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**Appendix 1. Regional Crises**

**Table Regional Crises**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crises | Code | Brazil Role | Government |
| 1. Lubbers Plan Suriname 1990 | Sur01 | Third Party | Collor |
| 2. Operation Traíra Colombia 1991 | Col01 | Party | Collor |
| 3. Chávez coup Venezuela 1992  | Ven02 | Third Party | Collor |
| 4. President Fujimori's coup Peru 1992  | Per01 | Third Party | Collor |
| 5. Cenepa War Peru-Ecuador 1995  | Cenepa | Third Party | FHC |
| 6. Paraguayan coup against President Wasmosy 1996  | Par02 | Third Party | FHC |
| 7. Ecuadorian coup against President Mahuad 2000  | Ecu01 | Third Party | FHC |
| 8. Venezuelan coup against President Chávez 2002  | Ven01 | Third Party | FHC |
| 9. Haitian crisis 2004-2015  | Haiti | Third Party | Lula |
| 10. Pulp mill dispute Uruguay-Argentina 2005-2010  | Uru01 | Third Party | Lula |
| 11. Gas crises Bolivia 2006 | Bol02 | Party | Lula |
| 12. Operation Fenix Colombia-Ecuador 2008 | Col02 | Third Party | Lula |
| 13. Santa Cruz unrest Bolivia 2008  | Bol01 | Third Party | Lula |
| 14. Honduran coup against President Zelaya 2009 | Hond | Third Party | Lula |
| 15. Itaipú Treaty renegotiation Paraguay 2009  | Par03 | Party | Lula |
| 16. US bases in Colombia 2009 | Col03 | Third Party | Lula |
| 17. Albina riots Suriname 2009  | Sur02 | Third Party | Lula |
| 18. Police riots Ecuador 2010  | Ecu02 | Third Party | Lula |
| 19. Paraguayan coup against President Lugo 2012 | Par01 | Third Party | Dilma |
| 20. Peace agreement FARCs-Colombia 2012-2017 | Col04 | Third Party | Dilma/Temer |
| 21. Bolivian Senator crisis 2013 | Bol03 | Party | Dilma |
| 22. Chilean-Peruvian Maritime dispute 2014 | Chi01 | Third Party | Dilma |
| 23. Venezuela suspension of Mercosur 2016 | Ven03 | Party | Temer |

**Coding Regional Crises**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Code | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
| Ecu01 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Cenepa | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Col02 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Col03 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Ven01 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Per01 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Ven02 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Haiti | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Par01 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Par02 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Bol01 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Hond | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Uru01 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Sur01 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Sur02 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Col04 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Chi01 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Ecu02 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Col01 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Bol02 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Bol03 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Par03 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Ven03 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

**1. Lubbers Plan Suriname 1990**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sur01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

Following the military coup led by Dési Bouterse that overthrown President Ramsewak Shankar in December 1990, the Dutch Prime Minister Rudd Lubbers designed a plan - eventually called the "Lubbers Plan" - to establish a Commonwealth composed of the Netherlands, Aruba, and Suriname. The Plan aimed at stabilizing Suriname politically in exchange for financial help to the indebted local economy[[1]](#footnote-1).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil opposed the "Lubbers Plan" since its inception. Recently revealed diplomatic cables show that in December 1991 the Brazilian government opposed vehemently the plan when asked by the State Department in Washington[[2]](#footnote-2). In a series of cables the Brazilian government call it a "re-colonization of Suriname" by the Netherlands[[3]](#footnote-3). In one hand, Brazil supported the return to the constitutional order which opposed Brasília to Colonel Bouterse; but on the other, Brazil's aimed to maintain its geopolitical interests, and political influence accumulated since the early 1980's. This influence was characterized by a close cooperation in ​​defense, included with the military establishment commanded by the colonel Dési Bouterse that articulated again a military coup[[4]](#footnote-4) .

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt by Brazil to create new norms.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil reacted threatening to withdraw its military aid and training programs if the coup leaders did not cooperate to re-establish the constitutional order and promote new general elections. In January 1991, the Brazilian government sent to Paramaribo the diplomatic mission so-called Reis mission. The delegation was composed by the Ambassador Fernando Guimarães Reis, Head of the Americas Department at Itamaraty, and by the military attaché and two representatives of the Strategic Affairs of the Presidency. The mission main goal was to pressure Bouterse to hold general elections[[5]](#footnote-5).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil voted in favor of the Resolution at the OAS and Group of Rio condemning the 1990 coup and requesting immediate return to the normal constitutional order. The consensus resolution by the OAS resolved ‘to categorically repudiate the military coup in Suriname, which thwarts the fundamental right of the people of that country to live in a system of freedom and democracy’[[6]](#footnote-6).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

The Lubbers Plan had the US support. The United States was uncomfortable with the proximity between Brazil and military coup leaders in Suriname. The US Secretary of State James Baker sent a letter to then-Brazilian chancellor Francisco Rezek asking Brazil to change its policy of giving military training to US military leaders[[7]](#footnote-7).

 **g) Result**

The Lubbers Plan has never been executed by the Netherlands, despite the American support. Eventually, both the Netherlands and the USA, as well as many other countries pushed for a peaceful and domestic solution for the crises. Eventually, under pressure from the United States, the Netherlands, Venezuela, and Brazil, the Bouterse regime held elections again on 25 May 1991[[8]](#footnote-8).

**2. Operation Traíra Colombia 1991**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Col01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

**a) Background**

On February 26, 1991, a group of 40 guerrillas of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) crossed the Colombian-Brazilian border and raided the Traíra detachment of the Brazilian Army, which was in semi-permanent installations and had only 17 troops. During the attack three Brazilian soldiers died and nine were injured. Two illegal Colombian miners who were detained at the camp also died. Various weapons, ammunition and equipment were stolen. Due the remote location of the Traíra detachment, Brazilian authorities were informed of the attack only five days after the event. As soon as the information arrived, the Brazilian Central Command mobilized two Infantry companies to the region to protect the Traíra detachment from further attacks[[9]](#footnote-9). Meanwhile, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Francisco Rezek, proposed to the Colombian government a military partnership to fight together the FARC group that entered the Brazilian territory[[10]](#footnote-10).

**b) Brazil's revealed preference**

President Fernando Collor called the FARC incursion a "coward attack from people living in illegality" and that Brazil soldiers who died were "fulfilling their patriotic duty"[[11]](#footnote-11). The Brazilian Foreign Minister, Fracisco Rezek, said that the Brazil does not want *bandoleiros* attacking Brazilian soldiers any time they want, demanding Colombian authorities to cooperate with the Brazilian Army to hunt down the attackers[[12]](#footnote-12).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not create new norms for this crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil sent 300 army soldiers to fight the FARC group inside Colombian territory, with the support of the Colombian Army[[13]](#footnote-13). Around 10 FARC soldiers had been killed by the Brazilian Army over the course of two weeks of combats[[14]](#footnote-14).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not seek coalition building, only the authorization from President César Gavíria of Colombia to enter Colombian territory[[15]](#footnote-15).

**f) Structural Conditionality - the US Pivotal Position**

We have identified any US official position on the Operation Traíra, therefore, characterizing a neutral position.

**g) Result**

Brazil's revealed preference of retaliating and cooperating with Colombia to fight the guerrilla group had been accomplished.

**3. Chávez attempt coup Venezuela 1992**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ven02 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In 1989, rioting began in slums bordering Caracas. The *Caracazo*, as it came to be known, quickly spread. The military was called out to stop the violence, which it did, sometimes ruthlessly. Professional soldiers resent orders to use force against unarmed civilians. The reaction of the Venezuelan military was no different. Many in the officer corps were outraged at the use of force against the weakest in the society. Among them was a Lt. Colonel of the paratroopers Hugo Chávez Frias. Chávez (the purported great-grandson of a revolutionary *cauldillo*) had plotted for several years with likeminded leftist officers interested in overthrowing what they perceived to be a corrupt regime. The *Caracazo* reinforced their anger and accelerated their timetable for a coup[[16]](#footnote-16).

Chávez and his fellow rebel officers were particularly repulsed by the role played by soldiers in gunning down hundreds, perhaps thousands, of citizens during the riots of February 27, 1989. They also reacted with indignation to the killing of students during subsequent demonstrations and actually ordered their subordinates to refrain from firing on protesters[[17]](#footnote-17).

The Venezuelan political situation deteriorated by Hugo Chávez and some generals began in February 1992 to elaborate a conspiracy plan to overthrown President Carlos Andrés Pérez. They managed to arrest the President in the presidential palace. However, troops loyal to the government surrounded Chávez and arrested him. In exchange for other conspirators to surrender their weapons, Chávez was allowed to keep his military uniform, and speak to the whole nation on television. He asked the remaining rebels to stop the hostilities, but added that the movement had failed only at that moment ("for now")[[18]](#footnote-18).

**b) Brazil's revealed preference**

President Collor condemned the attempted military coup against President Pérez. Collor phoned President Pérez giving Brazil full support to the Venezuelan government[[19]](#footnote-19). Foreign Minister Francisco Resek visited Venezuela during the crisis to attend a Group of Rio meeeting and showed full support to President Pérez[[20]](#footnote-20).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not create new norms during this crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

The Brazilian Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek received reports that the gold-diggers conflict between Brazil and Venezuela could be considered one of the reasons for the coup attempt. Chávez and its allies called President Pérez stance in border conflicts "weak"[[21]](#footnote-21). Brazil mobilized its Federal Police and Army to control the situation in the border due to the Brazilian gold-diggers situation in Venezuela. The Brazilian Army occupied clandestine runaways built by gold-diggers in the border with Venezuela[[22]](#footnote-22).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

The Permanent Council of the OAS unanimously approved a resolution condemning the armed rebellion. The OAS members repudiated those who "sought by the use of force to revoke the popular sovereignty and democratic will of the Venezuelan people". It expressed support for Perez; and reiterated respect for the "principle of democratic solidarity" and reaffirmed that in the Western Hemisphere there was no longer a "place for force regimes". At the initiative of the President of the Council, Ambassador Bernardo Pericás, Permanent Representative of Brazil, it was decided to personally deliver the Resolution to President Perez. To this end, Pericás and the Secretary General of the OAS, the Brazilian Ambassador João Clemente Baena Soares, traveled to Caracas and were received by President Pérez on February 7th[[23]](#footnote-23).

At the Group of Rio of December 2nd the Brazilian Foreign Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso expressed his satisfaction "for the defense of demographic institutions during the coup attempt" and congratulated the Armed Forces and the Venezuelan people "for demonstrating loyalty to democracy and for share of sacrifice with which they opposed resistance to the coup". Cardoso considered that the "insurrection" was "aimed at preventing the free expression of the popular will" not only because it "attacked the government chosen by universal suffrage" but also because it "would prevent the new sovereign expression of the voters" at rallies scheduled for days later. Cardoso reiterated the Group's conviction that "democratic institutions throughout the continent have effective instruments to peacefully channel the protests, express disagreements and express the yearnings of reform and change." After rejecting "any tolerance for violence and terrorism". The communiqué stressed that since its inception, the Rio Group has been "a united front for democracy". In this sense, "in the new international context, increasingly adverse to dictatorships and authoritarianism," the component countries were "more than ever" willing "to work to ensure compliance with the will of our peoples expressed at the polls." Finally, Cardoso reiterated his solidarity with Carlos Andrés Pérez, the Venezuelan people and nation"[[24]](#footnote-24).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

The US fully supported President Pérez. President George Bush call the coup attempt "outrageous and illegal"[[25]](#footnote-25).

**g) Result**

Brazil accomplished its revealed preference on this crisis. At the OAS meeting in May, referring to the attempted coup in February, the Brazilian Minister Celso Lafer considered it "auspicious" to note that, "upholding the solidity of its traditions," the country had known "to overcome difficult moments without allowing That there was a rupture of the democratic order". Lafer reiterated the Brazilian solidarity "to President Carlos Andres Pérez and the Venezuelan people"[[26]](#footnote-26).

**4. President Fujimori's coup Peru 1992**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Per01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

**a) Background**

Peruvian president, Alberto Fujimori, elected in 1990, enacted a “self-coup” in 1992, as he suspended the Constitution, changed Supreme Court judges and closed the Congress.
Fujimori's main argument was that the country lived a situation of economic and social chaos due to the guerrilla Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil's position in relation to the coup was negative. Two days after, Itamaraty denied receiving the Peruvian ambassador for a meeting. In addition, Brasília freeze negotiations about the construction of a road between the two countries, as well as the importation of Peruvian gas by Petrobrás[[27]](#footnote-27). There was, also, a very sensitive reaction from the Brazilian National Congress regarding the closure of the Peruvian Congress by Fujimori [[28]](#footnote-28).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt by Brazil to create new norms.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

There were no material expenses in relation to the coup.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil supported two coalitions efforts. The OAS held a special session to analyzed the Peruvian situation. The Resolution AG / RES. 1080 (XXI-O / 91) was applied raising the fact that there was an interruption of Peru's democratic institutional process[[29]](#footnote-29). The return of representative democracy in the country was strongly demanded by all members. Regionally, countries like Argentina, Chile and Venezuela opposed Fujimori. The Rio Group also met in Washington to condemn the situation in Peru. The country was banned from attending the organization's meetings during the coup[[30]](#footnote-30).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

The immediate position of the United States was contrary to the coup. Suspension of humanitarian and financial aid to the country occurred, as well as the suspension of negotiations on a US-Peru-Japan loan agreement[[31]](#footnote-31). George H. W. Bush would have threatened Fujimori that aid to the country would be impaired if democracy was not reestablished [[32]](#footnote-32).

**g) Result**

Fujimori adopted reforms and some palliative measures after the international outcry, but he remained in power despite international pressures, withholding full political authority created by the coup. Brazil's preference of reverting the situation or increasing the costs to Fujimori was not accomplished.

**5. Cenepa War 1995**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cenepa | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

The territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador is the only case is the Americas where war occurred several times, since World War II. In 1942, Peru invaded Ecuador with 15,000 troops against 3,000 Ecuadorian soldiers, and the victory was Peruvian. Despite Peru’s achievement, the situation regarding the territory was a stalemate. It was only through the diplomatic efforts of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the United States, that a peace agreement was reached, which finally established stable borders. However, in early 1995, the two countries once more fought a war along their borders. The peace agreement established, in 1998, between the two countries is in sharp contrast to the persistent rivalry between neighbors with a history of war and border skirmishes.

**b) Brazil's revealed preferences**

From the start, Brazil acted as leader in the peace negotiations. Having a tradition of a peaceful country, located in a relatively peaceful region, and seeing itself as more than just ballast to regional stability, the Cenepa War was a type of instability that Brazil wanted to eliminate. Secondly, Brazil’s administration aimed at opening its economy to globalization, based on the idea of a new Brazil, politically stable, responsible, and friendly to foreign investors and trade partners. Any political instability in the region could tarnish this image. Thirdly, the conflict could be a South America´s incapacity to fully integrate its economies and people. Peru and Ecuador’s rivalry was perceived as one of the last negative inheritances of the colonial past, in terms of instable borders and painful state building. Finally, endorsing and assuring peace in Latin America is one of Brazil’s lasting goals, one that shows its own international identity as a peaceful nation[[33]](#footnote-33). So, it is fair to say that Brazil’s preference regarding the crisis was to bring stability and peace to the region[[34]](#footnote-34).

**c) Normative Entrepreneurship**

Throughout the 1995 conflict, Brazil acted according to 1942 Rio Protocol’s framework. As soon as the conflict broke out, Brazil called an urgent meeting in Rio de Janeiro to come up with a ceasefire immediately. After a month of negotiations led by the Brazilian diplomat Sebastião do Rego Barros, the parties agreed on a temporary ceasefire (the Itamaraty Agreement) that evoked the main principles of 1942 Rio’s Protocol[[35]](#footnote-35).

After the initial ceasefire, the parties again called upon the 1942 Rio Protocol’s framework as the legal basis for negotiation. Based on the Rio Protocol and the Itamaraty Agreement, communication channels were open, becoming frequent among the belligerents and guarantors. Almost one year after the conflict, Peru and Ecuador exchanged a deadlock issues list; however, it was clear that the list was going to be difficult to handle by the four guarantors. In a secret *memorandum,* Peru and Ecuador were threatened with the withdraw of the four guarantors and pushed them to fulfill their obligation regarding the ceasefire agreement and to follow the recommendation from the military mission created to oversee, on the ground, the border demarcation (MOMEP - Military Observation Mission to Ecuador and Peru)[[36]](#footnote-36).

Right after the peace agreement of 1995, while the Brazilians were the most willing to allow the discussions to proceed at their own pace, the United States insisted on constant progress and rapid resolution[[37]](#footnote-37). In turn, Brazil was not interested or capable of compensating both parties immediately. During early negotiations Brazil was prone to adopt a strategy in which the guarantors would not impose conditions[[38]](#footnote-38).

In October 1996, both parties and the four guarantors signed the *Santiago Agreement* wherein they settled on the mechanisms necessary to find solutions. The diplomatic process then moved from the procedural level to substantive talks, and based on this agreement, the guarantors created a “Special Commission” to deal more steadfastly with the issues still pending. Having this structural mechanism in place to move forward, the Commission could finally tackle the major impasses of conflict, for Peru it was defining the complete demarcation of the border, as established by the Rio Protocol, while for Ecuador it was the issue of free and sovereign access to the Marañón-Amazon. In November 1997, Peru and Ecuador struck a deal over the list of disagreements, especially on the free navigation for Ecuador on the Amazon basin (through the Cenepa River). The deadline to find a final agreement was May 1998[[39]](#footnote-39).

Despite the efforts of the Special Commission, by August 1998, no agreement had been reached. President Fujimori from Peru and Mahuad from Ecuador had had several meetings throughout the year with no final consensus on the free navigation and trade along the Cenepa River. Facing domestic pressure, both presidents sent a letter to the Brazilian President asking for mandatory arbitration on the final issues, and requested that the guarantors should propose a mandatory issues package that included both MOMEP demarcation lines and the Cenepa river navigation solutions as the final deal[[40]](#footnote-40).

All parties recognized Brazil as an honest and neutral broker. The Brazilian neutral position was a direct result of regional disputes among neighboring countries and misgivings regarding the United States. Peru perceived the other three guarantors of the Rio Protocol as biased brokers. Chile had a long border rivalry with Peru, having helped the Ecuadorian Armed Forces to build-up for decades. The Argentineans sold weapons to Ecuador during the conflict, and the United States had a long-standing military agreement with Quito that provided modern Israeli KFIR aircrafts that created conflict imbalance towards Ecuador. On the other hand, Brazil was seen by Peru as an honest broker with no direct involvement in the border problem. Ecuador saw Brazil as partially honest, once they believed that, during the negotiations of the 1942 Protocol, the Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha had sided with Peru[[41]](#footnote-41).

According to the Brazilian diplomat Luis Felipe Lampreia – Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs during the conflict - Brazil had a special responsibility, in 1995, exactly because the political solution established in the 1942 Rio’s Protocol had an intense Brazilian participation, giving the country legal responsibility to lead future negotiations. Lampreia argues that the Treaty had created the legal basis that put Brazil in a leading position of arbiter[[42]](#footnote-42) [[43]](#footnote-43) [[44]](#footnote-44).

Three important aspects about the agreements had decisive Brazilian influence: first, the fact that the original Rio Protocol was already negotiated under Brazilian supervision, second, a Brazilian diplomat was responsible for arbitration function in 1995 and third, the Itamaraty Agreement was signed at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. Perhaps more than any of the other guarantors, Brazil has provided long-term leadership that has been crucial to resolving the conflict, proposing possible solutions in accordance to previously established normative frameworks.

**d) Material Entrepreneurship**

Brazil’s relative material capacity and willingness to spend it was also important to accomplish its goals. The Itamaraty Agreement had created the military mission, – MOMEP – formed by the military forces of the four guarantors led by Brazil. These forces had 90 days to oversee the ceasefire and to establish a non-military zone in the Cenepa Valley, functioning as a buffer between the two armed forces; at least 18 militaries from Ecuador and Peru were also members of the MOMEP, and eventually, the mission extended its functions until the final peace agreement in 1999[[45]](#footnote-45).

Brazil was willing to lead the military observation mission since the beginning. The actual military coordinator of the MOMEP was a Brazilian Lieutenant General, alongside a staff that consisted of senior colonels from each national contingent. The United States military was also important providing headquarters facilities, camping for the troops, and barracks for observers, on a military base occupied by the Ecuadorean 21st Jungle Infantry Brigade. The SOUTHCOM US Armed Forced Command pushed other guarantor’s military partners to increase their roles and responsibilities, first by putting the entire operation under the command a Brazilian General, and later transferring the logistics and operation support to the other countries as well. In the end the Brazilian military provided military leadership, and later assumed much of the logistics role[[46]](#footnote-46) [[47]](#footnote-47).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

The Brazilian diplomatic effort to organize and lead the coalition among Argentina, Chile and the United States was very important to successfully finding a solution to the crisis.The four friendly nations brought Peru and Ecuador together to settle their differences by signing a treaty of “Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries,” known as the Rio Protocol[[48]](#footnote-48), which promised peace one and for all. The 1998 agreement, that came after, is the result of a long negotiation that started right after the ceasefire, and the same four guarantors had a very import role in coordinating efforts towards peace[[49]](#footnote-49).

**f) Structural Conditionality**

The US to the Brazilian leadership was also important for resolving the situation. Records showed that President Clinton’s interference with the negotiation process was affirmative in assuring Brazilian leadership, although initially there were differences between Brasilia and Washington on how to deal with the belligerents[[50]](#footnote-50). According to Lampreia, Clinton supported Cardoso’s initiatives during the negotiation and without the American support would be more difficult for Brazil to establish its leadership. Once Clinton administration trusted Cardoso’s personal performance during the negotiation gave Brasilia more room to maneuver[[51]](#footnote-51). The initial Brazil and the US disagreement eventually evolved into partnership both at the diplomatic and the military levels.

**g) Result**

The result was positive. Presidents Fujimori and Mahuad met President Cardoso in the Alvorada Palace, Brasilia in November 1998. Cardoso suggested presidents should send the final package to their respective Congress for approval, he was concerned about any backlash from the presidents, but Fujimori and Mahuad accepted the deal right away, signing the final peace agreement in December (The Brasilia Peace Agreement).

**6. Paraguayan failed coup against President Wasmosy 1996**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Par02 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In 1993, Juan Carlos Wasmosy was elected President of Paraguay, naming General Lino Oviedo as military commander. Oviedo had an important role in the uprising against General Stroessner, leader of the military dictatorship of Paraguay for 35 years until 1989. As command of the army, Oviedo sought to gain more and more influence within the government, which led President Wasmosy to fire him on April 22, 1996. Oviedo refused to obey and created a political crisis. Senators loyal to Oviedo pressed Wasmosy to renounce his post. However, supported by the governments of the United States, Brazil and Argentina, as well as opposition parties, President Wasmosy resisted, even though he spent the night at the Embassy of the United States. On the following day, support for Wasmosy increased, with police, navy and air force backing the President, thereby dividing the Armed Forces[[52]](#footnote-52).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

President Wasmosy, feeling that a coup attempt from Oviedo could happen, met President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil. Wasmosy the intended to secure Brazil's support in the case of any political turbulence in Paraguay[[53]](#footnote-53).When the coup finally happened, Fernando Henrique Cardoso declared that he felt “compelled to act personally in this delicate moment of an ally so close to Brazil, always with the help of the Ambassador in Asuncion, Márcio Paulo de Oliveira Dias, Itamaraty and the Armed Forces”[[54]](#footnote-54). Cardoso came to the conclusion that Brazil should not use force against Paraguay, but that it should employ its power of dissuasion to defend Paraguayan institutions[[55]](#footnote-55).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Due to its mediation in that episode, Brazil introduced a new democratic clause to MERCOSUR (Ushuaia Protocol/1998). This clause predicts a temporary suspension of a MERCOSUR member in case of a breach in its democratic institutional order”[[56]](#footnote-56).

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Fernando Henrique Cardoso confirmed that the Brazilian Armed Forces would keep the Itaipu hydroelectric safe, and asked the Brazilian Army Minister, General Zenildo, who was a former instructor of General Lido, to explain that he would not have any support from Brazil to his coup attempt[[57]](#footnote-57). Brazil also send two diplomats, the Itamaraty secretary-general, Sebastião do Rego Barros, and the ambassador responsible for Latin America, Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves, to Asunción. Their mission was to tell Wasmosy and Oviedo that Brazil would not tolerate a breach in the Paraguayan constitutional order[[58]](#footnote-58).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

According to Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Wasmosy’s political support came from the Brazilian Ambassador in Assunción, Márcio Paulo de Oliveira Dias, and the US Embassy[[59]](#footnote-59). In April, 22nd the US embassy issued a declaration of support to Wasmosy. This action was followed by MERCOSUR when Dias issue a similar statement in the name of MERCOSUR. Later the ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil and United States made an attempt to contact Oviedo personally, but he refused to listen to them[[60]](#footnote-60).

The Brazilian diplomatic mission in Asunción met with the Argentina’s and Uruguay’s representatives to show unified support to Wasmosy[[61]](#footnote-61). To Ambassador Antonio Mercader, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the OAS, “MERCOSUR and the swift action of its presidents, foreign ministers, and some of their military played a key deterrent role in this crisis”. “In various ways, Paraguay's trading partners warned those who were encouraging the coup that, if they were to succeed in their design, Paraguay would suffer sanctions that might entail its exclusion from MERCOSUR's basic agreements”[[62]](#footnote-62)

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

Brazil and United States had similar positions in this crisis. In the same morning Oviedo was dismissed, “the US embassy issued a communiqué condemning the general's sedition and strongly reaffirming his support for the constitutional president. [The United States] did so, by the way, to avoid the possibility of a composition with the president that would undermine the clear characterization of Oviedo as a coup” [[63]](#footnote-63).

**g) Result**

To avoid a conflict, Wasmosy negotiated an agreement with Oviedo, promising him the Ministry of Defense if he resigned as commander of the army. Oviedo accepted the proposal and was appointed Minister of Defense on 25 April, and abandoned the coup attempt[[64]](#footnote-64). Brazil reached its revealed preference of political stability for Paraguay.

**7. Ecuadorian coup against President Mahuad 2000**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ecu01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

**a) Background**

Ecuador experienced a series of economic difficulties in the late 1990s. As a proposed solution to this situation, in the last days of 1999 President Jorge Jamil Mahuad proposed the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy. However, this generated a series of protests, promoted by indigenous groups in Quito, with the military and police refusing to intervene. On January 21, 2000 protesters entered the National Assembly building and declared that a junta would govern the country. After a night of negotiations, Mahuad was forced to leave the Presidential Palace. A decree gave power to Vice-President Gustavo Noboa. On the 22nd, however, Mahuad endorsed on television Noboa as his successor. The military triumvirate that in fact governed the country also endorsed it. The Congress met in an emergency session in Guayaquil on the same day and ratified Noboa as President of the Republic[[65]](#footnote-65).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

The Brazilian government issued three press releases about the crisis in Ecuador. In the first two Brazil condemned violent manifestations and demanded stability in the democratic order. The Brazilian government was confident Ecuador would overcome its difficulties, "in plain observation of democratic principles and constitutional order [[66]](#footnote-66).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no normative entrepreneurship by Brazil in this crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not spend any material resources in this crisis.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

According to Barraca, “the OAS called an emergency meeting on the day of the coup and the Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria, warned that any regime resulting from the coup would come under 'enormous international pressure”[[67]](#footnote-67). BBC News reiterates that the organization gave its "full and determined backing" to Mr. Mahuad and "firmly" condemned efforts to oust him[[68]](#footnote-68). Brazil supported both initiatives at the OAS. In addition, MERCOSUR countries condemned the coup and demanded the preservation of the rule of law and the constitutional process. In the same way, the Rio Group expressed its enormous concern and criticized "any attempt to break the order constitutional and democratic institutions[[69]](#footnote-69).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

United States strongly condemned the coup. A state department spokesman said that "Any regime that emerges from such an unconstitutional process will face political and economic isolation, bringing even greater misery upon the Ecuadorean people"[[70]](#footnote-70). According to Barracca, “the response of the USA was particularly important in convincing Ecuador's Military High Command to restore the constitutional order. On the night of the coup, acting on President Clinton's direct orders, officials of the US embassy met personally with General Mendoza, the former Chief of the Military High Command and then military representative on the junta. They warned him that the USA would freeze investments if the constitutional order was not restored”[[71]](#footnote-71). In fact, this was proved by Carlos Menoza who said that the decision to install Vice-President Noboa was taken after talks with US officials[[72]](#footnote-72).

**g) Result**

President Jamil Mahuad was never again reinstated as President. Despite international pressure, Vice-President Noboa continue to be the president until elections were held in 2002. Brazil did not accomplished its revealed preference for normal democratic order continuation in Ecuador.

**8. Venezuelan coup against President Chávez 2002**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ven01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In February 2002, President Chávez decided to dismiss the leaders of state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). In protest, half of the oil wells were paralyzed by company workers. The CTV (*Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela*) decided to call a new strike in solidarity with the employees who were fired far from PDVSA. The strike was called for 9 April[[73]](#footnote-73). The CTV and the business federation *Fedecámaras* led a series of demonstrations and work stoppages aimed at overthrowing the elected government of President Hugo Chávez Frias. These actions were supported by almost the entire media, opposition political parties, a number of civil organizations and non-governmental organizations, sectors of the Armed Forces and much of the middle classes and the more established working classes represented by the CTV. On Thursday 11 April, the opposition held a multitudinous march to the headquarters PDVSA in east Caracas, which on arriving at that destination was directed by the leadership of the march, without warning or permission of the authorities, to the presidential palace in the centre of the capital. Near the palace up to twenty people were shot dead and many more were wounded, many of them amongst the marchers, but many also amongst pro-government demonstrators who had gathered around the Miraflores palace to defend it. During the following 3 days, the government of Chávez was toppled, a new government led by the leader of *Fedecámaras*, Pedro Carmona Estanga, was installed only to be itself deposed, with Chavez returning to power early on Sunday 14 April[[74]](#footnote-74).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Itamaraty issued a not on the same day of the coup deploring "the rupture of the institutional order," and "the acts of violence that produced dead and wounded", expressing "their solidarity with the families of the victims"”. Brazil also reaffirmed the “importance of democracy and of the rights of citizenship, two values shared and consecrated in the region"[[75]](#footnote-75). After the crisis was finished with Chávez return, another note was issued giving full support to Chávez, and celebrating “the resumption of constitutional order and the political process in Venezuela" and "affirmed that “the breakdown of institutions" deserved "the firm condemnation of Brazil and the international community”[[76]](#footnote-76). Brazil supported Chávez and criticized heavily the opposition throughout the crisis [[77]](#footnote-77).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt by Brazil to create new norms on this crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not spend any material resources on this crisis.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

During the crisis, there was a Group of Rio meeting happening in Cosra Rica. Brazil brought the Venezuelan issue to the discussion and sought to get as many signatures as possible to a regional declaration condemning the coup. The group issued a note requesting a extraordinary session of OAS to keep in touch with the Venezuelan’s situation and a declaration condemning the interruption of the institutional order in the country[[78]](#footnote-78). In July, 4th OAS’S General Assembly approved the “Declaration about the democracy in Venezuela”, condemning the coup. It affirms “the willingness of the OAS to provide the support and assistance requested by the Government of Venezuela for the consolidation of its democratic process” and reiterates the “rejection of the use of violence to replace any democratic government in the Hemisphere” [[79]](#footnote-79).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

In the same day that the Group of Rio issued a declaration condemning the coup, the United States recognized Pedro Camona as legitimate Venezuelan president[[80]](#footnote-80). The OAS and other diplomatic sources “assert that the US administration was not only aware the coup was about to take place, but had sanctioned it, presuming it to be destined for success”[[81]](#footnote-81). White House officials also denied that a coup had taken place in Venezuela and referred to the situation as a crisis that Chavez had brought upon himself. But once it had become clear to everyone but the White House that a coup had in fact derailed democracy in Venezuela, and Secretary of State Colin Powell had acknowledged as much, the administration began to scramble to distance itself from any direct involvement[[82]](#footnote-82).

**g) Result**

Nonetheless, three days after the events, Chavez reacted and, with the backing of a major part of the population, the military, and the Brazilian diplomacy, returned to the government without any resistance by those who had overthrown him[[83]](#footnote-83). Brazil accomplished its initial position of maintaining constitutional order in Venezuela.

**9. Haitian crisis 2004-2015**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Haiti | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In 2001, after a series of unsuccessful peacekeeping missions by the UN in the 1990s, President Jean-Baptiste Aristide won an election perceived by many Haitians as unfair. Bad economic management and failure to curtail corruption caused Aristide to become more and more unpopular until February 2004, when rebel groups initiated a series of clashes with security forces in the city of Gonaives that would soon spread to other cities. Gradually, the insurgents took a large part of the northern part of the country.

In the imminence of a rebel takeover of Port-au-Prince, Aristide resigned and was removed from the Presidency by a US military task-force on February 29th, receiving political asylum from South Africa. The President of the Supreme Court took power on an interim basis and asked immediate assistance from the United Nations to support a peaceful political and constitutional transition, with a view to maintain internal security. The Security Council (CS) approved the Resolution 1542 on April 2004 allowing the formation of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) for peacekeeping mission purposes and the MINUSTAH.

As soon as MINUSTAH forces began to deploy, the Multinational Interim Force Haiti (MIF-H), which was composed of troops from the United States, France, Canada and Chile, withdrew. It left only the Chilean contingent, which remained in Haiti under the MINUSTAH umbrella. Therefore, in the very first month of the mandate, international forces in Haiti were reduced from 3,800 soldiers (MIF-H) to less than 1,000 (MINUSTAH).

The MINUSTAH military component is led by the Brazilian Army and the force commander is a Brazilian Army-general. The force is composed of 2,366 military personnel and 2,533 police, supported by an international civilian personnel, a local civilian staff and United Nations Volunteers.

The situation of Haiti deteriorated dramatically in January 2010 when the country was hit by a earthquake. About 300,000 people died, mostly in the capital Port-au-Prince and a million people were left homeless and without food. Most of the buildings collapsed, including the presidential palace.

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

In May 2004, Celso Amorim stated, in a hearing on the Foreign Relations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, that the Brazilian willingness to participate in Haiti was explained by the conviction that an active participation of Brazil would give it more moral authority to influence UN resolutions[[84]](#footnote-84). Therefore this commitment with the reconstruction of the country was for the long term, and not just an emergency action to prevent a migratory problem[[85]](#footnote-85).

In response to criticism from those who opposed the deployment of troops, Celso Amorim declared that it was not possible to support multilateralism and, when it came to acting, to claim to be too dangerous[[86]](#footnote-86). Brazil would be important on the international scene and had to make its contribution, in view of three main objectives: 1) the creation of a security environment; (2) promoting dialogue between political forces, with a view to a genuine democratic transition; And 3) effective international support for Haiti's social and economic reconstruction[[87]](#footnote-87).

A very striking criticism from the opposition about deploying troops in Haiti was based on the principle of nonintervention. Celso Amorim replied saying that there would be another equally important principle - that of non-indifference. According to Amorim, just as it was not possible to interfere in the sovereign right of each people to solve their own problems, it was necessary that neighboring countries and friends showed a willingness to collaborate, whenever called, especially when the signs of political and social crisis were evident[[88]](#footnote-88).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

According to Braga, since the deployment of Brazilian troops to Haiti, military tactics, techniques and procedures have been improved on an evolutionary basis with an eye to effectiveness in such a distinct environment. One of the most successful innovations was the concept of ‘strong points’. Unknown to most MINUSTAH civilian staff, this tactic, adapted by Brazilian forces, allowed the establishment of a permanent military presence in the most critical and violent areas of Port-au-Prince: the first step in dealing with illegal armed groups and returning control of the area to the government. This technique was especially successful in pacifying Bel-Air, Cité Soleil and Cité Militaire[[89]](#footnote-89).

Although originally created as a response to the 2011 intervention in Libya (Operation Unified Protector), the new concept called Responsibility While Protect (RwP), proposed by Brazilian authorities at the UN, is also related to the Brazilian strong criticism and discomfort with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept, several times evocated in the Haiti intervention. Brazil's own experiences in peacekeeping mission, especially in Haiti, has been central to the creation of the RwP principle[[90]](#footnote-90).

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Initially, Brazil had deployed 1,266 soldiers, 223 vehicles, and other equipment in Haiti. After the January 2010 earthquake, the Brazilian congress passed a bill allowing for the dispatch of more troops to Haiti, raising the total to 2,200, to help with the relief and reconstruction operations[[91]](#footnote-91).

Brazil also established bilateral initiatives in several areas, such as policing, economic, social and political-institutional. Between 2005 and 2009, Haiti received US$ 3 million managed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. In addition to monetary resources, Brazil sent, during times of acute crisis, medicines, food, water, necessities and military contingents. Brazil has also acted in the country through technical-scientific projects, making international technical cooperation[[92]](#footnote-92). Brazilian authorities have also included Brazilian NGOs to improve local acceptance[[93]](#footnote-93).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil acted with many countries and organizations to either established MINUSTAH or to create coalitions to bring aid to Haiti. MINUSTAH was a jointed military force led by Brazil and supported by Argentina, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sri Lanka and Uruguay. Brazil has also been part of the Core Group for Haiti, along with Canada, Spain, USA, France, the United Nations Special Representative of the United Nations and representatives of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union, that aimed at promoting the implementation of MINUSTAH's mandate and promoting the effective implementation of the efforts of the international community in the country[[94]](#footnote-94).

Brazil also led a political coordination among the Mercosur countries. Several meetings were held between the governments of Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, which resulted in the decision to obtain greater weight in the operation and gave a form of sub-regional consultations to the efforts to solve the problem in Haiti. Subsequently, these governments established a forum for discussions materialized in meetings held with the presence of diplomats and public officials from their respective defense ministries in order to coordinate their military activities in that country[[95]](#footnote-95).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

With its military forces saturated by the ongoing wars in the Middle East, the United States formally invited Brazil to take the leading role in the MINUSTAH[[96]](#footnote-96).

**g) Result**

The mission has shown considerable improvements in the country's security levels. The demilitarization actions carried out in the most dangerous neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince were partially successful[[97]](#footnote-97). The stabilization of Haiti has been carried out with relative success with the country holding presidential elections in 2016. Brazil accomplished its goals of stabilization and return to democracy.

**10. Uruguay River pulp mill dispute Uruguay-Argentina 2005-2010**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Uru01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

**a) Background**

In 2005, two Uruguayan companies created by the Finnish company *Oy Metsa-Botnia AB* started the construction of a cellulose pulp plant. In the same year the Spanish company *Empresa Nacional de Celulosa de España* (ENCE) received authorization to begin ground clearing on a second pulp mill. Together, the mills represented an investment of $1.7 billion, the largest in Uruguay’s history. On both sides of the river, citizens worried about dioxin, furan, and other pulp plant pollutants harming fish, birds, honeybees, and fruit crops. In Uruguay, many argued that they needed the jobs and export income from the pulp mills, but on the Argentine side of the river, people expected to receive no economic benefit from the mills and feared harm to agriculture, fisheries, and tourism[[98]](#footnote-98).

Before the formal acceptance of the construction proposal by the Uruguayan government, the Argentine government calls upon a previous regulation - the Uruguay River Statute - on waters usage of the Uruguay River, signed by both countries in 1975. The Uruguay River Statute created the Administrative Commission of the Uruguay River (CARU), responsible for managing the river usage. According to the Statute, before any construction that may have an impact on river navigation, the other country should receive information and consultations. At this moment and starting from the assumption that the paper mills would be pollutants, a protest begins among the civil society in the city of Gualeguaychú in Argentina against the construction of the plant[[99]](#footnote-99).

In October 2003, the Uruguayan government gave its authorization to the company to start construction, which prompted more protests from the Gualeguaychense movement in Argentina. The Argentine government, already under the leadership of Néstor Kirchner, summoned CARU urgently and demanded compliance with the requirements of the Statute regulations. The Uruguayan Foreign Ministry sent to Argentina the documentation delivered by the company setting the limits of environmental impact. The documentation was examined by Argentine experts which identify high risks of environmental impact and suggest the use of a different technology that would produce less environmental damage, as well as greater control by CARU. At the beginning of the same year, the Uruguayan Ministry of the Environment granted definitive authorization to Metsa-Botnia, which was considered by the Argentine government a violation of the Uruguay River Statue[[100]](#footnote-100).

The political situation deteriorated. The Argentine government formalized the complaint against Uruguay in the International Court of Justice and, in May 2006, the process began, accusing Uruguay to have violated the Uruguay River Statute, authorizing the construction without the consent of the Argentine government. Argentina called on the ICJ to suspend the construction until the issue of environmental impact was duly assessed. In July, the CIJ rejected the Argentine request stating that there was no proof that the construction would cause the environmental impact suggested by the Argentinean government. But ICJ also argued that Uruguay was to be responsible for any future environmental damage[[101]](#footnote-101).

On April 2010, the ICJ ruled the pulp mill in Uruguay can keep operating. It is also stated that Uruguay failed to negotiate with Argentina over the plant, but said it would not be appropriate to make Uruguay pay damages or dismantle the operation[[102]](#footnote-102). Based on this final ICJ decision, the Uruguayan President José Mujica signed a memorandum with the Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner in which both countries would monitor the pulp mill trough CARU and that the pulp mill dispute was settle by both parts.

**b) Brazil's revealed preference**

The official position of Brazil was that the crisis was bilateral and that Brazil should not interfere in its neighbors disputes. However, Brazil decided to mediate the issue in order to avoid further damage in the MERCOSUR, as well as resorting to the ICJ[[103]](#footnote-103). There are several speculations about Brazil favoring one of the two neighbors in the mediation, but nothing official on this regard has been identified[[104]](#footnote-104). In an interview in March 2008, Celso Amorim reported that Brazil tried to be available to Argentina and Uruguay to mediate the dispute over the pulp mills. But he added that those countries had decided to take another path. He stated that Brazil could imposed its preference. Amorim also noticed that, at each moment in which he presented himself the opportunity to influence the issue to be resolved positive way, Brazil did it. He emphasized that diplomacy on this case was carried on with ultimate discretion[[105]](#footnote-105).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not create any new norm during this crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not use any material resources on this crisis.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not seek to build coalitions during this crisis.

**f) Structural conditionality - the US pivotal position**

We did not identify any US official position on this issue, remaining therefore neutral. However, leaked cables from the US embassy in Buenos Aires discussing the dispute informed that "the United States voted in favor of a US$ 170 million IFC loan and US$ 350 million MIGA risk insurance package for the Botnia plant", which might reflect a pro-Uruguayan position[[106]](#footnote-106). In addition, Uruguay President Tabaré Vásquez mentioned in October 2011 that he had considered the possibility of an armed conflict in 2007 with Argentina over the topic, and sought support of the United States (during the presidency of George Bush) in such a case. He had interviews with Condoleezza Rice, and ordered the military commanders to stay ready[[107]](#footnote-107).

**e) Result**

The final result to this crisis was everything Brazil did not wish for. The case was not settled within MERCOSUR dispute mechanisms, showing how fragile the regime to mediate internal disputes. The case had to be settled by the ICJ. Brazil did not accomplished its preference.

**11. Bolivian Gas crises 2006**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bol02 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

**a) Background**

On the first day of May 2006, Bolivian President Evo Morales signed a decree nationalizing the hydrocarbons, including production plants, ducts and oil refineries of all multinational companies operating in the country, two of which were refineries of Petrobras Bolivia, a subsidiary of the Brazilian oil company. After the decree, a military operation was launched, fencing refineries in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz de La Sierra with soldiers and armoured vehicles, with former Petrobras production fields and petroleum stations being the first to get such treatment. The Supreme Decree 2871 (or “Héroes del Chaco) was based on constitutional articles that declared hydrocarbons as an inalienable patrimony of the State and that all companies in Bolivian territory are subject to its sovereignty, laws and authorities[[108]](#footnote-108).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil's revealed preference on the crisis was to either the status quo ante or to seek a substantial compensation for Petrobrás. The Bolivian intention to nationalize hydrocarbons was known by Brazil since President Morales' election campaign. What surprised Brazil was the military operation used to implement the decision[[109]](#footnote-109). The Bolivian decision placed Brazil in a dilemma. If Brazilian government acted in an aggressive manner against the operation it would have be an Imperial reaction, which would undermine Brazil's position in the region. If Brazil acted in a passive and friendly manner, the government would be severely criticized by its domestic opposition[[110]](#footnote-110).

Itamaraty stated that the Morales’ decision was a sovereign act that should be respected; yet, it also affirmed that both Bolivia and Brazil had rights under international laws that and they should be preserved[[111]](#footnote-111), showing Brazil’s disposition to fight for futures compensations to Petrobrás.

The Petrobrás reaction was more aggressive. The company’s CEO, José Sérgio Gabrielli, affirmed that “Petrobrás will take all necessary measures to preserve its rights. All. Whatever they may be, at all level”. But was a little more pragmatic when affirmed “there was no crisis between Brazil and Bolivia, but a dispute between Petrobrás and YPFB”[[112]](#footnote-112).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no Brazilian attempt to create new norms.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil threatened to impose economic sanctions, especially by Petrobrás. The Ministry of Mines and Energy positioned against the idea developed by Itamaraty of conciliation with La Paz. José Gabrielli, Petrobrás CEO, said that decision made by Bolivia demanded a “strong reaction by the company”, that would include even the freezing of investments in Bolivia. Petrobrás threatened to take the case to CIADI, but Bolivia reacted leaving the body. Gabrielli reacted stating that "the government of Bolivia had taken unilateral measures, in an unfriendly way, which forced Brazil to react in the same fashion"[[113]](#footnote-113).

During the peak of the controversy, Dilma Roussef, then Lula's Chief of Staff, declared that “she would defend Petrobrás' rights in Bolivia and, if necessary, Brazil would make economic retaliations”[[114]](#footnote-114). In the discourse Brazil acted friendly, but stood more aggressive in the closed meetings[[115]](#footnote-115). On May 22, Celso Amorim travelled to Bolivia to discuss the problem and stated that Brazil would cooperate with Bolivia, but that depends on Bolivia’s attitude[[116]](#footnote-116). This was a remind to Bolivia “of Brazil’s position as chair of IDB’s debt forgiveness program”[[117]](#footnote-117).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

On May 4, 2006, the Brazilian government called a meeting in Puerto Iguazú, with Hugo Chávez (Venezuela) e Nestor Kirchner (Argentina) to discuss the process of nationalization. This reveals Brazil’s concerns about the repercussions of the crisis in neighbouring countries. “Argentina stood by Brazil’s side and they formed a coalition. Argentina also had oil companies operating in Bolivia and had the concession contracts for the exploration of natural gas canceled[[118]](#footnote-118). Both, Argentina and Brazil feared the rise of gas prices[[119]](#footnote-119), and would be the worst hit by the nationalizations[[120]](#footnote-120) as they are the biggest consumers of Bolivian natural gas[[121]](#footnote-121).

**f) Structural Conditionality**

The United States remained neutral on the issue, not exposing any public position.

**g) Result**

After a few months of negotiation, a 4% increase in the price of imported gas from Bolivia was agreed between Brazil and Bolivia, and Petrobrás was going to receive a compensation around USD 100 million. In February 2007 President Evo Morales visited Brazil. In a press release, Lula declared that that the vision of the two countries about the gas issue was not always the same, but pointed out that the differences were small in comparison with what unites them as border countries. More than that, informed that Brazil would make a proposal in MERCOSUR of total elimination of the tariffs imposed on Bolivian products, opening a way to make Bolivia a full member of the economic bloc[[122]](#footnote-122).

**12. Operation Fenix Colombia-Ecuador 2008**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Col02 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In May 2008, Colombia initiated a military offensive in the territory of Sucumbios, Ecuador against a FARC camping site. The incursion resulted in the death of Raul Reyes, the number two in the FARC's command, and two dozen other guerrilla members. The military incursion, however, did not have the Ecuadorian government authorization, thus resulting in a violation of Ecuador's sovereignty. Regional reactions were immediate. Ecuador broke relations with Colombia, moved military forces to the border and used various channels to denounce the violation of its sovereignty, including convocations from the OAS and Andean Community of Nations (CAN), debates at the subsequent Rio Summit and at the first UNASUR meetings and a order to arrest Manuel Santos, as Minister of Defense, that would be refused by Interpol. The bilateral relationship between Colombia and Ecuador had always been permeated by frictions around the porous borders used as strategic corridor by FARC groups[[123]](#footnote-123).

Venezuela became part of the problem when was disclosed by Colombian authorities that the Venezuelan government could be tied with the FARC movement. The public debate between the Venezuelan and Colombian presidents was fueled by the fact that a computer with evidences of Venezuelan collaboration with FARC was found the camping site. In reaction, Venezuela officially condemned the military offensive and moved it military forces to the border with Colombia. Both Venezuela and Ecuador broke diplomatic relations with Colombia. Chavez seized the moment to reinforce his repudiation of President Uribe's government, his militaristic model, and his close cooperation with the United States[[124]](#footnote-124).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

The Brazilian government condemned the violation of Ecuadorian territory by Colombia, maintaining the Brazilian tradition of abstention from the use of force in inter-American relations[[125]](#footnote-125). It also demanded that Colombia should apologize to Ecuador and that the OAS should mediate the conflict between the two countries[[126]](#footnote-126).

Celso Amorim considered the violation of territorial integrity unacceptable and reprehensible. Amorim claimed that territory violation was not a principle that could be relativized and that, for this reason, the Brazilian government had very clearly condemned the violation that consisted of the illegal incursion into Ecuadorian territory by Colombian military forces. Amorim rebutted accusations that Brazil had taken the side of Ecuador, declaring that it had taken no side, but only defended respect for the territorial integrity of States; and that the requirement that countries supposedly support of terrorism did not justify armed action[[127]](#footnote-127).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt to create new norms by Brazil in this case.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not spend any material resource on this crisis.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

President Lula condemned the attacks on the territory But acknowledged that the presence of key members of the group Insurgent, Colombia's main enemy, was a real threat to the country. And so, through a discourse not to interfere in the internal affairs of Colombia, tried to appease the alleged regional dimension of the conflict. At the same time, it mobilized its diplomatic arsenal, mainly through the Group of Rio and the OAS, through constant dialogue with Ecuador And Venezuela in order to neutralize possible hostile intentions. Brazil was not indifferent to the issue and actively cooperated so that there was no escalation of conflict in the region[[128]](#footnote-128). So President Lula, along with Michelle Bachelet and Cristina Kirchner led the OAS action to mediate the conflict between Colombia and Ecuador. According to BBC news, “after hearing a report from an OAS delegation that had visited the site of the incursion and following hours of talks, the foreign ministers finally agreed on a resolution. The text deplored the "incursion of Colombian armed forces and police into Ecuadorean territory". The action was taken without the knowledge or approval of the Ecuadorean government, which constitutes a clear violation of articles 19 and 21 of the OAS charter”[[129]](#footnote-129).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

The initial US government position was to encourage Ecuador and Colombia to take the incident to the OAS. In light of the belligerent Venezuelan reaction and dispatch of troops to the Colombian border, the White House quickly recognized the importance of supporting President Uribe and Colombia in its struggle against narco-terrorism and in standing up to Chávez”[[130]](#footnote-130).

President George W. Bush called President Uribe and reaffirmed his full support for democracy in Colombia. The President expressed opposition “to any acts of aggression” aimed at destabilizing the region. In the OAS debate, “the U.S. joined the consensus that passed the OAS resolution but inserted a clear reference to the obligation of states not to support international terrorism”[[131]](#footnote-131).

The US State Department expressed its support for the Colombian government, reiterating not only the military victory, but also the whole speech against narcoterrorism. The US Department "strongly support President Uribe and the Government of Colombia in their efforts to confront terrorist violence from the FARC (…) you have seen (…) throughout the world, rejection of any idea that this group has some kind of legitimacy. (…) And we are working both in the OAS as well as talking with the various governments in the region to encourage both a diplomatic resolution of the immediate issue (…) as well as working to see that there is general regional support for Colombia in its efforts to confront the challenges posed by the FARC"[[132]](#footnote-132).

**g) Result**

During the meeting of the Rio Group in Santo Domingo, Álvaro Uribe acknowledged the Colombian incursion as a breach of Ecuador's territorial sovereignty, said he was willing to ask for forgiveness and pledged not to carry out such operations again. Rafael Correa accepted the excuses, promised to resume diplomatic relations with Colombia[[133]](#footnote-133). In a conflictive scenario, where there was a polarization between important countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela, on the one hand, and Colombia on the other, Brazil maintained a "neutral" position. In this way, Brazil has been able to be a bridge of communication, through Unasur, between those actors, which consolidated the need to create proper negotiation and conflict resolution[[134]](#footnote-134). Brazil accomplished its revealed preference on this crisis.

**13. Santa Cruz unrest in Bolivia 2008**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bol01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In September 2008, a wave of protests erupted against the president of Bolivia, Evo Morales. The protesters from Santa Cruz de la Sierra, a province located to the east in Bolivia , demanded a full review of the new Hydrocarbon Law, enacted in 2006, shortly after Morales’ election. The law altered the distribution of royalties from gas and oil and redistributed to all departments and not only to the producers provinces, which negatively affected Santa Cruz revenues.

The governors of the producer departments (Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Chuquisaca) did not support the new revenue allocation approved, so they planned to push for greater administrative autonomy through separatists’ claims, rejecting the new Constitution proposed by Morales. At the beginning of the disturbances, manifestations had as main targets the gas companies and government buildings.

However, protest took international crisis proportion when protesters also damaged part of the Brazil-Bolivia pipeline structure. The governors of the departments warned on September 3rd that if the government did not change its course that the protests could lead to a cut-off of natural gas exports to Argentina and Brazil[[135]](#footnote-135). They also threatened setting up roadblocks in the five departments in addition to road blocks set up on roads leading to Argentina and Paraguay. The governors also demanded government troops withdraw from Trinidad, the capital of Beni department, following clashes between police and protesters trying to seize facilities of the National Tax Service in the city. President Morales accused the governors of launching a "civil coup" against his government[[136]](#footnote-136).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil’s response to this crisis focused on negotiations and mediating the crisis. The Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, when questioned by the press, affirmed that the greatest contribution that Brazil country could offer was to help the reestablishment of dialogue and in the creation of a climate of trust between the government and the opposition in Bolivia[[137]](#footnote-137).

Brazil offered mediation between the Bolivian government and the opposition, with the formation of a coalition called “Friends of Bolivia”. The coalition supported the maintenance of order, the respect of Bolivian laws, institutions and territorial sovereignty. Marco Aurélio Garcia, the presidential special adviser on international affairs, said that Brazil "will not tolerate a rupture of Bolivian institutional order", but at the same time, military aid to Bolivia is also not in question[[138]](#footnote-138).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt by the Brazilian government to create new norms to solve the crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil was materially affected by the crisis. The Brazilian border with Bolivia was closed a few times during the period of instabilities, which prevented the traffic of people and goods. There were also damages to the Brazil-Bolivia Gas Pipeline. There were two diplomatic missions lead by Brazil to help with the negotiations. In the Palacio da Moneda’s Declaration, the representatives of the South American countries showed sympathy to Evo Morales and positioned themselves against any attempt to change the government or territorial integrity of Bolivia. Two missions took place – one to investigate the killings and other to follow the negotiations between Bolivia’s president and the opposition[[139]](#footnote-139).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil, Argentina and Colombia formed a group called “Friends of Bolivia” (Brazil, Argentina and Colombia) to try to mediate dialogue between Morales and the opposition. This mediation attempt had Morales approval. According to Marco Aurélio Garcia, "The Bolivian Friends Group will act to avoid the worst, the confrontation. Secondly, discover the possibility of creating a negotiating ground"[[140]](#footnote-140).

There was preparation for travel to Bolivia by the representatives of these three countries, but at the last minute, Evo Morales asked for it not to happen, with the justification of not wanting to internationalize the crisis[[141]](#footnote-141). Brazil showed willingness to continue helping in the crisis even in the face of the Bolivian leader refusal[[142]](#footnote-142).

It is interesting to note that both Evo Morales and the Bolivian opposition saw Brazil as a possible and important mediator of the conflict. Branko Marinkovic Jovicevic, president of the movement for autonomy in Santa Cruz, said: "We hope that President Lula can mediate. There have been initial contacts with Brazil and we hope that Brazil, with the leadership it has in the region, may be the one that leads to the pacification of Bolivia"[[143]](#footnote-143). At the same time, Morales would also have waited for Brazilian help to solve the political impasse[[144]](#footnote-144).

**f) Structural Conditionality**

The United States Position was against the Brazilian position. There were animosities between the Bush Administration and Evo Morales. During the crisis, Evo Morales expelled ambassador Philip Goldberg, "accused of leading the separatist process promoted by the governments of Santa Cruz, Pando, Beni and Tarija, which organize referenda in absentia of the Executive”[[145]](#footnote-145).

**g) Result**

One day after the UNASUR’s meeting, Evo Morales and Mario Cossío, Tarija’s mayor, sat together to solve the impasse. They established a deal, that “pointed out as facilitators and witnesses of dialogue UNASUR, the Catholic Church, European Union and the United Nations”[[146]](#footnote-146). Brazil initial position of finding a common ground between the two parties was accomplished.

**14. Honduran coup against President Zelaya 2009**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Hond | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

**a) Background**

Manuel Zelaya was elected President of Honduras in 2005. During his tenure, the new President promoted social reforms and closer ties with the governments of Venezuela and Bolivia and their Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas partnership. Such a conduct caused discomfort among the Honduran elite. Honduran oligarchs feared that closer relations with Chavismo would bring a wave of nationalizations in the country, weakening their power as a ruling class. At the end of its term, Zelaya called for a popular referendum to implement a new Constituent Assembly. He aimed to promote changes in the possibility of reelection, strengthening of the State, construction of a participatory democracy and improve indigenous rights[[147]](#footnote-147). Zelaya’s left turn in policy created opposition from Honduras’s economic elites, and his subsequent efforts to enhance presidential power and to obstruct the right of other branches to check his actions created a high-stakes inter-branch conflict[[148]](#footnote-148).

At the beginning of June, Zelaya announced that the referendum would be held in early July 2009. Thereafter, the Honduran Congress voted and approved a resolution that nullified popular referendums, thus preventing Zelaya from consulting the population about the new constituent assembly. He maintained his position, even though it did not had a binding character, but it caused a coup enacted by a joint formed by judiciary, legislative and military power representatives, supported by dominant oligarchies of the country[[149]](#footnote-149).

At the end of June 2009, Zelaya was deposed with an order of arrest issued by the Honduran Judiciary. According Honduran Constitution fifth article, an election shall be approved by 2/3 of Congress and organized by the Judiciary. The Public Prosecutor of Honduras accused Zelaya not to have met this standard, thus committing the crime of "treason". For the fulfillment of the decision, Zelaya was taken prisoner in a military base of Tegucigalpa and deported to Costa Rica. Trying to come back to Honduras, on September, 21st Zelaya requested political asylum at the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa and was granted by local diplomatic authorities[[150]](#footnote-150).

The situation deteriorated when interim president, Roberto Micheletti, urged Brazil to hand over his predecessor to face corruption and treason charges but said the embassy would not be invaded. Micheletti told the press "We will do absolutely nothing to confront another brotherly nation (...) We want them to understand that they should give him political asylum or turn him over to Honduran authorities to be tried." Zelaya, he added, could stay inside the compound for five to 10 years but would never return to power. Brazil's president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, said Zelaya's right to refuge would be honored. "Brazil is guaranteeing that he stays there - that is an international right and we do not expect the coup leaders to touch the Brazilian embassy. We expect them to negotiate."[[151]](#footnote-151)

 **b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

In a note at the day Zelaya was deposed, Brazil's government strongly condemned the military coup, showing support for the Honduran people, and called to the “immediate and unconditionally” return of Zelaya to his office. The note affirmed also that “ military actions of this sort represent an attempt to destabilize Honduran democracy and do not represent the political development in the region” and that “eventual domestic issue should be solved pacifically through the constitutional order”[[152]](#footnote-152).

A couple days after the coup, on July 12, there was a meeting between Zelaya and Lula, when a condemnation of the coup was reinforced. The Brazilian government “remembered his support to the resolutions of OEA and the declarations of UNASUR, MERCOSUR e Group of Rio, in the perspective of a pacific and immediate return of president Zelaya” At the same day, Celso Amorim stated that the dismiss of a president democratically elected opens a dangerous precedent in Latin America” [[153]](#footnote-153).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no Brazilian attempt to create new norms during the crisis. Brazil formally re-called a series of international norms already established, as the Vienna Conventions to ensure the Brazilian embassy’s security.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

According to Marco Aurélio Garcia, “Brazil sanctioned the coup with the formal withdrawal of its ambassador in Tegucigalpa, cutting off all economic and military cooperation with Honduras and requiring a visa for the citizens of that country”. Brazil temporarily suspended two visa agreements with Honduras signed by the both countries[[154]](#footnote-154).

The most important expense of material and political resources was offering political asylum to Zelaya by the Brazilian embassy in Honduras. He arrived there by his own account on September 21st. After four months there, Zelaya went to exile. During his stay in the Brazilian embassy of Honduras, some violent protests between his supporters and his opponents took place with electricity and phone lines being cut off by Honduran authorities[[155]](#footnote-155).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

According to Marco Aurélio Garcia, Brazil “focused its efforts on the Organization of American States (OAS), seeking to build a broad coalition of countries that reversed the situation by returning power to the ousted president”[[156]](#footnote-156). Brazil also worked with MERCOSUR and UNASUR to condemned the coup[[157]](#footnote-157). Brazil was also responsible for requesting to convene a UNSC meeting to address Zelaya's security and the integrity of the Brazilian embassy[[158]](#footnote-158).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

The first statement from the White House in response to the coup was weak and non-committal. It did not denounce the coup but rather called upon "all political and social actors in Honduras to respect democratic norms, the rule of law and the tenets of the Inter-American Democratic Charter". This contrasted with statements from other presidents in the hemisphere, such as Lula da Silva of Brazil and Cristina Fernandez of Argentina, who denounced the coup and called for the re-instatement of Zelaya. The EU issued a similar, less ambiguous and more immediate response[[159]](#footnote-159).

The Obama administration called for the respect of democratic norms and stated that “any existing tensions and disputes must be resolved peacefully through dialogue free from any outside interference”[[160]](#footnote-160). On July 7th, Zelaya was received in Washington by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who, after the meeting, announced the suspension of economic and military aid to Honduras [[161]](#footnote-161).

However, in late October, the United States began to support fresh elections against the Brazilian position of no support to the new president elected[[162]](#footnote-162). The United States, even if formally against the Micheletti government, was accused by Wikileaks to support Zelaya’s removal[[163]](#footnote-163).

**g) Result**

Against Brazil's position, President Micheletti remained in power until new elections were held. Porfirio Lobo was elected Honduras new president, with his government not being recognized by the international community. Just in may, 2011 with the Cartagena Agreements settled between Zelaya e Porfirio Lobo, the deposed President could return to his country. These agreements, promoted and supported by Venezuela and Colombia normalized the international relations of Honduras[[164]](#footnote-164).

**15. Itaipú Treaty renegotiation Paraguay 2009**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Par03 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

**a) Background**

Itaipú was a great example, at the same time, of bi-national cooperation between Brazil and Paraguay and asymmetry of power. The treaty that provided for the construction of the hydroelectric was signed in 1973 between two military dictators and contained terms highly unfavorable to Paraguay, benefiting only Brazil and a small Paraguayan elite favored by President Alfredo Stroessner[[165]](#footnote-165).

For years Paraguay had been pleading for a revision of the treaty in order to gain greater autonomy in the management of the hydroelectric plant and an increase in the resources to receive for its energy. This demand gained strength with the election of Fernando Lugo in 2008, who defended in his campaign the concept of energy sovereignty[[166]](#footnote-166).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

During Lugo's election campaign, Celso Amorim was asked by the press about the Itaipú issue and the minister answered that, in order to renegotiate the 1973 Treaty, Brazil also had to agree, and that the treaties had to be respected and that the President's Lula had been struggling to find adequate compensation for Paraguay[[167]](#footnote-167). In the beginning, Brazil's position was therefore to refute any consideration of the renegotiation of the Treaty[[168]](#footnote-168).

Lula and Celso Amorim said that nothing could be done until 2023[[169]](#footnote-169). Cardoso points out that “the position of the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) was also not to give in to the demands of the Paraguayans, since it was certain that Brazil was backed by the Itaipú Treaty, which is legitimate, clear and does not disadvantage Paraguay, since the country profits from the plant without making any investment on it[[170]](#footnote-170). The main concern of the MME was not to pass on to Eletrobrás the costs of any tariff change, which would consequently increase the energy bill for the Brazilian consumers and would damage the electoral interests of the government”[[171]](#footnote-171).

According to Lambert, however, “concerned about the negative effects on Brazil’s international image of the adverse publicity (including widespread media discussion in Paraguay of an appeal to the International Court of Justice), Lula agreed to set up a Bilateral Technical Negotiating Commission in September 2008 to study Paraguay’s demands”[[172]](#footnote-172).

According to Cardoso, the Brazilian government took into account the needs of the neighbor, who lived under the threat of suffering the overthrow of his democratically elected president and with a civil conflict that could take place. This would be a defeat for Brazil, since its main objective in South America was peaceful economic integration. Brazil's final decision was to determined by its domestic preferences and by the regional political ambitions of the presidential cabinet of the Lula government”[[173]](#footnote-173).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

After 10 months of renegotiation Paraguay and Brazil reached a historic agreement on July 25, 2009, the Joint Declaration of the Presidents of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Paraguay. Through this document, according to Lambert, “Brazil confirmed its commitment to agreements already made but not implemented, including parity in management, a full audit to be carried out by the Paraguayan Comptroller General, a full analysis of the so-called spurious debt, and the completion of outstanding works on the Paraguayan side”[[174]](#footnote-174).

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

In the 31-point aide memoire signed between Lugo and Lula, Brazil made a lot of economic concessions to Paraguay. The biggest one, plus the others mentioned above, was a promise of an increase in annual royalties from $120 to $360 million[[175]](#footnote-175) .

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt by Brazil to create a coalition to settle down this case.

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

We have not identified any official position of the US government on the Itaipú treaty renegotiation, which constitutes a neutral position in our coding process.

**g) Result**

With the declaration mentioned, Brazil and Paraguay solved the conflict. It was not exactly what Brazil preferred (the non-renegotiation), but at least the 1973 Itaipú Treaty was not fully reviewed or revoked (just its annexes were changed) which maintained Brazil's position that no agreed treaty should be changed unilaterally[[176]](#footnote-176). In May 2011 the Brazilian Senate voted in favor of the new agreement, grating Paraguay almost three times the price paid by the energy[[177]](#footnote-177).

**16. US bases in Colombia 2009**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Col03 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

In October, 2009 Colombia and the United State signed a bilateral agreement, behind closed doors, in which the Colombian government made the use of three of its air bases (Palanquero, Apiay and Malambo) available for the US military. The same was valid for some naval bases (ARC Bolívar and ARC Málaga) and army facilities (Tolemaida and Larandia) located in the country. In addition, US aircrafts could also make free use of the Colombian air space. The agreement also allowed the United States to deploy in Colombia about 1,400 people (800 US military and 600 US civilians) working for the US government to combat drug trafficking and terrorism over ten years. And to do so, the US government would invest up to $ 5 billion in Colombia[[178]](#footnote-178).

The agreement generated a crisis between Colombia and other Latin American countries. Colombia justified the US bases as a mean to combat drug trafficking, terrorism and promote peace in the region, while Bolivia and Venezuela, the main left-wing countries in South America, claim that the presence of the US military troops in the region was a major threat. President Hugo Chavez led the opposition to the agreement arguing that “these bases are not to fight the drug traffic’, but “ they are against the governments, the presidents and the revolutionary social movements of Latin America”[[179]](#footnote-179).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil's was against the US military bases in Colombia. President Lula reiterated Brazil did not agree with US deployments in South America[[180]](#footnote-180). Brazil opted for moderated criticism, focusing on the diplomatic channels that included US and Colombia[[181]](#footnote-181). According to Marco Aurélio Garcia, special advisor for International Affairs for the Presidency, “Brazil does not intend to isolate Colombia, above all, a friendly country”[[182]](#footnote-182). The ministry of defense, Nelson Jobim also pointed out that nothing would change in the routine of the Brazilian armed forces as a consequence of the installation of US military bases in Colombian territory[[183]](#footnote-183).

President Lula telephoned President Obama and reiterated the need for legal guarantees that US military bases to be installed in Colombia would be restricted to Colombian territory. According to Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, Lula said that the issue aroused a lot of sensitivity in South American countries, including in Brazil, and suggested that Obama should meet with the presidents of UNASUR[[184]](#footnote-184).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not create new norms during this crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not use its material capacity during this crisis.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Lula tried to mediate the tension between both Uribe and Chavez. At his suggestion, the question of US military base in Colombia was discussed at the presidential summit of UNASUR, held on August 10 in Quito, Ecuador. There it was decided that the US government should be contacted to express the region dissatisfaction with the agreement[[185]](#footnote-185). Brazil's decision to use diplomatic channels was again reinforced during the UNASUR meeting in Bariloche in the same August 2009[[186]](#footnote-186).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

Unites States used the argument of fight against terrorism and drug trafficking to install the military bases. However, there are evidences that the bases have other military purposes. A document published the US Air Mobility Command, called Global en Route Strategy, showed that one of the objectives of such bases would be the improvement of the US military capacity in South America, once from the base of Palaquero, almost half of the South America’s continent could be covered by the C-17, large transport planes, without the need for refueling[[187]](#footnote-187).

**g) Result**

In 2009, the Colombian Constitutional Court rejected the agreement determining that, by its characteristics of the treaty, it should go through a complete legislative procedure in the Congress. The government's reaction was not to confront the judiciary and pronounced that they would elaborate a new instrument of cooperation with the US, which nevertheless never took up the theme of sharing bases[[188]](#footnote-188). Brazil accomplished its revealed preference on this crisis.

**17. Albina riots Suriname 2009**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sur02 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

The Albina riots took place in the city of Albina, Suriname in the border with French Guiana. On December 24-25, 2009 local maroon inhabitants attacked Brazilian, Chinese, Colombian, and Peruvian gold diggers after a man was allegedly stabbed to death by a Brazilian[[189]](#footnote-189). According to the Surinamese government, 20 woman were raped, and at least 24 people were injured during the riots. The injured were transported to a military hospital, while Brazilians living in Albina had to be transferred to the capital, Paramaribo[[190]](#footnote-190). Brazilians and Chinese living in the surrounding region had to be evacuated by the Brazilian Air Force. According to the Brazilian Ambassador to Suriname, José Luiz Machado e Costa, there had been at least 25 Brazilians injured, seven of them in serious condition[[191]](#footnote-191).

The Ministry of Justice in Suriname estimates that 10.000 Brazilians live in the country, which means more than half of all illegal immigrants[[192]](#footnote-192). Some estimate that the Brazilian population represents from 5-10% of the total population in Suriname. These Brazilians are predominantly gold diggers. Brazilians and local maroons fiercely compete over the gold market in the last 20 years[[193]](#footnote-193).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil's main concern during the crises was the safety of the Brazilian peoples affected by the rioting[[194]](#footnote-194). Brazilian authorities urged the Surinamese government to provide security for Brazilian gold diggers and their families[[195]](#footnote-195). Brazil requested the creation of a bilateral forum in order prevent further riots against Brazilian citizens[[196]](#footnote-196).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not propose any new norms to solve the crises.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil has sent an Air force mission to rescue Brazilian victim of the riots and transport them back to Brazil[[197]](#footnote-197). Thereafter, Itamaraty sent a diplomatic mission to investigate if more Brazilian have been affected and if the Surinamese government was providing support for the victims that decided to remain the area[[198]](#footnote-198).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

We have not identified any attempt to solve the crises using regional coalitions or UNASUR.

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

We have not identified any US position on the issue. It is likely that the US remained neutral, although US authorities have long complained about the Brazilian influence on the Surinamese government[[199]](#footnote-199).

**g) Result**

The situation stop deteriorating to Brazilian gold-diggers after the Surinamese government enforced the rule of law in Albina[[200]](#footnote-200). No other incidents have been reported since the creation of the bilateral forum between Brasília and Paramaribo[[201]](#footnote-201). Brazil has accomplished its goals in the Albina crises.

**18. Police riots Ecuador 2010**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ecu02 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

The government of Rafael Correa faced a severe political crisis in September of 2010, The National Police protested against the approval of the Organic Law of the Public Service, which revoked a series of benefits to the police and officers. Correa went to the First Regiment of Quito to try to dialogue with the rebels. There was no agreement and the political situation deteriorated with the president suffering physical aggressions. The President was then taken to the police hospital and put in police custody[[202]](#footnote-202). From the hospital, Correa proclaimed that he was the victim of a coup attempt. Although the police made no moves to assassinate him, they did forcefully repel a march of his supporters that arrived at the hospital. Finally, 12 hours after the police protest began, an elite special squad stormed the hospital to free the president. Correa mobilized 900 soldiers from the three branches of the armed forces (navy, air force, and army) for the rescue. In the process, five people (a student, two police officers, and two solders) were killed and close to 300 injured, including Correa’s foreign relations minister, Ricardo Patiño. Meanwhile, about 100 air force officers occupied the Quito and Guayaquil airports and blocked other strategic transportation networks. Although only about 1,000 of Ecuador’s 42,000 police officers participated in the protests, Correa’s supporters pointed to a series of factors that indicated a broader conspiracy: provincial governors were in Quito for a meeting, Vice President Lenín Moreno was in the United States, and Correa had just undergone knee surgery and as such faced physical limitations[[203]](#footnote-203).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

According to official sources, the Brazilian government followed with attention and concern the incidents that occurred in Ecuador. On September 30, The Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said in a statement that the Brazilian government supports and demonstrates solidarity with President Correa, Ecuador's government and dits emocratic institutions. In the statement, Amorim argues that Brazil does not recognize any attempts to disrupt the prevailing order in Ecuador[[204]](#footnote-204).

Later on, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called the riots a coup attempt organized by police protesters and military personnel in Ecuador. At a press conference in São Bernardo do Campo, the president declared unconditional support to Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa[[205]](#footnote-205).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt by Brazil to create new norms in this case.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not spend any material resources on this crisis.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil acted in an attempt to form a coalition to condemn the coup, both in Mercosur and UNASUR, and also through OAS. In a note, MERCOSUR countries "have expressed their support for the president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, and call for the return of democratic normality in Ecuador. MERCOSUR countries consider the military's protests against the Ecuadorian government as a "clear attempt by constitutional revolts by the country's security forces"[[206]](#footnote-206). The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) convened an emergency meeting with foreign ministers of member countries to show South America's unity in favor of the Correa government. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was represented by the secretary-general of Itamaraty, Antônio Patriota. The member states condemned what they called an "attempted coup d'état" in Ecuador and the subsequent "kidnapping of Rafael Correa" and celebrated their release, with the consequent "return of institutional and democratic normalcy in the sister republic"[[207]](#footnote-207). The OAS also held an emergency meeting in Washington to discuss the case passing a resolution to reject "any attempt to change democratic institutions in Ecuador”[[208]](#footnote-208).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

Initially, the US did not condemned the riots forthright. Although, there has been speculations about the role of the US embassy in Quito, the US official position was seen at the OAS. The US ambassador to the OAS, Carmen Lomellín, condemned the police riots in Ecuador. In a statement the ambassador declared that “The United States supports the democratic government of Ecuador, President Correa and the democratic process and condemning any attempt to violate or alter the democratic process and constitutional order in Ecuador”[[209]](#footnote-209). The White House expressed support for Mr. Correa and urged a peaceful end to the crisis. “The United States deplores violence and lawlessness and we express our full support for President Rafael Correa, and for the institutions of democratic government in that country,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a statement[[210]](#footnote-210).

**g) Result**

The result was the accomplishment of Brazil’s preferences as Rafael Correa was finally released following the action of a military force that remained loyal to the government. The final balance of the episode resulted in 13 dead and 244 injured, which indicates the escalation of violence and the seriousness of the event[[211]](#footnote-211).

**19. Paraguayan coup against President Lugo 2012**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Par01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

**a) Background**

In mid-May 2012, a landless peasant movement occupied a farm in Caraguaty, Paraguay. After months without an agreement, the police were called to carry out the eviction, which resulted in great violence, including the death of eleven peasants and six police officers. On June of the same year, the Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo was accused by dissidents as responsible for the Caraguaty events. Some House deputies argued that the "improper, negligent and irresponsible" government had brought to light "the constant confrontation and struggle of social classes, which as an result brought the massacre among compatriots, an unprecedented fact in the annals of history since our national independence until the current date, in time of peace". In a two-day period, the Senate accepted the indictment and Lugo was found guilty of the charges presented by the House, by a score of thirty-nine votes against four. The Paraguayan Federal Supreme Court considered the process legitimate and constitutional, validating soon after vice-president Federico Franco as head of the executive branch[[212]](#footnote-212).

Thus, President Lugo was controversially impeached by the Paraguayan Congress, on the dubious basis of failure in performance of duties. The process was widely criticized both nationally and internationally on the grounds of constitutionality and procedure, with UNASUR countries, from Chile to Venezuela, concurring in their condemnation of what was widely seen as a ‘constitutional coup’. Alongside Argentinean president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, was instrumental in the decision to suspend Paraguay from both UNASUR and Mercosur, measures that received almost universal support in Latin America[[213]](#footnote-213).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

In a press release, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry condemned the summary and fast removal of the Paraguayan president because of the lack of a broad right of defense, which would undermine democracy and threaten regional integration. It is important to note that, at first, there was no mention of the word coup by Brazilian authorities. In addition, the MRE stated that was not taking extra measures that would harm the people of the neighboring country[[214]](#footnote-214). The Brazilian ambassador to Asuncion was called back to Brazil for consultations, as well as the Argentinean and Uruguayan ambassadors by their own governments.

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil acted together with the other countries of UNASUR and MERCOSUR to support democratic clauses of these institutions. These clauses provided for the expulsion of one of the members if there was an interruption of the democratic order. Dilma Rousseff was one of those who suggested the application of these norms[[215]](#footnote-215). In the case of Mercosur, the Protocol of Ushuaia, signed in the 1990s, was applied to the crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not spend any material resources on the crisis. The sanctions applied would be “lighter and political", and not economic or military[[216]](#footnote-216). Only Venezuela reacted more harshly announcing the interruption of oil shipment to Paraguay[[217]](#footnote-217).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil sought to articulate with the regional bodies of UNASUR and MERCOSUR and the result was the expulsion of Paraguay from the two institutions until democracy order was restored with either the return of Lugo to power or with Paraguay holding new elections in 2013. In addition, there was a negotiation with Argentina and Uruguay to include Venezuela to MERCOSUR, which was previously blocked by the Paraguayan opposition. Accepting this new member was one of the requirements for Paraguay to return to MERCOSUR[[218]](#footnote-218).

Following the sending of a high-level delegation of foreign ministers to Paraguay during the impeachment process, in an effort to show its support for Lugo, the South American Union, UNASUR, suspended Paraguayan membership until the 2013 elections, while ALBA members refused to recognize the new government. As the United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) wavered in their interpretation of events, calling for peaceful respect for democratic procedures, Latin America almost unanimously condemned the impeachment[[219]](#footnote-219).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

The Vice-President, Federico Franco, was recognized by the United States as the new President. Washington considered the process as legitimate and recognized Franco as president immediately[[220]](#footnote-220). The United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) wavered in their interpretation of events, calling for peaceful respect for democratic procedures[[221]](#footnote-221).

**g) Result**

Against Brazilian position, President Franco continued in power, although Paraguay was suspended from the MERCORSUR and Venezuela was incorporated to the bloc[[222]](#footnote-222). Brazil's initial position of condemnation and immediate return of Lugo was no accomplished.

**20. Peace agreement FARCs-Colombia 2012-2017**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Col04 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

**a) Background**

Negotiations began in September 2012, and mainly took place in Havana, Cuba. Negotiators announced a final agreement to end the conflict and build a lasting peace on August 24, 2016. However, a referendum to ratify the deal on October 2, 2016 was unsuccessful after 50.2% of voters voted against the agreement with 49.8% voting in favor. Afterward, the Colombian government and the FARC signed a revised peace deal on November 24 and sent it to Congress for ratification instead of conducting a second referendum. Both houses of Congress ratified the revised peace accord on November 29-30, 2016, thus marking an end to the conflict.

When Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos announced that his government would engage in peace talks with the FARCs, with the intent of ending a conflict that persisted for decades, skepticism loomed. The purpose of these talks was to build up a positive agenda with a view to end the conflict in a timeline of five years; the agenda was comprised of themes such as the FARC’s political role after the end of the hostilities, the treatment of victims, drug policy, beside the proper end of the conflict. The idea was to hold a popular referendum to legitimate the agreement between government and guerilla by the end of the negotiations.

When the agreement was rejected by Colombian voters in the referendum, the most conservative voters made clear their rejection to some sensitive points such as the participation of FARCs members in the Colombian politics and impunity for crimes committed by the group.

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Brazil’s role in the peace process has been marginal, despite its efforts to be an important broker. Brazil's foreign policy towards Colombia has been characterized as distant and ambivalent. Since President Uribe administration, Brazil has feared an enhanced US support to Colombian actions against the guerrillas and the possibility of a formal US military presence in Colombian territory. From the Brazilian point of view the normalization of relations between Colombia and Venezuela and a peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government would converge with Brasília objectives for regional integration. However, President Santos' explicit refusal to include Brazil on the mediation efforts both on the Colombian-Venezuelan issue and the peace process surprised Brazilian diplomacy[[223]](#footnote-223). Brazil has tried multiple times to offer its mediation, but it was systematically rebutted by Colombian authorities[[224]](#footnote-224).

Formally, the peace negotiations had Brazil's full support[[225]](#footnote-225). By the time of the referendum, President Michel Temer and Foreign Minister José Serra said that despite outcome in the referendum the cause of peace in the country should not be abandoned. In that sense, they encouraged the Colombian government, the FARCs and all political forces in Colombia to continue their search for a peaceful solution to the half-century conflict that caused so much suffering to the Colombian people[[226]](#footnote-226).

The news about the new peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARCs was officially received with great satisfaction by the Brazilian government. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the Brazilian government hopes that the new text will obtain the necessary support from Colombian citizens and that the same spirit of goodwill and national reconciliation will prevail during the implementation of the peace agreement. For Itamaraty, Brazil will continue to contribute, to the extent of its possibilities and in accordance with what the Colombian government requests, so that peace can finally reach Colombia, a neighboring country and a friend to whom, at this historical moment, We reiterate our congratulations and our solidarity”[[227]](#footnote-227).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt to create new norms by Brazil.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Although Brazil does not seem to have participated directly in the negotiation process, Brazilian authorities have made important contributions to Colombia in order to minimize the effects of the long conflict, especially in military sales, demining, and release of hostages. In 2005-2006, Brazil sold 25 A-29 Super-Tucano Embraer light aircrafts to the Colombian Air Force. These aircrafts allowed the Colombian Air Force to bomb several FARC bases during the conflict, which helped to favorably balance the conflict towards the government[[228]](#footnote-228). In 2009, Brazil actively participated in the Operation Emmanuel to facilitate the release of hostages kidnapped by FARC. Brazil provided part of logistics to the operation[[229]](#footnote-229). According to the Brazilian Ambassador in Bogotá, Maria Elisa Berenguer, nine out of ten demining Colombian battalions were trained by Brazilian military. Brazil has collaborated in the training of deminers and collaboration to develop a demining doctrine, as well as offering military personal in exchange. Since the arrival of the first Brazilian military, in 2005, when Brazil gained a prominent role in the development of demining in Colombia, more than 40 Brazilian specialists were assigned to join the so-called Inter-American Group of Inter-American Monitors of the OAS Inter-American Defense Board for Colombia[[230]](#footnote-230).

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil actively participated in coalitions to rescue hostages from FARC. In 2007 Brazil was one the guarantors of the Operation Emmanuel to rescue FARC hostages, alongside Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, France, Cuba, and the Red Cross[[231]](#footnote-231). Brazil tried to participate in the negotiations through UNASUR, but even this organization has had a marginal role in the peace process, despite having twice a Colombian national as secretary-general[[232]](#footnote-232).

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

After more than a decade of close cooperation and direct involvement in the Colombian security policies, in February 2012 Presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Barack Obama gave a qualitative change in the bilateral relationship with the beginning of a High Level Dialogue on Security Strategy, among which the most significant mechanisms are the Coordination of Security Cooperation[[233]](#footnote-233). The US fully supported the peace process during Santos administration. The role of US diplomats in the *Mesa de Havana* has been important to facilitate solutions. Although, the Obama administration had supported the peace process from its inception, it was not until February 20, 2015 that the US role was more active with the appointment of Bernard Aronson as "Special Envoy" to the negotiations in Havana. This suggests an interest particular by the United States to support the negotiations between the Colombian Government and the FARC and, by extension, the of agreements reached in a hypothetical post-conflict scenario[[234]](#footnote-234).

**g) Result**

Although Brazil officially supported the peace negotiations in Havana, its marginal role due to the Colombian rejection can be considered a failure. Brazil’s lack of participation in the negotiation as a key mediator has been considered one of the most important failures in Brazil regional policies, despite the material spending and coalition building initiatives[[235]](#footnote-235). By inviting Chile and Venezuela as facilitators and Cuba and Norway as guarantors, Santos and FARC isolated Brazil in the negotiations.

**21. The Bolivian Senator Crisis 2013**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bol03 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**a) Background**

The Bolivian senator, Roger Pinto Molina, a representative of the Pando province and a leading dissident of Morales government, stayed for 15 months at the Brazilian embassy in La Paz from May 28, 2012 until August 24, 2013. Although Brazil had granted diplomatic asylum in June 2012, a safe-conduct of the government of Bolivia was necessary for the Senator leave La Paz to Brazil. This save-conduct was never issued by Bolivian authorities, who accused him corruption with more than 20 lawsuits. In May 2012, the Senator Roger Pinto Molina, went to the Brazilian Embassy in La Paz to request diplomatic asylum. He claimed to have become a political target by the government. The political persecution against Molina would have been made through accusations of corruption, against which the senator declared to be innocent. However, Brazil was never able to convince Bolivia to grant a safe conduct. Facing this deadlock, the Brazilian diplomat Eduardo Saboia decided, by his own account, to transport senator Molina into Brazilian territory, using an official car escorted by Brazilian military men[[236]](#footnote-236). Bolivia accused Molina of having left the country as a criminal and demanded explanations from Brazil[[237]](#footnote-237). La Paz perceived it as a breach of trust[[238]](#footnote-238). Evo Morales threaten to trigger Interpol about the case in question[[239]](#footnote-239).

**b) Brazil’s revealed preferences**

Itamaraty decided to open an inquiry to investigate the case[[240]](#footnote-240). Brazil’s preference would have been that this situation had never happened. But once in Brazil, Molina’s received from Brazilian government a guaranty of his security. President Dilma Rousseff classified the occurred as a “very serious episode”, and to show disapproval removed the Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota from office. The President called Saboia's attitude as a “grave breach of hierarchy”[[241]](#footnote-241).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not create any new norms in this crisis, but many legal aspects were invoked.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

We have not identified any material expenses on the crises. The travel was a privately funded by Saboia.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

There was no attempt from Brazil to create a coalition in this case.

**f) Structural Conditionality – the US pivotal position**

Although the United States remained neutral in the crises, serious animosities existed between the Washington and Evo Morale’s government.

**g) Result**

The actions taken by the Brazilian diplomat created a diplomatic crisis, culminating in the resignation of Antonio Patriota, then Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil. Saboia was also suspended. Shortly after the senator’s arrival in Brasília, Molina asked for a change in his status (so he could be considered a political refugee) to the National Council for Refugees (CONARE). During the UNASUR’s summit in Suriname, Evo Morales and Dilma Rousseff discussed the questions, and according to him “the problem was settled down”[[242]](#footnote-242).

**22. Chilean-Peruvian Maritime dispute 2014**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Chi01 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

**a) Background**

The maritime dispute between Peru and Chile has a historical origin in the Pacific War (1879-1883), when Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia, annexing Bolivia’s coastal province of Antofagasta and the Peruvian provinces of Tacna, Arica and Tarapacá[[243]](#footnote-243). However, the maritime border between the two countries remained badly defined through the years. In 2008, Peru brought the case to the International Court of Justice, stating that the border was still not legally set and that it should be an equidistant line between the two countries. In response, Chile took the position that the maritime boundary between the two States had been established in 1952 (with the Santiago Declaration) and that it followed a horizontal latitude line starting at the Peru-Chile land boundary and extending to 200 nautical miles. In practice what was at stake were 38,000 square kilometers of ocean encompassing a region rich in fish resources[[244]](#footnote-244).

The final decision of the ICJ was disclosed in January 2014, defining a new maritime border between Peru and Chile. With the decision, that was mandatory and immediately enforced, Peru gained more than half the extension, but Chile was left with the richest zone in fishing resources. Of the 38 thousand square kilometers in dispute, Peru gained about 20 thousand kilometers and Chile maintained sovereignty over an area with fishing resources[[245]](#footnote-245). Despite Chiles clear loss, both countries pledged to abide by The Hague ruling. Chilean President-elect Michelle Bachelet said she "regretted" what she called a "painful loss" for her country, but promised she would work to "implement the ruling gradually". Her Peruvian counterpart, Ollanta Humala, said "Peru is pleased with the outcome" of the court decision, and would "take the required actions and measures immediately for its prompt implementation"[[246]](#footnote-246).

**b) Brazil's revealed preference**

As a principle, Brazil observes the policy of not intervening in territorial disputes, unless expressly requested by both parties, which never happened in the case of the Chilean-Peruvian maritime dispute. Brazil carefully observed the course of the controversy and had been called by both countries to hear their respective positions on specific aspects of the maritime litigation. In 2005, when the Peruvian Congress passed the Maritime Domain Baseline Law, Chile made a strong diplomatic protest in some South American capitals, including Brasilia. The efforts did not seek any Brazilian intervention, but only to expose the Chilean position that Peruvian law unilaterally altered the limits established by the trilateral agreements signed in 1952 and 1954 by the two countries along with Ecuador. More recently, in February 2012, when the incident involving the movement of land mines into the disputed coastal triangle, it was the turn of the Peruvian Government to seek the Brazilian to expose the situation in the region and ensure that Brazil had all the information needed[[247]](#footnote-247).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not create new norms for this crisis.

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not spend any material resources in this crisis.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not seek coalition-building for this crisis.

**f) Structural conditionality - the US pivotal position**

There are evidences that the United States stood by Chile’s side on ICJ, arguing that the maritime border between the two countries had been defined by the Santiago Declaration in 1952, which favored the Chilean position[[248]](#footnote-248).

**e) Result**

Brazil's official position of neutrality and pacific solution of conflicts was accomplished. Since both Peru and Chile accepted the ICJ decision, and despite Chile clear loss on the matter, the new maritime borders giving Peru more than half of the claimed area and Chile the richest fishing location were fully implemented.

**23. Venezuela suspension Mercosur 2016**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ven03 | NORMENT | MATENT | COALENT | USPIVOTAL | CONTROL | RESULT |
|  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

**a) Background**

On December 1, 2016, when Venezuela completed four years as a member of the Mercosur, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay decided to "cease the exercise of the Venezuelan rights inherent in the status of Mercosur State Party." In other words, they suspended Venezuela from Mercosur, through technical and legal arguments, since the country did not fulfill some obligations assumed when it joined the bloc. This document was signed after the fact that Venezuela did not incorporate norms and agreements that should have been adopted, first, until August 12, and later extended to December 1st. Up to one day before the suspension, of the total of 1,224 technical standards required, Venezuela incorporated about 80% (238 pending standards) and 25% of the necessary treaties (16 of the planned 57 included). Among these non-adhered treaties is the agreement on residence - which allows a citizen of any country in the bloc to live in another. Another important treaty not adhered to was the Economic Complementation Agreement 18, which provides for the common external tariff and the program for the elimination of intra-bloc tariff barriers, which is considered the backbone of the Mercosur trade agreement and the democracy clause[[249]](#footnote-249).

However, the main reason behind Venezuela's suspension is the change in the domestic politics on three out of the four other Mercosur members. After many years controlled by leftists’ parties, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay experienced transition to center-right or right wing parties from 2014 to 2017. Fierce criticisms towards Venezuela democratic status became a political issue to pressure for a referendum that could outs President's Maduro. When Brazil first voiced its uneasiness with Venezuela as a full member in May 2016, President Tabaré Vásquez from Uruguay supported Venezuela arguing that the Brazilian position was negative for the future of regional integration[[250]](#footnote-250). This deadlock was eventually overcome when President Macri of Argentina sided with Brasilia against Venezuela, isolating Montevideo and making virtually impossible to prevent the suspension[[251]](#footnote-251). However, even after the official suspension Uruguay defended that Venezuela should have voice in all Mercosur deliberations and decisions[[252]](#footnote-252).

**b) Brazil's revealed preference**

In May 2016 Brazil and Argentina started to contemplate the possibility of suspending Venezuela[[253]](#footnote-253). In August 2016, Brazil started to push harder criticizing the possibility of Venezuela assuming the presidency pro-tempore of Mercosur after the end of the Uruguayan term in July 2016. Brazil’s official position was to prevent Venezuela to start its term after Uruguay. In August, the Brazilian Minister José Serra said that Venezuela had no conditions to assume the presidency of Mercosur. The Brazilian chancellor defended Argentina's proposal to create an informal commission of ambassadors to run the economic bloc until the end of 2016, when Buenos Aires would take over the rotating presidency. According to Serra, the Venezuelan government did not have the necessary credentials to preside over the group: "The president of Venezuela is not able to assume the presidency of Mercosur, first because Venezuela has not fulfilled the existing requirements, the prerequisites for integrating Mercosur. And second because someone who cannot govern his own country will not be able to lead Mercosur”. In Serra’s view Venezuela was not a democracy. For him, “democracy has no political prisoner and Brazil could not divert its attention from regional economic integration due to the dynamics of an authoritarian government in Venezuela”[[254]](#footnote-254).

**c) Normative entrepreneurship**

Although Brazil threatened to invoke Mercosur's democratic clause, that allows countries with serious democratic instability or authoritarian tendencies to be suspended from the bloc, the Venezuela official suspension was solely based on technical issues with norms and rules implementations. In this sense, Brazil managed to change or bend rules in its favor to maintain its position of suspending Venezuela from Mercosur without creating new norms[[255]](#footnote-255).

**d) Material entrepreneurship**

Brazil did not use material power on this crisis.

**e) Coalition entrepreneurship**

Brazil allied with Argentina and Paraguay against Venezuela. Brazil managed to create a larger coalition to isolate both Venezuela and Uruguay within the Mercosur. The Brazilian chancellor said that Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil share "more or less" the same point of view, with Uruguay having a more intermediate position, "due to internal political problems." Serra said there have been bilateral talks among the bloc members to define the next steps. "This past week I was in Lima, and I talked a lot with the Uruguayan chancellor - Rodolfo Novoa – and we also talked to the Argentine chancellor - Susana Malcorra. We have intensified the contacts, we want to put the Mercosur forward, not paralyze (with Venezuela)" he said[[256]](#footnote-256).

**f) Structural conditionality - the US pivotal position**

We did not identify any official US position on the issue, thus reaming neutral. However, due to US complicated relations with President Maduro, Washington has recently requested Brazil to put pressure over Venezuela, which indicates that Brasilia and Washington are working together to change the regime in Venezuela[[257]](#footnote-257).

**g) Result**

Brazil’s revealed preference of suspending Venezuela from Mercosur was accomplished[[258]](#footnote-258). Since December 2016 Venezuela does not have voting rights or has participated in Mercosur daily activities. Despite Uruguayan and Venezuelan opposition, Brazil managed to lead Paraguay and Argentina for the suspension. When Uruguay decided to abstain from suspending Venezuela the other four members were free to accomplish their goal.

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32. See Conaghan, 2005, pp. 03. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. On the motivations see Herz and Nogueira 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
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37. See Simmons, 1999, pp. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
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41. The records show that in the middle of the Allied efforts to win World War II Brazil wanted to finish the regional war quickly as possible, favoring the military result on the ground that balanced towards Peru. Brazilian Foreign Minister Luis Felipe Lampreia revealed such perception of Brazil’s partiality towards Peru in 1942. See Lampreia, 2010, pp. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. See Lampreia, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. On the Brazilian leadership see Simmons, 1999, pp. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. It is important to remember that the Cenepa war is a rare case of Brazil acting as a mediator in the region. Data show that Brazil was most of the time directly involved on border disputes, being the USA the most common broker in Latin America. See Simmons 1999, pp. 02. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. On MOMEP details see Weidner 1996. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
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