing, decentralizing, or ambiguous. Chapters 6

and 7 lay out the authors’ evidence for their central thesis on the relationship between centralization/decentralization and party system change. Their critical indicator of party nationalization is one they call party aggregation. They use Laakso and Taagepera’s (Markku Laakso and Rei Taagepera, “‘Effective’ Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe,” *Comparative Political Studies* 12 [1979] 3–27) measure for the effective number of parties, and define party aggregation as the difference between the effective number of parties at the national level and the average of the effective number of parties at the district level. While the simplicity of the measure is its virtue, it can overestimate the degree of nationalization in a system because it takes into account only the effective number of parties contesting at each level. As a result, the authors describe the Canadian party system at the end of the last century as “curiously nationalized” (p. 189) because their measure suggested it was nationalized, even though the party system had a “lack of cross-provincial voting” (p. 190) and, by virtually all other counts, was highly regionalized. Still, with this and other measures, they are able to illustrate a general relationship between centralization and nationalized party systems, especially in the earlier years covered in each of their countries.

What is more difficult to establish is the direction of causation in this relationship. Does the degree of centralization or provincialization cause party system change, or does the regionalization/nationalization of party systems affect government centralization? Chhibber and Kollman acknowledge that sometimes threats from the rise of regional parties do contribute to devolution, but they contend that the chronologies in the countries they have studied clearly indicate that growing centralization contributes to a more national party system. Moreover, they argue that even with the more difficult case of provincialization, their chronology shows that regional/provincial parties emerge after regional governments have gained power. Yet how quickly this occurs seems quite variable in their chronologies, and why it occurs seems undertheorized. Although the authors do refer to “more opportunities for regional, state or provincial parties to thrive” (p. 21), and to regional parties finding “the political space to form and survive” (p. 101) in decentralized systems, a more extended discussion of how decentralization works to support regional parties would be welcome.

With its focus on state power and party aggregation, *The Formation of National Party Systems* addresses an issue that has not, until now, received sufficient attention. It presents a number of useful theoretical discussions about party aggregation and provides a wealth of data on the topic. It documents, for example, that the United States did not have a two-party system until 1930, and it illustrates that even in a country such as India, which is very diverse within districts, Duverger’s law still tends to hold at the district level. Although some country specialists may

quibble with particular interpretations of the timing of changes in their variables, the authors' general thesis is largely born out. Overall, this book makes an important contribution to the literature on party systems and system change.

**Resurgent Voices in Latin America: Indigenous Peoples, Political Mobilization, and Religious Change.**

Edited by Edward L. Cleary and Timothy J. Steigenga. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004. 304p. \$24.95.

— Donna Lee Van Cott, *Tulane University*

Latin America's indigenous peoples' social movements are gaining increasing attention from political scientists. Once the exclusive interest of anthropologists, sociologists, and historians, by the 1990s political scientists could no longer ignore the implications of the emergence of regional, national, and international indigenous political actors for the development of democracy and the state. By the end of the decade, political scientists had produced a handful of scholarly books on indigenous peoples' politics (e.g., Alison Brysk, *From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America*, 2000; Donna Lee Van Cott, *The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America*, 2000; Deborah J. Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, 2005) and many other comparative and monographic studies are in the publishing pipeline or at the dissertation stage.

The dynamic growth of scholarly interest in indigenous peoples' political movements also is demonstrated by the flood of edited volumes on this theme. *Resurgent Voices in Latin America* is a welcome and valuable contribution to this burgeoning literature and provides a more explicitly political science approach than most. The majority of the new collections are edited and written by anthropologists and, thus, while offering valuable empirical detail, are less appropriate for political science courses (e.g., David Maybury-Lewis, ed., *The Politics of Ethnicity: Indigenous Peoples in Latin American States*, 2002; Kay Warren and Jean Jackson, eds., *Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the State in Latin America*, 2002). The editors of *Resurgent Voices*, in contrast, are political scientists who present the volume's themes and chapters within an overarching social movement theory framework. In addition to the three chapters written by the editors, the volume includes an excellent analysis by political scientist Alison Brysk of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement. Moreover, the volume's comprehensive and sensitive analysis of the interaction of indigenous actors and cultures with religious ideas, identities, and institutions gives this collection a greater theoretical and empirical coherence than others in this genre.

The focus on religion is particularly welcome. Although most political scientists have noted the vital role of Cath-

olic and Protestant churches and individuals in constructing indigenous organizations, and in providing advice, resources, and solidarity to indigenous movements, this book constitutes an important effort to fully explore the implications of contact with religious actors and institutions for the development of indigenous political movements, as well as the significant ways in which indigenous communities, movements, and cultures have shaped the institutional and theological development of Catholicism and Protestantism in Latin America. For example, Bruce Calder, in his chapter on Guatemala, notes not only how the Catholic Church "accompanied" Mayan Indians in their struggle against repression and racism but also how the Church increased in size and influence and became more diverse and progressive, through its involvement in indigenous struggles (p. 117). Moreover, although two of them come from the ranks of the scholarly clergy, the authors frankly assess the contributions as well as the obstacles presented by religious actors and institutions to the political and spiritual liberation of indigenous peoples, and they address the controversial topics of the role of clergy as intermediaries between indigenous communities and of the question of indigenous agency in social movements that are often dependent upon outsiders for access to resources and the state.

The editors' introduction provides a comprehensive gateway to a complex and geographically vast topic. Six chapters by political scientists, historians, and anthropologists provide case studies of countries with significant indigenous populations—Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, and Mexico—with both Guatemala and Mexico featured in two chapters. A seventh provides a rare study of Paraguay, where religious missions are intimately involved with indigenous communities. A chapter purporting to compare Bolivia and Peru actually focuses mainly on Bolivia and wrongly argues that "Peru does not have a national movement" (p. 58), a statement that has not been true since the formation in 1999 of the Permanent Conference of the Indigenous People of Peru (COPPIP), which has been quite active in the last several years. A number of important Peruvian regional organizations also are ignored. A comparative chapter by Stephen Judd provides a fascinating account of how indigenous catechists and clergy developed an autonomous "indigenous theology" in opposition to efforts by Christian churches to develop intercultural approaches to resolving the tension between universal truths and the diversity of local cultures. A fine conclusion by Timothy Steigenga reinforces the collection's four main themes: the syncretic nature of religious practice and institutions in Latin America; the role of religious actors, identities, and ideas in social movements; the effectiveness of spirituality-based social movements; and "the complexity and fluidity of both the religious marketplace and religious politics in Latin America" (p. 232).

The selection of cases contributes to a serious defect of the political science literature on Latin American indigenous peoples: a theoretically unjustified bias toward studying the same few countries, those with large indigenous populations and where indigenous movements have been most successful. The accumulation of knowledge in this field would be better served if scholars would devote more attention to understudied countries where interesting political developments are underway, such as Colombia, Guyana, and Venezuela, and to countries where, despite their efforts, indigenous peoples have achieved little, such as Argentina and Chile.

This is a book about political actors, causes, and outcomes, and also about ideas, culture, and faith. As such, it fills an important niche in the politics literature on indigenous peoples and on religion in Latin America. Students will encounter a straightforward introduction to both topics, while senior scholars will learn a great deal about the understudied convergence between two important forces in contemporary Latin American politics.

**Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies.** By Russell J. Dalton. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 230p. \$45.00.

— Allan Kornberg, *Duke University*

Russell Dalton has written an impressive, thoughtful, and useful comparative analysis of the origins, character, and consequences of variations in public support for a number of advanced industrial democracies, all of them long-term (since 1960) member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Following David Easton's landmark study (*A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, 1965), Dalton distinguishes three broad objects of political support—political communities, political regimes, and political authorities—and two types of support, diffuse and specific. These are operationalized by the author in Table 2.1. Most of his empirical data are derived from a variety of National Election Studies in member states, as well as World Value and Eurobarometer surveys. The book is organized in three parts.

Following an introductory chapter, Part I (Chapter 2) presents empirical evidence tracking changes in public political support in advanced industrial democracies. Part II examines rival theories that have been posited to explain changing public orientations toward democratic political systems. As an organizational device, Dalton employs the assumption of Allan Kornberg and Harold Clarke (*Citizens and Community*, 1992, p. 21) that there are two principal sources of political support. One is the socialization and resocialization experiences of people. These generate the values, attitudes, and perspectives that provide the context in which they make cost-benefit calculations. The latter are the second source of support in that they con-

cern the way political actors perform and political institutions and processes function. Dalton examines the first source in Chapters 4 and 5 and the second in 6 and 7. Chapter 3 begins the exercise by summarizing the major theories and providing some initial empirical tests. Part III (Chapters 8 and 9) examines the political consequences of variations in support and some of the major challenges and choices political authorities face in maintaining the continued viability of the states they lead.

Among the author's findings are that people are able to make meaningful distinctions among objects of support and that both the levels and the correlates of support vary for different political objects. For example, judgments about governmental performance correlate with support for incumbent authorities and institutions but not with community support (Chapter 3). Over the 1960–2000 period, political support has dropped disproportionately among the better educated and the young, rather than people at the margins of politics (Chapter 4).

This is in part a function of the gap between what citizens expect of governments and what the latter produce: "It is not so much that governments produce less, but that citizens expect more" (p. 151). Contributing to these increased expectations is the proliferation of interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, and new social movements that have assumed some of the interest aggregation/articulation functions that historically have been the province of political parties. These groups make more demands on government and increase the potential for people to feel that government is not addressing their concerns sufficiently. Negative evaluations of governmental performance and the willingness of the media to report on the peccadilloes, large and small, of politicians, on graft, on corruption, on waste, and so forth, as well as the sheer increase of the kind of media able to report on these matters, also have contributed to the erosion of support for governments, at least in the short term. However, Dalton argues that these have played only a secondary role (p. 198).

Not surprisingly, the erosion has had consequences. Thus, for example, the decline of trust in government erodes feelings that citizens should comply with government's directives, whether the latter involve paying taxes, following regulations, or a general respect for the law (p. 186). It has also discouraged public participation in conventional forms of electoral politics and greater approval of and engagement in elite-challenging forms of political action.

To repeat, Dalton acknowledges that by any measure, public confidence in and support for political authorities, political parties, and political institutions have declined over the past generation in advanced industrial democracies, although the pace and timing of the declines have varied by nations. Moreover, as noted, the decline of support has been disproportionately greater among younger upper-status groups. That is on the one hand.

On the other, support for political communities and pride in one's nation have held constant in most democracies (p. 192), and the younger, better-educated elements that have been the most critical of governments are also the strongest adherents to the norms and ideals of the democratic process. In brief, what they appear to want is *more*, not *less*, democracy and for their leaders to live up to democracy's ideals. He observes that the desire to move toward the democratic ideal that leads to periods of dissatisfaction is what has sparked the political reform that has been central to the expansion of democracy (p. 203).

*Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices* has much to recommend it. Dalton writes easily and well, and each chapter ends with a useful summary and discussion of the matters that have been addressed. He also is very much in command of the data on which this study rests. This is no small achievement given the 40-year time period and the number of states that are the focus of his investigation. It would have been relatively easy to figuratively drown in the data. Instead, he has marshaled them in an impressive series of tests of a variety of theoretical assumptions.

Throughout the book, Dalton is periodically skeptical but not dismissive of some of the explanations that have been offered for the decline of support for democratic governments and their leaders. This is especially the case in his concluding chapter, which, in a number of respects, is a kind of model of how to address the "why" and "so what" questions that almost inevitably arise in systematic, comparative, empirically grounded investigations.

That said, some of the strengths of the analysis of a relatively large number of cases over a substantial (40 years) time period also generates some problems. With respect to data presentation, for example, although some of the graphic displays are illuminating, much of the tabular material that features tables of 50-plus cells will present a daunting challenge to even the most interested readers. In addition, although some of the data available to the author are derived from panel studies, most of them are from cross-sectional studies. Of necessity, this constrains the confidence with which generalizations about trends and over-time changes in attitudes, values, and behavior can either be posited or accepted. In addition, the data from some of the national election studies were probably derived from face-to-face interviews, others by computer-assisted telephone interviews, and still others from mail-back questionnaires. Surely, this has resulted in variations in data quality and reliability. I noted above that Dalton periodically exhibits a healthy skepticism about some of the theoretical assumptions and explanations that have characterized research in this area. At times (p. 133), he also is skeptical about using some of the data pertinent to this investigation. One wishes, however, that he might have exercised the same degree of skepticism about the data available to him as he is of the uses others have made of it. But these are relatively minor caveats about what is, on the whole, a

genuine contribution to systematic comparative analysis by an accomplished social scientist.

**Politics Beyond the Capital: The Design of Subnational Institutions in South America.** By Kent Eaton. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 288p. \$55.00.

— Scott Mainwaring, *University of Notre Dame*

This is a good book about an interesting and important subject: waves of centralizing and decentralizing change over time and across four different country cases. The book analyzes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay from the nineteenth century to the present. More specifically, Kent Eaton examines 30 periods of movement toward greater or lesser centralization—12 in Argentina, 6 in Brazil, 5 in Chile, and 7 in Uruguay.

Eaton focuses mainly on change over time within these four countries and secondarily on differences across the four countries. He analyzes both the causes and consequences of centralization and decentralization. As many countries around the world have embarked on decentralization, this issue has become prominent. He eschews a parsimonious theory and emphasizes case specificity, path dependence (pp. 22–24), and causal complexity, yet he still advances one major generalizable argument. Democratization consistently leads to decentralization when subnational actors are important within their parties (Argentina and Brazil), but not when they are insignificant as party actors (Chile and Uruguay). This argument has multiple virtues: It is a testable generalization; the case studies support the conclusion; and it adds nuance to a deductively appealing simpler argument that democratization should *consistently* (rather than only when subnational actors are important in their parties) favor decentralization. Eaton carefully considers alternative explanations for understanding decentralization/centralization (pp. 9–19, 52–54).

The author also develops some interesting arguments on how presidentialism affects the bargaining game involved in designing subnational institutions. Presidents usually prefer greater centralization; during periods of competitive politics, legislatures often push for more decentralization.

Eaton persuasively argues that centralizing and decentralizing reforms often have unintended consequences. For example, in the 1990s, democratic leaders in Chile and Uruguay undertook what they intended to be modest decentralizing reforms, but these reforms have had more significant consequences than politicians envisioned. In Argentina, subnational politicians secured major decentralizing concessions in the 1980s, but these concessions fueled the country's economic meltdown in 2001.

The author's reasons for his country case selection are compelling. He argues that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay had the most significant record of relatively free and fair subnational elections of any countries in Latin

America prior to the post-1978 wave of democratization. At the same time, these four countries have very different “scores” on the dependent variable, that is, the centralization or decentralization of subnational institutions. For this reason, they escape the methodological problems associated with lack of variance in the dependent variable. During democratic periods, Argentina and Brazil have historically had federal systems with powerful governors and significant resources at the subnational level. In contrast, Chile and Uruguay have unitary systems that were historically quite centralized.

Eaton argues that the actors that have pushed for decentralization—when such a push has occurred—have been different in the four countries. In Argentina and Brazil, subnational politicians, especially governors, have led the drive for decentralization. In Chile and Uruguay, in contrast, national-level politicians have occasionally fostered modest decentralizing initiatives in order to achieve some of their own national-level objectives. Subnational actors have not been major players in decisions related to decentralization.

Eaton presents several persuasive arguments for looking at a broad historical sweep. First, doing so increases the number of cases because each wave of centralization and decentralization is then a distinct case. As is well known, having more cases is useful for explanatory purposes. Second, the past often illuminates key points about the present. For example, the lengthy history of past movements toward recentralization suggests that the decentralizing trends of the past two decades in much of Latin America could be reversed. Examination of the past enables us to understand what is distinctive about the present wave of decentralization. Third, he argues that bargaining over subnational institutions is a path-dependent game; scholars cannot understand the present game without analyzing the past. Finally, including historical cases allows social scientists to assess whether some arguments presented as generalizable are time-bound. At a time when there is some tendency toward a growing gap between political science and history, it is refreshing to read a book by a political scientist that evinces awareness of history.

This work adds much new information and insight to the analysis of decentralization and centralization, and its many virtues overshadow its shortcomings. My two criticisms revolve around differences in social science methodology more than deficiencies in the argument. First, the book would have benefited from a sharper operationalization of the dependent variable. Eaton sometimes implies (for example, p. 48) that the dependent variable is so multifaceted that it is not useful to rely on a few simple operational measures thereof. Yet it is helpful to have some consistent and systematized measures of the dependent variable even when it is complex and multidimensional. Second, perhaps to a fault, he avoids formulaic grand causal arguments that purport to hold up over time and across

cases. *Politics Beyond the Capital* is admirably fine-tuned to differences among cases and to change over time, but it offers less in the way of generalizations and theory building than some works in political science.

**The State Must Be Our Master of Fire: How Peasants Craft Culturally Sustainable Development in Senegal.** By Dennis C. Galvan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. 331p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

—Shaheen Mozaffar, *Bridgewater State College*

Oral history among the Serer ethnic group in western Senegal suggests that a heroic itinerant ancestor founded the community in a parcel of land he cleared by setting fire to the brush and the forest. This original fire is the source of the authority over claims to control and use the land that became institutionalized in the inheritable office now widely known by the title of *laman* (the “master of fire”). With the commodification of the economy under colonial rule, the introduction of a new land tenure system, and the creation of elected rural councils for local management of land tenure by the postcolonial government, the state has replaced the lamans as the master of fire. This history provides the fascinating title and the substantive focus of Dennis Galvan’s interesting book that addresses theoretically important and empirically relevant issues concerning the relative impact of structure and agency on the choice of new institutions, the resulting impact of embedded institutions on social and economic development, and, more broadly, the relationship among institutions, culture, and development.

Drawing on Anthony Giddens’s notion of the “duality of structures” and on Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, Galvan theoretically situates his analysis in the interplay of the formal and informal aspects of institutions (Chapter 1). He employs a “thick description” research strategy, skillfully combining demographic surveys, structured and open-ended interviews, and ethnographic participant observation to collect intensively detailed data on institutional changes introduced first under colonial rule and then by the postcolonial state in the land tenure and cultivation systems, and on responses to these changes, among the Serer of Siin. This is a subset of the larger but culturally and politically heterogeneous Serer ethnic group who live in an area that constituted the precolonial kingdom of Siin but now forms the administrative subzone of Njafaj in western Senegal (Chapter 2).

Galvan’s careful data analysis turns on the notion of “institutional syncretism,” the continuing process of creative bricolage by which Serer peasants blend elements of imposed and existing institutions by drawing on the interpretive and behavioral framework of the latter to respond strategically to the incentive structures of the former. But institutional syncretism is not a reflexive reaction of disembodied atavistic peasants to the

pressures of modernization. It is an incremental process structured by traditional ideology, culture, and associated moral values that endows institutions with legitimacy and gives meaning to resulting patterns of social, economic and political relationships. As the data analysis in Chapter 3 shows, Serer peasants are enmeshed within the traditional ideological and cultural frameworks and rely on the moral values embodied in these frameworks to interpret and accommodate the conflicting incentives of new and old institutions. But the strategic use of these moral values is the contingent outcome of conflicting historical memory and contested interpretations of tradition and culture that correlate with social structural variations in caste, age, gender, education, wealth, stated religious affiliations, and degree of religious orthodoxy. The result is the incremental adoption of new institutions and the uneven transformation of both new and old institutions.

For example, in response to the commodification of the economy, the expansion of the profitable peanut production, and the standardization of land tenure through the introduction of individual ownership and alienation rights under colonial rule, the Serer peasants adapted the traditional land tenure system based on a clear distinction between title and usufruct rights and enforcement by the lamans. The syncretic adaptation, which involved the informal practice of pawning land as collateral in exchange for a cash loan, successfully integrated the peasants into the profitable cash-crop economy without totally eradicating traditional notions and practice of land tenure, but also restricted the introduction of individualized freehold property rights (Chapter 4). The postcolonial Senegalese government introduced a comprehensive National Domain Law designed in part to correct this problem of “incomplete modernization” by transferring authority over the enforcement of the new land tenure system based on individual freehold and alienation rights from the lamans to state agencies. But by destroying the traditional local authority structures instead of co-opting them, the new institutional framework for the governance of land use failed to secure the legitimacy needed for the successful achievement of its stated goals. The result was a dual tenure system, one based on the formal institutions of the National Domain Law and the other based on the traditional informally negotiated arrangements, with corresponding decline in productivity and deterioration of land management (Chapter 5).

The Senegalese government’s ensuing attempt to correct these problems through the creation of democratically elected rural councils also failed in fully achieving their stated objectives, largely because of the dual and inherently contradictory institutional position of the rural councils as elected bodies and as agents of the centralized state. The demands of administrative uniformity limited the councils’ ability to respond flexibly with locally appropriate strategies to the varied concerns of the peasants

who elected them. So Serer peasants, even as they strategically used and adapted the official language of rights and equality and the administrative procedures of the rural councils (pp. 184–90), also vilified the rural councils as alien institutions with no legitimacy in local culture (pp. 190–206).

Galvan’s theoretical contribution lies in highlighting the interaction of structure and agency as the principal theoretical mechanism animating institutional syncretism. He correctly emphasizes the centrality of agency in reconstituting institutions but avoids the disembodied reflexivity of thin rational-choice explanations, as well as the structural determinism of institutional explanations. By stressing the contextual embeddedness of institutions, he draws attention to the strategic constraints on rational choice and, hence, to the contingencies that typically attend institutional choice and institutional outcomes.

Unfortunately, this contribution remains incomplete. The empirical materials in *The State Must Be Our Master of Fire* powerfully confirm the importance of informal institutions in securing high levels of self-enforcement, reducing transaction costs, and commanding popular legitimacy, three variables that are considered in comparative scholarship to be crucial determinants of institutional performance. But this importance, which is recognized only at the end of the book (p. 213), is never systematically theorized. Specification of the mechanisms by which high self-enforcement, reduced transaction costs, and sustained popular legitimacy help to solidify the cultural foundations that give institutions their strategic vitality and thus promote culturally sustainable development would have greatly enhanced the broader comparative utility of the book. For despite the unwarranted claim of the “sui generis qualities” of local culture and informal institutions (p. 228), the issues of institutional embeddedness and the interaction of culture and institutions in shaping political, social, and economic outcomes so creatively examined in the book have universal relevance.

**Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from 16 Developing Countries.** By Goran Hyden, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. 262p. \$55.00.

— Pádraig Carmody, *St. Patrick’s College, Dublin City University*

This is an unusual and intriguing book. It is both erudite and exploratory (as the authors acknowledge), brilliant in conception, and problematic in execution. It is based on the results of the World Governance Survey (WGS) of “well-informed people” (WIPs), such as high-ranking civil servants, long-standing parliamentarians, businesspeople, academics, and so on. At least 35 WIPs were surveyed in each of the 16 developing countries in the study. No one can doubt the importance of the topic that Goran Hyden, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease address, particularly given the increasing prominence that it occupies in development

theory and practice. The authors define governance as “the rules that regulate the public realm” (p. 16). They rightly seek to give badly needed analytical depth to its study.

The book sets the context well, tracing the historical shift and upscaling of development policy from project to program through to policy and now politics. Drawing inspiration from Amartya Sen’s work on development as a product of freedom, the authors develop the concept of governance in reference to the near universally accepted (by states) United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The study identifies a number of key questions, such as “are the rules applying to civil society legitimate in the eyes of key actors” (p. 4). Following on from this, Hyden, Court, and Mease develop a questionnaire on governance covering such issues as corruption, respect for property rights (public, private, and communal), living standards, personal security, and so on. This methodology, they argue, does not load the dice in favor of liberal democracies. For them, improved governance is as much about improving indigenous institutions as adopting new ones from the outside.

From the questionnaire, governance scores are then tabulated, and each of the results chapters then tackles a particular theme, such as civil or political society or the judiciary. Some countries, for example Jordan and China, perform notably better on the WGS than they do on other indices, such as the Freedom House Index. In part, perhaps this is because regime stability, which contributes to better scores on this survey, may be negatively correlated with democracy. For the authors, political society is the most critical link in the governance chain, and they argue that this works well in China. They also note that it is possible to have improved governance with a deteriorating economy, as in Indonesia in the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.

Overall, the study finds that governance has improved in 10 of the 16 countries over five years. The authors cite this as evidence that political and economic liberalization has been successful “at least as far as the rules of the game are concerned” (p. 45). Some might find their focus on process, rather than outcomes, problematic, however. Later in the book it is noted that government social welfare scores are low in countries that have undergone World Bank structural adjustment programs. It is difficult to discern whether “better” governance is the result of liberalization, donors’ governance programs (as the authors argue elsewhere in the book), or a secular trend toward greater institutionalization.

The authors make the interesting argument that governance is a prerequisite for both democracy and development. However, they do not find a correlation between a country’s governance score and economic growth or development. Nonetheless, they argue that regime type does matter in explaining growth and development, but they do not clearly show how it matters.

There are also some other problems with the methodology chosen. India scores third out of 16 on its aggregate governance score in the survey, but there are at least as many bonded child laborers in India as people in the United Kingdom. Surely this is one of the most egregious governance failures across economic, political, and civil society, and the different branches of the state. A cynic might subtitle the book *Voices of the Élite*. It is the poor who are on the sharp end of bad governance, for the most part.

Overall, *Making Sense of Governance* is somewhat difficult to read as it jumps from country to country and covers a substantial number of topics. This makes it hard to discern a unifying thread to the argument. Qualitative work tends to be most successful when it undertakes an in-depth analysis based on extensive engagement and fieldwork. This book employs a large-scale survey, from which it then describes the results. This makes it difficult to support some of the conclusions and hard to see how they were reached, for example, that “civil society appears to be *the potential* (emphasis added) engine for the improvement in governance” (p. 205). Problematic concepts, such as social capital, are also used without definition. The draft chapters for this project are available on the Web, and some of them are more theoretically developed than the eventual ones, perhaps because of space constraints.

Many questions are left unanswered. Is it really the quality of the state that determines governance? Do developmental states conform to the tenets of good governance? Are there intertemporal trade-offs between different rights, or are they temporally interdependent? Is the rights-based conception of governance adopted in the study sufficient to capture these and other issues? For example, neoliberal economic governance is about much more than respect for property rights and anticorruption measures.

The premise behind this book, that governance deserves more empirical research in order to develop the concept analytically, is well founded. However, the methodology adopted gives us little understanding of the drivers of good governance, beyond somewhat speculative assertions. Nonetheless, this is a provocative and worthwhile book and a clarion call for more research, analytical depth, and clarity about the nature, causes, and consequences of governance.

**Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union.** By Joseph Jupille. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 294p. \$80.00.

— David M. Wood, *University of Missouri-Columbia*

According to Joseph Jupille, “procedural politics” extracts from the European Union’s policymaking process the conflicts and maneuvers regarding which of the EU institutions will have a say in which policy decisions, and how important that say will be. Ordinary procedural politics

are of considerable importance, and the case studies the author presents give us an excellent picture of the coalition building and conflict resolution that goes on among the member states' ministers, the Commission officials, and the leaders and committees of the European Parliament. The cases go into considerable depth and display procedural politics in a fascinating variety of forms. Procedural politics among the EU institutions regard how issues are defined in order to be classified according to the varying treaty-defined competences of the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the European Parliament. But ordinary procedural politics goes on in a time frame that is bounded by new treaty rules as to what procedures will be applicable to what policy issues. In ordinary procedural politics, that is, during periods in between Treaty revisions, the Commission can employ a variety of strategies and tactics to keep Council members on its side or else in conflict with one another short of the point where division means stalemate. As it has gained in power via treaty revisions, the Parliament can be expected to win something from these battles, sometimes on its own, at other times in alliance with the Commission.

As noted, the main actors in these dramas are three EU institutions. Procedural politics involves coalition building, with policy substance being the focal points of temporary partnerships between pairs of the three central actors, sometimes the Commission and the Parliament and sometimes the Council and the Commission, but not, at least in the cases examined, the Council and the Parliament. The Commission would appear to enjoy the enviable position of being able to choose which of the other two will be its partner in any particular conflict over procedure. While the Parliament was in a relatively weak position before the major treaty bargains of the past two decades, the Commission was at times a valuable ally against the Council; but Jupille also presents cases wherein the more powerful Council and Commission could leave the Parliament on the outside looking in. Surprisingly, this included a case that was resolved in favor of a coalition of the Commission with the Council and against the wishes of the Parliament, in spite of, or perhaps because of, the stronger position of the Parliament in the period following the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. In all of these cases, the European Court of Justice played the role of final arbiter.

But what happens when none of the three possible pairings can materialize? This may be the case when the Commission refuses to initiate a policy that either the Council or the Parliament, or both, would support; or when even a qualified majority is unavailable in the Council for a Commission proposal that the Parliament would support. The author recognizes that deadlocks occur, but turns his back on the principal means by which they might be resolved, that is, by decisions reached between heads of state and government—not in the Council of

Ministers, but rather in the European Council or via less formal contacts that produce compromises the Council of Ministers and the Commission can implement. In the book's index, the entry for the European Council is "see the Council of the European Union." Likewise, the entry for the Council of Ministers is "see Council of the European Union." Under the latter heading, many pages are listed, in which "the Council" referred to as the Council of Ministers, which, as noted, is one of the principal players of "procedural politics." So is the European Council, which is the name of the body of heads of state and government who have usually met three to four times a year, among other purposes, to resolve the issues that the other players of procedural politics cannot resolve. This happens because the only players who can resolve the issues are the heads of state and government. But they are not playing procedural politics. What they reach agreement on is substantive policy, unless they are going a step further and agreeing on changes in the rules that govern both substantive and procedural politics, as they also have in the historic agreements that have produced treaty revisions.

It is in this latter function that the author acknowledges the existence of a sort of *deus ex machina*. He distinguishes between procedural politics, which involves the choice of procedure available, whether it be consultation, cooperation, or codecision, and higher-order decisions involved in treaty revision. Yet these higher-order decisions are the source of the rules that constitute "procedural politics." This is not to say that they overshadow procedural politics. It is to say that by keeping procedural revision out of the definition of procedural politics, the predictability of procedural politics is time-bound, because it must periodically give way to new rules of the game, as new treaties come into effect and, until the EU Constitution comes on board, hopefully to be more stable, less susceptible to major changes than the preceding series of treaties have been.

But there will always be procedural politics. The contribution of Jupille's work is to bring it into clearer focus as an important part of the EU's scope of policymaking competence. While it is this reviewer's view that the author has not made it clear enough what procedural politics is *not*, he has given us some highly effective tools for understanding procedural politics when it does occur.

**The Moral Economy of Welfare States: Britain and Germany Compared.** By Steffen Mau. New York: Routledge, 2003. 248p. \$114.95.

— Janet C. Gornick, *City University of New York*

As postwar welfare state accords unraveled in the 1970s, welfare state scholarship grew rapidly, with most scholars aiming to identify the determinants of policy variation and growth. Scholars typically debated the relative roles of



economic and demographic factors, political configurations, and national attitudes and preferences. In subsequent decades, many researchers turned their attention from the *determinants* of welfare state development to the *effects* of social policies on varied social, economic, and behavioral outcomes. At the same time, a number of scholars moved away from social expenditures as the primary measure of welfare state effort and aimed instead to analyze the institutional features, or the architecture, of public provisions. Furthermore, scholars began to argue that the welfare state's causes and effects were, in fact, multi-directional. Welfare state features shape socioeconomic outcomes, political alliances, and preferences, and in turn are shaped and maintained by their own effects.

Steffen Mau's book draws on each of these recent shifts as it tackles its central question: To what extent do people's attitudes toward welfare state provisions derive from self-interested versus altruistic impulses and judgements, and how are those impulses and judgements shaped by actual welfare state designs?

Mau begins by establishing that legions of scholars have assumed and/or argued that citizens' approval of welfare state provision is largely instrumentalist. In short, people see the welfare state as legitimate when, and to the extent that, it enhances their own welfare. As Mau notes: "The material self-interest and self-regard of social groups have been served up as the master determinant for the analysis of welfare state stability and the political conflicts of welfare state restructuring" (p. 5). He observes that "it has been assumed that the distributive preferences of the people are aligned with the output structure of the welfare arrangement" (p. 20).

Mau, however, is skeptical that "pocket-book motives" have been the dominant factor. Drawing on the work of Albert Hirschmann, Amartya Sen, John Elster, Samuel Bowles, and others, he concludes that theories that rely on the explanatory power of self-interest alone neglect the crucial role of other factors that demonstrably influence people's orientations toward the welfare state: "Without other motivational sources of the normative kind, many of the welfare state assets which realize huge resource transfers between social groups would not be sustainable and would evoke strong resistance" (p. 20).

Mau's counteroffer is the logic of reciprocity. The citizens of developed welfare states are neither fully self-interested nor altruistic; they are instead (borrowing from Howard Becker) *homo reciprocus*. Reciprocity, in most cases, means that people expect some kind of reward for their efforts (such as the promise of protection) and a guarantee that transfers entail rights and obligations from both payer and recipient. The reciprocity perspective, he argues, requires that we pay careful attention to social programs' operating rules: "Emphasizing reciprocity as a vital principle in organizing and legitimizing welfare exchanges makes it clear that the reasons why people endorse trans-

fer policies have to be located within the social logic of these exchanges themselves" (p. 35).

The heart of Mau's work, then, is his empirical analysis, which he reports in the sixth chapter. There, he links welfare state features in Britain and Germany (East and West separately, where possible) in five programmatic areas—"redistribution," social assistance, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, and health and sickness benefits—to self-reported attitudes and preferences regarding social provisions. Data on attitudes and preference come from three international data sets (the International Social Survey Programme, the Eurobarometer, and the International Social Justice Project) and two country-specific ones (the British Social Attitudes Survey and the German General Social Survey). In each of the five program areas, the author identifies the "implicit and sometimes explicit norms of reciprocity" (p. 89) embedded in the program design, and aims to clarify how various structural determinants account for British and German attitudes toward the collective welfare provisions in their countries.

Mau argues that the empirical evidence confirms that, in general, people accept welfare state programs when they are built on norms of reciprocity: "People are driven by a mix of motives and if the arrangements are morally plausible and perceived as fair in terms of sharing burdens and benefits they are also willing to make costly sacrifices" (p. 196). Norms of reciprocity are present to varying degrees across countries and across programs, and, not surprisingly, attitudes vary across both welfare regimes and welfare sectors.

Despite the methodological limits of a two-country study—three when East and West Germany are separated—Mau makes a persuasive case that welfare state designs "cause" attitudes; he has effectively marshaled several literatures as well as his own empirical evidence. *The Moral Economy of Welfare States* is a valuable resource for comparative welfare state scholars at the graduate level and above.

That said, the book also has some crucial weaknesses. Its central claim, a relatively narrow one, is repeated too often, quickly wearing out the reader. The writing is overly formal and, in addition, the author's (or copy editor's?) decision to present the entire book in the passive voice ("it has been argued that . . .") was an unfortunate one. That construction is exhausting and, on too many occasions, I was unable to discern whether the author was discussing his own conclusions or that of another scholar.

More substantively, the book seems oddly disconnected from some contemporary issues that clearly affect acceptance of welfare state provisions. Other than a single (and extremely understated) observation about the Nazi period—"welfare policies also entailed a previously unpracticed discrimination policy excluding other ethnic groups" (p. 74)—Mau neglects immigration, ethnicity,

and race, despite their increasing salience in both Britain and Germany. Furthermore, his empirical analysis omits the social programs that feminist welfare state scholars have so effectively brought to the fore in recent years—especially work–family reconciliation policies. This is an unfortunate omission, as the generosity and design of these policies are contested, and changing rapidly, in his study countries.

### Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics

**Worldwide.** By Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 348p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.99 paper.

— Carolyn M. Warner, *Arizona State University*

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart tackle two pressing empirical and theoretical questions about religion and politics: Why have most wealthy countries become less religious, and why have most poor countries become more religious? Their answer will be no surprise to those who have followed Inglehart's research over the years: The socioeconomic and external security conditions in which people grow up strongly affect their propensity to be religious. Those who were socialized during conditions of "existential security" have less need for religion; those whose formative years were marked by conditions of insecurity (to themselves, their families, or their communities) have much more need for religion. As with Inglehart's earlier work on postindustrial values (*The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, 1977), the main variable is socioeconomic well-being and security when young.

The book is an effort to show that despite appearances to the contrary, secularization theory is viable. Much recent scholarship has argued the contrary, that secularization theory, rather than God, is dead. The theory has been challenged by the facts of extensive religious participation and its political influence in the United States, as well as the rise of religious parties and movements across the globe, including in Europe. Even if people do not attend religious services, the majority in many wealthy countries express a belief in God. Modernization and industrialization, with their emphasis on rationality and science, do not eradicate religiosity. Yet Norris and Inglehart want to make a strong case for secularization theory. They do so by presenting "a revised version of secularization theory" (p. 4), which holds that people turn to religion when their world is insecure. Faced with poverty and violence, religion trumps science.

The book also disputes the theory of religious markets, derived from rational choice theory and supply-side economics. This theory holds that the demand for religion is constant, while the supply of it, and hence societal religiosity, varies according to the extent of competition among faiths.

The authors' argument is based on two axioms. The first is that societies differ in their level of security and that those conditions may vary over time within any given society, and across any given society at particular times. The second is a "cultural traditions" axiom (pp. 17–18), which implies that even as countries become secular, they become secular in Protestant or Catholic or Islamic ways (though there are negligible differences on attitudes toward major moral issues across religions): "Even in highly secular societies, the historical legacy of given religions continues to shape world-views and to define cultural zones" (p. 17).

The book's first chapter develops six hypotheses, which the authors claim are suggested by the two axioms. The first one, and the book's main hypothesis, which the reader might also confuse with their theory, is that "*the experiences of growing up in less secure societies will heighten the importance of religious values, while conversely, experience of more secure conditions will lessen it*" (p. 18, italics in original). This hypothesis relies on a psychological view of religion: that religions reassure individuals that despite all the difficulties and threats they face, "things work out" (p. 19).

Norris and Inglehart develop several more hypotheses (pp. 20–24); the second is identical to their second axiom: that even as societies secularize, the dominant religion will be discernible in the values of the society. The third hypothesis is that as religious values lose their importance, participation in religious services and organizations drops. The fourth is that participation in religious organizations is related to participation in civic organizations; the fifth is that existential security reduces religious values, which in turn reduces fertility rates; and the sixth is that "greater religious pluralism and also greater religious freedom will both increase religious participation" (p. 24). The authors are taking advantage of their 76-country data set to test a variety of hypotheses that have been dominant in the literature in the past 20 years (the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey panels from 1981 to 2000).

The main conclusion is a striking contrast to the Huntington thesis: There is no clash of civilizations; there is, instead, a clash of demographics: Rich people are more secular and have fewer children, while poor people are more religious and have more kids. There are more poor people in the world having more kids, and fewer rich people in the world having fewer kids; therefore, "*the world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before*" (p. 25; cf. p. 64; italics in original).

The authors use generational data; as a result, they do not expect religiosity to fluctuate with immediate economic conditions and disasters but that different generations in the same country will have been exposed to different levels of security during their formative years, and that the values acquired during those years will hold (pp. 28–29). Unfortunately, they undermine this thesis with frequent comments to excuse poor correlations and

regression results, including that peoples' religiosity can be deeply affected by immediate events, such as September 11. More puzzling is that for a theory that depends on time as a key factor, they often pool their data, thereby washing out the variance in existential security of different generations within the same country (e.g., pp. 68, 235).

Perhaps the book's most interesting finding is presented in Chapter 6: What differentiates the West from the rest of the world, and most especially from Islamic societies, is the level of support for "gender equality and sexual liberalization" (p. 149), not support for democratic governance. Their survey data show that while there is a broadly similar level of public opinion support for democratic governance, there is a striking gap in attitudes directly affecting women and sexual mores.

The statistical analyses employed by the authors cannot do away with the glaring anomaly of high religiosity in the United States. According to their theory, the United States should, because of its high level of human development, rank low. It does not. Some inconsistency is evident in the way they try to do away with the anomaly by discrediting the statistics. In order to discredit the religious market theory, they point out that religiosity is still high in two countries where a religion had a virtual monopoly, Ireland and Italy (p. 94), but it is only for the U.S. case that they argue that the survey data are systematically inflated due to the "social desirability bias concerning churchgoing in American culture" (p. 91). However, one could say the same of Italy and Ireland. Further, given that the presumed bias only increases religiosity by a few percentage points, they turn to ad hoc explanations, such as immigration to the United States by Hispanics and Asians, suggesting that those immigrants are more religious than the rest of the population, and therefore distort the underlying trend toward decreasing religiosity. However, if that is the case, European countries should see similar effects. They do find a correlation between poverty and frequency of prayer in the United States, with the poor, on that measure, being "*almost twice as religious as the rich*" (p. 108, italics in original). Yet rich Americans still present an anomaly: 47% of them claim to pray daily.

Operationalization of some variables is problematic. For instance, Norris and Inglehart claim to debunk the part of secularization theory that holds that a "rational worldview" undermines religious beliefs (pp. 8–9, 67). However, they do so by measuring attitudes toward the benefits of science, not by measuring attitudes toward rationality in government, society, and daily life. European societies have experienced some of the worst excesses of scientific discoveries, and so it may not be surprising that they do not tend to think that scientific advances will help humanity (pp. 67–68).

The major failing of *Sacred and Secular* is that it wavers on two of its key assertions. First, it is ambiguous about the mechanism by which "existential security" affects

individuals: Sometimes it is by way of diffuse communication within a society, sometimes by way of personal experience. Second, the authors caution that the socialization effect can be reversed by current events. In the end, readers may find the book frustrating, because it raises far more questions than it answers. There are so many country-, region-, and era-specific exceptions to their rule that one wonders at times if the theory is anything more than a statistical artifact. The book is, nevertheless, essential reading for those engaged in the debate about secularization theory and about religiosity throughout the world, and it invites further theorizing and research on these subjects.

**Community-Driven Regulation: Balancing Development and the Environment in Vietnam.** By Dara O'Rourke. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004. 288p. \$62.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Erika Weinthal, *Tel Aviv University*

The prevailing assumption among scholars and policy-makers alike is that developing countries have a poor track record when it comes to environmental protection. Dara O'Rourke challenges this assumption through the lens of six extremely well researched case studies of environmental regulation in Vietnam. Specifically, his book is motivated by the puzzle that despite Vietnam's rapid integration into the global economy, weak state capacities, and the promotion of industrialization over environmental protection, effective environmental regulation has emerged. O'Rourke argues that local communities are spearheading environmental protection in Vietnam, and precisely because environmental protection has emerged as a bottom-up effort, which he terms "community-driven regulation" (CDR), Vietnam may be better posed to balance development with environmental concerns.

Those interested in comparative environmental policy-making should read the book. It offers an original argument about environmental policymaking in developing countries that challenges conventional theories of state-driven and market-induced environmental protection. Moreover, O'Rourke's CDR model offers concrete policy prescriptions for shoring up regulations and public participation in developing countries.

According to O'Rourke's CDR model, effective environmental regulation is derived from "local mobilization" rather than "top-down prescriptions" (p. 51). Chapter 7, which could have easily been placed earlier in the book, offers a succinct summary of effective community-driven regulations in which communities that are directly affected by local industrial pollution demand such regulations from state agencies and firms. In brief, a community initiates a regulatory policy process by writing complaint letters to local government agencies and/or carrying out small-scale protests. In response to community demands, local

environmental agencies then carry out investigations, gather data, analyze the performance of firms, and perhaps also issue fines or demand technological improvements. If the community believes that state action has not resulted in any visible change for the better, the community elicits the assistance of extralocal actors, such as the media or nongovernmental organizations, to place additional pressure on the firm. Ultimately, a community's ability to achieve environmental regulations depends upon its mobilizing strategies, internal cohesion, and external linkages. This model, unlike other theories of state or public participation, captures the complex web of interactions among communities, state environmental agencies, extralocal actors, and firms in bringing about effective environmental regulations.

The six case studies presented to illuminate the CDR model draw upon impressive research carried out throughout Vietnam and across urban and rural communities. These case studies also examine four types of firms, including centrally managed state-owned enterprises, a locally managed state-owned enterprise, a foreign-owned firm, and a joint-venture firm, in order to understand what motivates different types of firms to respond to community demands and hence comply with environmental regulations. The most well known case addressed in the book concerns a Korean-owned firm that produces Nike shoes. The Nike case (Chapter 6) provides a stark contrast with the state-owned and joint-venture firms because local pressure alone was insufficient to change environmental and labor practices; rather, a network of NGOs and activists outside of Vietnam was also necessary to force the sneaker plant to introduce improvements in its working conditions.

The main lesson that emerges from the CDR model is that communities can take action and work to improve their immediate environmental situation. This book provides several powerful stories about "thinking locally, acting locally." Less convincing, however, is O'Rourke's claim that the CDR model holds promise for balancing environmental concerns with development more broadly. Most of the cases are really about NIMBY (i.e., Not in My Backyard) issues and not about generating a more environmentally sustainable approach to economic development or promoting effective environmental regulation at the national level. In fact, a very traditional definition of sustainable development is employed that does not call into question the economic growth paradigm, which has been at the heart of many of the antiglobalization protests. The book also fails to demonstrate how pervasive CDR is beyond these select cases within and outside of Vietnam.

O'Rourke's CDR model gives primary agency to the role of communities in bringing about effective environmental regulations and in increasing the capacity of state regulatory agencies. State-centered explanations that deal with the command-and-control approach, in which the

state promulgates regulations and then is able to enforce them, are dismissed. As a result, the book does not consider alternative state-centered explanations that focus on the role of the state in creating the appropriate institutional context. Such explanations might suggest that before communities can act locally, the state must provide the appropriate "rules of the game" to empower these communities. In fact, O'Rourke's analysis inadvertently shows that communities were only able to initiate a regulatory process because of state-directed institutional change. In the 1990s, the state introduced a set of new environmental laws (e.g., 1993 Law on Environmental Protection) and procedures for monitoring and enforcement that created favorable conditions for the public to complain about industrial pollution and for compensation to be provided to those who suffered economic hardship from the pollution.

The book concludes with a clear set of policy prescriptions for policymakers concerning how to strengthen CDR-like processes in Vietnam and in other developing countries. These conclusions focus on devising mechanisms for community input and strengthening the role of NGOs, along with improving state capacity of the regulatory agencies and developing incentives for firms to engage in pollution prevention. Yet, while CDR is depicted as a bottom-up process, the conclusion takes an abrupt turn and promotes top-down "intentional" policy prescriptions to broaden community participation in the decision-making process on environmental issues and to strengthen state capacity. What remains ambiguous is whether communities first need to mobilize before international organizations can intervene or whether international organizations can also initiate a community-driven process.

Overall, O'Rourke's claim that communities are vibrant is persuasive. More so, the book provides a refreshing reminder that researchers and policymakers should not overlook the power and commitment of communities for promoting effective environmental policy in developing countries. Given the growing awareness for improving state capacity in developing countries, O'Rourke should also be commended for providing an additional mechanism (i.e., CDR) for strengthening the administrative capacity of state agencies responsible for regulating industrial activities and thus enforcing environmental regulations.

**Picking Winners: From Technology Catch-up to the Space Race in Japan.** By Saadia Pekkanen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 304 pages, \$45.00.

— Dennis Patterson, *Texas Tech University*

The purpose of this book is to use the postwar Japanese political-economic experience to answer a question that has divided Japan and other Asian scholars for over two

decades, namely, how governments choose which industries to favor. This is an important question for both intellectual and policy reasons. Indeed, answering this question will help determine which of two very different points of view better explains Japan's postwar trajectory and will assist the governments of the developing world to design and enact policies that best serve their economic development goals. Saadia Pekkanen addresses this question with a rich variety of quantitative and qualitative data, the former captured in an expanded data set that breaks down the Japanese economy and trade and industrial policy tools by two-digit economic sectors, and the latter involving short case discussions of specific industrial sectors and an extended case study of the commercial space industry.

After stating the problem to be addressed, the author clarifies the two views that have competed for dominance as the best explanation for Japan's postwar economic trajectory. One view sees the Japanese government selecting industries for promotion on the basis of economic criteria, such as their contribution to the industrial and technological future of Japan's manufacturing base. This view is rooted in the idea that governments can identify economic sectors that are characterized by external economies and rents and see that they get resources they otherwise would not get. This view also places Japan's bureaucrats at the center of the economic policymaking process, which contrasts significantly with the alternative view that understands industry selection as the result of political considerations, specifically, the reelection concerns of Japan's politicians. This view places Japan's elected officials at the center of the policymaking process, who then use the government resources available to them to serve their own parochial interests.

Each of these two views predicts a very different allocation of government resources, and Pekkanen concludes that the distribution of industrial support suggests that the Japanese government selected industries to support more on the basis of economic criteria than in light of the reelection concerns of Japan's politicians. She makes this determination by means of an extensive and carefully designed econometric analysis, after which she expands on the quantitative results with several sector-specific case studies and a larger case study of Japan's commercial space industry. Since the book's conclusions rest entirely on the quantitative analysis, that part of the volume deserves more attention.

Pekkanen builds on an earlier analysis published in the *Review of Economics and Statistics* in 1996 by defining eight tools of trade and industrial policy and then determining how much of each was received by 12 two-digit economic sectors from 1955 to 1990. To explain the varying levels of government support each sector received, she separately regresses these tools of trade and industrial policy on nine independent variables that capture both the economic and political logic by which these government resources may have been allocated. While the results do

not show overwhelming support for either view, the author contends that the preponderance of quantitative evidence is in favor of the view that the Japanese government selected industries to support on the basis of economic criteria. To be sure, this is an important finding that is evaluated in different ways with quantitative data and expanded on in the case discussions, but its validity rests on several assumptions that may not in fact be supportable by the analysis presented in this book. These assumptions involve both general questions about how the research design addressed the overall problem of industry selection in postwar Japan and specific problems about whether the model was specified in a way that supports the book's overall conclusion.

While there are a number of specific model-specification issues that call the author's conclusions into question, three are most important. First, the author eliminated the mining sector from the analysis, which other researchers have shown to be quite favored by the Japanese government. She stated that the book's purpose was to focus on Japan's industrial sectors (fair enough), but others have shown that the mining sector—a sector that is hardly representative of a bureaucratically directed, nationally oriented industrial policy—received more low-interest Japan Development Bank loans, government subsidies, and tax relief than any other economic sector. In light of this, one has to ask how the overall results would have differed if this thirteenth sector was included in the analysis.

Second, the author includes the impact that *amakudari* (the practice of placing bureaucrats into private sector positions after retirement) may have had on the allocation of government support to Japan's 12 economic sectors, and the results show that it was by and large not an important explanatory factor. The econometric results are clear, but the author interprets them as supporting the view that economic criteria were mostly responsible in the selection of the industries that the government would favor. This is curious since the literature on Japanese industrial policy argues that *amakudari* is a tool of Japan's bureaucrats, and not politicians. Consequently, the overall insignificance of this variable rejects the economic and not the political view.

Thirdly, the influence of politicians in industry selection is measured by the number of votes an economic sector has, and the author concludes that this variable was not an important explanatory factor. The reason is that, when significant, the signs on this variable's coefficients were not in the expected positive direction. There are essentially two problems with this conclusion. First, expecting the number of votes in an economic sector to be positively related to the amount of government support it received assumes that economic sectors were favored by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) strictly on the basis of their size. We know well that the LDP favored certain sectors over others, which tells us that this variable does not capture the potential impact that political criteria may have on

industry selection. To capture this, we would need to identify critical LDP sectors through dummy variables or, given the importance of small business for the LDP, the average size of firms in a sector. Second, we know from the political economy literature that it is when economic sectors are in decline that they become politically vocal, and not when they are economically healthy and growing. This means that we should expect the coefficients on this variable to be negative rather than positive.

In light of these model specification problems, we need to ask if the results presented in *Picking Winners* actually support the economic criteria view. In Chapter 3, the author uses two measures to trace the ranking of sectors in terms of the trade and industrial policy support they received. This is an interesting and thoughtful analysis, but it leads this reviewer to a very different conclusion than the one presented. From 1955 to 1990, Japan's leading-edge industries, such as transportation machinery, electrical machinery, and precision instruments, consistently ranked lower on government support levels than such politically sensitive industries as basic metals, textiles, and paper. Again, in light of this and other issues raised here, can we conclude that government support for Japanese industry was directed by bureaucrats in light of nationally focused economic criteria? While this book has not made a convincing case for an affirmative answer, it has opened the door to the nature of the problem we face with respect to Japanese industrial policy and the manner in which it needs to be addressed. For these reasons, the book is essential reading for all interested in Japanese industrial policy in particular and postwar Japanese political economy in general.

**God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh.**

By Ali Riaz. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 232p. \$69.00 cloth, \$28.95 paper.

— Elliot Tepper, *Carleton University*

Ali Riaz's book may be too easily dismissed as either glib or alarmist. It opens with an attention-getting question that is the title of Chapter 1: "Is Bangladesh Becoming a Taliban State?" Riaz's answer is startling: For reasons elaborated upon, "it becomes clear that a variant of Talibanism is on the horizon" (p. 11). The rest of the book is divided into chapters that support his thesis. There are copious detailed footnotes, an extensive bibliography, appendices that provide a useful chronology of political events, and descriptions of the leaders of Bangladesh.

Many see Bangladesh as possessing a tolerant, inclusive Islam and a vibrant, secular civil society. That is, after all, one of the reasons proffered for the violence, the "purifying" actions, of the Pakistani army in the 1971 civil war, leading to the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. But the author shows that close attention to the rise of Islamism offers reasons for con-

cern. Along the way, the book offers a reexamination of Bangladesh's political evolution, a coherent theoretical foundation, and useful distinctions and definitions about Islam today. It is a serious scholarly book, vividly written, and ominous.

The central contention is that recent political alliances that brought Islamist parties into government for the first time should be seen as part of a process, one that has been going on for the past two and half decades. The reason that parties once reviled by nationalists for opposing the creation of Bangladesh (and Pakistan before it) could gain such sway can be explained best, in Gramscian terms, as the failure of alternative ideologies to gain hegemony and the breakup of the of the ruling hegemonic forces. Nationalism thins out and divides; Islamists expand into the gap. Extreme competition and opportunism among mainstream parties, both military and electoral, lead to steady introduction of Islamic elements into public discourse, which over time strengthens the Islamists to the point that they impose increasingly their own specialized, conservative version of Islam. Weakness or indecisiveness by secular movements in civil society further opens the path to expansion. Successive chapters illustrate the battle lines, showing the steady enlargement of Islamist space and the decline of opposing forces.

The battle lines skillfully detailed are the stuff of Bangladeshi politics since independence. First, the author shows the intricacies of party politics and how the Islamist parties maneuver among them in an ever-successful fashion. Always rejected decisively at the polls, they gain influence by backing one mainstream party and then another, switching sides as often as needed. Nonelected military leaders seek legitimacy by turning to Islamic coloration. Felicitous phrases encapsulate the phenomenon, such as "The Politics of Expediency" and "confessional nationalism" (p. 41). He then goes on to an examination of areas of public life affected by the rise of Islamist elements. Chapter 2 is devoted to "Persecuted Minorities and the Enemy Within," a chilling account of the fate of Hindus in Bangladesh. Although there were few communal riots in Bangladesh until the 1990s, steady pressure and state measures led to the "missing millions," the out-migration of Hindus. Then came the riots. The next chapter deals with the rise of fatwas, religious edicts, and "Islamification" of traditional local courts in the countryside. Women and development organizations are the special victims. The following chapter examines "Three Battles of the Secularists," including the well-known matter of the fatwa against Taslima Nasreen. Here the author faults the secularists for failure to cohere and to persevere, and so over time they lose capacity to oppose the rising influence of Islamists. The book concludes with a look "Beyond Bangladesh," a brief comparison with Indonesia and Pakistan. And Riaz finds great similarities: the rise of Islamism due to the failure or rupture of ruling

ideologies, accommodative politics of secular parties, and the relation to authoritarian regimes.

One of the strengths of the book is the careful distinctions and definitions presented. A lengthy section distinguishes between fundamentalism and Islamism, which he insists “is inherently a political phenomenon and by no means something Islamic” (p. 14). The final chapter is of interest to the broader field of comparative politics and policy, seeking to make sense of Islam in a post-9/11 context. The author is a political scientist and journalist; the book is a mix of analytical insight and evocative prose.

There are both “clinkers and blinkers” that mar the text. When in opposition to other authors’ interpretation of Bangladesh politics, Riaz is unduly harsh and self-serving. Readers who care about Bangladesh will benefit from the interpretations of Talukdar Maniruzzaman, for example. When in deep Gramsci mode (mercifully brief), Riaz is capable of reductive characterization of Kamal Hossain, the distinguished human rights leader, barrister, and author of the constitution, as “an ideologue of the nationalist movement” (p. 27). Rise in day-to-day violence is attributed to the rise of Islamism, though violent lawlessness has been an endemic issue since liberation. In the section on minorities, no mention is made of Muslim minorities, including the “Biharis.” The external environment is mostly ignored; events in Bangladesh are indigenous. Thus, dropping secularism from the early state ideology is related solely to the rise of Islamism, the author’s thesis, with no reference to the reported Saudi role, which withheld vital recognition of the new state until the “Godlessness” was removed, and may still be playing a role in facilitating the rise of Islamism in Bangladesh. General Zia is portrayed as introducing Islam while president in order to gain popularity and legitimacy; he also heavily relied on development and on regional diplomacy for the same reasons. India is barely mentioned.

Bangladesh seems nowhere near Talibanization in the immediate future. Secular forces are not as helpless nor ineffective as implied; the underlying culture is not as supportive of authoritarian Islam as the tight focus on the Islamist phenomenon may suggest. However, *God Willing* provides a service by drawing our attention to how deeply entrenched Islamism is, and how much nearer the possibility of some form of Talibanization has become.

**Election Timing.** By Alastair Smith. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 286p. \$75.00.

— Anthony McGann, *University of California, Irvine*

Alistair Smith has written, no doubt, the definitive book on the timing of elections in the United Kingdom. This, together with two party swings, is a subject that greatly concerns politicians and commentators in Britain. The

conventional wisdom is that the choice of election date is a crucial decision for the incumbent prime minister, and that this choice gives the incumbent a considerable advantage. This follows from the ability of the incumbent to engage in “political surfing” (holding election when the government’s popularity is at its highest) or to actively manage the political business cycle to achieve favorable economic conditions at the time of the election. Smith argues, however, that this advantage is overstated. The very act of calling an early election sends a signal to voters that the government has information about future performance that it wishes to hide from the voters. As a result, when governments call early elections, their actual vote share tends to be considerably less than the opinion polls before the announcement would suggest. For example, when Margaret Thatcher called early elections in 1982, she got 42% of the vote, as opposed to preannouncement polls of 48%.

The author constructs a Bayesian game theoretic model to demonstrate this logic. He shows that it is only rational for a government that anticipates a decline in performance to call early elections and sacrifice the remainder of its term. Realizing this, voters will lower their assessment of the government, making an early election even less desirable to a government confident of future performance. Indeed, one simple version of the model works too well—it predicts that it never makes sense to call an early election. However, when certain refinements are added (not all voters are sophisticated enough to process the signal sent by early elections; early elections catch the opposition off-guard and not prepared for a campaign), we get more plausible results. In this case, early elections will pit incompetent incumbents against ill-prepared challengers.

Of course, the model is susceptible to the criticism that few voters are sufficiently sophisticated to reason in such terms. However, Smith does not need to show that many individuals follow this reasoning. It is possible that many individuals follow cues from relatively few sources, and indeed, he goes to considerable lengths to show that governments that call early elections are accused by the media and the opposition of “cutting and running” and having something to hide. The burden of proof on the author is to show that the electorate as a whole behaves as if it used the information provided by the government’s choice of election date.

The remainder of the book tests this hypothesis. Chapters 3 and 4 provide econometric evidence, while Chapter 5 provides case studies. The model predicts that when elections are earlier than expected, government support will be less than it was prior to the announcement. Furthermore, we would expect that early elections would be followed by poor economic performance, in terms of inflation, unemployment, and growth. If the government is trying to catch the opposition off-guard, then we would

expect that early elections are followed by short campaigns to maximize this advantage. In spite of the small number of cases (14 elections), the author obtains statistically significant results for all these predictions, with the exception of the effect on economic growth. (Even this would show a significant effect in the expected direction if the exceptional case of the February 1974 election that led to the end of the miners' strike is excluded.)

It should be noted that the independent variable in the model is the timing of elections relative to expectations. A great deal of the methodological ingenuity of the book goes into estimating expectations of elections. This is done in two ways. The first involves a hazards model, whereby the cumulative probability of an election is calculated using such factors as the government's majority and the remaining length of its term. This is then compared to the cumulative probability of an election estimated using these variables, plus future economic performance (which the government is assumed to know). If the election would only be expected knowing what the government knows, then it is a surprise election. The second method relies on counts of newspaper stories in the six months preceding the election. The first method poses some endogeneity problems—future economic performance is used to measure the independent variable, as well as being one of the dependent variables. Fortunately, the second method does not have this problem.

The author does not make a normative case about the relative merit of fixed and variable election cycles, but it is clear where such a case would lead. He refutes the main argument made in favor of fixed electoral cycles (that variable election dates give an advantage to incumbents). Furthermore, he documents various advantages of flexibility in election dates—it allows unviable governments to put themselves out of their misery, and it reduces the incentive for governments to manipulate the political business cycle.

In Chapter 6, the author extends the analysis to other countries, such as Australia and Canada. However, the analysis in its present form can only be applied to countries where a single agent chooses the election date. It is notable that the 1979 election is excluded from the analysis because the government was brought down involuntarily after losing a vote of no confidence. In many multiparty parliamentary democracies, this is the usual way in which governments fall. However, *Election Timing* has a broader significance in another sense. There has been a great deal of theoretical literature suggesting that elites can manipulate democratic institutions, by exploiting legislative voting cycles, the provision of information, or the political business cycle. However, recently there has been a substantial body of work that suggests that this manipulation is far harder to achieve than was once thought. This book adds to this growing consensus.

**Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil.** By Edward E. Telles. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 336p. \$35.00.

— David L. Covin, *California State University, Sacramento*

Edward E. Telles's consideration of race in Brazil is a landmark study. It brings scholarly perspective, the careful application of quantitative data, systematic analysis, a thoughtful reading of contemporary conditions, and a deep familiarity with the subject to a frequently fragmented, contradictory, and anecdotal area of scholarship.

The book is a study of race. That is critical. *The Another* in the title points to one of the key reasons why. Telles states the condition explicitly: "Since DuBois the relation of blacks and whites in the United States has continued to serve as the paradigmatic case for the sociological understanding of race" (p. 2). He says that matters of race are assumed to be similar in places like Brazil: "But that is clearly not the case, as I will demonstrate in this book" (p. 6).

The study's focus on race is significant for Brazil where treatments of race are conflicting. Telles cites three tendencies: (1) There is little to no racial discrimination, (2) there is widespread but ephemeral racial discrimination, and (3) there is deep and structural racial discrimination (p. 6). He collapses the second and third categories into one, as both admit the existence of racial discrimination in Brazil. He thus confronts an international understanding of race based on a paradigm derived from conditions in the United States and challenges two dominant interpretations of race and its effects in Brazil: "Ultimately, I seek to reexamine the adequacy of race relations theories" (p. 15) To accomplish this, he undertakes a rigorous study of race there.

The author examines the two Brazilian traditions. One difference between them is generational. The nondiscriminatory school came first and is associated with Gilberto Freyre. The latter school is associated primarily with Florestan Fernandes and Carlos Hasenbalg. Telles sees the generational differences as ideological. Scholars understand race in Brazil as they do because their ideologies dispose them to see race in particular ways. Another difference centers around the geographical areas where the scholars did their research. The nondiscriminatory findings were largely derived from the Northeast. The discriminatory findings were from studies conducted mainly in the Southeast. Confounding a region with the nation is very likely to produce suspect results.

Telles reasons that the two sets of thinkers focus on different aspects of Brazilian race relations. He calls one of these aspects, the vertical dimension, the ways in which Brazilian society is stratified. He calls the other, the horizontal dimension, the nonstratified relations between people, how they get along as neighbors, friends, lovers, spouses, families, compatriots. The nondiscriminatory school emphasizes the horizontal dimension. The discriminatory school emphasizes the vertical. He claims that both dimensions are present. In



order to understand race in Brazil, one must understand how they are present and the effects of their interaction.

Telles's correctives are to replace the databases and to develop substantial qualitative information. He discards northeastern and southeastern regional samples for national samples. His 1997–2000 posting as a Ford Foundation officer in the country gave him unprecedented access to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics and exposed him to the major political and social actors of the period. The institute calculated census tract data for him. He was able to examine the computer programs to ensure that formulas for computing indicators were correctly applied.

In Chapters 1 through 3, Telles lays the groundwork for his detailed presentation. In Chapter 4, he tackles the confounding enigma of racial classification in Brazil, setting forth an analysis that will be required reading for any serious student of Brazilian social life. He indeed shows *another* America, where 38% of “white” males indicate that they have some African ancestry. In Chapters 5 through 8, he characterizes Brazilian life in its vertical and horizontal dimensions. In Chapter 9 he discusses his findings and in Chapter 10 he examines how public policy can influence the situations he describes.

The strengths of this book greatly outweigh its weaknesses, but the latter require some attention. Reducing three tendencies among racial studies to two is misleading. The differences among all three are substantial. Within the collapsed set, the Fernandes group is comfortable with an understanding of the essentially nonracist character of Brazilians and with North American theories that industrial development will lead to the reduction of class barriers and racial distinctions. The Hasenbalg group is insistent on the deep, structural characteristics of racism in Brazil and that increased industrial and postindustrial development have the potential to worsen it. Yet even the nondiscriminatory and discriminatory schools are not antithetical. Most sympathizers of Fernandes and Hasenbalg know that Brazil has the horizontal dimensions Telles associates with the Freyre school. They do not suggest that race in Brazil is like race in the United States. They question whether a warmer, friendlier racial stratification does much for the great masses of black and brown Brazilians.

Telles assumes too uncritically the reliability of Brazilian census figures. In *Shades of Citizenship* (2000), Melissa Nobles undertakes a detailed, longitudinal comparison of the racial roles of the census in the United States and Brazil. She indicates on page 93 that often in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Brazil, the census was “unreliable.” Telles never raises the question of whether similar problems might exist in the dense and dangerous “peripheries” of contemporary Brazilian cities, even though it is a constant refrain of the black movement.

His explanations of vertical and horizontal dimensions are minimal. The concepts constitute a powerful shorthand, but it is the reader who must refine it.

Telles suffers from a failing common to students of African-descended peoples. He accuses black leaders of being less than perfect. He cites the achievements of the Brazilian black movement at length, then says, “Despite these gains, the black movement has not been able to achieve at least two . . . challenges it has laid out for itself: creating a mass movement and . . . constructing a popular negro identity” (p. 235). Given the entrenched and aggressive resistance to the Afro-Brazilian efforts at racial change that Telles has so ably documented, this characterization minimizes the context—and hence, the magnitude—of the accomplishment.

His use of sources for race in the United States is sometimes bewildering. Why on page 234 use Livio Sansone, a scholar of Afro-Brazilian life, as an authority on African continuities in the United States? On page 197, he cites a 1987 study by Reynolds Farley and Walter Allen, *The Quality of Life and the Color Line in America*, as indicating that in 1970, less than 40% of black people in the United States lived in the South. The U.S. census for that year lists 11,955,143 black people in the United States as residing in the South, out of a national black population of 22,530,362.

The most egregious weakness of *Race in Another America* is its proofreading. A press as distinguished as Princeton University Press, publishing a book of this importance, has done the author a disservice by the quality of its proofing. The *first* sentence of the *first* page contains an error in verb tense. The book is replete with questionable editorial decisions, such as repeating exact phrases throughout the text. Errors range from publication dates of sources to years that international events occurred.

The author's faults are minor. His achievement is monumental. His identification of hyperinequality, a discriminatory glass ceiling, and a racist culture as the three factors primarily responsible for racial inequalities in Brazil is realized by a remarkable tour de force. Telles understands the contextual character of most social science representations. He shows how empirical findings derive their meanings, not only from the quality of academic conceptualizations, data, and analysis but also from societal conceptions. Telles has produced a work of unusual richness and clarity. It sets a standard for the study of race in Brazil against which all future works on the subject will be measured.

**Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China.** By Dali L. Yang. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 432p. \$60.00.

—Barrett L. McCormick, *Marquette University*

Dali L. Yang argues a thesis many would like to find true. In China, he argues, markets have created pressure for limited, effective, and transparent government. Crises in the 1990s and since led Chinese leaders to implement reforms with these goals. They have achieved considerable if not complete success, and this leaves China better

prepared for democracy. This thesis is most clearly stated in the conclusion. The first chapter offers an introduction and historical overview. Each of the intervening seven chapters documents and assesses a particular type of reform.

Yang must be commended for encyclopedic research based on extensive reading in Chinese newspapers, among other sources. Copious information makes this book a useful resource for anyone working on political reform in China from 1997 to 2003. Successive chapters look at downsizing government and separating business from government; reforms to the tax system to restore central revenues and create more rational incentives for localities; the divestiture of military-owned enterprises and related efforts to level the economic playing field; administrative rationalization to increase transparency and the provision of services; reforms to procurement and the management of public works; the struggle against corruption; and strengthening legislative and accounting institutions to promote horizontal accountability.

This sophisticated argument uses crises to link markets' abstract needs with leaders' policy choices. Revenue shortfalls led to many reforms, including, for example, the decision to divest enterprises owned by the military when such enterprises engaged in such rampant smuggling that tariff revenues drastically declined. The Asian Financial Crisis prompted reforms to reduce cronyism. The SARS crisis stimulated reforms to promote transparency.

Dali Yang is one of many who find wisdom in the choice of Chinese leaders to maintain authoritarian rule while implementing economic reforms, especially in contrast to Russian leaders who allegedly allowed too much democracy too soon. In Yang's view, the Russian route led to an increasingly parasitic state that Putin could only control by imposing less democratic government. In contrast, he argues, Chinese reforms "have taken the essence of Margaret Thatcher's reforms to heart: 'We are strong to do those things which government must do and only government can do'" (p. 108). He sees similarities with the American Progressive Movement and endorses Samuel Huntington's argument that strong government is "the foundation of political liberty." The conclusion is that China may be on a more expeditious route to democracy than Russia.

How to assess this argument? Yang has accurately identified the intentions of some Chinese leaders. His evidence includes their statements of intent. These reforms are a logical response to the crises China has faced. Many reforms are clearly designed to create incentives to lead agents to govern effectively, rather than the traditional reliance on commands and moral exhortation.

The sticking lies in how successfully this program is being implemented. The author consistently reaches guardedly optimistic conclusions on the basis of carefully qualified assessments of a great deal of evidence. He often employs words like "appears to," and "emerging." He commendably presents contrary evidence, as in his chapter on corrup-

tion when he notes that most of his informants "remain viscerally skeptical about the Chinese leadership's commitment to anticorruption" (p. 249), but goes on to express guarded optimism that corruption will be controlled.

Some of Yang's evidence can be construed to reach other conclusions. For example, he cites the Yueyang City People's Congress's refusal to confirm the Communist Party's nominee for mayor as evidence of the increasing authority of legislative organs. Careful readers will find his footnote stating that two days later the mayor was confirmed. Other accounts attributed this to the party's forceful arm twisting. Are Peoples Congresses gaining power? Or does this show that when they step out of line, the party reins them in? Similarly, Yang argues that the problem of illegal land seizures has been addressed by new systems for procuring land, but it remains that many still see land seizures as the leading source of contentious politics. Propaganda departments, for example, find the issue so sensitive that they have banned further reporting of land disputes.

This raises the question of whether a government that practices extensive censorship and arrests outspoken critics can be said to be limited. Yang repeatedly states that he is aware of and regrets political constraints. He notes that there are differences between China's reforms and the Progressive Movement because of the democratic environment in which it occurred. But his explanation of these differences is limited and, as noted, he argues that it is to China's advantage that there has not been more democracy sooner.

How limited China's government may seem depends on what sphere we look in and the standard by which we judge. By most accounts, the sphere the author investigates, business, is the area in which the Chinese government allows the most space for private initiative. And yet, most of the literature that considers trade associations and other business organizations finds corporatism, not pluralism. Entrepreneurs evidently believe that the government has so much arbitrary authority that it is best to collaborate. By the standard of Maoist totalitarianism, corporatism is a move toward limited government, but this is not the definition of "limited" that Margaret Thatcher uses. There are other spheres where government is less limited. Yang does not say much about China's large and growing inequalities, or the contentious farmers and unemployed workers who try to claim equality before the law.

I count myself among those who hope that the thesis of *Remaking the Chinese Leviathan* is borne out. If the governance reforms that this book describes succeed in sustaining China's rapid economic growth, humanity's fate will be happier. If they also lead to limited government, which in turn leads to democracy, so much the better. But it could be that compared to Poland or Hungary, Russia's troubles stem from too little democracy, not too much, and that China will eventually suffer similar problems. Dali Yang is to be commended for making a serious case that we all must consider. But the jury is still out.

---

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

---

**People out of Place: Globalization, Human Rights, and the Citizenship Gap.** Edited by Alison Brysk and Gershon Shafir. New York: Routledge, 2004. 272p. \$75.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Shelley Wilcox, *Temple University*

The original essays in this anthology make a significant contribution to the ongoing debates about citizenship, human rights, and the future of the nation-state by exploring the contradictory impacts of globalization on the provision of individual rights. On the one hand, the transnational flows of people, capital, and technology associated with globalization have led to a deflation of citizenship rights, particularly for members of vulnerable groups, and created large noncitizen populations with significantly fewer rights than citizens. Yet on the other hand, the cosmopolitan aspects of globalization, such as the evolution of human rights and the expansion of liberal legal norms, create new levels of membership and new venues in which to claim rights. The book has two related goals. The first is to describe the complicated processes by which globalization is altering the nature of nation-state citizenship and creating a “citizenship gap” among global elites, legal citizens, marginalized citizens, and migrants. The volume’s second goal is to determine whether the cosmopolitan aspects of globalization can remedy the citizenship gap. Will existing nation-state citizenship and emerging universal rights regimes be sufficient to protect the rights of marginalized citizens and noncitizens? Or must human rights be embedded in global governance in order to close the citizenship gap?

Building on an historical introduction by Gershon Shafir, the essays in Parts II to IV masterfully accomplish the book’s first, descriptive goal. Part II provides fresh insights into the specific ways that the globalized political economy is reshaping the material and symbolic aspects of nation-state citizenship. It is widely agreed that neoliberalism inherently diminishes the social rights of citizens. Ronnie Lipschultz’s genealogy of citizenship lends new theoretical support to the view that neoliberal policies marginalize and constrict the national political sphere, thereby also weakening substantive political rights. Aihwa Ong’s chapter provides a fascinating account of a particular dynamic of economic globalization—the role of Asian entrepreneurs and techno-migrants in the Silicon Valley—and its impact on the social and symbolic meanings of American citizenship. She argues that the successes of Asian entrepreneurs and high-tech managers, which come on the backs of piecework and in-home migrant workers, have created a new class of elite, transnational citizens

while consolidating the notion that citizenship, and indeed humanity, must be earned through economic contribution, as measured in capital investment or transnational skills.

The chapters in Part III focus on the cosmopolitan aspects of globalization, describing the impact of human rights norms on state immigration laws, and ultimately, the practice of liberal democratic citizenship. Historically, states have enjoyed nearly complete authority to adopt whatever immigration policies are deemed to be in the national interest, and many have implemented discriminatory and exclusionary guidelines. Recently, however, argue David Jacobson and Galya Ruffer, and Peter Spiro, international law has begun to constrain state discretion over immigration and citizenship (e.g., requiring states to adopt nondiscriminatory admissions criteria). The most intriguing arguments in this part charge that the imposition of such universal norms, while moderating the citizenship gap between migrants and citizens, diminishes national democratic governance. Jacobson and Ruffer argue that the notion of individual agency implicit in human rights is displacing traditional democratic and republican practices. Political agency is no longer a matter of asserting one’s voice in the public sphere, but rather of pressing one’s rights via new judicial and administrative institutions. Echoing liberal nationalist concerns, Spiro warns that the external imposition of membership policies will erode national solidarity by undermining the connection between national identity and citizenship.

Together with Ong’s contribution, Part IV includes the book’s most illuminating chapters. Combining rich empirical studies with sophisticated theoretical analyses, these essays develop the volume’s central argument that globalization tends to benefit elites, while putting migrants and “second-class” citizens at risk. Gay Seidman argues that increasingly liberalized trade regimes provide a limited number of well-paying jobs to highly trained individuals, but generally worsen conditions for workers by weakening labor unions and undermining the ability of states to sustain labor and social rights. These effects are particularly acute in developing countries, where both unions and the state must be concerned with creating jobs and preventing capital flight. Kristen Maher’s chapter provides an insightful analysis of the new global “trade in domestic workers” (p. 131). Migrant domestic workers enhance the citizenship of their employers, she argues, but at a cost to their own rights: Domestic workers are subject to the same deficit of citizenship rights as other relatively poor migrants, and their gendered and racialized social positions in host states raise significant obstacles to claiming universal rights. Finally, Alison Brysk examines a neglected consequence of globalization: the increase in intercountry adoption and its contradictory impacts on migrant children.

Despite the promise of these chapters, however, the book falls short of accomplishing its second, explicitly normative goal. Theorists of globalization, including those in this book, frequently argue that neither the weakened nation-state nor nascent human rights regimes is sufficient to remedy the citizenship gap. As Brysk and Shafir put it, the forces of globalization “construct rights without sufficient institutions to enforce them, identities without membership, and participation for some at the expense of others” (p. 209). Thus, we would expect the volume’s final chapters, in Part V, to theorize new institutions and forms of governance capable of providing the rights, membership, participation, and accountability that would constitute substantive, universal, democratic citizenship. Regrettably, these essays fail to meet this critical challenge. Saskia Sassen’s contribution consists largely of a restatement of her earlier work on the emergence of “denational” citizenship in global cities. Although Richard Falk describes four possible modes of transnational citizenship—regionalism, a world state, international activist communities and nongovernmental organizations, and the “global pilgrim”—he offers little by way of critical evaluation. Finally, Brysk and Shafir evaluate various models of global governance in their concluding essay, but their appraisals are too brief to be of much use. Thus, *People out of Place* is likely to leave political theorists and philosophers unsatisfied: The book makes a strong case that globalization has created a multifaceted citizenship gap, yet leaves the pressing normative issues associated with it unresolved.

**Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law.** By Allen Buchanan.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 520p. \$35.00.

— Richard Burchill, *University of Hull*

Allan Buchanan is well known for his work on justice, secession, and self-determination. The volume under review draws on and builds upon his past work, developing and updating previously stated positions and setting new ground in formulating a moral approach to international law. The title of the book clearly encapsulates its content and the intentions of the author. Buchanan’s first line in the book explains that it is “an attempt to develop moral foundations for international law” (p. 1). Undoubtedly this is a formidable and complex task, but one to which he skillfully addresses himself. His goal is to set out manageable frameworks for establishing and developing ideas and practices of justice and legitimacy that, in turn, will act as guiding principles in international law and relations. He certainly succeeds in achieving this and goes even further to set out interesting and provocative suggestions for reform of the international system. In short, this book is to be highly recommended, if not required, reading for anyone interested in the future of the international system.

The book is divided into four parts preceded by a synopsis and introduction. The introduction sets out Buchanan’s views on why moral theorizing about international law is necessary and the main lines of argument to be pursued in the remainder of the work. The structure of the book then follows the title. Part I examines justice; it deals with issues of how and why we should be committed to a particular view of justice, the key role human rights plays in our understanding of minimal thresholds of justice, and the nature and place of distributive justice in the international system. Part II concerns legitimacy, with chapters building from a more general discussion of political legitimacy that is then applied to the issue of legitimacy in the recognition of states and the legitimacy of the international system as a whole. Part III covers self-determination, secession, and intrastate autonomy, demonstrating the application of the previous parts on justice and legitimacy. There is a considerable focus on self-determination and secession, not only because these are the author’s main areas of research but also because secession and self-determination have become “one of the most important and perilous developments in international law in the last half-century” (pp. 1–2). Part IV sets out Buchanan’s views on reform of the international legal system, based on the views of justice and legitimacy developed in the previous parts. The chapters within the parts are well connected and build upon each other to provide strong support for his main argument, which is relatively simple: We not only need to, but are also obligated, to work to develop institutional arrangements that protect basic human rights and improve upon existing ones in order to ensure that other individuals enjoy the benefits of rights protection, regardless of whether or not we have a direct link to or any interaction with these other persons.

In a review of this nature, it is not possible to give adequate coverage to Buchanan’s thesis and to systematically deal with the arguments set out. Buchanan starts with the belief that in international law “there is a need for self-conscious, systematic moral reasoning” in order to derive “prescriptive principles that will provide substantial guidance” for international law to deal with the crucial issues it faces (p. 15). He rejects the belief that international law cannot or should not deal with moral prescriptions. He then builds his central theoretical concept, what he terms the “Natural Duty of Justice,” whereby all individuals have “a limited moral obligation to help ensure that all persons have access to institutions that protect their basic rights” (p. 27). It is based on Kantian ideas that every individual should be treated with equal worth and respect. The book goes on to demonstrate and justify why international law should direct itself to this simple but extremely multifaceted and contested idea. Buchanan avoids any sort of absolutism; he does reject aspects of traditional international law that fail to live up to the foundations of his moral theory, but in doing so, he deftly navigates through the system of law to give respect, where

necessary, to existing international law, but at the same time showing how it may be reformed to be more in line with the Natural Duty of Justice.

What is perhaps one of the more valuable contributions of the work is the emphasis on the ability of international law to change and develop on the basis of moral prescriptions. In the concluding chapters, Buchanan details how change may occur in international law through a discussion on humanitarian intervention that is based on his moral theory. In doing so, he expresses the necessity of overriding existing rules of international law in order to live up to the Natural Duty of Justice. This will be controversial reading, but it will be up to the opponents of such a view to explain why international law should remain tied to ideas and practices that may bring stability to the system as a whole but result in harm to individuals.

The book is well written and structured, setting out the argument in an accessible manner. Buchanan takes us through his study in a systematic and organized fashion. There is continual reference to preceding and future sections in such a way that the reader never feels lost and can clearly see the links developing. Summaries of the argument are provided and key points highlighted throughout. In setting out his argument, he covers a good deal of ground, and he makes the effort to ensure that various criticisms or contrasting positions are dealt with head-on and not just glossed over. But this breadth may have been at the sacrifice of depth, as some points of the discussion come across as sketchy and thin. There is a noticeable lack of examples or elaborations in large parts of the book (Parts I and II) to illustrate the point being made. But in Part III, examples and illustrations are more forthcoming. A similar pattern follows in terms of referencing, with Part III providing citations to the wider literature and specific examples but the previous parts providing very little in this respect. If Buchanan wants to convince international lawyers of the need for change, his argument would be greatly enhanced by specific examples to demonstrate the points being made.

*Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination* is to be highly recommended for all those interested in the current and future state of the international system. Whether or not one agrees with the general thrust or particular points of Buchanan's moral theory is irrelevant. The ideas put forth go to the heart of how the future of the international system will be shaped. Even if his suggestions are considered to be fanciful or even bizarre, it forces us to come up with our own prescription or to demonstrate that somehow international law is adequately addressing the needs of humanity. Recently, international law has been at the forefront of current events and has not fared all that well at times in demonstrating its relevance. It has become accepted that some sort of reform is necessary; Buchanan provides a convincing case for a particular direction for change that, it is to be hoped, will influence the future of the discipline.

### **Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy.**

By Katrina Burgess. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004. 224p. \$27.95.

— Maria Lorena Cook, *Cornell University*

In Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela during the 1980s and 1990s, labor-backed political parties in power adopted market-oriented reforms that strained the parties' alliances with their union base, generating a "loyalty dilemma" for labor leaders. In response, unions in all three countries initially pursued strategies of demand making based on norms that had traditionally governed their interactions with the party ("norm-based voice"). Over time, however, labor leaders' responses to the loyalty dilemma diverged. Katrina Burgess explains why. She argues that whether unions chose norm-based voice, norm-breaking voice, or exit depended on two main factors: the relative power of the party and workers to punish labor leaders for disloyal behavior, and the party's capacity to act autonomously from its own government.

Burgess posits that both punishing power and party autonomy depend, in turn, on a set of institutional foundations. She identifies four institutional arrangements as important for determining the punishing power of workers and the party: 1) the legal framework governing industrial relations; 2) the structure of the labor movement; 3) party system type; and 4) the party's mechanisms for filling party posts. In the case of party autonomy, Burgess looks at the location of supreme authority within the party (e.g., chief executive or national executive committee of the party) and the existence of intraparty spaces for dissent as the main institutional factors.

Drawing on this framework, the author is able to explain why in Mexico the largest national labor confederation, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), remained allied with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and even collaborated in keeping down wages during the reform period. In Mexico, the party's ability to punish labor leaders was stronger than workers' punishing power, and the PRI lacked autonomy from the government. In Spain, in contrast, the General Workers' Union (UGT) eventually broke with the ruling Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) in response to workers' willingness to punish the UGT in factory council elections. In Venezuela, the party was able to distance itself from its own government during the neoliberal reform administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez. Venezuelan workers' power to punish labor leaders was also stronger than in Mexico, but more constrained than that of Spanish workers. This explains the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers' shift from norm-based voice to norm-breaking voice, and then back to norm-based voice, once the party took a stand against the Pérez government.

Burgess succeeds in presenting a comparative argument that is at once spare and sophisticated. She both

underscores the persistence of organized labor as an important political actor and shows how this watershed era of neoliberal reform is reconfiguring labor's role. The author's writing is concise, yet *Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy* is rich with essential details, especially in the discussion of the historical "bargains" that labor confederations in each country developed with their party allies. These sections are critical to our understanding of the origins of union-party ties, and they provide a better sense of what labor leaders stand to lose when they confront the loyalty dilemma.

Burgess's explanations of the institutional and legal frameworks that govern unions and provide the contexts for labor-party alliances in each country are also excellent. They reveal an impressive depth and breadth of knowledge regarding these countries' histories of labor-party-state relations. The author successfully integrates the nuanced historical analysis found in the best national case studies with the attention to broader relevance that good comparative research offers.

Although she focuses on the neoliberal reform periods in each country, since these are what pose the loyalty dilemma for unions in the first place, Burgess also updates her analysis through the mid-2000s. This enables readers to see the implications of union choices made during the critical juncture of the reform period. In Mexico, the CTM retains its alliance with the PRI even as another party's candidate has won the presidency for the first time in the country's history, yet the expansion of independent union activity may eventually increase workers' choices and their ability to punish trade union leaders. With the presidency of Hugo Chávez, Venezuelan labor faces important political and institutional changes and the likelihood that union-party ties will become weaker than before. In Spain, the UGT has maintained its autonomy from the PSOE, even through two administrations of conservative government under the opposing Popular Party. Burgess cautions that it is too soon to predict how union-party relations will evolve, particularly in Mexico and Venezuela, which are in the midst of profound political and institutional transformation. However, she does suggest that union-party ties are likely to become more fluid, contingent, and issue based, rather than to retain the relatively rigid commitments forged in the twentieth century.

What does this mean for workers and unions? Burgess suggests that the more fluid and contingent ties between unions and parties may have a positive overall effect on interest representation. At the same time, she clearly appreciates the dynamic and open-ended nature of this process, including its risks: "The hope is that the collapse of the old arrangements will prompt the emergence of more representative organizations and give working people a stronger voice in their own future. The fear is that it will leave them even more marginalized and underrepresented than before" (p. 165).

Another possible future scenario, however, is that the recent backlash against market reforms in some countries may reinvigorate labor-party ties. For example, in Argentina (a country outside of Burgess's study but which shares the basic features of her cases), union-party ties appear to have been strengthened after the recent economic and political crisis, and after a period of strained alliance during President Carlos Menem's implementation of market-oriented reforms in the 1990s. The loyalty dilemmas posed by the neoliberal-reform period may prove to have been transitory, as some labor-based parties now move to adopt policies with broader popular backing.

This is not a quibble with Burgess's argument or framework, however. In this fine book, she manages to give us the analytical tools to decipher the complex dynamics of union-party relations as these evolve in response to the challenges of globalization in the coming years, an admirable contribution.

**New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism.** By Barry Cooper. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004. 264p. \$44.95.

— Ian Reader, *Lancaster University*

Barry Cooper argues that a characteristic of modern terrorism is the rise of "new political religions" that claim to be engaged in spiritual conflicts that transcend the political realm and that involve waging spiritual warfare in order to realize an idealized spiritual kingdom on this earth. Thus, in order to understand contemporary terrorism, Cooper states, one must look at the "spirituality that terrorists experience as central to their own activities" (p. 7), while recognizing that religious terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and Japan's Aum Shinrikyô, do not operate within the frameworks of cost-benefit analysis that political terror groups have generally espoused (p. 55). He further contends that religious terrorists groups are on a continuous treadmill of violence that is self-generating and will never cease (p. 12), leading him to advocate extreme measures (negotiation not being one of them) to counteract it. Here he seems not to consider that similar arguments were once advanced to suggest that political terrorists were equally bound up in a cycle of violence from which they could not escape, yet there are many examples (the African National Congress and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example) that have disproved such perceptions.

In considering that religious terrorists are "spiritually disordered" (p. 25) and hence incapable of rational discussion, Cooper's analysis draws heavily on the work of Eric Voegelin and his concept of pneumopathology, defined as a state in which someone "arbitrarily denies the reality of one or another of the world in order to fantasize about an imaginary world" (p. 42). For Cooper, religious terrorists from Aum to Al-Qaeda manifest this characteristic

when they advocate the immanent realization of the kingdom of God in this world: since such visions are irrational, unrealizable, and counter to the “commonsense” world that is clearly focused around pragmatic, political principles, their proponents are drawn to violence as both an expression of their spiritual disorder and as a way out of the impasse that their irrational thinking has produced.

The problem with this view is that Cooper displays little understanding of the nature of religion and of religious worldviews, which are invariably framed around idealized visions of the world now and to come as they “ought to be.” People who espouse religious worldviews—from contemporary Christians in the United States who think that the second coming might be near, to the devotees of Aum, who believed that they were on a mission to transform the world—often do think that such achievements are possible. While Cooper assumes that “rationally” they cannot believe such things, he offers no concrete evidence on this score. How, for instance, does he know that members of Aum knew that their visions of world transformation were “impossible”? Has he talked to them—or is he just assuming that because he thinks their visions were irrational, they too must realize it? As someone who studied Aum, I can only say that the members I interviewed in depth consistently and genuinely expressed the belief that the world was facing apocalypse and that they had a mission to transform it and build a new spiritual realm—just as have numerous other millennialists from other traditions over the centuries.

Cooper’s problems of interpretive understanding are also displayed in such statements as “Normal people, living in a shared, commonsensical world, do not believe in magic” (p. 25). This remark takes no notice of the academic literature on “magic” showing that magic has its own “logic” and is often widely accepted in cultural contexts by people who are clearly “normal” within their cultures and share in commonsensical views of the world within them. Studies in Japan and other places have shown, indeed, that beliefs in magic may increase as societies become more focused on the “rationalization” of mass education, production, economic development, and political pragmatism, and that people may increasingly develop a fascination with the magical as a personalized counterbalance to the rationalizations that they experience in their public, work, and business lives. In such contexts, this fascination with magic can therefore be seen as both normal and a product of a particular form of common sense.

The author’s notion of a shared commonsensical world, which runs through the book as an alternative (highly westernized) worldview that confronts religious terror, is itself highly problematic, in that he assumes there is one such entity, when, of course, depending on cultural perceptions, there may be many competing “commonsensical” views on hand at any time. To give one example:

Recently a British newspaper printed on its front page the headline “How can 59,921,463 people be so dumb?” This comment on the U.S. election reflected what many in Europe would have regarded as a commonsensical view about the U.S. election, while, of course, the United States delivered its own commonsensical, and very different, view at the ballot. Cooper appears never to consider (to twist the phrase about one person’s belief being another’s superstition) that what is commonsensical to one group may be highly irrational to another.

Such conceptual problems are compounded by Cooper’s selective readings of the religions he addresses, as well as by basic errors in his research. The latter are exemplified by numerous mistakes on Aum, whose 1994 sarin attack in Matsumoto he erroneously calls a “dress rehearsal for the Tokyo attack” (p. 60). It was not; the two had different motivations, modes of delivery, physical environments, timescales of preparation, and target groups. Other errors here include the statement that there are “200,000 registered cults” in Japan (p. 63), which fundamentally misapprehends the religious situation, in which there are some 200,000 legally registered religious institutions in Japan, the vast majority of them individual Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines from the mainstream traditions. By contrast there are perhaps a few hundred new religions and “cults.”

The author’s errors are even worse when it comes to Islam, where he draws on a few selective perceptions of a complex tradition to compare the Islamic historical paradigm unfavorably with Christian and Jewish experience. He argues that Christianity from the outset recognized two spheres of existence (the political and the religious, that is, Caesar’s and God’s) (p. 79), and thus forged a practical understanding of the political realities of the world and developed the capacity to envision its ideals as things not realizable in the world. In other words, he posits that Christianity was grounded in a rationality that enabled it to deal with setbacks and to get on with living in the world. He portrays Judaism in similar terms. By contrast, Islam’s initial successes, which fused the religious and the political orders, meant that it failed to develop a sense of pragmatic reality in separating out the things of Caesar from those of God. The result has been a failure to adjust to political realities—a failure that, in Cooper’s terms, means that a dominant Islamic paradigm, whenever crises occur, is to return to an original impulse to “succeed” through religiously based activism founded in an irrational ideological fusion of the political and the religious. In portraying Islam thus, Cooper effectively dispenses with the need to analyze actual political problems and historical realities: Whether it is Chechnya, Bosnia, or the Palestinians, it seems, the problem is one of Islamic failures to keep religious visions out of the world of political realities. Such an approach, of course, provides a rationalization for powers outside the Muslim world to avoid dealing

with actual political problems that Muslims might face: The problem remains located within the Muslim world and its inability to deal with the commonsense world.

This highly partial portrayal ignores the continuing attempts within Islam to deal with visions of the past while seeking ways to deal with the realities of the present, and makes no attempt to examine Muslim opinion, save at its extremist edges. Any scholar aware of the complexities of religious traditions will be readily aware of how impractical it is to typify or stereotype them in such monolithic terms, just as they will realize how skewed is Cooper's portrayal of Christianity and Judaism. Any instances where his thesis on these traditions might be disproved are conveniently ignored, so that, for example, there is no mention of the repeated cases throughout history—such as medieval Christian millennialism—where these traditions have actively sought religious-political fusions and the realizations of idealized spiritual kingdoms in this world.

This inherent bias in *New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism* is painfully evident, too, in his concluding chapter. Here, Cooper contrasts the slaughter brought about by religious terrorists with the ethical and rational actions of Western powers and makes the staggering claim that “avoiding the ethical irrationality of slaughtering non-combatants on such a large scale is central to the way Westerners conduct war” (p. 175). Such acts as the blanket bombing by the United States in Cambodia and Vietnam, and the Allied bombing of Dresden and Tokyo (the latter causing more than 100,000 civilian deaths), are testimony to the ludicrous and jaundiced nature of such arguments. Likewise, when one looks at recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq, one seriously wonders about the author's description of the war against Al Qaeda as “systematic, high tech, rational, calm, and lethal” (p. 180).

In this final chapter, Cooper propounds a strategy for counteracting terror groups. This does not say much new in practical terms (monitor their e-mails, disrupt their cash flows, cut off their supplies, and kill those we can identify), while advocating breaches of civil rights “with the tools of police, judge, jury and executioner all combined in a single action” (p. 181). In other words, the “morally compelling narratives against terrorism” (p. 183) that he speaks of are to be reinforced with strategies that throw moral values out the window while promoting the abandonment of liberal values as a means of defending them. One commonsensical British experience relating to terrorism, in connection with the IRA in the 1970s, suggests that when such values are set aside, not only do breaches of justice occur but also is more hostility generated, leading to more recruits for terror groups. On that count, the “commonsensical” approach advocated by Cooper may not be so founded in common sense after all.

This approach assumes without question—just as did Aum's—that the world is divided into good and evil, but Cooper seems oblivious to the fact that in criticizing reli-

gious extremists for their irrational positing of a conflict of good and evil between spiritual and secular values, he does the same thing, with the roles reversed. Such myopic perspectives are hardly helpful in advancing our understanding of religious terrorism. One looks in vain for any serious insights into the actual thinking of those who use the language of religious justification for their heinous deeds, or into any understanding of why they do so. Sophisticated analysis of religious terrorism requires more than the simple assumption that “they” are irrational and spiritually disordered, while “we” are good, rational, and guided by common sense and can hence crush them by whatever means we choose. One can get such views from the average tabloid newspaper. Academic analysis demands more than this sort of simplistic thinking, which provides no means of understanding modern religious terrorism, and hence offers no potential for thinking about solutions to this grave modern dilemma.

**From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations.** By Amitai Etzioni. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 272p. \$29.95.

— Nicholas Onuf, *Florida International University*

Amitai Etzioni is a seasoned political sociologist and leading voice in the communitarian program to offset the narcissistic and alienating individualism of liberal modernity. Communitarians emphasize the affective bonds that make community an indispensable feature of the human condition and, thus, the local conditions within which individual human beings are best able to understand and act on the common good. Notwithstanding republican antecedents, communitarians have effectively abandoned the universalistic tendencies of cosmopolitan Enlightenment republicanism to rights-minded liberals. In doing so, most communitarians have neglected international relations.

Etzioni is something of an exception. Important early work (*Political Unification*, 1965, and *The Active Society*, 1968, Part V) has much to say about international relations. Nevertheless, he bills *From Empire to Community* as a new approach to the subject—whether new to communitarians, or new because it is communitarian, or both he never makes entirely clear. The book is organized into three parts, together addressing ways in which “the American semi-empire can be converted into a legitimate new global architecture” (p. 1). These parts reflect Etzioni's early view that community depends on three sorts of bonds: normative (i.e., the affective bonds communitarians now emphasize), coercive (bonds that rely on the threat or use of violence), and utilitarian (instrumental bonds reflecting the reciprocities of interest). Part I is devoted to an “emerging global normative synthesis,” Part II to a “new safety architecture,” and Part III takes us “beyond global safety” to a plausible world of functionally oriented social authorities, regional communities, and perhaps a new



“Global Nation” (p. 201). Part II reflects Etzioni’s judgment that “the world is in a Hobbesian state and not yet ready for a Lockean one” (p. 116). Part II outlines developments that would make the Hobbesian world safe and Part III a safe-world Lockean. Part I sets forth the necessary conditions for what we might call a Rousseauian world within which safety and prosperity can be achieved.

Etzioni’s claim to novelty in Part I is a normative synthesis of Western and Eastern notions of a good and well-ordered society. Westerners favor individual autonomy to the point that distrust and alienation swamp society; Easterners favor social conformity to an authoritarian degree. The author advocates a balance between autonomy and social order, and he believes that Western societies are moving toward stronger community with less need for coercion, and Eastern societies toward more freedom. The necessary synthesis would give priority to universal rights over particular preferences and rules in some sort of federal system of layering, and it would depend on moral suasion (pp. 44–45).

For Etzioni, moral suasion, or normative power, together with economic power, is soft power. Coercion is hard power. The use of soft power softens societies; he extols a soft version of Islam and alludes to “‘soft authoritarianism’ in Eastern belief systems” (p. 38). Oddly, the unremitting public demand for the exercise of hard power within the United States goes unexamined; instead, he remarks on the shift from individual rights to social order prompted by 9/11. More generally, the softness criterion for the communitarian middle ground is itself too soft and spongy to ground Etzioni’s claims adequately.

The author’s effort to spell out the Eastern contribution to moral suasion is little better. At times, moral suasion seems to include appeals to universal standards and the invocation of particularistic obligations. At other times, moral suasion and “informal social controls (‘normative controls’)” are distinct mechanisms for making people socially responsible (p. 22). People obey the latter because of social pressure: They fear shame and seek praise. Etzioni seems to assume that social pressure is less hurtful, and thus more conducive to the common good, than the use of force.

Yet constant social pressure may well be cumulatively more damaging than threats of force calibrated to specific acts. Nor should we take for granted that modern peoples are nearly as immune to social pressure as Etzioni implies. While new status markers displace old ones, status ordering fills the modern void, fosters antisocial conduct, distributes privilege in an awesomely unequal fashion, and supports the coercive capabilities of modern regimes East and West. Nevertheless, as he emphasizes elsewhere (*The Common Good*, 2004, Chap. 1), affective bonds and the particularistic obligations they give rise to have moral standing because they are indispensable to human flourishing. A glib discussion of Western autonomy and Eastern social order only detracts from this crucial claim.

Part II presents us with a dangerous world. Etzioni has no difficulty recommending that nation-states use their coercive capabilities to make themselves secure. He believes that the campaign against terrorism led by the United States has yielded what is in practice a Global Antiterrorism Authority. He is adamant that nuclear proliferation be curbed and suggests that adding this responsibility to the antiterrorism campaign, with the self-interested support of Russia and China, would foster the development of a Global Safety Authority also capable of intervening in chronic conflict situations and humanitarian disasters.

Part III begins with transnational communitarian bodies as major constituents in an emerging global civil society but finds them lacking as elements in the new global architecture. Transnational governmental networks are also lacking. That transnational communitarian and governmental networks may reinforce each other, in the process acquiring the legitimacy that makes their many activities authoritative without making them authorities, is a possible development Etzioni might have investigated. Instead, he projects the creation of additional global authorities. Thus, a Global Health Authority would displace the World Health Organization as the latter’s sclerotic bureaucracy failed to respond, for example, to the threat posed by the outbreak of a new and virulent disease.

Etzioni has great faith in social evolution in response to need, but he is vague about the effects of bureaucratic inertia, political resistance, and provincial attitudes on the changing distribution of powers and functions in any large, complex society. It is here that he might have weighed the relevance of Asian models of social order. Yet Part III ignores the discussion of West and East framing Part I. In this respect and many others, the communitarian program that he sketches in Part III harks back to the liberal institutionalist vision of world federation.

**The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees.** By Matthew J. Gibney. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 298p. \$70.00 cloth, \$27.99 paper.

— Peter H. Koehn, *University of Montana*

This book is an important contribution at the interface of contemporary political theory and international relations. Political asylum is a defining issue of our time because of the scope and impact of the refugee crisis and its roots in deepening global inequities. Matthew Gibney addresses the conflict between the ethical and political claims of refugees and the claims of citizens that are embodied in asylum issues. In the process, he demonstrates the intellectual and policy value of treatments that interactively engage normative political theory and international relations.

The first part of the book critically distinguishes strengths and weaknesses found in prevailing ethical perspectives

on the entrance responsibilities of states. Chapter 1 considers “partiality” principles and approaches (communitarian, conservative, nationalist) that privilege the interests of citizens and admission criteria. This chapter focuses on the special attachments and solidarities that citizens of heterogeneous liberal democracies feel for their compatriots; it lacks consideration of the contemporary challenge of dual/multiple national identities and citizenship and of the growing importance for global governance of transnational ties and interactions among nonstate actors. Chapter 2 deals with “impartiality” principles and approaches (utilitarian, global-liberal) that hold that states are obliged to give equal account to the interests/rights of the human community as a whole in entry decisions.

Gibney then leads us on a search for a reasoned and realizable balance between partial and impartial claims. In constructing and defending an ethical and practical framework of state responsibility for refugees, he combines political theory with the historical experiences of four receiving states. Case studies of Germany, the UK, the United States, and Australia illustrate the practical constraints that liberal-democratic states confront in determining policies toward asylum and refugees and how far state practices have departed from ethical ideals. Reference to recent Australian responses is especially instructive because of the state’s adoption of extreme restrictive policies (most notably, mandatory detention) and the actions of the John Howard government to “reshape its political environment in a way that created even greater public hostility to asylum seekers (many of whom were genuine refugees)” (p. 249). I regret that Japan was not included in this part’s illuminating comparative review.

For Gibney, adequate prescriptions for state response to the refugee crisis must possess both ethical force and practical relevance. Not to insist that normative theory formulate ethical standards that spell out “what any government should actually do” (p. 230), he maintains, “is to allow normative theory to drift loose from the real world of political debate, choice, and, ultimately, action” (p. 228). The third part consists of a thorough and provocative attempt to derive and justify realistic and contemporary standards for response to asylum seekers that address this challenge. In Chapter 7, Gibney persuasively argues that prescriptions for government action in liberal democracies must take into account three key empirical considerations: 1) States are particularistic agents, with primary responsibility to promote the interests of their own citizens (the “structural constraint”); 2) principles and policies need to be viewed as legitimate by receiving-state citizens (the “political challenge”); and 3) the unforeseeable and unintended consequences of different normative standards and policy responses cannot be predicted with precision. The final chapter is devoted to elaborating and applying the author’s proposed humanitarianism principle; it includes a discussion of asylum versus security in the post–September 11 world.

Gibney’s humanitarianism (“states have an obligation to assist refugees when the costs of doing so are low”; p. 231) is impartialist, but less comprehensive in scope and deliberately less onerous than other impartialist principles (he refers to it as a “minimal” statement of state responsibilities; p. 233). The author recognizes that the humanitarian principle will not solve the refugee crisis on its own. What he finds plausible is that its adoption will move liberal-democratic states “closer to realizing the values they claim to live by now” (p. 260) and, thereby, overcome the “organized hypocrisy” (p. 229) that characterizes their current response to refugees and asylum seekers.

The book contributes insightfully to the vexed issues of state security and refugee-admission numbers. To allay the security concerns of liberal-democratic states within a framework of practical ethics, Gibney proposes that the standards and procedures states use for assessing security threats “should resemble those demanded of individual asylum seekers wishing to be admitted” (p. 258)—including establishment of a personal link between individuals denied entry and a “well-founded” security threat. His approach to increasing refugee admissions in Western states calls for fixing the total number of immigrants admitted annually at current levels, while changing the composition of those granted entry to give “refugees at least as high a priority in entrance decisions as regular [economic] and family [-reunion] migrants” (pp. 242–43). This compelling proportional fix lacks attention to the parallel need to rectify state partiality in the application of resettlement criteria in order to ensure that the *most needy* refugees are granted admission priority (see Aninia Nadig, “Forced Migration,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 16, [no. 4, 2003]: 364).

The doing more at “lost-cost” emphasis of Gibney’s humanitarian principle leads the author to recommend that Western states focus on resettlement in refugee camps outside their borders (pp. 237–40). The responsibility-shifting prospects inherent in this prescription are apparent (see Joanne van Selm, “Refugee Protection Policies,” in Edward Newman and van Selm, eds., *Refugees and Forced Displacement*, 2003, pp. 66–92). Under the proposed humanitarian principle, moreover, a state’s duty to help unprotected outsiders decreases as its efforts impinge upon commitments to the security and welfare of one’s own citizens (p. 234). Should such decreasing obligations not apply among poor first-asylum countries as well as wealthy, but distant, places? If so, Gibney’s recommended priority application of the humanitarian principle would mean that far fewer refugees will receive protection and assistance. One way out of this conundrum is to attach another consequentialist principle to humanitarianism; linking *common but differentiated responsibility* (see Scott Barrett, “Montreal Versus Kyoto” in Inge Kaul, et al., eds., *Global Public Goods*, 1999, pp. 210–11) would facilitate collaborative North/South responses by addressing the enormous

disparities that currently prevail in state capacity and refugee-resettlement burdens. Another unaddressed concern is the likelihood that Western states will possess little, if any, incentive to act in ways that minimize or prevent refugee *formation* when the benefits of inaction are high (p. 248) and the consequential costs of the humanitarian principle are low.

In this otherwise comprehensive account of factors and forces that impinge on refugee-reception perspectives, there are some glaring omissions. Gibney ignores the expanding roles and responsibilities of nongovernmental actors as Western governments contract their “responsibilities to necessitous strangers” (p. 211). One finds no mention in this work of the contributions of the U.S. Committee on Refugees, the International Rescue Committee, or the Church World Service, among others. The obligations of states to refugees generated in part by foreign policy and arms-supply interventions that do not involve military deployments, such as in Ethiopia at the height of the Cold War (Peter Koehn, *Refugees from Revolution: U.S. Policy and Third-World Migration*, 1991), do not receive attention. Readers would have benefited from presentation of guidelines for identifying victims of egregious state actions and from consideration of the possibility that responsible states bear more than “minimal” obligations to persons they have helped to dislocate. In addition, references to refugee resilience, asylum-seeker contributions to admitting societies, and the long-term impact of refugee skill development and remittances would strengthen the author’s argument in key places. Gibney notes (citing Myron Weiner) that new entrants exert political pressure for policy changes by receiving governments (p. 225), but he devotes insufficient attention to the concomitant and arguably even stronger effects of migration on sending states and on interdependence.

*The Ethics and Politics of Asylum* offers an informative and provocative analysis of state responsibility for refugees. In an increasingly borderless world, Matthew Gibney’s practical/ethical argument and approach regarding entrance issues deserve to be taken seriously and considered critically by policy makers, students, and lay publics.

**Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus.** By David Held. New York:

Polity, 2004. 216p. \$54.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Amitai Etzioni, *George Washington University*

David Held lays out a detailed design for an “alternative” global order to the one promoted by the United States. He vigorously rejects the approach to the world of George W. Bush and instead offers a social democratic agenda, which has three main parts: economic, political, and legal. For each part, Held provides both the overarching principles that ought to guide us and a considerable list of specific steps that should advance his design. Readers should

not stop reading just because the list of values that Held beseeches us to pursue is as impressive as it is lofty: He calls on us to uphold the principles of equal moral worth, equal liberty, equal political status of human beings, legitimate political authority “on all levels,” and a “deeper” commitment to social justice, among other such values. He buttresses his agenda with a list of measures to be undertaken both in the short and in the longer run, most of which deserve careful attention. It is here that ultimately the rubber does not meet the road.

Regarding the global economy, Held favors first and foremost more regulation of global markets and more help for economic development, as well as the introduction of mandatory standards to protect labor and the environment and accord developing nations “privileged” access to the markets. On the political front, he calls for basic reforms of the existing institutions, in the short order. This would entail making the UN Security Council more representative, strengthening the negotiation capacity of developing nations, and enhancing “parliamentary scrutiny of regional and international bodies” (p. 164). In the longer run, he favors democratization of national and supranational governing bodies, the establishment of a global tax, and a world water court, among other reforms. As far as international law is concerned, Held calls for the convening of international representatives to “reconnect” security concerns with the human rights agenda “through the consolidation of international humanitarian law” (p. 165) and other such measures.

The reader may well have gained by now a sense of both the values that guide Held and the steps he believes we ought to embrace in order to advance these values. Just to be sure, here is one more telling example. He writes that the “the pursuit of impartial, rule-based free trade throughout the current round of negotiations is urgent. The trade round that begun in Doha needs to be a successful development round—one that brings real benefits to poor countries and the least well off” (p. 59).

The book does not seek to provide an analysis of the social and political forces that might bring about the basic changes to foreign policy and the global order that Held so strongly and eloquently favors. While Bush (and his allies) are blamed for following the opposite, misbegotten track, it is never suggested that if he (and Blair) were replaced, say, by John Kerry (and Gordon Brown), this would suffice to keep multinational corporations in check, make people dig much more deeply into their pockets to provide international aid, support international courts, and so on. Take just one of the less controversial suggestions that the author embraces (I am not saying it is not controversial): making the Security Council more representative. It is not accidental that the current structure persists. There are major powers that favor its present form or at least find it vastly more in line with their interests and values than any of the suggested alternatives. Why would

France and Britain, for instance, agree to be replaced by a European Union representative? What would motivate or force China to welcome India as a fully equal member?

I do not believe that it is proper to chide an author for a book that he has not written and the reviewer wishes that he had. All I am suggesting is that for those who share Held's values and agenda, another volume(s) is called for—one that draws on a Freudian (or Marxist) analysis. Freud assumed that there are not accidental personal conducts. They are all expressions of a subterranean structure that is not visible to the naked eye and can be changed only through a difficult process. The same, Marx showed, holds for societies. It is not accidental that farm subsidies (which Held wishes to eliminate) continue to persist, for powerful countries pay little mind to weak ones and so on. Those who seek change had better write a companion to Held's book. Its subject would be how to mobilize the forces that would change the subterranean structures, which in turn would allow for the modification of many of the "surface" phenomena. I am not saying that history is predetermined; rather, that if one seeks to alter its course, one first needs to understand what drives it and how it can be deflected or new forces be introduced into the matrix.

Held does suggest that global networks of people could form shared norms and embody them in constitutions, which then would be implemented. How much of a force they can be, as they face all the other forces that are not about to fade away, is a critical question one must ponder in assessing the future of the social democratic agenda he holds out. As I see it, a global governing body is being fashioned, but one that is light years away from what Held—and I—dream about. The United States, propelled by a new force, terrorism with a global reach, has responded by cobbling together a global police authority, which is expanding to include the limitation of nuclear proliferation and also provide a small measure of humanitarian interventions. Many nation-states were initially formed to provide security, but they later expanded their missions and their legitimacy. The question for this new global design is how we can move this authority in a similar direction.

One may argue that by providing a detailed agenda for those who favor social justice, equality, and peace (among other virtues), Held energizes their endeavors. Moreover, it might be said that such social democratic (or liberal, in the American context) exhortations have carried considerable weight in the past. Granted, they are one force that drives the provision of foreign aid (although much of it is deflected to arms purchases), made Bush turn to the United Nations for approval for invading Iraq, and so on. However, these forces clearly do not suffice to move the world anywhere near where Held and his fellow travelers believe it ought to be. And a considerable case can be made that over the last years—especially under the impact of terrorism—they have grown

weaker, rather than stronger. For progress to occur, one needs to find the equivalent of the proletariat in Marxist analysis, one or more social groups that can be mobilized (or form new coalitions) on the side of the favored changes. These need not be economic classes; in effect, they often are ethnic groups (which were mobilized very successfully in wars of national liberation). And they do need the kind of normative case that Held is making to mobilize them. However, in this book I did not find the needed historical carrier(s).

Finally, as *Global Covenant* is largely normative, one may ask about the standing of the values it promotes. Should one favor a global government under current conditions? Thus, should one make the United Nations more representative—even if many of those representatives that are to be accorded with much more power represent tyrants and not their people? Should we rather heed a Council of Democracies? What would be an equitable global distribution of wealth—would it be the same for those who work hard as for those who would rather spend their days studying their scriptures?

Held charted an agenda that deserves examination on both levels: first, its normative appropriateness, and second, whether one can identify the forces needed to advance his agenda. The second assessment is, of course, needed only if Held's agenda passes the first test.

**Violence and Democracy.** By John Keane. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 226p. \$65.00 cloth, \$23.99 paper.

—Brien Hallett, *University of Hawai'i*

This is a very readable discursive essay. In consequence, John Keane's many digressions are provocative and informative, for example, his meditation on death on page 40 or his short history of the British peace movement on pages 83–88. His method also adds greatly to the reader's pleasure: He identifies key authors in a wide range of related fields, summarizes their key works, links them together, one generous summary after another, and finally, criticizes the synthesis he has just created. For example, after summarizing and synthesizing Hans Mangus Enzensberger's, Martin van Creveld's, and Robert D. Kaplan's views on post-Cold War "uncivil wars," Keane remarks: "The temptation to think of contemporary uncivil wars as 'primitive' is itself primitive. It should be resisted" (p. 115). He then resists the temptation by discussing primitive warfare among Muslim desert tribes and Native Americans, as described by Ernest Gellner and Pierre Clastres, respectively. The value of this method is that one learns in a critical manner what others think. The disadvantage is that the issues in hand are never addressed.

What, then, are the issues in hand? It is difficult to say. Keane is clearly upset about violence and sees democracy as the answer. Yet while the democratic peace is fine among "mature democracies," what about the "surplus

violence” found among the immature democracies, the many post–Cold War era “uncivil societies” with their “uncivil wars” (pp. 24–27, Chap. 6), and the “islands of violence” within even mature democracies? In the face of all this, the simplest summary of the essay is the following: “The East Europeans established democracy and vibrant civil societies in 1989 without resorting to ‘surplus violence’; should others not be able to do the same? And, oh, yes, do not forget Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and many others. Perhaps the nineteenth- and twentieth-century romance with violence of Marx, Georges Sorel, Frantz Fanon, and others was less than salubrious.” In sum, Keane is not really interested in democracy at all, or even violence. A better and more accurate title for *Violence and Democracy* would have been *Civil and Incivil Societies*.

A more extended summary might begin by identifying Keane’s goal and means. The Goal: Because nurture (i.e., social context) accounts for violence to a greater degree than nature (pp. 8, 93f.), violence is contingent and removable, reducible and eradicable (i.e., it can be “denatured” and “democratised” [p. 3]). This means that “incivil violence” can be transformed into “civil violence” (pp. 138f.). The Means: “Civility Politics” (pp. 81–88) or “global civil society backed by representative government” (p. 136) is the primary engine for “denaturing” and “democratizing” incivil violence. Social movements, especially peace movements, are the heart of civility politics; they thrive best in mature democracies. (Keane recognizes the importance of the structural or institutional aspects of modern representative constitutions, but focuses narrowly on the cultural aspects in this essay.)

In addition to tracing out a goal and a means, Keane also wrestles with a false dilemma: Democracy “implies opposition to violence in all its forms,” but at the same time, “violence may be required to put an end to violence” (p. 134). And he comes to an unhelpful resolution: “Democracy requires commitment to the rule that violence is only justified when it serves to *reduce* or *eradicate* violence. . . . This of course begs the question of when and where violence is legitimate under democratic conditions [where it can be denatured, democratised, and turned into civil violence]” (p. 161).

Keane probably feels that his struggles with this dilemma and his “rule” are the most important and innovative parts of the essay. And they would have been, had he not begged the question. To be sure, he does come tantalizing close to the end of Chapter 1. There, he introduces momentarily the concept of “just violence.” Had he elaborated this idea, his thought might have developed as follows: Because civil society and the just-violence criteria (also known as just-war criteria; pp. 11–13) are both grounded in a deep respect for the humanity and dignity of opponents (pp. 1, 42ff.), therefore the just-violence criteria provides a nonreligious, non-First Principle, contextually rich

way for individuals and civil societies to judge (p. 162) when and where violence is civil or incivil.

The fundamental problem with the essay, then, is that Keane, like many others, equivocates when using the word *violence*. To say at one and the same time that “[v]iolence, civil society and democratic government cannot peacefully coexist. . . . But it is important to recognize that the simple ethical equation of non-violence and democracy does not always work” and then, to dismiss the contradiction as “the Paradox of Civil Violence” is only to fail to address the equivocation head-on (p. 139). Talking about denaturing violence by democratising it and transforming it from incivil into civil violence is perhaps ironic, certainly paradoxical, but inadequate.

Instead of defining violence narrowly as physical violence (Chap. 2), Keane should have recognized the need to move from the abstract to the concrete. For, violence, like murder, is a prejudgment upon an act. To say that “[f]rom a democratic perspective, violence is ‘bad,’ but not always so” (p. 161) is like saying that from a democratic perspective, murder is bad, but not always so. The abstract terms used prejudge the case, creating irony and paradox, but not understanding. For behind the prejudging abstraction is a concrete, context-rich act. As Gandhi’s explanation of *ahimsa* illustrates (p. 35), for myriad contextual reasons, a surgeon cutting open a heart is not murder, while a thief doing the same thing is. Likewise, the 1939 Nazi invasion of Poland was violence (and, hence, aggression), while the 1945 Allied invasion of Nazi Germany was not. And this is true despite the fact that the surgeon, the thief, the Nazi, and the Allies engaged in physically violent acts.

The issue, therefore, is not physical violence but justification and legitimacy. Is the specific, concrete act justified or unjustified? If justified, it is legitimate; if not, it is illegitimate, and hence, violence. It follows, therefore, that surgery and war must be condemned, in general, in the abstract, because the presumption must *always* be against employing either. Yet in the particular, in the concrete, when the circumstances warrant, the general, abstract presumption can and ought to be overridden.

Needless to say, I have returned to the just-violence suggestion proffered by Keane at the end of Chapter 1. Not only do the criteria of the just war provide the template for judging when and where the presumption against surgery or war or any other act should be overridden, but by generalizing the criteria to all physical violence—wars and civil wars, homicide and rape, road rage and child abuse, bullying in schools and cruelty to animals, including the institutional violence of prisons, asylums, and hospitals—Keane would also have struck out into new territory. He was on the cusp of dragging the just-war criteria out of the international relations ghetto and making it available to civil society. The only caveat is, of course, his use of the equivocation, violence. For the criteria do

not measure abstract violence; they judge concrete acts. Hence, the better term would have been “just act,” not just violence. Moreover, when the substitution is made, the full impact of many of Keane’s sentences and digressions are realized. For example, by substituting “*an act*” for “violence,” one illuminates the just cause that should motivate any political act: “*An act* can be deemed ‘good’ only when it serves as an effective means of creating or strengthening a peaceful civil society secured by publicly accountable political-legal institutions” (p. 161).

**The Limits of Protectionism: Building Coalitions for Free Trade.** By Michael Lutzig. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 2004. 288p. \$27.95.

— John A. C. Conybeare, *University of Iowa*

This is an ambitious and useful book that takes the reader through eight cases of governments that tried, with mixed results, to guide their countries from protectionism to free trade. A successful strategy requires the government to make allies of the industries that can transform themselves and survive in a more competitive environment (“flexible rent-seekers”) and quickly to kill the industries that cannot (“inflexible rent-seekers”). Michael Lutzig adopts from the classic public choice literature the term *rent-seekers*, a group that seeks to effect a zero sum transfer from others to itself, usually resulting in a negative sum game for society, by the amount of the transaction costs necessary to effect the transfer.

The process starts with a government perceiving one or more of three types of opportunities that Lutzig calls economic crisis (e.g., the Mexican debt crisis of 1994), mandated change (e.g., Canada complying with the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations), and strategic calculation (e.g., Prime Minister Robert Peel hoping to repeal the Corn Laws). Governments then pick one or more of four plans for implementation: the big bang (self-explanatory), divide and conquer (picking off the protectionist industries one by one in order to lessen the overall magnitude of political opposition), incrementalism (slow but broad-based reductions in protection), and path of least resistance (liberalize the sectors where resistance is low, buy off the stronger opposition with subsidies, and put off the tough cases). With this framework in place, Lutzig has a 4 × 7 table with 28 boxes in it. The eight cases (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Britain, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United States) populate only seven of these boxes. Most of the cases are contemporary (late twentieth century), except for Britain (the 1840s) and the United States (the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Amendment of 1934 that moved the United States away from the Smoot-Hawley level of protection).

While the typology set up is both interesting and useful, especially for a public policy strategist, it does not constitute a “model” (pp. 21–25). There is no clear spec-

ification of a hypothesis or of dependent and independent variables. The only global generalization I was able to get out of the book was that sometimes liberalization works and sometimes it does not. The reasons why it does or does work seem to be mostly idiosyncratic and unique to each case. What the author presents as a model in Figure 1.1 is simply the chronological sequence of events that may occur.

This quibble aside, the cases are well presented, sensitive to historical nuances, detailed in their uses of source material (i.e., not superficial), and told in ways that show how the author sees them fitting into the appropriate boxes. Therein lies another problem. Lutzig elaborates on one version of Peel’s decision to attempt repeal of the Corn Laws: It was necessary to prevent revolution. However, as Lutzig is surely aware, there are a number of other explanations for the repeal of the Corn Laws, such as the rise of middle-class urban voters and election buying by the cotton textile producers. He is giving us the version that fits his typology. Similarly, his story of U.S. trade liberalization is slanted: “Roosevelt and Hull used the iteration strategy as a means of implementing free trade through gradual conversion of flexible rent-seekers” (p. 77). There are many other factors one could emphasize in telling the story of U.S. trade policy between the wars, ranging from ideology to optimal tariffs (the effective rate of protection for the U.S. manufacturing industry actually went up during the period in question).

I have much less familiarity with the other cases, though in each case, the story Lutzig tells appears quite plausible. Yet there is often a whiff of tautology in the accounts. When President Carlos Salinas’s big bang strategy works in Mexico, it is evidence of his “acute political skills” (p. 102). When Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s big bang fails, it is evidence of “poor policy decisions” (p. 173). To be fair, Lutzig does try to offer some reasons as to when a particular strategy works and when it does not, but they are often just dropped on the reader as asides in the course of recounting a case study. The twin cases of Chile and Brazil are particularly interesting since a comparison of the two would presumably hold a lot of extraneous variables constant, and since Lutzig says liberalization worked in one case and not in the other, fertile ground for some small-n generalizations. Yet again, the cases are discussed separately with little comparison. The Chicago Boys’ big bang worked in Chile because it worked. Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso’s big bang ran into opposition and he retreated into the protected cocoon of Mercosur. Lutzig clearly does not want to attribute the Chilean success to the Pinochet dictatorship, but that is the only obvious reason that jumps out at the reader. The author himself seems puzzled by the different outcomes and notes that “as late as the mid-1980s, the situations in Brazil and Chile were reasonably comparable” (p. 204). Yet the analytic judgments offered are invariably country

unique. In the case of Brazil, for example, he says that “seeking to build a coalition by satisfying protectionist rent-seekers dooms . . . the prospects for successful neo-liberal reform” (p. 204).

Overall, *The Limits of Protectionism* is something of a curate’s egg. The framework and the cases are helpful, but the dissection and analysis is less satisfying. It does remind us to reread the classics: “the new ruler ought to determine all the injuries that he will need to inflict. He should then inflict them once for all, and not have to renew them every day, and in that way he will be able to set men’s minds at rest and win them over to him when he confers benefits” (Machiavelli, *The Prince*). Did Machiavelli invent the big bang strategy of public policy innovation?

**Global Prescriptions: Gendering Health and Human Rights.** By Rosalind Pollack Petchesky. New York: Zed Books, 2003. 320p. \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

—Betsy Hartmann, *Hampshire College*

In her book, Rosalind Petchesky sets herself the ambitious task of analyzing the development and impact of transnational movements for women’s health in the last two decades of the twentieth century. She examines them not only in relation to the changing concepts of human rights and major United Nations conferences, but within the broader political and economic context of the spread of neoliberalism, religious fundamentalisms, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and militarism. Originally commissioned by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development for a five-year review of the World Summit for Social Development, the book assumes a fair degree of sophistication in regard to transnational politics although the text is punctuated by short boxes that give readers a useful introduction to key policy developments.

The first two chapters of *Global Prescriptions* focus on the rise of transnational women’s health movements and the pros and cons of their participation in UN conferences, especially the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994. Petchesky has long been active in reproductive rights issues and has participated in feminist organizing around the ICPD. Thus, in a sense she writes as a “participant observer,” though there is little personal narrative in the text. She views the UN conferences on environment (Rio de Janeiro 1992), human rights (Vienna 1993), population (Cairo 1994), social development (Copenhagen 1995), and women (Beijing 1995) as important sites of discursive struggle as a growing coalition of women’s groups, from both the North and South, came together to push for an inclusive agenda of women’s rights and empowerment. The models of organizing they developed, from pre-conference networking to an active Women’s Caucus at the conferences for lobbying governments and international agencies, proved highly successful in terms of increasing

women’s visibility, expanding the concept of human rights, getting new language into policy documents, and in many countries serving as an opportunity for diverse groups to come together to put pressure on the state.

Of all the conferences, the 1994 ICPD in Cairo marked the most notable “paradigm shift” as women’s health groups made an alliance with the population and family planning establishment to fight off fundamentalist opposition to birth control, abortion, and sexuality education. The result was the “Cairo consensus,” in which reproductive health programs and women’s empowerment were put forward as a much better means for addressing population growth than the narrow, top-down, and often coercive population control programs of the past. In feminist circles, the process of producing the consensus was far from consensual, however. The period was marked by intense and sometimes bitter struggle and debate. In particular, many women’s groups were concerned that the Cairo consensus did not challenge the dominant neoliberal model of development with its emphasis on privatization of health and other social services and its negative impact on women’s livelihoods.

Petchesky acknowledges these struggles and notes in retrospect how the Women’s Caucus at Cairo probably should have paid more attention to the structural and macroeconomic conditions necessary for the realization of women’s reproductive and sexual rights. However, she argues that “this shortsightedness reflects not so much a willful political choice or the dominance of Northern women’s NGOs as deeper structural and cultural weaknesses of women’s movements across the globe.” She argues that feminist activists have to some extent “internalized dominant gender norms so that macroeconomic issues (trade, finance and resource allocations), like military and security issues, are perceived as intrinsically masculine and insular terrain” (pp. 50–51).

In actuality, however, many women’s groups involved in the Cairo process did have a strong and well-developed analysis of these “masculine” terrains (e.g., see Jael Silliman and Ynestra King, eds., *Dangerous Intersections*, 1999). And it was precisely this analysis that led them to question the strategic decision of the Women’s Caucus leadership not to bargain more strongly on economic issues when negotiating the Cairo consensus. Although Petchesky is right in saying that this decision was not a simple outcome of the domination of Northern feminists and foundations over Southern activists, I would argue (as someone who also participated in the Cairo process) that no understanding of that process is complete without examining the hierarchies in transnational women’s organizing, the role of strategic philanthropy in gatekeeping and amplifying certain voices over others, and the collaboration between U.S. foundations, such as the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the State Department and national security community around Cairo. The *material* politics of the Cairo process

are integrally related to the strategic decision to leave neoliberalism out of the discussion. The discursive terrain of UN conferences is not a level playing field, even in feminist politics.

In the next two chapters, Petchesky moves away from the heady days of the UN conferences where another world seemed possible in order to examine the challenges and opportunities facing activists working on access to essential medicines to treat HIV/AIDS and on health sector reform. In both cases, the human right to health is on “a collision course with global capitalism.” These chapters offer a detailed, nuanced overview of the current political economy of health care and the problematic market-based values that underlie it. The chapter on HIV/AIDS contains case studies of movements in South Africa and Brazil to secure access to essential drugs against powerful pharmaceutical interests. The author broadens her focus here beyond women’s organizing, although she continues to keep gender issues at center stage.

The penultimate chapter returns to women’s movements, examining the tricky position in which women’s health nongovernmental organizations now find themselves as they navigate between “the hegemonic market and the moribund welfare state” (p. 223). In many countries, as public health services decline, women’s NGOs have been pressed into duty as direct service providers, often draining their energy from political advocacy work and placing them in problematic and unequal partnerships with governments and international agencies. With examples drawn from many different countries, Petchesky shows that there are no easy answers and that strategies necessarily vary according to context. Referring again to Brazil and South Africa, she argues that both countries “suggest models in which active civil society organizations and socially committed state institutions can interact to create strong systems of accountability even where some services are provided by NGOs or the private sector” (p. 243).

Against the dark backdrop of U.S. hegemony and militarism, Petchesky remains cautiously optimistic about the possibilities of democratic global governance and the role of transnational women’s movements in achieving that goal. Her final chapter summarizes some of the key global prescriptions for protecting and advancing human health and well-being.

**Spatializing International Politics: Analyzing Activism on the Internet.** By Jayne Rogers. New York: Routledge, 2003. 184p. \$96.95.

— Brian D. Loader, *University of Teesside, UK*

Recent anxiety about variable electoral turnout, falling party membership, and opinion polls depicting the disaffection of young people with politics has led some commentators to suggest that democratic politics in many

countries is in crisis. While these concerns may reflect a significant dissatisfaction among citizens with their politicians and representative institutions, it may however be far too early to conclude that people have ceased to be interested in participating in the political arena.

In her book, Jayne Rogers offers an alternative perspective of democratic participation through the adoption and creative shaping of the new communications media, such as the Internet. There have, of course, been numerous accounts of the potential use of the Internet to foster democracy and empower citizens. Yet very little empirical evidence has been found to support these utopian accounts in practice. Rogers’s contribution to the debate is altogether more grounded in a cautious appraisal of the actual use of the new media by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for political activism. While aware of the potential of information and communications technologies (ICTs) to provide a valuable tool for NGOs both to challenge “official” public information and to offer alternative perspectives to an international online audience, Rogers thankfully resists the cyber-hype that has dominated much of the early debate in this field. As the title suggests a central concern of *Spatializing International Politics* is to foreground the limitations of the state-centric orientation of traditional international relations approaches and to develop a spatially theoretical model that can be applied to the behavior of international nonstate actors. The global and flexible electronic networks that offer many-to-many communication any time of the day, while not eliminating the dominant role of the nation-state in political analysis, do however offer new international dimensions for human interactions and access to contested and competing information sources.

The book is structured to provide, in the first part, a detailed critical exposition of spatial theorizing in IR and the weakness of these accounts as a means for understanding contemporary international political activism by NGOs, which utilize ICTs. Feminist writers have for some time provided valuable insights into the role of political spaces for legitimizing particular political practices and discourses. Rogers draws very effectively upon the work of these feminist scholars to make an argument for the possibility of respatializing IR models and perspectives to include nonstate actors as a component of the political arena, instead of simply “outside” the nation-state.

Chapters exploring the nature of the new media and NGOs are provided for those less familiar with these complex areas and are necessary for the author’s later arguments. The central chapters, which provide case study material on the actual use of the Internet by political activists, may well be of most interest to many readers. An examination of four types of nonstate activism is undertaken on the basis of interviews with members of a number of NGOs within each classification. Rodgers draws



her typology of NGOs according to what she describes as those largely concerned with “structural issues,” such as *transnational NGOs, and independent online media*, and those orientated around “issue-specific politics,” such as *genetically modified foods and missile defense*.

The author’s findings give a compelling impression of an increasingly sophisticated adoption of the new media for very diverse objectives. The transnational NGOs studied, Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, the Association of Progressive Communications, and One World, offer examples of clearly thought out and targeted application of the Internet. As Rogers remarks, “the gold-rush to simply have a presence on the Internet is over and many organizations are now using the technology much more strategically, designing online campaigns around specific goals” (p. 83). The independent media organizations, such as Squall, Indymedia and AlterNet, are similarly using the new ICTs to plan and coordinate their activities to achieve their objectives of providing alternative information sources that would not otherwise be available to a wider audience. The issue-specific activism also provides good accounts of the use of the Internet, as well as the differences to be observed between the pro- and anti-genetically modified foods combatants (the latter being required to use the media for more interactive repertoires of action) and the cultural differences in the missile debate between the Alaskan and UK activists (the former favoring Internet communications over the telephone dominance of the latter for mobilization).

The final chapters of the book provide an analysis of the importance of online activism for retheorizing the discourses of special politics. The author sensibly makes no grand claims for what remains a complex and contested domain. This book does, I believe, make a significant contribution to raising some critical questions about both the limitations of traditional models of IR and the challenges for the discipline to take seriously the changing spatial relationship and role of NGOs, significantly facilitated by new media, to shape future models of democratic governance.

**The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric.** By Frank Schimmelfennig. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 338p. \$80.00 cloth, \$28.99 paper.

— Joyce P. Kaufman, *Whittier College*

At the European Union meeting in December 2004, one of the topics for discussion was Turkey’s accession. Although it appears that negotiations regarding this topic and the specific requirements regarding membership (e.g., Turkey’s recognition of Cyprus) will continue for the next few years, this time it also appeared that EU member states were willing to engage in serious discussion about this issue. For Turkey, this has been a long time in coming; it ini-

tially applied for membership in 1987 and has been rebuffed each time since then. Although a member of NATO since 1951—the only Muslim member-state of the alliance—Turkey has been kept at a distance by the EU for a number of reasons. Justified largely on economic grounds, an underlying issue clearly has been whether the countries of first Western and now Eastern Europe really want to admit a country that is so “different.” In other words, what values and perspectives, as well as political and economic structure, are important for a country to really become a member of “the community”? The decision calculus regarding the admission of new states to both NATO and the EU are at the heart of this monograph by Frank Schimmelfennig, and the arguments he puts forth are especially germane now as the EU considers Turkey’s membership and as NATO ponders its own future in light of the divisions caused by the war in Iraq.

Schimmelfennig sets the stage for his arguments early in the book when he outlines clearly his arguments as to why the two major European organizations, NATO and the EU, each made the decision to enlarge. But it is important to note that this is not a book that dissects the policy decisions within each organization; rather, what the author does is try to explain the enlargement decision using a range of approaches. What sets this book apart from others that also address enlargement is that he draws from both sociological and political theory to analyze and answer a set of questions regarding enlargement of both the EU and NATO. This multifaceted approach gives added richness to our understanding of this clearly complex topic.

Two important questions are central to the focus of *The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe*: Why did the Eastern European countries want to join each of these two solidly Western European organizations, and why did each of the two organizations agree to enlarge and admit new members? The author does an excellent job of answering the first question from a number of perspectives. He puts the various countries’ desires for membership into the context of history and the Cold War, as well as their identification with the democratic countries of “the West.” Using traditional political theory approaches as well as the sociological, Schimmelfennig makes the case that it was rational for the countries to want to join the two organizations.

The author is less successful at answering the second question, however, that is, why both organizations were willing to enlarge and accept new members, especially when doing so had the potential to cost each organization more than what it gained. He concludes that “a rule-based collective outcome is possible even if the individual actors pursue selfish and conflicting goals” (p. 279). Introducing the sociological perspective does give added dimension to what is generally seen as a uniquely political issue. While this provides some insight into understanding why each of the organizations acted as it did, I think that it does not

begin to provide a complete picture of the answer to the very important question that he asks. Rather, to do so would require melding his approach with other research that looks at the question in different (i.e., more political) ways. Taken together, these approaches would provide a more complete picture of the decisions that each of the organizations made and why.

In other ways, the approach that he takes gives short shrift to the role of politics. In fact, I would argue that it is impossible to really understand the enlargement decisions made by both NATO and the EU without fully appreciating the role that politics played. Domestic politics helped drive each country's decision to apply for membership in NATO and/or the EU and, in many cases, affected the member-states' responses to the application. Similarly, the politics of each of the organizations affected its response to the enlargement issue. In this case, the whole (whether the EU or NATO), becomes more than simply the sum of its parts as organizational politics and dynamics come into play as well.

In his analysis, I think that the author stretches when he decides to expand his model to include all countries in the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) region and then to do a multivariate statistical analysis "designed to analyze the conditions under which an event is more or less likely to occur" (p. 112). Given the richness of his theoretical analysis, this statistical approach did not add much explanatory information to his model and in many ways detracted from the central argument.

The idea of comparing the two organizations, the EU and NATO, is a sound one. Comparison can provide the basis for generalization and insights that are easily missed when looking at only one case, the approach that most research takes. In this case, the author gives the reader a detailed case study of each of the organizations and draws conclusions that become the basis for more general conclusions tied to the importance of community rules and rhetorical action in order to help explain why each organization acted as it did. This allows him to come to some important generalizations, especially about why states wanted to join one or both of these organizations. Although the studies of the two organizations were to be parallel, he interviewed a range of people whose focus was on NATO enlargement; he did not do the same for the EU. I think that his arguments would have been strengthened had he done similar interviews with those who study the EU as well.

Because of the unique approach that the author takes, despite its relatively minor flaws, the book makes an important contribution to our understanding of a process that is far from over, as the case of Turkey makes clear. And it is incumbent upon all of us who study this topic, whether NATO or the EU, to realize that our perspective and understanding of the enlargement issue will be broadened if we study it from multiple points of view.

**Models, Numbers and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations.** Edited by Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 424p. \$75.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

— Timothy J. McKeown, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*

This volume, which originated in conversations among the editors at the 1997 meeting of the International Studies Association, is an attempt to provide an introductory handbook covering three categories of research methods now widely used in the study of international relations: case studies, statistical data analyses, and formal models. Thirteen chapters discuss the application of these methods to studies of international political economy, international environmental politics, and international security; an introduction and conclusion complete the volume.

The editors are committed to the notion of methodological pluralism. They state in the introduction that they wish to foster a discussion about the uses and limitations of various methods, rather than yet another argument about which method is the best for studying international relations. Although many will greet this announcement with relief, some will notice that the commitment to pluralism is honored a bit unevenly. While empirical research is covered by two different approaches, the only theoretical approach addressed is formal theory—and in this volume, that almost always means conventional game theory or microeconomic theory. From a practical standpoint, that means that the reader is presented with no guide to informal (i.e., verbal) theory, and alternatives to conventional economic theory receive very little attention (a discussion of Richardson process models by Duncan Snidal and a few references to computer simulation and agent-based modeling are the only departures from game-theoretic orthodoxy). Although the editors seem to believe that the field of international relations is steadily expanding to cover new issues and new methods (pp. 1, 372), a comparison of the methods covered here to those in a survey from an earlier era (James Rosenau's 1969 anthology *International Politics and Foreign Policy*) shows that the more recent volume has a much narrower conception of the useful range of approaches. (In addition to including the topics covered here—case studies, statistical methods, formal theory, and multiple methods—Rosenau's volume also covered ethnography, content analysis, survey research, simulation, and gaming.) While one can sympathize with the desire to produce a compact volume with a well-organized and focused presentation, the price of this is high in terms of the richness of the menu of approaches that is provided to the reader. Graduate student readers whose research interests do not map easily into the framework presented here will be left wondering whether their own approach is taken seriously by the discipline.

The editors intend *Models, Numbers and Cases* for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate classes,

as well for scholars interested in research methods, or in the application of a specific research method to one of the substantive topic areas covered here. The different competencies and interests of these two audiences are not easy to address simultaneously, especially in a book of moderate length. From a pedagogical standpoint, the usefulness of the chapters is limited by the relatively small number of concrete examples of good and bad research practice (two welcome exceptions to this pattern are the chapters by John Odell and by Bear Braumoeller and Anne Sartori). The suggestions for further readings at the end of each chapter partially substitute for this omission. If the book is to be used by graduate students who are beginning to conduct their own research, the abstract quality of much of the commentary will be less of a problem than if it is being read by undergraduates with little or no experience in conducting or reading research that goes beyond descriptive narratives.

For the professional, the chapters succeed in providing snapshots of some important research programs and a sense of current thinking about some important methodological questions. The coverage of the uses and limitations of these three methods is given too little space to address in detail many of the issues in the literature, but perhaps more in-depth discussions of those issues are best postponed until readers have a better sense of what is at stake in these debates.

**Collective Preventive Diplomacy: A Study in International Conflict Management.** By Barry H. Steiner. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 255p. \$50.00.

— David Cortright, *University of Notre Dame*

In recent years, international scholars and policymakers have focused considerable attention on the moral and political challenges of collective action by major states to defuse ethnic conflict within smaller states. Among the most important recent studies examining these issues are the United Nations General Assembly *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (2004) and the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (2001). Barry H. Steiner's study of collective efforts to prevent and resolve conflict is a welcome contribution to this literature. Steiner examines how and why major states join together for preventive diplomacy purposes. He draws from eight cases, ranging from the Greek revolution of the 1820s to the Bosnian conflict of the 1990s, and employs Alexander George's method of focused, structured comparison to distill lessons about the nature of great-power collective action.

Steiner's analysis distinguishes between interventionist and insulationist action. The former includes the familiar range of conciliatory or coercive options by which major states seek to manage conflict between violent antagonists

within a targeted smaller state. The latter refers to actions that are designed to defuse the conflict as a source of friction among the great powers themselves, with little regard for the needs of the primary antagonists. Insulation seeks to contain the conflict and avoid great-power disputes by heading off unilateral intervention.

The insulationist dimension of collective action has been neglected to date in the preventive diplomacy literature. Insulation is important, however, in laying the foundations for subsequent great-power intervention. In the early stages of a conflict, it is easier for states to agree to insulate than to intervene. But the act of cooperating to insulate enhances the motivation for intervention and increases its potential effectiveness. States initially come together to protect their own interests and prevent the pursuit of unilateral advantage, but as conflict dynamics unfold, they are often motivated to seek an end to the conflict through collective action.

Steiner identifies important differences between conciliatory and coercive intervention. The former is easier to undertake and more likely to occur in cases where the local conflict is not of compelling interest to the major states. On the other hand, the usefulness of conciliatory action is "severely limited" (p. 138) and fails to address the security dilemmas that often propel conflict. Coercive intervention involves a much greater commitment and occurs only where the major powers are strongly motivated to act. Among the "transitional" developments that increase the motivation for shifting from conciliatory to coercive collective action are humanitarian emergencies, military involvement by outside states, and provocations against peacekeepers. The effectiveness of coercive action is often limited by the perception of antagonists that the collective threat of force lacks credibility. Here, the prior commitment to insulation can be problematic, since states that have previously limited their involvement have difficulty convincing antagonists of their newfound commitment to coercive action.

The cases show, as other studies have found, that the motivation for collective intervention is usually low, and that states often fail to heed ample early warnings of impending crisis. The ability of states to prevent worsening ethnic conflict can be enhanced, the book proposes, by a "previously created early warning regime" (p. 207) to detect and legitimate collective involvement. The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe is a prototype for this type of regime on a regional basis, and a similar effort has been proposed for the UN in the Lakhdar Brahimi *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000) to the Security Council.

The book's findings on the harmful effects of great-power unilateral intervention are relevant to the current crisis in Iraq. The cases confirm that unilateral intervention "is the most important obstacle to defusing the local conflict" (p. 199). Unilateral intervention disrupts political

relations among the great powers themselves. In every case studied, “outside military intervention complicated maintenance of internal stability” within the targeted country (p. 122).

Steiner’s study suffers from a tendency to belabor obvious points (for example, that inadequate great-power unity impedes collective action) and from a limited set of cases. The criteria for selecting cases are not specified, other than a desire to avoid the problems that arise from large case samples, which often lack detail and nuance. The cases are diverse and span a long time frame but otherwise have no obvious commonality. The examples of coercive intervention involve the use of military force, but not economic sanctions. Only one of the cases is from the 1990s, when the number of ethnopolitical conflicts was at its height, while half are from the nineteenth century.

The author contends that the state today “remains as important for collective preventive diplomacy as it did in the 19<sup>th</sup> century” (p. 61). This is a point many scholars would dispute. His own analysis shows that the media and nongovernmental groups play an important role in

dramatizing humanitarian emergencies and violent provocations, which can increase the collective motivation to intervene.

The cases reflect a distinctly European bias (all occurred in Europe or involved European powers). This ignores important recent examples of regional powers in Africa and other continents engaging in collective insulation and intervention. States such as South Africa or Nigeria are not “great powers” in the conventional sense of the term, but they are influential in regional settings and recently have exerted significant effort toward collective preventive diplomacy. Some attempt to distill lessons from such experiences would be of much greater relevance to the contemporary challenges of preventing deadly conflict than an examination of the Belgian revolution of the 1830s.

Despite these limitations, *Collective Preventive Diplomacy* is an important book that breaks new ground in analyzing the dynamics among the great powers that determine the prospects and patterns of collective action to defuse ethnic conflict in smaller states.