Feliciano de Sá Guimarães and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, From Middle Powers to Entrepreneurial Powers in World Politics: Brazil's Successes and Failures in International Crises. *Latin American Politics and Society* volume 59, number 4 (Winter 2017)

**Appendix 2. Global Crises**

**Table Global Crises**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crisis | Code | Brazil Role | Government |
| 01. AIDS Patents dispute 1997-2001 | AIDS | Party | FHC |
| 02. East Timor Independence - UNTAET 1999-2002 | Timor | Third Party | FHC |
| 03. OPCW crisis José Bustani removal 2002 | OCPW | Party | FHC |
| 04. IAEA inspections in Resende nuclear facility 2004 | IAEA | Party | Lula |
| 05. Teheran Agreement 2010 | Iran | Third Party | Lula |
| 06. Libya Intervention and Responsibility While Protect 2011 | Lib | Third Party | Dilma |
| 07. UN Internet Privacy Resolution and NSA espionage 2014 | Privacy | Party | Dilma |
| 08. Gaza War 2014 | Isr | Party | Dilma |
| 09. Brazilian citizens executed in Indonesia 2015 | Indon | Party | Dilma |

**Coding Global Crises**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Code | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
| OPCW | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Privacy | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| IAEA | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| AIDS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Indo | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Isr | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Timor | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Lib | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Iran | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

**01. AIDS Patents dispute 1997-2001**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| AIDS | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

**a) Introduction**

In the late 1990s, Brazil created a program to fight HIV/AIDS. As part of this program, the government, in 1997, made it compulsory to distribute antiretroviral drugs to people with HIV/AIDS in Brazil. Despite relentless pressure from the US and its pharmaceutical firms, Brazil chose to pass a patent law that provided that “local working” of the patent is required for a patent holder to enjoy patent rights in Brazil. Brazil’s law permits the government to issue compulsory licenses for goods that are not manufactured locally within three years of receiving patent protection. Brazil has maintained that the threat of compulsory licensing has helped it negotiate reasonable drug prices with global pharmaceutical companies; it has used this threat effectively against Roche and Merck in the quest for affordable AIDS drugs[[1]](#footnote-1).

According to Cepaluni, "in order to escape the monopoly of patents and reduce the cost of the program, the Ministry of Health, through the Network of Official Pharmaceutical Laboratories, began to produce generic substitutes for these drugs, being of fundamental importance the Law of Generic No. 9,787, of February 10, 1999) for the local production of these drugs"[[2]](#footnote-2). In sum, the Brazilian government was opposed to the pharmaceutical industry, especially to the US laboratories, when it demanded the right to override pharmaceutical market rights to sell drugs to treat AIDS. Brazil defended the argument public welfare should prevail over profit[[3]](#footnote-3).

However, according to the US government, Brazil was discriminating against US products through its intellectual property law and violating TRIPS at the WTO. The US filed a panel request with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (CSO) on January 9, 2001, accusing Brazil to violate Article 68 of the Property Code of the TRIPS. despite the fact that Although the Brazilian government did not manage to actual provide compulsory licenses[[4]](#footnote-4).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

According to The Guardian, “Brazil argued that its patent laws were consistent with WTO rules and that the contested article was an important instrument available to the government, in particular in its efforts to increase access of the population to medicines and to combat diseases such as AIDS. The provision of cheaper, locally produced, generic drugs is a cornerstone of Brazil's widely praised national AIDS policy”[[5]](#footnote-5).

In addition, as pointed out by José Serra, Minister of Health at the time, antiretroviral drugs produced locally did not violate TRIPS rules, since they have all been developed prior to 1997 - when the Industrial Property Code (Law 5,772 / 71) did not allow the patenting of medicines[[6]](#footnote-6).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

On May 18, due to a Brazilian proposal, the World Health Assembly of WHO declared that access to medicines for patients with AIDS was a fundamental human right. It was unanimously approved by 188 WHO members (CEPALUNI, pp. 79). Brazil defended the compulsory license, that is, the breaking of patents, in the case of economic abuse by the pharmaceutical industries[[7]](#footnote-7).

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

In 2001, Minister Serra threatened to break Roche's Nelfinavir patent for HIV/AIDS retroviral[[8]](#footnote-8). In the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference, Brazil India and other 50 countries threaten to break patents and violate the TRIPS agreement if the US and Switzerland, another drug producer, did not force their producer to reduce prices. According to the Brazilian proposal countries with public health problem would be allowed to use compulsory license in case of national emergency[[9]](#footnote-9).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

According to the BBC, Brazil obtained support from 48 countries for the patent proposal[[10]](#footnote-10). According to Oliveira, Brazil "obtained international sympathy from most other countries; Among them, South Africa (a country suffering from an HIV / AIDS epidemic and, like Brazil, does not have the financial resources to ensure free treatment for all those in need), India (a country with advanced technology for the production of generics and (Kenya), Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and other developing countries (interested in technology transfer and international technical cooperation for the treatment of their AIDS patients). For the author, "international public opinion and epistemic communities were also essential to the" victory "because they defended the right of Brazil and the developing countries to access to medicines. Among the key players were NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières, Health GAP and Oxfam, and even international organizations involved in public health and human rights issues such as the United Nations (UNAIDS) and WHO”[[11]](#footnote-11).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

United States was against the measures taken by Brazil in relation to the production and distribution of medicines for AIDS, and as so, initiated legal proceedings against Brazil, through the WTO’s dispute settlement body, claiming that Brazil’s production of generic HIV drugs breaks international laws on patent protection[[12]](#footnote-12).

**g) Result**

According to Cepaluni, "in June 2001, an out-of-court agreement was reached in which the United States withdrew the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's complaint and Brazil undertook to notify if it decided to provide compulsory licenses for Patents of US companies "[[13]](#footnote-13). The agreement was considered a Brazilian victory. The United States had just admitted the possibility of patent breaches in public health issues in developing countries[[14]](#footnote-14).

**02. East Timor Independence 1999-2002**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Timor | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In 1999, with the help of the UN, a referendum was held on East Timor for the autonomy or independence from Indonesia. When the referendum produced a decisive 'NO' to continued integration with Indonesia (78.5 per cent as against 21.5 per cent), the Indonesian army launched the Timorese militia on a scorched earth campaign. The process of independence was marked by a deterioration of the security situation of the new country. The Security Council authorized an international military intervention - the Australian-led INTERFET, a multinational non-UN peacekeeping force organized and led by Australia in accordance with UN resolutions to address humanitarian and security crisis which took place in East Timor from 1999-2000 until the arrival of UN peacekeepers. Established in 1999, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) operated in East Timor in the moments prior to its formal independence, and was not only a peacekeeping mission, but also had multidimensional characteristics in carrying out administrative functions. After the independence was formally established in 2002, a third mission was created - United Nations Mission for East Timor (UNMISET) - in order to provide assistance to East Timor until all operational responsibilities were fully transferred to the Timorese government two years later[[15]](#footnote-15).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil fully supported the East Timor independence. At the end of March 1999, in the light of new developments on the ground, the Brazilian delegation at the UNSC suggested that the Secretariat inform the Council about the situation in East Timor, thus paving the way for the Council start analyzing the issue[[16]](#footnote-16). The Brazilian representative at the UNSC, Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Jr., stated that "it was a critical and tragic moment for East Timor and for the international community." They would be dealing, at the time, "with an urgent and serious threat to international security." To restore respect for international standards they would have to "find ways to induce the Indonesian government to fully comply with the May Agreements." And, if necessary, they would have to "consider further action by the Council, in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Charter." They could not "wait any longer as the disorder and chaos in East Timor and the people are being massacred by the hands of criminal militias"[[17]](#footnote-17).

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso made an important speech at the departure ceremony of the Brazilian military troops that were going to be part of the Multinational Peace Force in East Timor: "In the last days, we have all witnessed tragic manifestations of intolerance and violence in Timor. Minority groups, defeated by democracy, turned hatred into argument. The self-determination won by the Timorese people, legitimately endorsed by the polls, was threatened by the folly of weapons and by an escalation of atrocities to which the international community could not be indifferent". He said that "Brazil was not indifferent", since "with the Timorese people, we share a common language, a same cultural heritage. We share, above all, the defense of freedom and the belief in solidarity as fundamental values​ (...) in the name of this heritage and values, Brazil sends its support to the Timorese brothers." More than that, the mission would be a "defense of the right to self-determination achieved after years of efforts"[[18]](#footnote-18).

According to Barreto, "at the UNGA opening, Foreign Minister Lampreia declared that the task of helping the people of East Timor to secure the right, clearly in free voting, to decide their own future as an independent nation was urgent. He affirmed that Brazil could not accept, nor the Brazilian citizens understand, that the self-determination of the Timorese people was not fully assured. He expressed hope that the multinational force approved by the UNSC could end the atrocities committed after the popular consultation and restore the necessary conditions for a peaceful transition to independence" [[19]](#footnote-19). Brazil played an important role in establishing UNTAET, with the Brazilian Ambassador the UNSC defending vehemently its creation[[20]](#footnote-20).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt by Brazil to create new norms in this case.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Among military troops, policeman and military attaches Brazil sent over 100 people to UNTAET over the course of three years. As for the UNMISET provided 135 people over five years, becoming the largest contingent in the last years when there was a sharp reduction of the mission[[21]](#footnote-21). Brazil had made important contributions in foreign aid to East Timor in health, policing, and education[[22]](#footnote-22).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Within the INTERFET, Brazil participated in an international force led by Australia and supported by New Zealand, alongside with Argentina, Denmark, Fiji, France, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom[[23]](#footnote-23). A coalition of nations sent troops to support UNTAET. As well as the INTERFET, the forces were led by Australian and New Zeeland, but France , Brazil, Denmark, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea Thailand, the Philippines, Portugal, Sweden and the UK provided additional troops. Brazil participated Brazil participated alongside Portugal and Australia as the main contributors to UNMISET mission[[24]](#footnote-24).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

Initially there was great US reluctance to support a coalition-based intervention. The United States cited other commitments. Eventually Clinton administration agreed to make available vital logistics support, and some ASEAN countries then joined the coalition. There was talk in Australia of a crisis in the alliance relationship with the US, and of the country’s isolation in the region. Finally, in a speech of 9 September 1999, President Clinton threatened dire economic and other consequences should Indonesia fail to comply with the international demand for intervention that the allies countries now come to support[[25]](#footnote-25).

**g) Result**

The independence of East Timor was fully accomplished by the end of 2002 when the second UN backed mission - UNTAET - was formally ended with the full transferring of governmental functions to East Timor government. Brazil accomplished its revealed preference of supporting East Timor independence.

**3. OPCW crisis José Bustani removal 2002**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| OPCW | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**a) Background**

The Brazilian diplomat José Bustani was director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons since 1997. As Director-General Bustani was responsible for promoting universal membership. By 2002, he proposed to admit Iraq to the OPCW which would have meant sending the organization’s inspectors to the country and pursuing peaceful resolutions to problems related to possible chemical armaments. This position dissatisfied United States as Jose Bustani appears to have become an obstacle to the American intention to engage in military action in Iraq. Forthright, arguing bad OPCW management by Bustani, the US government requested Brazil to summon him back to Brasília, but Bustani and the Brazilian government denied. The Unites States then threatened to cut off its funding to the organization, which corresponded to 22 per cent of the OPCW’s total budget. Once again the US called for a Special Session of the Conference of States Parties, tabling a motion for Bustani’s dismissal[[26]](#footnote-26).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil opposed the removal of Bustani, denying American requests to fire him. According to President Cardoso, the country since the beginning of the process supported the ambassador and expressed confidence in his work[[27]](#footnote-27). In an official note released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Brazilian government reiterated its favorable position on Bustani's management at OPCW and thanked countries that supported the Director General[[28]](#footnote-28). Bustani argued that the articulation for his departure was a consequence of his conciliatory stance, which ran counter to the US intentions to carry out military actions in Iraq[[29]](#footnote-29).

However, as Lopes points out, “President Cardoso’s administration provided no effective backing to Bustani and did not give him any assignment afterwards, which created the perception that Brazil had also tacitly disapproved Bustani’s actions”. Bustani would have said that “if Brazil had decided to seek the official support from (which was already unofficially stated by) Latin-American, African and Asian countries, I wouldn’t have been sacked from the post and, in the end of the day, multilateralism would have won an important battle. Had Brazil acted in full accordance with its foreign policy records, this unique chance to embolden multilateralism wouldn’t have been missed”[[30]](#footnote-30).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not attempt to create new norms in this case.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

There was no material expense by Brazil in this case.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt by Brazil to create coalitions to settle down this crisis.

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

Unites States sought to gain support from other countries to overthrow Bustani who opposed its military interests. According to Barreto, the episode “would show, on the one hand, the unilateralism of George Bush's US administration in dealing with multilateral issues between the Sept. 11 attacks and the decision to invade Iraq; And, on the other hand, the apathy of many countries in the face of this strong pressure from Washington to assert what it considered to be its strategic interest”[[31]](#footnote-31).

**g) Result**

On April 2002, the conference decided to terminate Bustani’s tenure. The decision was taken with 48 votes in favor, six against (Brazil, China, Cuba, Iran, Mexico and Russia) and 43 abstentions[[32]](#footnote-32). According to Stanic, “on July 16, 2003, the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor organization found that José Bustani was unlawfully dismissed from the post of director general of the OPCW. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal affirmed the importance of the independence of international organizations and their secretariats, and condemned political interference oby member states in their workings”[[33]](#footnote-33). Lopes shows that “in 2003 Bustani was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his achievements at the OPCW. For many this nomination represented acknowledgement of an effective management of the organization as well as of his commitment to the neutrality and independence of the OPCW”[[34]](#footnote-34).

**4. IAEA inspections in Resende nuclear facility 2004**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| IAEA | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In December 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) made a request for Brazil to sign a safeguard agreement that covered the Brazilian Nuclear Industries facilities in Resende, Rio de Janeiro. As early as 2004, pressure mounted for Brazil to adhere to an Additional Protocol related to the safeguard measures previewed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such Protocol was designed to give IAEA authorities more autonomy for inspections on the country nuclear program, granting access to all areas and process that dealt with uranium enrichment, except for the specific case of machinery, while also permitting as many inspections as desired by the organization. But Brazil resisted on signing the Protocol, giving rise to controversies among the international press, which suspected that the country envisioned making weapons of mass destruction in its facilities.

The uranium enrichment plant in Resende is planned to supply the nuclear power plants *Angra I*, *Angra II* and soon even *Angra III* with low enriched uranium (3.5 up to 4%). According to the information of the Brazilian government, the ultra-centrifuges used for this have been built with their own innovative technology which makes the uranium enrichment by far more cost saving than it has so far been the case with the enrichment-procedures in other countries.

In October 2004, the U.S. journal *Science* published an article, in which the authors Liz Palmer and Gary Milhollin suggest that the nuclear program at the Brazilian enrichment plant *Resende II* aims at the immediate construction of up to six atomic bombs[[35]](#footnote-35).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim officially assured that Brazil had nothing to hide from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its nuclear facilities, located in Resende, in Rio de Janeiro. He said, however, that the Brazilian government preferred to wait a bit longer before signing the IAEA's additional protocol, which provided for more extensive inspections at the site, because Brazil did not want to reveal at the moment to the technicians of the agency the technology that the country had developed recently"[[36]](#footnote-36).

In response to the international news about its nuclear activities, the Brazilian government issued a note stating that it considered "unacceptable, because they are unfounded, attempts to draw parallels between the situation of Brazil which has rigorously fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement Guadalajara Agreement, the Quadripartite Agreement, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the situation of countries that have recently been led to admit secret or undeclared activities in the nuclear area"[[37]](#footnote-37).

For Bustani, Brazil's ambassador to London and former director of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW), there would be a disinformation campaign to embarrass the Brazilian government. He said "our nuclear aspirations are legitimate and peaceful and aim to meet the needs of our large coast, the demands of development"[[38]](#footnote-38). The minister of science and technology, Eduardo Campos made similar statements. He said he was astonished at the attempt to "make a whole international wave that would imply that Brazil is using nuclear technology for armaments, which is not true, that is not the fact, it is not the tradition of Brazil." In addition, according to him raises the important point that the nuclear use for war purposes is prohibited by the Brazilian constitution[[39]](#footnote-39).

A day after technicians made the expedition in Resende, Defense Minister Jose Viegas said the Brazilian government offered the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all the guarantees that "there is no deviation of nuclear material" in the country. According to him, "Brazil has nothing to hide in terms of the use of nuclear material and has never refused to open Resende's facilities and any other to the inspection."[[40]](#footnote-40)

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt to create new norms by Brazil in this case.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

By the international treaties Brazil had committed itself not to exceed the enrichment degree of 20%. The production of a nuclear explosive charge requires an enrichment degree of 90% at least. According to the information of the INB the uranium in *Resende II* can only be enriched up to 5%, which is sufficient for the production of electric energy in nuclear power plants. The nuclear reactor of a nuclear operated submarine needs an enrichment degree of up to 20%. The Brazilian Navy has been working on the development of a nuclear powered submarine over decades. According to Flemes, one concern of the IAEA might be that the ultra centrifuge in *Resende II* is technically capable of exceeding the allowed enrichment degree and possibly producing plutonium suitable for the production of weapons. The mentioned ultracentrifuge has been developed at the research centres of the Brazilian Navy, especially at the *Centro Experimental Aramar*, which has devoted itself to the project of the nuclear powered submarine since 1979. The head of the military nuclear research centre *Aramar*, Rear Admiral Alan Arthou, holds the view that the Brazilian centrifuge technology is technically superior to the U.S. and European procedures. The more efficient and cost-saving enrichment method is based on a magnetic pending procedure, by which there is no frictional resistance at the more than 1,000 rotations per second. Therefore the ultracentrifuge can do without water-cooling and works almost silently. The innovative centrifuge procedure will enable Brazil to participate in the worldwide uranium trade as a competitive rival. The more efficient enrichment method will lead to selling prices that are lower than the current prices[[41]](#footnote-41). It was very important for Brazil to protect the highly expensive technology developed domestically.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt to create coalitions by Brazil in this crisis.

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

The USA supported IAEA, pressuring Brazil to accept the inspections and measures. The question of nuclear inspection would have created a deadlock between Brazil and the United States, placing safety as a priority issue in the relationship between the two countries[[42]](#footnote-42). In April, the United States Department of State pressured Brazil to sign the Additional Inspection Protocol with the IAEA, which would allow for surprise and deeper inspections of Brazilian nuclear installations. The request followed the controversy caused by a report in The Washington Post in which Brazil is accused of resisting IAEA inspections[[43]](#footnote-43).

**g) Result**

By the end of September 2004, Brazil announced that a restricted agreement was reached with the agency, contemplating all the delicate points in a manner acceptable to the Brazilian government. The agreement was signed at the Agency's headquarters in Vienna, Austria, by the Minister of Science and Technology, Eduardo Campos. According to the document, IAEA inspectors cannot have visual access to the centrifuges, but can see the pipelines of the unit to make sure there is no diversion of enriched uranium into the plant[[44]](#footnote-44).

**05. Teheran Agreement 2010**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Iran | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

**a) Background**

On May 17th, 2010, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, presented the *Declaration of Teheran* to the press. The document was the result of 18 hours of negotiations between high representatives of Turkey, Brazil and Iran and offered a diplomatic solution for a long lasting crisis initiated when the IAEA uncover a program to enrich uranium, in secret Iranian nuclear facilities, in 2002. The United Nations Security Council, under US leadership had previously promoted three rounds of sanctions against Iran in 2006, 2007 and 2008.

The agreement was joyously celebrated in Istanbul, Teheran, and Brasilia and initially applauded by Russia and France as a triumph of diplomacy over force. Eventually, many considered the Turkish-Brazilian initiative misplaced and naive, a result of efforts from countries whose international experience and power resources did not allow them to play this kind of international game[[45]](#footnote-45) [[46]](#footnote-46). In Brazil, the government was severely criticized by domestic opposition forces for showing too much sympathy towards an authoritarian regime and especially for overestimating its own power, going beyond its actual capabilities[[47]](#footnote-47).

Then why did Turkey and Brazil decide to go for such a risky operation? Turkey’s motives were clearer and related to its interests and stakes in the Middle East conflictive and intricate politics. Brazil’s motivations were less obvious.

**b) Brazil's revealed preferences**

Brazil’s decision was grounded on traditional ideas and motivations. First, the belief that Brazil has the credentials to be a global actor is an important dimension of its self-image. The Iranian nuclear crisis was considered an important step towards improving such credentials[[48]](#footnote-48). Going beyond its region and tackling an international security issue, commonly thought to be *chasse gardée* of great powers, Brazil would show that it was qualified to be a member of a limited club and able to sit at the UN’s highest table[[49]](#footnote-49). Second, the South-South orientation of Lula’s foreign policy helped to reinforce the center-left government interest in Iran; after all another member of the Global South was in peril. The long tradition of the Brazilian diplomatic bureaucracy to portrait Brazil as leader of developing countries may also have played an important role on its resolve to acting as a broker for the Iranian nuclear issue. Third, Brazil had interest, as signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty, in avoiding a precedent that could in the future have consequences for its own peaceful nuclear program[[50]](#footnote-50).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil put on the table a proposal for a new approach to the crisis, one that emphasized Iran’s rights to develop a peaceful nuclear program as part of its right to economic development[[51]](#footnote-51) and the possibility of a negotiated solution, whose credibility relied on Turkey and Brazil’s credentials as developing countries, as opposed to a coercive approach sponsored by traditional powers[[52]](#footnote-52).

The Brazilian and Turkish diplomacy had a series of advantages that allowed their success in Teheran. First, both countries engaged Iran for a period of time, trying to build confidence. Amorim and Ahmet Davutoglu visited Iran several times. In addition, Brazil and Turkey understood that any agreement should be debated and approved by the complex domestic system of Iranian politics, something that P5 countries usually paid less attention. Efforts were made to convince not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the Supreme Leader Cabinet, the Parliament and several political factions[[53]](#footnote-53). Although, these efforts of confidence building were efficient enough to gain Iran, they were not powerful enough to change the US’s final position.

In the end, the Teheran agreement did not operate within a previous institutional framework, relying on *ad hoc* and unstable diplomatic requests, making it harder for countries like Brazil or Turkey to sustain their normative entrepreneurship on the issue

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Lula and Erdogan managed to convince Iranians to sign an agreement that went against three main Iranian long-term objections – Uranium should be transported in a single shipment, the swap should happen outside of Iran, and uranium pads should be returned to Iran within twelve months. On the other hand, the agreement avoided mentioning three US concerns – the fact that Iran was already enriching Uranium at 20%; Iran’s stock of slightly enriched Uranium was increasing, and recognizing the Iranian right to enrich Uranium[[54]](#footnote-54) [[55]](#footnote-55). In this sense, a key element for the success of the agreement was the swap of uranium between Turkey and Iran.

In this time, Iran committed itself to transferring out, in one single shipment, 1.200 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) and would receive, a year later, 120kg of enriched uranium pads that could be used for peaceful purposes by the Teheran Research Reactor. Iran would have LEU but not the control over its enrichment process. Turkey would be the guarantor of the whole operation assuring Iran that the agreement would be fully respected and the pads shipped to its final destination[[56]](#footnote-56). The possible role of Brazil in this process would be marginal. Turkey would provide the material capacity to implement the swaps at their enrichment facilities.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

After deciding to step in, Brazilian diplomatic authorities had intense exchanges not only with Turkey, but also with members of P5, informing them of their purposes and concrete steps[[57]](#footnote-57). The real challenge was not creating a coalition with Turkey or Iran, but developing a coalition wide enough to include members of the P5, notably the US.

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

A combination of factors placed the Obama administration against the agreement. : For months the Congress had being pressuring the White House to impose severe sanctions on Iran. If Obama had accepted the agreement and, consequently, gave up on imposing new sanctions trough the Security Council, the Congress would have passed sanctions despite the President. The delicate international consensus against Iran would have probably faded away. Although the agreement could have brought strategic victories, due to opposing domestic forces favoring sanctions, especially within its own party, it would have damaged the Obama administration[[58]](#footnote-58). At the end, sanctions were more important than swapping.

There is no doubt that, at some point, Brazil and Turkey had been encouraged to step in by the United States and France[[59]](#footnote-59) [[60]](#footnote-60). It is likely that Brazilian authorities misread messages sent by the White House, counting on the American support for the diplomatic initiative. Still, after the deal, the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accused Brazil and Turkey of being *naive*, fooled by a savvy Iranian strategy[[61]](#footnote-61). It is likely that within the Obama administration different interpretations about how to deal with Iran have played a role against the Turkish-Brazilian initiative[[62]](#footnote-62).

**g) Result**

Despite the agreement, the US decided to impose new sanctions, successfully convincing reluctant partners of UN Security Council, such as Russia and China. The Obama administration considered Iran’s strategy towards Brazil and Turkey as window dressing, meanwhile continuing to pursue its nuclear program and avoiding new damaging sanctions[[63]](#footnote-63).

Against this backdrop, on June 9th, 2010, The UN Security Council approved Resolution 1929 imposing additional sanctions on Iran, with support of all members – permanent or not – except for Brazil and Turkey that opposed the decision[[64]](#footnote-64). For the first time in the history of the Brazilian participation on the Security Council, the country voted against the unanimous opinion of permanent members.

**06. Libya Intervention and Responsibility While Protect 2011**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Lib | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

**a) Background**

In February 2011 the uprisings in the Arab world reached Libya. Muammar Gaddafi's 42-year-old government responded to the protests severely - armed attacks on civilians, arbitrary arrests, torture and extrajudicial killings have taken place. The country was plunged into chaos. The UN Human Rights Council soon drew attention to the violation of human integrity. Against this backdrop, Resolution No. 1970 was adopted on 26 February 2011 under the UNSC condemning the use of lethal force by the Muammar Gaddafi regime against protesters participating in the Libyan civil war; and imposing a series of international sanctions in response. The tension and aggressive response by the Libyan authorities only increased. The Arab League would then have acclaimed for more direct action by the UN.

In this context, France and England designed the Resolution 1973 for the UNSC. The resolution established a blockade on Libya's airspace, increased the embargo on arms exports to that country and froze financial assets of Libyan authorities. The Resolution also authorized "all necessary measures, nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to protect civilians and areas of civilian population under threat of attack" (Article 4). In other words, the UNSC authorized the use of force in Libya, based on the Chapter VII of the UN Charter and invoked the Principle of Responsibility to Protect

The concept is structured in three pillars. The former identifies the state as primary responsible for protecting its inhabitants from four types of crime - genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in general. The second deals with the role to be played by the international community in assisting each state in the fulfillment of this duty. With regard to these first two parts, the reception was positive and homogeneous by virtually all countries.

The discussion and disagreement revolved around the third pillar, so that the doctrine of responsibility to protect only reached its consensus form in the final document of the 2005 Summit, adopted as a resolution of the General Assembly. Intended only to be applied in exceptional circumstances, it allows for interference by the international community by following certain established norms in order to avoid the typified crimes.

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

The resolution was adopted with ten votes in favor and five abstentions. The countries that abstained were: Germany, Brazil, China, India and Russia. In general, the justifications given by their respective foreign ministers for this behavior were that, first, they were not convinced that there was an immediate threat to peace and international security, as contained in the resolution. Secondly the methods provided by the Resolution would hardly lead to the desired objective - an immediate end of violence and to save the lives of civilians[[65]](#footnote-65).

More than that, they feared that the measures adopted would lead to unpredictable effects, further increasing the tension in the region. Finally, the argument opposing the intervention, was that its advocates were appropriating the humanitarian discourse as a instrument for power expansion. According to Celso Amorim, the R2P would be “the *droit d’ingerénce* in new clothes”[[66]](#footnote-66).

In view of all these reasons, the Brazilian position was contrary to the resolution. Brazil believed that further discussions and study should take place before deciding to act.

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazilian criticism of misuse and limitations of the principle of Responsibility to Protect resulted in a note presented during the debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict that took place on November 9, 2011 in the Security Council. It was the first time that Brazil acted as a norm entrepreneurial[[67]](#footnote-67), with the objective in mind of becoming a global actor[[68]](#footnote-68). More than that, Brazil assumed the leadership of the debate about humanitarian interventions[[69]](#footnote-69).

According to the document, the lack of limits to the methods that powers could use, based on the prerogative of securing human rights, could make humanitarian intervention a mechanism of political manipulation[[70]](#footnote-70). From the title, originally in English, "Responsibility while protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept" (General Assembly Security Council, 2011), we can assess the main idea approached by the Brazilian authorship document. It was necessary for the international community to establish some procedural rules governing the adoption of similar measures in the future.

In practice, Brazil proposed the adoption of stricter criteria in the decision-making process for the use of force by the Security Council. It would be the proportionality of the response to the act. Its use as a last resort after exhausting all other means of conciliation and dialogue; and a premeditated calculation that balanced, on the one hand, the negative consequences that would inevitably follow actions and, on the other hand, the dangers associated with inaction. It also proposed more intensive monitoring of missions and a post-conflict trials that would also provide for the punishment of unlawful acts that could have been carried out by the UN forces themselves.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

The letter was an attempt to create an "intermediary" concept, reconciling the interventionism of the Western powers and the resistance of Russia and China, but which lacked more investment from Itamaraty after the initiative. Since Brazil did not have any military and financial resources to become a major actor in this peace operations, Itamaraty still depended very much on the reception of its proposals by influential countries of the international community[[71]](#footnote-71).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Over time some countries revised their position of opposition to the concept, since Brazil has shown more flexibility in its proposal. One of these countries was Germany, which had also abstained in the vote on Resolution 1973. According to Brenner , Germany began to engage in the concept and to re-join the discussion, becoming the spokesperson of the European continent , which still has countries that strongly reject the concept.

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

Brazil’s proposal was seen with skepticism by the west[[72]](#footnote-72). The US stood up against and did not support the Brazilian position, as they saw in this initiative an attempt to block international action, allowing rapist leaders to use state sovereignty as a shield[[73]](#footnote-73), and not as an attempt to enrich and cause debate[[74]](#footnote-74). As Brazil do not have hard power neither any knowledge of armed conflicts, the US doesn’t believe that our country should be part of the security dilemma discussions[[75]](#footnote-75).

**g) Result**

As foreseen in the resolution, the intervention, contrary to what Brazil wanted, occurred through NATO - a regional organization - with the dispatch of troops from the two most involved European countries. The US participation was indirect so that the intervention could be seen as a multilateral measure. The first actions began two days after the Council decision. The presence of NATO remained for eight months and only after the fall and death of Muamar Kadaffi, has withdrawn from Libyan territory.

**07. UN Internet Privacy Resolution and NSA espionage 2014**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Privacy | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

**a) Introduction**

In June 2013, the world was informed that National Security Agency (NSA)watched more than terrorists and US enemies. The former NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked many classified documents related to US espionage on foreign governments and authorities, including the President of Brazil. Rousseff had had her personal emails tapped by US agency. The tapping wad done through the use of corporate servers like Google, Apple and Facebook. As a result, this episode had many implications for the political fields, at both international and domestic levels. In terms of foreign relations, Snowden´s revelations provoked a diplomatic dispute between Brazil and the United States and forced Brazil to officially convey its discontent. The bilateral relations witnessed a huge setback with President Rousseff cancelling a scheduled visit to Washington.

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

In a statement in July 2013, Foreign Minister Patriota said that "the Brazilian Government has received with grave concern the news that electronic and telephone communications of Brazilian citizens would be subject to espionage by US intelligence agencies." Finally, he stressed that the "Brazilian government will promote in the framework of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Geneva, the improvement of rules. In addition, Brazil will launch initiatives in the United Nations to prohibit abuse and prevent invasion of the privacy of users of virtual communication networks, establishing clear standards of behavior in the area of ​​information and telecommunications to ensure cyber security that protects the rights of citizens and preserves the sovereignty of all countries"[[76]](#footnote-76).

A few days later, Dilma Rousseff said during a Mercosur summit in Uruguay that the bloc should adopt "pertinent measures" to avoid repeating the episodes. She stated that the security of the country and the privacy of citizens and businesses should be preserved[[77]](#footnote-77).

In September, Foreign Minister Figueiredo raised the idea that US espionage acts on President Dilma Rousseff are "inadmissible" and "unacceptable." He argued that "this type of practice is incompatible with the confidence necessary for a strategic partnership between the two countries"[[78]](#footnote-78). A Parliamentary Inquiry Commission was installed in the Federal Senate to investigate reports of US spying on e-mails, phone calls and digital data in Brazil[[79]](#footnote-79).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

In response to the crisis, Brazil pushed for the creation of new international norms on the issue. At the General Assembly, Dilma Roussef highlighted three points: (1) that there is a clear link between electronic espionage and Internet governance; (2) that cyber security is also a development issue; and (3) that regulating electronic espionage at an international level requires a truly global solution”[[80]](#footnote-80). According to Abdenur and Gama, “in the speech, Brazil claimed for itself a degree of leadership role in proposing solutions, announcing it “will present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet and to ensure the effective protection of data that travels through the web”[[81]](#footnote-81).

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

A part from Dilma canceling a state visit she would make to the US in October, the Brazilian government reacted by choosing the Swedish aircraft proposal in a bidding to replace the ageing Brazilian Air Force F-5 aircrafts. Until the last minute the Boeing proposal, offering the F-18s, had the Brazilian Air Force preference, but to the espionage scandal President Dilma decided to chose the Saab Gripen offer instead. Some argue that such decision intended to show that the NSA behavior in Brazil would be costly to the US economy[[82]](#footnote-82).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

In November 2013, the governments of Brazil and Germany presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations a proposal that establishes rules to guarantee the "right to privacy" in the digital era[[83]](#footnote-83). According to Globo, the German-Brazilian document noted that "while public security concerns may warrant the collection and protection of certain confidential information, States must ensure full compliance with their obligations under international human rights law"[[84]](#footnote-84).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

According to Globo, when questioned about the reports, the US government affirmed that it would not discuss the issue publicly, but directly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[[85]](#footnote-85). Eventually, the US Vice President Joe Biden phoned Dilma Rousseff to explain the allegations of espionage on Brazilian citizens and institutions. The Vice-President regretted the negative impact and reiterated the US government's willingness to give "complementary information on the subject to Brazilian authorities"[[86]](#footnote-86).

**g) Result**

The UN human rights committee unanimously passed the 'right to privacy' resolution sponsored by Germany and Brazil[[87]](#footnote-87). Brazilian accomplished its revealed preference with the resolution approved and the apologies from the US government. Snowden sought asylum in Russia.

**8. Gaza War 2014**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Isr | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In July 2014 Israel launched the military offensive called Protective Edge in Gaza. It was a response to a missile attack on Israeli territory by Hamas. On the July 17th a land Israeli military incursion into Palestinian territory took place. That same day, the Itamaraty released a note condemning the escalation of violence between the two peoples. The Brazilian government released an important note regarding the situation of the region. In this note, Brazil rejected the Israeli incursion into Gaza, which represented a serious setback in the peace efforts: "Such an offensive could have serious repercussions for increased instability in the Middle East and exacerbate the already dramatic humanitarian situation in that Occupied Palestinian Territory," it said. Brazil, therefore, urged Israeli forces to strictly abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law and considers it necessary for Israel to put an immediate end to the blockade of Gaza[[88]](#footnote-88). On July 23rd, a new note was issued against the "disproportionate" use of force by Israel and calling for the return of the Brazilian ambassador in Tel Aviv for consultations in Brazil[[89]](#footnote-89).

The following day, in an interview with the Jerusalem Post, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor responded to the Brazilian criticism by stating that “this is an unfortunate demonstration of why Brazil, an economic and cultural giant, remains a diplomatic dwarf,”. Palmor said also that “the moral relativism behind this move makes Brazil an irrelevant diplomatic partner, one who creates problems rather than contributes to solutions”[[90]](#footnote-90).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

The Brazilian government responded to Yigal Palmor. Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, reiterated Brazil's condemnation of "the disproportionate nature of Israel's reaction, with the death of about 700 people, of whom about 70% are civilians, including many women, Children and the elderly. For him, "an attack that leads to such a number of deaths of children, women and civilians is not acceptable”[[91]](#footnote-91).

At the time, the minister made it clear that Brazil had already condemned the Hamas action in the note of July 17 and that this condemnation remains valid, since Brazil is absolutely against it. The request for a cease-fire was obviously worth both sides, he said[[92]](#footnote-92).

As for the statement that Brazil would be a diplomatic dwarf, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo stated that “Brazil is one of the few countries in the world, one of the 11 countries in the world, which has diplomatic relations with all members of the UN” and that “we have a record of cooperation for peace and actions for international peace”. According to him, “if there is any diplomatic dwarf, Brazil is not one of them, surely”[[93]](#footnote-93).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was not a great attempt to create new norms by Brazil on this crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil is the largest importer of Israeli weapons and military technology in Latin America. During the diplomatic incident, Israeli companies pushed Israeli President, Reuven Rivlin, to officially apologize to Brazil after the "diplomatic dwarf" incident - even against Netanyahu's recommendations[[94]](#footnote-94). After a while, the Brazilian Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, claimed that the Brazilian Armed Forces should reduce their military dependency to Israeli avionics and missile technology. Amorim claimed that such dependency would allow Israel to force Brazil to take political positions against Brazil's core interests[[95]](#footnote-95). Brazil was using its domestic military purchases to check Israel's position.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil has acted in Mercosur to condemn Israel's actions in Gaza. In her address at the summit meeting, Dilma said: "From the outset, Brazil condemned the launching of rockets and mortars against Israel and recognized Israel's right to defend itself. However, it is necessary to underscore our most vehement condemnation of disproportionate use of the force by Israel in the Gaza Strip, which resulted in a high number of civilian casualties, including women and children"[[96]](#footnote-96).

According to Folha, shortly after the end of the meeting, Mercosur issued a document similar to Dilma's speech, criticizing the Israeli army for the disproportionate use of force, as well as "any kind of violent civil action against civilians in Israel." The bloc also expressed support for the UN Secretary-General's "peace efforts" and demanded an "immediate lifting of the blockade affecting the population of Gaza".[[97]](#footnote-97)

In addition to Mercosur, there was a special session of the Human Rights Council held in Geneva, where a resolution was adopted, condemning "widespread, systematic and flagrant violations of human rights" in Israeli military operations, "in particular the last military offensive of Israel in the Gaza Strip "[[98]](#footnote-98). The text received 29 votes in favor, 17 abstentions and one vote against the United States. Brazil voted in favor, followed by the other Latin American UNHRC countries, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela.

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

Although not directly involved on the bilateral crisis, the United States, following its diplomatic tradition, stood for Israel. This position is confirmed by its dissenting vote in the Human Rights Council on the resolution condemning human rights violations by Israeli actions in Gaza.

**g) Result**

In August, the president of Israel, Reuven Rivlin, called the president to apologize. Rivlin would have said at the time that the expressions used by this official "do not correspond to the feelings of the population of his country in relation to Brazil”[[99]](#footnote-99).

**9. Brazilian citizens executed in Indonesia 2015**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Indo | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

**a) Background**

In 2015 the government of Indonesia decided to execute Brazilians citizens, Marcos Archer Cardoso Moreira and Rodrigo Gularte, convicted of drug trafficking. Archer was arrested with 13.4 kg of cocaine at Jakarta airport in 2003, hidden in a hang glider. Gularte was arrested in July 2004 in an attempt to enter the country with 6 kilos of cocaine stored in surfboards. He was sentenced to death in 2005, despite two medical reports pointing to a diagnosis of schizophrenia.

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil was against the executions and did everything to avoid them. Dilma Rousseff called the Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, and asked that the Brazilians not be executed. In a statement, the president said, "deeply regret President Widodo's decision to carry forward the execution of Brazilian Marcos Archer"[[100]](#footnote-100).

Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira lamented the fact that Indonesia did not accept requests not to execute the Brazilian: "We never contest the prosecution, nor the judicial process and we respect the sovereignty of Indonesia. However, we always contest the application of the sentence, for humanitarian reasons. We regret that the Indonesian government did not accept our arguments and that, under these conditions, they executed the Brazilian Rodrigo Gularte"[[101]](#footnote-101).

The Itamaraty described as "unacceptable" the execution of Gularte, saying that the Indonesian government refused to recognize the mental illness of the Brazilian and escaped "to the most basic common sense and basic standards of protection of human rights”[[102]](#footnote-102).

According to Marco Aurelio Garcia, adviser to the President, among the various attempts to intervene, the Brazilian government even appealed to the Apostolic Nunciature - a representation of the Vatican in Brazil. "I sent a small dossier on the case to the Holy See in Brazil and it was assured to me that this would be sent to the Vatican Secretariat so that His Holiness could intercede in favor of an attitude of leniency of the Indonesian government," he said[[103]](#footnote-103).

In addition, Brazil convened its ambassador to Indonesia in protest; and in February President Dilma Rousseff temporarily refused the credentials of the new Indonesian ambassador to Brazil, increasing friction between the two countries[[104]](#footnote-104).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not make any attempt to create new norms on this case.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

There were no material expenses or threats to use material entrepreneurship in this case.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

According to the Itamaraty, Brazil tried to coordinate with the other countries (Australia, the Philippines and Nigeria), countries that had citizens in the same condition, to identify possible routes of action and seek ways to avoid the executions[[105]](#footnote-105).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

The US remained neutral on this issue.

**g) Result**

Marco Archer Cardoso Moreira was executed in Indonesia on January 17, 2015 and Rodrigo Gularte on March 28, 2015, contrary to the Brazilian government position.

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41. See Flemes, 2006, pp. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
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43. See BBC Brasil (São Paulo, 2004), “EUA querem que Brasil assine protocolo nuclear”, April 6th. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. See Uol Notícias (São Paulo, 2004), “Brasil fecha acordo para inspeção nuclear em Resende”, September 22nd. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. According to Brazilian Ambassador Marcos Azambuja by deciding to participate in efforts to bring the Iranian crisis back to a diplomatic path, Brazil departed from a long tradition of prudent distance regarding conflicts in the Middle East. See Azambuja 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. This opinion was far from consensual. See Sotero 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. See Pereira Macedo 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. See Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. “It’s a global issue,” a senior international adviser to Lula told Trita Parsi. “Not just because we have 12 million Arabs and 500,000 Jews. It’s because it’s in the interest of global peace. How do we want to become a member on the Security Council for if we don’t have anything to say about the Middle East? See Parsi, 2012a, pp.176. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Minister of Foreign Relations during Lula’s two terms in office, Celso Amorim, later wrote on the Brazilian government motivations. See Amorim 2010a and Amorim 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. On the idea of “nuclear rights” as an important component of Iran’s developmentalist narrative see Wunderlich (2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. See Amorim, 2010b. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. See Parsi, 2012b. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. See Parsi 2012a. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. See Parsi 2012b. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. See Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil, Paragraph 07, May 17th, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. See Parsi 2012b. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. See Parsi 2012b. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. See Parsi, 2012a, pp. 176-177. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. In late 2009, Foreign minister Celso Amorim went to Teheran, by request of the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to try to cajole the Iranian government to set free a French young woman, arrested under the charge of espionage. See Parsi, 2012a, pp.179. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. See “Clinton attacks Turkey-Brazil deal with Iran”. Financial Times, May 18th 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. See Parsi 2012a and Amorim 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. See Sotero 2012, n.p. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. See Financial Times (London, 2010), "Clinton Turns the Table on Tehran over Sanctions" May 10th. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. See UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Records of 6498th Meeting of United Nations Security Council. General Assembly Security Council - UN, New York, 17 mar. 2011. S/PV.6498. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. See Spektor, 2012, n.p. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. See Serbin, 2015, pp. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. See Brenner, 2013, pp. 04 [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. See Stuenkel, 2015, pp. 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. Sixty-sixth Session. General Assembly Security Council - UN, New York, 9 nov. 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. See Spektor, 2012, n.p. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. See Stuenkel, 2015, pp. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. See Spektor, 2012, n. p. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. See Stuenkel, 2015, pp. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. See Stuenkel, 2015, pp. 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro. 2013), “Governo brasileiro pede explicações aos EUA sobre espionagem”, July 7th. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), “Países do Mercosul devem adotar medida contra espionagem, diz Dilma”, July 12th. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), “Violação da soberania brasileira pelos EUA é 'inaceitável', diz governo”, September 9th. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), “Senado instala CPI para investigar espionagem dos EUA no Brasil”, September 3th. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. See Abdenur and Gama, 2015, pp. 465. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. See Abdenur and Gama, 2015, pp. 466. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), "Governo anuncia compra de 36 caças suecos Gripen por US$ 4,5 bilhões", December 18th. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), ”Brasil e Alemanha propõem à ONU regras de privacidade na internet”, November 1st. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), ”Brasil e Alemanha propõem à ONU regras de privacidade na internet”, November 1st. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), “EUA dizem que não discutirão ação de monitoramento em público”, July 7th. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. See G1 (Rio de Janeiro, 2013), “Vice americano telefona para Dilma e diz lamentar caso de espionagem”, July 19th. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. See RT (Moscow, 2013), “UN gives green light to internet privacy resolution”, November 27th. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. See Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília, 2014), “Conflito entre Israel e Palestina”, July 17th. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. See Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Brasília, 2014), “Conflito entre Israel e Palestina”, July 23rd. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. See The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, 2014), “Israel slams 'diplomatic dwarf' Brazil for recalling envoy to protest Gaza operation”, July 24th. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. See Agencia Brasil (Brasília, 2014), “Brasil mantém condenação ‘a uso desproporcional da força’ por Israel em Gaza”, July 24th. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. See Agencia Brasil (Brasília, 2014), “Brasil mantém condenação ‘a uso desproporcional da força’ por Israel em Gaza”, July 24th. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. See Agencia Brasil (Brasília, 2014), “Brasil mantém condenação ‘a uso desproporcional da força’ por Israel em Gaza”, July 24th. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. See Casarões, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. See Folha de São Paulo (São Paulo, 2015), "Veto a embaixador expõe dependência da Defesa com Israel, diz Amorim", December 25th. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. See Agencia Brasil (Brasília, 2014), “Dilma reafirma condenação a uso desproporcional da força por Israel em Gaza”, July 29th. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. See Folha de São Paulo (São Paulo, 2014), “Dilma critica uso desproporcional da força por Israel e pede cessar-fogo”, July 29th. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. See El País (Madrid, 2014), “A ONU investigará possíveis violações de direitos humanos em Gaza”, July 23rd. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. See El País (Madrid, 2014), “Israel pede desculpas ao Brasil pela expressão ‘anão diplomático’”, August 11th. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. See G1 Mundo (Rio de Janeiro, 2015), “Presidente indonésio rejeita pedido de Dilma para não executar brasileiros”, January 16th. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. See O Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 2015), "Brasil considera fato grave a execução de mais um brasileiro na Indonesia", April 28th. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. See Uol Internacional (São Paulo, 2015), “Indonésia executa brasileiro Rodrigo Gularte por tráfico de drogas”, April 28th. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. See Brasil Econômico (São Paulo, 2015). "Fuzilamento gera atrito diplomático entre Brasil e Indonésia", January 19th. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. See Folha de São Paulo (São Paulo, 2015), "Com atrito diplomático, Dilma nega credenciais a embaixador da Indonésia”, February 20th. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. See BBC (London, 2015), “Indonésia notifica brasileiro e execução poderá ser na 3ª-feira”, April 25th. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)