**THE ACTIVATION OF POPULIST ATTITUDES**

**Appendix**

### Populist attitudes items

Survey participants rated their level of agreement with a series of statements that capture populist discourse. Responses were gauged on a 5-point scale (1= very much disagree and 5= very much agree) and Table A.1 presents the questions included in the two surveys in English.

Table A.1. Items included in the 2013 UNDP and 2015 Hellenic surveys to measure populist attitudes (English translation)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| UNDP question | Hellenic question | English wording |
| P69a | pop1 | The politicians in [Congress/parliament] need to follow the will of the people.  |
| P69b | pop2 | The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions. |
| P69c | pop3 | The political differences between the people and the elite are larger than the differences among the people. |
| P69d | pop4 | I’d rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than an experienced politician. |
| P69e | pop5 | Politicians talk too much and take too little action. |
| P69f | pop6 | What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles. |

Table A.2 shows the items in Spanish and Greek languages and the the mean levels of agreement for all statements (also shown in Figure A.1). Results for both countries are similar to each other, with up to two-thirds of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with each statement. For a few questions in Greece, results are somewhat weaker than in Chile, especially the “Ordinary citizen rather than experienced politician” statement. Generally, however, these results show that populist attitudes in both Chile and Greece are widespread.

## Table A.2.Original Item Wording

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2013 UNDP wording |  | 2015 Hellenic wording |
| P69a | Los políticos en el Congreso tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo | pop1 | Οι πολιτικοί στο κοινοβούλιο πρέπει να ακολουθούν τη βούληση του λαού.  |
| P69b | Las decisiones más importantes deberían ser tomadas por el pueblo y no por los políticos | pop2 | Ο λαός, και όχι οι πολιτικοί, θα πρέπει να λαμβάνει τις σημαντικότερες πολιτικές αποφάσεις.  |
| P69c | Las diferencias políticas entre la elite y el pueblo son más grandes que las diferencias que existen en el pueblo | pop3 | Οι πολιτικές διαφορές μεταξύ της ελίτ και του λαού είναι μεγαλύτερες από τις διαφορές μεταξύ των επιμέρους ομάδων του λαού.  |
| P69d | Preferiría ser representado por un ciudadano común que por un político experimentado | pop4 | Ο λαός μπορεί να εκπροσωπείται καλύτερα από έναν απλό πολίτη παρά από έναν έμπειρο πολιτικό. |
| P69e | Los políticos hablan mucho y hacen muy poco | pop5 | Οι εκλεγμένοι αξιωματούχοι μιλούν πάρα πολύ και κάνουν πολύ λίγα πράγματα.  |
| P69f | En política se llama consenso a lo que realmente significa renunciar a los propios principios | pop6 | Αυτό που οι άνθρωποι αποκαλούν "συμβιβασμό" στην πολιτική, στην πραγματικότητα είναι απλώς ξεπούλημα των αρχών εκείνου που συμβιβάζεται. |

Figure A.1 Mean populist attitudes in Chile and Greece

Table A.3 Mokken Scale Analyses of Populist Attitude Index

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Chile | Greece |
|  Variable | H |  | H |
| Congress follow people | 0.43 |  | 0.50 |
| People not politicians | 0.44 |  | 0.45 |
| Differences between people and elite | 0.38 |  | 0.37 |
| Ordinary citizen, not experienced politician | 0.38 |  | 0.45 |
| Politicians talk too much | 0.40 |  | 0.35 |
| "Compromise" is just selling out | 0.34 |  | 0.49 |
| Scale | 0.39 |  | 0.44 |
| N=1,498 for Chile N=982 for Greece The H coefficients are calculated using an extension of the coefH function (R package mokken) suitable for weighted data. The extension is available at: <http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.844048> |  |  |  |

### Independent variables

Descriptive statistics for all independent variables we have used in our models are found in Table A.4. All variables have been transformed so that they use the same scales across both countries. Note that in the models for Greece, we omit measures of partisan identity because the results of the survey question were highly correlated with vote choice (both of them ask about party choice), and we must omit the sociotropic assessments of economic performance, which were overwhelmingly negative and showed almost no variance.

Table A.4. Independent Variables in Vote Choice Models for Chile and Greece

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Chile |  | Greece |
| **Variable** | Label in survey | mean | s.d. |  | Label in survey | mean | s.d. |
| ***Populist attitudes*** (index of 6 populism items) | P69a-P69f | 3.9 | 0.62 |  | pop1-pop6 | 3.7 | 0.67 |
| ***Economic ideology*** (index of attitudes on economic policy; recoded so that 1=left 2=right) | P116a-P116b, P116f-P116h | 1.4 | 0.32 |  | eco1-eco5 | 1.5 | 0.20 |
| ***Social ideology*** (index of attitudes on social policy; recoded so that 1=left 5=right) | P42a-P42f | 3.1 | 0.91 |  | tan1-tan12 | 3.1 | 0.63 |
| Need for ***constitutional change*** (recoded so that 1=change not needed 2=undecided 3=moderate change 4=deep change needed) | P39i | 3.5 | 0.88 |  | N/A |  |  |
| Prioritizing ***protection of the environment*** (recoded so that 1=employment and economic growth should be prioritized, 2=don’t know, 3=environment should be prioritized) | P122 | 2.5 | 0.85 |  | N/A |  |  |
| ***European Unification*** (0 = has already gone too far, 10 = should be pushed further | N/A | N/A |  |  | eu5 | 5.7 | 3.45 |
| ***Sociotropic retrospective* (**how the country’s situation is compared to 10 years ago; recoded so that 1=worse and 3=better) | P22 | 2.2 | 0.75 |  | N/A |  |  |
| ***Sociotropic prospective (***what the situation of the country will be in 10 years, recoded so that 1=worse and 3=better | P23 | 2.4 | 0.64 |  | N/A |  |  |
| ***Pocketbook retrospective*** (How their personal economic situation compares to 10 years ago; Greece: compared to 12 months ago; recoded so that 1=worse and 3=better) | P142 | 2.4 | 0.67 |  | E9 | 1.4 | 0.60 |
| ***Pocketbook prospective*** (How their personal economic situation will be in 10 years; Greece: in 12 months; recoded so that 1=worse and 3=better) | P143 | 2.5 | 0.61 |  | E11 | 1.4 | 0.66 |
| Measures of ***partisan sympathy***, rendered as a series of dummy variables that include: | P108 |  |  |  | N/A |  |  |
| * Support for parties in the **Nueva Mayoría**
 |  | 14.5% sympathize |  |  |  |  |
| * Support for parties in the **Alianza**
 |  | 6.8% sympathize |  |  |  |  |
| * Support for **all other parties or no party at all** (baseline)
 |  | 78.7% sympathize |  |  |  |  |
| ***Sex*** (recoded 1= male 2 = female) | sexo | 1.60 | 0.48 |  | male | 1.48 | 0.50 |
| ***Age*** (years)  | P1 | 46.8 | 17.7 |  | age | 46.1 | 16.29 |
| ***Education*** (1=elementary education incomplete 9=postgraduate) | P4 | 63.1% have complete secondary or higher |  | edu | 44.4% have completed secondary or lower |

### Robustness check

Table A.5 Robustness check: Unconditional Model of Party Preference in Chile (Multinomial Probit)

NOTE: For Chile, in order for the model to converge under any estimation technique for mprobit, we had to drop both measures of partisan identity. Even with this, estimates of the impact of populism for any candidate or alternative choice do not vary substantially from the mlogit results reported in the paper.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Bachelet |   | MEO |   | Parisi |   | Other |   |
| Populist attitudes index | 0.32 | \*\* | 0.53 | \*\*\* | 0.12 |  | 0.31 |  |
| Social ideology | -0.17 | \* | -0.32 | \*\* | -0.18 |  | -0.57 | \*\*\* |
| Economic ideology | -0.74 | \*\*\* | -0.32 |  | -0.25 |  | -0.01 |  |
| Environmental protection | 0.26 | \*\* | 0.24 | \* | 0.32 | \*\* | 0.05 |  |
| Constitutional change | 0.24 | \*\* | 0.26 | \* | 0.09 |  | 0.35 | \* |
| Sociotropic retrospective | -0.62 | \*\*\* | -0.53 | \*\*\* | -0.38 | \* | -0.43 | \* |
| Sociotropic prospective | 0.05 |  | -0.03 |  | 0.01 |  | -0.06 |  |
| Pocketbook retrospective | -0.03 |  | 0.15 |  | -0.08 |  | -0.23 |  |
| Pocketbook prospective | -0.02 |  | 0.32 |  | -0.2 |  | -0.21 |  |
| Age | -0.01 |  | -0.02 | \*\* | -0.03 | \*\*\* | -0.04 | \*\*\* |
| Sex | 0.01 |  | -0.23 |  | -0.15 |  | -0.17 |  |
| Education | -0.47 | \*\*\* | -0.23 | \*\* | -0.09 |  | 0.33 | \*\* |
| Constant | 2.73 | \*\* | -0.6 |  | 2.36 | \* | 1.72 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Variable | None |   | Missing |   | Abstain |   |  |  |
| Populist attitudes index | 0.31 | \* | 0.25 | \* | 0.21 |  |  |  |
| Social ideology | -0.17 |  | -0.15 |  | -0.13 |  |  |  |
| Economic ideology | -0.26 |  | -0.18 |  | -0.3 |  |  |  |
| Environmental protection | 0.09 |  | 0.13 |  | 0.06 |  |  |  |
| Constitutional change | 0.23 | \* | 0.16 | \* | 0.34 | \*\*\* |  |  |
| Sociotropic retrospective | -0.57 | \*\*\* | -0.42 | \*\*\* | -0.45 | \*\*\* |  |  |
| Sociotropic prospective | 0.05 |  | 0.11 |  | -0.19 |  |  |  |
| Pocketbook retrospective | -0.28 | \* | -0.15 |  | -0.07 |  |  |  |
| Pocketbook prospective | -0.12 |  | 0.04 |  | -0.14 |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.01 | \*\* | -0.01 |  | -0.04 | \*\*\* |  |  |
| Sex | -0.16 |  | -0.02 |  | -0.17 |  |  |  |
| Education | -0.22 | \*\* | -0.2 | \*\* | -0.48 | \*\*\* |  |  |
| Constant | 2.02 |  | 1.68 |  | 4.27 | \*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Model statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N | 1456 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\*p<.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table A.6 Robustness check: Unconditional Model of Party Preference in Greece (Multinomial Probit)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | SYRIZA | GD | POTAMI | KKE | ANEL |
| Populist attitudes index | 1.02 | \*\*\* | 0.68 | \*\* | 0.18 |  | 0.99 | \*\*\* | 0.73 | \*\* |
| Social ideology | -1.07 | \*\*\* | 0.62 |  | -0.78 | \*\*\* | -1.12 | \*\*\* | 0.04 |  |
| Economic ideology | -4.20 | \*\*\* | -2.14 | \* | -0.20 |  | -4.00 | \*\*\* | -3.28 | \*\*\* |
| European unification | -0.02 |  | -0.07 | \* | 0.07 | \* | -0.11 | \* | -0.09 | \* |
| Pocketbook retrospective | 0.18 |  | -0.15 |  | 0.05 |  | 0.79 | \*\*\* | 0.30 |  |
| Pocketbook prospective | 0.40 | \*\* | 0.01 |  | -0.04 |  | -0.68 | \* | 0.16 |  |
| Age | 0.00 |  | -0.01 |  | -0.01 |  | -0.02 |  | 0.01 |  |
| Sex | -0.06 |  | -0.50 |  | -0.00 |  | 0.10 |  | -0.31 |  |
| Education | -0.06 |  | -0.15 |  | 0.07 |  | -0.18 |  | -0.13 |  |
| Constant | 6.26 | \*\*\* | 0.19 |  | 1.23 |  | 6.63 | \*\* | 1.96 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Variable | PASOK | OTHER | NONE | MISSING | Abstention |
| Populist attitudes index | 0.18 |  | 0.75 | \*\*\* | 0.81 | \*\*\* | 0.65 | \*\*\* | 0.97 | \*\*\* |
| Social ideology | -0.91 | \*\*\* | -0.93 | \*\*\* | -0.10 |  | -0.65 | \*\*\* | -1.03 | \*\*\* |
| Economic ideology | -1.35 |  | -2.50 | \*\*\* | -2.84 | \*\*\* | -2.11 | \*\*\* | -1.38 | \* |
| European unification | 0.01 |  | -0.02 |  | -0.00 |  | -0.00 |  | -0.02 |  |
| Pocketbook retrospective | 0.02 |  | 0.06 |  | -0.26 |  | 0.07 |  | 0.15 |  |
| Pocketbook prospective | 0.05 |  | -0.39 |  | 0.04 |  | -0.14 |  | -0.01 |  |
| Age | 0.01 |  | -0.00 |  | 0.00 |  | 0.00 |  | -0.02 | \* |
| Sex | -0.04 |  | -0.08 |  | -0.45 |  | -0.25 |  | 0.05 |  |
| Education | -0.11 |  | -0.04 |  | -0.00 |  | 0.02 |  | 0.04 |  |
| Constant | 3.61 | \* | 4.36 | \* | 1.43 |  | 3.17 | \* | 1.77 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Model statistics |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N | 910 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\*p<.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |



 Figure A.2 Robustness check: Predicted probabilities of voting in Chile (unconditional model, mprobit)



Figure A.3 Robustness check: Predicted probabilities of voting in Greece (unconditional model, mprobit)

Table A.7 Full triple interaction results: Model of Party Preference in Greece for Populism\*Social ideology \* European unification (Multinomial logit; baseline category is New Democracy)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | SYRIZA | GD | POTAMI | KKE | ANEL |
| Populist attitudes index | 2.94 |  | -0.58 |  | 3.58 |  | 3.39 |  | -6.25 |  |
| Social ideology | 0.80 |  | 1.60 |  | 4.32 |  | 0.42 |  | -7.90 |  |
| Populist attitudes \* Social ideology | -0.52 |  | 0.39 |  | -1.71 |  | -0.55 |  | 2.25 |  |
| European Unification | 1.04 |  | 0.76 |  | 0.93 |  | 1.74 |  | -4.35 | \* |
| Populist attitudes \* European unification | -0.20 |  | -0.03 |  | -0.23 |  | -0.51 |  | 1.17 | \* |
| Social ideology \* European unification | -0.48 |  | -0.38 |  | -0.51 |  | -0.70 |  | 1.22 | \* |
| Populist attitudes \*Social ideology \* European unification | 0.10 |  | 0.04 |  | 0.15 |  | 0.18 |  | -0.34 | \* |
| Pocketbook retrospective | 0.32 |  | -0.03 |  | 0.09 |  | 1.43 | \*\*\* | 0.56 |  |
| Economic ideology | -6.44 | \*\*\* | -2.62 |  | -0.10 |  | -6.83 | \*\*\* | -5.82 | \*\*\* |
| Pocketbook Prospective | 0.49 | \* | 0.08 |  | -0.09 |  | -1.23 | \* | 0.33 |  |
| Age | 0.00 |  | -0.02 |  | -0.01 |  | -0.04 |  | 0.03 |  |
| Education | -0.11 |  | -0.36 | \* | 0.10 |  | -0.39 | \* | -0.19 |  |
| Sex | -0.12 |  | -0.93 |  | 0.06 |  | 0.37 |  | -0.62 |  |
| Constant | 3.34 |  | -1.43 |  | -9.40 |  | 4.67 |  | 29.75 | \* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Variable | PASOK | OTHER | NONE | MISSING | Abstention |
| Populist attitudes index | -5.44 |  | 2.88 |  | 2.82 |  | -1.41 |  | 1.92 |  |
| Social ideology | -8.98 | \* | -0.90 |  | 3.34 |  | -5.75 |  | -3.44 |  |
| Populist attitudes \* Social ideology | 2.15 |  | -0.07 |  | -0.68 |  | 1.27 |  | 0.29 |  |
| European Unification | -3.02 |  | 0.40 |  | 0.44 |  | -1.74 |  | -0.65 |  |
| Populist attitudes \* European unification | 0.91 |  | -0.04 |  | -0.01 |  | 0.50 |  | 0.09 |  |
| Social ideology \* European unification | 1.16 | \* | 0.12 |  | -0.31 |  | 0.82 |  | 0.45 |  |
| Populist attitudes \*Social ideology \* European unification | -0.35 | \* | -0.06 |  | 0.05 |  | -0.23 |  | -0.09 |  |
| Pocketbook retrospective | 0.00 |  | 0.04 |  | -0.47 |  | 0.06 |  | 0.23 |  |
| Economic ideology | -2.04 |  | -4.18 | \*\* | -5.24 | \*\* | -3.31 | \*\*\* | -1.92 |  |
| Pocketbook Prospective | 0.06 |  | -0.85 |  | 0.06 |  | -0.28 |  | 0.06 |  |
| Age | 0.02 |  | -0.01 |  | 0.01 |  | 0.00 |  | -0.04 | \* |
| Education | -0.19 |  | -0.09 |  | -0.01 |  | 0.00 |  | 0.05 |  |
| Sex | -0.13 |  | -0.02 |  | -0.85 |  | -0.41 |  | 0.17 |  |
| Constant | 25.48 |  | 0.44 |  | -5.60 |  | 14.63 |  | 3.12 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Model statistics |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| N | 910 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| pseudo R2 | 0.20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \*p<.05 \*\*p<.01 \*\*\*p<.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |









 Figure A.4 Full triple interaction results: Marginal effects of Populism\*Social ideology\*European unification on voting in Greece (unconditional model, mlogit)