**Online Appendices for ‘The Evolution of Party Policy and Cleavage Voting under Power-Sharing in Northern Ireland’ by James Tilley, John Garry and Neil Matthews, published in *Government and Opposition***

**Appendix 1: *Details of manifesto coding***

Our approach is similar to that of the manual coding in Laver and Garry (2000).[[1]](#footnote-1) We used an example manifesto from approximately the middle of the time period under examination (2007 SDLP) to conduct an initial coding to enable us to test and refine our coding categories and coding instructions, and to assess systematically inter-coder reliability. We focused on seven substantive policy domains: ethno-national (nationalist/unionist); economic (left/right); socio-moral (liberal/conservative); crime (permissive/authoritarian); immigration (pro-anti); environment (green/growth) and the EU (pro/anti).[[2]](#footnote-2) A description of the policy content of each category is elaborated in the Appendix 1. In our analysis here, we focus on three policy dimensions: economic left-right, ethno-national nationalist-unionist and a general liberal-conservative dimension (constructed from a combination of the socio-moral, crime and immigration codes).

Regarding coding units, we used the quasi-sentence which is either a full sentence or a subset of a sentence containing a distinct policy position (see Appendix 1 for details). As stated, our initial analysis of the 2007 SDLP manifesto aimed to refine our draft coding scheme, establish clear instructions for coders, and to improve inter-coder reliability. This task was completed in three stages. In stage one, two of the authors independently coded the first third of the test manifesto, with an intercoder reliability score of 43 per cent. The two coders then discussed and reflected on any discrepancies or coding mismatches and then amended the coding instructions. This new version of the coding scheme was then used by both coders to code the second third of the test manifesto, with an improved intercoder reliability score of 66 per cent. Following this step, further amendments were made to the coding scheme. The final third of the test manifesto was then coded by both coders. After these incremental improvements in intercoder reliability from stage one to three (with a final inter-coder reliability score of 73 per cent), a single coder coded the remaining manifestos.

The coding unit is a quasi-sentence. When unitising the text we follow the instructions contained in the *Comparative Manifesto Project Coding Instructions Handbook* (Werner *et al.*. 2014: 16):

‘One quasi-sentence contains exactly one statement or “message”. In many cases, parties make one statement per sentence, which results in one quasi-sentence equalling one full sentence. Therefore, the basic unitising rule is that one sentence is, at minimum, one quasi-sentence. In no case can two or more sentences form a quasi-sentence. There are, however, instances when one natural sentence contains more than one quasi-sentence … Only if the natural sentence contains more than one unique argument should this sentence be split. There are two possibilities for unique arguments: 1) a sentence contains two statements that are totally unrelated; or 2) a sentence contains two statements that are related (e.g. they come from the same policy field) but address different aspects of a larger policy. Clues to unique statements might be 1) semicolons; 2) the possibility to split up the sentence into a meaningful bullet point list; 3) general clues from codes. Regarding the third point, it is especially likely that the sentence includes two unique statements if a sentence contains codes from two or more domains.’

So, according to these instructions, the statement ‘Implement an all-Ireland corporation tax reduction of 2.9 percent’ would be assigned two codes:

*‘Implement an all-Ireland [CODE1] corporation tax reduction of 2.9 percent [CODE2]’*

It is, therefore, feasible that multiple codes can be assigned to a sentence. For example:

*‘The SDLP want to further develop North South co-operation [CODE1] on environmental issues [CODE2] that will benefit people on all parts of the island [CODE3]’*

A statement could conceivably be assigned to two or more categories (e.g. the statement concerning paramilitaries on p.23 of the test manifesto could be coded as either ‘criminal authoritarian’ or ‘ethnonational other’). When presented with such a case, coders, with an in-depth expert knowledge of the Northern Ireland case, are permitted to make an informed decision as to which category and code applies to the statement in question.

Text is coded in context (see Laver and Garry, 2000: 624 for an outline of this coding convention). Codes are also issued to section headings or prefaces which link to subsequent statements (usually identifiable by use of a colon or semi-colon). Codes are not assigned to prefaces, leader’s addresses, excerpts from newspapers or other articles, section headings etc. Codes are only assigned to text which is in the English language. If text is in the Irish language and no translated version in English is subsequently offered the text can be coded as ‘nationalist’ (11). Similarly, if text is in Ulster Scots and no translated version in English is offered the text can be coded as ‘unionist’ (13). When necessary, coders are permitted to consult the internet or other resources when unsure or guidance is required about the specific details of a certain event or policy (e.g. SDLP 2007, inquests).

**References**

Hayward, K. (2011) ‘Convergence/ divergence: Party political discourse in Northern Ireland’s transition from conflict’, *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 4 (3): 196-213.

Laver, M. and Garry, J. (2000) ‘Estimating policy positions from political texts’, *American Journal of Political Science*, 44 (3): 619-634

**Northern Ireland Manifesto Coding Scheme, 23 August 2016**

0 none of the other categories apply

 **Ethno-national**

11 nationalist

12 cross-community/ centrist/ non-sectarian/

13 unionist

14 ethno-national other (general)

 **Economic**

21 economic left-wing

22 economic centrist

23 economic right-wing

24 economic other (general)

 **Socio-Moral**

31 socio-moral liberal

32 socio-moral centrist

33 socio-moral conservative

34 socio-moral other (general)

 **Crime**

41 crime permissive

42 crime centrist

43 crime: authoritarian

44 crime other (general)

 **Immigration**

51 pro-immigration

52 immigration centrist

52 anti-immigration

53 immigration other (general)

 **Environment**

61 pro-environmental protection/‘green’

62 environment/growth centrist

63 pro-economic growth/anti-‘green’

64 environment other (general)

 **EU**

71 pro-EU

72 EU centrist

73 anti-EU

74 EU other (general)

***Detailed category descriptions***

**0 None of the other categories apply**

Statements not covered by other categories.

Includes references to human rights and equality which aren’t explicitly group-related (e.g. nationalists, LGBT community: the former should be coded ‘nationalist’ and the latter as ‘socio-moral liberal’).

 ***Ethno-national***

**11 nationalist**

Supports goal of a united Ireland, including statements which advocate a united Ireland in which *both* unionists and nationalists will benefit. Opposes Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.

Supports the harmonisation of services between ‘North and South’. Promotes Irish national identity. Defends the interests and culture of people from a Nationalist, Republican and/or Catholic background (e.g. supports restrictions on parading; supports promotion of Irish language; supports restrictions on flying of the Union flag etc.).

Promotes protection of nationalist minority interests (e.g. human rights; equality) in decision-making/government structures.

Criticises the British Security Services and their former and/or current practices (e.g. MI5; Special Branch); advocates inquiries into British state security service action during the conflict, including references to collusion.

Supports the full implementation of those aspects of the Good Friday Agreement (and/or subsequent agreements) designed to benefit the nationalist community (e.g. policing reform).

Supports loyalist paramilitary decommissioning.

**12 cross-community/ centrist/ non-sectarian/**

Supports promotion of cross-community initiatives and policies, designed to eradicate and/or overcome communal divide in Northern Ireland (e.g. integrated education).

Includes references to ‘inclusion’, protection of minorities (when no explicit mention of nationalist or unionist community) and the promotion of power-sharing between both communities.

Includes statements in support of ‘human rights’ and ‘equality’, when made in an ethno-national context and which cannot be assigned to either a unionist or nationalist position.

**13 unionist**

Supports long-term maintenance of Northern Ireland as part of United Kingdom. Opposes a united Ireland.

Promotes British national identity. Defends the interests and culture of people from a Unionist, Loyalist and/or Protestant background (e.g. opposes restrictions on parading; opposes promotion of Irish language; opposes restrictions on flying of Union flag etc.).

Supports IRA decommissioning (including dissident republicans).

Advocates inquiries into Irish state security service action during the conflict, including references to collusion.

Supports the protection of unionist interests in decision-making/government structures.

**14 ethno-national other (general)**

General comments and statements which fall under the theme of ethno-national debate but do not fall under any of the three above categories.

Includes statements referring to the Good Friday Agreement (and/or subsequent agreements) where no clear nationalist, unionist or cross-community position is explicitly adopted or referred to (e.g. ‘Stand strong for the Agreement and seek the immediate restoration of its democratic institutions of government’).

Statements concerning decommissioning, generally conceived (i.e. no mention of specific paramilitary organisation, e.g. IRA, UVF, UDA etc. or when no clear ‘nationalist’ or ‘unionist’ position can be determined).

Statements referring to ‘victims’ or ‘dealing with the past’ where no clear nationalist, unionist or cross-community position is explicitly adopted or referred to (e.g. ‘an overarching victims’ strategy’).

Includes references, both positive and negative, to Direct Rule, when no clear ethno-national position can be determined.

Statements referring to the devolution of Justice (or related issue), when no clear ethno-national position can be determined.

***Economic***

**21 economic left-wing**

Generally in favour of state intervention in the economy and limits on market capitalism.

Promotes raising taxes to increase public services.

Favours high level of state regulation and control of the market.

Corporatism/Mixed Economy: Favourable mentions of cooperation of government, employers, and trade unions simultaneously. The collaboration of employers and employee organisations in overall economic planning supervised by the state. Supports ‘mutualisation’.

Pro-protectionism: Favourable mentions of extending or maintaining the protection of internal markets. Measures may include: Tariffs; Quota restrictions; Export subsidies.

Pro-controlled Economy: Support for direct government control of economy. May include, for instance: Control over prices; Introduction of minimum wages.

Nationalisation: Favourable mentions of government ownership of industries, either partial or complete; calls for keeping nationalised industries in state hands or nationalising currently private industries. May also include favourable mentions of government ownership of land.

Pro-welfare State Expansion: Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of: Health care; Child care; Elder care and pensions; Social housing.

The provision of support for low-income citizens; an emphasis on need to protect and/or defend low-income citizens.

Includes promotion of initiatives and measures designed to foster or improve ‘social inclusion’.

 Negative references to ‘globalisation’.

**22 economic centrist**

**23 economic right-wing**

 Generally in favour of the free market rather than state intervention in the economy.

Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes; advocates relief from rates.

Favours deregulation of markets at every opportunity.

Pro-Free Market Economy: Favourable mentions of the free market and free market capitalism as an economic model. May include favourable references to: Laissez-faire economy; Superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems; Private property rights; Personal enterprise and initiative (entrepreneurialism); Need for unhampered individual enterprises; statements advocating the removal of ‘red tape’, ‘bureaucracy’ or the simplification of regulatory systems and processes; capital investment.

Pro-Incentives: Favourable mentions of supply side oriented economic policies (e.g. assistance to businesses rather than consumers). May include: Financial and other incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks etc.; Wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; Encouragement to start enterprises. The provision of loans (rather than grants).

Anti-Protectionism: Support for concept of free trade and open markets. Call for abolishing all means of market protection.

Pro-Welfare State Limitation: Limiting state expenditures on social services or social security. Favourable mentions of the social subsidiary principle (i.e. private care before state care).

Negative references to labour groups and trade unions. May focus specifically on the danger of unions ‘abusing power’.

Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration and/or the general appeal to have less government and administration and cutting down in the civil service.

Middle class/Upper class; pro-business (including Small and Medium sized businesses; favours rights of business owner over worker).

Middle Class and Professional Groups: General favourable references to the middle class. Specifically, statements may include references to: Professional groups (e.g. doctors or lawyers); White collar groups (e.g. bankers or office employees); Service sector groups (e.g. IT industry employees); Old and/or new middle class.

**24 economic other (general)**

General comments and statements which fall under the theme of economic debate but do not fall under any of the three above categories.

***Socio-Moral***

**31 socio-moral liberal**

 Favours liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia

Opposition to traditional and/or religious moral values. May include: Support for divorce, abortion etc.; General support for modern family composition (including extolling the values of a ‘traditional’ family ‘way of life’); Calls for the separation of church and state.

**32 socio-moral centrist**

**33 socio-moral conservative**

Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia

Favourable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values. May include: Prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; Maintenance and stability of the traditional family as a value; Support for the role of religious institutions in state and society.

**34 socio-moral other (general)**

General comments and statements which fall under the theme of socio-moral but do not fall under any of the three above categories.

***Crime***

**41 crime permissive**

Favour rehabilitation of criminals rather than simply punishment. Emphasises civil liberties and the rights of the accused. Opposed to practices or measures which facilitate covert preventative measures (e.g. extraordinary rendition of suspects; robust interrogation methods)

Promotion and support of ‘restorative justice’ measures.

**42 crime centrist**

**43 crime: authoritarian**

Favours punishment rather than simply rehabilitation. Emphasises the rights of the victim of crime rather than the accused or the criminal (e.g. supportive of robust interrogation methods and preventative measures).

**44 crime other (general)**

General comments and statements which fall under the theme of crime but do not fall under any of the three above categories.

***Immigration***

**51 pro-immigration**

Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into Northern Ireland society.

Statements favouring new immigrants; against restrictions and quotas; rejection of the ‘boat is full’ argument. Includes allowing new immigrants for the benefit of Northern Ireland/UK/Ireland’s economy.

Favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions.

Statements favouring the idea that immigrants keep their cultural traits, voluntary integration; state providing opportunities to integrate.

Favourable mentions of the rights of migrant workers.

**52 immigration centrist**

**52 anti-immigration**

Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin.

Statement advocating the restriction of the process of immigration, i.e. accepting new immigrants. Might include statements regarding: Immigration being a threat to national character of Northern Ireland/UK/Ireland; ‘the boat is full’ argument; The introduction of migrant quotas, including restricting immigration from specific countries or regions etc.

The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society.

Calls for immigrants that are in the country to adopt Northern Ireland/UK/Ireland’s culture and fully assimilate.

**53 immigration other (general)**

General comments and statements which fall under the theme of immigration but do not fall under any of the three above categories.

***Environment***

**61 pro-environmental protection/‘green’**

Supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth.

General policies in favour of protecting the environment, fighting climate change, and other ‘green’ policies. For instance: General preservation of natural resources; Preservation of countryside, forests, etc.; Protection of national parks; Animal rights.

May include a great variance of policies that have the unified goal of environmental protection.

Includes references to specific modes of transport with the explicit intended outcome of environmental protection.

Supports regulation to enhance sustainable development (including references to ‘sustainability’).

**62 environment/growth centrist**

**63 pro-economic growth/anti-‘green’**

Supports economic growth (broadly conceived). This may be in the context of damage to the environment.

**64 environment other (general)**

General comments and statements which fall under the theme of environment but do not fall under any of the three above categories.

 ***European Union***

**71 pro-EU**

Favours increasing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy.

Favourable mentions of the European Union in general. May include: Desirability of UK/Ireland remaining a member of the EU; Desirability of expanding the EU; Desirability of increasing the EU’s competences; Desirability of expanding the competences of the European Parliament; Desirability to avail of EU services.

**72 EU centrist**

**73 anti-EU**

Favours reducing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy.

Negative references to the European Union. May include: Opposition to UK/Ireland remaining a member of the EU; Opposition to expanding the EU; Opposition to increasing the EU’s competences; Opposition to expanding the competences of the European Parliament; demands for EU reform.

**74 EU other (general)**

General comments and statements which fall under the theme of EU but do not fall under any of the three above categories.

**Appendix 2: *Details of ideological scales***

To measure ethno-national position, we use a composite of the strength of people’s expressed unionist or nationalist identity (for Protestants it runs from very strong unionist to nationalist, for Catholics the scale runs from unionist to very strong nationalist); a question which asks whether ‘parades should only be allowed after talks between marchers and residents’; and a question which asks whether ‘the IRA’s violent campaign during the Troubles was totally unacceptable and always wrong’. All three responses are measured on 1-5 scales. The wording of these questions was slightly different in 1998. The parades question in 1998 asked whether people agree that ‘no marches should be allowed thorough areas that are predominantly those of the other tradition unless the residents approve’ and the IRA question asks whether people ‘have any sympathy with the reasons for the violence - even if you don’t condone the violence yourself’ as applied to ‘Republican groups’. We simply add responses to these questions together, after reversing questions where necessary, and divide by 3. High scores indicate greater unionism for Protestants, and greater nationalism for Catholics.

To measure economic left-right position, we are able to use a battery of five questions which ask whether people agree or disagree that ‘there is one law for the rich, and one for the poor’, that ‘ordinary people get their fair share of the wealth’, that ‘there is no need for strong trade unions’, that ‘private enterprise is the best way to solve Northern Ireland’s economic problems’ and that ‘major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership’. The question responses range from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’, and we create a 1-5 scale by summing the scores (some questions are reversed) and dividing by 5. High scores indicate a more economically right wing position.

Lastly, to measure social conservatism-liberalism, we use two questions on ‘moral’ issues: whether people agree or disagree that ‘homosexual relations are always wrong’ and whether ‘women should be free to decide on matters of abortion’. The two questions are slightly different in 1998, in that people are asked whether they think that ‘sexual relations between two adults of the same sex’ are ‘always wrong’, ‘almost always wrong’, ‘wrong only sometimes’, or ‘not wrong at all’ and similarly whether it is ‘wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion’ with the same response categories. The 2016 data shows that answers to these questions are highly correlated with responses to questions that ask about tolerance of ‘unconventional lives’, teaching ‘children to obey authority’, and giving criminals ‘stiffer sentences’. That suggests these questions tap into an underlying socially liberal-moral traditionalist dimension. High scores here indicate greater social conservatism.

It is worth noting that the three ideological dimensions that we identify are not highly correlated with one another. In both years none of the correlations exceed 0.2.

**Appendix 3: *Full tables of vote choice model coefficients***

Table A3a: Multinomial logistic regression model predicting first preference vote for Protestants in 1998

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | UUP |  | Alliance |  | Other |  |
|  |  | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left-rightLiberal-conservativeUnionist-nationalist | 0.57 | 0.30 | 0.09 | 0.48 | 0.11 | 0.34 |
| -0.36\* | 0.16 | -0.66\* | 0.26 | -0.61\* | 0.17 |
| 1.04\* | 0.28 | 2.64\* | 0.52 | 0.55 | 0.31 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Man |  | -0.20 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.60 | 0.45 | 0.39 |
| Generation | Pre 1930 | 1.81\* | 0.69 | 2.24 | 1.45 | 0.73 | 0.82 |
|  | 1930-39 | 0.96 | 0.66 | 1.60 | 1.35 | 0.85 | 0.73 |
|  | 1940-49 | 1.83\* | 0.74 | 2.12 | 1.43 | 2.02\* | 0.80 |
|  | 1950-59 | 0.57 | 0.64 | 0.92 | 1.36 | 0.34 | 0.72 |
|  | 1960-69 | 0.17 | 0.64 | 1.35 | 1.26 | 0.89 | 0.68 |
|  | 1970+ | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Qualifications | Degree | 1.93\* | 0.86 | 1.33 | 1.18 | 0.38 | 0.97 |
|  | Some higher | 0.47 | 0.91 | 2.22 | 1.16 | 0.46 | 1.02 |
|  | A-Level | 2.28\* | 1.13 | 2.24 | 1.43 | 1.09 | 1.25 |
|  | O-Level | -0.02 | 0.43 | 0.69 | 0.75 | 0.18 | 0.47 |
|  | CSE | -0.16 | 0.84 | 0.98 | 1.42 | -0.73 | 0.97 |
|  | No qualifications | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Religiosity | Weekly | 1.73\* | 0.73 | -0.58 | 1.02 | 0.16 | 0.71 |
|  | Monthly | 0.97 | 0.72 | -1.13 | 0.98 | -1.21 | 0.71 |
|  | Occasionally | 0.13 | 0.77 | -2.03 | 1.08 | -1.75\* | 0.79 |
|  | Once a year | 0.81 | 0.69 | 1.37 | 0.95 | -0.91 | 0.64 |
|  | Never | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Social class | Missing | -0.71 | 0.47 | -0.52 | 1.18 | -0.10 | 0.53 |
|  | Old middle class | 1.65\* | 0.61 | 2.00 | 1.23 | 0.87 | 0.76 |
|  | New middle class | -0.02 | 0.56 | 1.85 | 0.99 | 0.72 | 0.62 |
|  | Junior middle class | 0.75 | 0.63 | 2.63\* | 1.06 | 0.98 | 0.67 |
|  | Own account | 4.07\* | 1.34 | 4.88\* | 1.64 | 1.22 | 0.67 |
|  | Personal service | 0.40 | 0.90 | 0.75 | 1.54 | -0.56 | 1.10 |
|  | Foremen | 0.59 | 0.79 | 1.16 | 1.84 | 1.53 | 0.82 |
|  | Working class | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Denomination | No religion | 0.20 | 1.06 | -1.96 | 1.35 | -0.93 | 1.01 |
|  | No denomination | -2.58 | 1.63 | -3.92 | 2.10 | -2.45 | 1.67 |
|  | Baptist | -2.41\* | 1.08 | - |  | -0.91 | 1.06 |
|  | Methodist | -1.63 | 0.96 | -0.01 | 1.23 | -0.58 | 0.93 |
|  | Presbyterian | -0.63 | 0.37 | -0.01 | 0.67 | -0.88 | 0.42 |
|  | Free Presbyterian | -2.18 | 1.30 | - |  | - |  |
|  | Other | -2.16\* | 0.82 | -2.34 | 1.7 | -1.93\* | 0.96 |
|  | Church of Ireland | - |  | - |  | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant |  | -3.56\* | 1.45 | -7.73\* | 2.48 | 0.69 | 1.48 |

Note: \* = p < 0.05. Unweighted N = 367. Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.54. Reference category is DUP first preference vote.

Source: 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.

Table A3b: Multinomial logistic regression model predicting first preference vote for Protestants in 2016

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | UUP |  | Alliance |  | TUV |  |
|  |  | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left-rightLiberal-conservativeUnionist-nationalist | 0.29\* | 0.13 | -0.02 | 0.19 | -0.27 | 0.26 |
| -0.23\* | 0.09 | -0.78\* | 0.15 | 0.52\* | 0.17 |
| 0.01 | 0.11 | 1.36\* | 0.18 | -0.81\* | 0.23 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Man |  | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.25 | 0.21 | 0.59\* | 0.30 |
| Generation | Pre 1940 | 0.82\* | 0.32 | 1.85\* | 0.50 | -0.13 | 0.68 |
|  | 1940-49 | 0.19 | 0.30 | 1.44\* | 0.44 | -0.51 | 0.63 |
|  | 1950-59 | 0.20 | 0.29 | 1.06\* | 0.42 | -0.12 | 0.62 |
|  | 1960-69 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.50 | 0.42 | -0.41 | 0.62 |
|  | 1970-79 | -0.21 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.42 | -0.34 | 0.62 |
|  | 1980-89 | -0.22 | 0.31 | 0.03 | 0.44 | -0.58 | 0.68 |
|  | 1990+ | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Qualifications | Degree | 1.04\* | 0.22 | 2.53\* | 0.39 | 0.00 | 0.52 |
|  | Some higher | 0.20 | 0.27 | 1.50\* | 0.45 | -0.33 | 0.62 |
|  | A-Level | 0.39 | 0.26 | 1.70\* | 0.44 | -0.29 | 0.59 |
|  | O-Level | -0.02 | 0.20 | 1.24\* | 0.39 | 0.21 | 0.37 |
|  | CSE | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.38 | 0.70 | -0.15 | 0.61 |
|  | No qualifications |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Religiosity | Weekly | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.54 | 0.33 | -0.80 | 0.46 |
|  | Monthly | -0.12 | 0.23 | 0.39 | 0.34 | -0.65 | 0.48 |
|  | Occasionally | -0.13 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.05 | 0.46 |
|  | Once a year | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0.33 | 0.33 | -1.21\* | 0.60 |
|  | Never | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Social class | Missing | 0.04 | 0.33 | 0.28 | 0.58 | 0.10 | 0.68 |
|  | Old middle class | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.43 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.43 |
|  | New middle class | 0.02 | 0.19 | 0.47 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.38 |
|  | Junior middle class | 0.03 | 0.20 | 0.05 | 0.33 | -0.23 | 0.44 |
|  | Own account | 0.11 | 0.46 | 1.36\* | 0.56 | 0.68 | 0.67 |
|  | Personal service | -0.13 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.44 | -0.57 | 0.78 |
|  | Foremen | 0.25 | 0.52 | 1.19 | 0.74 | - |  |
|  | Working class | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Denomination | No religion | -0.21 | 0.27 | 1.23\* | 0.35 | -0.19 | 0.71 |
|  | No denomination | -0.79\* | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.33 | -0.96 | 0.58 |
|  | Baptist | -1.68\* | 0.65 | -0.38 | 0.85 | 0.98 | 0.72 |
|  | Methodist | -0.83 | 0.35 | -0.07 | 0.50 | -1.23 | 1.09 |
|  | Presbyterian | -0.21 | 0.18 | -0.07 | 0.30 | 0.50 | 0.39 |
|  | Free Presbyterian | -1.46\* | 0.78 | - |  | 1.03 | 0.70 |
|  | Other | -1.02\* | 0.38 | -0.66 | 0.70 | 0.08 | 0.66 |
|  | Church of Ireland | - |  | - |  | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant |  | -1.32\* | 0.56 | -6.50\* | 0.94 | -1.27 | 1.11 |

Note: \* = p < 0.05. Unweighted N = 1381. Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.34. Reference category is DUP first preference vote.

Source: 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.

Table A3c: Multinomial logistic regression model predicting first preference vote for Catholics in 1998

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | SDLP |  | Alliance |  |
|  |  | B | SE | B | SE |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Left-rightLiberal-conservativeUnionist-nationalist | 0.28 | 0.36 | 1.29 | 1.13 |
| -0.14 | 0.15 | -0.15 | 0.45 |
| -1.67\* | 0.33 | -4.39\* | 1.25 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Man |  | -0.06 | 0.40 | -1.47 | 1.14 |
| Generation | Pre 1930 | 1.12 | 0.95 | 5.72\* | 2.43 |
|  | 1930-39 | 1.27 | 0.80 | 5.19\* | 2.20 |
|  | 1940-49 | 0.93 | 0.81 | 4.98\* | 2.54 |
|  | 1950-59 | 0.49 | 0.70 | - |  |
|  | 1960-69 | 0.84 | 0.64 | 3.73 | 2.03 |
|  | 1970+ | - | . | - | . |
| Qualifications | Degree | 2.32 | 1.06 | 3.71 | 2.34 |
|  | Some higher | 0.45 | 0.96 | 3.38 | 2.06 |
|  | A-Level | 0.55 | 0.91 | 2.21 | 1.77 |
|  | O-Level | 0.12 | 0.53 | -0.50 | 1.51 |
|  | CSE | 0.57 | 0.83 | 1.52 | 1.94 |
|  | No qualifications | - | . |  | . |
| Religiosity | Weekly | -0.57 | 0.90 | -1.79 | 1.92 |
|  | Monthly | -1.25 | 0.94 | -0.30 | 2.08 |
|  | Occasionally | -0.77 | 1.38 | -1.61 | 2.88 |
|  | Once a year | -1.23 | 1.07 | - |  |
|  | Never | - | . | - | . |
| Social class | Missing | 0.18 | 0.51 | 1.31 | 1.23 |
|  | Old middle class | -0.34 | 0.61 | -0.87 | 1.72 |
|  | New middle class | 1.57 | 0.95 | 1.84 | 2.58 |
|  | Junior middle class | 0.36 | 0.80 | 1.63 | 1.88 |
|  | Own account | -0.06 | 0.84 | - |  |
|  | Personal service | 0.03 | 2.05 | - |  |
|  | Foremen | 1.55 | 1.16 | - |  |
|  | Working class | - |  | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant |  | 5.63\* | 1.81 | -7.73\* | 2.48 |

Note: \* = p < 0.05. Unweighted N = 224. Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.47. Reference category is Sinn Féin first preference vote.

Source: 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.

Table A3d: Multinomial logistic regression model predicting first preference vote for Catholics in 2016

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | SDLP |  | Alliance |  | Leftist |  |
|  |  | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left-rightLiberal-conservativeUnionist-nationalist | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.50\* | 0.26 | -1.24\* | 0.22 |
| 0.01 | 0.10 | -0.67\* | 0.21 | -0.05 | 0.16 |
| -1.40\* | 0.14 | -2.80\* | 0.29 | -0.78\* | 0.19 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Man |  | -0.17 | 0.16 | -0.60\* | 0.29 | 0.22 | 0.24 |
| Generation | Pre 1940 | 1.78\* | 0.40 | 2.83\* | 0.70 | 0.07 | 0.69 |
|  | 1940-49 | 1.14\* | 0.34 | 2.10\* | 0.59 | -0.68 | 0.61 |
|  | 1950-59 | 1.65\* | 0.30 | 1.69\* | 0.57 | -0.02 | 0.47 |
|  | 1960-69 | 0.76\* | 0.28 | 1.02\* | 0.49 | -0.13 | 0.40 |
|  | 1970-79 | 0.53\* | 0.29 | 1.06\* | 0.48 | -0.24 | 0.40 |
|  | 1980-89 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.49 | -0.20 | 0.37 |
|  | 1990+ | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Qualifications | Degree | 1.33\* | 0.26 | 3.10\* | 0.69 | 0.83\* | 0.41 |
|  | Some higher | 0.41 | 0.34 | 1.39\* | 0.82 | -0.22 | 0.58 |
|  | A-Level | 0.27 | 0.29 | 1.90\* | 0.72 | 0.02 | 0.46 |
|  | O-Level | 0.33 | 0.25 | 1.80\* | 0.70 | -0.52 | 0.45 |
|  | CSE | 0.21 | 0.41 | 2.13\* | 0.88 | 0.64 | 0.54 |
|  | No qualifications | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Religiosity | Weekly | 0.50\* | 0.25 | -0.55 | 0.40 | -0.29 | 0.35 |
|  | Monthly | 0.13 | 0.29 | -0.50 | 0.46 | -0.61 | 0.41 |
|  | Occasionally | 0.43 | 0.30 | -0.29 | 0.48 | 0.21 | 0.39 |
|  | Once a year | 0.25 | 0.28 | -1.11\* | 0.50 | -0.32 | 0.38 |
|  | Never | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Social class | Missing | 0.16 | 0.35 | -0.11 | 0.71 | 1.20\* | 0.43 |
|  | Old middle class | 0.00 | 0.27 | 0.11 | 0.50 | -0.56 | 0.50 |
|  | New middle class | 0.04 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.43 | -0.17 | 0.37 |
|  | Junior middle class | -0.08 | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.43 | 0.22 | 0.36 |
|  | Own account | -0.34 | 0.47 | - |  | 0.25 | 0.71 |
|  | Personal service | -0.19 | 0.29 | -0.21 | 0.54 | 0.17 | 0.44 |
|  | Foremen | -0.82 | 0.65 | -0.62 | 1.24 | 0.72 | 0.71 |
|  | Working class | - |  | - |  | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant |  | 2.55\* | 0.73 | 4.72\* | 1.45 | 4.08\* | 1.08 |

Note: \* = p < 0.05. Unweighted N = 1093. Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.41. Reference category is Sinn Féin first preference vote.

Source: 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.

**Appendix 4: *Full tables of vote choice model coefficients for 2003***

Table A4a: Multinomial logistic regression model predicting first preference vote for Protestants in 2003

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | UUP |  | Alliance |  | Other |  |
|  |  | B | SE | B | SE | B | SE |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left-right |  | 0.39 | 0.23 | 0.82 | 0.52 | 0.48 | 0.38 |
| Unionist-nationalist | 0.60\* | 0.28 | 2.59\* | 0.55 | 0.38 | 0.42 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Man |  | 0.44 | 0.30 | 0.17 | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.47 |
| Generation | Pre 1930 | 1.68\* | 0.67 | 3.96\* | 1.91 | 3.72 | 1.19 |
|  | 1930-39 | 1.35\* | 0.60 | 4.92\* | 1.72 | 3.20\* | 1.18 |
|  | 1940-49 | 1.45\* | 0.57 | 3.29\* | 1.80 | 3.18\* | 1.14 |
|  | 1950-59 | 1.11\* | 0.54 | 2.97\* | 1.65 | 2.49\* | 1.09 |
|  | 1960-69 | 1.03\* | 0.56 | 2.22 | 1.67 | 2.58\* | 1.09 |
|  | 1970+ | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Qualifications | Degree | 1.26\* | 0.63 | 2.03 | 1.12 | 2.45\* | 0.87 |
|  | Some higher | 1.69 | 0.74 | 2.14 | 1.17 | 3.14\* | 0.94 |
|  | A-Level | 0.80 | 0.63 | 2.15 | 1.13 | - |  |
|  | O-Level | 0.69 | 0.40 | 0.53 | 0.90 | 0.49 | 0.66 |
|  | CSE | 0.05 | 0.65 |  |  | 0.50 | 0.92 |
|  | No qualifications | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Religiosity | Weekly | -0.83\* | 0.43 | -2.37\* | 0.98 | -1.79\* | 0.67 |
|  | Monthly | -0.93 | 0.49 | -1.30 | 0.93 | -0.73 | 0.71 |
|  | Occasionally | -1.24\* | 0.54 | -1.82 | 1.06 | -2.08\* | 0.95 |
|  | Once a year | -0.76 | 0.48 | -0.74 | 0.96 | -0.02 | 0.64 |
|  | Never | - |  | - |  | - |  |
| Social class | Missing | -0.10 | 0.72 | - |  | 0.08 | 1.09 |
|  | Old middle class | -0.35 | 0.43 | 1.45 | 1.17 | -0.90 | 0.76 |
|  | New middle class | 0.71 | 0.50 | 2.85\* | 1.13 | 0.53 | 0.75 |
|  | Junior middle class | 0.52 | 0.43 | 2.00 | 1.21 | 1.13 | 0.63 |
|  | Own account | -0.81 | 0.63 | 0.75 | 1.53 | 0.44 | 0.86 |
|  | Personal service | -2.31 | 1.62 | - | 0.00 | - |  |
|  | Foremen | 0.08 | 0.55 | 1.28 | 1.51 | - |  |
|  | Working class | - |  | - |  | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant |  | -2.95\* | 0.99 | -13.37\* | 2.76 | -6.04\* | 1.76 |

Note: \* = p < 0.05. Unweighted N=332. Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.42. Reference category is DUP first preference vote.

Source: 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.

Table A4b: Multinomial logistic regression model predicting first preference vote for Catholics in 2003

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | SDLP |  | Alliance |  |
|  |  | B | SE | B | SE |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Left-right |  | 0.22 | 0.39 | -0.91 | 0.91 |
| Unionist-nationalist | -0.87\* | 0.25 | -3.67\* | 1.04 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Man |  | 0.62 | 0.43 | -0.41 | 1.10 |
| Generation | Pre 1930 | 2.53 | 1.43 | 4.87\* | 2.33 |
|  | 1930-39 | 1.66\* | 0.83 | 2.32 | 1.90 |
|  | 1940-49 | 2.05\* | 0.68 | 0.55 | 1.60 |
|  | 1950-59 | 2.42\* | 0.72 | 4.35\* | 1.60 |
|  | 1960-69 | 0.38 | 0.55 | 1.05 | 1.45 |
|  | 1970+ | - |  | - |  |
| Qualifications | Degree | 0.92 | 0.69 | -1.22 | 1.46 |
|  | Some higher | -1.41 | 1.11 | 0.56 | 2.85 |
|  | A-Level | 1.83\* | 0.78 | - |  |
|  | O-Level | 0.29 | 0.59 | 2.12 | 1.31 |
|  | CSE | 3.06 | 1.83 | - |  |
|  | No qualifications | - |  | - |  |
| Religiosity | Weekly | 0.46 | 0.68 | -2.04 | 1.48 |
|  | Monthly | 0.60 | 0.84 | 0.55 | 1.53 |
|  | Occasionally | -0.21 | 0.99 | -0.65 | 2.20 |
|  | Once a year | -1.40 | 0.90 | - |  |
|  | Never | - |  | - |  |
| Social class | Missing | -0.30 | 0.78 | -1.34 | 2.41 |
|  | Old middle class | 0.35 | 0.74 | 2.99\* | 1.47 |
|  | New middle class | 0.87 | 0.77 | 4.37\* | 1.43 |
|  | Junior middle class | -0.42 | 0.66 | - |  |
|  | Own account | -0.75 | 1.04 | 2.12 | 1.82 |
|  | Personal service | -1.55 | 1.10 | - |  |
|  | Foremen | -0.20 | 0.71 | - |  |
|  | Working class | - |  | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant |  | -0.42 | 1.53 | 7.53\* | 3.79 |

Note: \* = p < 0.05. Unweighted N=183. Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = 0.54. Reference category is Sinn Féin first preference vote.

Source: 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study.

1. We applied a similar logic of coding, and also an application of the same set of policy themes, as used in Laver and Garry (2000), with the addition of the Northern Ireland specific unionist-nationalist theme. Of course, manifestos may also be analysed in a more discursive way rather than quantitatively coded. For an example of a more qualitative interpretation in the Northern Ireland context see Hayward (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. We also included ‘centrist’ categories to capture positions on the ideological middle ground on each domain as well as a ‘general’ category that discussed that policy domain but did not indicate a position. In practice, few sentences fall into a centrist category. Finally, we included an ‘other’ category in which to code statements that did not fall into any of the above policy domains. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)