

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory

Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political Theory of the *Disquisition* and *Discourse*. By H. Lee Cheek, Jr. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001. 202p. \$29.95.

Christopher M. Duncan, *University of Dayton*

C. S. Lewis claimed that he was a democrat because he believed in the fall of man. He went on to suggest that it was not that some men did not deserve to be slaves, but that none deserved to be masters. While not exactly the sort of uplifting proclamation that many partisans of democracy would hope to rally their followers around, it does provide those among us who are persuaded that human beings are limited in their capacities to reject vice and sin with an avenue and persuasive rationale to join their ranks. It is with this sort of view in mind that H. Lee Cheek, Jr.'s provocative and cogently argued book on the political thought of John C. Calhoun ought to be read.

Broadly speaking, Cheek engages in two general projects in this book. The first is an attempt to get Calhoun right, i.e., to understand him as he understood himself. The second project involves answering the larger question of whether the correctly defined Calhoun was, himself, *right*. This work succeeds admirably both in its provision of a sustainable interpretation of Calhoun's political theory and in its argument that much of what he theorized remains pertinent and useful. To those who believe that the term "Southern Democrat" is oxymoronic when applied to a supporter of slavery, the latter assertion will no doubt seem quite problematic. Cheek manages to disarm his potential critics, however, through what some may see as a slightly disingenuous strategy of at once narrowing his focus and generalizing his questions. Hence, we are asked to read the *Disquisition* and the *Discourse* closely and in the context of the South Atlantic republican tradition, but diverted from asking what the relationship between those works and defense of the South's peculiar institution might have been.

Indeed, slavery is barely mentioned, and in a footnote we are told that it is simply "beyond the scope of this book" (n. 37, p. 92). Though others may balk at this, I think that Cheek is on target when he asserts that "defending slavery was not the touchstone of Calhoun's thought" (p. 22) and, furthermore, that it is instructive to note along with him that readers as different and far removed from Calhoun as Stokely Carmichael sought out the *Disquisition* for theoretical guidance. Still, the question of linkage does remain begged.

That having been said about what the author does not attempt, there is much to be said in favor of what he does. According to Cheek, Calhoun's larger goal was to "reconcile the need for popular rule with the ethical preconditions for its survival" (p. ix). After a perfunctory but lucid account of the existing scholarship, Cheek embarks on his constructive project in the second chapter. There we are treated to a persuasive argument that places Calhoun's thought in a direct and quasi-apostolic relationship to the Jefferson of the *Kentucky Resolutions* and the Madison of the *Virginia Resolutions* and the *Report of 1800*. The case is made there that "for Jefferson, Madison, and Calhoun, only the states could adequately represent the people" and that "no other assemblage, and certainly not the population en masse, could represent the needs and diversity of Americans" (p. 56). Rather than the simplistic amalgamation of Calhoun's defense of states rights with a defense of slavery that is often performed by his less thoughtful critics, Cheek portrays it as the foundation of a larger political commitment to diffused power, legisla-

tive dominance, and the overall restraint in political life that is ultimately necessary for the preservation of liberty itself. As such, Cheek can assert without flinching that "Calhoun may be called the last of the founders" (p. 79). Though perhaps something of an overstatement, those who would reject the lineage or its basis would do well to remember exactly to whom the first 10 amendments to the Constitution were meant to apply.

Where Calhoun's thought departs from his predecessors is in his significantly deeper appreciation of the obstacles and limits to human perfection contained in our very nature. What many would refer to as the burden of original sin, Calhoun calls the "law of animated existence" (p. 100). That appreciation prods Calhoun to reject both libertarian individualism and political centralization as threats in their own right to a sustainable and ordered liberty. While Cheek ignores the obvious irony, he is on firm ground when he frames Calhoun's position as one designed to thwart majority tyranny and the dangers of unrestrained and nondeliberative "momentary electoral majorities" in an effort to unite "constitutional and popular rule" (p. 113). What many may find discomfiting is that at least one strong logical extension of that position is the claim of Calhoun's that "to accommodate the greatest amount of liberty, individuals and states must be allowed to pursue those avenues they may deem best to promote... interests and happiness" (p. 118).

The substantive chapter on the *Discourse* that follows only deepens that level of discomfort for opponents of states rights by asserting straightaway that when the *Discourse* is read properly and in light of the *Disquisition*, the conclusion that "the Tenth Amendment was a guide for defining the theoretical core of the republic" (p. 151) becomes all but inescapable. Now while I believe that the author does overestimate the continuity between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution that is both asserted and implied by such an argument, the larger vision of both his and Calhoun's retains its consistency and integrity. Simply put, that larger vision forces Calhoun's detractors to explain how liberty, popular rule, community, and constitutionalism can all flourish simultaneously without a sustained commitment to the principle of subsidiarity and the diffusion of power. Neither the author nor his subject believes that you can, and both cases are persuasive.

In sum, this is a rich and well-argued book. It not only forces its thoughtful readers into a serious reconsideration about the political thought and theory of John C. Calhoun, but, at its best, forces them to reconsider the nature, purpose, and future prospects of the American regime. If the author is correct when he claims that Calhoun attempted to "locate the restorative features of the tradition within the original purity of the document [the Constitution]" (p. 166), then we must ask those who oppose his arguments, yet share his larger goals, where they would have us look.

If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? By G. A. Cohen. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 233p. \$35.00 cloth, \$18.00 paper.

Gillian Brock, *The University of Auckland*

In this work, G. A. Cohen presents his Gifford Lectures. He explains why he no longer believes in the inevitability of equality, why he rejects liberals' faith in the sufficiency of political recipes, and why he now believes "that a change in social ethos, a change in the attitudes people sustain toward each other in the thick of daily life, is necessary for producing equality" (p. 3). Both just rules and just personal choices are required for distributive justice. Good structural design is not

enough: You cannot change the world without changing the soul, as it were. He discusses how closely this aligns him with Christian views he once utterly disparaged.

The 10 chapters of the book are (mostly) so arranged as to explain the background to why he held the key views he did and why they have changed where they have. Autobiographical detail liberally intermingles with philosophical analysis. The autobiographical portions inform the philosophical analysis in ways rarely attempted in typical works of political philosophy, and the result is astonishingly successful.

Cohen starts off outlining (rather than resolving) some paradoxes of conviction. He moves on to a wonderfully candid discussion of his Montreal communist Jewish childhood and the political, religious, and antireligious views he once held. He then turns to discuss how classical Marxism was in the grip of the “*obstetric* conception of political practice” (p. 43) and why this dangerous idea should be rejected. If you hold the obstetric conception, you are more inclined to believe that solutions will simply appear and you do not expect to have to encounter hard choices in a way that responsible politics must. Moreover, obstetricism “appears to justify a criminal inattention to *what* one is trying to achieve, to the problem of socialist design” (p. 77). Cohen argues that recipes are essential not only so that it is clear what those in power are to do with power, but also so that the masses might have some reason to give them that power. So, rather than holding the obstetric view “according to which the baby is what the baby is, not what the midwife designs it to be” (p. 77), we should, at the very least, switch (and possibly mangle) metaphors, so that if we do not like the hot kitchen we are in, we start writing “recipes for future kitchens” (p. 77).

After an examination of Marx’s view that religion is the opiate of the people, Cohen explains why equality is no longer inevitable. Marx believed that since the working class constituted the majority, produced the wealth, yet were exploited and needy, they would have nothing to lose from revolting. Cohen argues that this view is no longer sustainable because there is now no group within society of which all these features are true: There is no group on which society depends for production, that is exploited, constitutes a majority, and is in dire need. Furthermore, he is skeptical about creating proletarian solidarity across countries.

Equality is not inevitable, but we have ample reason to demand it, so the move to normative political philosophy is a wise one for a Marxist to make. There follows his engagement with leading American political philosophers, especially the work of John Rawls. He presses several criticisms of Rawls. It is important to note that he disagrees with Rawls on just how much inequality can be justified by the difference principle, and he takes issue with Rawls’s view that the difference principle applies to the basic structure of society (which typically is taken to consist in society’s major coercive social institutions). Cohen argues that there is no defensible account of what the basic structure is, such that principles which apply to it do not also apply to choices made within it. Rawls believes that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and pervasive. Cohen argues that if these are the relevant grounds for identifying the primary subject of justice, the major coercive social institutions cannot be our only focus, as the example of the family makes clear. The major reason for caring about the basic structure that Rawls offers is also a reason for caring about the informal structure and personal choice within society. Moreover, there is ample scope for personal justice or injustice within a just structure. Securing distributive justice by purely structural means is impossible. A society committed to the difference

principle would still need “an ethos which informs choice within just rules” (p. 132).

Finally, Cohen turns to the issue of whether rich (professed) egalitarians can really answer the question “If you’re an egalitarian, how come you’re so rich?” in any defensible ways, given the widespread inequality in the world today. He examines a number of justifications an egalitarian might offer for not giving away much personal wealth: giving wouldn’t remove inequality of power or reduce division between people, giving would merely be a drop in the ocean, giving is a duty of the state not individuals, giving could disadvantage one’s children relative to one’s peers, and giving would involve a sharp reduction in standard of living, which would induce a strong sense of deprivation. His aim in the final chapter is simply to assemble reasons, and although he believes some reasons are good ones (for instance, something like the last two listed), he doesn’t weigh up just how plausible on balance we should find these.

In this excellent book, Cohen has combined fascinating autobiography with rigorous theoretical analysis, often drawing on the details of his past to explain the importance of key shifts in his theoretical views. The result is a work that is both immensely enjoyable to read and a sophisticated contribution to Marxist theory, egalitarianism, and debates about what political philosophy should entail for personal behavior. In particular, his discussion on this last issue constitutes pioneering work in an area not yet claiming many political philosophers’ attention (professionally, at any rate).

The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict By Elizabeth Frazer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 279p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Barbara Arneil, *University of British Columbia*

This book begins where *The Politics of Community* (1993), Elizabeth Frazer’s previous book (coauthored with Nicola Lacey) left off. Having laid the groundwork for the analytical problems within both liberal and communitarian thought and proposed a new type of feminist communitarianism in the first book, Frazer turns her penetrating analytical mind in this book to considering in greater depth the nature of both communitarianism and community. Ironically, having spent so much time analyzing the community, Frazer’s recommendation at the end of this book is to dispense with the term in many contexts in favor of a series of interlinked concepts such as family, locality, association, and group.

Frazer begins by distinguishing three types of communitarian thought: vernacular, political, and philosophical. The first of these gets little attention in the remainder of the book and Frazer is explicitly concerned with the work of political communitarian thought in the works of Henry Tam and Amitai Etzioni as well as the political platforms of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. The analysis of these two very distinct threads of thought within the communitarian tradition is both illuminating and thorough. The central problem for communitarian analysis from Frazer’s point of view is the vague meaning of “community” that lies at the heart of both types of communitarianism but is left strangely underanalyzed in either body of thought.

Frazer devotes a preliminary chapter to analyzing the concept of “community” and then uses this analysis to anchor the subsequent chapters on family, locality, and the larger political society. She is informed by social theory as well as political literature in this quest and she does an admirable job of pinning down what exactly the community is from a number of theoretical vantage points. While community,

as it is characterized in both strains of communitarian thought, is fundamentally enmeshed in social relations, Frazer rightly concludes that it is its transcendent character that distinguishes the community from what might otherwise be called an association. And it is this capacity to transcend, coupled with the shared values and boundaries implied, that creates problems for democratic politics according to Frazer, for a number of reasons that she develops in succeeding chapters.

Before she turns to look at the family, locality, and political society more broadly, Frazer turns her attention to the connection between interpretivism and social constructionism in communitarian thought. She concludes that communities necessarily play a role in the grounding of interpretations, but cannot be a solution to adjudicating the resolution of differing interpretations. She argues that social constructionism is useful to the extent that it is clear about “the mechanisms and processes the communitarians hypothesize” (p. 131). Frazer again draws together a disparate number of sources to provide a rigorous account of what the exact social constructs in building a community are. Within communitarian social constructionist thought however, Frazer acknowledges a tension. Ultimately, if the community is a social construction, it may be altered. As such, social constructionism often leads to the questioning, indeed dismantling, of previous social constructs (p. 138). This strain between a transcendent, bounded, and organic community and the shifting, fluid nature of politics is an underlying theme of Frazer’s analysis.

Frazer explores this theoretical tension by disaggregating the “community” into locality, family, and political society, in three separate chapters. In all three cases she argues that the use of “community” as a theoretical category has perverse effects. In essence, community as it is conceptualized in communitarian thought creates a politics of boundaries. The metaphor she has in mind is a series of nested boxes; the family, the place, and the nation-state are all bounded communities, each conceived to fit nicely into the next and building community at each stage. Frazer rightly points out that the nature of identity and democratic politics moves toward the disruption of such boundaries. “A preferable conception of democratic politics emphasizes the unsettlement of boundaries” (p. 7). And the “community” as it is currently understood cannot “capture the range of social relations and conflicts that make up these organizations, institutions and agglomerations” (p. 191). According to Frazer, the preferable metaphor would be that of a network, which would better encompass the tension between the unity and the conflict in her title. A question immediately arises as to the implications of losing the concept of community and the boundaries and membership that go with it. Without hard boundaries circumscribing a community and a clear notion of its membership, how does one ensure the standard bearers of democratic theory practice: accountability, representative institutions, and transparent authority?

Ultimately, not only has Frazer made an important contribution to communitarian theory (both political and philosophical variants) by forcing its proponents to take more seriously the concept of community and how it is to be reconciled with the principles of democracy, identity politics, and social constructivism, but she has contributed to all those other bodies of literature that have, hitherto, used an undertheorized notion of community: from communitarian feminism to criminal justice reform to support of expanded local governments. The analysis is rigorous and methodical, the organization clear, and the writing lucid. This book would be a useful contribution for anyone interested in liberalism or communitarianism, in both theory and practice.

Millenarianism and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture Vols. 1–4. Edited by Matt Goldish, Richard H. Popkin, James E. Force, Karl A. Kottman, and John Christian Laursen. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 784p. \$253.00.

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All societies contain some image or vision of their own perfection—of life, both individual and collective, free of the burdens of history and death. In the history of civilizations, these visions have often served as a fulcrum of radical change and social transformation. Just as often, they have served as the ideological underpinnings of more abortive movements of social change. Moreover, in the lives of individuals and groups, they have often led to a renunciation of the world and its concerns in search of a more private wholeness, in a life of contemplation and retreat.

While some image of human perfection, free of suffering and death, has characterized all human societies, the notion of a perfect social order, posited over and against the chaos and mutability of human history, is more intimately related to what Max Weber defined as those universal problems of meaning addressed by theodicies: that is, the promise of salvational religions to overcome the inherent finiteness of human existence, the problems posed by the discrepancy between fate and merit, and the perfection of the transcendent order in contradistinction to the imperfection of reality. The positing of a harmonious social order characterized by the full satisfaction of human wants, peace, equality, and the absence of discretionary authority—which has been identified with different strands of utopian and messianic thought—is thus rooted in the selfsame dynamic that gave rise to salvational religions. There thus would seem to be some innate connection between millennial speculation as a mode of thought and social action and the vision of salvation held out by the different world-historical religions.

The Western tradition of millennial thought and action was rooted in both early Hellenistic images of the perfect city or a perfect past, as illustrated in Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, and in the particular religious visions of both Judaism and early Christianity, with their stress on an otherworldly future, an Endzeit of absolute perfection still to be experienced. To these must be added the speculation of the early Church Fathers and Christian philosophers on the prelapsarian state of nature. The early Christian communities, of course, lived in an intense expectation of the Second Coming and the End of Days, which, until the third and fourth centuries, retained their “this-worldly” character. The linear temporality of Christianity in positing an end to historical time, posited also the ultimate reunion of historical and sacred dimensions of time through its eschatological notions. This perspective, bearing as it does on the millennial element of Christian belief, was, however, through its very nature, a centrifugal, antinomian force, working against the concrete needs of institution building as perceived by many of the early Church fathers, in both the ante-Nicene and post-Nicene periods. Indeed, this centrifugal tendency was manifest in the reigns of Constantine and Theodosius, when an apocalyptic separatism led many groups of Christians beyond the boundaries of a Church tainted by its compromise with secular authority. Its potentially disruptive force was fought by none as strongly as St. Augustine, who in his writings, especially in *City of God* and the *Confessions*, laid out a different temporal schema, which, while maintaining the linear structure of sacred time, removed its end from any possible embedment in the mundane sphere of secular historical processes. In its stead, he posited the “ends of time” beyond time proper and beyond

history, thus separating salvation from society and history from eschatology. In temporal terms, the separation of the *civitas terrena* and *civitas Dei* effected an ultimate disjunction of sacred and mundane times and “histories,” by declaring events in the *saeculum* irrelevant to the schema of salvation.

The disembedding of sacred time, and so of the eschatological moment from mundane historical referents, dictated, however, the necessity of positing a new realm where people and especially Christians could orient their lives to the fount of the sacred. On the most general level, this was achieved through the ministrations of the Church. More concretely, the realization of salvation was achieved in the sacraments, which provided that arena in which the communicant could establish contact with the sacred dimension of existence. The sacraments thus became that arena where sacred and profane met and salvation was attained, in contrast to its previously imminent perceived realization at the end of historical time.

Such a “solution” to the eschatological orientations of Christian belief was, of course, incomplete, and many alternative visions appeared over the millennia of Christian history, from lay reform movements such as the *Devotio Moderna*, to Neoplatonic mysticism, to the folk traditions of the Land of Cockaigne and the rituals of carnival. The most salient expression of alternative visions was in the different millennial movements of the Middle Ages, which broke at the same time with the sacramental doctrines of the Catholic Church and with its institutional structures. By propounding a this-worldly millennialism, one seen to take place within mundane history, they effectively broke down the institutional constraints that had, within the Catholic Church, bounded millennialism to otherworldly interpretations and pursuits. Thus, in many medieval millennial movements, such as the Waldensians and later the Taborites, there developed, concurrently with a break with the sacramental doctrine of the Church, the positing of new boundaries of collective membership, that is, of the salvational collective, as well as new principles and structures of authority.

The early modern period—that covered by these four volumes—experienced an outburst of millennial expectations and millennial-inspired action across Europe. And while much has been written on the Protestant aspects of this millennial outburst, these collected volumes illustrate just how endemic millennial speculation was, not only among the different Protestant sects but also among Catholics and Jews as well. The themes of the volumes run from *Jewish Messianism in the Early Modern World* (Vol. 1), to *Catholic Millenarianism from Savonarola to the Abbe Gregoire* (Vol. 2), to *The Millenarian Turn: Millenarian Contexts of Science, Politics and Everyday Anglo-American Life in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Vol. 3) to *Continental Millenarians: Protestants, Catholics, Heretics* (Vol. 4). All the chapters were presented as papers at a series of conferences organized by Richard Popkin. Popkin is perhaps best known in the scholarly world for his *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes*, which was first published in 1964 and attained the status of a classic. For the last twenty years or so, however, he has concentrated most of his efforts on the study of millennial groups and thinkers, contributing significantly to the vast scholarly literature devoted to this subject. The current volumes include chapters by some of the best-known scholars working in the history of millennial thought, dealing with personages and themes both known and more esoteric. The vast majority of the contributions are of historical focus and deal with either small groups of virtuosos or exceptional thinkers within the different religious communities. Much less attention is paid to sociological factors, to issues of group dynamics, and to the broader societal implications of millennial speculation in the periods under consideration. One has

the sense that the conferences were very much of historians and scholars working in the field of the history of ideas and much less with the intersection of these ideas with broader social processes (such as the emigration to New England in the 1630s, for example).

There are exceptions to this characterization, most often in the first volume, dealing with Jewish millennial speculation. Fascinating in this volume is the focus not only on intra-Jewish debates, but on the relation of Jewish millennial speculation with Christian developments. Different groups of Sabbatian thinkers are discussed in different chapters, but so are the millennial traditions of certain “converso” groups. Quite a few of the chapters deal with individuals who, in one way or another, bridged the Jewish and Christian worlds—either Christians following Jewish messianic speculation or Jewish converts to Christianity engaged in calculating the Second Coming of Christ. Richard Popkin’s own chapter on “Christian Interest and Concerns about Sabbatai Zevi” forms a lynchpin of those essays dealing with joint Christian-Jewish speculation on the immanence of the millennium.

The second volume, on Catholic millenarianism, is, perhaps not surprisingly, the shortest. It opens with a masterful essay by Bernard McGinn, one of the leading scholars of millennialism, giving an overview of Catholic millennial speculation—arguably the least studied of the millennial phenomenon (for reasons made clear in the beginning of this review). This is followed by another intriguing essay by Popkin on Savonarola’s thought, which in fact connects Savonarola’s millennial speculations to his critique of philosophy. In this volume, too, the Jewish-Christian nexus of millennial thought plays a strong role, not least in the case of the French revolutionary priest Abbé Gregoire, for whom the emancipation of the Jews was part of a millennial scenario.

The third volume deals with more generally familiar themes in millennial studies: the thought of Joseph Mede, Issac Newton, Robert Boyle, Joseph Priestly, and others, and the millennial rhetoric and tropes of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain. As in the other volumes, the emphasis is on relatively circumscribed case studies of historical figures, rather than on a political or sociological analysis of broad social movements.

The final volume returns from the Anglo-American context to millennial speculation on the Continent, with essays on Dutch millenarianism; studies of the Frenchmen Issac Le Peyrere, Pierre Jurieu, and Pierre Bayle; of German Pietism, Rosicrucianism, and of the fascinating link between Arian and millennial heresies. A major figure in the latter was Miguel Servetus, who—as readers of Popkin’s early work know—was burned as a heretic in Calvin’s Geneva and for whom Sebastian Castellio offered a spirited defense predicated on a skeptical consciousness, that the very nature of a *Deus absconditus* makes it impossible to go so far as to burn someone as a heretic since we cannot, ultimately, be certain of our own knowledge.

The chapters are all written for cognoscenti; they are not introductory texts, nor do they provide sufficient context for those not already knowledgeable about the issues studied. However, for those students and scholars already committed to the study of millennial voices, these volumes will open new vistas. Perhaps their most important contribution, which is much inspired by Popkin’s own work, is in the study of those individuals and groups who bridged religious communities and social universes. Indeed, with the focus in so many chapters on the shared cognitive universe of millennial speculation (across religious boundaries), an important new dimension is opened in our understanding of early modern mentalities, at least among a fascinating and interconnected group of global (or at least trans-Atlantic and inter-European) elites.

Environmentalism Unbound: Exploring New Pathways for Change By Robert Gottlieb. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001. 408p. \$29.95.

David Schlosberg, *Northern Arizona University*

The key argument of Robert Gottlieb's *Environmentalism Unbound* is that an integrated focus on pollution prevention and environmental justice can lay the groundwork for fundamental environmental and social change (p. xiii). The aim is to develop a common vision and a more "embracing language" for environmentalism that is more broadly appealing than a mainstream focus on nature and species and more broadly applicable to a range of environmental and social issues. Such an expanded environmental discourse—integrating the workplace, the social, and the ecological—would make for an unbounded and more successful environmentalism. This is another wonderful offering by Gottlieb, right up there with his *Forcing the Spring* (1993). The recognition of diverse discourses of environmentalism and social justice is a challenge to movement strategies, and Gottlieb takes on the issue with a focus on both a broad vision and everyday practice.

The opening chapters, laying out the historical boundaries of the environmental movement and the possibilities of moving beyond those boundaries with reference to pollution prevention and environmental justice, provide a thorough and well-argued framework for the cases that follow. Gottlieb's examination of the development of the environmental justice movement goes beyond the standard fare. He delves into the internal politics and definitional conflicts in the movement, and focuses on issues such as land use, brownfields redevelopment, and transportation. And in attempting to forge a larger discursive community across different parts of the environmental movement, Gottlieb demonstrates how a mainstream concern with air quality, for example, can also be articulated from the point of view of environmental justice by focusing on diesel fumes, children's health, and the transit needs of poorer communities. Such expanded discourse, he argues, can lead to a more inclusive and challenging environmentalism.

"Clean production" is the place where pollution prevention and environmental justice can come together, and Gottlieb looks at three industries—dry cleaning, janitorial, and food production/distribution—with an eye toward his proposed common vision. One key question for Gottlieb is how to overcome the worker/community divide. In response, his case studies attempt to get at community support for a change in environmental practice, for example, Korean community development agencies' support for the transition to less toxic dry-cleaning processes. But while the stories and descriptions of the case studies are thorough in and of themselves, Gottlieb is not always successful in his aim of thoroughly tying together the discourses of pollution prevention and environmental justice. In the dry-cleaning example Gottlieb offers an excellent discussion of how industry and regulatory agencies are slow to come around to a viable, front-end alternative to the toxic emissions of the conventional dry-cleaning process and gives insight into the problematic regulatory process with regard to chemicals (a focus on the tail end rather than prevention and the bias toward industry-sponsored and -supported initiatives). While Gottlieb then demonstrates the possible role of community organizations in convincing cleaners to retool with nontoxic processes, the broader link to the discourse of environmental justice is weak. More discussion of the principles of environmental justice, including, for example, demands for the cessation of the production of toxins and the right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment, would have helped strengthen the pollution prevention/environmental justice link. In the case study of janitorial

work and workers, the discussion is, again, comprehensive, well researched, and thoroughly documented, but there is not much of a link made—or a "common vision" laid out—across the various issues and discourses brought up in the chapter. Gottlieb wants us to see how the disparate discourses existing around environmental issues, labor conditions, and community-based job creation can be brought into a broad and linked environmental social movement. While the vision is clear, the case studies seem to prove the difficulty more than the promise of such a move.

That is, until Gottlieb gets into two chapters on the politics of food production. The links among community needs, pollution prevention, and environmental justice are much more directly and clearly made here. Pesticide concerns are linked to nonpoint pollution, which is linked to farmworker health, which is linked to sustainable agriculture, and all relate to both health and elimination of hunger. The reaction to the USDA proposed rules on organics is a wonderful example of an issue where the potential for broad coalitions has been awakened. In response to Agriculture's attempt to certify the use of sewage sludge, genetic engineering, and food irradiation as "organic," organic farmers and consumers teamed up with environmental advocates and pesticide critics (among others) who had been arguing for sustainable food production. Again, the food chapters are wonderfully rich and well documented, with not just coverage of the last 30 years of the organic agriculture movement, but discussion of depression-era relief gardens, wartime victory gardens, community gardens, school gardens, market gardens, and farmers markets. In addition to this thorough approach, Gottlieb here demonstrates the potential discursive links among different audiences concerned with the current food production regime. One only has to be a regular visitor to a farmers market (a description of which opens the book) to understand the potential "embracing language" that sustainably produced food can have. Farmers markets link urban justice to sustainability through an alternative mode of food distribution and encompass a response to a variety of environmental, social, labor, and market issues (and are also attractive across the political spectrum).

But even here, the notion of a unified, yet unbound, environmentalism is incomplete. While links are made discursively, and food issues may bring together members of diverse discursive communities, no social coalition has been formed that encompasses all of the food issues Gottlieb addresses. There are numerous groups and efforts surrounding a critique of the current food regime, but as Gottlieb notes, the effect is still less than the sum of its parts (p. 271).

Gottlieb identifies the project of *Environmentalism Unbound* as an outline of the possibilities for reenvisioning institutions and systems, including challenges to structures of power that maintain current systems and discourses; his case studies offer "snapshots of these possibilities for reenvisioning" (p. 275). But in offering a visionary, yet pragmatic, discussion of the emerging discourse and obstacles faced, Gottlieb is still not convincing that disparate parts of a movement—its various concerns and values—can be brought into a *single* discursive project, which was the hope at the start. Environmentalism's biggest challenge, he concludes, is in providing a singular "totalizing vision" (in Hilary Wainwright's terms). Maybe that focus on a single vision is itself the problem, however. An environmentalism unbound may be a collection of visions with multiple points of linkage, which comes together on particular issues yet eschews the singularity of one common vision. That type of environmentalism is in evidence in numerous recent protests regarding globalization, and certainly abounds in the farmers markets Gottlieb celebrates.

De-Facing Power By Clarissa Rile Hayward. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 224p. \$54.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

P. E. Digeser, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

Clarissa Rile Hayward's book begins with the provocative claim that focusing on the relationship between the powerful and the powerless is not the best way to study power. Traditional theories of power have concentrated on the question of what it means for A to have power over B. By seeking to discern who possesses it and how their possession diminishes the freedom of others, researchers have tended to put a face on power. In contrast, Hayward "de-faces" power by arguing that it need not entail a relationship between A's and B's but can be understood entirely in terms of how the field of action of both the powerful and the powerless is defined.

Drawing on the poststructural work of Michel Foucault, Hayward advocates seeing power as a set of social boundaries that can both constrain and enable action. These boundaries include laws, rules, norms, conventions, practices, and institutional arrangements. They create a space for action, define what constitutes knowledge, establish the urgency of problems, legitimize the forms of discipline, and generate a set of identities. Like Foucault, Hayward argues that we can never escape such power relations. However, unlike Foucault, Hayward emphasizes the fact that we are differently situated vis-à-vis these boundaries and that these differences have an ethical import. Some of us have the resources and the opportunities to reflect upon and seek to transform the norms that govern our conduct and some do not.

By drawing on the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas, Hayward endorses the normative claim that those who are affected by a rule or practice should have a say in its creation. The capacity to shape and not escape the boundaries that define our fields of action is what Hayward calls political freedom. Those who lack the resources to rethink and reformulate the norms that govern their lives lack political freedom and suffer from domination. Domination, however, is not a matter of A's pushing around B's (although this certainly occurs) but entails the existence of asymmetries in political freedom. In emphasizing the ways in which power affects all parties, Hayward argues that there is no space for negative freedom if such freedom means acting outside social constraints. Hayward wants to deface (as in disfigure) the traditional portraits of power that emphasize a relationship between the powerful and the powerless and a realm of negative freedom that exists beyond power.

The beginning and end of the book engage in some quite refined theoretical work, while the middle chapters illustrate the research implications of defacing power by offering two case studies in education. Using the method of participant observation, Hayward seeks to explore (as opposed to explain) the ways in which power operates in two very different fourth-grade classrooms. One is in a very affluent suburb and the other is in a poor, inner-city district. By understanding power as "a network of boundaries that delimit, for all, the field of what is socially possible" (p. 3), Hayward uses these case studies to show how power constrains *and* enables teachers and students in both classrooms.

Hayward is well aware of the limitations and advantages of her chosen approach. She presents her conclusions in a very measured form as trying to elicit some hypotheses about how constraints shape teaching. Hayward's analysis, however, would be strengthened by talking more about the advantages and disadvantages of using classrooms (as opposed to other arenas) and fourth graders (as opposed to older or younger students) for studying power. Hayward is also aware that her own democratic/participatory response to asymmetric

power relations entails norms that are neither natural nor universally shared. She acknowledges that these norms would "discourage a range of possible ways of ordering social life, including those supported by many religious and other traditional views" (p. 176). But the range of those excluded by Hayward's democratic alternative extends beyond the believers in divine commands and natural hierarchies. It also excludes the shy and the inarticulate. A universal call to politicize all social norms will appear burdensome, if not oppressive, to those who prefer a quiet private life to the hubbub of the political or those who seek to explore and exploit, as opposed to question and legitimize, the norms they have inherited. Whether Hayward's argument is open to these criticisms depends on how one understands political freedom. On the one hand, Hayward may be claiming that political freedom exists when the opportunity exists to call into question the norms that govern one's life, even if one decides not to act on that opportunity. Acting on one's political freedom need not be a norm for everyone, although the opportunity to act should be open to all. On the other hand, Hayward may be making the stronger claim that freedom can be found only in critically thinking about and collectively acting on our capacities to establish social norms. The opportunity to exercise political freedom is not sufficient and so those who prefer not to participate in norm formation are not free. On this reading, the position is open to the risk that, by forcing reticent people to participate, they can be forced to be free.

Hayward's discussion of defacing power is most successful in attacking visions of negative freedom that require complete independence of all norms and conventions, or what Richard Flathman calls unsituated negative freedom. Rejecting unsituated negative freedom, however, does not entail accepting political freedom as the only or the most important form of freedom. As Hayward notes, Flathman's situated negative freedom acknowledges the necessity of social norms and conventions. However, the project of defacing power would seem to leave situated negative freedom intact, and calling into question conventions, norms, and institutions could be an exercise of this form of negative freedom. Nevertheless, these comments regarding Hayward's discussion of freedom do not diminish the compelling nature of her analysis of contemporary disputes over power or of her exploration of defacing power. Hayward provides an important contribution to the problem of how to study the power of norms and institutional structures.

Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market: Beyond Commercial Modelling By Russell Keat. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 224p. \$69.95.

Peter Lindsay, *Georgia State University*

With respect to markets, the twentieth century closed with a great deal more ebullience than it opened. Not that 1900 was a watershed in antimarket thinking—that was still to come. No, the contrast between *finis de siècle* is striking because whatever criticisms markets had to endure during the final century of the millennium seemed to have all but vanished by its close.

The problem of our ebullience is that it renders any difficulties we may have with markets increasingly awkward to express. How, for instance, might those in academic, scientific, and cultural enterprises respond to being left to the iron hand of market discipline? What counts as a good reason *not* to conform to the same pressures as felt in the "real world"? If consumers will not support a given activity with dollar votes, then what possible defense, short of elitist pleas, can haute culture muster? These are precisely the sorts of difficult

questions addressed in Russell Keat's *Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market*. If anything, then, the book is timely. It is, fortunately, also quite good.

Keat's general claim is not that the market is bereft of appeal, but simply that there are "certain kinds of social activities and institutions which *are* appropriately governed by the market and others that are *not*" (p. 3). To illustrate the latter sort of activity/institution, Keat draws on Alisdair MacIntyre's conception of 'practices,' or (in MacIntyre's words) "socially established cooperative activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to . . . that form of activity" (p. 22). (Obvious examples are dance, chess, sports, and scientific research.) The claim here is that practices give expression to different sources of well-being than the market does. Hence societies that allow the market to, in Habermas' parlance, 'colonize' all social life (these practices, in particular) do so at their own peril.

Keat's account of the market's shortcomings is fairly familiar. First, he reminds us that at best the market only satisfies existing preferences (and often it does not even accomplish this), while doing little for "the kinds of critical or reflective processes upon which, ideally, individuals might wish to base their judgements of what is valuable to them" (p. 46). Second, he examines, and, in a chapter devoted to the issue, questions the extent to which consumption and well-being are positively correlated. Finally, he notes that many of the things we value (family, friends, commitments) have little bearing on the market.

Fortunately, where the market falls short, practices can, if preserved, provide relief. For instance, "people's ability to develop their own sense of what is valuable . . . will be enhanced by their access to cultural practices in which the tensions and conflicts between various conceptions of the good . . . are thematized and explored in both discursive and non-discursive forms" (p. 47). The key to this argument lies in the distinguishing feature of practices—namely, their rejection of "want-regarding" value in favor of "ideal-regarding" value. Practices have internally generated standards of excellence (such as the arc of a diver or the laboratory technique of a scientist) that are at least conceptually distinct from (although too often actually sullied by) the tastes of nonauthoritative consumers. As such, they offer intrinsic rewards ("internal goods") quite apart from whatever else (honor, pride, power, money) might come the way of the practitioner.

The problem, however, is that because such rewards are independent of a practice's ability to stay afloat financially, it can have only a contingent chance for success in a market-dominated society (i.e., in a society where rewards and financial return are indistinct). If forced to conform to market rules of survival, many practices would simply cease to exist. Moreover, because such a society would view success through a market framework, any pleas to spare the practice would likely fall on deaf ears. The task, as Keat sees it, is thus to promote spaces for practices, either as supplements to markets or through the infusion into markets of the "practice-like characteristic of productive activities" (Chapter 6).

The strength of Keat's argument is derived largely from his success at articulating the appeal of practices (for both producers *and* consumers). To the already converted, such articulation offers reassuring confirmation of what might be only intuitively understood. To the rest, it serves a more vital role of helping to broaden the support base for practices.

As we have seen, however, articulating appeal will not take either camp past the lament, "Yeah, sounds great, too bad the market won't support it." Hence, Keat needs also to show why practices are not just a desirable, but a *just* supplement

to the market, a task he saves for the final chapter. The argument there turns on the distinction between ends and means. The virtue of markets, according to their nonlibertarian "classical" defenders, lies in their ability to generate "the kinds of human goods that contribute to people's material well-being." But, he goes on, "Suppose one can show that . . . the market does not always succeed in contributing maximally to everyone's well-being?" (p. 150). As he has shown precisely that throughout much of the book, he is able to conclude that the limits to the market can be established by the very arguments that offer it its greatest support. Thus the "bottom line" gives way to well-being, as the argument for market discipline is trumped by an argument of a higher calling. That the market cannot support a productive enterprise turns out to have little bearing on the more vital question of whether a good society *should* support it.

The argument has great force, in large part because Keat presents it with clear and coherent language. There are, however, a few problems here that should not go unmentioned, problems owing to the fact that this is not so much a book as a collection of essays on a theme. As such, and because Keat has made little effort to adapt the essays into a single cohesive argument, much gets repeated. (Twice we read MacIntyre's verbatim definition of practices [pp. 22, 82], as we do his verbatim definition of institutions [pp. 24, 122–23].) In and of itself, repetition is not always such a bad thing, but where it adds little in the way of clarity, it serves only as a needless annoyance.

The more pronounced difficulty with the essays-on-a-theme approach involves the layering-on of supportive but ultimately distracting arguments. Many of the chapters offer refinements of a number of other theorists, among them Mark Sagoff (Chapter 3), Michael Walzer (Chapter 4), and Robert Lane (Chapter 7). I say refinements because, with all his interlocutors, Keat is in general sympathy, looking only to offer fairly subtle critiques and distinctions. The trouble is that much of the force of his overall argument can too easily get lost in what sometimes amounts to little more than nitpicking.

Such problems are unfortunate, but they should not obscure the value of Keat's contribution. His plea for perspective on markets offers a much needed reminder of arguments that—to continue the earlier historical comparison—have not had great currency since the days of T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse, and R. H. Tawney. It is especially refreshing to see these arguments reintroduced in the social and intellectual context of a very different time.

Faith, Reason, and Political Life Today Edited by Peter Augustine Lawler and Dale McConkey. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 272p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.00 paper.

Lief H. Carter, *Colorado College*

These 14 essays range as far and wide as the sprawling title of this collection implies. The papers originated at a 1999 interdisciplinary conference at Berry College on politics, religion, and community. Most of the authors teach at Southern colleges. They come not only from political science and government departments but also from philosophy, English, sociology, religion, and theology departments. Twelve of the 14 are male. On first glance the collection might appear to be "traditional." Indeed, many of the essays, e.g., Daniel Mahoney's treatment of Solzhenitsyn on "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations," explicitly raise religious themes and questions.

However, as the editors freely admit in the introduction, these essays are diverse and comprehensive rather than thematically tight. They are not traditional. The postmodern condition, which frees us from the obligation to honor ruling

disciplinary canons, allows these authors to write about whatever strikes their fancies. Michelle Brady writes of "Autonomy and Community in Aristotle," while James Pontuso writes about Trevanian's "Perfect Postmodern Tale," the 1979 novel *Shibumi*. Paul Cantor's essay (see below) includes this line: "Who know what happens when you tickle a Klingon?" (p. 30). This fancy-driven diversity makes the collection a surprisingly good read.

An excerpt, chosen almost at random, from the index suggests the scope of this book's diversity. In the middle of the "Gs" we find in order, with no omissions, these six entries: *Gilligan's Island*; Girard, Rene; God; Goethe; Goldberg, Whoopie; Gore, Al. (God gets by far the most page references here, but the index as a whole gives roughly as many references to Hegel and to Heidegger as it does to Christianity and to Augustine.) The editors' arrangement of the essays also belies any unifying theme. The book might have sequenced together essays by Gregory Johnson and Henry Edmondson III featuring Flannery O'Connor or placed together essays by Paul Cantor and Diana Schaub, both of which draw on political themes in *Star Trek*. But the first 10 of the 14 essays appear to be listed alphabetically by author. Johnson and Cantor belong in the first 10, while Edmondson and Schaub appear, out of alphabetical order, among the final four.

While no single subject matter unifies these essays, a plurality of them explicitly takes up the "end of history" theme. In doing so they raise nice questions about the shape of global governance mechanisms. Indeed, normative and religious questions, according to these authors, inevitably arise because popular democracy is clearly not itself a viable model for global governance. Joseph Knippenberg's essay on Leo Strauss and the end of history raises these questions most directly. A second, and perhaps counterintuitive, theme is that many of these authors embrace postmodernism. Editor Peter Lawler's "End of History 2000" touches on themes raised more fully in his recent book, *Postmodernism Rightly Understood* (1999). Both Lawler, who links Thomism and postmodernism, and Pontuso's working of *Shibumi* give Rorty his full and fair due. Ashley Woodiwiss writes of "A Postmodern Augustinian Recovery of Political Judgment." Marc Guerra analyzes "Christianity's Epicurean Temptation."

A few essays get overly dense. Tom Darby's "On Spiritual Crisis, Globalization, and Planetary Rule" tries to answer the question, "So who has the right to rule the planet?" (p. 60). His answer tries to link Alexandre Kojève, Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, and Martin Heidegger, not to mention Bacon, Nietzsche, Aristotle, and Christ. In doing so he puts too many academic balls in the air to juggle successfully. Most of the time, however, the writing and editing are remarkably concise. They display little tendentiousness. Mining this book almost at random can extract many nuggets. For this reviewer, most of the nuggets consisted of discovering new minds: Kojève and Trevanian, already mentioned, and Paul Seaton's discussion of the work of Pierre Manent. Just within the last year, I discovered Rene Girard and, thus, particularly appreciated Stephen Gardner's "Tocqueville, Girard, and the Mystique of Anti-Modernism." Readers who don't know Flannery O'Connor's short story "Revelation" may find Johnson's juxtaposition of this Southern "Christian" with Walker Percy's analysis of stoicism in Southern culture especially satisfying.

Beyond the specific nuggets, this collection yields at least three less tangible satisfactions. First, these essayists, like most of the rest of us most of the time, are not academic superstars. We do not have here the academic equivalent of a West End theatrical triumph. These essays instead give the satisfaction of seeing your hometown theater company tackle a series of major plays, doing the material inventively and

doing themselves proud in the process. Second, whether or not these authors are relatively young, the collection does describe interesting new directions that liberated and pluralistic scholarship can take. Finally, for those of us of a certain age who find it harder to communicate political wisdom to students who are increasingly disengaged, cynical, and/or merely "local" rather than "cosmopolitan," it helps to learn some new teaching materials from the more playful and fanciful of these essays. I think I'll try Diana Schaub's "Captain Kirk and the Art of Rule" on some undergraduates this year.

Individual essays in the collection may resonate deeply with readers' own academic projects, but for most of us this is more a browsing book for professors than a collection to assign en masse to a graduate seminar. There are many good reads here. Indeed some of them may read better precisely because they help us sharpen our own positions in contrast to those of the authors.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: The Ascent from Ideology By Daniel J. Mahoney. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 200p. \$65.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Peter Augustine Lawler, *Berry College*

This very remarkable and most timely book differs from others on Solzhenitsyn by highlighting his "critique of ideology" and his "recovery of the 'natural world'" (p. 3). Ideology, for Solzhenitsyn, is the name for the lie characteristic of the twentieth century: Human beings, through historical transformation, can end suffering and so make virtue or the distinction between good and evil superfluous. The state and God can wither away because we will no longer be political and spiritual beings. We know that ideology could not change human nature or what Daniel Mahoney calls "the ontological structure of the world," but it could magnify human evil to genuinely monstrous dimensions. Solzhenitsyn's contention that communist ideology was responsible for the murder of tens of millions has become much less controversial in recent years. *The Black Book of Communism*, Mahoney shows, provides abundant evidence for what Solzhenitsyn already knew.

Solzhenitsyn presents numerous examples of courageous, personal resistance to the lie of ideology as evidence that the natural world exists. The natural or real world of human beings is where conscience cannot be exterminated, where we cannot help but distinguish between good and evil. The truth is, Solzhenitsyn said, that human beings are born to die, and so they are not meant only to be happy. They cannot live well unless they have a clear and calm view of death, and they must be willing to risk their lives to live responsibly in light of the truth. The Marxist has never been able to explain why at history's end we will be simply happy if death itself does not wither away and we remain conscious of all that is implied in our individuality. For Solzhenitsyn, the idea of the end of history in all its forms is a self-deceptive lullaby that turns us away from the ineradicable necessity of personal responsibility. The recovery of the natural world through reflection on the "point of view" at the foundation of the dissident experience may well be *the* antidote to the progressivist or historical imagination.

Mahoney makes the jarring but brilliant and perfectly true observation that Solzhenitsyn is a postmodern foundationalist. He is a stern critic of the laziness and moral weakness or relativism of postmodernism as it is usually understood. But if postmodernism is really a reflection on the failure of the modern project to conquer human nature, then Solzhenitsyn is a proponent of postmodernism rightly understood. At the end of his famous Harvard Address, he contends that medieval thought was distorted because it was excessively spiritual;

it slighted the fact that human beings have bodies. Modern thought was distorted because it tried to understand human beings as simply bodies. It denied the fact that they have souls or a spiritual life. Postmodern thought—given the experience of medieval and modern excesses—can be based on a realistic assessment of the places of both the material and spiritual dimensions of human existence. Postmodern thought is the foundation of a world fit for human beings, not angles or pigs.

The idea that the dissident reflection might actually be the foundation for the reconstruction of social and political life based on a balanced view of the truth about human nature Mahoney rightly criticizes as somewhat utopian. But it is also the basis for Solzhenitsyn's most realistic proposals for political reform, including the reinvigoration of local self-government as the starting point for civic consciousness and his promotion of a form of Russian national patriotism that is far from imperialism. The being who is neither mind nor body needs political pride tempered by religious repentance; human beings must both assert themselves and limit themselves to fulfill what is best about their natures. Solzhenitsyn opposes most vehemently the characteristically modern resistance to the idea of human limitations. The truth is that we are not self-made; we must acknowledge a natural and divine order which we have been given and to which we are somehow responsible. We must acknowledge that what we have been given, even death, is good for us. But Solzhenitsyn also provides examples of towering political excellence, of the fact that not all human pride is vanity. The best of these, Mahoney meticulously explains in his central chapter, is the unjustly neglected Russian statesman Pyotor Arkadievich Stolypin.

Solzhenitsyn, with his belief in natural conscience and the virtue of repentance, is undeniably a Christian. Mahoney notices that he was not always one. He converted to Russian Orthodoxy because he discovered through his natural powers and dissident experiences that Christian anthropology—its account of man—is true. But he is a curiously moderate or political sort of Christian. At one point, Mahoney claims that Solzhenitsyn “combines Pascalian ‘existentialism’ and classical realism” (p. 33), which means that he is partly Augustinian and partly Aristotelian. That claim is meant to correct the characteristic excesses of the best interpreters of Solzhenitsyn prior to Mahoney. Some of them say he is an Aristotelian (Delba Winthrop and James Pontuso) and others an Augustinian (Robert Kraynak and Edward Ericson). But Augustinians, for Solzhenitsyn, disparage excessively the goods of the natural world; they exaggerate human misery and impotence. The Aristotelians exaggerate the completeness and self-sufficiency of the political and philosophical lives; the political philosopher does not account for all the longings and inevitable shortcomings of the whole human person.

The natural world is good because it is *both* moral and truthful, but it is not good enough for us to be completely satisfied by the goods it offers us. Our reflection on the good that is a human being culminates in mystery, and so a genuinely thoughtful person engages in dissident resistance against theoretical and practical efforts to abolish that mystery or make us totally at home in the world. The Solzhenitsyn-inspired dissident Mahoney even rebels against Leo Strauss's tendency to reduce morality to merely a tool for philosophers. Even the philosopher is not exempt from the moral responsibility that living in the truth gives us all.

Another way Mahoney expresses Solzhenitsyn's moderation is by saying that there is a dialectic between magnanimity and humility in his thought. The idea of dialectic suggests that the Christian and Aristotelian components of

Solzhenitsyn's thought are not merely mixed. Not only do the points of view of magnanimity and humility each reflect only part of the truth about human nature, they also fit together into some kind of whole, the whole that is the natural world and natural conscience. That would make Solzhenitsyn's “postmodern, post-totalitarian foundationalism” (p. 46) at least something like Thomism. Mahoney never does call Solzhenitsyn a Thomist, but he does say that the “natural goods” Solzhenitsyn defends “clearly point beyond themselves and are compatible with the truth of faith” (p. 102). Mahoney's exceptionally penetrating, wonderfully judicious, and always accessible analysis is on the cutting edge of thought today.

The Free and Open Press: The Founding of American Democratic Press Liberty, 1640–1800 By Robert W. T. Martin. New York: New York University Press, 2001. 288p. \$40.00.

Mark A. Graber, *University of Maryland*

The Free and Open Press is an exceptionally satisfying first book. Robert W. T. Martin revitalizes a debate over the status of press rights in eighteenth-century America that had grown tiresome over the past 20 years. Challenging Leonard Levy, his critics, and the ongoing republic/liberalism divide in American political thought, Martin's work offers an interpretation of free speech thought that explains why early Americans sometimes fought for and sometimes fought against press rights. Though Martin claims too much for his thesis at times, all scholars of American political thought and constitutional development should read his book.

When Americans during the eighteenth century spoke of a free and open press, Martin claims, they mingled two distinct concepts: a free press and an open press. The free press was a vehicle for exposing government tyranny. The open press provided all people with an avenue to express their political and social beliefs. These two concepts were conflated in colonial America, Martin notes, because proponents of press rights thought a press open to all was the best means of preventing government tyranny. During the Revolution and last decade of the eighteenth century, prominent Americans separated the two rationales. Whig advocates of the Revolution and Democratic-Republicans claimed that an open press was a kept press, biased toward the status quo and royal power. Jeffersonians during the 1790s regarded an open press as unnecessary, given the existence of multiple papers in most areas. Much of the debate surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts, Martin observes, stemmed from political reactions to an emerging partisan press. Federalists feared a press that might weaken confidence in republican institutions. Jeffersonians championed a republican press that kept a close watch for government tyranny. Jeffersonians won the battle and lost the war. The Alien and Sedition Acts expired to the relief of all. The partisan press thrived throughout the nineteenth century. The modern theories of democracy that gave birth to the partisan press, however, would not be revived until the twentieth century.

Martin deserves particular credit for uncovering the important debates over an open press that structured much free speech debate during the eighteenth century. He presents much evidence demonstrating that for most Americans before the Revolution, a free press was a press that was open to all persons. Printing was a public calling, much as medicine or keeping a tavern. “Printers are educated in the Belief,” Benjamin Franklin declares in the pages of *The Free and Open Press*, “that when Men differ in Opinion, both sides ought equally to have the Advantage of being heard by the Publick” (p. 55). Other printers similarly claimed that ownership of a

press gave them no right to determine the ideological content of what they printed.

This vision of an impartial press was undermined during the late eighteenth century. Many Americans during the Revolution believed that the press had a special obligation to scrutinize government. A partisan press, they believed, prevented government officials and their supporters from dominating public debate. Numerous journalists claimed that their obligation to print only reasonable pieces required them to take sides in controversial debates. One Revolutionary printer noted that no good arguments existed against independence from Great Britain (p. 86).

Eighteenth-century Americans did not distinguish the free press from the open press in quite the way presented by *The Free and Open Press*. Martin sees the free press as a republican instrument for retaining community control of the government, and an open press as a liberal instrument enabling persons to exercise their right to political advocacy. Arguments might be made for the reverse conclusions. The free press was a liberal instrument allowing those who owned presses to determine the use of their property. An open press was a republican instrument ensuring public exposure to ideas on both sides of political struggles. The best synthesis is that both free press and open press notions contained liberal and republican elements, and Martin is sympathetic to this general point. His work consistently observes that press thought in general has both liberal and republican dimensions, that distinguishing the two is a parlor game scholars are best off abandoning.

The Free and Open Press is a remarkably good book by any standard. The prose is clear, the jargon limited. Martin has done a fabulous job of reading the primary sources and integrating the secondary sources. He recognizes that constitutional history exists outside of courts, that the liberty of the press is more often defined by what is published than by what judges say at any given time. Martin has a wonderful story to tell and does not ruin his tale by consistently stopping to tell us that he is right while other distinguished minds are wrong. The conclusion highlights how the controversy over the free and open press is repeated at present in debates over whether the marketplace of ideas can be trusted to produce truth. Although Martin is not interested in theories of constitutional interpretation, his findings have important implications for free speech law. *The Free and Open Press* suggests that at the time the First Amendment was framed, the liberty of the press was the right to publish one's sentiments in a press, not the right of the person who owned the press to exclude reasonable commentary. The discarded fairness rule, in this view, was the original constitutional understanding. One wonders what Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas might make of these findings.

The Ethics of Nationalism By Margaret Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 272p. \$45.00.

Chandran Kukathas, *University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy*

This fine study purports to offer "a normative theory of nationalism." Such a theory is needed, the author claims, because most of the literature on the ethics of secession proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the normative problem of state breakup is best addressed by applying established liberal arguments or values to the issue at hand. In fact, however, it makes little sense to derive a theory of secession in this way, rather than by considering directly the kinds of normative claims secessionists make. These are nationalist claims. We need, moreover, to recognize that well-

known accounts of nationalism, such as those offered by Ernest Gellner, for whom nationalism is a political principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent, are inadequate—either because they include too much, or because, as in the case of Gellner (*Nations and Nationalism*, 1983), they associate it with a particular set of demands or principles. Nationalism, according to Margaret Moore, should be understood as "a normative argument that confers moral value on national membership, and on the past and future existence of the nation, and identifies the nation with a particular homeland or part of the globe" (p. 5). Once we have understood this, we will be in a better position to understand the key policies and demands of nationalists, including their occasional (and only occasional) demands for national self-determination, and to understand the normative limits of nationalism. And we will then be in a better position to understand the nature, and defensibility, of national self-determination, and of secession in particular.

The argument developed in this carefully constructed work is, ultimately, a defense of the institutional recognition of national identities. Moore's contention is that nations are moral communities characterized by bonds of solidarity and mutual trust, and that the attachment people feel to such communities is good reason to recognize national identity. But this requires a shift away from seeing nations as grounded in culture (as suggested by liberal nationalists, such as Yael Tamir, Joseph Raz, and Will Kymlicka)—for national identity should not be confounded with a common culture. Nationalists are concerned with preserving political communities, through the protection of jurisdiction, but this does not mean that they seek to preserve their cultures. This requires not the congruence of nation and state, but states that enable nationalist aspirations to be fulfilled—in part at least because they enable communities of identity to flourish. What is required is a state in which the different communities that comprise it cooperate with, rather than seek to control, one another. Equally required is the development of national and international institutions to uphold rights of self-determination. But, crucially, these would have to be institutions that upheld not so much particular norms of justice by which self-determination would be permitted, as procedure by which the legitimacy of a national community could be settled. The right to self-determination depends not upon the national community having the right values but upon its having its own identity—and one it seeks to preserve.

This is an argument of considerable merit, offered in a work that is as philosophically subtle as it is historically and politically well informed. The author engages with many of the major modern contributors to the literature on nationalism and secession, from David Miller (*On Nationality*, 1995) to Allen Buchanan (*Secession*, 1991), and offers criticism which is acute, and sometimes insightful—though always careful and fair.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that there is nothing in the book with which to take issue. One particular conclusion the author tries to defend that gives rise to a number of concerns is the constitutional right to self-determination. While attempting to strike a balance between institutional arrangements that make secession too easy and others that make it too difficult, Moore argues that a "constitutional right to self-determination, including a right to secession, is necessary because we do not want to trap minorities in states that they do not identify with or regard as legitimate" (p. 218). While this expresses what is surely a laudable principle (and one with which I have considerable sympathy), there is also the issue of the implications of such a principle for some states. Moore's contention is that not only would a right of secession clause in a state's constitution help guarantee

minority aspirations, but it would also offer the state “the best mechanism that [it] could employ to ensure the territorial integrity of the state” (p. 219).

Yet if we consider the case of Kashmir, a very different implication of a right to secession presents itself. Kashmir, as India’s only Muslim-majority state, is not only dominated by a vigorous and violent independence movement but is also claimed by Pakistan—which asserts precisely the principle of self-determination that Moore defends. The advantage for Pakistan of any attempt to establish the wishes of the Kashmiris is that Kashmir may not only leave India but also fall under Pakistan’s sphere of influence. (There is even a remote possibility of Kashmir’s irredentists succeeding in reuniting the province with Pakistan.) The disadvantage to India is not only the loss of territory, or even the encouragement this might give to secessionists in other regions, particularly in the Punjab, but the threat to civil peace within India. Indian Muslims would now be in an even smaller minority, and very possibly the targets of nationalist, anti-Muslim, resentment. At worst, this could mean a bloodbath. If so, the best solution might be one that made the claims of would-be secessionists more ambiguous or uncertain. Drawing clear lines demarcating rights in international law may make it more, rather than less, difficult to resolve complex matters by political accommodations.

To suggest this is not to argue that the principles Moore defends are wrong, only that a clarification of ethical principles may not imply that any particular institutional conclusions follow. Or that institutional reform is desirable. That said, however, it would only be fair to point out that such practical political issues are raised by Moore in a final chapter that is self-consciously “speculative.” While there is much to dispute or argue about in these pages, this is a mark of the author’s boldness, rather than an indicator of any sort of naïveté. Anyone coming for the first time to the issue of the morality of nationalism would do well to begin with this work. Scholars already working in the field will find it a valuable and challenging contribution to their discussions.

Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America By Andrew R. Murphy. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 337p. \$45.00.

Patrick Neal, *University of Vermont*

Political theorists interested in liberalism often fall into one of two quite different camps. There are those (call them the “analytic” school) who engage in arguments designed to justify or criticize various accounts of justice, legitimacy, and the like, and on the other hand, there are those (call them the “historical” school) who aim at providing a rich historical account of the processes through which such concepts developed in the modern age. Rawls and Dworkin as opposed to Pocock and Skinner, if you will. In my view, the most interesting and ultimately fruitful work in political theory is done by those who practice a mixture of the two approaches. Two prime examples would be Jeremy Waldron and Charles Taylor. Andrew Murphy’s first book is a highly interesting and very promising exemplar of this mixed approach. I have no doubt but that “pure” historians will question the novelty of his account of arguments over toleration in the seventeenth century, or that “pure” analysts will question the relevance of that account to the more analytical positions with regard to the contemporary concerns he stakes out in the latter portion of the book. But I found it to be one of the great strengths of his book that he does try to look at contemporary issues with an eye toward the historical context out of which they

emerged. I found my own understanding of contemporary normative arguments about toleration, religious freedom, and liberal public reason enriched and deepened by a reading of Murphy’s clear and lively account of the seventeenth-century arguments.

Murphy’s book is divided into two parts. The first, much longer, part is the historical account of arguments for and against religious toleration in three particular cases. They are Massachusetts Bay, Pennsylvania, and England from the Civil War through the Glorious Revolution. In the second, much briefer, part, Murphy calls into question a number of features of contemporary liberal theory, especially in the person of John Rawls, in light of the earlier historical account. He is highly critical of Rawls’s account of public reason in political liberalism, seeing it as more of a betrayal than an extension of the tradition of freedom of conscience begun in the seventeenth century. He is also skeptical of the idea that contemporary demands for equal recognition through the language of identity politics can be derived from or made compatible with the structure of the traditional liberal account of freedom of conscience. Without necessarily criticizing the appeals for equal recognition, Murphy usefully and persuasively shows that such appeals cannot be rightly seen as mere extensions of the right to conscience and toleration developed through the crucible of seventeenth-century politics. Indeed, as he shows, there is a deep analytical tension between the more or less negative quality of freedom from governmental coercion claimed by the traditional appeal to the right of religious conscience and the somewhat more positive notion of freedom presupposed in numerous contemporary calls for equal recognition and the affirmation of difference as such. I took Murphy’s argument to demonstrate once again the truth of Isaiah Berlin’s view that however much we may wish to believe that all good things are co-possible without loss, the truth is that liberty is not equality, and that sometimes they must conflict with one another.

In the historical sections of the book, Murphy emphasizes the way in which the practice of toleration gradually emerged as a consequence of particular historical events and pragmatic political choices (with sometimes unintended consequences) in various contexts. His aim is to undermine the idea that the rise of toleration as a practice manifested the unfolding of an ideal of liberalism that has reached its teleological culmination in our present era. Murphy’s account of the often ironic twists and turns of actual seventeenth-century controversies is designed to reveal the oversimplification of such a Whig interpretation of the history of liberalism. His account also brings out the intensely religious character of so much of the seventeenth-century debate over toleration on both sides of the issue, a fact that challenges the idea that the toleration debate was simply one between enlightened, secular liberals and regressive, conservative Christians. In the course of articulating his historical account, Murphy does a very good job of bringing out the considerable force of the antitolerationist arguments in these controversies. It is easy today to dismiss the antitolerationists in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and England as nothing more than irrational barriers in the way of progress, but Murphy persuades that concerns for basic order and about the politically destabilizing possibilities of religious dissent in the early modern age were no mere pretenses for the exercise of selfish state power. Thus, for example, he is able to acknowledge the courage and historical significance of Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson without having to make John Cotton and the other Massachusetts Bay leaders appear merely as cardboard villains.

It is common in the literature of political theory now to see toleration dismissed as “mere” toleration, and to see the pragmatic idea of a *modus vivendi* political arrangement

that secures peace among groups with different modes of life treated as the poor relation to a more elevated ideal of political consensus built upon either moral consensus (communitarianism) or at least an overlapping consensus of similar moralities/religions (Rawls's political liberalism). Murphy does not seek to debunk these higher ideals, but he does try to remind us that it is practically imprudent, not to say foolish, to denigrate toleration and *modus vivendi* politics for falling short of those ideals, not least because the very possibility of the ideals is built upon the practical foundation provided by them. I think Murphy is right to think that the emergence of toleration in the seventeenth century was not the nascent beginning of a necessary process whose glory is abundant today, but a contingent achievement of both good fortune and political skill, an inheritance that we are fortunate to have been bequeathed and which we would do well to take better care of.

Forms of Power By Gianfranco Poggi. Cambridge: Blackwell, 2001. 256p. \$66.95 cloth, \$28.95 paper.

Regina F. Titunik, *University of Hawaii at Hilo*

The main themes of this book are prefigured in Gianfranco Poggi's two significant earlier works on the rise and character of the modern state: *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction*, 1978, and *The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects*, 1990, (especially in the first chapter of the latter). In connection with his discussion of state formation, Poggi put forward the view that political power is one particular form of social power and is distinguished from other types of social power by its control of the means of violence. In the current work, Poggi undertakes the considerable task of explicating power in its various forms. He abstracts the concept of power from the historical context of his previous works and, with characteristic lucidity, details the various forms of social power and their interrelations.

Poggi distinguishes three forms of social power—political, ideological/normative, and economic. This tripartite division of social power recalls Max Weber's distinction of "class, status and party" and other similar conceptualizations of a trinity of power forms reflecting the physical, psychical, and material needs of human beings. Indeed, Poggi readily adopts this familiar and useful tripartite formulation and rests his particular distinctions on the kinds of resources that are controlled by power holders, that is, wealth, status, and rulership.

In the broadest sense, power, for Poggi, signifies the human ability to "make a difference" to the world (p. 3). Human beings necessarily transform external nature in order to sustain their existence (and are in turn transformed by the results of their activities). Social power is recognizable when this ability to make a difference is used "in order to control the ability to make a difference that another individual possesses *qua* human" (p. 9). Poggi examines the political, ideological/normative, and economic expressions of social power successively and considers the interactions between the latter two forms and political power. He also adds a concluding chapter on military power, which, though an aspect of political power, has become sufficiently distinct from other aspects of the political system to warrant separate consideration.

Political power, which represents the constant "point of reference" (p. 29) of the work, involves the threat of violence and the arousal of fear. This form of social power most starkly manifests the phenomenon of power insofar as the deepest human vulnerabilities are evoked and exploited—though, as was indicated by Thomas Hobbes (and is emphasized by Poggi), violence is threatened and fear "awakened" precisely in order to control violence and assuage fear.

It is through the exercise of political power, Poggi intriguingly observes, that the tension between equality and inequality becomes especially pronounced. All forms of social power, he thinks, necessarily embody a tension between basic human equality, on the one hand, and the asymmetries produced by power relationships, on the other. Social power, as indicated, involves making use of another human being's power to "make a difference." The power holder does not aim to extirpate or crush the human powers of the subordinate, but rather seeks to direct those powers to serve his or her own ends. Paradoxically, however, by endeavoring to control the other's uniquely human power to make a difference, the equal humanity of the other is implicitly recognized. One of the primary acts through which political power is deployed—communication of command—particularly exposes this paradox because the act of command relies on the equal humanity of the underling. The subordinate party is expected to *understand* (p. 32) the command. The act of command—albeit backed by the "or else" of force (p. 30)—presumes a basic commonality between the subordinate and superordinate parties, a commonality or equality that necessitates elaborate justifications of the inequalities sustained by political power. Economic power, by contrast, operates not by issuing commands; it directs action by using constraints in such a way that the individual, still pursuing his or her own designs, is compelled to follow one path rather than another and thus "advance the power holder's interests" (p. 123). In view of the evident difference between political and economic power, an argument has been made that there is really "no such thing as *economic* power proper" (p. 125). Consistent with his overriding idea that political power is only one form of social power, Poggi convincingly refutes this argument with the recurring view that access to and control of resources is decisive in identifying the exercise of power.

Since human beings "make a difference" and are artificers of their own conditions of existence, a profound insecurity about the ultimate foundations of existence necessarily arises. Wielders of ideological/normative power control the resources of ideas and meaning that assuage this human anxiety, but, not unlike in the case of political power, also arouse this insecurity in order to be in a position to continuously relieve it. Religious power is the prime manifestation of this kind of power that controls and dispenses longed-for meaning. Creative intellectuals also provide cognitive maps that make needed sense of the world. Both forms of ideological/normative power benefit political power when their apparent access to spiritual and ultimate forces is used to exalt the political realm and cover it with a kind of sublimity. Bearers of ideological/normative power, in turn, benefit from support and other resources provided by political powers. It is important to note, however, that while various forms of power enter into mutually beneficial relationships, no harmonious reconciliation of these forms of power, according to Poggi, takes place. Competition and struggle characterize their dynamic interrelations.

Max Weber and Thomas Hobbes represent the most notable intellectual influences on this study. (Hegel, it seems to me, is also a presence, though his relevant account of the contradictions inherent in the "master/slave" relationship, among other things, is not cited.) Like Hobbes, Poggi affirms the fundamental equality of human beings. This view of the basic equality of human beings as the proper starting point for understanding political power is also shared by Max Weber (though this aspect of Weber's thought is insufficiently appreciated by many commentators). Weber, and Poggi following him, hold that political power, however necessary, is "artificially established" (p. 49) and thus represents a deviation from the more real, equal condition of

human beings. Because the power relationship is an aberrant condition, it requires “justification” or, in Weber’s terms, “legitimation.” While Poggi’s arguments for seeing equality as the basic human condition are compelling, the notion of political power as “imposition” is, arguably, too narrow. It may be that political power, in the form of leadership, is sought out by the potential subordinates in order to pursue collective projects more effectively. This idea is only briefly considered by Poggi (pp. 49–53) and is, in my view, not adequately stated or refuted. The fact that the powerful have different interests from the powerless and often do not serve the collective good (p. 52) does not disprove the idea that human beings may naturally seek to set up and follow leaders.

This is an ambitious work that deals in an illuminating and comprehensive way with a notoriously difficult concept. Given the scope and complexity of the project, it is perhaps unfair to raise objections about what might have been covered more extensively. Still, I will note one significant issue that lingers on the edges of the exposition, demanding fuller attention. There is a diachronic dimension intrinsic to forms of social power and their interrelations, which Poggi clearly indicates by identifying some recent trends—globalization, for example—that change the relations between and within forms of power. The historical changes in the forms of power account for the necessity of distinguishing military power for separate consideration. Over time, the warrior has become disassociated from the political leader, a process that Poggi characterizes as the “‘civilianization’ of government” (p. 46). Since, at present, one organizational segment—the military—controls the implements of violent force, this group develops separate interests and enters into competitive and conflictual relations with other parts of the political system (p. 183). In the tradition of pluralist liberalism, Poggi generally prizes the conflict between and within forms of power and is anxious that, in the future, some forms of social power may be eliminated or various forms of power will be consolidated into a single hierarchy (p. 204). What I miss is a fuller account of how the institutional embodiments of social power are differentiated over time and of the broad mechanisms that account for the prospect that this process may reverse itself and the power forms merge into a hierarchy. In effect, I miss the elucidation of historical patterns that Poggi so ably accomplished in his previous works. But this is only a minor observation about what is altogether an important and impressive work.

Value, Respect, and Attachment By Joseph Raz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 186p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

William Corlett, *Bates College*

Widely known for the challenges he poses for the excesses of “me-first” individualism loosely associated with contemporary Western liberalism, Joseph Raz has grown accustomed to plumb its depths for signs of humanity and goodness. His new book approaches the twin problem of pursuing universal values while acknowledging particularistic cultures, through a window opened in *Engaging Reason* (1999), where he unpacks the complexity of a “value-reason nexus” to conclude that valuable options are often pursued for incommensurate reasons. In what sense, he now asks, can this “nexus” be said to be universal? At the heart of this project lies an attempt to extend his earlier analysis of value in two related directions: toward human attachments, where Raz must show that particular engagements with value need not fly in the face of universality, and toward an abstract approach to universal respect, which nevertheless remains part and parcel of our contingent attachments.

Raz offers a delightfully accessible opening chapter that embraces both sides of the tension between universal and particular approaches to value. The attachments one forges with others are universal in the sense that everyone can in principle rely upon them and particularistic in the sense that one’s attachments are one’s own. This double suggestion—that value is “neither and both” self-created and immutable—is explored in greater depth in the second chapter, where Raz tightens the knot between contingent human attachments and value’s universality. He writes in ways that are determined to show that “reconciliation is possible” (p. 74). After defining value in an “inflationary” sense as “any property which (necessarily) makes anything which possesses it good (or bad) at least to a degree” (p. 43), Raz turns his back on attempts to unearth value’s universality by bringing “to light a general feature of all values” (p. 59) and looks instead at approaching the universality of value through a “rejection of those false values about which rage past or present moral struggles” (p. 59). Objectivity begins to require an avoidance of wrongdoing instead of a pursuit of an immutable truth. Raz put it like this: “Since values are objective, they cannot be independent of social conditions” (p. 62), which leads him to suggest that contingency sets “a limit to the intelligibility of value” (p. 76). But if there is an “element of pure contingency at the heart of values” (p. 76), then Raz will have to show how it makes sense to speak of value’s universality without relying on an Archimedean point or even a loosely overlapping consensus.

This he prepares to do in the third chapter, which works both to reinforce the point that universal values depend upon social relations and to set the stage for establishing the sense of universality that can survive this kind of social dependence. Raz accomplishes the first task by contesting the popular claim that human life has “an unconditional and non-derivative value” (p. 115). Arguing instead that our lives bear conditional value—that is, that they “are good because something else is, when the relationship between them is a necessary relationship” (p. 77n)—he needs here to distinguish “the value of people from the value of their remaining alive” (p. 115n). Setting aside the (intrinsic) value of life itself, Raz makes what we do or could do with our lives a fundamental part of why we value them. And so the stage is set for discussing the value of people.

But not so fast. Although he is prepared to argue that “respect for people . . . is a central moral duty” (p. 125), Raz’s approach to universality requires spending more time with the abstraction “respect” than with real people, at least at first. By connecting the second chapter’s inflationary sense of value to reasons for one’s duty to respect what is valuable—for example, each other—the fourth chapter moves well beyond the way Raz views respect in *Morality of Freedom* (1986). Raz opens by isolating Kant’s categorical approach to respect from its familiar housing in a phenomenal-noumenal binary, but remains sufficiently Kantian to claim that moral law is the object of respect; he quotes Kant as saying “the object of respect is, therefore, nothing but the law. . . . All respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) of which the person provides an example” (p. 135). On this basis, Raz moves to distinguish the theoretical construct of a value in itself—a person, for example—from the more popular notion of treating people as ends in themselves and never as means, a distinction that even Kant, he explains, sometimes conflated.

Raz next advances “three stages of correct response to value”: first, “psychological acknowledgment” of what is valuable and, relatedly, “expression of recognition of value in language”; second, “preserve what is of value”; and third, “engage with value in appropriate ways” (pp. 161–62). The

first two ways of relating to what is valuable—respecting it—are required universally to avoid moral wrongdoing, whereas the latter—engaging with it—is optional and thereby subject to contingencies. Even though “ultimately, our lives are about engaging with value,” respect “is the right reaction to what is of value even when you do not value it” (p. 164).

Raz can finally apply his value-reason model to human beings. One has a duty to the moral law to respect fellow human beings. But there is plenty of room left at the third stage of the model for attachments in the world of contingency. One is doing wrong, for example, by denigrating a person from a different culture or failing to preserve it, but continuing to identify with an inherited culture is entirely optional. In the end, we begin to realize that respecting other people is good for those who do so. In a nutshell, Raz argues that “foundational moral values are universally valid in abstract form but they manifest themselves in ways which are socially dependent, and become accessible to us in ways which are socially dependent” (p. 8).

Those concerned with Western liberalism—whether critic, vanguard, or apologist—ignore the careful work of Joseph Raz at their peril. Readers new to Raz may find this newest volume a useful point of access before studying his more technical arguments. Those familiar with his work will certainly want to study his new distinction between the avoidance of wrongdoing and more optional life choices. And yet because this provocative work makes the autonomous agent its unit of analysis—in a sort of me-first methodology—respect for and engagement with others add to the risk of sliding back into precisely the individualism Raz seeks to enrich. This backsliding may reinforce his liberal credentials with some readers, but it stands at odds with his promising critique of excessive individualism. If the liberal tradition is ever to set its sights on what Iris Young’s (2000) *Inclusion and Democracy* continues to call domination, it will have at least to begin defending its habit of methodological individualism. This requires engaging with the work of those less comfortable with (nonrelational) autonomy as a starting point. Raz’s newest work on respect would have benefited, I think, from a studied engagement with the work of some “unusual subjects”—for example, Marilyn Frye’s loving perspective (*The Politics of Reality*, 1983) or Young’s democracy. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to a politics of respectful inclusion is a studied reluctance, when selecting “one’s” unit of analysis, reviewing the relevant literature, and constructing abstract categories, to foreground and not lightly pass over the fact that we are always already in this life together.

Making Babies, Making Families: What Matters Most in an Age of Reproductive Technologies, Surrogacy, Adoption, and Same-Sex and Unwed Parents By Mary Lyndon Shanley. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001. 206p. \$27.00.

Julie Novkov, *University of Oregon*

Mary Lyndon Shanley’s *Making Babies, Making Families* bravely wades into the difficult ethical questions of accommodating new reproductive technologies and diverse family arrangements within the framework of existing and possible liberal legal principles. The book grapples with definitions of parenthood and parental rights in the contexts of adoption, unwed fatherhood, gamete transfer, surrogate motherhood, and multiple parenting within the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community. Shanley mines these situations in order to derive some workable ethical and legal guidelines for the state’s exercise of its regulatory capacities with respect to families. In doing so, she reveals the tensions and possibilities inherent in the state’s role in defining families at

a moment when many perceive traditional family structures as collapsing, for better or for worse.

For the reader interested in the policy-based bottom line, Shanley provides ample food for thought. Among other policies, she argues in favor of facilitating open and transracial adoptions, undermining the promotion of “as if” adoptive families (families that look and behave structurally as if the children were the biological offspring of their parents). In disputes between unwed biological fathers and other claimants to parenthood, she advocates focusing on the relational aspects of parenthood, in lieu of complete reliance on genetic ties. She argues strenuously against permitting the marketing of gametes, claiming that such a market represents an illegitimate extension of capitalist principles into an area ill-suited for their articulation, and that it has significant potential for racial and class-based exploitation. She objects to legal decisions enforcing contracts against surrogate mothers who decide after giving birth that they do not wish to relinquish their babies, although she would permit individuals to form such contracts. Finally, she recommends centering the child’s standpoint and needs in untangling sticky question of custody and visitation arising in the context of “queer” families.

The point of her book, however, is as much how she reaches these conclusions as the conclusions themselves. She opens the book with the claim that “the traditional fabric of family law is unraveling,” attributing this problem to rapid transformations in family relationships (p. 1). The argument of the book, however, seems to be more that the problem is located at the interface of law and family relationships. The problematic principles that she identifies repeatedly within contemporary family law are the extension of market forces into the family, the legal commitment to models of extreme individualistic liberties and rights within family disputes, and the near exclusion of considerations of children’s needs and perspectives. She argues for supplementing or replacing these principles with factors derived from modern feminist theories of justice. These factors include meaningful equality for women (defined as a recognition of women’s unequal status in the family, the workplace, and in civil society more generally), the significance of relationships and care as well as individual rights and liberties, and the centering of children in the disputes that swirl around them. Her work thus incorporates feminist critique and vision as grounding in order to derive concrete answers to tough policy questions.

The scope of the book and its elegant argumentation are striking. Any one of these topics could command a lengthy analysis, but by considering all together, Shanley is able to develop a more unified critique and set of positive principles than she could otherwise provide. Moreover, she does not present her prescriptions as ideal and perfectly just solutions, recognizing the pain inherent in these questions. She seems to see her task as that of taming the tangled network of relationships into recognizable legal statuses that will produce more just outcomes than those that modern family law is currently providing. She consciously places herself with the strand of feminist thinking that emphasizes experiential theory and the centering of relationships in place of celebrations of individual liberal autonomy. These commitments both make her work more grounded and underline her insistence that a one-size-fits-all approach to family law will not produce justice.

One might question, however, Shanley’s background assumptions about why this crisis has emerged now. She clearly wants to reject the traditional patriarchal conception of the family as wage-earning male married to nurturing female living together with their mutually dependent biological children. She does not go far enough, however, in emphasizing the extent to which this model of family life did not represent reality for many families in the past and does not for

contemporary families. Multiple caretakers, ranging from grandmothers and other adult relations to associates within ethnic enclaves to slave laborers and paid workers to older siblings, have provided nurturance for young children. Families freely opened their homes to orphans and children whose parents could not take care of them. What is at least somewhat new is the extent to which the law has become the means through which family relationship are not only legitimized but also constituted. Historical research on the family suggests, for instance, that the legal formalization of adoption as the primary means of adding a nonbiological child to a biologically related family is a relatively recent phenomenon (see, e.g., Michael Grossberg, *Governing the Hearth*, 1985). This reading of the problem as a collision between historical practice and legal formulations also emphasizes the need for legal change but suggests that the problem itself is neither new nor primarily one of accommodating new reproductive technologies and family forms in the law.

One might also question some of Shanley's proposals. Most notably, will merely allowing children the right to know basic information about their biological roots really achieve a meaningful centering of children's needs and interests? In practice, such a reform could easily fall short of accomplishing any major reframings of children's positions with respect to the law, becoming merely another procedural requirement with little ultimate significance. Likewise, while Shanley is surely right to require the taking of children's needs into account, this approach cannot lead to results that are universally generalizable or painless for children and those who wish to parent them.

Nonetheless, Shanley's approach of centering children has the potential to change the way we think about family law and the regulation of relationships in positive and significant ways. The book is thus a major accomplishment in terms of both its potential for shaping policies and its significance as a work of applied feminist ethics.

Body/Politics: Studies in Reproduction, Production, and (Re)Construction By Thomas C. Shevory. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 249p. \$59.95.

Robert H. Blank, *Brunel University*

Body/Politics is a well-researched book that brings together a significant range of topics to explicate the connections between changes occurring with the biological body and within body politics. The theoretical structure of the book is Marxist/feminist with heavy reliance on critical theory for Thomas Shevory's legal analysis in some of the chapters. According to the author, the central thesis of the book is that "the process of technological change will be creatively destructive, opening new avenues for equality, diversity, self-expression, resistance to hierarchy and control, while also offering new means for domination, exploitation, oppression, and dehumanization" (p. 3). He thus rejects the more extreme stances of the "technoproggressives" who see nothing but good and the "technophobes" who see nothing but bad coming from these developments. He argues quite convincingly that the historical processes we face through these technological changes are dialectical and thus subject to human political intervention. In other words, if we so choose, we do have the capacity to shape technologies, though it is far from clear that we now actually have the will to do so.

Shevory is largely successful in meeting his stated aim of showing how contradictions within the current system of production manifest themselves in particular technological and ideological contexts. He is, however, less successful in meeting a second aim of providing "a form of resistance to a resurgent

right, bent on sacrificing public and natural spaces in favor of short-term and shortsighted economic benefits" (p. 11). His analysis of schizophrenic Right with the "cyber" right faction of Gingrich on one side and the "patriot" right wing on the other, as reflected in their responses to new interventions in reproduction and resulting expansions in the domain of property and commodification, is interesting, although one could likely come up with similar conclusions about the political Left, feminists, and others. As the author himself clearly demonstrates, the issues raised by these new forays into modifying the human biology represent fundamental transformations in the way we think about our bodies, our rights, our property, and politics, and if so, I would argue they are thus unlikely to impact only on one segment of the political spectrum.

In order to argue his case, Shevory presents relatively detailed, and in some areas highly technical, case studies on such topics as surrogacy contracts, frozen embryos, the environment, biotechnology, and cosmetic surgery and other changes in appearance. Through these case studies he largely succeeds in his goal of providing concrete evidence of how body technologies are socially constructed and how they, in turn, have the power to reconstruct ideological positions and political practices. Although there is little new substantively in most of these chapters, together they do clarify the author's arguments and at the same time make for interesting reading, especially for readers who might not have had previous exposure to the material they cover. The chapter on (re)constructions of appearance, especially, I found most insightful, and I agree with Shevory that the virtual absence of this topic in the mainstream bioethics or public policy literature is puzzling.

Most of the case chapters provide detailed conceptual and legal analysis. The discussions of rights in the chapters on surrogacy contracts and frozen embryos demonstrate the futility we face when attempting to create an abstract set of rights claims and the insurmountable problems that result when we try to reconcile such concepts within the context of these new technological capabilities. Likewise, the discussion in Chapter 6 of the changing conceptions of property brought about by biotechnology shows how property rights are continuing to subsume ever larger shares of life, thus leading Shevory to conclude that it is possible that someday everything will simply become property.

Unfortunately, as with many books published today, this book suffers from a lack of a rigorous copyediting process. Among the many coherence-type problems I found was the tendency not to follow through on lists of points. On page 65, for instance, the author says he will argue that surrogacy does this for several reasons, then states "First" but no others. Similarly, on page 69, he states that Raymond has criticized surrogacy on "four grounds: First"—but no Second, and so on. While these might be minor points, cumulatively to a reader such gaps are difficult to follow and frustrating, and they do divert attention from the author's arguments.

Another point of concern, which might also be related to editing at a different level, is that some of the case study chapters do not seem to be shaped by the themes of the book. Chapter 5, especially, seems out of place here. The book has the appearance of an attempt to fit separately written pieces into the whole after the fact with mixed results. Although I believe the author has done a relatively good job in tracing his argument and themes across the chapters, in some places it appears forced, and there remains a considerable unevenness in the book.

These caveats aside, *Body/Politics*, like its title, is an intriguing book that should be of potential interest to readers in political theory, public policy, and American politics. The

analysis is sound and in places highly detailed. Whether the reader agrees or disagrees with Shevory's specific conclusions (and I tend to agree), the discussion represents a competent analysis of an area that strikes at the heart of what we are, both as individuals and as members of society. As such, this book is a valuable contribution to a debate that might now be simmering but that in the near future is likely to reach the boiling point.

Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle's Dialectical Pedagogy By Thomas W. Smith. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 325p. \$75.50 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

Jacob Howland, *University of Tulsa*

Like Socrates, Thomas Smith's Aristotle practices philosophy as a way of life. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is Aristotle's proreptic and therapeutic introduction to this way of life. It is not a didactic treatise but a teaching that aims at the improvement of its readers' souls. It therefore begins from reputable opinions (*endoxa*) and employs dialectical arguments—not the best arguments simply, but the best available for improving the lives of Aristotle's audience.

This approach to the *Ethics* has much to recommend it. It offers the most compelling explanation I have seen of the text's many contradictions. Smith shows that these contradictions (e.g., regarding whether virtue is one or many, whether honor or friendship is the greatest external good, or whether shame is a virtue) have a twofold root. First, dialectical pedagogy necessarily involves contradiction because it begins with inadequate opinions and moves toward more adequate modes of understanding. Second, *endoxa* are intrinsically contradictory because they always reflect an incomplete sense of human flourishing. Smith is especially attuned to this problem because he reads the *Ethics* with an eye to Aristotle's political thought. Our souls have already been formed by the regimes in which we have been raised. But because all actual regimes "are more or less defective and exhibit a partial sense of human excellence" (p. 17), Aristotle must confront what Smith calls the problem of "prior deformation."

What, then, are the guiding assumptions of Aristotle's audience? Smith approaches this question in Part I of his book. He argues that the *Ethics* is aimed at men who love not virtue but "noble action." For these men, nobility entails "a shining vitality that demands recognition by others" (p. 35). Their upbringing has led them to pursue what Smith calls "virtue-as-virility," and to valorize honorable actions and political power rather than moral virtue. This description of Aristotle's audience makes sense: What spirited young Greek could remain unmoved by the example of Achilles? And as Smith observes, it is Aristotle himself who, in the course of criticizing the devotion to honor and power (*NE* 1.5), first presents virtue as a candidate for happiness.

If Smith is correct, Aristotle is in his own way engaged in what Plato calls the "ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry" (*Republic* 607b). His audience consists of risk takers whose love of noble action leads them to compete for zero-sum goods like honor, power, and wealth. Aristotle's task in the *Ethics* is to lead his readers from virtue-as-virility toward "virtue-as-equity," and to introduce them to sharable goods like friendship and knowledge. This will not be easy, especially because the practice of philosophy may strike readers as useless or even dangerous within the context of zero-sum competition.

In Part II, Smith provides a detailed account of Aristotle's "revaluation" of the virtues in the *Ethics*. The distinction in Book 1 between moral and intellectual virtue, as well as more specific distinctions between individual moral virtues, are not

Aristotle's own. Here again, Aristotle follows the *endoxa*, which undervalue the importance of thought with respect to action. Smith's analysis of the treatment of specific moral virtues in Books 3 through 5 of the *Ethics* accordingly aims to disclose Aristotle's dialectical attempt to transform reputable opinion in preparation for his reconsideration, in Book 6, of the role of thought in virtuous action.

Smith emphasizes the implicit yet essential role of thought in the virtues Aristotle discusses. The magnificent man, for example, is celebrated as much for his ability to judge what is needed by his community as for his openhandedness. What passes for generosity is furthermore most often an excessive attachment to external goods. (Contra Smith, however, excessive or extravagant gift giving must still be regarded as a vice.) In place of generosity as ordinarily understood, Aristotle points toward the spiritual generosity of Socrates. Indeed, Smith suggests that Socrates stands at the mean of other virtues as well, including truthfulness. This seems right, and, if anything, Smith does not develop these insights far enough. He misses Aristotle's suggestion that Socratic thoughtfulness is the key to genuine courage: Compare 1116b4–5 ("Socrates thought courage was knowledge") with the implicit reference to Socrates at 1115a17–18 ("perhaps one should not fear poverty or sickness, or in general anything that does not spring from vice and is not due to oneself").

Smith takes pains to show how Aristotle's account of justice differs from that of modern liberal thinkers. Aristotle's emphasis on the problem of political (de)formation helps us to understand that the liberal ideal of neutrality with respect to individual interests is unattainable. In any case, reflection on the limitations of legal justice discloses the need for the more fundamental virtue of equity (*epieikeia*). Equity turns out to be more fundamental than justice because "decent laws are precisely the rules of thumb determined by those who possess virtue-as-equity" (p. 153). Like the virtues discussed earlier, equity demands the cultivation of thoughtfulness. By the end of Book 5, then, Aristotle has prepared the reader for a radical reconsideration of the relationship between thought and action.

Aristotle begins this reconsideration in his discussion of practical wisdom or *phronēsis* (the subject of the rest of Part II of Smith's book) and concludes it in his exploration of pleasure, friendship, and philosophy (the subjects of Part III). *Phronēsis*, Smith argues, does not involve the implementation of an abstractly formulated life-plan. It is rather the essentially "reactive" capacity to "determine the best course of action in the situations that have been handed to us" (p. 170). Because *phronēsis* involves an awareness of one's own failings and limitations, it opens one up to the satisfactions of friendship or *philia* (p. 268). Smith brings these insights to bear on the problem posed by Book 10 of the relationship between the life of contemplation and the life of action. We go astray if we approach this problem as a choice between two abstractly formulated life-plans. *Phronēsis* does not deal in abstractions; it "is actualized precisely when we judge aright amid the complexities of the situation given to us" (p. 258). In any case, contemplation and action are intertwined. Thought informs all action, and life itself is a kind of thoughtful wakefulness that is most fully actualized in the company of friends (pp. 173, 204). For that matter, the *Ethics* itself is rooted in *philia*: It is a supremely generous encouragement to the difficult and often misunderstood work of trying to become more virtuous (p. 224).

I have been able in this short review to touch only on the high points of Smith's comprehensive, engaging, and intelligent study. Suffice it to say that *Revaluing Ethics* is an important book from which all serious students of Aristotle's ethics and politics will profit.

The Ship of State: Statecraft and Politics from Ancient Greece to Democratic America By Norma Thompson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 256p. \$35.00.
Nature, Woman, and the Art of Politics Edited by Eduardo A. Velasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. 385p. \$80.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

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These books have similar aims and are written from a similar perspective. There are, however, important differences in content, emphasis, and form. Norma Thompson explicitly seeks to show that the Western intellectual tradition is not misogynist. One reason that it is not, she urges, is that it is not univocal. Within the tradition one can find several very different views of the character and relation of men and women. Introducing the volume he edited, Eduardo Velasquez states, "This collection of essays does *not* purport to give an answer to the question of what are 'nature' and 'woman,' at least not in an immediate, definitive sense. Rather, the comprehensive aim here is to reopen *questions* as to the 'nature of nature,' the 'nature of woman' with consideration given to the consequences of pairing some understanding of 'nature' with that of 'woman'" (p. xi). A collection of essays necessarily contains a variety of voices.

Thompson's *Ship of State* is an extended, elegantly written essay that displays great erudition. She covers the entire history of Western political thought—and more than the traditionally recognized theorists—from Homer to Gertrude Stein. She divides her consideration of the understanding of the relation and the significance of the relation between men and women or the masculine and feminine into three periods or "parts" concerning 1) the polis, 2) the state, and 3) democratic America. In her first two chapters, she argues that classical Greek authors saw the need for male and female traits to complement and balance each other in individuals as well as in communities. Homer in the *Odyssey* depicts such a balance within Odysseus and Penelope as well as in their marriage, Thucydides indicates the importance of the feminine by its absence, Aristotle argues that different individuals should serve the polity by performing different functions, and Plato balances male and female in the contrast between the "male drama" of the *Republic* and the explicitly feminine characteristics of Socratic philosophy.

Whereas the ancients advocated the need for a balance, Thompson argues, modern political thinkers emphasize the tension between the masculine and the feminine along with other extreme polarities. Machiavelli's works are full of antitheses—between princes and republics, foxes and lions, the great and the people: "What prevents these dichotomies from ensuing in hierarchies? Only subtlety in presentation" (p. 76). Rhetoric thus becomes extremely important to modern political theorists, who seek to find a balanced structure for the increasingly central control exercised over individuals by the state. Thompson defends herself in passing from critics who would accuse her of taking an essentialist view of the masculine and the feminine by pointing out that in her account of modernity, Edmund Burke "stands in as the paradigmatic 'feminine' writer, and Wollstonecraft as the sometimes 'masculine' one" (p. 76). In valorizing complexity and tradition as opposed to the simplicity of principle and the clarity of reason, Burke appears womanish. When Wollstonecraft urges women to become more virtuous, she keeps some of the original meaning and, therefore, the root in the masculine "vir." The tensions emerge full-blown in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*. "On one level of *Frankenstein*, Mary Shelley issues a feminist critique analogous to Burke's in the *Reflections*" (p. 105). By creating his monster in the laboratory, Victor Frankenstein makes the female unnecessary.

On the other hand, what the monster comes to desire above all is feminine companionship. The balance is obviously awry and things go badly.

Rousseau and Tocqueville both try to right the balance by recognizing the equality of the sexes as parts of the human race, yet trying to reintroduce complementary traits and roles. They do not succeed, Thompson argues, because, in the end, they, their theories, and their writings cannot escape the leveling effects of democracy. Thompson defends Tocqueville from critics who point out that on the basis of his analysis, women never will achieve political or economic equality; he does so by reminding us that Tocqueville argues not for the equality but for the superiority of women: Women virtuously sacrifice themselves and their pleasures, rather than calculating their own interests like the men. Nevertheless, Thompson thinks the distinction Tocqueville attempts to draw between the roles and characters of the two sexes fails. It fails, first, because it is based merely on one passing phase of American history; it fails more fundamentally because he does not have the literary form or talent to resist democratic leveling. He writes a survey. The author who succeeds in establishing an identity for herself that differs from that which her male associates would impose upon her is Gertrude Stein. In praising Stein as the democratic Socrates, Thompson demonstrates that she or her analysis is not essentialist. However, what Thompson means by male and female, or what the forces and functions she thinks need to be distinguished and balanced in a polity are becomes unclear. Is she, in the end, talking about the relation between male and female in the tradition, or the superiority of literary to argumentative forms of writing? She praises literary works because they resist the democratic tendency to level everything and everyone to a common denominator and so to cover over, if not entirely to lose the complexity of, politics. This reader finds it difficult to believe, however, that political problems cannot merely be dramatized or even analyzed but actually solved through fictional works.

The essays in the Velasquez volume each focus on one author, or, in some cases, a few authors. The volume does not have a unifying thesis, although the essays all address a common problem or theme. Some of the authors, for example in the case of Jane Austen, explicitly disagree with each other. (Germaine Paulo Walsh argues that Austen has an Aristotelian view of character, whereas Inger Brodey contends that Austen is closer to Adam Smith.) In this space, I can only mention some of the pieces I found most striking. In the opening essay, Ronna Burger points out that the search for knowledge on the part of the woman apparently condemned in *Genesis* is what is praised in Socrates. Burger does not, however, consider the potential difference, if not outright contradiction, therefore, in the roots of the Western intellectual tradition. Likewise, Evanthia Speliotis points out that the apparent ground for the superiority of male to female in the household in the first book of Aristotle's *Politics*, greater physical strength, is the reason for the natural inferiority of the slave. Both of the natural relations in the household, Speliotis argues, are shown to be subpolitical and hence sub-rational. True *political* relations among equals involve ruling and being ruled in turn. But does Aristotle ever indicate that women can become citizens? Speliotis does not say. Matthew Crawford raises questions about the adequacy of Plutarch's defense of married love in the face of ancient philosophical pederasty. Melissa Matthes and Arlene Saxonhouse both suggest that the distinctions traditionally drawn between male and female roles and characteristics can be traced to force as much as, if not more than, to nature. Lee Ward disproves claims that John Locke supported a traditional notion of the natural and hence social and political inferiority of women

on the basis of an extraordinarily careful reading of a number of Locke's texts. Deborah Winkle brings out the ambiguous complexities in Rousseau's treatment of the natural, historical, and desirable relation between sexes in much more detail than Thompson. The collection ends with essays by Nicholas Capaldi on liberal political culture (Hegel to Mill), Denise Schaeffer on Nietzsche, Lesley Wheeler on Emily Dickinson, and Marc Conner on Toni Morrison—topics or authors Thompson ignored.

Whether one agrees or disagrees, the arguments presented in both volumes are wide-ranging and thought provoking. Both should be required reading for anyone exploring the basis and implications of sex and gender for human social relations and political order.

Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory By John Tomasi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 163p. \$55.00 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

Stephen L. Newman, *York University*

In a book published almost a decade ago, Ronald Beiner complained that contemporary liberalism suffers for its neglect of the Big Questions traditionally addressed by political philosophy. Preoccupied with narrowly conceived and highly formal questions of (procedural) justice, liberalism had no advice to give about how one should live. (See Ronald Beiner, *What's the Matter with Liberalism*, 1992.) John Tomasi's provocative new book takes this complaint seriously and attempts to remedy the defect in contemporary liberalism by moving it "beyond justice" to address the normative concerns of persons earnestly striving to lead good and worthwhile lives.

Tomasi considers modern liberal theory deficient insofar as most contemporary liberal theorists are willing to address social concerns only "in terms of justice and the legitimacy of state coercive action (or in terms of a narrow band of deliberative dispositions—e.g., the much ballyhoed 'sense of justice'—immediately attendant to those concepts)" (p. xv). Hence, an adequate theoretical defence of liberalism "is taken to be identical to the project of justifying the authority of the liberal state" (p. xvi). But this narrow theoretical focus ignores the effects that liberal political institutions and practices inevitably have on the ethical outlooks of liberal citizens. Since there is much more to the moral lives of individuals than politics, and because the fit between a diverse citizenry's nonpublic moral views and the principles of political association is important to maintaining the stability of liberal regimes, liberals need to think seriously about why people such as we are would want to live in a society where the goal of contemporary liberalism—democratic justice—has been legitimately achieved.

Liberals may be forgiven if they thought that the answer was obvious: Liberal justice offers a neutral political framework within which individuals who cannot agree on the meaning of life are able to live together peaceably, all of them free to pursue their own notions of how best to live (so long as they do not seek to impose their preferred ways of life on one another by force). Tomasi associates this position with "ethical liberalism," which treats the individual as the ultimate arbiter of what gives value to his or her own life. Ethical liberalism is said to rest on a particular conception of human moral personality, one that makes value formation a consequence of the individual's autonomous choices. Importantly, however, the ethical liberal point of view does not go unchallenged in modern society. Tomasi points out that the Romantic tradition is every bit as deeply rooted in Western culture; however, because Romantics do not affirm the normative ideal of individual autonomy, which seems to them a morally pernicious

notion, they are hardly likely to accept justificatory political arguments that invoke an autonomy-affirming philosophy of life. Far from providing a neutral political framework, liberal institutions and practices will appear to them as morally subversive agents of change.

Respect for ethical diversity, which Tomasi places at the heart of the liberal principle of legitimacy, requires that all citizens be able to affirm liberal principles of political association for reasons that are fully convincing to them in light of their own more or less comprehensive moral views. In short, consistent liberals cannot require nonliberals to affirm a comprehensive liberal doctrine (such as ethical liberalism) as the price of admission to the liberal state. Tomasi understands Rawls's "political liberalism" as a response to the liberal legitimation crisis. By politicizing justice, i.e., by appealing only to people's shared *political* beliefs concerning the principles of justice, Rawls avoids having to make any substantive claims about the true moral nature of human beings. Instead, he anchors normative support for liberal justice in an overlapping consensus of moral viewpoints, each of which gives support to liberal political principles for good and sufficient reasons of its own. The only condition political liberalism imposes on citizens is that they "share the moral idea that humans are the kinds of beings who are owed reasons, in terms they themselves can accept, that justify coercive actions undertaken by the state with respect to them" (p. 9). While this limits the applicability of political liberalism to some finite number of social environments where reason-giving is the norm, it does not require any agreement concerning the best good for human beings.

In this sense Rawls succeeds at constructing a neutral scheme of justification; however, Tomasi insists that liberal political institutions and practices are not and cannot be neutral in their effects. This is because the language of liberal public discourse and the requirements of public reason have a tendency to infiltrate what he calls the "ethical background culture" of political liberalism, subtly pushing nonpublic moral beliefs in a liberal direction. He chides Rawls and other political liberals for treating this systemic ethical bias as inconsequential and insists that if political liberalism is to be truly accommodating of ethical diversity (and thus fully legitimate on its own terms), some way must be found of limiting the potentially homogenizing effects of liberal institutions and practices on the nonpublic sphere. It is here that Tomasi's argument is most original, and most controversial. He claims that political liberals have an obligation to be mindful of people's nonpublic moral commitments, which although not any part of public reason are, nonetheless, essential to their making a home in the world and thus immediately connected with their support of liberal institutions and practices.

Significant policy implications flow from this claim. Tomasi advocates that whenever possible public policies should be designed in ways that reduce the unintended effects of liberal justice on some citizens (without, of course, violating the rights of others). For example, liberal educators must be concerned "that they do not send a distorted or misleading message about *nonpublic value* as they go about preparing students for public life" (p. 93). This may require accommodating parental demands that public school students be educated about (though not in) particular religious traditions and made aware of how it is possible to reconcile political autonomy with their nonpublic moral commitments. More broadly, Tomasi thinks that liberalism needs to cultivate a deeper conception of citizenship, one that emulates the classical model by seeking to integrate the good citizen and the good person. "For any self-aware political liberal, any theory of good citizen conduct must include considerations about the way public values impinge on nonpublic spheres, and how

those values can be put to personal uses there. . . . In a free society, the virtues of good citizens must be the virtues of (diverse) *good souls*" (p. 71).

Political liberals may not feel comfortable following Tomasi down this path. It is one thing to argue that genuine neutrality requires the liberal state to make reasonable accommodations for the protection of people's nonpublic moral beliefs; it is something else altogether to insist that liberals have an affirmative obligation to foster the nonpublic values that inform a morally diverse people's answers to the Big Questions of life. Political liberals will also find unsettling Tomasi's insistence that the need to accommodate ethical diversity places significant limits on the scope of redistributive social justice. In his view, redistributive measures turn out to have costs paid in terms of "the vanishing social space in which reasonable people might otherwise have perceived and responded to challenges of human social existence on their own, eudaimonistically directed terms" (p. 123). In other words, state intervention to address inequalities that may result from "the normal operation of free institutions" (p. 124) risks interference with the exercise of responsibilities toward others embedded in particular moral traditions. Fairness to these traditions and the ethical diversity they represent, Tomasi argues, reduces the opportunities for "social construction" undertaken in the name of justice. Perhaps. But there is a fine line in his argument between respecting the moral practices of social groups and providing incentives for potentially dissident members to stay where they are. Political liberals may well prefer to err on the side of potential dissidents by supplying them, as a matter of right, with the material resources that would ensure their independence.

The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt Edited by Dana Villa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 320p. \$55.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

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This is an excellent collection of essays about the political thought of Hannah Arendt. Its editor, Dana Villa, has assembled a first-rate group of scholars, many of whom are already well known for their contributions to Arendt studies. The volume is distinguished by the high quality of its contributions and by the effort of so many of its contributors to go beyond standard lines of exegesis to raise interesting questions and to press the boundaries of Arendt commentary. Arendt's work has received a great deal of attention from political theorists in recent years. *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt* makes clear the richness of her thinking, the range of her concerns, and the ability of her writings to inspire creative commentary and constructive political theory.

The book consists of an Introduction and six thematic sections. In his fine Introduction, Dana Villa offers an overview of Arendt's career and concerns, emphasizing the rootedness of her theorizing in distinctively twentieth-century problems centering around totalitarianism. Villa underscores Arendt's modernism and her continuing relevance to contemporary concerns, themes that recur throughout the volume.

In Part One, "Totalitarianism and Nationalism," Margaret Canovan explores the distinctiveness of Arendt's unconventional account of the totalitarian phenomenon, emphasizing its diabolical and relentless tendency to sweep away human agency; and Ronald Beiner considers Arendt's discussions of different forms of nationalism, pointing out that while Arendt well understood the capacity of nationalism to frustrate human rights and political freedom, she failed to think constructively about political solutions to these problems. In Part Two, "Political Evil and the Holocaust," Seyla Benhabib ana-

lyzes the complexities of Arendt's treatment of Eichmann, and Mary Dietz offers an ingenious account of Arendt's theorizing as a particular kind of response to the traumatic horrors of the Holocaust, focusing on the absence of the Holocaust theme from Arendt's most constructive work of political theory, *The Human Condition*. While Benhabib emphasizes the lessons Arendt sought to learn from Nazism and the Eichmann trial, Dietz suggests that Arendt's political theory sought a "recreative escape" through the construction of a "powerful imagistic symbol" of heroic action removed from contemporary concerns. Similar themes are broached in Part Three, "Freedom and Political Action," with George Kateb discussing the strengths and weaknesses of Arendt's "heroic" conception of political action, and Jerome Kohn emphasizing the forward-looking character of Arendt's freedom. In Part IV, "Arendt and the Ancients," these themes are pursued from yet another angle, with J. Peter Euben, Jacques Taminiaux, and Hauke Brunkhorst interpreting, in different ways, Arendt's reappropriation of ancient Greek and Roman theory and practice.

Part Five, "Revolution and Constitution," is perhaps the most interesting section of all. In it Jeremy Waldron offers a judicious and powerful account of the centrality of institutions to Arendt's politics, and Albrecht Wellmer presents a Habermasian rendering of Arendt's *On Revolution*, emphasizing the importance to modern politics of moral universalism and technological dynamism—both short-shrifted by Arendt—but also emphasizing the centrality of the political agency and civic responsibility that Arendt gives pride of place. Wellmer and Waldron both insist that Arendt's politics is best understood as a supplement rather than an alternative to liberal democratic institutions. Finally, in Part Six, "Judgment, Philosophy, and Thinking," essays by Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves, Frederick M. Dolan, and Richard J. Bernstein consider Arendt's writings on the various modes of thinking, underscoring in different ways Arendt's emphasis on the importance of intellectual independence and reflexivity in politics. Bernstein's essay, in particular, wrestles with some deep ambiguities in Arendt's corpus, locating a tension between worldliness and solitude in her understanding of "thinking," and linking this to her difficulty in coming to terms with the lessons of the career of her mentor, Martin Heidegger.

Arendt's corpus has exercised an extraordinary hold on the minds of political theorists since her death in 1975. It is hard to generalize about the voluminous Arendt literature, but it is possible to identify distinct lines of argument. If early readings of Arendt often tended to embrace her classicism as a counterweight to the positivistic tendencies of behavioral political science, for the past decade or more, as political theory has come into its own as a field, Arendt has been read against some of the dominant idioms of contemporary political theory itself. This has led to the flourishing of civic republican, Habermasian, Foucauldian, Derridaean, and other readings of Arendt. These readings have allowed scholars to construct fruitful dialogues between Arendt and a range of approaches, in the process fleshing out Arendt and these approaches themselves. *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt* builds on this work. But it is also part of a broader recent tendency to move beyond it, following her own admonition to "think without bannisters" and outside of the box. Many of its commentaries are more than commentaries and more than efforts to extend conventional paradigms. They are efforts to probe Arendt in order to pursue difficult and relevant contemporary questions about the political meaning of evil, the nature of political agency, and the possibilities of democratic renewal. To this extent these essays are truly a fine "companion" to Arendt, for they help us not simply to

understand her but to do what she rightly thought we need to do—to think for ourselves about what we are doing.

The Platonic Political Art: A Study of Critical Reason and Democracy By John R. Wallach. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 468p. \$65.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

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Not only is the practice of a genuinely Platonic political art compatible with a commitment to democracy, but, according to John Wallach's ambitious book, it furnishes a needed critical resource that can help tap the unfulfilled potential of democracy at the present time. Wallach's unconventional thesis emerges from his *critical historicism*, a method that attempts to carve a mean between the relatively *ahistorical* readings of Popper, Strauss, Arendt, Derrida, and Rorty (among others) and the *radically historicist* readings more typical of classicists and ancient historians (pp. 21–23). Whereas the latter tend to subordinate Plato to the historical and political forces of his time, the widely disparate interpretations of the former cohort view him as either "authoritarian" or radically "self-mocking." In either case, Plato is portrayed as an antagonist to the freedom and equality of democratic life. To release the Platonic political art from the grip of these influential but debilitating interpretations, Wallach seeks to navigate between the *ahistorical* elevation of theory (*logos*) and the *historicist* subordination of theory to practice (*ergon*), focusing instead on the dissonance of the *logos/ergon* relation itself.

Wallach explains that Plato's political art was forged in response to a welter of problems concerning power, ethics, and critical discourse in democratic Athens, all of which came to a head in "the honorable yet problematic life, and memory of Socrates," something he dubs "Plato's Socratic Problem" (p. 43). Socrates' failure to reconcile the exercise of virtue with the requirements of political life (depicted especially in the contrasting perspectives of *Apology* and *Crito*) became the central feature of Plato's Socratic problem, one that led to a new and distinctively philosophic conceptualization of the political art as an attempt "to understand and promote the potential for harmony between a critical ethics and the power of politics, between the *ergon* of democracy and the *logos* of justice" (p. 234).

The longest part of the book is devoted to an elucidation of Plato's political art. Plato begins with critical explorations of Athenian conventions in the aporetic dialogues (culminating in *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*), gives comprehensive and positive expression to his art in the *Republic*, and later applies it to practical themes of political leadership and constitutional law in the *Statesman* and *Laws*, respectively. Wallach incorporates generally accepted writing chronologies for the dialogues, but dependence upon theories of Plato's "intellectual development" has been displaced by the centrality of Plato's Socratic problem. The heart of this section—indeed, of the book as a whole—is a 116-page analysis of the *Republic*. Wallach contends that the *Republic* is misread when it is taken as a blueprint for political reform or dismissed as merely utopian; the genuinely Platonic connection between *logos* and *ergon* resides in the "inevitably problematic *effort* both to identify genuine justice discursively and philosophically and to exemplify it practically and politically" (p. 311). Moreover, Plato's pursuit of justice is marked by "the persuasion of education" rather than by the coercive or authoritarian imposition of violence. With these arguments in mind, Wallach takes on antidemocratic interpretations of the *Republic*. He maintains that the dialogue as a whole is not primarily directed against

democracy but evidences a more radical project, one that rejects "the necessary connection between *any existing political order* . . . and the definition of justice" (p. 279, emphasis added). Rather than provide an ideal resolution for the problem of justice, Plato articulates an enduring problem, one that emerges from his attempt to grapple with the immediate historical conundrums dramatized in his "Socratic problem." It is this dynamic and open-ended interpretation of the Platonic political art that enables Wallach, in the final part of his book, to suggest ways in which that art might benefit contemporary debates about the relationship between critical reason and democracy.

Readers of Wallach's book will encounter an earnest Plato, one ardently devoted to the constructive project defined by his Socratic problem. But it is a Plato without humor and a Socrates stripped of the characteristic irony that both engaged and alienated his contemporaries. Indeed, the only time that irony becomes thematic is on the concluding page, where Wallach rightly notes "the remarkable irony" of his argument: A political art distinguished by its critical stance toward ancient democracy can become a democratic asset in the current postliberal age. Wallach intentionally plays down Socratic or Platonic irony, apparently fearing a movement of interpretative regress that threatens constructive philosophic claims (p. 90). He turns instead to the seemingly more solid ground of history but, in so doing, (ironically) runs the risk of distorting a truth about the historical Socrates that may be inseparable from his critical legacy. With respect to Plato, the possibility of infinite regress is constrained by the artistry of the dialogue form he helped perfect.

This points to a second lacuna in Wallach's study, the almost complete absence of sensitivity to literary genre. In fact, Wallach wishes to bypass both the vagaries of literary interpretation and the apolitical appropriations of analytical philosophy. His halfway house, however, leans to the analytic side in its neglect of irony and literary drama, something he justifies with the claim that "philosophical arguments . . . count for more than their embodiment by characters" (p. 90). Dramatic elements are not entirely neglected but are valued as evidence for the historical problems that Plato attempts to resolve (p. 91), an approach that raises a more general question about the adequacy of the critical historicist method itself. Whereas it is readily apparent that our understanding of Plato is enriched by knowledge of history, it is by no means obvious when a particular argument should be considered historically dependent or historically transcending. Wallach invokes the latter perspective in the crucial case, arguing (correctly in my view) that the critical political theory of the *Republic* was not developed primarily in opposition to Athenian democracy, but with reference to injustices that suffuse "every existing political order" (p. 234). The reader is left to wonder how one ought to distinguish historical contingencies that constrain Plato's formulations from aspects of Plato's art that transcend the particular practical circumstances within which they were originally conceived. This judgment seems no less susceptible to the kind of regress that Wallach decries with respect to interpretations that engage the ironic and/or literary dimensions of Plato's art. Wallach also appears to allow partisan passions to intrude upon his project in a most unPlatonic way. Key points in his interpretation of the *Republic* (neither blueprint nor utopia; not a critique simply of democratic Athens but of all existing regimes) have been anticipated by Strauss and Bloom, whom he cites only to dismiss, derisively caricaturing their work as antipolitical or conservatively aristocratic.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, Wallach's book is clearly written, encompasses an impressive breadth of historical and

philosophic material, and strenuously engages a mountain of recent and not so recent scholarly debate about Plato. It also contains several subtle and insightful ways of framing particular issues within the *Republic* and relating them to Plato's other dialogues. Those who find Plato's literary genius or use of irony to be inseparable from his political

art will find this book unsatisfying. However, in the measure that Wallach succeeds in problematizing a widespread tendency to read Plato through the analytic or radically historicizing lenses developed especially during the last century, his book deserves serious consideration and makes an important contribution.

American Politics

Black and Multiracial Politics in America Edited by Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh and Lawrence J. Hanks. New York: New York University Press, 2000. 404p. \$55.00 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

Michael K. Brown, *University of California, Santa Cruz*

The waves of immigrants arriving in the United States over the last 20 years, largely from Latin America and Asia, have settled in a few states—mainly California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey—and in big cities in those states. Like the migration of African Americans to northern cities in the twentieth century and the suburbanization of whites, this demographic transformation is remaking urban politics. *Black and Multiracial Politics in America*, a collection of original essays, addresses the implications of this change for “the practice and process of black and multiracial politics in American society” (p. xiii). The authors seek to forge a new link between the study of black and the study of multiracial politics.

This anthology is dedicated to the proposition that the black–white paradigm “no longer appropriately characterizes American racial politics.” Not all of the essays speak to this question, but those that do raise two important issues. One question concerns the meaning of race in American politics, whether recent demographic changes fundamentally alter the color line. The second question is whether the relationship between the new immigrants and African Americans will turn on conflict or cooperation.

Some of the essays in this book suggest that racial divisions between whites and nonwhites remain salient to American politics despite immigration. Pie-te Lien and Margaret Conway demonstrate that blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans are all far more likely to support affirmative action, albeit for very different reasons, than whites, who disproportionately oppose such policies. And Pie-te Lien shows that race is still consequential to voting. She writes, “All the nonwhite groups—Asians and Latinos especially—had much lower registration and voting rates than Whites” (p. 207). It is well known that voting rates for Latinos and Asian Americans are much lower than those for other groups because far fewer are eligible to register. Almost half of Asian Americans and two-fifths of Latinos are not citizens and therefore are disqualified. This is changing, particularly in California in the wake of the antiimmigrant ballot initiatives of the 1990s. Even so, racial differences in voting remain after accounting for differences in education, income, marital status, and union membership of eligible voters.

Since race matters for the new immigrants as well as African Americans, the interesting question is whether the divide between whites and nonwhites will lead to multiracial political coalitions or whether competition for resources, access, and political power results in new patterns of ethnic conflict, especially between blacks and the new immigrant groups. If the studies in this book are any guide, the answer

depends as much on how blacks respond to the new immigrants as on the reaction of whites. One factor influencing African Americans' response is the continuing significance of black racial consciousness, particularly a strong nationalist outlook. In one of the most interesting essays in the book, Errol Henderson argues that Black Nationalism waxes or wanes depending on macro political phenomena, specifically war, a repressive political climate, and whether the country is preoccupied with foreign or domestic affairs. Wars sharpen the discrepancy between black sacrifice abroad and oppression at home, inducing African-American militancy and white intransigence. In these circumstances, black leaders championing integration lose out to nationalists.

Henderson's valuable effort to chart the oscillations of Black Nationalism is not wholly convincing, mainly because World War II and the Korean war do not really fit the pattern. There are also secular changes that matter. In their fascinating study of the Million Man March, Joseph McCormick II and Sekou Franklin find that racial consciousness remains the most salient feature of African American political identity today even among putative integrationists. They are far more race conscious than the integrationists of the pre-1965 era and “far more concerned,” McCormick and Franklin write, “with reforming the economic, political, and social order and removing racial impediments to their progress than with mere racial integration per se” (p. 331). McCormick and Franklin think that either black consciousness could lead to efforts to form new political coalitions or it could intensify nationalism and impede the development of nascent multiracial coalitions. Whether it leads to coalitions or to separation depends in part on the ethnic and political consciousness of other groups. Unfortunately, we learn very little in this book about the political identity and consciousness of most Latinos or Asian Americans. This is one of the major weaknesses of the collection.

Several essays address the difficulties of building multiracial coalitions. Raphael Sonenshein argued some time ago that biracial political coalitions depended in part on an alliance between groups who were mutually excluded from political power and influence but who shared political goals and ideology. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Afro-Caribbeans all tread the same side of the color line and could be expected to endorse similar policies. For two reasons, however, multiracial coalitions are difficult to build and sustain. One of the paradoxes of contemporary black politics is that African Americans now have political power in many cities but remain a marginal group, victimized by white racism. José E. Cruz found that resentment and racial ambivalence governed the relationship between blacks and Puerto Ricans in Hartford, Connecticut, and frustrated efforts at cooperation. Black elites were reluctant simply to give up power to a new group, who, not surprisingly, insisted on appointing members of their own group to agencies and elected offices.

The other reality shaping the development of multiracial political coalitions is the transnational identity of many of the new immigrants. Whatever ostensible political objectives they might share with blacks, Reuel Rogers argues that

Afro-Caribbean political identity is shaped by a “sojourner mentality [that] fuels the ‘myth of return.’” (p. 39) Maintaining their ties to families and friends in their home countries enables Afro-Caribbeans to think that exit may be preferable to voice. Rogers is right to point out that both pluralists who preach assimilation and those who think that the new immigrants will become just another minority group wrongly ignore the power of a transnational political identity.

This collection of essays could not be timelier. Although some of the studies are peripheral to the major themes and thus less interesting, scholars pondering the implications of recent immigration for ethnic and racial politics would do well to look at this collection of essays.

American Labor Unions in the Electoral Arena By Herbert B. Asher, Eric S. Heberlig, Randall B. Ripley, and Karen Snyder. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 207p. \$69.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Glenn Perusek, *Albion College*

For more than a generation, as the authors rightly point out, the impact of organized labor on electoral politics has been neglected in scholarly literature. Indeed, only a tiny minority of social scientists explicitly focuses on organized labor in the United States. Although the impact of the social movements of the 1960s appeared to heighten awareness of the importance of class, race, and gender, class and its organized expression, the union movement, has received less attention, while studies of race and gender have flourished.

Thus, a systematic study of the impact of organized labor upon electoral politics, historically grounded yet centered upon contemporary outcomes and prospects, is to be welcomed. This work, the product of a decade-long study of organized labor in electoral politics, relies on American National Election Studies for national data. But in research funded by the Center for Labor Research at Ohio State University, the authors conducted four original surveys of elections in Ohio (1990–96), sampling union members and the general population. In addition to being a succinct statement from a behavioralist perspective of the trajectory of American labor in politics since the 1950s, this work’s distinctive contribution is the careful analysis of these surveys.

The study is set against the backdrop of a long process of erosion of the power of organized labor in the United States, as well as the political and organizational turn taken by the AFL-CIO in 1995 to arrest this decline. The authors have a strong sense of the transformation of the socioeconomic circumstances of organized labor. In the 1930s to 1950s period, the typical union member lived in an urban/industrial center, near the factory, in a neighborhood with many co-workers. In this environment, the union hall was an integral institution in the community, “the site of frequent meetings, wedding receptions, weekend dances, and summertime potlucks. Factory, family, union, and neighbors were intertwined” (p. 35). But the postwar period, of course, brought suburbanization and membership dispersal, as well as transformations of the American economy that resulted in membership decline, with a membership that was more white collar, self-identified as “middle class,” and less committed to traditional strategies for achieving organizational goals.

While union density declined throughout the postwar period, the official labor movement adopted a status quo political orientation. Traditional union political strategy minimized expenditures on education and mobilization, particularly of members whose beliefs differed from the organization. Tar-

geting key races for political action committee (PAC) contributions, and then lobbying those elected to office, was easier than the painstaking process of working with the rank and file to solidify them behind the Democratic Party or a comprehensive issue agenda. Even though this system achieved few political victories for labor in the post-Taft Hartley era, it was able to protect organized labor from greater political defeats so long as the Democratic Party enjoyed majorities in Congress. As narrowly efficient as this strategy was, it bred organizational complacency. When Democratic control of Congress ended, labor was forced to reevaluate the traditional strategy. The Sweeney administration of the AFL-CIO has emphasized aggressive organizational campaigns, political mobilization of existing members, and an increasingly sophisticated use of electronic media to improve organized labor’s image to the general public.

With the election of the John Sweeney as president of the AFL-CIO, organized labor sought renewal through a renewed focus on organization of new members, although it engaged in increasingly sophisticated electoral activity as part of a comprehensive strategy. Sweeney openly spoke of the danger that organized labor would be consigned to permanent irrelevance in the United States if unable to organize new members. The authors disagree with Sweeney’s advocacy that organized labor renew itself by becoming a social movement representing universal interests, suggesting, definitionally, that social movements operate outside “normal institutional channels” and employ “illegitimate, disruptive tactics” (p. 3). Their judicious formulation treats organized labor as a “peak association” primarily concerned with advancing the interests of their own members, but capable of speaking for the interests of nonmembers as part of broader coalitions.

The book, however, is not centered upon organized labor as an interest organization advocating a policy orientation in the legislative arena. Instead, it is organized labor’s work in elections, and the related activities of membership education and mobilization, that form the primary concerns of the volume. After examining the historical, demographic, and sociological transformations that have diminished union power in the postwar period, the authors explore members’ attitudes toward unions (Chapter 3), traditional political strategy (Chapter 4), political strategy in the Sweeney era (Chapter 5), union political activists (Chapter 6), and election day outcomes (Chapter 7).

This research confirms the standard wisdom of behavioral studies that “party identification is the ultimate variable” (p. 41); in the case of organized labor, party identification and ideology are the strongest predictors of support for union-endorsed candidates. In other words, membership in a union alone washes out as a factor in vote choice, once controlled for party identification. Does this make labor irrelevant in American elections? Hardly. The authors convincingly argue that deeper, long-run education and mobilization do make organized labor a factor. Election campaign mobilization is less important than long-run education: “Committed members are more likely to look to the union for cues and to follow those cues” (p. 151). This seems to confirm the Sweeney administration’s view that organizing new members, educating members and the general public on the positive social and economic benefits of unionization, and political strategy work hand in hand in the difficult task of revitalizing American unionism. It also points in the direction of studies on the formation of liberal ideology and Democratic Party identification, studies that in all likelihood will need to rely on different methodologies than those employed in this able expression of behavioralist research.

Superintending Democracy: The Courts and the Political Process Edited by Christopher P. Banks and John C. Green. Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 2001. 396p. \$39.95.

The Votes That Counted: How the Court Decided the 2000 Presidential Election By Howard Gillman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001. 301p. \$27.50.

Robert W. Langran, *Villanova University*

Superintending Democracy is a very fine collection of articles about the role of the judicial branch and our electoral system. It is an especially timely book in view of the Supreme Court's ruling in *Bush v. Gore*. However, the book does not focus on that one decision. Rather, the articles run the gamut and cover all the times the courts and electoral politics intertwine.

In the opening article, not only do editors Banks and Green discuss the theme of the book and how the remaining 11 articles fit that theme but they set forth a model to examine just how much of a role the courts do play. They look at the degree of intervention and whether the subject matter involves political resources or political actors. Then the next five articles use the political resources area.

The article by Banks has a myriad of cases that discuss the Supreme Court's response to political corruption, i.e., bribery, conflict of interest, campaign finance (with much emphasis on *Buckley v. Valeo*, the integrity of the ballot and franchise, political participation, and partisan parties. The author gives the Court praise. The John Bonifaz, Gregory Luke, and Brenda Wright article gives arguments why *Buckley* should be revisited in light of the massive campaign spending in federal elections, whereas the Joel Gora article likes *Buckley's* linkage of campaign spending with free speech. Each will be persuasive for its adherents. The Trevor Potter article looks at the Supreme Court's decision on disclosure in campaign finance reform, arguing that the Court will be more inclined to uphold disclosure laws for larger organizations than for individuals. The Barbara Perry article tackles the racial gerrymandering problem and how the Court has tried to steer a moderate path here.

The six articles concerning political actors starts with coeditor Green's look at the Supreme Court and political parties, beginning with a classic anecdote from one of his students about parties. Green fears that the Court may become too involved with intraparty disputes, a highly political matter. The David Ryden article looks at political reform and concludes that the Court has done poorly here with regard to minor and new parties, with the *Timmons* case a classic example. The David O'Brien article examines the Court's role in political patronage, stressing that it has not ended it despite allegations to the contrary. The Katy Harriger article focuses on the Whitewater and Iran-Contra controversies, arguing that independent counsels in both cases encountered problems in this investigation due to legal limitations. The Steven Tauber article shows how great the influence of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was, is, and will be with regard to minority voting rights law. Finally, coeditor Banks closes with a look at *Bush v. Gore*, concluding that the Court did overstep its bounds here in its attempt to superintend democracy.

As for the Gillman book, it is a meticulous study of the 2000 presidential election and the role played by various people and institutions once Election Day was history. It differs from other books on the subject in that it gives an in-depth look at all the events that led to the Supreme Court's *Bush v. Gore* decision, so much so that the book is not only a fascinating read but also an excellent resource tool. After setting out the plan of the book, Gillman proceeds to show why Democratic voters in Palm Beach County had lawsuits filed in their behalf (his description of the "butterfly ballot" is illuminating)

and why Volusia County filed a lawsuit against the Florida secretary of state (later joined by Palm Beach County). Contrary to what many people believe, the Bush campaign filed the first lawsuit (for an emergency injunction to try to halt manual recounts), which was denied by a U.S. District Court judge and the Court of Appeals. The Florida Supreme Court would also not halt them, but after a lower Florida judge allowed the secretary of state to ignore late recount results, the Florida Supreme Court unanimously held that she must accept them and extended the deadline (although it later refused to compel Miami-Dade County to restart its recount, and it upheld a lower Florida judge's ruling that he had no authority to order a new election in Palm Beach County).

This is where the Bush campaign decided to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and three days after hearing the arguments, it unanimously vacated the decision and asked the Florida court to clarify whether its decision was based exclusively on Florida statutes, which subsequently they said it was. The U.S. Court of Appeals then ruled 8-4 that the manual recounts were valid. As all this was occurring, separate cases were heard by lower Florida judges about the way absentee ballots were handled in two counties by Republicans, but were allowed, and the decisions were later upheld by the Florida Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the separate case of *Gore v. Harris* saw a 4-3 Florida Supreme Court order an immediate commencement of a statewide recount of so-called undervotes, the Court of Appeals deny Bush's appeal, but the U.S. Supreme Court 5-4 issue an emergency injunction to halt it. That same day, a U.S. District Court judge held that the Florida Constitution was not violated by the acceptance of absentee ballots after Election Day, said decision later upheld by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals.

That brings Gillman to a full discussion of the oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in *Bush v. Gore*, followed the next night (December 12) by the Court's 5-4 decision holding that the manual recount violated the equal protection clause due to the standard for reviewing ballots, which allowed for too much variation. Thus ended the election, because Gore conceded the next day.

The book would be valuable enough if it ended here, as it has so much detailed information. However, Gillman now proceeds to give his analysis, and he comes to the conclusion that the Court's decision was wrong: It was a usurpation of judicial power, and even though it ended a period of uncertainty about next president, it was classic partisan decision making. Acceptance or rejection of that conclusion should not be the determining factor of the book's importance, which lies in its thorough examination of all the legal maneuverings surrounding this historic election. Both the Banks-Green and the Gillman books are worthy contributions to the literature on the role played by courts in electoral processes.

Continuity and Change in House Elections Edited by David W. Brady, John F. Cogan, and Morris P. Fiorina. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 297p. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Patricia Conley, *Northwestern University*

For years, congressional elections were ignored or treated as fairly straightforward and predictable. The Democrats controlled the House. Incumbents nearly always won. Voters chose the candidate who would deliver the local goods. The magnitude of the Republican victory in the 1994 midterms set politicians, journalists, and scholars on a search to find an explanation that would place the election in the proper context. Was 1994 an outlier or the beginning of a new era? This volume places the 1990s in the context of the past 40 years of

House elections and provides a solid foundation for gauging whether 1994 was the culmination of long-term trends or a dramatic break with the past.

The book is an outgrowth of a conference sponsored by the Hoover Institute after the elections of 1994 and 1996, aimed at explaining how the Republicans could have captured the House of Representatives and retained their majority, despite Clinton's sizable reelection victory. First, what best explains the Republican takeover in 1994? A nationalized congressional campaign? Redistricting? A large number of Democratic retirements? Some chapters look at structural changes that provided opportunities for Republican gains over time; other chapters focus on more immediate causes of victory. Second, what are the factors that affected a member's reelection chances in the 1990s? Roll call voting or district service? The book suggests that candidate ideology and policy behavior played an important role in the congressional elections of the 1990s. In most chapters, the 1994 election is not viewed in isolation, but in the context of time-series data going back 20 to 40 years.

The early chapters outline long-term trends and structural changes that led to the Republican majority in the House. Gary Jacobson suggests that "the question is not so much why the Republicans finally won the House in 1994 but why it took them so long to do so" (p. 11). During the past 40 years, the incumbency advantage has declined and the number of contested House races has increased. In recent years, there has been a greater congruence between presidential and House voting. Jacobson argues that these factors, along with an increase in the quality of Republican challengers and voluntary retirements among Democrats, combined to give the Republicans their majority in 1994. Charles Bullock documents the increase in white voter support for Republican candidates in the South, where the Republican Party has gained the greatest number of seats. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran analyze the effects of majority-minority redistricting.

Later chapters focus on the nationalization of the 1994 election. Congressional elections are typically viewed as low-salience, local events. But in 1994, the Republican House leadership offered their "Contract with America" as a platform for all Republican candidates and ran against the politics of President Bill Clinton. The public was more aware of which party controlled the House in 1994 than in any election year since the mid-1970s when this type of data was first collected. John Hibbing and Eric Tiritilli show that in 1994, disapproval of Congress actually mattered—attribution of blame to the Democratic Party hurt Democratic incumbents. David Brady, Robert D'Onofrio, and Morris Fiorina discuss nationalization by examining how well House elections are predicted by the previous presidential vote. They provide an interesting account of the ups and downs of the local and national components of the House vote since 1954, and show that the national component of the vote was indeed on an upswing in the early 1990s.

Several authors take issue with the notion that congressional elections are not oriented around policy. The steady increase in the ideological polarization of political parties in the House has made it easier for parties to be viewed as collectives and held responsible at the polls. Both Robert Erikson and Gerald Wright and also David Brady, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and John Cogan argue for the importance of policy by providing evidence that members who stray too far from their districts' ideological position are punished at the polls. Brady and his coauthors speculate that members may stray from their districts on roll call votes in exchange for appointments and perks offered by presidents and party leaders. David Leal and Frederick Hess examine the role of issues by interviewing the campaign staff of challengers in

several states in 1994. They find that Democratic challengers were less eager to campaign on the issues, even when their party was generally viewed as more competent on a particular issue. They argue that Republican emphasis on the issues, particularly crime, could help explain the magnitude of their victory in 1994.

The book provides persuasive evidence that the elections of the mid-1990s were not merely an anomaly. Congressional elections have changed. After reading this book, it would be hard to argue that congressional elections are purely local affairs. The public appears to treat members of Congress as men and women of style, pork, and substance. As for political predictions, the book suggests that the factors that led to the Republican takeover do not offer the Democrats hope of a dramatic return to power in the near future. In addition, Stephen Ansolabehere and Jim Snyder show that good committee assignments and membership in the majority party lead to much greater success in fund-raising, particularly political action committee donations. Thus, the Republican majority is potentially reinforced by incumbency advantages in raising money.

Although the major explanations for Republican victory are compelling, it is difficult to glean the relative weight of explanatory variables because each chapter focuses on a separate subset of explanations. One chapter documents changes in the South; another concentrates on the effects of congressional disapproval. Further, several authors impute policy motivations to voters when evaluating congressional candidates, yet only one chapter uses individual-level survey data to discuss the reasons and motivations of voters; other chapters use aggregate, district-level data. Senate races would be a helpful and interesting contrast. More attention could be paid to whether theories of divided government would be modified by what we have learned about recent congressional elections.

Yet despite these concerns, this edited volume is a major contribution to the literature on congressional elections. The chapters present solid empirical work and fit well together. In addition to providing a thoughtful analysis of the election of 1994, the editors have put together a volume that will give the reader an overview of the major trends, empirical measures, and theoretical questions that motivate this field of research.

The Politics of Breast Cancer By Maureen Hogan Casamayou. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 191p. \$60.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Carol S. Weissert, *Michigan State University*

This book aims to explain why funding levels for breast cancer research suddenly achieved extensive media coverage, as well as both attention and action from Congress and the White House, in the period between 1990 and 1993. Maureen Hogan Casamayou's answer: the effective mobilization of legions of angry women and their allies by entrepreneurial leaders in a new breast cancer coalition. She tells the story of how these women came together, charted strategy, and succeeded in expanding federal funding.

In fact, the book covers more than this rather narrow time frame and provides an engaging and informative description of the history of funding for cancer research, the political activities surrounding that history, and the role of women legislators in bringing the issue of research parity to the policy agenda—all happening before 1990. In fact, as Casamayou notes, women's grassroots groups have been active against cancer for many years. For example, in 1937 a coalition of women's groups drummed up support for federal cancer legislation. Congressional hearings on breast cancer were first

held in 1976. Breast cancer has long garnered research funding, which in 1987 was larger than research related to any other type of cancer.

The actors (or actresses) in Casamayou's story are engaging and smart. Too many women die from the disease, but their contributions are many. Indeed, the contribution of this book is primarily in the story it tells of three breast cancer issues that played out prior to the announced time frame of the book: surgery options for breast cancer victims, mammography screenings, and funding for research on breast cancer.

Casamayou clearly and concisely documents the frustration of women in the 1970s when they sought alternatives to radical surgical treatment of breast cancer. When one medical writer sought to get a diagnostic biopsy prior to surgical removal of her breast, 19 surgeons turned her down. In the following years, a modified radical mastectomy and other surgical offerings became widespread. The efforts to increase access to mammography also took place in the 1970s, and mammography screenings greatly increased in the 1980s. Grassroots lobbying played an important part in the passage in the late 1980s of federal legislation requiring Medicare coverage of routine mammography screening. The original requirement was part of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act that was later repealed. It was revived as part of the fiscal 1991 budget-reconciliation bill, even though it had been in neither the House nor the Senate bills.

In the late 1980s, women legislators in the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues were raising questions about breast cancer research and other issues, such as the poor representation of women in clinical trials in National Institutes of Health-funded research. Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, whose sister had died from the disease, was a strong supporter of increased funding for breast cancer research, and he was the initiator of the "ingenious device" by which Department of Defense money could be directly allocated for this purpose. As Casamayou notes, "It is indeed ironic that one of the most prestigious and traditional male-oriented government departments, the DOD, is disbursing funds for breast cancer research" (p. 161).

While this background is useful and provides extremely vivid examples of how legislative and individual entrepreneurs can affect policy in major ways, Casamayou's primary concern is the nationally and regionally organized efforts to affect policy in the early 1990s. She focuses on the National Breast Cancer Coalition (NBCC), which was formed in 1991 with the express purpose of political advocacy. The coalition built on the work of earlier advocates by organizing massive petition drives and marches, encouraging congressional hearings, and using the media to help tell the breast cancer "story." The NBCC was active in political campaigns; in the late 1990s it organized a voting registration drive and sponsored a national poll illustrating the importance of breast cancer to the American voter.

Casamayou describes the activities of the new NBCC, highlighting their mobilization and publicity efforts. While she asserts that the early 1990s are a distinctive and remarkable period in the history of grassroots mobilization, her own story highlights how this mobilization actually built on and expanded earlier efforts. The NBCC did provide an organizational framework for political advocacy—performed in earlier years by more loosely coupled groups and organizations focused primarily on funding issues. But the similarities far exceed the differences.

Casamayou makes the point that the success of the breast cancer-prevention advocates (pre-1990 and later) is because of their "collective entrepreneurship." But she does not cite the literature on collective entrepreneurship and indeed

never fully specifies how she is defining the term. Further, her "evidence" is pretty weak. She makes the (interesting) point that entrepreneurs in the area have had personal experience with breast cancer, but her documentation is flawed by a lack of clarification of how she is "counting." In one table, she counts the number of entrepreneurs in grassroots and national organizations but does not explain how entrepreneurs are defined and what it means that the Kentucky organization has two leaders (entrepreneurs) who had breast cancer. Similarly, the table does not explain why seven state organizations were selected. A second table supporting the idea that collective entrepreneurship took place has only a few of the states from the earlier table and little explanation for how the "shared experience" explaining their involvement was defined.

Another quibble is with the organization of the book, which early on mentions groups by initials and individuals by name, none of whom are identified. There is also some confusion caused by the author's skipping around in chronology—with some earlier events explained later in the book rather than in more obvious introductory sections. In addition, the espoused focus of the book on the 1990–93 period seems forced and inappropriate. Some of the most interesting events described in the book occurred before or after that period. She notes that the NBCC "fairly claimed much of the credit for the enormous increases in breast cancer research in the 1990s" (p. x), but the NBCC was not even formed until mid-1991. And the book does not provide a table showing the growth of funding for breast cancer—a mystifying omission given that explaining the growth in breast cancer funding is a major aim of this book.

Finally, the author doesn't adequately make the case that it is the national political advocacy group that is the true success story here. She undercuts her own case by showing how individual, congressional, and grassroots efforts started almost two decades before 1990, efforts which were very successful and paved the way for the NBCC—a latecomer to the policy world. Nevertheless, the book provides a very useful telling of a very interesting story of grassroots and congressional advocacy. It outlines the strategies, motivations, and personal stories behind this effort. The analysis of collective action on the part of the NBCC was a secondary and more disappointing aspect of the book.

Civil Rights and Public Accommodations: The Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung Cases By Richard C. Cortner. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. 240p. \$29.95.

Joseph Stewart, Jr., *University of New Mexico*

Mention Richard Cortner's name and political scientists think of "stories" of court cases well and thoroughly told. Cortner's latest effort is another superb contribution to this line of work. In this work he focuses on the two cases in which the constitutionality of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA) was tested—the *Heart of Atlanta Motel* case and the "Ollie's Barbeque" case.

Title II was the most hotly debated part of the CRA, but, probably because of the relative ease of implementing its provisions compared to subsequent civil rights policy in voting rights, school desegregation, equal employment opportunity, or open housing, it has been neglected in recent scholarship. This inattention is doubly ironic given the fact that one of the most infamous of the Supreme Court's cases, *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), was a public accommodations case.

Cortner begins by setting background for and the context of the passage of the CRA. The constitutional and strategic issues are immediately obvious. Where does Congress get

the power to legislate against racial discrimination in public accommodations? How can privately owned business enterprises be *public* accommodations? Does the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause apply? Should Article I's Commerce Clause be dispositive? Would the Supreme Court be willing to overrule the *Civil Rights Cases* (1883), which struck down the previous Congressional attempt to outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodations—the Civil Rights Act of 1875?

Having set the stage, Cortner details the progress of each of the cases. The contrast is also immediately obvious. The Heart of Atlanta Motel is clearly and admittedly covered by Title II and houses a restaurant that had desegregated. Thus, the government (read: Solicitor General Archibald Cox) can take the offensive. (Recent attendees of the APSA convention might find it interesting to know that the motel stood on the current site of the Atlanta Hilton & Towers.)

Simultaneously, in the same city, Lester Maddox defended (literally, with pickax handles) his Pickrick restaurant against desegregation (and parlayed the accompanying fame into the Governorship and Lt. Governorship of Georgia, in that order). The FBI had thoroughly investigated this case, and the government was well prepared to defend this case at the Supreme Court. Because, however, Maddox declined to appeal his initial court loss, the first restaurant case came from an out-of-the-way barbecue joint in "Bombingham," Alabama—Ollie's Barbeque—which had not been the target of any enforcement action. Ollie McClung, Sr., according to Cortner, found the inspiration for his opposition to the CRA not in racism, but in religion. To the government's discomfort, the case was more tenuously connected to interstate commerce, the grounds upon which Congress had at least implicitly based the legislation. Interestingly, in both cases, both opponents of the CRA vowed to obey the Supreme Court's decision.

Cortner is at his best as he details the legal arguments in each of the cases and judicial deliberations of the cases combined. "Details" is not an idly chosen verb. Cortner's research into presidential files, oral histories, Department of Justice Civil Rights Division files (of the *Heart of Atlanta* case but not the *McClung* case, the files of which are lost), and files of participating attorneys is obvious. Cortner recalls both old (*New York v. Miln*, 1837) and more contemporaneous (*Bell v. Maryland*, 1964) public accommodations cases. His insights on the arguments and the rationales for those arguments of the *Heart of Atlanta* and *McClung* attorneys and the Justices is superb—the result of careful, time-consuming, and meticulous scholarly work. We know more about the politics of litigation and of Supreme Court politics because of this work.

So what? Cortner again does a superb job of explicating the importance of these cases for Commerce Clause and civil rights law. One might be tempted to say that these cases ended an era. After all, the Court has issued only one significant decision applying the public accommodations section since 1964 (*Daniel v. Paul*, 1969 [upholding the application of the public accommodations provisions to a privately owned recreation area outside of Little Rock, AR]). Cortner, however, demonstrates the continuing relevance of this litigation by comparing it to the "mini-revival of the doctrine of dual federalism" (p. 195) and the Court's willingness to impose limits on the use of the commerce power as a basis for legislation, signaled by the Court's rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment and its creative readings of the Eleventh Amendment. The account is current through the spring 2000 decision in *U.S. v. Morrison* (the Violence Against Women Act case).

Cortner's latest book is valuable on several dimensions. Even those scholars and teachers who have taught these cases for years will learn something from Cortner's account. Quite

simply, no one before has gone to the effort to amass so much information in one place about these important and interesting cases and the people involved. Scholars and teachers will already know the basics of judicial process and the nature of litigation that are presented herein, but their students, who do not, will learn what they need to know in the context of real cases, vividly depicted by Cortner. Thus, this volume would be a superb supplement in judicial process, constitutional law, civil rights, or American government courses. It should be read by anyone interested in these topics or teaching these courses.

Taking Aim: Target Populations and the Wars on AIDS and Drugs By Mark C. Donovan. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 148p. \$50.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Steven A. Peterson, *Penn State, Harrisburg*

One recent approach to the study of public policy has been policy design. And one component of this is the concept of target populations. Perhaps the strongest case for the importance of target populations as a focus for research has been advanced in the work of Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram. They have argued that target populations help to shape the construction of public policies. If target populations are politically weak and have negative constructions (for instance, drug users and drug dealers), then policies will tend to be harsh and punitive—penalties rather than benefits. In part, this serves political purposes, since one would get "political points" for being harsh with those who have little power and are perceived as "bad" people. In the process, bad policy may result, since the construction of target populations and policies aimed at them may have little to do with actually solving complex social problems.

Mark Donovan's book, *Taking Aim: Target Populations and the Wars on AIDS and Drugs*, begins where Schneider and Ingram leave off. His analysis of target populations adds an extra dimension—the nature of the problem being addressed. As a result, this book becomes a modest but useful step forward in the literature on target populations and policy design.

First, a brief description of the book. The first chapter simply explores the concept of target populations, building on the work of Schneider and Ingram. Donovan defines target population thus (p. 4): "Target populations are groups of people delimited by some shared characteristics who are identified through legislative language as the recipient of a benefit, a burden, or special treatment under federal law."

Donovan notes the importance of the political ambition of elected officials in dealing with target populations. He also emphasizes the key role of social problems. In the end, policy is a function of the interaction of target populations and social problems, with political ambition of elected officials and the structure of political institutions also coming into play.

Chapter 2 elaborates upon the political context, noting the importance of institutions, especially committees and committee hearings and floor debate, on the politics of target populations. Hearings and other venues provide opportunities for political leaders to "explain themselves" regarding policy choice—including how target populations are to be treated and why.

Chapters 3 and 4 are case studies of target populations: first, drug policy, and second, AIDS policy. Many in the target populations of drug users and AIDS victims are negatively constructed—and without much power. Thus, not surprisingly, political discourse can be harsh against such groups, with penalties assessed against them. Examples include the

clever use of politicizing the target population of AIDS victims by Jesse Helms and how he put opponents into a bad political position by his framing of the targeted people with AIDS (PWAs). However, Donovan notes that within each target population we find subpopulations, such as veterans who become drug users. Political leaders make fine-grained calculations and may treat different subgroups within a target population differently for political purposes (e.g., veterans who are drug users end up treated differently than other subpopulations of drug users).

The end result, as the rest of the book shows, is that sometimes segments of negatively constructed target populations are treated positively by Congress, receiving benefits rather than punishment. The Ryan White Act, for instance, provides benefits for some components of the AIDS population, based on the positive construction of innocent victims, such as hemophiliacs. This discussion is a modest advance over the original conceptualization of target populations by Schneider and Ingram.

A key case study is needle exchange. This is a program that has some rational linkage with reducing the spread of AIDS among intravenous drug users. But the “war on drugs” makes it, politically, extremely difficult for policymakers to accept this program as a policy choice. The construction of target populations is one important element in this political decision.

All in all, this is a useful volume that advances discourse on target populations. A number of commentators have observed that the policy design literature often has an abstract, ungrounded flavor to it. One aspect of policy design, though, does appear to provide an opportunity for solid empirical research, and that is the focus on target populations. What Schneider and Ingram did at a conceptual level, Donovan does at a more grounded level: He demonstrates the importance of the concept for explaining federal policy. Especially noteworthy is his use of content analysis to examine committee hearings and floor debate in order to see what themes emerged and how these were linked to target populations and policy problems, as members of Congress grappled with how to create policy on drug use and AIDS.

This book will be useful to readers who are interested in the formation of public policy, who are interested in the nature of policy design—especially as policy design is linked to target populations, and who study the nature of the linkage of social problems with policy solutions. In the final analysis, this book makes a nice, albeit limited, contribution to the literature.

Married to the Mouse: Walt Disney World and Orlando By Richard E. Foglesong. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. 251p. \$27.95.

Susan E. Clarke, *University of Colorado at Boulder*

This account of the development of Walt Disney World in Florida is an engaging contribution to the growing literature on tourism and urban politics. The many pleasures of reading this book include learning that Disney World was initially slated for St. Louis, that Henry Kissinger declared that Epcot would enhance world peace more than this shuttle diplomacy, that Disney prepared a proposal for a HUD planning grant for Disney World, and that even Walt Disney thought that Disneyland Anaheim was tacky. Foglesong meticulously details more than three decades of negotiations among the Walt Disney corporate conglomerate, the city of Orlando, and Orange and Osceola counties in Florida over the location and development of Walt Disney World and its spinoff theme parks. Not surprisingly, the Mouse wins most of the battles.

To Disney, “both capitalism and democracy were problematic,” in Foglesong’s felicitous diagnosis. Each resulted in more fragmentation than the Disney corporation considered tolerable; to resolve this dilemma in Florida, the Disney corporation constructed a land development model with highly centralized administration and control, embedded in fused private and public powers. Disney negotiated not only for tax breaks and infrastructure development subsidies in Florida but also for institutional arrangements that granted Disney developments autonomy from local and state political control. These institutional privileges and “immunities,” rather than tax incentives per se, are at the heart of the Orlando deal. It promised growth in exchange for privatization of governmental authority and deregulation of conventional land use and zoning controls. The Orlando area boomed with the location of Disney World: It remains one of the fastest-growing urban areas in the United States, job growth is explosive, and an enormous tourism infrastructure of hotels, entertainment attractions, and commercial development continues to unfold. The price of this growth, however, is equally staggering: Tourism brought low-wage jobs, overloaded local services and transportation facilities, and created substantial affordable housing shortages.

For Orlando and the surrounding counties, the Disney deal proved remarkably lopsided. Tax breaks reduced the local tax revenues that might have contributed to meeting the costs of explosive growth. The establishment of Reedy Creek Improvement District as a special-purpose district governed by Disney allowed the Mouse to control development as well as crowd out other local governments in bidding for bond financing for the Disney World infrastructure. Disney’s informal influence operated through lavish perks for local and state officials, well-funded lobbying, a clientelistic pattern of contracts with planning organizations, engineering and construction companies, and legal firms throughout the region, and a readiness to enter into lawsuits with anyone appearing to stand in the way of the corporate mission. And in an early and prescient move, Walt Disney himself insisted that the Disney World project spill over government boundaries to ensure interjurisdictional competition for Disney favors.

Early on, the Orange County Commission (p. 73), labor unions (p. 86), and public planners (p. 91) contested the Disney initiatives. Indeed, when opponents mobilized to voice their concerns, Disney often made strategic concessions to preserve its favorable image and public support. These occasions were infrequent, however, the concessions were modest and public officials rarely pursued their advantage in negotiations over an obviously immobile investment. Most local elected officials sought growth, local political structures were underdeveloped, the media remained syncophantic, and local taxpayer and downtown business organizations found it difficult to mobilize challenges to Disney’s legal and fiscal powers.

But as Foglesong astutely notes, “legal powers exist in a political context” (p. 114); changes in the political context eventually undermined the seemingly hegemonic Disney control. In 1985, the state began to implement growth management legislation requiring “concurrency” in private development and public facility provision; this meant that Disney would have to negotiate with local communities if it continued its aggressive development plans. Disney’s corporate decision to move beyond hotel and entertainment development and to launch Celebration, a planned residential community development, outside its own Reedy Creek special district, triggered a growing chorus of discontent from Celebration residents and taxpayers in surrounding communities. And over the years, the Disney presence itself set in play changes in local economic and political conditions that encouraged

resistance from citizen groups and the occasional civil servant, such as Osceola's Property Appraiser, willing to stand up to the Mouse. Even though political factors and conflict became more important over time, there is little evidence of an alternative vision or strategy for the area. Foglesong sets out some options in his conclusion—building on the emerging high-tech sector rather than offering further incentives for tourism, constructing a human capital agenda, establishing a living wage policy, and supporting revitalization of downtown Orlando—but there is little reason to anticipate that the necessary leadership or constituencies for these agendas will emerge. This inability to anticipate the conditions under which these agendas might become important hints at some of the weaknesses of the study.

Foglesong's narrative underscores the importance of documenting the postwar urban development experience while many of the key players are still available. This is ultimately a descriptive rather than an analytical or theoretical account of these processes. While this is a significant accomplishment, the many claims to loftier theoretical goals mar the effort, not because they are inappropriate but because they are not used to frame and interpret the analysis. The study is sprinkled with references to regimes, regime transition, growth machines, path dependency, and human capital agendas; but this is primarily a story about a clever and complex land development deal in Florida rather than an analysis using these concepts to understand better the political processes involved. Few readers will see this as a case study assessing "the significance of Walt Disney World for city-building and urban governance" (p. xi), much less be persuaded of Disney's intellectual interest in urban planning ideas. Nor are private decision making, privatization, and deregulation unique to Orlando and as remarkable as Foglesong's emphasis suggests, although the scale at which these occurred is noteworthy. Similarly, Foglesong declares that a regime perspective, with its emphasis on political factors, provides "a better understanding of the dynamics of the Disney-local relationship" (p. 189) but falls short of linking the details to the theory.

Instead, Foglesong uses the metaphor of love and marriage to frame his work. Each chapter is titled accordingly, ranging from "Seduction" to "Conflict" to "Therapy." This comes across as precious rather than insightful; using this framework stymies any attempt at theory-building. This is most apparent in the final chapter ("Therapy"), one of the strongest in the book. Foglesong's observations about the Disney World experience are intriguing but disconnected; references to regimes and other concepts appear as afterthoughts in a book structured around a rhetorical device rather than a theoretical argument. In the absence of an analytic logic, alternative explanations, or counterfactuals, the reader is left to sort out the meanings and implications of being *Married to the Mouse*.

Tabloid Justice: Criminal Justice in an Age of Media Frenzy

By Richard L. Fox and Robert W. Van Sickel. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 225p. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.00 paper.

William C. Green, *Morehead State University*

We live in a tabloid era defined by *The National Enquirer* and *The Star*. How has it affected popular confidence in the criminal justice system? Richard L. Fox and Robert W. Van Sickel's study examines the mass media's tabloid news coverage of high-profile criminal cases that involve violence and race, gender, and social class issues. This news coverage, they argue, sacrifices the media's educational function, misinforms the public about the operation of the criminal justice system, and contributes to the public's lack of faith in criminal justice.

The authors argue that the 1990s are a unique period in tabloid news coverage of criminal trials and investigations. Chapter 1 introduces seven cases—William Kennedy Smith, Rodney King, Erick and Lyle Menendez, O. J. Simpson, Louise Woodward, JonBenet Ramsey, and William Jefferson Clinton—that serve as vehicles to explore the mass media's use of criminal cases as entertainment. Chapter 2 details how the mass media became tabloidized with the blurring of the mainstream media and tabloid press and the emergence of television news magazines. Then it explores how the tabloidized media increased the amount and immediacy of its coverage of criminal cases. Chapter 3 examines the rise of the new media of cable television news, talk programs, and the Internet, which, the authors argue, has increased the tabloid coverage of political and legal news. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the authors' 1999 national poll conducted to assess the criminal justice effects of tabloid media coverage. Their poll results reveal a high level of familiarity with the seven tabloid cases and low levels of confidence in the criminal justice system and in police, judges, and juries. Chapter 5 turns to the national poll's examination of the racial, gender, and class impacts of tabloid media coverage and finds that the seven cases diminished confidence in the criminal justice system's treatment of blacks and women and of all defendants regardless of their economic status. The findings also reveal that blacks and women viewed these cases as lessening their confidence in the criminal justice system, but there were no differences on the basis of wealth.

In sum, the authors find that commercial interests now drive the mass media's focus on criminal trials; that the mainstream media are increasingly employing tabloid techniques in reporting criminal cases; that cable television, talk radio, and the Internet are critical elements in fostering a tabloid justice environment; that faith in the criminal justice system has decreased as public awareness of high-profile criminal cases increases; and that tabloid coverage reinforces racial, gender, and economic cleavages (pp. 187–90).

Tabloid Justice suffers from two faults. First, there is only a tenuous connection between the social constructionism theory the authors discuss at the outset (pp. 5–7) and their analysis of the data on tabloid news coverage. Largely absent is any sustained attention to larger historical, political, economic, and cultural changes driving the transformation of television news. Over the past 30 years, they claim that there are three "distinct" periods (1968–74, 1975–89, and 1990–) in which television news coverage has changed, but they fail to define their "social and political importance" criteria for these periods and they fail to include all the cases from Table 2.5 (p. 69) in their analysis of the 1975–89 period. If they had included Patty Hearst, John Hinckley, Bernard Goetz, and Jim Bakker, all identified in Table 2.5, they would not have been able to conclude that the media focused on "more individual and personal types of crimes" and less on crimes of broad social and political importance (p. 68). When they turn to the 1990s, they assert that it is a distinctive decade in which media coverage increased largely due to an increasingly frenzied climate of tabloid journalism fostered by their seven tabloid cases, but they do not provide any criteria for the choice of their seven cases (p. 30), nor do they explain findings contrary to their argument. In their discussion of Table 2.10, they tell us that *60 Minutes* and *20/20's* coverage of tabloid cases did not increase, but they do not explain what the table tells us: The coverage by these two television newsmagazine programs decreased by 2%.

Second, the authors create a straw man, the media as civic educator, and then bewail the fact that news coverage does not live up to their expectations. The news to which they want the media to give continuing coverage is information about

events that do not often touch our personal lives directly: diplomatic visits, tree-spiking environmentalists, and campaign finance reform. Yet the authors cannot demonstrate that their straw man's tabloid coverage of criminal trials and investigations has lessened popular faith in the criminal justice system or its police, judges, or juries. In fact, they admit that they cannot confirm their second and most critical of three hypotheses: "Public exposure to tabloid cases has diminished confidence in the criminal justice system" (p. 127). All they can establish is a "relationship between an individual's general confidence in the system and how the system worked in each of the cases" (pp. 134-35), and not the direction of this relationship. Even this conclusion is thrown into doubt by the failure of the first question of their national poll to focus solely on the media: "When you learn of the verdict in a criminal case, whether it is in the news or through talking with friends and family, how confident are you that the criminal justice system made a correct decision?" (p. 202). These observations also apply to their analysis of race, gender, and economic status. The authors are unable to tie levels of confidence based on these demographic groups to a tabloid style news coverage of criminal cases. In sum, *Tabloid Justice* may have established a case based on reasonable suspicion, but not on probable cause.

By Popular Demand: Revitalizing Representative Democracy Through Deliberative Elections By John Gastil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 275p. \$48.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Christopher Wlezien, *University of Oxford*

A growing chorus of academics, journalists, and politicians alike bemoans the state of American democracy. The symptoms are well known. Public trust in government has declined over time, the stock of social capital has shrunk, and turnout remains low. Some observers even argue that politicians now are less responsive to public opinion on various issues. Perhaps understandably, there is increasing pressure for reform of the electoral process, including campaign finance, the conduct of campaigns, media coverage of campaigns, and election rules themselves. In *By Popular Demand*, John Gastil joins the call for reform, but in an original and provocative way.

The book begins on familiar territory: the tenuous state of representative democracy in the United States. Gastil states: "There are two fundamental problems in American politics. The first is that most Americans do not believe that elected officials represent their interests. The second is that they are correct" (p. 1). That is, there is a democratic deficit in the United States and a serious one at that. The problem to Gastil is that elections fail to ensure the accountability of elected officials. This failure of elections ultimately reflects "underdeveloped public judgments, superficial voter evaluations of candidates, and the shallow pool of contestants for elected office" (p. 33).

Gastil marshals a lot of the empirical literature that implies or might imply that public opinion is largely uninformed and incoherent and that most voters are largely incapable of making decisions based on policy preferences. He highlights incumbent reelection rates to argue that sitting politicians have effectively stifled competition among candidates, which leaves voters with little choice on Election Day. The confluence of these factors, according to Gastil, has produced the misrepresentation, nonvoting, and distrust that we currently observe in the United States. Civic neglect has taken root.

Gastil considers various radical and conventional reforms of the process that have been proposed over the years and finds them wanting. They will not meaningfully change a

thing, he argues, because the real problem is with the public's voice itself. It simply is not clear to politicians what the public actually wants, partly because most of us have little information and partly because we speak in a cacophony of voices. Measured public opinion thus is of little guidance to elected officials. As Gastil writes: "Officeholders cannot represent the public's policy judgments to the decision-making body until the public *presents* those concerns to them" (p. 111). He argues further that revealing this public voice requires active deliberation among citizens: They must be brought together to discuss issues face-to-face.

Deliberative forums have been used in the United States for some time now and Gastil nicely traces the history, from early efforts to promote civic education to more recent attempts to conduct deliberative polls. He finds much to recommend these forums but concludes that a full-fledged deliberative democracy is not feasible. This is understandable. It nevertheless is possible, he argues, to use deliberative methods to reveal a meaningful public voice on various political issues. Specifically, he proposes using "citizen panels." Here a representative sample of the public would be brought together to deliberate on the issues of the day, aided by the testimony of various partisan and expert witnesses. This would serve to reveal a public voice on political issues. Then, to actually reflect these preferences more broadly, and in a politically meaningful way, summary information about the conclusions of the panels would be made available to the voting public, say, in the League of Women Voters' guides. Gastil goes even further in some formulations and recommends putting the information on ballots themselves. By doing so, voters would have ready access to the considered opinions of typical people on the important issues of the day. They would be armed and dangerous, at least for incumbent politicians. This could serve to fundamentally revitalize representative democracy in the United States, according to Gastil.

What Gastil is proposing clearly is provocative and warrants consideration. Let me put aside practical issues, such as picking issues for citizen panels to consider, putting together and running the panels, and summarizing the results of the deliberations, let alone getting this information on ballots. These are for others to sort out. My concerns are more basic: the existence of a real problem in modern American democracy, whether more information about issues and candidates is the solution, and what deliberative elections might actually accomplish.

In contrast with Gastil's characterization, a good amount of research shows that representative democracy in the United States actually works quite well. We have learned that the American public has meaningful preferences for policy, at least in certain areas, and acquires reasonably accurate information about candidates' positions (and policy itself) in these areas. We also have learned that voters use this information when evaluating politicians and, perhaps most importantly, that elected officials represent public preferences in policy. Some research even suggests that politicians quite literally respond to changing preferences over time. Gastil does not reflect this literature, at least not much of it. As a result, his portrait of American political life is not quite right. It is not that things are perfect. It's just that the sky is not falling.

This is not to gainsay the value of providing additional information to voters. After all, with more, presumably representative, information, there is reason to suppose that people's opinions will change. Of course, this is most likely where people have little information to begin with. With more information, opinions about extending "most favored nation" status to China, for example, are likely to change. So are opinions about approaches to regulating water pollution. This is not surprising. Neither is it surprising that most people know

little about these issues to begin with. They are not salient to many voters. But why then would they vote on the basis of these issues? What difference would the added value of deliberation actually make on Election Day? This is of fundamental importance, as Gastil himself claims—the electoral incentive being the most reliable motivation for politicians. He does consider the electoral connection in a very general way toward the end of the book, and is surprisingly tentative in his expectations. One ultimately cannot help wondering what deliberative elections can accomplish, even in the best of circumstances.

Perhaps there is reason to experiment, which Gastil encourages us to do in his concluding chapter. Perhaps we will learn that deliberative elections can have a beneficial effect on the quality of voters' judgments, the responsiveness of politicians, and public trust in government itself. I am not optimistic, however. All Gastil really offers us here is hope. The book is interesting, to be sure. It also is well written. It just does not add anything to what we already know. Then again, that is not what Gastil sets out to do, and he has given us something to think about.

Justice & Nature: Kantian Philosophy, Environmental Policy, and the Law By John Martin Gillroy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000. 443p. \$70.00 cloth, \$34.95 paper.

Kerry H. Whiteside, *Franklin & Marshall College*

That environmental problems such as groundwater contamination, global warming, and loss of biodiversity pose mounting political challenges is now widely admitted. The meager progress in reversing these trends calls into question the adequacy of policy instruments conventionally used to address them. Gillroy maintains that the environmental policy failure stems from its grounding in economic reasoning. An alternative paradigm of Kantian inspiration is his proposed remedy.

The market paradigm that informs cost-benefit analysis and current environmental legislation makes efficiency the primary measure of sound policy. Through a "thin theory of autonomy," that paradigm valorizes a society in which individuals exercise freedom in the form of choices that aim to give them opportunities to achieve, in relation to their initial endowment of goods, the highest index of satisfied preferences. In contrast, Gillroy proposes a thick theory of autonomy that discriminates morally among preferences. It recognizes that endowments are unequal and that individuals have a moral claim on the material and cultural resources that are necessary for them to become capable of truly free choice. It takes account of the human ability to revise preferences in light of a fuller understanding of personal potential and community well-being. And it understands that the functional integration of living and nonliving components into evolving natural systems generates noninstrumental value worthy of human respect. Securing at least a minimal "baseline" of conditions that support the autonomy of both humans and nature should become the standard of a just polity (p. 280).

In building this alternative paradigm, Gillroy contributes to scholarly debates in an unusually wide range of disciplines. Philosophers will discover a nuanced reconstruction of Kant's moral and political philosophy. Gillroy credits Kant with greater moral flexibility and more attention to communitarian concerns than is commonly acknowledged. Policy analysts should be drawn to Gillroy's contention that the strategic situation driving many cases of environmental risk-taking is not a prisoner's dilemma, but an assurance game: a situation in which citizens would prefer to cooperate to protect collective goods, provided that the state acts to prevent others

from taking advantage of them. Environmental ethicists will be struck by Gillroy's view that Kant would recognize a duty "to respect and preserve nature's functional integrity as an evolutionary and homeostatic end-in-itself" (p. 189).

That is a highly controversial claim. In *The New Ecological Order* (1995), Luc Ferry maintains that Kant's emphasis on freedom as the source of a being's inherent worth excludes intrinsic value from nature's causally determined order. Yet, demonstrates Gillroy, Kant did call for harmonizing humanity and nature, and he saw something inherently wrong in "destroying all order in nature" (pp. 184–189). Critics may still challenge the idea that functional integrity constitutes intrinsic value. Surely functionally integrating the parts of my computer does not give those parts inherent worth. For Kant, our moral duties toward other people are grounded not in our functional interdependence with them, but in each person's existence as a rational self, who can guide his or her own behavior in a principled way. Simply instrumentalizing people is wrong because it overrides the very capacity that commands respect. Ecosystems, even if they are "self-regulating" in a sense, do not regulate their actions *by principle*. So it remains unclear why instrumentalizing them is *intrinsically* any more wrong than dismantling my computer for spare parts. Perhaps the wrongness stems from the disruption of *life* or perhaps there is something about the *nonhuman* origin of certain homeostatic processes that makes them especially valuable. But Gillroy develops neither argument. It remains open to question whether the Kantian language of inherent worth is adequate to the task of describing an ethic of respect for things that we must continue, at some rate, to chop down, to domesticate, to eat.

This book illustrates the promise and the pitfalls of *a priori* moral theorizing in environmental affairs. Promisingly, it does a fine job of grounding the intuition that the significance of some goods, including natural ones, is distorted unless we devise political processes protecting them from commensuration, aggregation, and trade-offs. From a strictly pragmatic perspective, polluting an aquifer and providing bottled water to local inhabitants can seem morally equivalent to preventing groundwater contamination in the first place. Those who reject such equivalency will be attracted to Gillroy's "Ecosystem Design Approach."

A pitfall of *a priori* theorizing, however, is a tendency to envision policy as the direct implementation of moral imperatives, without pausing to ask whether the prescribed approaches are ratified by political experience. Gillroy tends to favor regulatory regimes that rely on centralized, state-sponsored, scientifically informed decision-making processes (e.g., pp. 311, 342, 378). Meanwhile, he is content to leave unspecified the level of aggregation—individual life form, species, ecosystem, biosphere—at which safeguarding "nature's" intrinsic value becomes imperative. As a result, the potential scope of bureaucratic discretion in Gillroy's world of anticipatory regulation is breathtaking. He would require that "all risk-producing activity causing collective damage to environmental security be justified as supporting moral-baseline needs before it can continue" (p. 145). Since virtually all human activity disrupts some manifestation of "nature," just about any imaginable economic enterprise might be subject to *ex ante* regulation. Students of bureaucratic behavior might wish that Gillroy had considered evidence that dysfunctions such as regulatory capture, corruption, and stultifying inertia can compromise the effectiveness of such centralizing approaches.

But more analysis is not really what would most increase the appeal of this book. It already contains so much material that its Table of Contents is longer than the present review. If its audience were more precisely targeted, this

volume could be more approachable. Gillroy hopes for readers as comfortable contemplating Kant's Realm of Ends as perusing Supreme Court opinions on environmental impact statements or digesting academic debates over the concept of Kaldor efficiency. Those with more specific interests will find their patience tested at times. Quite justifiably, most will read this book selectively. Parts of *Justice and Nature* will then rightly find their way into many graduate-level seminars on environmental policy and environmental ethics.

The Limits of Policy Change: Incrementalism, Worldview, and the Rule of Law By Michael T. Hayes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 204p. \$60.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Robert F. Durant, *University of Baltimore*

"There remains," writes Michael T. Hayes in his provocative new book, "a pressing need to educate the public—specialists and nonspecialists alike—on what politics can accomplish, and at what speed" (p. 189). To this end, Hayes challenges what Thomas Sowell (*A Conflict of Visions*, 1987) calls the tenets of "articulated rationality" (i.e., rational-comprehensive ideals) in the policy process. He vigorously asserts that the benefits of incrementalism (viz., its focus on "partisan mutual adjustment," its understanding of "the importance of checks on the arbitrary abuse of power," and "its ability to draw on the dispersion of knowledge throughout the political system" [p. 8]) exceed its costs (e.g., delay and incoherent policy outcomes). Moreover, on balance, "partisan mutual adjustment produces *better* [emphasis added] policy outcomes than any attempt at rational-comprehensive analysis" (p. 8).

Grounded in the "anti-rationalist" tradition (e.g., Hayek, *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*, 1948), Hayes begins by reviewing the reasons why rationalists (i.e., those predisposed toward "large-scale policy experiments," "logical coherence" of thought, and "perfect solutions to problems" [p. 29]) presumably err. Among other things, they underestimate human fallibility, hold naive faith in reason alone to address public problems (as opposed to the "systemic rationality" afforded by tradition, custom, and political bargaining and compromise), and overestimate what government can accomplish. These errors, in turn, produce failed results, disillusion citizens, and accrete presidential and bureaucratic power at the expense of Congress.

Hayes, however, is no apologist for incrementalism. In lamenting the biased pluralism it produces, he argues, first, for federal policies (e.g., tax subsidies and campaign finance reform) to "mobilize] interests that currently are unorganized and thus unrepresented in the policy process" (p. 162). Thus, rather than wanting to *lessen* conflict among interest groups (a common reform prescription), Hayes wants to *heighten* it by expanding the types of contestants participating. Second, to combat interest group pluralism and constrain bureaucratic discretion, Hayes joins Lowi (*The End of Liberalism*, 1979) in promoting policymaking premised on the "rule of law" (i.e., making laws that apply equally to everyone and do not discriminate against or privilege particular groups).

After stressing how evaluations of incrementalism are colored by personal views of human nature and what is achievable through politics, Hayes is at his analytical best in Chapters 3 through 9. Using case analyses of the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA) of 1996, and the Clinton health care initiative in 1993–94, he offers a series of typologies for sorting out the dynamics of the policy process. Included are typologies of philosophical worldviews (Chapter 3), policy

processes (Chapter 4), public policies (Chapter 5), policy environments (Chapter 7), and policy outcomes (Chapter 9).

Especially useful is how Hayes puts contemporary policy controversies into the context of enduring philosophical debates (among adaptive conservatives, utopian visionaries, nostalgic conservatives, and meliorative liberals). Valuable also is his identification of key contextual factors (and their interaction) that animate those debates. He identifies, for example, how different policy demand patterns (conflictual versus consensual) lead to different reactions by Congress (e.g., nondecisions, delegative policies, and allocative policies). Highlighted throughout is how interest group inequalities contribute to these disparate congressional reactions.

Likewise, Hayes offers insights (some counterintuitive) that beg testing, elaborating, and refining in future research. For example, in classifying policies by how consensual or conflictual their objectives are and how well- or ill-understood their proposed solutions might be, his analysis both refines and challenges conventional thinking about mass public arousal (e.g., Charles O. Jones, *Cleaning the Air*, 1975). Absent a convergence of consensual objectives and expectations, for example, Hayes argues that mass public arousal leads to dramaturgical incrementalism (i.e., symbolic policies—e.g., nuclear freeze legislation in the 1980s—that may or may not address the problem), rather than nonincremental policy change.

Despite these strengths, however, Hayes ultimately fails to make a persuasive case either that the benefits of incrementalism exceed its costs or that it produces better policy outcomes than rationalist strategies. They certainly may, but he offers neither an explicit empirical standard for testing these theses (i.e., "better" in what sense and measured in what way?) nor systematic comparisons of these disparate types of policy approaches in practice (e.g., comparing environmental policies produced at different times or places using rationalist versus antirationalist processes). Rationalists, moreover, will dismiss his litany of their "shortcomings" as a caricature rather than a serious treatment of their aims, assumptions, or approach to policymaking. Skeptics, too, will note that large-scale and initially nonincremental programs like Social Security, Medicare, and the Marshall Plan did work; did not produce citizen disillusionment; were devised with political acumen rather than "naïveté"; and were not premised on assumptions of human infallibility.

Nor is Hayes's case for the superiority of incrementalism helped by leaving key concepts undefined (e.g., what constitutes adequate "deliberation," "incremental versus non-incremental change," and "public arousal" versus "public anxiety"). This conceptual ambiguity places judgments about "better policy" squarely within the eye of the beholder. For example, his own "rule of law" proposal will strike some as utopian, naive, and misguided. Nor is his argument helped by conceptualizing rational-comprehensive and incremental decision strategies as mutually exclusive in practice. The former can be a potent "input" into the latter, qualitatively altering policy discourse, options, and outcomes.

Readers more sympathetic to nonincremental policy needs, processes, and possibilities also are unlikely to believe that Hayes has adequately presented or effectively countered their arguments (and counterarguments to incrementalism) as robustly as he could. For example, he curtly dismisses in a paragraph (p. 96) the theses that periodic bursts of non-incremental policy change do occur (e.g., Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, *Agendas and Instability*, 1993). Even more broadly, one wishes that Hayes had explicitly related his arguments to contemporary reconceptualizations of interest group, policy process, and bureaucratic dynamics and motives.

Recent scholarship, for example, challenges “capture” theories of agencies and images of unresponsive bureaucrats (B. Dan Wood and Richard Waterman, *Bureaucratic Dynamics*, 1985), notes the rising success of postmaterialist over materialist values in the policy process (Jeffrey Berry, *The New Liberalism*, 2000), and heralds the power of ideas (Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, *Policy Change and Learning*, 1993). Yet Hayes’s arguments rest largely on tenets of interest group liberalism that these reconceptualizations modify or challenge.

These shortcomings and oversights, however, do not lessen the importance of addressing the problems of incrementalism that Hayes summarizes. Nor do they make his contributions less important for policy specialists and nonspecialists to engage seriously. If they do, the educational aims of *The Limits of Change* will be realized.

Who Speaks for the Poor?: National Interest Groups and Social Policy By R. Allen Hays. 277p. New York: Routledge, 2001. \$75.00.

Declarations of Dependency: The Civic Republican Tradition in U.S. Poverty Policy By Alan F. Zundel. 178p. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. \$50.50 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Douglas R. Imig, *University of Memphis*

The new monographs by R. Allen Hays and Alan F. Zundel are welcome additions to our effort to understand the processes by which Americans make social welfare policy. Hays’s work looks at the set of interest groups that testified before Congress on poverty policy during the 28-year period from 1970 to 1997, a period characterized by both incremental change and major upheaval in poverty policy-making. Zundel’s work examines the rhetorical frames that have driven major social welfare reform efforts over the past century and a half.

In *Who Speaks for the Poor?* Hays provides a close examination of those who gave testimony before Congress during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s on three critical sets of issues: housing, food stamps, and cash assistance. Hays answers his title question by showing that a “chorus of voices” participate in drafting major legislation affecting the poor (p. 4). But of the dozens of groups that testified before Congress, almost none are made up of low-income people. Instead, the interests of the poor are represented by proxies, including intergovernmental lobbies, public and private sector service providers, and public interest and good government groups. After reviewing who testified on these dimensions of social welfare policy, the final sections of the work are devoted to a call for more direct participation by the poor in politics and for more community organizing around social justice.

Hay’s project provides much-needed insights into the configuration of organizations that testified on key pieces of legislation during a critical era in the history of American social welfare policy. Over these 28 years, we saw both expansions in social welfare spending (e.g., through Nixon’s block grant programs) and profound retrenchments (most notably, the abolition of entitlements to assistance through the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act). Hays’s analysis sheds light on the ways that major shifts in the direction of policymaking influence the actions of individual groups (p. 16), as well as the influence of policy shifts on the composition of policy communities (p. 35). The work is largely silent when it comes to identifying which voices were most significant in engineering the fundamental shift itself in the overall direction of American social welfare policy during this period, or the mechanisms through which that shift occurred.

Ultimately, Hays attributes major policy shifts to “forces outside the arena of interest group struggle” (p. 139), and proposes a number of potentially critical factors. These include the weakening of labor unions and a shift to post-Fordist modes of production (p. 59), the growth of well-funded conservative think tanks in the 1970s and 1980s (p. 61), and shifts in party control of Congress and the White House (e.g., p. 80). It would be helpful if the work offered a theoretical construct for understanding the ways in which these factors influence the policy space available to alternative visions of effective social welfare policy. We are left to wonder if these contextual factors work in consistent ways across time in shaping the debates surrounding policymaking.

Additionally, the work is largely silent on other voices contributing to social welfare policy, other venues for action, and other types of political engagement. Presenting testimony and lobbying Congress are only a few of the strategic choices available to advocates. The volume mentions the wave of antihomelessness protests that were launched during the early 1980s, but the author doubts that protest would have had much effect in the late 1990s, given the Republican majority in Congress (p. 232). Yet much of the mobilization in the early 1980s came in direct response to the polarizing rhetoric of a strong Republican president. Similarly, the current surge in anti-globalization protests has emerged in direct response to a strong pro-business and anti-labor political climate. If Hays ultimately intends the volume to be a call for more direct participation in politics (p. 9), it would have been useful to analyze the effectiveness of a broader range of mobilization efforts with differential transaction costs.

In *Declarations of Dependency*, Zundel argues that U.S. poverty policymaking bears the imprint of a “civic republicanism,” in which small farm owners are held up as models of civic virtue because they are tied to the communities in which they live, are motivated by foresight, and—through thrift and hard work—are able to achieve economic independence (p. 122). The author argues that both the public and policymakers continue to attribute these civic virtues to small landowners, despite the shrinking place for small-scale agriculture in the U.S. economy (p. 121). Zundel traces the influence of this civic republican tradition through the Homestead Acts, through homeownership programs for the poor, and to more recent proposals to expand the productive assets of low-income people through microcredit associations, tax-exempt capital development accounts, and employee stock purchase plans. Zundel’s work makes a compelling case that the image of the homesteader continues to permeate antipoverty policy, and that the durability of this image appears to be independent of the actual legacy of the homesteading acts.

Most of the best land offered to homesteaders, for example, was taken very early in the nation’s history (p. 39), and the majority of the remainder was not suitable for farming. Further, there were a great many instances of fraud, with businesses filing false claims and then stripping the lands of their timber or mineral resources before abandoning them. Congress also used the acts to deed an additional 100 million acres to those already granted to the railroads (p. 40).

In spite of the uneven policy implications of the Homestead Acts, Zundel demonstrates that the frame surfaces again and again: for example, in land reform schemes (e.g., the 1937 Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act) and in proposals to promote homeownership by the poor (e.g., the 1919 “Own Your Own Home” campaign designed by the Department of Labor and the National Association of Real Estate Boards).

As with the Hays monograph, Zundel’s work hints at the overarching importance of social and political factors in explaining the rise and fall of these individual reform movements. He notes that policy proposals depend on open

“windows of opportunity,” which can result from contentious politics (p. 49), patterns of partisan control of political institutions (e.g., the “stunning Republican takeover of both houses of Congress” [p. 97]), levels of issue salience and media attention (p. 112), and the presence or absence of powerful allies (pp. 112–13), as well as shifting employment patterns (p. 40).

But, again, these factors are mentioned largely in passing, and the work does not offer a coherent theoretical framework for understanding the ways in which these contextual factors influence patterns of policymaking, the reception that various policy proposals will receive, or the conditions under which challengers—employing this or some other frame—will gain policy concessions.

Without such a framework, the monograph is unable to explain why certain policy entrepreneurs have been comparatively successful at employing this frame in particular historical eras. If Zundel is right that the frame itself is enduring, then a significant part of the story concerns the conditions under which policy proposals in this tradition have captured the public imagination and leveraged political concessions, and the conditions under which they have not. What should we make, for example, of the short history of Reconstruction efforts to make public lands available for homesteading by freed slaves in the south (p. 39)? Certainly this effort fell directly within the civic republican tradition, and gained strong backing from Radical Reconstructionists in Congress. The reasons behind the weak implementation and ultimate reversal of this set of policy proposals might provide analytical heft to Zundel’s argument by suggesting the boundaries of the power of the civic republican frame.

The analysis would also benefit from a consideration of the terms under which other dimensions of “deservedness” have come to dominate discussions of poverty and of effective social welfare policy. The narrative is largely silent, for example, on social welfare policies built upon attributions of civic virtue associated with military service (Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, 1992), or participation in public or civic work (Harry C. Boyte and Nancy N. Kari, *Building America*, 1996; Daphne Spain, *How Women Saved the City*, 2001).

Ultimately, these two works are useful additions to the literature in the field, and are interesting companions to each other. They offer different perspectives on critical inputs to the same policy processes—during overlapping time frames—and provide two distinct vantages on the relationship between effective and vigorous citizenship and social welfare policymaking. Finally, taken together, these works make a striking case for the need for more integrated efforts to build a theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that link dimensions of social and political context to the routines and processes of incremental public policymaking.

Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law By Robert A. Kagan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 339p. \$49.95.

Ronald Kahn, *Oberlin College*

Robert Kagan has three main objectives in writing this book: to demonstrate that the American systems of criminal and civil law, social welfare, and environmental regulation are dominated by “adversarial legalism,” to critique and explain why it has taken hold in the United States, and to make proposals for reform in light of findings in the United States and the advanced capitalist nations of Europe, the Commonwealth, and Japan.

Drawing upon his own research and other previously published single nation and cross-national studies, Kagan suc-

ceeds in demonstrating that the United States, compared to these other nations, is dominated by adversarial legalism in its criminal and civil justice systems and its implementation of social welfare and environmental policy. Kagan argues that adversarial legalism is the term that best describes American legal systems and policy implementation because they are dominated by costly, stressful, and inefficient litigation fostered by politicized lawyers who rely on detailed prescriptive legal rules and formal processes of contestation. These result in plaintiffs in civil suits making outrageous demands for damages, prosecutors proposing long prison terms resulting in plea bargaining, and corporations and public interest groups using the courts to secure their interests from government and those with fewer resources failing to pursue their interests.

A superb critique is offered of the process of adversarial legalism in the United States. Kagan views adversarial legalism as a functional, more negative, equivalent to large central legal and regulatory bureaucracies of trained experts and judges found in these other democratic, capitalist nations. The major drawbacks of the process of adversarial legalism in the United States include legal malleability, uncertainty, and unpredictability and time-consuming delays that impose economic and social costs on people who can least afford them and benefit those with resources to enter the legal and regulatory process. He demonstrates forcefully that adversarial legalism impedes and increases the costs of bringing and settling civil and criminal disputes, securing economic development, and providing benefits to welfare recipients and improving the environment. He also argues that the process of adversarial legalism fosters adversarialness between business and labor, between government and citizens, and among corporations and levels of government. Adversarial legalism encourages unclear legislation, so groups and citizens must go to courts to secure benefits and protect their interests, and fosters legislatures to expand the right to sue government, corporations, and professionals such as doctors. This has a chilling affect on the establishment of less costly, user-friendly, informal bureaucratic and court processes.

Kagan reviews the elements of American political structure and culture that further adversarial legalism. Kagan argues that adversarial legalism is fostered by the following structural aspects of the American political system, compared to these other nations’: far more fragmented, decentralized, nonhierarchical, and political courts and bureaucracies, with different outcomes likely at the national, state, and local levels of government; and strong interest groups, weak parties, and a weak state, rather than the strong central state, bureaucracy, and neocorporatist cooperation among interests such as labor and business found in other capitalist democracies.

Kagan argues that American political culture spawns a legal culture that views law, courts, and regulation, as malleable, fallible, and the product of continuing political battles rather than the application of universal standards through rational decision making. Lawyers’ engagement in adversarial legalism and the rejection of compromise and cooperation among parties in a dispute is caused by a fundamental tension between a political culture that expects government to protect citizens from serious harm, injustice, and environmental dangers (“total justice”) and a second set of values that emphasize a mistrust of concentrated power in government that requires limits on government authority. As a result, lawyers convince the public that adversarial legalism is the process needed to fight injustice and arbitrary government.

Kagan is less successful in arguing that the United States would be better off without adversarial legalism and with a system of civil and criminal justice and social welfare and environmental regulation that is found in Europe, the Commonwealth nations, and Japan. Part of the reason for this

is that Kagan moves back and forth between process and outcome-based standards of evaluation when making comparisons. In his analysis of criminal and civil court systems, Kagan defines injustice, in process terms, as the condition when parties feel compelled to abandon legally justifiable positions to avoid the costs and uncertainties of adjudication. When Kagan discusses the implementation of social welfare laws, he introduces an outcomes standard of evaluation. Kagan writes, "It [adversarial legalism] has not proved capable of producing significant effects on levels of, or gaps in, benefits and services" (p. 175).

Unfortunately, the small-n cross-national case studies Kagan relies upon to make the argument against adversarial legalism and for a European nation-like legal system do not provide systematic evidence of whether, and under what conditions, the poor, government, and corporations are the winners and losers overall. Nor can such studies explain whether inequities are the result of the negative aspects of the adversarial legalism as a process, differences in political structure, or different political cultures. The studies that Kagan draws upon simply do not provide systematic evidence of distribution differences among institutions and citizens in the United States and compared to these other nations. The linkages among process, structure, and political culture are not clear enough to make such determinations.

Nor is evidence presented of process and outcome injustices in the criminal justice, tort, and regulatory systems of the nations of Europe, the Commonwealth, and Japan, to which the United States is compared. Therefore we cannot assess the process and outcome injustices in these nations with less adversarial legalism when we make comparisons with the United States. For example, we need to assess the impact on legal certainty, stability, and justice in England that is caused by the power of the House of Commons to change civil liberties, civil rights, and criminal procedures overnight and the impact of European Union courts and bureaucracies on the English legal system and regulation process when comparing the United States and Britain. These problems raise questions whether the American criminal justice and tort law system and social welfare and environmental regulation systems come up as short as Kagan suggests when they are compared to other advanced capitalist nations' systems.

Finally, Kagan has not demonstrated that adversarial legalism is the primary cause of injustice whether measured in process or outcomes terms. With regard to social welfare, Kagan admits, "Adversarial legalism is not the *cause* of the grudging and incomplete character of the American social welfare system. It can more properly be viewed as a *consequence*—the response of politically liberal lawyers and judges to a political system that has not provided a nationally uniform, broad-based regime of social and health insurance, public housing, and generous employee benefits" (p. 175). However, Kagan argues that the response by the political system to social welfare policies is due to a political culture that spawns an individualistic, not a collectivist, vision of individual needs and agency. If this is so, then reducing the effects of adversarial legalism in individual decision-making processes, while the political and (resulting) legal culture remain unchanged, may produce little substantive change. It may, perhaps, ensure more justice as that is defined in process terms, but less outcome justice.

Moreover, we would have to discount expected declines in legal advocacy and resources for groups involved in such advocacy with the introduction of central legal bureaucracies and other efforts to reduce adversarial legalism in the United States. However, Michael McCann provides clear evidence that fear of lawsuits and legal advocacy, the core elements and structural consequences of adversarial legal-

ism, resulted in increased allocations by government with regard to equal pay for women in Washington state (Michael McCann, *Rights at Work: Law and the Politics of Pay Equity*, 1994). Would this economic redistribution have occurred if adversarial legalism were abandoned and we placed our trust in a political system dominated by what Theodore Lowi has called "interest group liberalism?"

If we do not know whether process and outcome injustices are primarily caused by the political structure or culture, then we cannot know whether changes in political structures and processes will produce declines in either type of injustice. Therefore, it is hard to determine whether the reforms that Kagan advocates, such as establishing better-trained, centralized legal bureaucracies at the state level and introducing a loser-pays system into tort law, would reduce or increase injustice. Perhaps more research on the linkages among political culture, political structures, and legal and policy implementation systems in the United States and other advanced capitalist nations would provide a firmer foundation on which to make a determination whether replacing adversarial legalism with legal structures and processes from other advanced capitalist democracies is the best course to follow.

Dreams of a More Perfect Union By Rogan Kersh. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 358p. \$39.95.

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Rogan Kersh's ambitious and well-researched book traces the history of the concept of American national "union" from the middle of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, when the concept lost the peculiar force it had had and fell out of use (more or less replaced by such concepts as "nation," "country," and, especially, "America"). The analysis demonstrates how the concept of national union has been used in exclusive as well as inclusive ways. The subject is an important one, especially to an America united by terrorist threats. And it is a topic made more conspicuous in the last decade by our ongoing discourse over multiculturalism. So the concept of national union is perhaps less obscure and more relevant than Kersh suggests (p. 3). Connections to the recent work of Rogers Smith (*Civic Ideals*, 1997) are also apparent. Still, the term itself has been out of favor for about a century now, so Kersh's study is a welcome effort to get us thinking about a relatively novel topic.

In breaking new ground here, Kersh's excellent and wide-ranging book speaks to a number of audiences. Scholars of American political development will learn much from the book, and those who study multiculturalism will find intriguing the twists and turns taken by the concept of national union. *Dreams of a More Perfect Union* will interest conceptual historians with its well-researched example of conceptual growth and decline. All of these audiences, and lay readers of American history, will benefit from this book. Many may find themselves wanting even more, their appetites whetted, but that is to be expected. Tracing such a broad and important topic over a century and a half is a monumental task that naturally raises more questions than any one book—no matter how well crafted—can hope to answer.

Kersh examines the rise and eventual decline of the concept of national union, mapping its impressive staying power, even to the verge of—and immediately after—the Civil War. Readers follow the concept's emergence in the middle of the eighteenth century, and its brief fading in the face of Tory praise of transcontinental union in the 1760s. We then see how the concept grew in importance, despite the vast cultural (not to mention practical) distances between regions during the early nineteenth century. In many ways, the concept itself

was the glue that bound the country together. Yet national union all but disappeared in the 1890s. Radical Republicans and African Americans abandoned the term after their egalitarian vision of a moral union was widely rejected by white America. And then the word was co-opted by an emerging labor movement.

To trace this underappreciated history, Kersh uses a powerful mix of methodologies and levels of analysis. First, there is the qualitative investigation of exemplary central figures, such as Madison, Webster, Douglass, and Lincoln. This analysis is then augmented by a broader reading of less elite writings in newspapers and other popular sources. This is all pretty standard; but Kersh adds to the mix a more systematic study of the proportional use of the concept in a sample of representative newspapers. The outcome of this methodical analysis is a number of graphs charting the ebb and flow of national union's political and rhetorical salience. As a result, *Dreams of a More Perfect Union* is more historical in temper than many conceptual histories, which tend to focus almost exclusively on important philosophical contributions and advances. If the work is less dramatic than a study of bold innovations, it is more historically precise, detailing even periods of relative conceptual stasis.

A number of important findings emerge. For example, Kersh occupies a well-supported middle ground between those who see early American thinkers as mere borrowers of the European tradition and those who view American thought as wholly unique. The indefatigable liberal/republican debate is shown to miss a great deal about the American visions of national union. Another contribution should be mentioned as well: Conceptual historians are here given a rich new example of conceptual demise from which to learn. They might, however, wish he had drawn more substantial connections to existing approaches to conceptual history (pp. 282–83).

Kersh's empirical sample and content analysis is methodologically innovative and quite valuable. His sampling technique involved studying representative newspapers' issues for the fifth day of January, April, July, and October (every other year, 1750–1900) and calculating the proportional use of the concept of national union per newspaper page. A number of adjustments were required to fill out the samples (pp. 20, 305), so the result is only "an informal sense of union across time and place" (p. 20). But that is enough to demonstrate the power and longevity of union as the conceptual tool for understanding American federalism. For instance, although profound transformations after the Civil War remade America, it was still conceived of—in both North and South—not as a nation, as many scholars suggest, but as a union.

These and other significant findings supported by Kersh's methodology are generally augmented by his careful use of even the most recent research that touches on any aspect of this broad study. One notable exception to this attention to the scholarly literature involves the concept of the public sphere. Kersh analyzes at length James Madison's notion of affective union and demonstrates its powerful influence throughout the nineteenth century. Yet Madison's vision of the union was not built solely on affect, but even more so on public reason engendered by political discourse. Saul Cornell's (1999) *The Other Founders* documents some Anti-Federalists'—and later Madison's—understanding of the role a vibrant public sphere could play in unifying the country. Similarly, although Lance Banning's (1995) *Sacred Fire* is cited to support Kersh's unionist reading of Madison, Banning's stress on Madison's liberal republicanism and vision of the public sphere is ignored. Ultimately, the role of an animated public sphere as a unifying force in the polity seems underinvestigated.

Dreams of a More Perfect Union closes with brief reflections on the prospects for American national unity and an assessment of whether religion or a sense of patriotism might be the source for our future civic bonds. In his surefooted way, Kersh then turns to Walt Whitman as the preeminent American theorist of unity in diversity. The questions raised are all the more pressing in light of the recent flag-waving that reassured a terrorized Union; and if this ambitious and informative study cannot answer all of them, it does provide the basis for approaching these crucial challenges in a sophisticated, well-informed, and intelligent way.

Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the U.S. Congress

By Glen S. Krutz. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001. 183p. \$60.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

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In recent decades, roughly 25 percent of major bills considered by the U.S. Congress have been omnibus measures—large, often unwieldy, legislative vehicles that touch on multiple policy areas. The 1981 reconciliation bill, which included much of President Reagan's economic agenda, is perhaps the best-known example. But many important policy proposals, from crime control to welfare reform, have passed as part of omnibus legislation.

Critics argue that these megabills undermine deliberation and that the practice should be curtailed. For one, members of Congress are seldom able to secure separate votes on the component parts of an omnibus measure because of chamber rules, leadership pressure, and ignorance about what these massive bills actually contain. The omnibus strategy also reduces the policy discretion of the executive branch. A president can either veto the entire package, including must-pass items that the administration supports, or sign into law a grab bag of unrelated items, perhaps including major legislation opposed by the administration.

There is, however, another side to the omnibus story. On Capitol Hill, the passage of legislation is complicated by overlapping committee jurisdictions, budgetary constraints, a crushing legislative workload, rampant obstructionism, and, according to some, our national tendency toward divided government. By streamlining the legislative process, the omnibus strategy provides congressional leaders with a valuable tool for overcoming gridlock and competing for power with the president. According to this view, omnibus legislating is an important institutional adaptation to the practical difficulties of lawmaking in the contemporary Congress.

What factors explain the rise of omnibus bills in Washington? How do the consequences of omnibus legislating vary, depending on the scope of the measure, the context of consideration, and the issue areas under focus? What strategic calculations determine when and how congressional leaders will construct an omnibus measure, as well as the response of other legislators and the president? Are bills in certain issue areas particularly likely to be considered via the omnibus? On balance, does the strategy strengthen or weaken the legislative process? Scholars seeking answers to these and related questions should begin with Glen Krutz's excellent book on the topic.

This book is an important addition to the literature for a number of reasons. First, the author stakes out important new territory for systematic analysis. Prior to this study, no one had developed a workable definition of what constitutes an omnibus bill, and generalizations about the practice have been based mostly on anecdotes, such as the 1981 reconciliation measure. Krutz's definition—rooted in the scope and length of a bill—makes good intuitive sense, and it can be

operationalized, generating valuable insights about Congress. The 1981 reconciliation bill, for instance, was not a turning point in the emergence of the omnibus practice. Instead, the percentage of omnibus measures (among major bills) grew gradually during the 1950s and 1960s, began to increase sharply during the mid-1970s, and then leveled off during the 1990s. It is interesting to note that the rise in Senate individualism and obstructionism that occurred during the 1970s corresponds nicely with Krutz's time series, helping to explain why congressional leaders increasingly resorted to the omnibus strategy.

A second strength of the book is the author's attempt to relate omnibus usage to leading theories of legislative behavior. Krutz distinguishes between two broad categories of theory. Purposive explanations, which he also labels "political" and "micro-level," emphasize the strategic calculations of individual members. Included here are the distributive and partisan theories of Congress. Organizational explanations, in contrast, are characterized as "macro-level," and place a greater emphasis on institutional adaptation and chamber efficiency. Krutz posits that both categories of explanation are necessary to understand omnibus legislating. He develops a hybrid conceptualization that yields a number of hypotheses about the factors associated with omnibus usage. For the most part, these hypotheses are supported by data, providing further evidence that no single theory can explain the central elements of Congress.

Third, the author compiles extensive new data about omnibus legislating. For instance, he marshals evidence about more than three thousand bills that received serious consideration by Congress from 1949 through 1994, and conducts a multivariate analysis of the factors influencing whether or not these items were considered via omnibus packages. Purposive factors help explain these data. Partisan theories, for example, generally imply greater minority party obstructionism when the majority party is relatively small and divided and the minority party is relatively large and unified. Overcoming such obstructionism is a key motivation behind the omnibus strategy. As expected, Krutz finds that individual bills are more likely to be added to omnibus measures when these conditions are met. However, organizational explanations, such as issue fragmentation and the size of the budget deficit, also have a statistically and substantively significant relationship with omnibus usage. In other chapters, the author conducts multivariate analyses of the incidence of omnibus bills by Congress, the impact of omnibus usage on legislative productivity, and the consequences of the strategy for congressional or presidential dominance over legislation.

Fourth, and most important, *Hitching a Ride* provides scholars with highly useful guidance for further research. The logical structure of Krutz's conceptual framework should be further developed. He argues that the construction of omnibus bills derives from two sets of strategic interactions: between congressional leaders and rank-and-file members and between Congress and the president. But the precise nature of these interactions—from actor goals and informational endowments to procedural constraints and the bargaining sequence—are not really spelled out in this book. The economics literature about commodity bundling and recent theoretical work by political scientists on legislative bargaining should inform scholarly efforts to build on the conceptual groundwork in this study.

Moreover, the rules that structure the consideration of omnibus measures vary somewhat from bill to bill and over time, and these differences receive only passing attention in this book. Reconciliation measures, for instance, provide the most consequential forum for omnibus legislating, and they are qualitatively different from the other megabills that Krutz

considers. (Reconciliation occurs via expedited procedures, and no filibusters are allowed.) We need more empirical research about the impact of structural arrangements on the construction of legislation, including omnibus packages. In this very impressive book, Glen Krutz provides us with a model for how such research should be conducted.

The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics By Geoffrey Layman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 435p. \$49.50 cloth, \$22.50 paper.

Ted G. Jelen, *University of Nevada, Las Vegas*

Analysts of religion and American politics have been awaiting this book for some time. In *The Great Divide*, Geoffrey Layman brings together two strands of research in American political behavior in an elegant, systematic fashion: the study of party system change (often described as the literature on "party realignment") and the analysis of religion in politics in the United States (long something of an esoteric speciality within political science). While Layman is not first to address the connection between the pew and the precinct, his impressive effort is at this point the authoritative source on religion and contemporary party politics.

The volume can be described rather simply. Using a variety of secondary data sources, Layman shows that the Republican and Democratic parties have become more internally homogeneous, and more distinctive, with respect to a variety of issues relating to traditional morality: abortion, women's roles, pornography, gay rights, and others. These changes have been taking place since the late 1960s and are manifested in the attitudes and behavior of political elites and mass publics. While the changes do not rise to the level of a "critical realignment," the manifestation of a "culture war" between traditionalists and progressives is a classic illustration of gradual party system change through "issue evolution."

This volume has at least two outstanding strengths. First, Layman provides a rather comprehensive description of recent changes in the party system, which incorporates analyses of both mass and elite political behavior. He convincingly demonstrates that the attitudes of political elites (delegates to national nominating conventions and members of Congress) and mass publics vary together, and he makes a plausible case for the direction of causality. Layman argues that changes in the basis of party cleavages are generally initiated by strategic candidates and leaders who stand to benefit from new alignments. Voters, in Layman's account, generally react to the changing cues provided by political leaders. Layman's description of recent changes in party cleavages is thoroughly grounded in the literature on party realignment, which makes the work quite relevant and accessible to political scientists.

A second strength of this book follows from the first. For several reasons, this is a book by a political scientist for political scientists, which means that Layman's analyses are quite accessible to readers who are not specialists in the religion-politics subfield. As such, Layman has provided an important service to scholars who may be quite willing to acknowledge the importance of religion to contemporary party politics (a connection which by now seems virtually self-evident), but who, quite understandably, do not wish to devote the balance of their careers to the operationalization of religious variables. Scholars who specialize in the study of religion and politics will find relatively little new here but will surely admire the clarity and breadth of Layman's vision. Analysts of party politics in the United States who wish to take into account the role of religion will find their task made much easier by Layman's contribution.

To illustrate, at the conceptual level, Layman provides an excellent, self-contained description of the difference between the “ethno-religious” account of religious politics (in which membership in a particular religious tradition is paramount) and the more recent “culture wars” literature (in which a progressive-traditionalist cleavage cuts across denominational lines). In a clear, yet nuanced, analysis, Layman shows that the culture wars cleavage is becoming the dominant religious division in contemporary American politics, but that vestiges of the older, community-based alignment persist among African Americans, some white Roman Catholics, and Jews. Methodologically, Layman provides a plausible ordinal measure of religious orthodoxy that is based on denominational affiliation and church attendance. This measure is carefully validated with attitudinal measures from more recent surveys, and it permits Layman (as well as other scholars) to perform time-series analyses using surveys that contain fewer religious variables. The work contains extensive methodological and statistical appendices, which provide sophisticated analyses for those interested in the details of Layman’s empirical research without detracting from the readability of a very well written volume.

While *The Great Divide* contains no glaring weaknesses, it seems appropriate to point out a couple of limitations to Layman’s impressive effort. First and most importantly, this is a book about party politics, and readers are advised to generalize his analyses to other aspects of American religious politics with appropriate caution. For example, Layman’s relatively simple index of doctrinal orthodoxy is quite useful in explaining variations in the attitudes and electoral behavior of voters and political elites, but it may be less helpful in other settings. If one is interested in explaining attitudes toward objects of the Christian Right (such as support the Christian Coalition or Pat Robertson), or in accounting for variations in the pro-life movement, the empirical picture might be somewhat more complicated. Other works (such as Clyde Wilcox’s earlier book, *God’s Warriors*, 1992) have shown that the interest group politics of doctrinally conservative Protestants are often fragmented by arcane (at least to those outside the evangelical tradition) doctrinal disputes or interdenominational rivalries (a phenomenon termed “religious particularism” by sociologists of religion). Layman shows that political parties in the United States do aggregate interests (or, more accurately, values), and this characteristic of American parties simplifies the task of the researcher enormously.

Second, Layman’s work contains relatively little in the way of explanation of the independent variable: religious beliefs and values. Why the cleavages subsumed under the “culture wars” rubric are manifested in the party system (in contrast to social movements or religious revivals) is an important question that awaits further analysis. His explanation—that these religiously-based values cleavages were exploited by strategic political elites—is quite promising, but ultimately incomplete. Why did political entrepreneurs find such fertile ground in the politics of morality, and how did this set of issues displace others on the political agenda? Layman offers some anecdotal evidence (most specifically, in the activist base of the McGovern campaign in 1972), but a more complete explanation of the social changes that made possible the political change described in the book remains to be completed.

All this is simply to suggest that the work to relate religious memberships, attitudes, and behavior will continue. Layman has provided an excellent account of recent changes in the American party system, which will be indispensable as religion continues to command the attention of political scientists.

Elements of Reason Edited by Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 344p. \$64.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Scott de Marchi, *Duke University*

Rarely is one invited to see the ingredients that go into the sausage, and if one plans only to eat sausage, this is an ideal situation. But the only way to *make* sausage is to take a close look at these ingredients, blemishes and all. Despite modeling shortcomings and disagreements that are evident among the authors, *Elements of Reason* is a remarkable book, both for its instructional value and the insight it offers into one of the most important problems in the social sciences.

Models of human decision making underlie almost all research problems, and currently, the debate is framed as a dichotomous choice between rational choice models on the one hand and bounded rationality models on the other. To the extent that Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin expose this dichotomy as false, and provide an infrastructure for building better models, this book is a much-needed contribution. It seems to me that studying this book, blemishes and all, is far more worthwhile than engaging in the silly debate about whether humans satisfy the axioms of rational choice theory. Given how many instructors assign Donald Green and Ian Shapiro’s *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory* (1996), there is a real need for a book that seriously discusses the potential for better models; *Elements of Reason* is by far the best such offering to date.

As noted, the first benefit provided by this book is instructional. Many of the chapters summarize and extend important research traditions within political psychology. Norman Frolich and Joe Oppenheimer discuss the role of ethics in decision making; Shanto Iyengar and Nicholas Valentino examine political advertising and source credibility; Wendy Rahn relates public mood to decision making; Milton Lodge and Charles Taber extend the on-line tally model to account for affect; Popkin and Michael Dimock investigate how different levels of information condition reasoning about international policy; and Mark Turner presents findings on conceptual blending. These chapters would benefit any advanced undergraduate or graduate class that examines decision making.

The other benefit of the book is to provide building blocks for new models of decision making. In the tradition of Herbert Simon, the editors seek nothing less than models that explain human choice. Given this goal, the best way to evaluate the success of various research agendas is to compare the predictive power of their models. In particular, proposed models should be compared to rational choice theory, which in many respects is the baseline model for the social sciences because of its claims of generality. This positive goal is in contrast to past research that simply aims to discredit rational choice, and the contributors of this book deserve praise for making this argument forcefully.

It is worth repeating that rational choice has been widely accepted in large part due to analytic simplicity. Any model of human decision making must provide two working parts. First, one needs an instantiation for the problems that humans confront. In rational choice, this instantiation is most often an extensive form game with explicit utility functions. Second, one needs a solution concept and an algorithm that “solves” a given problem; rational choice theory typically utilizes Nash equilibrium as the solution concept and backwards induction as the algorithm.

An enormous amount of research has focused upon whether humans can actually frame problems correctly (i.e., can we satisfy information requirements?) or apply the appropriate solution concept (i.e., can we satisfy computational

requirements?). It is abundantly clear that humans fail at both aspects of decision making as defined by rational choice. Further, a fair reading of the cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence literatures suggests that rational choice is not even a good approximation of how humans solve problems.

The problem is that it takes something to beat something, and that is what Green and Shapiro, and other critics of rational choice theory, have failed to recognize. The important point made by the editors of this volume, and more forcefully by Arthur Denzau and Douglas North in their chapter, is that the counterclaim to the above, that is, that humans are in many ways limited or less good than *homo economicus*, is also wrongheaded. Denzau and North point out that humans typically make choices in difficult environments with limited information; in fact, our performance in even relatively simple games, such as go or poker, defies scientific understanding. Computers have had some success in chess, but games of slightly more complexity stymie the best computer opponents.

This is important because computers are the best embodiment of rational choice theory I can think of—they instantiate games in extensive forms and solve them using variations on backwards induction (e.g., alpha-beta pruning). We thus find ourselves in a world where very powerful rational choice entities (i.e., computers) cannot drive to work, cannot play poker, and cannot really match human behavior in most simple activities, much less something as complex as running a political campaign or passing legislation in Congress. Denzau and North, along with the editors of this volume, argue that we need to stop mocking the afflicted and instead build better models. Additional guidance on this point is presented in a chapter by Philip Tetlock, where he argues that humans are cognitive managers, rather than misers, who cope with trade-offs and taboos in a sophisticated way.

There is, however, discord on this central issue across different chapters of *Elements of Reason*. In an astonishing chapter, Paul Sniderman critiques his own research program on heuristic use, and proposes that much of the heavy lifting humans require to make choices is instead accomplished by institutions. In many ways, Sniderman's argument follows that of Simon, who claimed that the algorithms underlying choice are not sophisticated, and that complex environments condition choices such that humans only appear sophisticated. Thus, humans cannot on their own steam use heuristics to simplify choices. Rather, political parties and other institutions simplify choices, creating the illusion of citizen competence. The mistake here is that we have existence proofs that Simon and Sniderman's account is incomplete. Humans perform extremely well at impossibly difficult problems, absent any guidance from the environment or institutions. Further, moving the spotlight to institutions is a shell game. Institutions are created and maintained by elites, who are simply a different set of actors making decisions in ways we do not understand.

James Kuklinski and Paul Quirk follow Sniderman's lead in criticizing the political-heuristics and collective-opinion research. They correctly argue that much of the work in political heuristics falls into the category of "just-so stories"—we lack models that describe how heuristics are learned, modified, or stored in memory, and so instead, political psychology resorts to semiplausible reconstructions that fail not only on the grounds of cognitive plausibility but also on utility. Given their pessimism, it is surprising that the answer Kuklinski and Quirk propose is derived from findings in evolutionary psychology. This substitutes one set of just-so stories for another. Instead of clever heuristics, we have untestable stories

of how hunter-gatherer society conditions current political choices.

I have highlighted one area of debate with the pages of *Elements of Reason*, though there are others of equal import. This volume is engaging for the simple virtue that debate of this kind furthers research in a way that is seldom witnessed in the sanitized accounts presented in journals. *Elements of Reason* makes a considered argument for building better models of choice, and makes an enormous contribution by providing a shared framework for evaluating these models. Further, the contributors to this volume present work that points to several promising directions for future research. Disagreements strengthen the book by providing researchers with insight into questions that are still contentious.

Elements of Reason raises more questions than it answers, and all the authors, to varying degrees, fail to provide models that implement their ideas. Without precise models, rational choice theory will continue as the default model of decision making. An unanswered question in astronomy or metaphysics is that if the universe is expanding, what is it expanding into? *Elements of Reason* poses a similar question for social science: If rational choice theory is contracting, what has been left behind? We need answers to this question, and *Elements of Reason* makes important strides in providing them.

Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections By Stephen K. Medvic. Columbus: Ohio State University, 2001. 224p. \$50.00 cloth.

Darrell M. West, *Brown University*

Political consultants have become an omnipresent part of the election landscape. Almost no prominent campaign emerges without a group of paid advisors who raise money, poll, design ads, and craft messages for the candidate. Yet despite the extensive visibility of campaign consultants, few empirical studies exist that attempt to measure the impact of this important player in American elections.

In his new book, *Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections*, political scientist Stephen Medvic seeks to fill this gap in the literature. He focuses on two questions: what consultants do and how successful they are. Using case studies and empirical data, he looks at voting, fund-raising, and media advising. Unlike some others who have studied this phenomenon, he suggests that consultants are not as harmful to our political process as some observers have argued.

His major approach is what Medvic calls a theory of "deliberate priming." In this perspective, the author says that candidates emphasize specific themes to alter voter standards of candidate evaluation (p. 51). It is a process that is deliberate and self-conscious on the part of consultants. Through polls, focus groups, and ads, campaigners seek to alter the content of political races in ways advantageous to themselves. Appeals are made not to all voters, but to a subset of the electorate that is available to the candidate.

The book draws on a meticulously compiled general election data set. Taking advantage of federal laws requiring disclosure of campaign expenditures in federal races, the author develops a data set that includes the names of all consultants paid in two or more specific congressional elections (a criteria developed to weed out part-time consultants). Among other things, the data set included variables measuring the type of consulting service provided, the candidate's party, sex, incumbency status, previous elective office, the district presidential vote, the perceived vulnerability of the seat, the votes cast per candidate, the total votes cast in the race, wins

and losses, expenditures, and contributions (broken down by source).

Using these data, Medvic is able to develop a comprehensive look at congressional races in 1990 and 1992. Not surprising, winners were more likely to hire consultants than losers and to employ larger numbers of consultants per race. Media specialists and pollsters were the most likely consultants to be hired, followed by generalists, fund-raisers, and direct mail specialists. Interestingly, Democrats were more likely to hire consultants than Republicans. However, winning challengers were more likely than losing challengers to rely on consultants. There was no gender gap in reliance on campaign advisers.

The last part of the book seeks to measure the successfulness of consultants on election fortunes. To undertake this analysis, the author separates incumbents from challengers due to the well-recognized advantages incumbents bring to the electoral process in many areas. Using ordinary least-squares regression, Medvic models the incumbent's percentage of the vote by various campaign factors including whether or not each party's candidate employed a consultant.

The results reported in Chapter Five demonstrate that having a consultant significantly helps them run competitive campaigns. According to the analysis, challenges could reduce their opponent's vote by 2.7 percentage points merely by hiring a consultant. Since these results are independent of campaign expenditures, it suggests that consultants have an independent effect on election campaigns. In open seat elections, Medvic finds even more dramatic examples of consultant influence. Using multivariate models, he shows that Republicans in the early 1990s were able to raise their vote by 16 percentage points through employment of consultants.

Medvic deserves credit for undertaking a thorough, careful, and detailed study of the use and impact of campaign consultants. Although many observers make normative judgments about these hired guns, few inform their opinions with data analysis. In what surely was a laborious data collection effort, Medvic gets high marks for attempting to reach systematic generalizations about a subject that rarely goes beyond anecdotes.

The major thing I would have liked to see is some explication of the results beyond the 1990–92 period studied. In 1994, for example, House Republicans stormed the gates and took control of the House and Senate. What role, if any, did consultants play in this reversal of electoral fortune? It would have been interesting for Medvic to extend his analysis to this and later time periods to see if the patterns he found stood up or were idiosyncratic to periods of Democratic control of the House. If the latter were true, for example, it would point to contextual factors that are important for congressional elections.

In addition, I would have liked to see more development of the normative argument found in the closing chapter. In that chapter, Medvic suggests that consultants are not nearly as harmful to American democracy as frequently alleged. It would have been interesting for the author to speculate more generally about his results and explain why consultants should not be feared. Some, for example, blame consultants for the negative and misleading tone of election campaigns and the rising costs of gaining office. In what ways do his results speak to those fears and how do they refute them?

I would suggest that scholars interested in campaign effects take a close look at this book. The author tackles a difficult question and reaches some conclusions that are unconventional. His thesis deserves serious attention by campaign observers.

The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality By Tali Mendelberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 320p. \$52.50 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Vincent L. Hutchings, *University of Michigan*

Tali Mendelberg's *The Race Card* offers a methodologically rich and convincing account of the impact of subtle race cues in contemporary American politics. Although her thesis is a controversial one, Mendelberg develops a careful and cogent argument that racial attitudes can have a substantial effect on candidate evaluations—provided that candidates craft a racial appeal that appears to be about something other than race. She argues that the success of implicit antiblack appeals, ones juxtaposing visual references to race with ostensibly nonracial verbal messages on issues such as crime or welfare, are due to four “A” factors: ambivalence about racial stereotypes, accessibility and priming, awareness of one's reliance on racial attitudes, and the ambiguity of the racial cue.

According to Mendelberg, white Americans' ambivalence on racial matters springs from their simultaneous commitment to the norm of racial equality and their persistent acceptance of negative antiblack stereotypes. Thus, racial appeals are likely to be most persuasive when they evoke a racial reaction without appearing to violate this norm. Mendelberg relies on the extensive social psychological literature on accessibility and priming to show that it is through this mechanism that racial messages influence voters. That is, although many whites have internalized negative racial stereotypes, these attitudes are not necessarily brought to bear on political judgments absent some racial cue provided by political elites. Awareness of the racial intent behind political cues is important for Mendelberg because it can prevent the activation of antiblack attitudes. As she points out, a growing body of evidence suggests that attitudes can be primed without the conscious awareness of the individual. Indeed, socially undesirable attitudes on issues such as race may be especially susceptible to priming when the individual is *not* aware that he or she has been affected.

Finally, Mendelberg argues that political cues with an ambiguous racial message are likely to be more effective than explicit appeals (i.e., appeals where words such as “black” or “race” are used). This is because, when confronted with ambiguity, voters tend to rely on their own attitudes in order to make sense of the political world. If, as Mendelberg suspects, this applies to race-based appeals, then candidates will be most successful when their messages imply racial meaning without conveying it openly.

Perhaps the most notorious use of implicit racial appeals in contemporary politics is the Republicans' use of the “Willie Horton ad” during the 1988 presidential campaign, and much of Mendelberg's book is devoted to this issue. Anyone familiar with the 1988 campaign will recall that Horton, a black man serving time in Massachusetts on first-degree murder, assaulted a white couple, stabbing the man and raping the woman, during a weekend pass. Republicans used this tragic episode to argue that the Democratic presidential nominee, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, was soft on crime. Many also believe they used it to send a not-too-subtle message about the Democrats' stand on race.

Although not the first to provide an in-depth account of the Horton ad and its subterranean linkages to the Bush campaign, Mendelberg does provide a theoretically grounded assessment of when the Horton message should have been most successful. Utilizing a detailed content analysis of the period, she points out that although Horton's race and that of his victims were routinely provided in the press, the news media—and presumably the white public—did not interpret

this appeal as racial for most of the campaign season. It was not until late October when the Reverend Jesse Jackson, and later Democratic vice-presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen, accused the Republicans of crafting a racist appeal that the news media skeptically aired this interpretation.

According to Mendelberg's theory of racial priming, the Horton ad should have been most successful in activating racial attitudes vis-à-vis candidate evaluations *before* Jackson accused the Republicans of racism, thereby transforming an implicit racial message into an explicit one. In order to test this theory, Mendelberg examines survey data during each of the three media phases of the Horton campaign: when the message received little attention; when attention became far more prominent, but remained "implicit;" and when the strategy was accused by Jackson of being racist, and hence became "explicit." Consistent with her theory, she finds that whites' attitudes on the Racial Resentment scale are most strongly associated with Candidate evaluations during the first two phases, *but not in the third*. In fact, the effects are substantively and statistically insignificant in the final phase of the campaign. Mendelberg concludes in this chapter that in order to counter the Republican strategy of race priming, the Democrats would do well to follow the example set by Jesse Jackson.

Mendelberg is well aware that the results from these analyses are not definitive. Clearly, the impact of racial attitudes on candidate evaluations did decline just as the Horton campaign shifted from an "implicit" stage to a more "explicit" one. Still, analysis of survey data does not allow her to rule out the possibility that some other, unmeasured factor accounts for this decline. In order to confront this possibility, Mendelberg designed a series of clever experiments set in either Michigan or New Jersey. Essentially, she randomly assigned her subjects to conditions either where they viewed news accounts of one candidate making an explicit appeal to racial attitudes (e.g., "Hayes says that people, especially African Americans, take advantage of welfare at the expense of hard-working taxpayers") or where they viewed the same candidate making merely an implicit appeal (i.e., visual references only).

The author deserves considerable credit for the ingenuity and care that went into her experimental designs. In addition to designing her entirely fictitious news accounts, Mendelberg also selected her subjects randomly from the phone book and then exposed them to the stimuli in their homes. Virtually no one in this subfield has gone to greater lengths to ensure that a study occurred under the most realistic conditions possible. In spite of all this effort, however, the results from these experiments do not resolve all of the unanswered questions from her survey analyses.

Mendelberg's experiments generally show that explicit appeals are far less successful at priming racial attitudes than are implicit appeals. Moreover, consistent with her theory, these effects seem to be driven by concern with norm violations and awareness of the racial content of the political message. One peculiar result from these experiments, however, is that racially liberal subjects who are not concerned when they are informed that their views violate the norm are far *more* likely to support the racially conservative candidate. This result does not fundamentally undermine the author's argument, but it does suggest that we need to know more about how and why norm violations moderate racial priming.

My greatest concerns with the author's experiments have less to do with what they show than with what they do not reveal. In my view, Mendelberg never directly tests the strengths and weaknesses of her core advice to Democrats: that the appropriate response to implicit racial messages is to unmask them. By showing that explicit messages are less effective—

although, significantly, *not ineffective*—she has shown that many whites will reject such crude appeals. However, I suspect that many readers will find that a candidate engaging in an explicit racial appeal is not the same as another candidate who labels an implicit appeal as racist. Indeed, as Mendelberg herself argues, the power of implicit appeals lies in part in their very ambiguity. This ambiguity makes it difficult to successfully label an implicit appeal as racist, particularly as the sponsoring candidate is likely to contest this charge. Also, I wondered whether Jackson's apparently persuasive effort to undermine the Horton ad was actually due to Jackson's accusation or Bentsen's. This raises the question of what types of Democrats (e.g., black or white, liberal or moderate, male or female, etc.) can successfully raise the charge of racism without the fear that it might backfire? Also, how successful will this strategy be in the South? In fairness, Mendelberg cannot be criticized for failing to address all of these questions, but they seem like an appropriate starting place for those who will wish to build on her work. Until these questions have been answered, I think the jury is still out as to whether unmasking implicit racial appeals is necessarily a winning strategy.

With these important caveats aside, Mendelberg's book should be regarded as a major contribution to the field of race and politics. The theory is well grounded in the literatures of political science and social psychology, the supportive evidence is carefully analyzed and methodologically diverse, and the conclusions drawn are generally persuasive. Although Mendelberg's thesis will undoubtedly be regarded as controversial in some circles, her book goes a long way in providing compelling evidence that race, and racial attitudes, still matter in contemporary American politics.

Learning by Voting: Sequential Choices in Presidential Primaries and Other Elections By Rebecca B. Morton and Kenneth C. Williams. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 184p. \$55.00.

Lonna Rae Atkeson, *University of New Mexico*

While most elections in the United States are simultaneous (with all voters casting their ballots on the same day), there are elections, such as the presidential primary system, in which voters cast their ballots over an extended period of time. Sequential voting poses an interesting puzzle for scholars of voting behavior, particularly given the information flow of elections, but also the strategic considerations of what is effectively an iterated process over time. Presidential primaries are essentially a sequence or series of state party races that begin in early February and last until June of a presidential election year. Although not precisely the same as the presidential primary process, mail-in balloting or early voting, whereby some voters, especially stronger partisans, choose to cast their ballots prior to election day, offers another example of sequential voting in the United States.

As Rebecca Morton and Kenneth Williams argue, the advantage and unique feature of sequential voting is that voters later in the process have more information about the candidates, including horse race information, delegate totals, candidate trait, ideology, and policy information because of the preceding electoral events. This advantage may give later voters the opportunity to make more informed and perhaps even better decisions than they would have otherwise. On the other hand, sequential voting has potential negative consequences. Specifically, states or voters that go early in the process may have an undue influence on the electoral outcome, influencing that process in ways that undermine its representativeness and fairness. If this is so, then simultaneous elections are better because they equalize voter influence and maximize the

chance that the better-known candidates will win. Morton and Williams are interested in tackling the normative questions of this debate, assessing through the use of formal methods and experimental design the strengths and weaknesses of each voting system.

Morton and Williams do a decent job of describing the history of the presidential primary system and document the increase by states in front-loading, the move from a later primary date to an earlier date in order to have a greater influence on the outcome. As a result of front-loading, they argue, primaries are now virtually simultaneous elections. They also do a nice job of describing the history of “early voting,” also known as absentee or mail-in voting, and attempt to build a case that makes it equivalent to the process of sequential elections found in the presidential nominating system. In Chapter 4 they do a thoughtful and interesting review of previous formal models of simultaneous and sequential voting.

Chapter 5 is where the real meat of their argument and analysis begins. As good formal modelers, they begin by outlining their assumptions and the implications of those assumptions on voter behavior. Their model assumes three types of candidates and voters: liberal, moderate, and conservative (though subjects know candidates as only x , y , or z). Information is constant in their analysis, but it is limited. Voters know about only one candidate and on the basis of that information must consider appropriate strategic choices. In the sequential model, voters in later contests have an additional piece of information: They know the outcomes of the earlier contests. In one case (designated high information), these later voters know how liberal, moderate, and conservative voters voted, and in the other case (designated low information), voters only know the aggregated outcomes of earlier voting.

To test their model, the researchers created a computerized election environment for subjects, providing them information about the candidate types, the payoffs, including information about how voter types rank the candidates, and the number of voters in each voter type. Subjects are also placed in risk-averse or risk-seeking groups based on payoffs. In the sequential experiment, “later”-voting subjects receive the additional information in the two cases described. The authors then test nine hypotheses about voter behavior within this constrained information environment, and the results are not always successful.

First, their best models test hypotheses related to simultaneous voting and are most applicable to a three-candidate, low-information general election race. These models, then, are especially useful in understanding local elections where there are often multiple candidates and little information. Their iterative model, though interesting and insightful, may not apply well to our understanding of presidential nominating campaigns. The reason is that this model and its payoff structure do not take into consideration that the presidential nomination campaign is only the first step in the selection process and that strategic considerations about the general election campaign may have an influence on voter behavior during the nomination campaign. In addition, their experiment misses the fundamental intraparty nature of a nomination campaign, how it is uniquely different from a general election campaign during which candidates can send clear cues about rational voting behavior. The electorate in a nomination campaign is not as ideologically diverse as it is in a general election campaign. Voters in a nominating campaign may have several good choices, and the different payoffs among candidates may often be very small or in some cases nonexistent, unlike a general election campaign in which the ideological and policy payoffs are clear.

Second, in their sequential game, the authors do not consider the fact that the presidential nominating game changes significantly over time as candidates withdraw from the race. These withdrawals are not reflected in the payoff structure. What happens in a nomination game is that eventually the race becomes largely a two-person, instead of a three-person or more, race. Thus, the winnowing aspect of the presidential nominating game is, at best, only partially represented by aggregate information about earlier voting decisions.

Third, the authors really try to stretch their theoretical framework by arguing that early or absentee voting is similar to a sequential race. In fact, it currently is not, and theoretically it is unlikely to evolve into a sequential process. Early voting results are not revealed to the electorate and cannot be used as a basis of information for election day voters. This factor diminishes the applicability of the iterative game to this process.

Despite these criticisms, this book serves as an important first step in considering the normative implications of sequential and simultaneous elections on voter behavior. It would be of most interest to election scholars, but also has some use for those teaching graduate method classes. In particular, I found Appendix A a good, though brief, introduction to formal modeling and experimental design. I also found the design of the experiment, its payoffs, and inherent assumptions very interesting and would like to see more use of experimental designs by political science researchers.

Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress By Eric Schickler. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 356p. \$65.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

David C. King, *Harvard University*

For those of us who watch Congress and steep ourselves in its history, there are a handful of theories purporting to explain how and why Congress changes. Political parties behave like cartels gathering power at another’s expense. Election-minded members shape Congress to ease the passage of pork-barrel bills and to trade votes. Congress often seems designed to encourage legislators to become policy experts, and their expertise is protected by deference to committees that fairly closely represent the interests of the whole House or Senate. For at least the last 15 years, and in the name of New Institutionalism, full-throated fans of various theories have been arguing over which one is “right.”

In *Disjointed Pluralism*, Eric Schickler looks at the history of Congressional rules, committee structures, and Congressional leadership through the various lenses of theory. He emerges with an argument that none of the prevailing theories is really right all the time and none of the theories is really wrong either. That criticism is not new or by itself very helpful, but Schickler does everyone better in inducing a theory about how various interests engage in a continual interplay over congressional power.

The “pluralism” in Schickler’s title is a bevy of “collective interests” that might spur innovations in Congressional design. These include political parties, chamber-centered interests, individual power bases, policy interests, and reelection interests. No one cause of Congressional change is predominant, and “*disjointed* pluralism portrays institutions as multilayered historical composites that militate against any overarching order in legislative politics” (p. 17). Furthermore, “congressional development is disjointed in that members incrementally add new institutional mechanisms without dismantling preexisting institutions and without rationalizing the structure as a whole” (pp. 17–18).

Schickler makes four claims about how Congressional institutions change, and each is successfully defended in case studies and through careful empirical work. First, several collective interests (or theories that have typically been offered) are in play each time there are important changes in Congressional institutions. Second, advocates of change in Congress appeal to multiple interests by, for example, fashioning temporary coalitions among believers in strong parties and members pursuing reelection. Third, new institutions typically layer on top of preexisting ones, so that exploring Congressional rules and procedures is not unlike an archeological dig, appearing “more haphazard than the product of some overarching plan” (p. 15). Finally, the whole system is dynamic in that changes promoting one collective interest (say, the desires of policy experts) provoke contradictory reforms from other collective interests.

Just as there is no overarching plan in the design of Congress, Schickler’s theory itself seems disjointed and at times patched together from a plurality of interesting explanations, path dependency among them. I suspect that the book will not be remembered for its theory, unless the notion of path dependency can be more explicitly developed in subsequent articles. And I risk making an especially nitpicky comment here: The book would have been better labeled simply by what comes after the colon—*Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress*.

Why?

Schickler’s theory reads more like an *ad hoc* explanation, but as a nuanced, rigorously researched and theoretically informed description of Congressional reforms, *Disjointed Pluralism* is a tour de force. Schickler covers reforms in four periods, 1890–1910, 1919–32, 1937–52, and 1970–89. The result is the best and most comprehensive work on Congressional reform since Joseph Cooper and David Brady were writing sweeping histories 20 years ago.

Schickler’s research is exhaustive but never exhausting to read, and he blends case studies with logit analyses in ways that should be a lesson to us all. *Disjointed Pluralism* is now, and for some time will be, the definitive analysis of the history of congressional reforms since the 1890s. There are some jarring surprises, which Schickler argues convincingly. Notably, Schickler shows that in the late 1800s and early 1900s, an era of strong parties, partisan interests did not singularly drive Congressional reforms. Multiple interests, as in all other eras, were very much in play.

If Congressional reforms emerge from a mixture of collective motives, reelection interests play a minor role. Schickler categorizes 42 reforms, beginning with the adoption of Speaker Reed’s rules in 1890, yet “there is surprisingly little evidence that members’ shared reelection interest has driven development in the four periods examined” (p. 255). That conclusion may jar students of Mayhew’s 1974 book (*Congress: The Electoral Connection*), but Schickler is a Mayhew devotee (and his former Ph.D. student at Yale). Indeed, throughout the four periods, Congressional changes seem driven by policy interests, the creation of individual power bases, a tug-of-war with the executive branch, and the flux of power between the parties. And as Schickler shows, when one constellation of interests makes a change, there is an almost-inevitable path-dependent reaction from the forces that lost in the previous reforms.

Disjointed Pluralism is, wisely, not teleological, but in arguing that new institutional structures are evermore layered on top of the old, Schickler misses an opportunity to explain when and why older edifices are explicitly exploded. Schickler is right that “the effectiveness of institutional change has repeatedly been compromised by the need to accommo-

date a preexisting authority structure that privileged other interests” (p. 252). But the word repeatedly in that sentence should not be read as “inevitably.”

The development of legislative institutions does tend toward complexity and layering, but on occasion whole lines of precedents and whole sections of the rules are jettisoned entirely. This is most likely to happen early in a legislature’s history, as we are seeing today with the Russian Duma, the Ukrainian Rada, and so on. Perhaps this dynamic would have been more evident in Congress had Schickler’s analysis begun with the late 1700s instead of the 1800s.

That is too much to ask, I know, because Eric Schickler’s attention to detail and careful analysis of the last 100 years is a wonderful achievement in itself. Thanks to *Disjointed Pluralism*, full-throated fans of various single-cause theories will have a lot to talk about.

The War Against the New Deal: World War II and American Democracy By Brian Waddell. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001. 236p. \$39.00.

Donald R. Brand, *College of the Holy Cross*

This book argues that the transition from the New Deal to a mobilized wartime economy during World War II restored corporate hegemony in collaboration with a state apparatus dominated by military elites. The purported losers in this transition were New Deal reformers committed to a planned economy and an extensive social welfare state, and groups like labor and small business whose interests were represented by reform elites. Organized chronologically, Waddell’s account traces the development of the military-industrial complex from the War Industries Board in World War I to what Waddell asserts is a neocorporatist pattern of governance that had become established by the late 1940s and early 1950s. For the intervening years, he devotes attention to the trade association movement of the 1920s, the National Recovery Administration in the early 1930s, the New Deal turn to Keynesian economics, Harry Truman and the Marshall Plan, and the National Security Act of 1947; but the book focuses on the three periods associated with mobilization for World War II. These three periods are prewar mobilization from September, 1939 to December, 1941; the institutionalization of wartime mobilization from early 1942 through early 1943; and the battles over postwar reconversion that began in 1943 and continued into the immediate postwar era.

Waddell has synthesized some of the existing secondary literature and supplemented it with material from published government sources to provide a coherent interpretation of the relationship of the New Deal to wartime mobilization; but his book will not, and should not, persuade anyone skeptical of his initial premises. He utilizes evidence selectively, cites literature that supports his thesis while ignoring literature that opposes it, and does not independently verify or evaluate assertions found in congressional committee reports.

One example of his selectivity is that there is surprisingly little attention to labor and labor unions in the war years. Instead, Waddell focuses on the plight of small businesses and their disadvantages vis-à-vis oligopolistic firms in securing lucrative government contracts. Labor unions only appear when they are playing second fiddle to big business in war production agencies or being asked to accept wage restraints while business profits mushroom. Doris Kearns Goodwin’s (1994) *No Ordinary Time* presents a very different picture of the wartime years. She argues that “even as he reached out to business during the war years, Roosevelt insisted on preserving the social gains of the previous decade.” Specifically,

his “partnership with business was not forged at the expense of American labor” (p. 608). Supporting her argument, she notes that labor unions added six million new members in the war years and that they emerged from the war with unprecedented organizational strength; and that many in labor made significant wage gains, notably automobile workers, who doubled their incomes because of labor shortages. Waddell should have addressed her thesis; he should have provided an alternative explanation for some of the facts and data that she provides to support her claims. Instead, he ignores her; he does not even include her book in his bibliography. Similarly, he ignores the claim made by Jordan Schwarz in *The New Dealers* (1995) that the New Deal disbanded the War Resource Board to preserve civilian control over defense preparations and to preserve New Deal principles under new circumstances.

One of the strengths of *The War Against the New Deal* is Waddell’s recognition that the struggle between New Deal reformers and big business was genuine and fundamental. The New Deal was not simply rationalizing capitalism, and its efforts to enhance the regulatory capacity of the American state posed a serious threat to the interests and prerogatives of business elites. While Waddell appropriately recognizes that opposition to some of the regulatory agenda of the New Deal could unite big business, it is a mistake to portray big business as a homogeneous class with unified interests. Waddell acknowledges that business leaders must overcome collective action dilemmas if they are to pursue shared interests effectively, and he acknowledges ideological differences between corporate liberals and laissez-faire conservatives; but he underestimates other conflicting business interests. For instance, he does not explore the important sectoral differences that fragment business unity. He pays particular attention to steel,

aluminum, and copper because these raw materials were rationed during war mobilization and the industries associated with them tend to be highly oligopolistic, but he ignores what happened in less regulated, less oligopolistic sectors of the economy like textiles. He does not adequately distinguish the interests of firms producing defense materials sold to government as the sole consumer from the interests of firms producing materials that could be sold to consumers. He needs to supplement his general analysis of government–business relations with industry case studies to provide a richer, more empirical account of the war years.

Waddell concludes that the “military-corporate alliance triumphed” and the state was stronger “at the cost of compromising and diminishing America’s democratic character.” (p. 3). He concludes his account of the evolution of civilian–military relations with Truman and the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, but his sweeping conclusion would seem to require some explanation for Truman’s firing of Douglas MacArthur in 1951. This was a major political episode in the Truman presidency, and it seems to testify to the preeminence of civilian over military control in the immediate postwar era. The claim that the military–industrial complex had “diminished America’s democratic character” would also entail some demonstration that America’s defense policy and defense spending in the postwar years did not reflect the preferences of democratic majorities responding to the growing, real threat of the Soviet Union. Waddell provides no evidence to refute this claim, just as he provides no evidence to refute alternative interpretations of the fate of reform aspirations in the wartime years. He makes no converts because he preaches only to the converted.

Comparative Politics

Unemployment in the New Europe Edited by Nancy Bermeo.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 368p. \$70.00 cloth, \$28.00 paper.

Per Kongshøj Madsen, *University of Copenhagen*

The publication under review is the outcome of a Princeton University conference entitled “Unemployment’s Effects” held in 1997. The themes of the chapters extend widely. Some authors focus on broad discussions of the possibilities for the “European model” to survive in a global economic setting, while others look at specific relations, for example, between unemployment and trade union strength, in just one European country. Some chapters have clear theoretical objectives, while others have a focus on empirical detail and statistical analysis. On the other hand, the majority of the chapters are related by a general positive view on the sustainability of the European model, even in the seemingly hostile environment of the global economy. Although the European welfare states and labor markets are often accused of being inflexible and hampered by “institutional sclerosis,” they may also foster the development of a soft and kind capitalism—or organized managed economy—as Nancy Bermeo puts it in her introduction to the book.

A useful survey of the development of European labor markets over the last two decades is found in the contribution by David Cameron, who correctly points to the large discrepancies among the European countries when it comes to employment and unemployment performance.

The following two chapters by Peter Hall and Martin Rhodes both argue the case for the organized market economy as a viable alternative to neoliberal capitalism. Hall provides a well-balanced discussion of the pros and cons of the two models, while Rhodes focuses on the effects of globalization on the European welfare states. Their positive attitude toward the “European project” is evident, but both authors argue their case in a balanced and well-documented fashion.

The next two chapters are written in the tradition of comparative quantitative macroanalysis. Bruce Western and Kieran Healy present results from an analysis of the wage slowdown in 18 OECD countries from 1965 to 1993, while Lyde Scruggs and Peter Lange examine the relation between unemployment and union density. The main message conveyed in both chapters is that “institutions matter.” The process of wage determination is strongly influenced by the institutional setup. The same goes for the relation between unemployment and union density. Thus, countries where trade unions control the unemployment insurance system gain members during times of crisis. The opposite is true for countries with state-controlled benefit systems.

Then follow three case studies, of Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands, by Allan Stoleroff, Javier G. Polavieja and Andrew Richards, and Steven B. Wolinetz, respectively. Though they all in one way or the other serve to substantiate the main argument of the book, they are also the least interesting to the general reader, mainly due to their great detail and lack of updated material.

The last part of the book is focused on a theme, political behavior, which is somewhat remote from the rest of the chapters. First, Christopher J. Anderson presents the results of a comparative study of political behavior of the unemployed in 12 member states of the European Union. Data are from 1994. He does find some differences between the employed and the unemployed part of the population, but neglects the fact that individual unemployment is not a stable situation. To the contrary, many persons move to and from unemployment during the year as a normal element of the functioning of the labor market. By example in the Danish case, about one-quarter of the employees experience at least one spell of unemployment every year. Furthermore, those affected by unemployment differ from the average employee in a number of respects, especially by having a high probability of being low skilled. Thus, one must expect that the political behavior of a person who is reported as unemployed at a given point in time is the result of the interplay between a large number of variables, including the duration of the current unemployment spell, educational background, income level, and so on. Or to put it differently: It is hard to tell from the analysis presented here whether we are dealing with the political behavior of the unemployed or the unskilled or—more probably—the result of the interplay between a number of socioeconomic variables. This criticism is less relevant in the case of the following chapter by José Maria Maravall and Martha Fraile, who use four background variables to explain the voting behavior of the Spanish voters in the election in April 1995. Not surprisingly, they find that variables other than unemployment, including income, are of importance to voting behavior.

In the final chapter, the editor Nancy Bermeo sums up the main argument of the volume. There is no clear winner of the “battle of the systems.” Contrary to the conventional wisdom, at least in some quarters, both coordinated and uncoordinated policy models are able to deliver the good in the form of lower unemployment. And furthermore, coordinated policy models and competitive corporatism have the merit of being more favorable to social inclusion and lower inequality. They are just a nicer place for common folks, which is of course a positive conclusion for the majority of the population that can be characterized as such.

It is rare to find a collection of conference proceedings that does not show some weakness when it comes to actuality and coherence. One striking feature, when looking back over the chapters of the present publication, is the limited discussion of the European Employment Strategy, which since 1998 has been an important element in the reform process of the European Union. Considerations of the expected enlargement of the European Union with up to 10 Central and Eastern European countries are also absent in the volume. These observations are not a criticism of the editor as such—because the two subjects mentioned *were* practically missing in the academic debates just a few years ago. But they still show the risk of a considerable time lag between publications about the “new Europe”—and what is actually going on in the new Europe.

These critical remarks should not, however, scare the reader away from the book. For those not familiar with this line of research, the publication provides a valuable and balanced introduction to important alternatives to the liberal free-market orthodoxy. Also, for those academics, students, and others who are already familiar with—and maybe sympathetic to—the alternatives to the neoliberal paradigm, this collection of papers gives a helpful survey of the views of some of the prominent scholars active in the study of the ongoing transformation of Europe.

The Retreat of Social Democracy By John Callaghan. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. 255p. \$69.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Against the Third Way By Alex Callinicos. Oxford: Polity Press, 2001. 160p. \$56.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Social Democracy in Neoliberal Times: The Left and Economic Policy since 1980 Edited by Andrew Glyn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 374p. \$70.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Fred Block, *University of California, Davis*

Since the 1980s, global financial integration and the rise of neoliberalism have significantly changed the terrain on which European social democratic parties operate. However, fierce debate persists over the evaluation of these changes. Some observers—from widely differing political standpoints—insist that social democracy and the free movement of capital across national boundaries are fundamentally incompatible. It follows that the only options for social democratic parties are either to embrace neoliberalism and dismantle much of the welfare state or organize concerted action to reshape the global financial architecture. An opposing group of analysts are equally adamant that while the terrain has certainly become more difficult, it is still possible for Social Democrats to preserve much of the welfare state and even launch new policy initiatives.

All three of the books under review argue for some variant of this second position with differing combinations of normative and empirical arguments. While the arguments are often implicit, most of the authors appear to be skeptical of neoliberal claims that markets can truly be self-regulating. It follows that if actual global financial arrangements fall far short of neoliberal dreams, then there is still considerable room for governments to play an active role in shaping how markets work. It is within this space that Social Democrats are able to pursue policies designed to protect citizens from the market.

The three books share a further agenda in common; they all see Tony Blair's Third Way path for the British Labour Party to be misguided. Alex Callinicos's book is a straightforward polemic that elaborates Perry Anderson's insight that “the Third Way is the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today” (p. 109). Callinicos considers that Third Way rhetoric is simply an effort to conceal Blair's actual agenda of dismantling what remains of the welfare state and providing unconditional support for U.S. initiatives in order to impose its vision of market liberalism on the rest of the world.

John Callaghan's book presents a more scholarly account of European social democracy over the past 40 years. But surprisingly, Callaghan's reference to “Retreat” in his book's title refers only to the United Kingdom. His conclusion argues forcefully that European social democracy is not in decline, either in terms of electoral support or the ability to achieve its policy objectives. While Callaghan recognizes that all of these parties have become more cautious in the current global environment, he insists that outside of the U.K., they are continuing to defend social democratic values. The book's real agenda is to show that Tony Blair is out of step with the rest of European social democracy. Callaghan argues that Blair and New Labour have gone too far in embracing Thatcherite ideas, even at a time when their European colleagues are effectively defending the welfare state and developing proposals to bring footloose global capital under greater control. Callaghan's book is particularly useful in detailing the leftward turn within social democracy in the major European countries in the 1960s and 1970s and in recounting the defeats suffered in the 1980s. However, the book would

be considerably stronger had he focused more attention on explaining the root causes of the policy divergences between New Labour in England and Social Democrats in Germany and France.

The third book is an unusually strong collection of essays that provide in-depth analyses of the recent experiences of a range of different social democratic governments. The quality is uniformly high and the essays develop detailed and sophisticated analyses. Most of the essays analyze the recent history of particular countries—with specific essays covering the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Austria, Greece, Spain, Poland, and the special cases of Australia and New Zealand. Andrew Glyn's introduction and the last three essays are broadly comparative and move toward a broader assessment of the issues.

The essay on New Labour by Glyn and Stewart Wood shares Callinicos's and Callaghan's distaste for Tony Blair's Third Way, but in only 22 pages, it offers a more subtle and detailed analysis. The authors acknowledge, for example, that some of New Labour's policies, such as the Working Families Tax Credit, the introduction of a minimum wage in April 1999, and possibly, the efforts to move young people into employment, have actually benefited the poorest households in the U.K. But they go on to explain why these initiatives are unlikely to make a significant difference in England's high rates of economic inequality and chronically high regional unemployment. They also persuasively argue that New Labour's consistent effort to keep the trade unions at arm's length "has left the government without any means to encourage the kind of coordination of wage bargaining which appears to have played a significant part in a number of recent 'employment miracles,' the Netherlands and Ireland, for example" (p. 209).

But while Glyn and Wood are in considerable agreement with the other authors in their assessment of New Labour, the cumulative thrust of the essays in Glyn's volume suggests a somewhat more pessimistic assessment of social democracy on the European Continent than that provided by Callaghan. Specifically, the chapters on Spain, Greece, and France emphasize both the failure of recent social democratic governments to bring unemployment rates down and their gradual accommodation to orthodox monetary policies. To be sure, each of these essays also stresses the unique challenges faced by these parties, particularly those that were not building on established social democratic traditions. In Austria and Sweden—in contrast—the assessments are somewhat more positive, and a comparative essay by John Stephens and Evelyne Huber does provide strong evidence that cutbacks in social spending in social democratic welfare states have thus far been quite limited.

In short, most of these essays downplay the role of global political economic factors in explaining the timidity or failure of particular social democratic governments. But there are occasional acknowledgments that capital mobility and exchange rate policies do significantly constrain government policy options. These arguments are developed most fully in one of the comparative essays written by Torben Iversen. Drawing heavily on the Swedish case, he argues that the government's conversion to a fixed exchange-rate policy, in combination with the collapse of centralized wage bargaining, significantly constrains its choices. Specifically, he cites Peter Swenson's use of the "trilemma" concept to argue that under current circumstances, social democratic governments cannot simultaneously pursue full employment, income equality, and budgetary restraint. And he goes on to argue that accommodation to either unemployment or increased income inequality threatens to undermine the coherence of social democratic electoral appeals.

Ultimately, the three books are persuasive in making the case that it is domestic politics and not global financial integration that has led Blair and New Labour to take minimal action to reverse levels of economic inequality that are far higher than those on the Continent. At the same time, they fail to provide a direct and persuasive challenge to those who argue that global financial integration is pushing all economies toward higher levels of economic inequality and greater acceptance of unemployment. The closest thing to such an argument is provided by Adam Przeworski in an essay in the Glyn volume that argues that "[m]ost of the effects attributed to globalization are due to something else, many to technological changes" (p. 330). But Przeworski also acknowledges that there is still too little solid research to make such a statement with any degree of confidence. The issue of whether social democracy can survive another 20 years of global neoliberalism remains unresolved.

But the Callinicos book provides a perspective that the other books lack; he devotes considerable attention to the United States role in advancing global neoliberalism. In contrast to those who imagine that economic integration is creating some kind of unified global capitalist class, Callinicos sees U.S. actions through the lens of Great Power politics, and he also sees U.S. hegemony as increasingly fragile. One source of weakness is the U.S. economy's dependence on a stock market bubble that Callinicos correctly predicted could not be sustained. Another potential weakness is the possibility that secondary powers can create effective alliances that will significantly limit U.S. international room to maneuver.

Implicitly, Callinicos raises the big question—whether the neoliberal era that began with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan might actually be coming to a close. If the mantra of deregulation, privatization, and elimination of barriers to the free movement of goods and capital is losing its persuasiveness, then the whole question of whether social democracy can survive in this new environment could be moot. But even though neoliberalism appears increasingly to be on the defensive as an ideology and a policy framework, the global financial architecture continues to permit the enormous private flows of capital that discourage most governments from experimenting with any type of unorthodox economic policies. Moreover, since it is highly unlikely that the current Republican administration would agree to any significant changes in the current international financial regime, any progress toward a negotiated alternative to neoliberalism is years away. To be sure, reports of neoliberalism's death might well be exaggerated; the doctrine has proven to be remarkably resilient over the last quarter century.

Even so, Przeworski's essay has some interesting insights about how a new policy regime to replace neoliberalism might emerge. Earlier changes in policy regimes—such as the program that the Swedish Social Democrats campaigned on in 1932 or the innovations that Reagan and Thatcher pursued at the end of the 1970s—share several elements in common. First, the policy changes occurred during a period of economic crisis when voters believed that established policies had failed. Second, voters are persuaded that the political party favoring the new policy direction is responsible and has their best interest at heart. Third, the new government is blessed with a certain amount of luck in the period of implementing new policies. Przeworski recognizes that these dramatic breaks in policy regimes are rare, but the rewards to those parties with the courage to pursue this kind of risky path are substantial.

Przeworski implies that the "success" of a new policy regime in one country can lead to imitation in other countries and then a shift in the global financial regime that supports

the new approach. It is significant that his approach places more causal weight on new policy ideas than on material conditions or political coalitions. Persuasive new ideas are the critical lever of historical change.

But Przeworski's emphasis on the centrality of ideas suggests a final observation about neoliberalism. A policy regime that is perpetuated by powerful institutions, but which is lacking in intellectual legitimacy, provides a fragile foundation for maintaining global economic and political order. The danger is that when crises occur, there will not be sufficient consensus among nations to negotiate effective responses. For this reason, even aside from the challenge of international terrorism, there is reason to fear that the early years of the twenty-first century might prove more turbulent and unpredictable than any time since the end of World War II.

The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America Edited by Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 372p. \$59.50 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

Eduardo Silva, *University of Missouri, St. Louis*

Standing the assumptions and causal propositions of established theories on their head, with an eye to refining them or pointing us to other theories, is a fruitful path to quickening the intellectual pulse, to reinvigorating a field of study, and to contributing to knowledge. *The Other Mirror* makes an eloquent and persuasive case for midrange theorizing as a tool for revitalizing area studies in general and Latin American studies in particular. If area studies are to recover from their marginality in the general disciplines, area specialists must once again engage the theory-building enterprise central to the disciplines that house them. By concentrating on midrange analysis, area studies have real contributions to make to general theory.

In the introduction, Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves argue that general theory offers area specialists a sure guide for framing questions guaranteed to advance knowledge of key but poorly understood problems. It also orders reality on the basis of assumptions and causal relationships. Through the lenses of a wide range of classic theorists, the volume focuses on one of the most enduring problems in Latin American studies: the problem of social order. Because order is defined as "the assumed understanding that institutionalized rules will be both imposed and obeyed in a standard and universal way" (p. 13), the editors make a case for focusing research on institutional development, specifically the persistence of political instability and weakness.

However, area specialists are not just idea "takers" and providers of data for general theorists. Grand theory can learn a lot from them. Their work may expose weaknesses in causal relationships and draw attention to problematic assumptions. Much of grand theory stands on the foundations of what has been learned from a few classic European cases and the United States. How well do concepts derived from that historically and culturally specific context extend to regions that have had a different historic experience? At what point does concept stretching or the teleology implicit in many general theoretic models based on those few cases call into question their utility for explaining outcomes in the developing world? The relevant question is, what factors explain the range of outcomes on a given problem across the developed and developing world?—not, what key elements in the development of Europe and the United States are missing in Latin America?

The editors organized the volume into three sections. Part One tackles the classic problem of economic development.

Jeremy Adelman applies Douglas North's work on property rights to explain the well-known gap between policy intent and result. North's approach leads Adelman to fruitful research questions. How does the structure of property rights vary at different moments of the reform process, and how does this affect the rationality of the subjects of reform? Adelman then uses his case to expose an important limitation of North's approach. It lacks a political sensibility. Creating those rights—the predicament of developing countries—is a complex political process that requires study. Paul Gootenberg's rich intellectual history of Latin Americanists influenced by Alexander Gerschenkron revives the debate over the relationship between the timing of industrialization and the tasks, opportunities, and obstacles to economic development that developing countries face. Steven Topik follows up with a fine-grained examination of the contemporary implications of Karl Polanyi's work for the problem of political order. Polanyi argued that conflict between organized society and spreading, market-driven commodification moves history. Today, market failure and the concentration of wealth drive demands for state regulation. Failure to address the issue could result in some latter-day version of fascism. Veronica Montecinos and John Markoff conclude the section with a revealing exploration of how the rise of neoclassical economists to positions of political prominence in Latin America adds institutional power to the force of their ideas.

Part Two grapples with another perennial "riddle" of Latin America: the lack of political stability after nearly two hundred years of independence from Spain. This section turns the spotlight on state formation. López-Alves uses key concepts from Charles Tilly's work on the effects of war on state building to explain different types of state formation and their institutional weaknesses in Latin America. It is an imaginative exercise in how to use theory creatively in order to think about one's cases, rather than simply applying case material as confirming or disconfirming evidence for a general theory. Alan Knight gives a tour de force performance on how to use a range of seemingly contradictory definitions of the state and the sources of state autonomy to tease out criteria for categorizing states. He shows—with excellent dry humor upon occasion—how the Mexican state has come back almost full circle to the weak agent state of the late nineteenth century. Jorge Domínguez's review of Samuel Huntington's work makes a case for more intensive study of political parties in Latin America, on the premise that they are a key institution for conflict mediation in modern democracies. J. Samuel Valenzuela uses his detailed knowledge of Chilean politics to show the limitations of Barrington Moore's classic work on the social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Valenzuela argues that the Chilean case confirms the need for research that emphasizes the autonomy of political factors from socioeconomic ones to explain democratization.

Part Three turns to culture, understood as systems of meaning. Centeno's analysis of the concept of discipline, a key component of the cultural transition to modernity that, it is often claimed, Latin America lacks, is a delight. He explores the utility of Michel Foucault's theorizing on the subject, adroitly applying evidence to demonstrate how the ambiguous specification of key variables introduces causal confusion and to highlight that Foucault's work is littered with Eurocentric assumptions that do not transfer to the Latin American institutional context. Therefore, the real research task is to explain that different institutional development path. Robert M. Levine turns the spotlight on Michel de Certeau's studies on language as an expression of resistance in everyday life by subordinate social groups. Levine suggests that the current emphasis on subaltern and resistance studies is a form of

escapism that directs research away from a more significant reality: the structures being resisted. In the concluding chapter, Claudio Lomnitz launches a thorough critique of Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism. He proposes an alternative approach focused on bonds of hierarchical dependence, rather than on horizontal feelings of a fraternal community.

Individual chapters have their difficulties, such as inconsistent analysis, dubious use of a single case for dismissing an entire theory, occasional lapses in how the theory applies to a case, or vice versa. These and other issues, however, in no measure detract from the tremendous achievement of the book. It reaffirms that the imaginative application of evidence to theory is a creative act leading to knowledge. One might have preferred a more consistent treatment of the relationship between theory and case material across the chapters. But perhaps the variety of approaches is a greater strength. It offers concrete examples by skilled scholars of the many uses of theory. The volume rekindles fundamental debates across a wide range of problems in theory building in several academic disciplines, and it makes a convincing case for the rich variety of ways in which area studies can contribute to the enterprise.

Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada's Electoral Districts By John C. Courtney. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001. 337p. \$75.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

Herman Bakvis, *Dalhousie University*

The approach to the design and revision of electoral districts in Canada is quite different from that found in the United States, despite the two countries' sharing of the same basic first-past-the-post electoral system. As John Courtney notes in his careful study of the topic, in Canada the emphasis in defining electoral districts, or constituencies or ridings, has been underpinned by concepts such as "community of interest" and "effective representation," which encompass a wide range of political and social considerations—many local in nature—and which permit substantial deviation from the principle of one person, one vote. At the federal level, the allowable deviation in the size of constituencies can be plus or minus 25% within any given province, with the possibility of even greater variances under special circumstances. At the level of provincial electoral systems, the variances can be even larger, in part due to the fact that in certain provinces the ratio of urban to rural seats is specified in law. At the same time, the actual process of designing and reconfiguring the boundaries of constituencies, in the hands of independent, arm's-length commissions for the past 40 years, has been remarkably free of direct partisan influence. In fact, given the rather tattered state of current Canadian parliamentary democracy, characterized by one-party dominance in the federal parliament and a precipitous decline in voter turnout over the past three elections, the institution of arms-length boundary commissions stands out as something that works well and enjoys broad respect.

Since the Election Boundaries Readjustment Act of 1964, the presence of 10 arm's-length federal bodies, one for each province, as well as comparable bodies at the provincial level, stands in marked contrast to the preceding era when constituency boundary adjustments were exclusively the domain of politicians and horse trading within the regional subcommittees of parliament was the predominant means of setting boundaries. Given that in Canada changes of any kind in institutional arrangements are relatively rare, the acceptance by members of parliament (MPs) and the government of the day of a new independent body that effectively removed them from the process is quite striking.

In *Commissioned Ridings*, Courtney, utilizing John Kingdon's agenda-setting model, notes the confluence of three streams in the 1950s and early 1960s: the problem of huge discrepancies in constituency size becoming more evident in light of increasing urbanization; the identification of a proposed solution in the form of independent commissions, a model that was already in place in at least one province and in effect in Australia since the turn of the twentieth century; and a unique set of circumstances—a series of minority governments in the federal parliament in the 1960s, the arrival of new, young urban Liberal Party MPs, and the leaders of the three main parties being committed to change—that allowed political support for the idea to take hold. Unlike the American case, none of these critical developments were driven by court challenges. Indeed, the only significant Canadian Supreme Court decision bearing on malapportionment—*Carter* 1991—came long after the 1964 act. Furthermore, *Carter* essentially affirmed the plus-minus 25% permissible variance in the federal legislation and legitimized the concepts of community of interest and effective representation. It is interesting to note, as Courtney points out, that since *Carter*, the commissions have actually moved in the direction of voter equality.

The main factor facilitating the adoption of independent commissions, claims Courtney, is federalism, particularly in respect to demonstration effects when one or more jurisdictions act as a laboratory to demonstrate the impact of new policies. In this case, it was the province of Manitoba that first adopted the independent commission model in 1955, drawing directly on the Australian experience. Other provinces, most notably Quebec in the 1960s, and the federal government, took serious note of the Manitoba experiment and subsequently adopted it.

In Canada there is a small but growing community of political scientists interested in the subject of electoral apportionment. This book effectively confirms Courtney as the foremost authority within this community. Painstakingly researched, well written, comprehensive, and above all balanced, Courtney's in-depth treatment would make it difficult for anyone to contemplate tackling another book-length study to complement or displace it. All aspects of the topic are covered, including the history of apportioning seats among the provinces, the unusual circumstances surrounding Manitoba's adoption of independent commissions (following an experiment with the single transferable vote in a multimember district for the city of Winnipeg), and the ramifications of the 1991 *Carter* decision.

While few people will take serious issue with Courtney's analysis or major conclusions, some might nonetheless argue that he perhaps underestimates the partisan elements that still remain. While politicians are no longer directly involved in deciding boundaries, in various ways they still shape the membership of the commissions. At the federal level, each commission is chaired by a judge selected by the chief justice for the province. The vast majority of judicial appointments in Canada are effectively partisan appointments made by the party in power without any legislative oversight or review. Thus, in the eyes of some there is still at least the taint of partisan bias. And while, as Courtney points out, academics have increasingly come to populate the membership of commissions, some of those academics will readily admit that there was likely a partisan element in their selection. (The selection of two of the three commission members is made by the speaker of the House of Commons, who is generally from the governing party.) Furthermore, the emphasis in some of the federal commissions on voter equality and the elimination of the privilege accorded rural seats can become an implicit form of gerrymandering favoring the governing

Liberal Party, given that the strength of the Liberals tends to be in urban areas.

If there is one area where the book disappoints, it could lie in the failure to engage the debate in Canada over proportional representation (PR), a topic that in recent years has preoccupied several political scientists and a rather more limited number of politicians. Pure PR, where the country as a whole becomes a single constituency, would make the issue of boundaries and constituency size irrelevant. However, most of the PR schemes proposed for Canada tend to involve some variant of the German or New Zealand model, where multiple constituencies are still a prominent feature. Such issues as district magnitude, boundaries, and the role of and need for commissions under these variants of PR in the Canadian context could have been usefully addressed by the author.

Courtney could validly respond that such discussion would stray too far from the main subject of the book. Furthermore, one suspects that the author believes the likelihood of PR's being adopted in Canada is rather remote, and he may well be correct. Nonetheless, the past year has seen the election of at least one provincial government, in British Columbia, that has made a commitment to examine the possibility of altering the first-past-the-post system in that province. If Courtney's thesis concerning the pivotal role of Manitoba in pioneering the role of the modern boundary commission is correct, it is conceivable that British Columbia could play a similar role with respect to PR. At a minimum, some discussion of PR in relation to boundary commissions would have made for a more interesting, and provocative, book. All this notwithstanding, the book represents a significant contribution to the literature on electoral district design and redistribution and an excellent starting point for further comparative research on the topic.

South Africa's Brittle Peace: The Problem of Post-Settlement Violence By Pierre du Toit. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 222p. \$65.00.

Then I Was Black: South African Political Identities in Transition By Courtney Jung. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 320p. \$35.00.

Allison Drew, *University of York*

These two books deal with the legacy of apartheid for South Africa's democracy, approaching the problems posed by this legacy from differing perspectives about the role of the state. Pierre du Toit, in a thoughtful and well-researched book, addresses the problem of violence in post-apartheid South Africa. Peace in a society with a history of violence needs to be nurtured, he contends, and the state must play a central role.

Du Toit traces the roots of post-apartheid violence to an evolving security dilemma. The British defeat of Afrikaners in the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902 was crucial to the development of this dilemma, he argues. A single statistic highlights the war's trauma for Afrikaners: In the concentration camps set up by the British for Afrikaner civilians, 7 out of every 20 Afrikaner children died from disease. This episode scarred subsequent generations, leading to the Afrikaner security dilemma. Apartheid was their response. In turn, apartheid created a security dilemma for Africans, whose identity was shaped by both material and nonmaterial deprivation. Ultimately, du Toit argues, apartheid broke down through its own contradictions, but not before spawning a culture of violence.

A mystique about armed struggle developed within the liberation movement. "Throughout the literature," du Toit writes, "the conviction is expressed (but not explained) that

the *armed struggle* served to inspire, motivate and spur the anti-apartheid movers more than any other form of resistance" (p. 83; italics in original). Crime came to be rationalized in terms of political struggle. Although issues about violence were at the heart of negotiations—notably debates about the suspension of armed struggle and the government's clandestine aid to the Inkatha Freedom Party—the paradox of transition was that violence and peacemaking went hand in hand. As negotiations unfolded, the "difference between conditions of war and peace became more vague, not less so, and the distinction between combatant and non-combatant more ambiguous and between enemy and ally more uncertain" (p. 78).

The democratic transition has brought a new security dilemma. Political violence decreased sharply after the 1994 democratic elections, while criminal violence has risen. As one indicator, South Africa's murder rate is 65 people per 100,000; in Canada, Sweden, and the United States it is less than 10 per 100,000. Family and community structures have lost cohesion; the police are seen as ineffective and corrupt; the inspirational motivation of the liberation struggle has dissipated. Criminal gangs have filled the social void. The culture of violence and the prevalence of arms are symptomatic of the state's inability to exercise a monopoly on the use of force and hence, du Toit believes, of the state's weakness: "A *strong autonomous state* able to deliver public goods both competently and equitably, and therefore to provide citizenship of equal value is a necessary yet still insufficient condition for democratic viability and for the containment of corruption" (p. 21; italics in original). Security is the basic issue around which the social contract between state and citizen is built; resolving this security dilemma is crucial to the maintenance of a stable democracy.

This resolution will entail strengthening state institutions to control violence, addressing unemployment, promoting foreign investment, and containing the international illegal trade in military equipment, which has been flooding the South African market. Just as importantly, argues du Toit, is the need to create national myths and symbols that are both neutral and inspiring. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) played some role in this process, du Toit states, even though in his view politicians had the last word on the commission. Nonetheless, he concedes, both acceptance of responsibility for collective guilt and forgiveness are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for reconciliation, and in this respect the TRC was successful. "There are now fewer lies, deceptions and half-truths in circulation," he writes. "For this the TRC deserves credit" (p. 163). The African Renaissance might also serve as an inspirational myth, he suggests, depending on its content. South Africa must develop a way to allow youth dignity while enabling them to earn honor.

Courtney Jung, by contrast, is critical of such an emphasis on the state for the maintenance of democracy. The call to "bring the state back in," she argues, has seen the pendulum swing too far toward state-centric approaches to democratic stability. Jung is concerned with the implication of politicized ethnicity for democratic stability. Political identity, as she defines it, is the product of elite manipulation "refracted through the memories and networks of those who are mobilized" (p. 17) and activated during struggles for resources and power.

Jung argues that ethnic identities are politicized or depoliticized through the interaction of five variables: "conditioning factors," that is, material conditions, organizational networks, and available ideology, which affect political identities more than the "proximate factors" of political institutions and mobilizing discourse. This implies, she maintains, that "an exclusive focus on the design of constitutional and electoral

systems is probably misplaced" (p. 236). Instead, negotiations about conditioning factors will be more likely to promote fluid political identities. This will minimize the persistence of rigid sectional divisions and allow the development of crosscutting cleavages necessary for a pluralist civil society. Hers is a plea for the compatibility of multiculturalism and democracy: "Difference is the norm" (p. 263).

Jung examines three cases of politicized ethnicity: those of Afrikaner, Zulu, and Coloured identities. Afrikaner nationalism was used by political elites at various points in the twentieth century to build political alliances and promote a state-led development that facilitated the rise of an Afrikaner capitalist class. But from the 1960s, state discourse referred increasingly to white rather than Afrikaner identity. By the 1990s, Jung points out, political mobilization on the basis of Afrikaner ethnicity represented a very minor and far-right tendency.

The discussion of Zulu ethnicity and its political uses is the strongest and most interesting. If Mangosuthu Buthelezi used ethnicity, combined with intimidation, to build the Inkatha Freedom Party during the apartheid era, his approach has changed in response to post-apartheid conditions. During the 1980s, the United Democratic Front (UDF), aligned with the exiled African National Congress (ANC), played down sectional and class identities in favor of a broad anti-apartheid front. That approach has been replaced by the ANC's celebration of Zulu identity and its desire to include it within a broader African national identity. The ANC has gained the allegiance of the Zulu king, and although Inkatha has relied on chiefs for its rural base, the ANC is now undermining that relationship through the use of the government purse. Buthelezi, in turn, is seeking to broaden Inkatha's traditional Zulu support.

Jung's discussion of Coloured politics in the 1980s focuses on the UDF and the Labour Party, which participated in the racially exclusive Tricameral Parliament. But those two organizations did not represent the entire Coloured political spectrum in the 1980s; the Western Cape UDF was also involved in and influenced by heated debates with leftists outside the ANC and its allies. Seemingly taking informants' views at face value, Jung takes a rosy view of the ANC's current politics vis-à-vis Coloureds. It is debatable whether the ANC has dealt adequately with the alienation of those formerly classified as Coloured, who still feel themselves trapped between whites and an African majority. Surely, any test of the ANC's ethnic neutrality would be found in its policies: whether development assistance is allocated on the basis of ethnicity or geographic locality or on the basis of income and class, for example. Jung's discussion of organizational policies could be stronger at points. The characterizations of the Pan Africanist Congress, the Unity Movement, and the Black Consciousness Movement are at times questionable and would benefit from a more nuanced approach (pp. 269, 283).

The possibility of using electoral rules to represent and control ethnic groups was, of course, rejected during the negotiations process. The new constitution enshrines universal franchise and democratic rights. That ethnic identity should be fluid in post-apartheid South Africa comes as no surprise. The previous regime used repressive social engineering to divide South Africans into four main sectional groups and then to subdivide Africans further on the basis of supposed tribal identities. In democratic South Africa, people are free to identify themselves, culturally and politically, in terms that they choose, which may or may not include ethnic identities. The post-apartheid state, concerned with promoting both national and African unity, has employed the motifs of the Rainbow Nation and the African Renaissance to symbolize its national vision. Jung highlights the importance of eth-

nic fluidity in post-apartheid South Africa, while pointing to the significance of class and of rural-urban divisions. Gender identity, of growing political salience in post-apartheid South Africa, merits further research. South Africa remains an extremely class-divided society; the poorest are disproportionately black, rural, and female.

That ethnically based electoral engineering was a non-starter does not, as Jung's argument implies, negate the need for a state role in other domains. South Africa must undoubtedly walk a fine line—avoiding the one-party state that may grow from a dominant party system, while addressing the pressing social needs faced by the country's majority. In a continent plagued by collapsed states and social anarchy, there is scope and need for South Africa to play a critical role in the continent's development. But this regional role does not negate the state's responsibility to its own population, as du Toit emphasizes. The most important checks on a state's arbitrary abuse of political power are the people and popular organizations and a willingness to hold political leadership accountable. To take one example, the publication of the TRC's report, in spite of partisan attempts to censor it and its critical evaluation of human rights violations across the political spectrum, indicates the commission's political autonomy from partisan influence. The TRC's report underlined, for the future, that post-apartheid governments will be held accountable for their own actions. Whatever the debates about the role of the state, it is the state's accountability to its people that is the greatest guarantor of democracy.

Support for Economic and Political Change in the China Countryside: An Empirical Study of Cadres and Villagers in Four Counties, 1990 and 1996 By Samuel J. Eldersveld and Mingming Shen. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 146p. \$70.00.

Alan P. L. Liu, *University of California at Santa Barbara*

Being one of a handful of opinion surveys conducted in China, this book should be of interest not only to China specialists but also to students of public opinion, political culture, and survey research. In 1990 and 1996, a joint team of American (University of Michigan) and Chinese (National Beijing University) scholars conducted surveys of the opinions of Chinese peasants and rural cadres in four Chinese counties in north and south China (in the provinces of Hebei, Hunan, Anhui, and the special municipality of Tianjin) concerning economic and political reforms in the post-Mao years. This book represents a partial analysis of the surveys.

Samuel Eldersveld and Mingming Shen conclude that "much democratization has, and is, taking place" (p. 134) in contemporary China. Although political liberalization at the mass level in China might be "only a small reality" (p. 134), it "is touching the lives of Chinese masses each day, socializing them to greater support for democracy" (p. 134). The evidence for such claims came entirely from Chinese respondents' answers to questions on their support for economic and political reforms, their beliefs on political participation, and their tolerance of political competitions and conflicts.

In economics, Eldersveld, Shen, and their colleagues asked peasants and cadres to evaluate the degree of success of the reforms and the benefits that they had received from them. They found that a large majority of cadres and masses in the four counties had accepted economic reforms, had benefited from them, and were ideologically disposed to less governmental control. They asked similar questions about political reforms, especially on direct election of county People's Congresses (China's nominal legislatures), election to village committees, separation between party and state, and

the extent of cadre corruption. A sharp difference appeared in the masses' responses to economic and political questions. A high rate of peasants, up to 50% of the respondents in both 1990 and 1996, refused to answer political questions. However, of those who responded, a clear majority supported the political reforms. Two major findings from the surveys are, first, the cadres' influence on attitudes of the masses (in a positive direction) and, second, a positive correlation between political activism and the extent of poverty in an area.

Interesting as these results are, the study by Eldersveld and Shen has a number of problems. First of all, the authors did not explain the criteria for selecting these four particular counties, out of 1,936 counties in China. But they noted considerable variances in people's attitudes in different localities. The lack of clarification in the standard for choosing the four counties makes one doubt their generalizations about democratization in China.

Second, the two authors had done a very limited background research into the history and social conditions of modern China. They neglected entirely the surveys and analyses of the countryside by Chinese scholars, relying instead on a few secondary English works. They mistook Chinese peasants' recovery of their precommunist way of farming for what they termed "amazing conversion" (p. 19; emphasis mine) to the so-called new system. They seemed to be unaware of the fact that post-Mao reforms in the countryside affected the political power structure very little. The rural power figures, such as (in descending order of authority) party branch secretary, secretary of the youth league, head of the local militia, and director of the women's association, remained intact and, in many villages, were still the same persons from Mao's era. These village elites controlled local elections. Chinese writers on local politics have presented a very different picture (for example, He Xuefeng, "System of Village Organization: Distances and Causes Between Ideal and Reality," *Shehuixue* 6 [1998]: 59-64; and Cao Yongxin, "Analysis of Some Problems in Rural Order and Village Political Development," *Shehuixue* 4 [1999]: 102-6). Eldersveld and Shen's descriptions of local politics as being competitive are thus extremely misleading (see pages 4 and 40). There were other errors of the same nature, such as portraying Mao as having played a significant role in promoting democracy within and outside of the Communist Party (see pages 11, 78, 93, and 131).

The third problem is that Eldersveld and Shen's discussion of political participation in rural China is out of context. According to the letters of the national government, village self-rule encompasses four democracies—election, decision making, management, and supervision. This book deals only with election. Academic and press reports from China tell us that villages that have lived up to the formal standard of self-rule are more exceptions than the rule. Furthermore, information from China indicates that an increasing number of peasants are resorting to the so-called collective *shang-fang gaozhuang* (visiting higher authorities and lodging complaints against local leaders) to air their discontent. Even riots have occurred in rising numbers. That peasants are resorting to extrasystem ways of expressing their views testifies to the ineffectiveness of the formal system of political participation.

Last but not least, Eldersveld and Shen's study lacks a theoretical foundation. They have said nothing about the mechanism that might connect village self-rule to democratization at the national level. They write without elaboration that "if political change is to be implemented, including democratization, what happens at the local level is critical" (p. 116). If they had carefully studied Taiwan's transition from local election to national democratization, they might have had a reference country to help their analysis of Mainland China.

Unfortunately, their one reference to Taiwan (p. 68) exposes the two scholars' lack of the most basic knowledge of Taiwan's experience in democratization.

Multinational Democracies Edited by Alain G. Gagnon and James Tully. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 428p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

Garth Stevenson, *Brock University*

As the distinguished Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor notes in his foreword to this book, liberal democratic political systems are becoming more diverse in terms of the cultural identities of their citizens, yet their legitimacy, unlike that of autocratic states or empires, depends on maintaining a certain level of unity and homogeneity. Without it, neither democratic participation, nor a regime of equal rights, nor even satisfactory economic performance appears to be possible. The effort to create a semblance of coherence and common purpose while recognizing and accepting unavoidable diversity, a theme that has dominated Canadian political discourse and practice for a century and a half, has become a preoccupation for much of the world. Yet there are more questions than answers. Consociationalism, a fashionable concept a generation ago, no longer has many supporters among social scientists. Federalism, originally invented in the United States for quite a different purpose, can accommodate conflicting nationalisms only if a precise geographical boundary can be drawn between them—and not always then.

This multiauthored, and multinational, book provides a number of insights into this problem. The concept around which the volume is organized, as suggested by its commendably brief title, is that of multinational democracy: defined as a democratic state containing more than one sociological nation. The four examples considered in the book are Canada, Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom, although the authors give the United Kingdom less attention than the other three. All are affluent, predominantly white, and reasonably stable North Atlantic democracies (although Spain's experience with democracy is relatively brief), a fact that suggests the implicit criteria for their inclusion in the volume.

"Multinational" should perhaps not be taken too literally: Belgium comprises only two national communities, although Brussels, where the two are mingled, constitutes a third component of Belgium's territorial federalism. In Canada, although it has recently become politically correct to refer to the aboriginal tribes as "First Nations," Quebec is the only minority nation with a fully developed civil society and a serious capability to form its own state, and the only one that controls a provincial government within the federal state. Spain and the United Kingdom, which are often, although erroneously, viewed as prototypical, and until recently highly centralized, "nation-states," are both more deserving of the multinational label.

The 19 authors of the book, about evenly divided between Canadians and non-Canadians, include both political philosophers and comparativists. (There are no women among the contributors, a rather conspicuous lack of inclusiveness in a book largely devoted to identity politics.) The book contains a lengthy general introduction by coeditor James Tully, followed by 16 chapters grouped into three parts. In the brief and anonymous introductions that lead off each of the three parts, we are told that the first part deals with interrelations between justice and stability in theory and practice, the second part with the tensions between normative claims about recognition and forms of accommodation, and the third part with the normative and institutional dimensions of modes of reconciliation and conflict management (pp. 35, 133, 275). In

practice, as these introductions may suggest, there is no clear delineation of purpose between the three parts, and the rationale for dividing the book into sections is not immediately obvious.

In his general introduction, Tully suggests that comparativists have usually approached the study of culturally divided societies with an emphasis on the search for accommodation and stability, while political philosophers have emphasized the themes of justice and recognition. As a political philosopher, Tully emphasizes the traditional preoccupations of his field, justice and recognition, but cautions that “the constitutive question is no longer the one that has defined these struggles since Kant and Hegel: what is *the* just and stable form of recognition that will end the struggle?” (p. 5). Instead, the quest for recognition should be viewed as an ongoing dialogue with no final resolution. The emphasis thus shifts from the “solution” that will “finally” resolve the question to the procedural rules that govern the dialogue, and to the freedom to adjust the relationships between national communities to reflect changing needs and aspirations. Almost half of Tully’s introduction is devoted to an analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in *Reference re the secession of Quebec* (1998) 2 S.C.R. 217, a decision that appears to be based on this assumption.

Several chapters refer, either explicitly or otherwise, to the familiar but somewhat misleading distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism. In Chapter 2, comparing the politics of bilingualism in Brussels, Montreal, and Barcelona, Dominique Arel suggests that the distinction is largely meaningless. No state can really be neutral or indifferent to questions of language or culture, and a civic nation-state is merely one whose minorities—usually immigrants who have voluntarily chosen to reside within the state—accept the inevitability of assimilation to the dominant language and culture. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is not necessarily illiberal and may tolerate minority cultures in practice while being dedicated to the protection of one culture in theory. He obviously has Canadian and Québécois nationalism in mind when he writes: “Like in a game of shifting mirrors, the civic nation to some becomes the ethnic nation in the eyes of the other” (p. 76). In Chapter 12, entitled “Nationality in Divided Societies” but largely focusing on the case of Scotland, David Miller reaches much the same conclusion (p. 306). He also makes the important point that people may have a dual identity: Scottish/British or Québécois/Canadian.

In Chapter 8, Shane O’Neill draws somewhat different conclusions from his examination of Northern Ireland, where religion more than language tends to differentiate the two national communities within the state, and where the identities appear to be mutually exclusive. Although admitting that the Good Friday Agreement falls short of his ideal, since it continues to privilege the Unionist (British) majority, O’Neill believes that a truly neutral and inclusive political culture is possible in a divided society, provided that both sides agree to regard the question of which constitutes the numerical majority as irrelevant. (The present assumption that a majority should be allowed to decide whether Northern Ireland is affiliated with the Irish state or with the British state is inappropriate, in his opinion.) Even this qualified optimism seems to be at odds with the conclusions of Arel’s chapter, not to mention the pessimistic but convincing comparative analysis of Canada and Belgium by Dimitrios Karmis and Alain G. Gagnon in Chapter 5.

In conclusion, this book is a welcome sign that the dialogue between Canadian and Québécois nationalists is maturing and becoming less parochial and more thoughtful—on both sides. It should be read not only by Canadians of both persuasions but by anyone interested in the politics of nationalism.

Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa By Clark C. Gibson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 262p. \$70.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

Goran Hyden, *University of Florida*

This interesting and insightful book on the political economy of wildlife policy in Africa is an important contribution to the literature not only on African politics but also on the role that institutions play in shaping behavior and decisions. Although wildlife may not occupy the same centrality in African economies as oil and precious metals do, it is a crucial natural resource that earns countries, especially in eastern and southern Africa, significant revenue. Few political scientists have paid attention to this sector. No one has really approached it from a political economy perspective. Yet the struggle over access to natural resources in Africa is very much a political matter. Gibson’s well-crafted and thorough study fills this gap. Its main contribution to the discipline at large is its focus on the distributive nature of institutions. The latter do not just produce collective or public goods. They also serve individual interests differentially. By concentrating on the strategic interaction of individuals within institutions, Gibson, following in the tradition of Douglass North and Robert Bates, identifies the intended and unintended consequences of policy decisions made with regard to the use and conservation of wildlife in Africa.

The empirical focus of this study is Zambia’s wildlife sector after independence. It traces the politics of wildlife beginning with the decision in the early years of independence by then-President Kaunda to continue, in spite of popular resistance, pursuing the conservationist approach adopted by the preceding colonial administration. The bulk of the analysis, however, centers on subsequent years when the principal issue was how to reduce poaching and ensure that ordinary citizens might be able to share the revenue from hunting and tourism. Much space is rightly devoted to the “community-based” approach to wildlife conservation that evolved in the 1980s following the reported success of the CAMPFIRE project (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) in neighboring Zimbabwe. The experiences of wildlife policy there as well as in Kenya provide useful, though not fully analyzed, comparisons with the empirically rich account of what took place in Zambia.

Anyone familiar with the issues of environmental conservation in Africa will feel at home in Gibson’s account and analysis. I find three themes particularly well covered. The first is the “parks vs. people” topic, that is, the issue of how to combine wildlife conservation with cattle grazing and other such activities that may compete for the use of increasingly scarce land. The second is the tension between the conservationist lobby—largely international in composition—and nationally elected representatives wishing to respond to the opinions of their local constituents that wild game is either a nuisance or a resource to which they should have unrestrained access. The third is the difficulty of finding an institutional formula that caters to the complex and contentious nature of wildlife conservation in Africa. The author has consulted a very wide range of primary and secondary sources on the subject, and although his coverage of Kenya and Zimbabwe is less satisfactory, he demonstrates his command of the subject matter.

My praise of the book notwithstanding, the author falls short of a critical reader’s expectation with regard to at least two issues. The first is the extent to which his own case study is typical of policymaking in Africa. Gibson does not address this issue. For example, he rather uncritically uses his finding that the Zambian legislature threw out a government policy

initiative in this sector as proof that parliaments in Africa are more powerful than the mainstream literature assumes. The fact that this single rejection occurred in the context of what may have amounted to thousands of discretionary policy initiatives by the president and his government ministers is completely overlooked. One would have expected a more careful use of the evidence than such a generalizing statement.

The second relates to his conception of private interest. Gibson is obviously right in suggesting that much strategizing in public institutions is private. In African countries, patronage rather than policy reigns. Public policy, therefore, is falling short of expectations less because of inadequate executive capacity than due to a lack of commitment to the notion of a "civic" public realm. Gibson's own explanation of this phenomenon, however, tends to suffer from an overly simplified notion of what "private" or utilitarian interest really means in the African context. He operates with a crude distinction between a utilitarian and "moral" notion of political economy, which makes him overlook the fact that the African political economy really falls in between the two. It is neither wholly utilitarian, nor fully communitarian (or moral). Choice and behavior are socially embedded but not institutionalized in a formal or more permanent sense. The political process in Zambia and elsewhere in Africa really responds to and moves forward because of the investments people make in strategic relations with other key actors, whether they are superiors, allies, or supporters. "Causes" or issues do not drive these relations; they are only instrumental in fomenting such relations. Institutions that matter, therefore, are not formal but informal. They are inevitably ephemeral. The challenge that political leaders face in such contexts is how to stabilize these transient relationships. Sometimes this can be convincingly achieved by accepting defeat, especially if it is, as in the case of the president's defeat over the wildlife policy, on an issue where a majority of potential allies and supporters are on the other side. The issue, after all, is only a means, not an end, to success. By sticking to an overly bare notion of what self-interest means in the African context, Gibson only touches on, but fails to explore, this key aspect of how relations rather than policy drive the political process in oft-unexpected directions.

No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 By Jeff Goodwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 428p. \$60.00 cloth, \$23.00 paper.

Eric Selbin, *Southwestern University*

"Do we need yet *another* comparative study of revolutions?" (p. 5; emphasis in original), Jeff Goodwin asks in this eagerly (and long) anticipated and important new book, which is destined to influence scholars in several disciplines and fields. The answer, as this volume makes abundantly clear, is "yes," and few will be disappointed with this well-written, accessible, and compelling volume, the most nuanced and sophisticated argument yet for the state-centered (but, pace Goodwin, not structuralist; see p. 53) approach, and worthy heir to Theda Skocpol's (1979) still paradigmatic *States and Social Revolutions*. But therein lies the rub: Rather than the first book of the (putative) emergent fourth generation of scholars of revolution(s), this is likely the last of the third generation. Goodwin concedes he has "largely moved beyond" (p. xvi) the perspective he articulates here, and he, along with John Foran, is one of the most likely suspects to produce the next paradigmatic statement on revolutions. This, then, would seem the third generation's crowning glory; given the long gestation period and the prolific Goodwin's many

and impressive contributions to matters revolutionary, this is almost more a legend than a book.

With the state firmly ensconced at the center (pp. 24–31) and implement—"the absolutely critical importance of political context" (p. 17)—in hand, Goodwin takes, primarily via secondary sources (p. xvi), a wide-ranging, erudite swing through a dozen-plus countries and many more movements. Adopting a broader ("political revolution") as opposed to more narrow ("social revolution") definition of revolution (p. 9), he sets out to sample revolutions and revolutionary movements that occurred only during the Cold War and only in "so-called peripheral or dependent societies of one type or another" (pp. 5–6); of greater note, he considers not just the successes but the failures as well (pp. 6–8). All of this is in pursuit of why revolutions and revolutionary movements emerge in some places and not others and succeed some of the time but not all of the time. The premise is that "general (if not universal) causal mechanisms" can be identified, catalogued, and compared (p. 8).

While the book is broken up into four parts (nine chapters), most people will read it as comprising two halves, one more theoretical, the other more substantive; a pithy annotated bibliography will quickly become a staple for graduate students in several disciplines. The more theoretically inclined will be particularly taken with chapters that consider the strengths and limitations of the state-centered perspective (Chapter 2), the introduction of "persistent insurgencies" as a nuanced third category to better theorize those processes caught between success and failure (Chapter 7), and a concluding chapter wherein Goodwin proffers "generalizations and prognostications."

The theoretical chapters are rich and provocative. Goodwin's artful discussion of the state-centric perspective, misleadingly labeled an "appetizer" (p. 31), is a powerful and clear paean to the statist tradition—long on strengths and short (and a bit dismissive; see, e.g., p. 55) on limitations. Goodwin presents a persuasive case for four distinct types of state-centered analysis: "the state-autonomy, state-capacity, political opportunity, and 'state constructionist' approaches" (pp. 37–40). In search of a "powerfully parsimonious" as opposed to "exhaustive" explanation (p. 58), Goodwin deftly demonstrates such a perspective as being suited to solving the puzzles that bedevil students of revolution to an extent that will convince most. Despite a caveat (to his credit, such are repeated early and often throughout the book) in the introduction that "states are not the *only* thing that matters" (p. 30; emphasis in original), this chapter and the rest of the book make clear Goodwin's commitment to the state as the key/critical (f)actor in the revolutionary process across its various stages; to borrow a line, the state isn't the only thing, it's everything—at least until "the sort of synthetic perspective on revolutions and collective action that we clearly need" (p. 63) comes along.

The other "half" of the book provides several brief nicely drawn case studies: chapters on Southeast Asia and what proved to be the only domino, Vietnam, set in a comparative perspective; chapters on Central America and the "anomalous" case of Honduras; and a chapter on Eastern Europe and its "revolutions." With regard to these more substantive chapters, I will defer to area studies specialists who will no doubt (and rightly) note problems; on the basis of the area with which I am most familiar, his accounts are perceptive and satisfactory. Some of these complaints may be more than mere quibbles or differences in emphases or interpretation; in any case, they will miss the point of the exercise. Despite some discomfort with such, presumably the social science project is to subject puzzling moments/processes of social disorder to the (calming) order of "scientific" analysis, and this is an attempt

to do a genuinely comparative project without resorting to either mindless number crunching or suspect rational choice analyses; neither have produced satisfactory answers with regard to resistance, rebellion, and revolution. Despite the reliance on secondary sources, the cases are treated seriously and rigorously. The absence of two of the most significant of the Cold War revolutions, China and Cuba (except for the latter's effective cameo in Chapter 2), seems odd.

The parsimony sought, Goodwin concludes, is ultimately not attained in the face of "the sheer implausibility of a general theory of revolutions or peripheral revolutions" (p. 290). The fault for this, it would seem, lies with an array of actors and factors that have relatively little to do with the state. But, he contends, few will be able to better the solutions to the puzzles that confront us, since across the myriad cases he finds that "revolutionary movements developed and sometimes thrived in opposition to" (p. 290) authoritarian albeit weak/ened states, even when they held elections, and succeeded most often when those states were particularly alienated from "civil society" and hierarchically structured. As presaged by his early invocation of Marx's dictum to the effect that people make their own history but not under the conditions of their own choosing (p. 25), and reflecting an impressive panoply of cases and a genuine effort to be sensitive to the conditions extant, Goodwin's bottom line is that "[c]ertain types of states and regimes unintentionally helped to construct revolutionary movements or, more precisely, the type of political contexts in which revolutionaries were able to thrive" (p. 292; another caveat echoes Marx: sometimes revolutionary movements "create, and [do] not simply exploit" opportunities).

For at least some, Goodwin's most controversial conclusion will be that revolutions will be less likely in the decades to come (p. 300). In short, globalization, the collapse of the Soviet model, and the emergence of formal democracies have dramatically reduced the space for and likelihood of revolutions. While as careful here as he is throughout, a quick refutation might simply be that globalization has created new economic problems and new sources of support, the collapse of the Cold War may create more rather than less space for revolutionaries (i.e., less excuses for intervention), and the institutionalization (often fragile) of democracy is proving to be a far cry from the consolidation of democracy, the democratization of people's everyday lives.

Goodwin has offered the most sensitive state- or institution-centered instrument yet for the study of revolutionary processes. And yet people remain at least distant and at times absent, and it is largely they and their actions whom and that we seek to explain. While recognizing that the inherent complexity of people may be problematic (even inelegant) in the salutary search for the most parsimonious explanation, ideology and culture provide entrees. People join revolutionary processes for many reasons, some of which, as Goodwin suggests, have to do with the state; but not all. Revolutionary struggles are about far more than struggles for or against state power, reflecting people's efforts to fundamentally transform the material and ideological conditions of their everyday lives (and those of others) now and for all time. However charily chosen, revolution is part of the tool kit for many people in many parts of the world, and it is the conscious efforts—not to deny the obvious profusion of concomitant unintended consequences—by at least an active minority of the participants to profoundly transform themselves and their entire society that defines the processes most of us construe as revolutions. That this happens largely within the constructs we have called states (more or less) since the seventeenth century may be in part a historical accident.

Revolution remains on the historical agenda both because "[r]evolutionary movements are not simply or exclusively a response to economic exploitation or inequality, but also and more directly a response to political oppression and violence, typically brutal and indiscriminate" (p. 3) and because there are people enmeshed in the struggle for profound change. While Trotsky posited revolution as the option only "when there is no other way out" (p. 26), a close colleague posed the question, "what is to be done." The puzzle posed by this marvelous book is, in part, why we should continue to center the state when, as Goodwin ably (and amply) demonstrates repeatedly, there are so many other factors that merit our consideration; there is another way to read Marx's dictum and its recognition that people make their own history. Ultimately, if we wish to understand and explicate why revolutions happen here and not there, now and not then, among these people and not those, we will have to investigate the lives of those people—their ideologies, their cultures, their communities, their symbols, and their commitments.

Here, I fear that I have committed the book reviewer's worst sin, taking the author to task for not writing the book the reviewer would have written if only s/he had been talented or clever enough to do so in the first place; mea culpa. This delightful and engaging book, crammed chock-full of thought-provoking and challenging ideas, is one of the finest books on revolution written to date and merits the wide consideration and regard it will receive.

Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage Edited by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 560p. \$72.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

David Coates, *Wake Forest University*

The volume and quality of the scholarship generated of late on the question of the "varieties of capitalism" has been truly outstanding. We now know far more than we ever did about the internal workings of particular national economies, and about the determinants of what Angus Maddison once termed the "proximate" causes of their competitive strengths and weaknesses. That knowledge has come in part from the work of a talented set of comparative political scientists and industrial sociologists, many of whom participate in this collection. It has also come from the work of a set of economists and economic historians with sufficient professional courage and intellectual integrity to operate at (or even beyond) the edge of their notoriously narrow and institutionally blind discipline. But because that knowledge has come from so many sources, and because so much of it has entered the public domain in the form of discrete case studies or collections of relatively disconnected essays, what the subfield now needs, more than anything else, is the consolidation of a set of organizing frameworks and governing concepts designed to go beyond proximate causes to a fuller understanding of the dynamics of competitive advantage. This is why Peter Hall and David Soskice's much-heralded collection of essays, *Varieties of Capitalism*, is so important a milestone in the development of the subdiscipline of comparative political economy. At long last it gives us what Pepper D. Culpepper calls here an "analytical tool kit" (p. 303): a collection of essays built around the powerful conceptual devices of "comparative institutional advantage" and "institutional complementarities"—concepts deployed to explain "how the institutions structuring the political economy confer comparative advantages on a nation, especially in the sphere of innovation" (p. v).

Building on the already powerful conceptual distinction between "liberal market economies" and "coordinated market

economies” developed by David Soskice and others in the 1990s, the opening essay of this collection seems destined to be widely cited. In it, Hall and Soskice develop a firm-centered political economy based on a relational view of the firm: one in which firms develop their core competencies and dynamic capabilities by coordinating effectively in five spheres (those of industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, interfirm relations, and intrafirm relations with their own employees). Such coordination happens one way in liberal market economies, in another way in coordinated market economies, in each case giving firms comparative institutional advantage to the degree that they exploit the institutional complementarities of the national system in which they find themselves embedded. The case study chapters that follow then demonstrate and reinforce the Hall and Soskice argument “that the institutional structure of a particular economy provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific types of activities there” (p. 37). In a collection of consistently high-quality pieces, there are particularly valuable comparative chapters on industrial relations, training systems, and corporate governance.

The very power of the argument developed here by Hall and Soskice, and the widely respected work already published elsewhere by many of the contributors to this volume, are likely to establish this book, and its governing concepts, as the dominant ones for the next generation of graduate students in the field. Yet insightful as the approach developed here is, there may be dangers lurking in such a dominance, for the notion of comparative institutional advantage as the key to competitiveness carries implications that are not widely signaled in this collection, even though the whole approach is introduced in an attractively tentative and open-ended manner. Two in particular stand out. One is that analysis should stop—that our explanation is complete—once the dynamics of institutional advantage are mapped, and the logics released by institutional interaction are charted. The other—queried in the volume only by Kathleen Thelen (p. 73) and Pepper Culpepper (p. 275)—is that particular bundles of institutional linkage, once established, largely predetermine the policy options available to economic actors (not least, labor movements) caught up within them.

The explanation of varieties of capitalism developed in the Hall and Soskice chapter does not go the extra inch to explore and explain why, when, and how particular sets of institutions come into existence. Nor does it go the extra mile to examine how those institutions relate to the wider set of class experiences and interests that seem (to some of us, at least) to be endemic to capitalism in all its national manifestations. Instead it gives us what can easily be read as a new kind of institutional determinism. Hall and Soskice establish the dynamism of coordinated market economies (and by implication, the long-term viability of welfare systems in their continental European form) by also conceding the viability of liberal market capitalism (and its incompatibility with labor rights and welfare provision of a commensurate kind). That runs the risk of inadvertently giving retrospective legitimation to the antilabor, antiwelfare arguments of Reagan and Thatcher, and of offering only the bleakest prospects for welfare provision in economies that have the misfortune already to be set onto a liberal-market path. I am sure that this political closure was entirely unintended by the editors, but it seems an ever-present danger of the analytical framework they have developed so well. And if it is, it follows that if we are properly to research the forces shaping institutional advantage, and if we are adequately to map the politics of changing those institutions, we now need to go beyond the conceptual universe and level of explanation developed in this fine collection.

There is no doubt that *Varieties of Capitalism* will prove to be a landmark text. It is a very important collection, of value to all students in the field. The issue before us is whether to treat its publication as an ending, or simply as a beginning. Let us hope, two decades from now, that the latter is its status.

Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics By Alexander Hicks. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 256p. \$45.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Norman Furniss, *Indiana University*

Alexander Hicks has written one of the most important works in the past thirty years on the development of income security policies in democratic capitalist states. (Hicks equates income security policies with “welfare states”—a point I will revisit later.) If this were not sufficient, the book also is the most significant comparative public policy study I have read. Based on years of reflection, scholarship and teaching, it covers, not merely cites, a wide range of literatures. It is extremely sensitive to particular historical experiences. It is theoretically informed. Most impressively, it is methodologically sophisticated and imaginative. And the book is concise and well-written. In short, it is a model of what exciting comparative research can be.

A brief review cannot capture the subtlety of the analysis, but broadly Hicks advances a “class centered, if state mediated, theory of the welfare state” (p. 15), in which “sustained working class steering integrates the journey” (p. 12). The argument proceeds historically, beginning with social security program consolidation after World War I. This is the most impressive chapter in the book. Hicks uses “Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” a form of Boolean logical comparison developed by Charles Ragin (with contributions from Hicks himself [*The Comparative Method*, 1987]), to distinguish three distinct routes to early welfare state formation.

Next, Hicks examines the consolidations through the 1950s, showing “social democracy’s predominance in the 1930s and 1940s social reform” (p. 109), and the significance of the strength of the labor movement throughout the 1950s. Once again, this account is methodologically imaginative and is grounded in an enviable command of the historical evidence. Finally, the chapters raise and develop a number of intriguing issues, ranging from the impact of Catholic social thought and Christian Democratic Parties to an assessment of Gosta Esping-Andersen’s “worlds of welfare capitalism” (*The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, 1990).

Hicks then turns neocorporatism as a “bridge” to the present pattern of social policies and politics, emphasizing the direct continued relevance of social democratic government to the “preservation of neocorporatist institutions and the welfare state regime” (p. 221). His concern shifts from funded program adoption (which states by now have or have not instituted—interestingly, there are few examples of states engaging in “late” adoption of, say, family allowances) to “welfare effort,” defined as the level of public spending. The range of policies considered is expanded to include public health care effort. The final empirical chapter considers two reasons for the welfare state “crisis,” demographic change and globalization, finding that in each case there is somewhat less than meets the eye. The discussion of globalization is particularly trenchant. Hicks concludes by raising the issue of “possible futures of the welfare state” (p. 230), with specific reference to social movement theory. Although he has a number of insightful things to say about the theory, it must be noted that this focus seems too narrow to tease

out the full dynamics involved in discussions of possible futures.

Some expansion of Hicks's theoretical perspective and "dependent variable" (public spending) would be useful for this discussion. First, the "welfare state" need not be seen conceptually as the same institution as the social security state. This is especially the case if we add a consideration of policies like health care (Chapter 7) or include education. For example, over the past twenty years France (mainly through the policies of Socialist governments) has experienced a remarkable increase in access to all levels of the educational system, including higher education. (Of course, many European countries have seen this "massification" as well, but the French case is particularly striking.) All this bears directly on our understanding of what we might mean by the "welfare state" and its putative retrenchment. Second, and related, it could be valuable to examine the *content*, not merely the level, of welfare provision. Hicks's admonitions about the dangers of "overinterpretation" of the Beveridge Plan to the contrary, an explanation of why Britain moved from welfare pioneer to laggard (p. 125) seems incomplete without including the content of the Plan. The institutionalization of the flat rate benefit/flat rate contribution scheme constrained further reforms, and its presence mobilized political forces (including the Labour Party for its defense), locking them into the status quo for years. Present reforms and debates that advance quasi-private, or "tax expenditure," supplements or alternatives to publicly funded income security policies bring the need to include content into sharper focus. On policies such as health care, a concern only with publicly funded provisions is clearly insufficient.

Third, returning to "working class steering," it is unclear how much longer this concept will be fruitful in light both of the decline in party identification and of the debates within left parties themselves about what their visions should be. This debate is occurring within Christian Democratic Parties, with the idea of Catholic social action in at least temporary retreat. Finally, on the term "state," the book makes no mention of the European Union to which a majority of the countries under review belong. This is not a particular difficulty when our interest is primarily one of accounting for historical developments. But when we turn to the present and possible futures, the EU will have to be considered.

In sum, this is a deeply thoughtful book that not only clarifies and expands our understanding of the development of income security programs but also helps structure further research programs.

Brazilian Party Politics and the Coup of 1964 By Ollie Andrew Johnson III. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001. 176p. \$55.00 cloth.

Deborah L. Norden, *Whittier College*

In 1964, Brazil embarked on one of Latin America's longest experiments in modern military authoritarianism. Ollie Johnson's *Brazilian Party Politics* seeks to understand one of the important antecedents to the coup by looking at the political party system during the 1945–64 period. While the book does not succeed in demonstrating a strong causal connection between party politics and the coup, it does provide a very interesting new perspective on party politics and realignment, looking beyond the more immediate electoral indicators of the Brazilian party system.

According to Johnson, Brazilian party politics during the pre-coup period "is fundamentally the story of the rise of leftist and nationalist party forces committed to changing the political and socioeconomic system and the reaction of more

conservative party forces against such change" (p. 14). The book effectively demonstrates this shift to the left in Brazilian politics by looking beyond merely electoral results to a consideration of intraparty factions and transparty alliances. By doing this, Johnson manages to build a much clearer picture of trends in Brazilian politics than the often amorphous, or "cloudy" (p. 35), image that emerges from considering only electoral support for the political parties.

As described, the three principal parties of the period, the PSD (Social Democratic Party, a centrist party), the PTB (Brazilian Labor Party, a party of the left), and the UDN (National Democratic Union, a conservative party), composed only the surface of organized political representation in Brazil. According to Johnson, by the early 1960s, each of these parties had developed progressive factions with similar agendas (p. 53). In the PTB, this faction succeeded in shifting the party to the left, while reactions against these factions encouraged the other two parties to shift further to the right. At the same time, two important "transparty" alliances formed, the FPN (National Parliamentary Front) and the ADP (Democratic Parliamentary Action), on the left and right, respectively (p. 89). Johnson writes that, "[w]hile the ADP was composed largely of UDN and PSD members, the FPN drew primarily from the PTB" (p. 101); however, both alliances included substantial numbers of individuals from all three major political parties, as well as from several of the smaller parties (pp. 144–51). Furthermore, Brazilians could opt to vote for these alliances instead of for political parties (p. 23). This is undoubtedly one of the most interesting revelations in the book. From Johnson's discussion, it would appear that these factions and alliances became more programmatic and ideological than the political parties during this period, and consequently perhaps more capable of representing ideas and interests than the major political parties.

In part because of this development, Johnson's effort to describe the changes as the realignment of the *party* system seems somewhat misplaced. The author defines realignment as "a systematic shift in strength among political parties" (p. 2), or "an important and sustained shifting of political power within the party system" (p. 12). However, the balance of power among the parties appears to have evolved much less—and much less consistently—during this period than the balance between parties, on the one hand, and subparty and cross-party units, on the other hand. To be sure, Johnson does demonstrate a trend in legislative elections toward a shrinking center (PDS) and growing left (PTB) (p. 42). Yet, neither presidential nor regional elections consistently follow the same pattern. Furthermore, leadership—at least at the presidential level—still appeared to be exercised by personalistic leaders with individual followings, rather than strong party ties. Thus, while politics in Brazil did appear to shift overall toward the left during this period, the political parties themselves do not seem to have been strong or cohesive enough to constitute the central players in this "realignment."

Despite the author's intriguing depiction of the different aspects of realignment in Brazil, he does not adequately demonstrate that this realignment led to the 1964 coup. While the coup itself, and the broader question of military intervention, is discussed very little in this book, the information given indicates that the overall political shift toward the left only indirectly motivated the coup. Instead, President João Goulart's leftist program and his efforts to embrace the "Basic Reforms"—a broad, reformist program including goals such as "democratizing the polity" and "reducing inequality" (p. 101)—gave the final impetus for the coup. Since Goulart had initially only been elected vice president, and the elected president (Jânio Quadros) represented a more

conservative party, Goulart's presidency cannot be interpreted as an indicator of leftist realignment. Rather, Goulart fell into the presidency accidentally. The growth of the more progressive FPN and leftist factions in the parties may have given teeth to Goulart's reformist goals, but it does not in itself appear to have motivated the coup.

Johnson's use of counterfactuals further highlights the importance of Goulart's leadership and policies for the coup. Using this approach, Johnson proposes that the outcome (the coup) might have been different had Goulart reacted differently at two points. The first of these was in 1961, when Goulart assumed the presidency. Goulart, from the PTB, had been elected vice president in the 1960 elections. Quadros, a personalistic leader now representing the conservative UDN, won the presidency with over 48% of the vote (p. 49). However, after seven months, Quadros resigned precipitously, and the government entered a severe political crisis, given the opposition to a possible presidency by more leftist Goulart. The military ultimately allowed Goulart to assume the presidency, but only after the rules had been changed in order to weaken the office. The second point was in 1964, when Goulart left the country in the face of the military insurrection. Johnson argues that at both these points, Goulart should have reacted more strongly, mobilizing supporters and standing fast in the face of these constitutional challenges. Although taking such actions admittedly would probably have led to bloodshed, Johnson proposes that Goulart might have managed to prevent the coup by stronger actions (p. 128).

The problem with this argument is twofold. First, as indicated, is that Johnson does not offer sufficient evidence that a change in Goulart's choices would have altered the outcome. The book simply does not provide enough information about the military, military decision making, and coup processes to make this claim, whether or not it is accurate. Secondly, as indicated, if Goulart's actions at either of these two moments could have prevented the coup, then his policies and choices would appear to have had more influence on military intervention than the broader political realignment.

In sum, this book offers an intricate, nuanced, and fascinating analysis of trends in Brazilian political representation during the 1945–64 period. In the process, Johnson makes an important contribution to the literature on party politics. However, efforts to link the study of party politics to the 1964 coup fall somewhat short. The author simply has not provided sufficient information about the coup to be able to explain it, nor does the information that is given support party realignment as a major cause. The book also lacks detail on the history and broader socioeconomic context, which makes it difficult for the reader to understand the links between the political shifts discussed and Brazil's broader social challenges. It is, finally, an excellent book on party politics, but a less successful contribution to the study of Brazil's 1964 coup.

The Politics of Elite Transformation: The Consolidation of Greek Democracy in Theoretical Perspective By Neovi M. Karakatsanis. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 224p. \$59.95.

Kevin Featherstone, *London School of Economics*

This is an ambitious and innovative study of the processes of democratization evident in Greece after 1974. It has two major distinctions. Firstly, it is based on an extensive range of personal interviews with some of the protagonists involved, as well as on archival searches. Secondly, the empirical analysis is placed within relevant theoretical frames, and these are used to draw out relevant comparisons with other European states. The book serves, therefore, as both a general introduction

to the turbulent history of the period and a useful source for comparative analysis of democratization processes. The book is highly accessible and readable. With these qualities, it is likely to become the definitive account of the transition to democracy in Greece. Many scholars and students will benefit from it.

In contrast to the repeated images of rancorous leadership squabbles, politics based on naked self-interest, and opponents accorded the utmost suspicion, Neovi Karakatsanis argues that it was the willingness to compromise among domestic political elites that "won" back democracy for Greece. The argument is qualified, however. Firstly, despite a shared opposition to the junta, the politicians could not bring themselves to negotiate a full settlement. Instead, agreements came in installments. Goodwill was restrained by timorous footsteps on the basis of careful calculation. Secondly, the gradual progress toward democratization was kept on track by the personal monopoly of power by Constantine Karamanlis. So, the cultural history of leader dependence was once again crucial.

The stress on theory in the title is potentially misleading. While the analysis is framed in the context of two competing theoretical approaches to democratic consolidation—elite settlement (following bargaining that overcomes traditional differences) and elite convergence (a two-phase process of elite collaboration)—the bulk of the analysis is empirical.

Not unusually, the book concludes on Greek exceptionalism: Reality requires a revision of the elite convergence model developed in other national contexts. Some of the justification for exceptionalism seems overstated. The elite convergence model need not be as restrictive as Karakatsanis assumes; the electoral logic on which it rests can be interpreted more broadly. Moreover, it is asserted both that the origins of elite consensus preceded the junta and that it was the result of the experience of the transition (p. 16). The main theoretical contribution is to argue that the convergence model must be disaggregated to capture "an often bewildering variety of elite motivations and dynamic processes" (p. 175). These include the logic of party building and a normative commitment to the establishment of an inclusive, stable democracy, based on drawing the appropriate lessons from modern Greek history. By contrast, no elite settlement or pact was negotiated; "politics remained a win-lose, zero-sum competitive game" (p. 176). For its part, the military first acted in compliance with democracy and then, differentially, imbued the values of civilian control. The theoretical frames are useful in allowing cross-national comparisons to be drawn. The author draws a limited number of parallels with countries elsewhere in southern Europe.

The author expertly dissects the interests and motivations behind the embrace of the new regime by each of the major political parties. The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), created by Andreas Papandreou in 1974, was reconciled to moderation not only by electoral calculation—there is much stress here on its cynical opportunism—but also by a range of other considerations, such as foreign policy interests and the constraints of government. Much is made of the difference between PASOK's initial radicalism and its gradual acceptance of the basic constitutional order. The party's early radicalism is seen as helping to integrate the disaffected antiestablishment voters, carrying them with the party along the road to moderation and helping the new system to mature.

The analysis is heavily rooted in a synthesis of the views expressed to Karakatsanis in the extensive range of (anonymous) interviews that were obtained. This produces an eclecticism of interpretation, but there is value in this. While the arguments are not highly original, they are more firmly

anchored in empirical evidence than is sometimes found elsewhere.

The net result of the process of democratization, the author argues, is that Greece has a stable and consolidated “yet low quality democracy” (p. 173). The “quality” is impaired by the abuses of state patronage and a skewed, fragmented social welfare system. The terminology might be awkward, but the focus on these agendas is apt. Both are the prime foci of much of the current political debate in Greece (and beyond). And both are symptoms of the processes of “modernization-cum-Europeanization” underlying so much of contemporary Greek politics. But that should be the subject of another book.

Has Liberalism Failed Women?: Assuring Equal Representation in Europe and the United States Edited by Jytte Klausen and Charles S. Maier. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 243p.

Noelle H. Norton, *University of San Diego*

Over the past decade, while the United States effectively decided that liberalism could not accommodate quotas or affirmative action plans designed to alleviate gender and racial inequality, Europe decided that liberalism could accommodate a form of positive discrimination. As the U.S. Supreme Court systematically rolled back affirmative action plans and the state of California led the initiative to curtail government and educational affirmative action, countries like France, Germany, and Norway were implementing a variety of parity policies at both the constitutional and political levels. The parity movement that gained strength in Europe in the 1990s called for equal representation of both men and women in elected assemblies. Methods for achieving parity ranged from reserving parliamentary seats for female legislators by means of constitutional change to legal gender quotas in party lists and party rules. The editors of this volume point out that the Europeans have implemented these electoral reforms with “little public outcry” and “no manifestations of mass protests.”

The essays the editors include address the challenges that parity presents democracies on the basis of liberal theories of representation, the institutional context in which parity has been implemented in Europe, and the concerns opponents of parity raise both in Europe and the United States. On the whole, the contributors present a broad and balanced analysis of the theoretical justification for parity and the concerns expressed by those who have experienced its implementation. Jytte Klausen and Charles Maier include essays by several prominent academics from Europe and the United States, political activists tied to the parity movement, and elected officials and jurists who currently face legal challenges to parity.

Although the editors note in their introduction that they present these essays for the purpose of discussion and not advocacy, it becomes clear after reading each one that they have serious reservations about political innovations that strengthen gender rights at the procedural level before more substantive rights are secured. Despite the placement of the argument by Jane Mansbridge (Chapter 2) at the front of the book, that “representation is best performed by descriptive representatives” (p. 19) and that the case for 50% female representation “is strong on historically contingent, non-essentialist grounds” (p. 33), a set of potential pitfalls and unintended consequences to parity legislation and parity party rules are also introduced as a primary theme early in the book.

In fact, the editors weave three kinds of concerns throughout alternating chapters in the book. First, several essays warn

that the parity movement might stimulate a political backlash, similar to the affirmative action backlash in the United States, which will undo feminists gains in Europe. Others claim that the parity movement has focused on limited goals of electoral politics and sacrificed more substantive or controversial gender justice goals. Finally, some contributors caution that parity will not promote a feminist agenda because women from both the Right and the Left have been supportive of the movement.

These “cautionary tales” told by several contributors only enhance the dialogue the editors provoke with the book. They have carefully placed essays supportive of parity among the essays that are more cautious of or opposed to parity. In fact, the arrangement of the chapters places the reader in the center of the intellectual debate over the compatibility of parity with classical liberal democracies, making this book a pleasure to read. Readers from the United States will find themselves excited by this bold European experiment at the same time they recognize the cautionary arguments against these proposals.

The book divides the parity dialogue into four basic sections: “Theoretical Perspectives”; “Parity as an Electoral Issue”; “The Policy Process”; and “Cautionary Tales.” In the first section, the editors introduce the theoretical discussion they will lead the reader into over the next 14 chapters. Essays by two academics showing contrasting perspectives are juxtaposed in Chapters 2 and 3: one by Jane Mansbridge from the United States supporting the compatibility of parity with liberalism and the other by Clause Offe from Germany opposing procedural mechanisms for overcoming gender injustice. The section concludes with a descriptively rich essay by Françoise Gaspard, the French scholar who coauthored the book that started the parity movement, stating that parity will only deepen democracy.

Gaspard’s essay offers a nice transition into the second and third sections where the diverse European experience with parity as electoral politics and governmental policy is explored. Notable essays in these sections include one by Isabelle Giraud and Jane Jenson (Chapter 5), who contend that parity was promoted in France only because it was non-controversial and left aside more important social and economic change for women. Another essay by Anna Coote (Chapter 7), a former consultant to the Labour government’s minister for women in Great Britain, similarly claims that the Labour Party used parity only to win the election and left feminism “in the wilderness: wanted on the voyage, but not on arrival” (p. 111). On the other hand, several other essays in this section tentatively support parity in principle and practice. For example, in a well-researched case study of the British Labour Party’s adoption of all-women shortlists in 1997, Pippa Norris (Chapter 6) shows that positive discrimination policies can transform legislative bodies when more women are included. Similarly, Christiane Lemke (Chapter 8) and Hege Skjeie (Chapter 10) write that parity dramatically increased the number of women legislators in Germany and in Scandinavian countries, respectively. Perhaps the essay by Agnes Hubert (Chapter 11), describing the European Union’s effort to advance gender equality, best represents the cautionary tone of the book. Although Hubert praised the EU for supporting parity democracy, she warns that parity must be about greater gender equality and not simply about a greater number of women in political office.

In the final section of the book, the editors fully reveal their preferences by including essays that emphasize the pitfalls surrounding parity implementation in Europe and skepticism about parity adoption in the United States. Both Rogers Smith (Chapter 12) and Jytte Klausen (Chapter 14)

contend that parity serves as a “quick fix” to political equality. Smith argues against expanding the political representation of women if it means giving up efforts to secure greater social change, while Klausen shows in a study of the conservative gender gap that a consequence of parity might be the depoliticization or neutralization of gender.

As noted, *Has Liberalism Failed Women?* puts the reader into what the authors would call a transatlantic intellectual dialogue about the merits of parity inside liberal democracies. Although the debate is lively, the essays diverse, and the contributors all prominent in their fields, the book is not flawless. The editors might have provided a more comprehensive introduction to these essays. At times, the redefinition of parity and parity policy alternatives inside each essay became redundant. Finally, a few of the contributions were not as fully developed or clearly linked to the larger themes of the book. However, none of these minor flaws detract from the overall value of this thoughtful and provocative book. Students of legislative politics and liberal political theory will find it as valuable as will those who are already immersed in the debate about the most appropriate methods for instituting gender justice.

Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin By Michael McFaul. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 384p. \$35.00.

The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime, 1989–1999 By Thomas F. Remington. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 288p. \$40.00.

M. Steven Fish, *University of California, Berkeley*

Each of these books is, in its own way, a tour de force; each provides the best book-length account and analysis available to date on its subject. Michael McFaul's book offers a major contribution to thinking on regime change in general, as well as a fine account and analysis of Russia's transition from Sovietism. Thomas Remington's book, which investigates the nascence and internal operation of the Russian legislature, powerfully advances our understanding of the Russian parliament and the formation of political institutions more generally. Both books are scholarly and sophisticated, but each is also elegantly written, well organized, and accessible to the nonspecialist. Both authors were present at the creation of the new Russian political order, and each book is deeply informed by extensive interviews and first-hand observation.

Remington uses the argot of game theory, while McFaul prefers the language of what has become known as the transitions literature. Yet each book emphasizes the importance of unintended consequences and critical junctures, and each argues that the institutions that have evolved in Russia since the late 1980s are best understood as the products of political struggle, rather than of a preestablished correlation of social forces, structural factors, or cultural predispositions. Each book asks not why Russian democracy has failed to flower fully, but rather how Russia has skirted the trap of dictatorship and managed to create some lasting institutions that regulate political competition and provide for some degree of civil peace and political openness.

Remington's book argues against the common view that casts the Soviet parliament of 1989–91, the Russian parliament of 1990–93, and the post-1993 Russian parliament as radically disparate and largely disconnected institutions. Remington sees the development of parliamentary structure as incremental, and he unearthes key sources of institutional continuity. He shows how bicameralism and partisanship, in particular, emerged and gained recognition over the lives of

all three parliaments, and he sees the post-1993 parliament as deeply influenced by its institutional predecessors. He discovers processes of learning and adaptation within and across parliaments over time, with legislators growing increasingly adept at bargaining, rule making, and rule following. He makes a powerful case for regarding parliamentarism in Russia as a work in progress.

Remington also takes on the conventional view of the Russian parliament as an anemic and inconsequential institution. He is fully cognizant of the formal limitations on the legislature's power. But he sees parliament as having expanded its prerogatives since 1993, and he holds that it has at least managed to make the president take his own constitution seriously. He argues that the growth of parliamentary capacity has enabled legislators and parties to check and tame executive power. Remington makes a strong case, detailing a record of legislative accomplishment and uncovering areas in which the parliament and the president are in continual discussion and negotiation. Still, on this score, this reviewer is not entirely convinced. Surely Remington is right to argue that parliament has turned out to be more than the decorative and toothless body that many observers expected it to be—and that the president perhaps wanted it to be—at the time of the constitution's passage in late 1993. But the president's decree powers and control over the government, judiciary, and state media, the absence of meaningful parliamentary oversight powers, and the enormous disparities in resources that prevail between the sprawling executive branch and a parliament that employs a staff with but a single personal assistant for each deputy make it difficult for the legislature to check the president in most areas of policymaking and implementation. This is not to deny that parliament may be, as Remington argues, a consequential and articulate political actor. I do, however, question whether the parliament really can, on an ongoing basis, tame executive power and force the president to abide by the law.

Whereas Remington focuses on a particular institution within the broader context of regime change, McFaul seeks to explain the character of regime change itself. McFaul's dependent variable is the emergence/nonemergence of stable rules for open political competition. His cases are the Gorbachev period (1985–91), the Russian First Republic (1992–93), and the Russian Second Republic (1993–present). He argues that the first two cases represented failures at building lasting institutions for regulating political competition, while the third case, at least in relative terms, has been a success. His main explanatory variables are perceptions of the balance of power among political antagonists and the scope of the contested agenda for change.

McFaul holds that a relatively equal balance of power between rival political forces that leads to political stalemate, particularly when the balance of forces is unclear to the protagonists themselves, is more likely to produce breakdown than is a circumstance in which one side has triumphed unequivocally and managed to impose its own rules unilaterally. Here McFaul challenges Dankwart Rustow's notion regarding the potential virtue of evenly balanced, protracted conflict for producing the compromises—and eventually the rules and agencies—that institutionalize competition and keep it peaceful. According to McFaul, the balance of forces between the main political protagonists was relatively equal and entirely unclear during the Gorbachev and early post-Gorbachev periods. After the unequivocal triumph of Yeltsin over his communist and nationalist opponents in the armed conflict of 1993 and the adoption of a new constitution that resolved the battle between the president and the parliament in the president's favor, however, the balance of forces

tilted decisively toward the presidency and specifically toward Yeltsin and his political program. The clarification of power relations created the basis for the emergence of a system in which even opponents of the government and of the new regime had an interest in playing within the established rules. The adoption of the new constitution, the passage of time, and the practice of elections under clearly specified rules helped pull even avowed opponents of the post-Soviet regime into the electoral game and ultimately advanced both stability and democratization.

McFaul makes clear that he is aware of the potential tensions between the advantages of greater clarity and disparity in the balance of power, on the one hand, and democratization, on the other, and he grapples with this tension throughout his account of Russian politics after 1993. Still, in this reviewer's opinion, McFaul might underestimate the perniciousness for democratization—if not necessarily for short-run political stability—of the lopsided balance between Yeltsin and his opponents that emerged from the ashes of the 1993 conflict. Yeltsin's victory and his ability subsequently to win approval in a referendum for a draft constitution that expressed his own preferences in nearly unadulterated form did establish some institutional clarity. Outside of Chechnya, moreover, Russian political competition has become less bloody and chaotic since 1993. But during the past half decade, little worthy of the name "democratization" has occurred in Russia. The very institutions—especially the weakly constrained executive—that helped bring some order to the system initially are also impeding democratization and may even become sources of political instability and state failure.

Another of McFaul's major arguments is that the wider the scope of the agenda for change, the less likely a new democratic regime will emerge. Multiple, simultaneous transformations are harder to manage, and more likely to derail democratization, than are transitions where challenges can be managed sequentially and discretely. The breadth of contested terrain, according to McFaul, was exceptionally expansive in Russia during the Gorbachev period and the first two years of the post-Soviet era. The shape of the state itself and the battle between capitalism and socialism in the economic sphere were under dispute. But settlement of problems of state autonomy and independence during the early post-Gorbachev years, as well as the elimination of the option of a return to a command economy following Yeltsin's victory in the armed clash of 1993, narrowed the terrain of contest and enabled politicians to concentrate on—and productively fight over—political institutions. This reduction in the scope of the agenda helped stabilize politics. This argument is not counterintuitive, but nor is it easy to demonstrate in practice, and McFaul does an excellent job of laying out precisely how this dynamic worked.

This reviewer does not fully embrace the arguments made in either book, but they are vigorously and skillfully made. Each book is a model of rigorous, theoretically informed qualitative analysis. Both authors define their terms with precision, map out and explicate their causal arguments clearly, and present prodigious amounts of empirical evidence.

Together with Eugene Huskey's *Presidential Power in Russia* (1999), *The Russian Parliament and Russia's Unfinished Revolution* represent the most ambitious and successful book-length efforts to date to grapple with institutional genesis and transformation in post-Soviet Russia. The books focus on a single country, but their arguments are not case-specific. These works richly merit, and are already gaining, a broad audience among theoretically minded comparativists.

Black Atlantic Politics: Dilemmas of Political Empowerment in Boston and Liverpool By William E. Nelson Jr. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 344p. \$74.50 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

Toni-Michelle C. Travis, *George Mason University*

Studies of local politics have often narrowly focused on elites, the role of competing interest groups, or the influence of the business community in making key decisions. Nelson's comparative study raises the level of discourse by drawing our attention to the often overlooked role of blacks in municipal politics. In comparing Boston and Liverpool the study expands our understanding of the similarities between racial politics in the United States and in Great Britain.

Organized in a readable manner, the book provides two opening chapters to frame the comparison. The chapters on Boston and Liverpool are designed as case studies, with a concluding chapter that allows one to focus on one city at a time.

Building on the literature of two fields, cultural politics and local government, Nelson presents a systematic study of the problems of blacks seeking empowerment on both sides of the Atlantic. In previous works on local government, blacks were merely incidental, while the focus here makes blacks central to the study.

As suggested by Paul Gilroy in *The Black Atlantic* (1993), the ocean provides a link between Britain and the North American colonies because of cultural commonalities and the experience of the slave trade. This examination of contemporary Liverpool and Boston reveals two communities trying to attain political empowerment. Two cities separated by an ocean exist where racial domination places the black community in a subordinate position as the recipients of policy outcomes, not partners in shaping policy, as the objects of institutional discrimination, and often as the victims of police harassment. The comparative analysis is framed in terms of the structure and budgetary constraints of local government, the relationship of the local government to the central government, the responsiveness of governing institutions to the black community, the resource level of the black community, and the ability of the black community to mobilize its resources to influence the public agenda. The beauty of the comparison is that it shows that race is a major force in determining policy in what appear to be two dissimilar cities.

Comparative studies, although often complicated, elucidate key similarities. In examining two port cities Nelson finds racial hierarchies in which whites have been intransigent in response to black demands for representation and inclusion in governing circles. By focusing on political linkage between the black community and the local government, Nelson clarifies the subtleties of ongoing problems of racism and internal conflict within the black communities of Boston and Liverpool.

This comparison, however, notes one important difference between the two cultures with regard to race. The role of the state in the British system is different because there is no *de jure* history of discrimination and segregation. Consequently, there is no official acknowledgment of the overt prejudice that is practiced. With the general denial that race is an issue and not state policy, opposition to racism as well as hope of achieving any political power at the local level becomes difficult.

This is a pioneering study that will lead other scholars to examine the continuing problem of black empowerment in democratic cultures. Nelson's work shows that the problem is far from solved. Race continues to matter in local politics on both sides of the Atlantic. Nelson presents a solid,

well-documented study. However, it would have been enhanced by his paying greater attention to the West Indian dimensions of protest politics in Boston, where activists more often than not are of West Indian descent.

With regard to Liverpool, while it remains difficult to achieve unity and to build coalitions, an overlooked dimension is the impact of the immigrant policy on racial politics. If immigration increases, then the black population will grow and place increasing demands on the system.

This seminal work invites future studies analyzing the connection between politics and policy outcomes on both sides of the Atlantic where race is a prime factor. Future studies of local government will certainly need to examine structure, political linkages, and policy outcomes, but with race as a key actor, not a bit player. Immigration will continue to impact the local policy as residents of commonwealth countries continue to move to Great Britain. Boston, too, is experiencing population shifts, with more people of color from the Caribbean and Latin America becoming Boston residents as whites flee to homogeneous suburban enclaves. The story is not over. It will be a long struggle for empowerment unless more common ground is found for coalitions in both communities. *Black Atlantic Politics* will prove to be the guide for assessing future political empowerment in the Atlantic context.

Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy

Edited by Jon Pierre. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 251p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Christopher Ansell, *University of California, Berkeley*

If you remain befuddled, perplexed, or even a bit hazy about why scholars have shifted in the last decade from talking about "government" to talking about "governance," this is the volume for you. *Debating Governance*, edited by Jon Pierre, brings together a diverse group of scholars to analyze the meaning and value of this concept within their respective subfields. The title of the volume may, however, be ambiguous. These scholars are not debating the meaning and value of the term governance among themselves. The contributors to the volume generally agree that governance is a useful and valuable concept. Despite differences in emphasis, perspective, and language, the authors generally agree about why we must shift from talking about "government" to talking about "governance." The debate, if there is one, is with those who would deny or ignore fundamental changes in the way in which we govern ourselves over the last several decades.

So what is this concept *governance*? There is no doubt that the term means different things to different people, and many of the authors in the volume show a healthy self-consciousness about what the term implies. The essay by Rod Rhodes, for example, identifies seven distinctive meanings of the term (pp. 58–60). However, I believe that these seven distinctive meanings are usefully reduced to two broader connotations. In the field of corporate governance, in new public management, and in the "good governance" movement associated with the World Bank, the term tends to signify the pursuit of fiscally responsible, efficient, and accountable organizations. Best business practices are advocated as a means to effective governance. In contrast, the other four meanings identified by Rhodes—governance as international interdependence, sociocybernetic system, new political economy, and networks—all refer to the ways in which activities of governing are now distributed over a much wider group of actors than they were in the past, none of whom can unilaterally control outcomes. Hence, governance

implies a process of coordinating and conciliating multiple actors.

The authors of this volume all lean toward the second of these two connotations. As a number of the authors explicitly point out, governance suggests the shift from a "state-centric" model of governing (hence, "government") to a model in which authority and power are much more widely distributed. This distribution of authority and power places (or reflects) constraints on the ability of the state to govern unilaterally. *Governance*, with its emphasis on process, implies that governing now requires new institutional forms and a more intensive engagement between state and society. In his introduction to the volume, Pierre announces a central theme of the volume: "As the state's traditional power bases seem to be losing much of their former strength, there has been a search for alternative strategies through which the state can articulate and pursue the collective interest without necessarily relying on coercive instruments" (p. 2).

Skeptics may note that the state-centric model was never an adequate model to describe governing. They might wonder whether governance is much different from conventional pluralist accounts of governing. Such a critique might surprise the authors of the volume, because their "debate" is really directed toward those who remain wedded to the state-centric model. However, I think that their response might be the same to skeptics from both state-centric and pluralist camps. Governance seeks to acknowledge and call attention to the *relative shift* away from the state-centric model of governing toward a more pluralist model. The end result does not fit into either the state-centric category or the opposing category of society-centered pluralism. While constrained, the state remains too active and interventionist in the governance model to be described in conventional pluralist terms. As Pierre points out in the introduction, the contributors to the volume agree that governance reflects the transformation rather than the decline of the state. How, otherwise, can we understand the volume's many references to the state's role in "steering"? Although Paul Hirst's essay does champion a shift to society-centered governance, the state retains a critical, if reduced, presence in the governance models described by most of the other authors. Pierre describes governance as follows: "Governance has a dual meaning; on the one hand it refers to the empirical manifestations of state adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in the late twentieth century. On the other hand, governance also denotes a conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of social systems and, for the most part, the role of the state in that process" (p. 3).

The great strength of this volume is the way it situates the concept of governance in many subdisciplines. Paul Hirst explores the tension between governance and democracy and advocates associative democracy as a framework for reconciling the tension. B. Guy Peters suggests that a comparative politics perspective on governance should ask, "Are certain types of political systems apparently better at steering and control than are others?" (p. 36). Rod Rhodes revises his well-known network model of public administration from the perspective of an "anti-foundational" epistemology. Gerry Stoker places governance in the context of the literature on urban growth coalitions and public-private partnerships. Andrew Gamble describes governance in terms of the evolving role of the state in the economy. Jan Kooiman's model of "social-political governance" emphasizes that public-private interactions have shifted from "one-way traffic" to "two-way traffic" (p. 142). James Rosenau elaborates his model of global "governance without government" by conceptualizing the nature of global change (p. 172). From a new political economy perspective, Anthony Payne describes projects of supranational regionalism as modes of governance. Alberta Sbragia analyzes the

European Union as a form of governance that relies heavily on regulation, information control, and fiscal poverty.

Thus, the contributions to this volume cover an enormous range of perspectives. They are also well written and informative. Combined with the effective introduction and conclusion by Jon Pierre, they comprise a useful text for introducing the concept of governance to advanced undergraduates or graduate students.

Grassroots Expectations of Democracy and Economy: Argentina in Comparative Perspective By Nancy R. Powers. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. 294p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Steven Levitsky, *Harvard University*

As the recent political meltdowns in Venezuela and Argentina made clear, a vast gap persists between elite behavior and mass attitudes in much of Latin America. Scholarly understanding of this gap—and its political implications—would benefit from more fine-grained, yet theoretically informed, studies of nonelites. Nancy Powers's *Grassroots Expectations of Democracy and Economy* is one such study. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 41 residents of two lower-income neighborhoods in Argentina's federal capital, Powers examines how poor people understand their own interests. She argues that people experience poverty in vastly different ways, and this variation has important implications for political behavior. Thus, to understand how poor people view the relationship between their own material conditions and government policy, one must examine "the conditions themselves and how people live with them" (p. 33). This kind of inductive analysis has important and well-known limitations, particularly for studies—such as this one—based on a small sample size. Yet given how little we continue to know about the relationship between mass attitudes and macrolevel politics in Latin America, such a "bottom up" approach should be welcomed. To the extent that fine-grained inductive research generates insights that 1) are unlikely to emerge out of larger-n studies and 2) challenge or refine dominant theoretical assumptions, it can be extremely fruitful. This is the case with important sections of the book.

Grassroots Expectations offers a wealth of insights into the conditions under which poor people respond—or do not respond—politically to material deprivation. Chapter 3 uses the case of low-income housing to show how variation in living conditions shapes poor people's political interests, as well as their capacity to act collectively. Thus, shantytowns are more likely to foster perceptions of shared housing interests and collective demand-making than are arrangements like "residence hotels" or abandoned buildings. More generally, Powers finds that the extreme heterogeneity of housing hinders collective mobilization, as the residents of hotels, abandoned buildings, and shantytowns "do not acknowledge a set of common shelter problems not do they seek similar solutions" (p. 85).

The book's core insights are found in Chapter 5. The chapter opens with typology of three possible orientations toward politics: 1) a microfocus, or a focus on private solutions to one's material problems, without attention to macropolitical issues; 2) macrofocus, or engagement with macrolevel political issues, but without making a link between these issues and personal material needs; and 3) micro-macro linkage, or an understanding of one's personal material problems (and their potential solutions) in terms of macrolevel politics. Powers is most interested in this third category, and the bulk of the chapter explores the conditions that give rise to a micro-macro linkage. For the poor, the first response to pressing

material need is usually to "cope" individually, via a combination of informal sector employment, state welfare programs, private charities, and local partisan patrons. These coping mechanisms are described with a richness that is unusual in contemporary political science. Powers finds a strong relationship between perceived capacity to cope and attitudes toward the government. Those who view themselves as unable to cope are more likely to link their personal material needs to government policy than are those who perceive themselves as coping adequately. Although it is worth considering the possibility that the causal relationship is reversed (people who are ideologically disposed toward privatist thinking may be likely to say they can cope on their own), Powers's argument generates some interesting insights. It sheds light, for example, on the political salience of high inflation. Because hyperinflation so dramatically affects the poor's capacity to cope, it generates more intense macrolevel demands than do such economic problems as housing scarcity, low salaries, and even unemployment. This helps to explain why many poor and unemployed Argentines voted for Carlos Menem in 1995: Because hyperinflation made the micro-macro linkage salient for many voters, the electoral benefits of resolving it were greater than the costs associated with not resolving many other problems affecting the poor.

Though largely persuasive, the chapter understates the role of partisan clientelistic networks. Clientelistic networks—most of them Peronist—are pervasive in most low-income zones in Argentina, and they undoubtedly shape the way the poor interpret and engage in politics. The book understates the role of clientelism because it draws its sample from the federal capital, which is not representative of the country as a whole. Because it is wealthier, better educated, and more open to mass media influence than the rest of the country, the capital is characterized by substantially less clientelism. Had Powers drawn her sample from Greater Buenos Aires or the northern interior, her results might have been quite different.

Chapters 6 and 7 provide fewer original insights, and its major findings do not depart substantially from those of many large-n surveys. Chapter 6 presents respondents' views of the Menem government and various political alternatives. Readers may find the chapter too anecdotal, and its various references to parties and politicians that soon disappeared may quickly date it. The chapter concludes with the assertion that poor Argentines are stuck in a "static" Peronist identity that inhibits them from effectively pursuing their interests (p. 178). This characterization smacks of the false consciousness arguments that progressive scholars have made about Argentine workers since the 1940s and is inconsistent with the book's effort to take grassroots views seriously. Chapter 7 examines popular sector attitudes toward democracy. Although Powers found that the bulk of her respondents supported liberal democracy, many were "effective liberal democrats" (rather than absolute liberal democrats), in that they were willing to accept some illiberal actions (including closing the congress) for the sake of effective government. Powers concludes that support for democracy in Argentina is "context driven," rather than rooted in a "recognition of democracy's inherent values" (pp. 208–9).

In the excellent conclusion to *Grassroots Expectations*, Powers links her findings to broader comparative theory. The chapter offers a critique of studies that characterize governments, such as those of Menem and Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, as "neopopulist," arguing that such analyses pay insufficient attention to why poor people support them. According to Powers, both Menem and Fujimori substantially enhanced the individual security of poor citizens, and that enhanced security, rather than neopopulist appeals,

best explains their lower-class support. Powers also evaluates her findings in light of dominant theories of voting, arguing that although micro-macro linkage (or "pocketbook voting") is generally treated by scholars as unsophisticated political behavior, it may be quite rational in developing countries, where public policy often has tremendous impact on poor peoples' lives. Indeed, an ability to turn microlevel needs into macrolevel demands may be critical to effective citizenship—and to closing the elite-mass gap—in Latin America. Powers might have pointed out that contemporary patterns of economic liberalization, state retrenchment, mass party decline, and the decentralization and NGOization of social policy have further eroded the conditions facilitating such micro-macro linkages. If her argument is correct, then these developments may have important negative implications for the quality of citizenship in Latin America.

Political Transition in Cambodia 1991–1999. Power, Elitism and Democracy By David W. Roberts. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 259p. \$40.00.

Patrick Vander Weyden, *IPSoM/Catholic University of Brussels–ISPO/Catholic University of Leuven*

In this book David W. Roberts provides an interesting descriptive account of recent Cambodian politics. The guiding principle of his study is the evaluation and implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA), which was signed in 1993. The main thesis in the book is that the content of the PPA mainly served the interests of international actors such as the United States and China, without taking into account the Cambodian political reality. In Roberts's view, the PPA developed from the Western ideal of liberal democracy, with multiparty elections as its central component and with total disregard for the Cambodian political context.

According to Roberts, the causes of the Cambodian conflict were still present after the signing of the PPA. In fact, "the significance of the conflict had not changed. It remained a vital struggle for political survival in an extremely hostile environment where the consequences of absolute defeat and marginalisation could be dire, and far more exaggerated than in western systems upon which the chosen model of polling was based" (p. 32). Cambodian political and social life is dominated by a system of patronage and clientelism, which is strongly hierarchically structured. Holding a political position in this system means having access to sources of personal wealth and the possibility of serving associated dependent groups of people. In addition, the Cambodian political elite is characterized by a lack of democratic values. Concepts such as cooperation and constructive opposition are of little substance to them. Furthermore, the lack of a democratic mechanism to solve conflicts, the dramatically poor economic situation, and the overall presence of arms make the ideal of the PPA and its implementation in the field even more unrealistic.

Roberts explores the lack of a democratic culture of the Cambodian political elite in view of the behavior of the different Cambodian actors in the period between 1991 and 1999. It becomes clear through the reading not only that the autocratic nature of the political elite was characteristic of Cambodia's governing People's Party (CPP), but also that other parties, such as the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), are practicing undemocratic values. This is evident in the way the political parties behaved during the 1993 and 1998 elections and in the way the period in between was governed by a coalition government of the CPP and Front Uni Nationale (FUNCINPEC). After the 1993 elections, with FUNCINPEC the winner and CPP coming in second, the CPP refused to

accept the election results. Only after the coalition government was installed was a nonviolent political climate restored. The forming of this coalition government is yet another illustration of the nondemocratic climate of the country because in Cambodia in 1993 having a coalition government simply meant that for each political department two ministers were appointed, one FUNCINPEC minister and one CPP minister. More or less the same thing happened after the 1998 elections. The CPP won the elections, FUNCINPEC came in second, and the Sam Rainsy Party third. Again, immediately after the elections, political parties did not want to accept the results, with a violent and aggressive atmosphere as a consequence. Finally, a nonelected senate was formed, which saved FUNCINPEC the affront of losing most of its power.

In the same critical fashion Roberts analyses the functioning of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was responsible for the implementation of the PPA and the conduction of the 1993 elections. According to Roberts the UNTAC did not succeed in creating a politically neutral environment, which was a precondition for "free and fair" elections, as stipulated in the PPA. The late deployment of the UNTAC, the inefficiency and ineffectivity of the deployment, the unsatisfactory disarmament, and the failure to separate the state administration from the governing party, CPP, are especially strongly criticized by Roberts. Roberts advances—in an impressively well-documented way—the uncommon proposition that the Khmer Rouge left the 1993 election process because the UNTAC was not able to create a politically neutral environment, which made it impossible, in the perception of the political leaders of the Khmer Rouge, to make their comeback in Cambodian politics by participating in the elections.

Although it is obvious that Roberts's detailed descriptions are the result of an accurate and critical analysis of primary written documents and in-depth interviews, he judges the transition process too harshly. Undoubtedly, there are still strong autocratic and nondemocratic values present within the Cambodian political elite. Certainly, the threat and the use of violence in a political context are still present. It is also true that the United Nations' implementation of the PPA was not very successful. Roberts seems to reject the idea of holding elections in an environment characterized by nondemocratic values such as clientelism, patronalism, noncooperative experience, and violence and, last but not least developed in the book, in an environment of poverty. Roberts leaves one crucial question unanswered: What would the alternative be?

Furthermore, Roberts's definition of democracy is rather stern and rigid. Consider, for example, the way he depicts the democratic attitudes of the Cambodians: "Many Khmers were thus not consciously voting for a transformation of political ideology and for democratic change. Many voted because doing so allowed them to make choices about who would best improve their socio-economic lot" (p. 205). It is unclear why voting for a party for this reason should be undemocratic. Elections are essentially about enabling the voter to establish his or her own priorities and to choose freely between parties. The high levels of turnout in both the 1993 and the 1998 elections clearly show that the Cambodian people want to express their vote and that they want to choose between parties, whatever reasons they might have.

Of course, it is too early to call Cambodia a democratic country, as evidenced most clearly by Roberts's extensive description of the autocratic behavior of the country's political elite. But it is worth taking into account that the transition from a nondemocratic to a democratic system takes time and that international support and pressure can achieve the desired effect of democratic values in the long run.

Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank By Cheryl A. Rubenberg. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 318p. \$59.95.

Sara Roy, *Harvard University*

Several years ago, not long before the signing of the Oslo agreement, I was in a refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. As I was walking through the camp with a male friend, a woman whom I did not know approached me. She gently took my arm as if we were intimate friends, pulled me close, and said, "I have nothing left to feed my children but black milk." She then turned and walked away, leaving as imperceptibly as she had approached. My male friend immediately dismissed her as crazy. Yet I have never forgotten this woman or our momentary but wrenching encounter. It was not only the poignancy of her words that struck me, but their poetry. Her message to me was one of ultimate despair: I can no longer nourish my children. What good am I?

I again was reminded of this encounter after reading Cheryl Rubenberg's fine and beautifully crafted study of Palestinian village and camp women in the West Bank. The author, who is an associate professor of political science at Florida International University, is well known for her work on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In this work, Rubenberg has opened a door into a critical segment of Palestinian society few have entered and has given voice to women who are rarely heard within their own societies, let alone beyond them. Over 60% of Palestinian women in the West Bank live in villages and refugee camps. Yet many, perhaps most, studies of Palestinian women have focused on the far smaller segment of urban, upper- and middle-class women who are educated and politically active and whose lives bear little resemblance to those of the women in Rubenberg's study. Indeed, despite certain differences between rural and camp women, Rubenberg clearly shows that these two female populations share more in common with each other than either does with urban women.

Rubenberg's central argument is that the core of gender inequality in Palestinian society resides in patriarchal control and the repression of female sexuality. She argues that tradition and culture—more than religion—perpetuate women's oppression in village and camp societies. The primary site of patriarchal relations—male domination and female dependency—is the family, and these relations are replicated and diffused through all other institutions of society. Women's oppression is deepened further by Israel's repressive occupation, which has undermined the economic and political base of Palestinian society. The study focuses on the ways in which "gender roles and relations have been constructed by determinate social institutions and how they have been formed, deformed, transformed, and reproduced from the perspective of the women who live within this institutional framework" (p. 9).

This case study examines a distinct group of women who find themselves at a particular and extremely difficult moment in history, a moment shaped by many factors: the failure of the first Palestinian uprising and the Oslo peace process to achieve political and economic sovereignty; the emergence of, and subsequent opposition to, a corrupt and authoritarian Palestinian regime; the rapid and widespread impoverishment of the Palestinian people in both the West Bank and Gaza; and the failure of the women's movement to achieve needed changes in patriarchal roles and relations. It is important to note that the women's movement virtually abandoned grassroots women during the years of the peace process, when many nongovernmental organizations, including those run by women, became professionalized, responding to the needs of donors rather than to those of their own constituents. Indeed,

given the profound problems and pressures facing rural and camp women and their limited access to resources of any kind, the abandonment of these women by their urban and elite counterparts is nothing short of shameful.

The strength and importance of this book lie in Rubenberg's extensive and painstaking field research, which produced literally hundreds of hours of interviews conducted with 175 respondents. Hers is not a theoretical study but an empirical one. Although theory is minimized, it is not negated—its relevance and importance are made clear. What emerges then is a powerful, moving, and, at times, disturbing portrayal of Palestine's poorest and most oppressed women. Yet these women are not monolithic or homogeneous. They reveal remarkable diversity on a variety of issues and trenchant insight, in many instances, into their own condition and its sociological underpinnings as well as strategies for negotiating and resisting their social, economic, and political reality.

It is clear from this and many other studies of Palestinian society that needed change must ultimately come from within as well as from without. The common social patterns that are described and form the basis of this book not only reveal what is limiting and injurious to Palestinian women (and men) but also what is empowering and possible. As such, Cheryl Rubenberg's book is a welcome and much needed contribution to the discourse on Palestinian women and to understanding the larger conflict in which they and their families find themselves embroiled.

Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China By Judith Shapiro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 287p. \$59.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

David Bachman, *University of Washington*

Judith Shapiro has written the first overview of environmental history of the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong (1949–76). It is a grim history indeed. Instead of employing a more common temporal approach, Shapiro identifies four major themes leading to environmental degradation, and uses compelling case studies to illustrate those themes. The four themes are political repression and suppression of dissenting opinion; utopian urgency; dogmatic uniformity; and war preparation and forcible relocation of the population to remote areas.

The first theme of repression and its effects on the environment is exemplified by case studies concerning Beijing University President Ma Yinchu's suggestion that birth control be considered, starting in 1957, and civil engineer Huang Wanli's argument that the Sanxia Dam across the Yellow River, constructed in the 1950s, would not work. Both were persecuted for what proved to be their prophetic remarks. Shapiro argues that their cases were emblematic of state-intellectual interactions, especially after 1957, that made it almost impossible for scientific knowledge to be treated as a relevant criterion in assessing state policies.

The second theme of utopian urgency is told via the Great Leap Forward generally, several of its component campaigns, and the mass campaign to produce steel at the local level, in particular. This last campaign led to tremendous waste and extensive deforestation. The Leap also created the worst famine in the twentieth century, if not in human history.

The theme of dogmatic uniformity is told through the campaign to study (copy) the Dazhai Production Brigade—to terrace fields, to reclaim land, to transform nature so that more grain could be planted and grown. She details how this movement was put into practice through attempts to partially

fill in Dianchi Lake in Yunnan Province, near the City of Kunming. The lake's ecology was devastated by these efforts, and almost no additional grain output was obtained from the labor of hundreds of thousands.

Finally, the theme of war preparation and forcible relocation of the population discusses how, because of fear of attack by first the United States and later the Soviet Union, China moved many defense-related factories to the interior of the country in remote locations, causing widespread environmental damage. Here she highlights the Panzihua steel mill in Sichuan Province. In the forcible relocation part of the chapter, she examines the policy of sending urban youths to live in the countryside. The attempt to grow rubber in Yunnan Province and how this destroyed tropical forests, with attendant damage or elimination of rare species of flora and fauna, are her particular entrée into connections between relocation and environmental degradation.

In her conclusion, Shapiro makes some brief comparative comments about environmental degradation in the economic history of the United States and the Soviet Union, and tries to open up the possibility of greater Chinese stewardship of China's environment. She notes, however, that China's economic reforms and dynamic economic growth over the last 20 years have severely compounded the damage inflicted during the Mao period.

The case studies are informative and well done, but while the environmental perspective sheds some new light on the nature of Mao's rule, China specialists will not find much that is terribly surprising here. Comparative public policy or environmental specialists might learn more about China and its environmental problems, but in the end, it should not come as a surprise to any thinking reader that a revolutionary regime is not likely to give much credence to rational scientific calculations, that the revolutionary regime will be impatient for success, and that it will go all out to transform all environments (social, natural, political, etc.). The magnitude of China's environmental damage under Mao is a measure of how thoroughgoing the Chinese revolution attempted to be.

One could find a number of points on which to challenge or question Shapiro's interpretations. One might ask, even if China had begun birth control with Ma Yinchu's suggestions (and assuming it was voluntary), would it have made much difference to the rate of population increase? Shapiro suggests it would have, but there is no demographic model presented to buttress her argument. She states that all steel produced in 1958 was useless because it was smelted by the masses (p. 75). But in fact, more than half of all the steel produced in 1958 came from large, relatively modern mills and was used throughout China. She implies that war preparation was excessive and unnecessary, but this, as with much of the interpretation in the rest of the book, is only true in retrospect, and not during 1969, when numerous instances of conflict among Chinese and Soviet troops occurred.

This last point hints at one of my two biggest problems with the book. The normative framework she uses (sustainable development) did not exist to any significant extent for most of the period of Mao's rule. While China's treatment of its environment was particularly disastrous, it was not as if an "ideology" of environmental protection was well established in government decision making anywhere. Her work is also highly idealist in the philosophical sense, as the Ma Yinchu and Huang Wanli cases suggest. If only rational democratic discussion had taken place, disasters could have been avoided. One voice crying out in the wilderness could have made a difference. But as mentioned, she provides no evidence to show how birth control would have influenced population growth rates. In retrospect Huang was right, but many other scientists felt differently, even before extensive

political pressure was exerted on them. Would he have prevailed with free debate?

Although the dictatorial nature of the Chinese revolutionary state certainly caused many environmental catastrophes, Shapiro almost totally ignores more philosophically materialist concerns. Nowhere does she mention, for example, that about 70% of China's energy resources come from coal, or that as with any developing country, especially one deeply affected by the international balance of power, concerns about the environment will receive short shrift, while rapid economic growth will be a top priority. We are left to wonder, how much more worse off is the Chinese environment because of Mao than it would have been if China had followed an "East Asian Model" at an earlier stage? Is the Chinese situation noticeably worse than India's, with its democratic system but slower growth?

The historian of China, Mark Elvin, entitled one essay on China's environment "Three Thousand Years of Unsustainable Development" (*East Asian History* 6 [1993]) There has been a very long term pattern of Chinese environmental misuse and destruction (undoubtedly true elsewhere). Is it realistic to think that with the advent of mass consumption in China and faster growth rates than during the Mao period, sustainable development is likely to be attempted in China anytime soon?

Politics after Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico By Richard Snyder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 268p. \$60.00 cloth.

Maria Lorena Cook, *Cornell University*

Richard Snyder's well-crafted study substantiates what most political scientists suspected all along: that neoliberal reforms lead to new institutions of market governance, rather than to unregulated markets. Snyder sheds light on this understudied topic by examining the reregulation of the coffee sector by four state governments after the Mexican government dismantled the Instituto Mexicano del Café (INMECAFE), the state-owned enterprise that dominated the coffee industry during the 1970s and 1980s. By the late 1980s, when deregulation began, INMECAFE was providing production supports, price controls, and government-managed marketing channels for nearly 200 thousand small coffee producers. Most of these producers were located among the poorest states in southern Mexico.

State governments stepped into the policy arena vacated by federal authorities. Governors developed new regulatory projects for the coffee sector that were aimed at building political support coalitions in their states. Some governors attempted to do so via neocorporatist projects, ensuring that producer organizations that were political allies (and linked to the ruling PRI, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional) would benefit. Other governors launched crony capitalist projects that favored private elites. Snyder argues that in developing countries, the key to understanding this new institution building is that ambitious politicians, rather than insulated technocrats, drive reregulation.

Politicians' career ambitions and their ideological orientation ("policy repertoire"), shaped in turn by regime institutions and societal forces, determined the nature of reregulation projects they pursued. Institutional outcomes, however, depended on the way societal actors responded to these projects. Given the proper strategies and right set of conditions, grassroots producer organizations could alter the original projects in their favor. In the end, institutional outcomes were explained by the "strategic interactions between politicians and societal groups as they negotiate[d] the terms

of reregulation” (p. 14). How small producers managed or failed to negotiate favorable terms is at the core of the author’s inquiry.

Snyder shows how in each of four states, strategic interactions among local elites, grassroots producers’ associations, state governors, and federal officials led to markedly different institutional outcomes. He divides these reregulatory results into two categories: “participatory” (the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas) and “exclusionary” (Guerrero and Puebla) policy frameworks. Exclusionary policy frameworks generated monopoly rents for private elites, whereas participatory policy frameworks involved the creation of inclusive institutions that helped small producers compete in export markets.

In Oaxaca, strong producer organizations pursued an “engaged productivist” strategy and were able to negotiate with a “statist” governor to create a participatory policy framework. Participatory institutions also emerged eventually in Chiapas, where the 1994 Zapatista uprising ended a stalemate between the governor and peasant coffee organizations by enabling an alliance between grassroots producers and federal officials that neutralized the local coffee oligarchy. In Guerrero, strong grassroots producer organizations became embroiled in electoral conflicts, rather than in pushing producer interests. This led to an exclusionary policy framework fashioned by a “neoliberal” state governor. Finally, an exclusionary outcome obtained in Puebla, where a weak producers’ movement faced a strong state governor and powerful oligarchy.

Snyder has produced an ambitious book, one that depicts the complex political interactions taking place in four regions of Mexico, while laying out an agenda for the study of “politics after neoliberalism.” His subnational comparison of reregulation efforts within a single sector effectively supports his argument about the central role of politicians in the creation of new economic institutions. His research also provides a framework for analyzing cases in other sectors or countries where new rules for market governance are being shaped.

I found the author’s discussion of producer strategies more problematic. Snyder claims that Oaxacan producer organizations pursued an “engaged productivist” strategy rather than a “partisan” strategy, thus enabling the creation of participatory frameworks. In Guerrero, by contrast, producer organizations pursued a partisan strategy, emphasizing political party opposition over productivist goals, which contributed to a reregulation project that failed to include or benefit small producers. Since Snyder is concerned with the conditions that enable the creation of participatory institutions, he appears to ascribe greater value to the former, “nonpartisan” strategy. Yet whether or not producer organizations were able to negotiate with state governors depended, among other things, on whether they signed on to newspaper ads in support of PRI presidential candidate Carlos Salinas prior to the 1988 elections. Organizations that chose to do so were rewarded with funds under PRONASOL (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad), a federal agency that funded antipoverty and development projects during the Salinas administration. Those organizations that did not sign the ads and that continued to support the left opposition PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) were punished.

What Snyder implies was a more effective choice of strategy, therefore, was really a willingness to forfeit broader political aims for narrower group interests. The Salinas administration lured many popular organizations away from the political opposition with funds and other forms of support, arguably delaying political democracy even longer. Whether an engaged productivist strategy would have yielded similar results in another political context, one in which competitive electoral politics rather than political authoritarianism dominated, remains unanswered given the time frame of Snyder’s

study, which ends in 1996, four years before the defeat of the PRI in the presidential elections.

As Snyder puts it, “one of the costs of choosing to be a democrat first, and a producer second, may be forfeiting the opportunity to build economic institutions that could help improve welfare and competitiveness” (p. 203). But Snyder devotes less attention to the costs of choosing to be a producer first, and a democrat second, in an authoritarian or semidemocratic regime undergoing political as well as economic transition.

This is an important book that deserves to be read by students of comparative political economy and Latin American and Mexican politics. Snyder has shown that politics remains central to understanding institution building in the wake of neoliberal reforms. The pessimistic lesson is that in the case of political decentralization, grassroots groups may become even more disadvantaged as the importance of national allies fades and they “struggl[e] alone against the exploitative designs of insurgent oligarchs” (p. 192). But his study also provides some cause for optimism. As long as politics matters, grassroots groups may shape their own future, even if they may not shape it under circumstances of their own choosing.

The Politics of the Spirit: The Political Implications of Pentecostalized Religion in Costa Rica and Guatemala
By Timothy J. Steigenga. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 220p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Virginia Garrard-Burnett, *University of Texas, Austin*

The Politics of the Spirit is Timothy Steigenga’s long-awaited quantitative study of religious affiliation and political behavior in Central America. What he has done in this spare and conscientious study is to take to task the “conventional wisdom” about Protestantism in Central America. This is a formidable endeavor, given the flood of scholarly literature that has been produced by anthropologists, historians, and sociologists about Protestantism, and especially Pentecostalism, in Latin America over the past two decades. Because Pentecostalism seemed to emerge in Central America during the region’s political crisis of the late twentieth century, much of this literature carried with it a highly deterministic subtext, defined by Max Weber and by models of political behavior borrowed from the United States and European experiences.

In general, much of the existing work on political behavior and religious affiliation in Latin America and in Central America in particular has been idiosyncratic, anecdotal, intuitive (if often based on sound intuition), and contradictory. In this study, Steigenga takes the central but fuzzy precepts laid out by this earlier work and tests them in two cases, Guatemala and Costa Rica. His findings, based on surveys, interviews, and statistical analysis are so surprising and so persuasive that they force us to reconsider whether our conventions on this topic contained any wisdom at all.

There are two overarching hypotheses that drive this study. The first is that in Central America, Protestants (whom Steigenga differentiates throughout as Mainstream Protestants, Pentecostals, and Sects—a potentially problematic term that he uses to refer to such groups as Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Adventists) make up a political monolith, whose theological conservatism and religious affiliation translates into political quiescence at best and blind obedience to oppressive governments at worst. This hypothesis lies at the heart of Steigenga’s study of Guatemala, where repressive government, 36 years of civil war, and a virulent counterinsurgency led briefly by the Pentecostal general,

Efrain Ríos Montt, would seem to offer a transparent example of the confluence of evangelical religious affiliation and political conservatism. Costa Rica, by contrast, which has a smaller Protestant population but a long-standing democratic tradition, would have seemed to offer a test case of whether Central American Protestants are more likely to be political and progressive in a more open society. The second operative hypothesis for this study is the Weberian equation of Protestantism and capitalism, recently updated by Amy Sherman, who argues in her 1997 work on Guatemala (*The Soul of Development: Biblical Christianity and Economic Transformation in Guatemala*) that Protestants can be shown to have adopted new patterns of thinking, which are demonstrably conducive to socioeconomic advancement that also enhances the development of democracy.

In his careful analysis, Steigenga unpacks these hypotheses element by element. His overall conclusion is that evangelicals, taken as a group (something he wisely advises us not to do), do indeed have a strong tendency to respect political authority, but that respect is present regardless of a given government's political context. In a series of surveys, which examine religious conservatism, political conservatism, and political affiliation, Steigenga is not able to identify any single pattern to support the notion that religious affiliation is the determinant of conservative political behavior in Central America, in either Guatemala or Costa Rica. What he does find, however, is that certain types of religious behavior (as opposed to affiliation) can drive political behavior.

In addition, he finds no evidence of the prosperity-enhancing behaviors described by Sherman (except among Guatemalan Neopentecostals, for whom material prosperity is theologically mandated). What Steigenga finds instead is what he describes as a "change in *perception* of economic status" [emphasis mine] (p. 42). While Protestants are not distinguishable from Catholics by any quantifiable economic measure, Protestants nonetheless typically *perceive* a causal relationship between religious affiliation and economic advancement, thus giving some credence to Anthony Gill ("The Economics of Evangelization," in Paul Sigmund, ed., *Religious Freedom and Evangelization in Latin America*, 1999) and others who advocate the rational economic model for religious change in Latin America.

For this reviewer, however, the real treasures in this little jewel box of a book are the secondary findings. Because Steigenga conducted his research among Catholics as well as Protestants, some unexpected congruencies emerge. Perhaps the most important of these is that in Guatemala, 50% of Mainstream (non-Pentecostal) Protestants and many Catholics perceive that they have experienced *glossolalia* (speaking in tongues), the defining experience of Pentecostalism, or some other miraculous manifestation of the Holy Spirit. The most common of these was miraculous healing, an event that no less than 71% of Guatemala Catholics report having experienced (pp. 45, 82). This revelation leads Steigenga to the conclusion that religion of all kinds is becoming "Pentecostalized" in Guatemala, as it is to a lesser extent in Costa Rica (p. 46).

This Pentecostalization of religion has serious implications for the development of civil society, the author suggests, because while he finds no consistent template for voting, political affiliation, or political participation across the lines of religious affiliation, he does identify clearly definable patterns across the spectrum of religious behavior, specifically in the area of charismatic behavior. The surprising evidence here suggests that charismatic religious experience, regardless of whether it is in a Pentecostal, Mainstream Protestant, or Catholic context, is a significant predictor of political variables in both Guatemala and Costa Rica. In Steigenga's

words, "the experience of speaking in tongues appears to be associated with higher levels of political quiescence" (p. 93). The reason for this is not entirely clear, although he indicates that it may have to do with the inward focus of charismatic behavior, which is likely to negatively impact voluntarism or involvement in political or other nonreligious social movements. But in these matters, denominational lines blur, for, as Steigenga notes, "charismatic Protestants may have more in common politically with charismatic Catholics than they do with other Protestants" (p. 93).

Another unexpected finding in this study is the apparent relationship between Protestant biblical literalism and the empowerment of women. Although gender was tangential to the larger concerns of this book, Steigenga surveyed respondents on their views of women's participation in the domestic and public spheres as a variable in his surveys on theological conservatism. While the work of Elizabeth Brusco (*The Reformation of Machismo: Evangelical Conversion and Gender in Colombia*, 1995) and others has suggested a causal relationship between women's membership in evangelical churches and the "reformation of machismo," the conventional wisdom heretofore was that Latin evangelical women nonetheless model themselves after the subservient "virtuous woman," the ideal type for many North American fundamentalists. In this study, Steigenga discovered an entirely different set of attitudes, based not only on behavior, but upon theology: Both doctrinally conservative Protestant and Catholics were likely to see gender equity, not subservience, as an ideal type. In the too-short chapter he devotes to gender, the author concludes that "measures of doctrinal orthodoxy are excellent predictors of positive attitudes toward gender equity across religious groups and across genders" (p. 132).

Clearly, Steigenga's work leads us to the juncture of important future studies. Its provocative and meticulous conclusions, laid out cleanly without rhetorical flourishes or overreaching analysis, suggests exciting new venues for research in ecumenical political behavior, gender analysis, and religious behavior in civil society. There may be scholars in the field who will disagree with his conclusions but who will also find it impossible to ignore them.

The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico By Judith A. Teichman. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 288p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Peter Kingstone, *University of Connecticut*

The politics of neoliberal reform in Latin America has produced a number of impressions that are more or less widely held, but not necessarily entirely accurate. For example, many critics of the neoliberal reform process see it as a creature of Washington and Wall Street—views of economic development imposed on vulnerable, debt-ridden Latin American governments. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank play crucial roles as carriers of the "Washington Consensus" and enforcers of its policy prescriptions. In this view, insulated technocrats—often with U.S. economics degrees—implement these essentially unpopular programs without consultation, oversight, or any societal participation. "Delegative democracy" and populations battered by a decade or more of debt and inflation help explain the extent to which these unelected and unaccountable technocrats have been able to promote this agenda. A narrow electoral coalition, anchored by wealth holders and conservative ideologues, has maintained the political space for these insulated technocrats to continue, despite deep opposition from societal groups such as labor.

In her new book, Judith Teichman does not dispute these characterizations. Rather, she notes that there are several aspects of neoliberal reform that are not fully addressed. First, as several scholars, such as Eduardo Silva for example, have shown, the image of technocrats working in isolation is not an accurate portrayal. Although technocrats did not consult widely, privileged members of the coalition, such as domestic business groups, played an important role in shaping economic policy. Second, this common “coalition” approach does not fully answer questions about why the pace and sequence of reforms vary among Latin American reformers. Examining the reform process in terms of coalitions makes it hard to recognize the role of specific individuals, their ideological or programmatic beliefs, and their links to specific groups in society. The failure to examine these individual technocrats and the alliances they form makes it hard to understand why some reforms advance quickly and substantially in one country, but lag in another. In other words, the coalition approach sheds little light on the political calculations in specific policy areas (pp. 15–16).

As an alternative to the coalition approach, Teichman instead imports the concept of a “policy network” from the literature on the developed world to the Latin American context. The differences in the Latin American context, however, mean that Teichman must adapt the concept in order to make it operable in the less democratic Latin American environment. Perhaps most importantly, policy networks in Latin America are not pluralistic and do not offer a wide array of societal groups any opportunities to influence policy. Policy networks in Latin America depend substantially on personal trust and loyalty instead of common interests, combine both personalistic and highly discretionary power with institutional sources of power, and form among individuals with formal positions and those without any formal office (p. 14). As a result, these networks persist even when specific individuals leave office. Policy networks in Latin America differ as well because they incorporate international actors, most importantly members of the World Bank. Finally, policy networks in Latin America appear to be important mobilizers of policy reform, in contrast to the United States or Britain where they are perceived as obstacles to change (p. 15).

Teichman uses this modified concept to great effect in examining the politics of market reform in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The book does an admirable job of tracing the rising influence of key technocrats in the three countries. In each case, she successfully tracks the connections that form among these technocrats (often drawn from academia), representatives of international agencies (particularly the World Bank), and leading figures in the business community. The approach allows her to illustrate how ideas about reform developed in dialogue between the bank and the technocrats. Teichman’s analysis shows how the flexibility and intimacy of World Bank officials in dealing with national policymakers fostered cooperation and learning, and facilitated the building of strategic alliances between bank and national officials and between national officials and domestic industrialists. In fact, the more distant and doctrinaire IMF officials wielded less influence than the more pragmatic World Bank. Thus, her analysis provides a nuanced alternative to the widely held view of neoliberal reform as an imposition from abroad. It also shows that the relationship between policy reformers and domestic industrialists was also more nuanced than often believed. Technocrats were neither agents of powerful economic interests nor entirely independent of business and thus able and willing to impose reforms on unsympathetic but impotent industrialists. Instead, industrialists and technocrats were involved in a genuine exchange: Industrialists

defended specific interests with some success in modifying policies; technocrats actively worked to teach, inform, and persuade industrialists, often successfully, of the merits of particular policy choices.

Teichman’s modified policy network concept is a valuable and promising instrument for examining the nuances of policy deliberation and implementation in Latin America. In fact, the policy networks approach could have been pushed further. The author provides a good accounting of the general reform program in the three countries, but she does not examine any particular policy area in greater depth. The policy network concept seems particularly well suited for exploring the character of specific policies at a more detailed level and for helping account for variations in policy design from case to case. All three cases pursued trade liberalization, for example, but the design of the reform varies among the three, and it would have been helpful to see the policy network concept applied at that level of detail.

The book offers an additional benefit beyond the introduction and application of the modified policy network concept. It is an excellent book for teaching purposes, with a good balance between background, historical review, and analytical discussion. Overall, this is a valuable contribution to the study of economic reform in Latin America.

The Tories and Europe By John Turner. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. 282p. \$29.95.

Samuel H. Beer, *Harvard University*

In this thoroughly researched, well-organized, and clearly written work, John Turner raises important questions of comparative politics. The book is packed with facts and informed by ideas. You may well disagree with his conclusions, as I do. But you must give him credit for the seriousness of his concerns and his willingness to present the evidence, even though it can sometimes be used to support a different interpretation. “Over the past forty years,” he writes, when stating his central conclusion, “Europe has transformed the nature of British politics and Tory politics in particular” (p. 1). Contrary to a view common among political scientists that foreign policy normally has far less influence on electoral behavior than on domestic policy, he finds that Britain’s relation to European integration has “gradually . . . moved to the heart of the domestic political agenda” (p. 1), radically altering the balance of power between the two main parties. As the Euroskeptical champions of national independence, the Conservatives have become “increasingly beleaguered over the issue,” thereby making it possible for Labour “to use Europe as a way of revitalizing the party’s programme and image” (p. 2). He clearly would like to see terminal decline for the Conservatives and continued success for a social democratic Britain in a similarly collectivist Europe.

Turner is certainly right when he claims that the question of Europe has so severely divided the Conservatives as to prevent them from governing effectively and winning elections. The causal connection between the European issue and these weaknesses, however, is not what he takes it to be. From Margaret Thatcher’s anti-European tirade at Bruges in 1988, the issue did with increasing bitterness divide the party leadership and the parliamentary party. This made it ever more difficult to govern the country, as John Major found, for example, in his prolonged effort in 1992–93 to win parliamentary approval of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union. It was not, however, the voter’s disagreement with the party’s Euroskepticism that led to its steep, continuing decline in the polls and to defeat in the general elections of 1997 and 2001. Actually, this decisive shift in the balance of

power, as Turner himself reports, dates from the economic crisis brought on by the Conservative government's move toward monetary union by adoption of the exchange rate mechanism. This humiliating failure deprived the Conservatives of their long-standing reputation as the party best able to manage the economy, opening up the huge gap behind Labour in the polls that has persisted to the present day.

While this failure strengthened Conservative Euroskepticism, that did the party no great harm among the voters. On the contrary, as Turner grants, they had long been of that mind. A survey done just before the 2001 election showed a preference for the Conservative position on Europe over Labour's of 44% to 28% (Robert Worcester and Roger Mortimer, *Explaining Labour's Second Landslide*, 2001, p. 29). The same survey, however, also reported the low salience of the issue. As an important reason for their choice, voters ranked Europe far below the familiar issues of a modern welfare state, health, education, pensions, the economy, unemployment and transport, with regard to all of which, and in that order, respondents greatly preferred Labour. The conventional wisdom is right. Domestic policy trumps foreign policy as an influence on electoral behavior.

The contests in which Europe has figured as an important influence have been the elections to the party leadership. This fierce quarrel within the Conservative elite had a decisive influence on public policy toward Europe, but contrary to Turner's view, it was peripheral to the transformation of British politics that took place during the Thatcher-Blair era. With a focus on domestic affairs, the essence of the change was the neoliberal break instigated by Margaret Thatcher from the post-war collectivist consensus. The significance of this break for Britain and the Conservatives appears if one looks back to the 1960s when the government of Harold Macmillan enthusiastically embraced and expanded the welfare state and managed economy introduced by Labour. In effect, Macmillan was reaffirming what he had said some years before, that "Toryism has always been a form of paternal Socialism" (*The Star*, London, June 25, 1936). R. A. Butler had also called on this brand of Toryism when he led the Conservatives into the convergence with Labour's achievement,

which made the party once more electable and which has been denominated "Butskellism." Turner seems totally unaware of this Tory tradition, whose power and history bring out the radical contrast of the boldly ideological innovations of Thatcher, who contemptuously dismissed its adherents as "the wets."

Conducting his own purge by eliminating socialism in all but the name from New Labour's program, Tony Blair reinvigorated his party by accepting all the basic Thatcherite reforms, denationalization, fiscal prudence, and reduction of trade union privileges, and in some respects, such as his workfare reforms, going beyond what she had attempted. To this display of convergence to the Right rather than the Left, which may be called "Blatcherism," he added certain more generous provisions of social policy, justifying his claim to champion a Third Way. Toward Europe he did take a more positive approach, accepting, for example, the Maastricht Social Charter. Few of its provisions, however, were enacted into British law, and with regard to monetary union, the practical effect of his five criteria in delaying acceptance is much the same as John Major's "wait and see" position.

As for the future, a long view of the past must qualify any inference that the two landslide defeats spell terminal decline for the Conservatives. That party is the phoenix of British politics, having from its origins as the Tories of the seventeenth century suffered repeated defeat on behalf of such causes as divine right, aristocratic privilege, and protectionism, only pragmatically to recover as the party of government. Today it is excluded from power by the Europhobic obsession of its dominant faction. If Europe advances into a prosperous and secure future, uniting not only its elites but also its peoples, the Tories once again will be obliged to adapt. On the other hand, now that the pressure for cooperation exerted by the Cold War has slackened and the new fear of Islamic terrorism is tightening control of national borders, the old rivalries among these nation-states may revive. If so, Europe, stabilized in its restricted but still remarkable achievement as a customs union, will fulfill the Thatcherite prescription, obliging the more visionary Conservative Europhiles to make a corresponding adjustment.

International Relations

Identities, Border, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory Edited by Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001. 328p. \$57.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations Edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 431p. \$50.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Nicholas Onuf, *Florida International University*

The editors of *Bridges and Boundaries* asked contributors—nine political scientists and eight historians, all of them North American—to reflect on their respective disciplines and the way they go about "the study of international events" (p. 1). We should notice a positivist disposition here. While contributors "share an interest . . . in the state, politics and war" (p. 2), events are the stuff of international relations. That the state, politics, and war are complex institutional phenomena perhaps not reducible to events points to conceptual issues that this volume fails generally to address. Instead, contributors discuss the many problems attending generalized explanation

and empirical fit—theory and science—as if their shared interests imply a common stock of core concepts.

Given that most of the contributors are political realists, this assumption is no doubt well taken. Whether the concepts in question suit the needs of good theory, good science, or good history of international relations is another matter, and never considered. According to the editors, what does matter are differences in the conceptualization of events: "Whereas historians focus on 'human conduct,' political scientists analyze 'behavior'" (p. 23). Yet human behavior is often and perhaps always intentional, while unintended consequences are often events not behavioral in any sense. What the editors, as political scientists, have to say on this subject is confusing, and their contributors offer little help.

Part I consists of essays by Jack Levy, Stephen Pelz, Ned Lebow, and Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, on disciplinary practices and methodological issues. Most of this material is familiar enough, not least because it carries on a discussion initiated in *International Security* 22 (Summer 1997). Part II provides a series of topical contexts by which to evaluate good practices in the two disciplines. First, Gerhard Weinberg's and Randall Schweller's relatively brief essays on the origins of World War II are juxtaposed for Carole Fink's

rather tentative adjudication. If this debate seems somewhat contrived, the next one, featuring substantial essays by Edward Ingram and William Thompson on British hegemony in the nineteenth century, is far more engaging.

With impressive command of relevant materials, the imperial historian and long-cycle theorist state their cases vigorously, while deftly exposing the other's weaknesses. Richard Rosecrance's postscript adds some perspective to the debate. By comparison, the three essays on the Cold War are rather disappointing. John Gaddis is all over the place. If his piece gives the distinct impression of being tossed off, Deborah Larson's rather pedantic discussion of sources in Cold War scholarship seems like a school exercise. Given so little to work with, William Wohlforth has little to contribute in his postscript. Finally, John Lynn's absorbing discussion of innovation and diffusion in the technology and organization of military affairs over several centuries stands by itself—rather oddly, since the rest of Part II uses debate as a format.

The two essays making up Part III, Conclusions, give the book a strong finish. Political scientist Robert Jervis picks up on three running themes. Positivist political scientists value parsimony and theory building more than historians do, while historians are more sensitive to moral concerns. Lacking theory, parsimony is out of the question; everything matters. If theory building means raising the level of abstraction in order to leave out what matters less, historians fear leaving out the wrong things. Acts of omission have ethical implications. Jervis suspects that political scientists tend to avoid the affective dimension of human affairs. Yet there is more to it than this. Issues of agency, intentionality, and normativity seem to make them uncomfortable.

Historian Paul Schroeder has a short reply to Jervis and his colleagues: "Yes, but" (p. 403). Schroeder argues that "history as actually practiced and presented by good professional historians is full of parsimonious explanation, if not theory" (p. 405). If no theory, then we must ask how the good historian knows what to leave out and how to organize what remains; narrative conventions hardly suffice. Indeed, the standards of good history remain as inscrutable as ever.

Schroeder does have quite a bit to say about moral judgment. He concludes that because historians tend to treat human actions as conduct, and political scientists treat it as behavior, historians are less disposed to ignore moral considerations. Yet this is too simple. Good historians often enough translate actions into events, not conduct. When they do so, they deploy an abstracting device that promotes neither parsimony nor moral self-awareness. Positivists know what to do with events. No contributor to this volume clarifies sufficiently the concept of *conduct*, and with it the relation of intention, judgment, and action, for any of us to put this concept to good use.

Metaphorical flourishes betray the conceptual limitations of *Bridges and Boundaries*. We might just as well position its contributors in a swampy zone at the distant margins of two disciplines. Neither ranchers and farmers (Lebow) nor martians and venusians (Thompson), they are back-country folk trucking and feuding with each other from time immemorial. Ancient tracks crisscrossing their landscape defy all boundaries; bridges and fords are everywhere but go nowhere. When offered a way out to the glittering city of social theory, with its Parisian fashions and multicultural sensibilities, these are the people who stay behind.

In these terms, *Identities, Borders and Orders* could not be more different. Its 15 contributors include political scientists, sociologists, and a geographer; several are European. They are participants in a "conceptually innovative" research project "operating against a background of North American-style International Relations" (p. vii). The contributors

variously draw on postpositivist social theory and normative theory—they are metaphorical migrants who have come to the city and love its ways. In their essays, we find no disciplinary nostalgia or defensiveness, and thus no calls for bridge-building. Their project follows an earlier volume, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., 1996), this time adding an explicit conceptual map for getting around the city.

Lapid sketches the map in his Introduction to the new volume. It identifies three sites for conceptual development—identities, borders, and orders—but always in relation to one another. Never fixed destinations, these linked points of reference constitute the "IBO triad" as inextricably related processes. Just as "the road to a processual-relational understanding of international relations will inevitably take us through the IB intersection" (p. 11), it will also take us through the IO and BO intersections. Of course, no single trip need go through all three intersections and, we might guess, each trip changes the map's details for the next adventurer.

Lapid's Introduction is too brief to provide an adequate conceptual orientation for city visitors. For the most part, contributors talk about identity (as a process) as if its relation to agency (as a condition) needs no additional clarification. The same may be said of order (as a process) in relation to structure (as a condition). Against this tendency are conceptually important discussions of the process of bordering in relation to identity and order. Nevertheless, the conceptual attention to borders has the perverse effect of turning the triad into a teeterboard whose fulcrum is bordering. At one end of the board are the essays of the book's Part I assessing an ever-shifting international order. At the other end are the essays in Part II for which issues of identity are paramount. These loads are unbalanced; the second part is less substantial than the first, perhaps because the latter draws upon the centuries' longer discussion of order (as a condition) in political and international theory.

The first three essays in Part I, by Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock, Richard Mansbach and Franke Wilmer, and Ronnie Lipschutz, intersect at many points in tracing the rise of "Westphalian" modernity. Their shared concern with normative properties of the modern world stands in marked contrast to the epic stories in *Bridges and Boundaries*. Didier Bigo's interesting discussion of the vanishing border between internal and external security emphasizes agents and their practices. Chris Brown examines liberal versions of cosmopolitan and communitarian polarities in what he might have called republican theory. As a geographer, David Newman helpfully reviews the way geographers think about borders.

David Jacobson leads off Part II with an essay on formal norms and global culture. Antje Wiener assesses the place of democratic practices in the "new medievalism"—a trope of Hedley Bull's certain to bemuse any good historian (cf. Brown, p. 233). Both Rey Koslowski and Martin Heisler consider migration and identity, respectively emphasizing dual nationality and citizenship. Neil Harvey could dispense with a formulaic use of Jacques Derrida in reviewing the Zapatista uprising.

Mathias Albert and Kratochwil structure their conclusion to the volume with a suggestive discussion of conceptual fuzziness. If processes are to be understood as changing sets of relations, as they assert, then fuzziness can be avoided if we turn our conceptual attention from objects to "*activities*" (p. 280; their emphasis). Despite this sensible claim, they invoke Niklas Luhmann's theory of society to uncover "a whole world of codes and evolutionary-communicative dynamics of world society, which work behind the intentions of the actors" (p. 288). Not only does the phrase "work behind" offer a

regrettable example of fuzzy conceptualization; Albert and Kratochwil seem to separate intentions and activities so radically that agency disappears from their conceptual world. If this is their intention, it is a gratuitous exercise in bordering, and one that works against the editors' stated intentions for this ambitious book.

Democracy, Liberalism, and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate Edited by Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 250p. \$52.00.

David Dessler, *College of William and Mary*

The essays in this ambitious volume take as their foil the democratic peace hypothesis: the claim that liberal democracies, while still going to war against nonliberal states, rarely wage war on one another. "This volume challenges the received international wisdom about democracy, liberalism, and war," write the editors in the Introduction. "The democratic peace, with its transhistorical causal law based on fixed definitions of democracy and war and a nation-state ontology of the international, is far too simplistic a frame from which to analyze the various historical and contemporary configurations of democracy, liberalism, and war" (p. 2).

The point of the book is not to refute the democratic peace hypothesis but to broaden the debate it has engendered. Several contributors examine the ways in which liberal democracy might be more of a problem than a solution in today's world. David Blaney argues that while liberal politics create a space for pluralism of a certain kind, they are also exclusionary in endorsing only those identities consistent with liberal norms. This "liberal fundamentalism," Blaney asserts, may explain why liberal states are warlike in their relations with nonliberal states. Himadeep Muppidi focuses on the relationship between democracy and state identity, suggesting in an analysis of India's relations with Pakistan and Sri Lanka that democracy did nothing to prevent conflict and war in these cases (and, in the case of Sri Lanka, may have actually helped give rise to war). Timothy Kubik claims that the military in modern liberal states is an independent actor that can influence and even work its way around the domestic normative constraints that are supposed to ensure the democratic peace. And Mark Rupert considers the ways in which democratic rule can be deformed by concentrations of private power grounded in relations between economic classes.

Other authors highlight the benefits of historicizing the concepts of "democracy" and "war" and moving beyond a narrow state-centric understanding of the relationship between them. Michael Mann maintains that in cases of colonial conflict (rather than interstate war), Western liberal regimes waged war against indigenous populations that were usually more democratic than they were. Tarak Barkawi assesses U.S. foreign policy in the Third World during the Cold War and notes that the wars the United States fought there do not fit into the analytic categories the democratic peace hypothesis provides. An adequate understanding of the relationship between democracy and war during the Cold War can be gained, Barkawi argues, only by shifting away from a purely state-centric theoretical framework. Bruce Cumings examines the origins of democracy in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and concludes that we cannot understand these histories without examining transnational systems and hierarchies of power that theorists of the democratic peace have ignored. And Martin Shaw sketches a historical and sociological approach to the problem of war and democracy that challenges the division of the world into distinct domestic and international spheres, suggesting that national states and societies cannot be treated as given structures in the global political order.

The volume largely succeeds in bringing the conventional debate about the democratic peace into question. The essays maintain a high scholarly standard, and they hang together much better than the contributions to most edited volumes do. They also strike a good balance between theory development and the introduction of new empirical material to the literature on democracy and war. This book will be indispensable reading for anyone interested in the full implications of the democratic peace debate.

The main weakness of the volume may be the tendency of some contributors to suggest they are challenging not only the conventional debate over the democratic peace but also conventional forms of social inquiry as well. In the book's concluding chapter, Raymond Duvall and Jutta Welde argue that the essays in this volume reject "the logic of explanation employed by analysts of the democratic peace," which they characterize as "reductionist and causal" (p. 200). The alternative developed in this volume, Duvall and Welde maintain, amounts to "the radical alternative of seeing [the democratic peace] as a historically contingent, systematic condition" (p. 200). But none of the substantive arguments in the book requires or entails a break with ordinary social science. The authors neither advance a new epistemology nor suggest new methods of social analysis. The novelty of their essays consists in the new theoretical and empirical ground they break, not in a new logic of explanation. What does democracy look like in India, and how does it shape India's relations with its neighbors? What role did democracy play in the colonial experiences of Western powers? How did U.S. policy in Asia during and after the Cold War shape the democracies that emerged in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan? The contributors to this volume argue convincingly that the answers to these and similar causal questions are crucial to an adequate understanding of the international relations of democracy, liberalism, and war. They do not show that we need new techniques of social inquiry to historicize and contextualize our understanding of democracy and war.

In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that, as noted, the aim of this volume is not to show that the democratic peace hypothesis ("democratic states rarely fight one another") is false. Indeed, several contributors state flatly that they recognize the truth in this claim. Their concern is not to question the *validity* of the democratic peace hypothesis but its *significance*. If there is a main overall message of the volume, it is this: The democratic peace hypothesis obscures more than it reveals about the complex interrelations among democracy, liberalism, and war. It is not the hypothesis per se, but the monopoly it has enjoyed in academic and policy debate, that needs to be confronted. If we want to understand more fully how democracy, liberalism, and war are connected, the contributors to this volume are saying, we need research that is more theoretically ambitious and historically sensitive than most work on the topic has been to date.

Rethinking Europe's Future By David P. Calleo. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 381p. \$24.95.

From the Nation State to Europe?: Essays in Honor of Jack Hayward Edited by Anand Menon and Vincent Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 261p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Francesco Duina, *Bates College*

Rethinking Europe's Future and *From the Nation State to Europe?* belong to two different genres of European studies. *From the Nation State to Europe?* is a collection of academic essays about the transformation of the nation-state in the European Union's context and its implications for social

scientific theoretical concepts. *Rethinking Europe's Future* is by contrast aimed at politicians and policymakers. Its major objective is to discourage policies designed to push Europe and NATO to expand eastward, perhaps to embrace Russia, and instead to encourage Western Europe to assert itself as a major independent, even if not fully united, force in the world. Despite this disciplinary difference, however, the two books complement each other well. The former is about the present state of affairs in Europe; the latter concerns the future and, for that purpose, a good deal of the past. Both involve excellent scholarship and thoughtful arguments, though organizationally they share some weaknesses. They should prove interesting to any student of European affairs.

The essays in *From the Nation State to Europe* are dedicated to Jack Hayward, a prominent scholar of Europe from the University of Oxford. In line with Hayward's interests and recent trends in European studies, the authors skirt the "rather sterile debates" between intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists over the drivers of integration (p. 99). They focus instead on three topics: the impact of integration on the nation-state, the appropriateness of using theories of national politics to study the European Union (EU), and the implications of the observed changes for existing theories of national politics. In addressing these topics, the authors do not intend to be comprehensive. Rather, they aim to be selective and incisive.

The transformation of the nation-state is investigated from a number of interesting perspectives. Monetary union, Elie Cohen points out, has introduced great structural and cultural changes in the political landscape of France. With monetary policy no longer controlled by a central bank that is dependent on national politics, the strategies and discourse of French politicians have altered dramatically. Yves Mény expands on Cohen's point to note that in a great number of areas besides monetary policy, we can observe a transfer of power from nation-states to Brussels. The transfer has especially affected the legal sphere. Yet the transfer has few precedents in history: It has not been accompanied by a Europeanization of administrative structures (in the sense of centralization at the European level). Nation-states in Europe lack legal authority but retain administrative clout. The implications of this situation for the organization and strategies of interest groups are discussed (p. 40). The next two chapters return to France. Both Pierre Grémion and Stanley Hoffman explore the tensions between the traditional interventionist role of the French state and the European project. "Not only," Grémion argues, "did the removal of trade barriers inhibit the state's proactive role, but the philosophy that underlay this new Europe was derived from the German social market economy, which was unknown in and alien to France" (p. 49). Predictably, such tensions have affected national political parties, both in France and elsewhere. Hence, the section concludes with an examination by Hugh Berrington and Rod Hague of British political parties and their relationship to educational and class groupings.

If the preceding chapters implicitly recognize the growing political stature of the EU, the chapters in the next section investigate whether the EU may in fact be examined with the conceptual tools traditionally deployed in the study of nation-states. "Does the EU," the authors ask, "defy attempts at comparison with national politics?" (p. 5). The evidence seems to suggest that it does. In the case of policymaking, Jeremy Richardson argues, the EU has no parallels with the nation-state. Political parties play a minor role in Brussels, and the Council of Ministers "is more a site for disputation and resolution of radically different policy programmes and ideologies than an institution trying to introduce and implement a more or less recognizable *programme* of public policy"

(p. 98). The mass media are largely absent from the scene, and interest groups do not attempt to manipulate media officials to their own ends. David Hine arrives at a similar conclusion when investigating whether treaty revisions in the EU's history may be said to resemble constitutional reform in nation-states. It is interesting to note that the comparison is executed along three dimensions: substance, context or justification, and operating procedures. Only with regard to substance (i.e., whether similar issues of governance are at stake) do parallels exist. Otherwise, differences abound. Edward Page further emphasizes the differences between the EU and nation-states when he demonstrates that the legal and bureaucratic structures of the EU are fairly fragmented and reliant on outside groups and various internal institutions to produce laws. They are altogether different from the typically hierarchical national structures. Even in the realm of monetary policy, the EU escapes direct comparison. Economic models used to explain the benefits of independent central banks seem not to apply to the EU, as James Forder points out.

As Menon notes, the third section of the book examines whether "any substantive effect that the EU may have had on its member states has potential implications for the way in which we study national politics" (p. 6). Do concepts, such as sovereignty, national identity, governance, and class struggle still apply to European nation-states? The authors lack consensus on this topic. Bruno Jobert argues that states have lost their cohesiveness as political agents. They have become "interacting states," permanently in transaction with one another and various supranational centers of power, and behaving in line with internalized norms and expectations that exist at the international level (p. 192). Colin Crouch seems more ambivalent. He points to the transformation of nationalist managerial and capitalist classes into transnational groups, but he notes that labor remains still rooted in national politics. Peter Hall argues outright that states retain their uniqueness and features. Integration imposes similar pressures on nation-states; however, he notes, "nations are endowed with distinctive sets of institutions, embodying strengths as well as weaknesses, which make it feasible for them to pursue multiple adjustment strategies in the face of common problems" (p. 235).

A concluding chapter is missing, but this is partly explained by the passing away of Vincent Wright—its intended author. This minor flaw highlights a problem with the book common to edited volumes. At times one has to struggle to see the relevance of a given chapter for the themes at hand. Some chapters are a bit unclear, and one—Stanley Hoffman's—is incisive and promising but a bit too brief. The volume nonetheless offers a stimulating set of essays in light of interesting questions about the current state of European affairs.

If curious about the future, however, the reader would do well to turn to David P. Calleo's *Rethinking Europe's Future*, which offers an unusual evaluation of what the future might hold for Europe. Calleo's main message is one of caution. Western European nations, he thinks, have historically been in conflict with one another. The Cold War merely dampened such tensions by forcing European states to collaborate. The collapse of the Soviet Union has the potential to revive old tensions. The potential is real, he suggests: Five decades of dependence on American power have discouraged Europeans from taking any serious steps toward political and military unification. Current plans to expand eastward, perhaps all the way to Russia under the umbrella of NATO, would only complicate matters. Calleo argues that Europe's core is far from being solid. Moreover, Russia is in any case unlikely to join the European project in any meaningful way, while too much of a cultural, political, and economic gap separates most of the

Eastern European countries from those in Western Europe. Western Europe must establish itself as a strong, independent player in the world. This means, among other things, severing ties with the United States. "A new transatlantic relationship," Calleo notes, "will have to be found, one in which Europe will depend more on its own indigenous forces, institutions, and balances" (p. 5).

Calleo's prognosis, or perhaps prescription, for the future rests on a deep examination of the past, carried out in the first two thirds of the book. The first third offers an interesting and unusual, even if at times somewhat eclectic, review of the conflicting geopolitical and intellectual currents that shaped Europe in the twentieth century up to the Cold War. Disillusioned with American involvement in Europe after World War I, France has turned to Germany for partnership. Britain has instead had a persistent faith in the United States. World War II only served to solidify the British belief in an Atlantic partnership, while a "disillusioned [France] began exploring collaborating with Germany around a common European project" (p. 23). Underlying such differences between France and Britain are larger philosophical and theoretical threads, dating back to medieval visions of a united Europe and continuing through the Reformation, English liberalism, mercantilism, Herder, Napoleon, von Hayek, Keynes, and even communitarian nationalism. These threads generate what Calleo considers three fundamental tensions in Western European history: those between sovereign nation-states and international coexistence, those between capitalism and its self-destructive forces, and those between capitalism and nation-states.

The second third of the book examines how the Cold War at once dampened these tensions and precluded the full development of a united Europe. "A divided and occupied Germany," writes Calleo at one point, "greatly eased and encouraged Franco-German contention" (p. 102). Nonetheless, it also compromised Europe's growth: "Being able to leave security to NATO under American leadership also allowed Europeans to avoid the dangerous issue of military primacy among themselves" (p. 102). When the Soviet Union unexpectedly collapsed, Europe resembled an insecure child charged with unprecedented responsibilities.

Many readers are likely to disagree with Calleo's recommendations for a strong, contained European Union. In the eyes of many politicians and academics, expansion seems desirable. Yet, most readers will surely acknowledge the merits of the book: a recommendable effort to link past and future, an unusual attention to intellectual and geopolitical currents, and a somewhat unfashionable (and therefore audacious) interpretation of the limits of enlargement. They will also identify some, primarily organizational, weaknesses. The last chapter, on Europe in the World Order, does not properly summarize the main themes of the book. It appears an addendum, rather than a concluding chapter. The links between chapters are moreover often unclear, as Calleo jumps from time period to time period, and somewhat unexpectedly alternates chapters on intellectual history and geopolitical history. It is the reader who must ultimately work to synthesize all the threads present in the book. The effort, as is the case with *From the Nation State to Europe?*, is worth making.

Through a Glass Darkly: Looking at Conflict Prevention, Management, and Termination By Stephen J. Cimbala. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 224p. \$65.00.

Joseph B. Underhill-Cady, *Augsburg College*

One test of a book is how well it weathers major developments in world events, and, as with the end of the Cold War,

the beginning of the new war on terrorism presents recent publications in international or military affairs with the danger of untimely relegation to the trash bin of history. After September 11, as we scramble to adjust and make sense of the "hunt for Osama," Stephen Cimbala's work, however, remains a useful compendium of lessons from several recent wars, crises, and ongoing military challenges. Although the book is not as suddenly relevant as Samuel Huntington's (1998) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* or Chalmers Johnson's (2001) *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, the wisdom distilled within it is sound enough to apply equally well to the pre- and post-September 11 worlds. It is largely rooted in frameworks developed for studying the Cold War and superpower arms races, but Cimbala's examination of the new realities of military strategy and technology still has much to say about the war being waged in Afghanistan and the campaigns that are likely to follow.

Despite its poetic title, *Through a Glass Darkly* is a fairly prosaic treatment of six cases of U.S. military crisis or warfare, from the Cuban Missile Crisis up through the NATO campaign in Kosovo and challenges of information warfare, with concluding remarks on lessons learned for U.S. conflict management practices. Its primary audience is security studies scholars and graduate students, and those otherwise not needing to be told what "C4ISR" (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) stands for. That said, several of the cases (particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis and Gulf War) cover some well-trod ground, and Cimbala's treatment of them would be useful to students who are new to those cases. The author is sufficiently modest in his claims about the cases, forgoing any attempt at broad, scientific generalizations. To his credit, he is aware of the limitations of the study and does not promise more than he delivers. Behavioralists and those favoring large-n studies (or even structured, focused case studies) will have to look elsewhere. For very different reasons, postmodernists, feminists, and those interested in the discourse of war may get some mileage out of the book's occasional use of sexual metaphors or the use of terms like "peace wars" (see pp. xi, 141, 170).

The central theme of Cimbala's reflections is the recognition and emphasis on the human and subjective elements of warfare—what Clausewitz called the "friction" of war. He explores the impact of changes in technology and increased sophistication of military hardware, while recognizing the imperfections that remain in the humans behind the machines. For someone so thoroughly versed in the technology and "bombs and rockets," this focus is both unexpected and admirable. He offers some persuasive arguments about the challenges of and need for seeing the world through others' eyes, and the dangers of an excessive optimism about the wonders of technology and of human ability to control that technology. This theme is illustrated through an extensive and in-depth investigation of his three past cases—the Cuban Missile Crisis, the tensions of 1983–84, and the Gulf War—and three current or future challenges—nuclear weapons and information warfare, nuclear proliferation, and military operations other than war (this last topic being of particular interest of late). The data used in analyzing them consists of a thorough reading of recent literature on the topic, some interviews, and a scattering of primary documents, but not an extensive new set of data; these are accompanied by some very useful tables that summarize and categorize such things as the survivable nuclear forces during the Cuban Missile Crisis (p. 11), targeting objectives during Desert Storm (p. 63), and a typology of different weapons and conflict types in the post-Cold War era (pp. 184–85).

The framework developed for looking at these cases, however, does not add much to our understanding of them. He groups the cases together into three categories—the conflict management, prevention, and termination of the book's subtitle—with one past case and one present or future case of each. The definitions offered for each of these three kinds of cases are useful enough, but they do not apply very elegantly to the cases picked, and the pairs of cases are poorly matched. For instance, the conceptual linkage between Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) deployments in Europe and nuclear proliferation is weak at best (vertical and horizontal proliferation being very different animals); and it is unclear what lessons for peacekeeping missions might be derived from studying the success of bombing in the Gulf War. As he notes in the introduction (p. xi), one reason he picked these cases was just his interest in them, and that appears to have been the overriding factor.

As an example of work in security studies, *Through a Glass Darkly* frames the problems of conflict prevention or management as strictly military matters, and takes as unproblematic the goals pursued by the United States. The lack of attention to the range of underlying cultural, economic, or political sources of these conflicts, or to the ways in which U.S. foreign policy may be contributing to instability and provoking attacks, renders the treatment somewhat akin to trying to prevent house fires by installing more smoke detectors and fire extinguishers (laudable moves), while ignoring the potential problem with taunting or selling gasoline to the deranged pyromaniac next door. These studies take for granted the foreign policy goals of the United States and focus simply on how to achieve those goals, without examining the ways in which those goals might be problematic or counterproductive themselves. But security is too vague and slippery a term to leave unexamined, particularly when the U.S. military is in a position of such military dominance in the world.

But despite the fact that the book brackets this larger international political context and that there is not much that is startlingly new in the book, there is a healthy dose of venerable and well-supported pieces of wisdom regarding military affairs that bears repeating. With the bold cries for eradicating evil from the face of the earth and the increasingly technological nature of the "war on terrorism," reminders of the problems of hubris, ethnocentrism, and the general foibles and limitations of the human animal are both very timely and very welcome.

Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks, vols. 1 & 2

By The Social Learning Group. Edited by William C. Clark, Nancy Dickson, Jill Jäger, and Josee van Eijndhoven. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. Vol. 1: \$75.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper. Vol. 2: \$60.00 cloth, \$27.00 paper.

Elizabeth R. DeSombre, *Wellesley College*

I have a colleague who collects maps of Africa that demonstrate a specific phenomenon: the developed world's unlearning of African geography. Across the centuries, the maps seem to show that mapmakers know less about the geography of the African continent—particularly the internal parts—than previously was the case. Rivers change direction; mountain ranges disappear. This unlearning, my colleague argues, comes from notions about the acceptability of sources of information previously used. These maps show the social nature of "learning," the idea that while in many cases there may be actual answers (after all, African geography exists), what information you look for, and from whom, determines how you will view the information you get, and ultimately what you will do with it.

Like geography, there may be a "right" answer to some of the world's atmospheric problems, but how these issues are defined, by whom, and when and where, has important impacts on how they are viewed and addressed. The ambitious project underlying these two volumes (with 37 contributing authors and countless research assistants and reviewers) attempts to examine the way countries of the world have evaluated, and responded to, environmental risks. "The Social Learning Group," as the authors collectively call themselves, do so by examining the responses of nine countries, the European Union, and international environmental organizations to three problems of atmospheric pollution: transboundary acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, and global climate change. The first volume, *A Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain*, focuses primarily on country (and institution) case studies. The second volume, *A Functional Analysis of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain*, examines materials from across the countries and issues by what the authors call "risk management functions." The time frame within which they examine these issues, actors, and functions is chosen to be the 35 years between the International Geophysical Year in 1957 and the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. Their aim is nothing less than a "long-term, large-scale, multinational perspective on global environmental management" (p. 3). In many ways they succeed.

There are multiple ways the authors could have organized the information presented here, and one of the most important aspects of this project may be what is not reported. So much work, for so many years, went into gathering systematic data for this study that the archives, stored at Harvard University, are likely to be invaluable to future generations of dissertation writers. Impelled perhaps by publishing necessity or the attention spans of potential readers, the authors and editors have had to seriously simplify the presentation of materials, and have taken only two passes of what could have been many through the information (by country and by function). By doing so they have demonstrated precisely what their volumes overall argue: How information is presented influences what you can do with it.

The first volume is organized by the responses of the countries examined—Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the USSR, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Canada, and the United States (along with the European Union and general international environmental institutions)—to the three environmental risks explored. This structure has both advantages and disadvantages. The country-by-country presentation becomes quickly repetitive. Precisely because of the learning that takes place across borders, the same information is presented as relevant to the decision processes of multiple countries, and it, along with the relevant acronyms and time lines, is discussed as if from scratch in each chapter. At the same time, the country-specific focus makes it easy to lose sight of the international or cross-border influences that are likely having an impact, since the information is presented from the perspective of the actors within a given country. Moreover, the chapters are structured to cover similar ground in a similar order, with the emphasis on the term *similar*; those hoping to skim through the chapters to find the information of most interest to them will have to look in slightly different locations in different chapters, and will find that some chapters cover some factors (the role of political structure, for instance) that others do not.

Nevertheless, some important ground is covered in these presentations. One of the most interesting approaches (demonstrating again both slight differences in implementation across chapters and vast quantities of work underlying seemingly simple presentations) involves graphs of the

attention given to environmental issues by national media, political decision makers, and scientific researchers. These can be used to explore the attention given within countries to an issue over time, and the relationship between scientific concern and popular attention. This approach is also used across countries (in Chapter 14, which draws conclusions from the preceding country chapters) to show what is often an eventual confluence of attention to a given issue, with climate change showing the greatest degree of simultaneity of awareness among the countries studied. This cross-cutting analysis also demonstrates that no one country of the group was the temporal or behavioral leader on all three issues examined. The comparisons also suggest that while countries may be addressing the same issue conceptually—acid rain, for example—on the international level, they do so by focusing on specifically local aspects of it in their domestic politics—lake acidification in Scandinavia and eastern North America, forest dieback in Germany, the Netherlands, and Hungary. Act globally, frame locally.

Occasionally frustrating in the country presentations is what is hinted at in the data but not covered in the analysis or sufficiently discussed in all cases to independently evaluate. The role of the Netherlands as a small country with an open economy is suggested as being important for its approaches, but there is no systematic way to examine either of those variables. Accidents and governmental structures are mentioned in various chapters as playing a role in what countries do, but again, not explored across cases. One of the most interesting stories that repeatedly crops up is the difficulty encountered by antinuclear environmental organizations when faced with decisions about responding to certain environmental problems (acid rain or climate change) for which nuclear power could be a logical solution. This, as well, does not fit nicely into the set of variables examined in the country analysis. What gets lost most in the analysis tends to be the politics: who gains or loses most from different approaches to addressing the issue, who decides what decisions are made.

The second volume explores different functional aspects of responding to risks; it cuts across cases and countries to look at risk assessment, monitoring, option assessment, goal and strategy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. In most of these chapters, the primary findings are presented through stories—of how the “solution” of banning chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) use in aerosol spray cans was implemented first in the United States and then elsewhere, of how an initial focus on sulfur dioxide as the cause of acid rain eventually broadened to include other substances. Important general lessons are drawn as well. Risk assessments focus much more on emissions and concentrations of pollutants than on other aspects, though most chapters aspired to focus on end-to-end assessments. These, as with some other functions, tend to be “sticky”; examining the role of carbon dioxide initially in climate risk assessments influences the likelihood that carbon dioxide will be the only gas considered when evaluating the risks associated with climate change (note that most models discuss the risks associated with a doubling of atmospheric carbon). Risk assessments also tend to progress from simple to more complex over time.

Monitoring often originates for purposes, largely scientific, prior to its being demanded for political processes. Information gathered from this process can have a huge impact on political decisions—witness Germany’s conversion to being a supporter of acid rain controls after discovering its own forest dieback, and the international community’s willingness to act on ozone depletion after the discovery of the Antarctic ozone “hole.” More monitoring is done on the scientific aspects of the environmental problem than on impacts of it. Option assessment, the process of exploring the possible activities that

can be taken as a response to the environmental problem, focuses much more on reducing emissions than on adaptation activities or environmental modification. Formulation of goals and strategies across issues move within the time frame of the issue from capacity building to pollution reduction, and come to focus more on economic-based solutions (such as taxes or tradable emissions permits) in real time, such that issues addressed later are more likely to feature these types of solutions as goals. Implementation follows from the goals set in moving from building capacity to reducing emissions, and also shows an increasing emphasis on the use and strengthening of international institutions. Finally, the authors suggest that evaluation—of the process of addressing the environmental risk—is rarely done except as part of one of the other functions.

The social character of much of the learning is implicit but important. While it is true that rivers either flow one direction or the other and that carbon dioxide either does or does not have an impact on the global climate cycle, the actual “source” of the Nile depends upon how you define what the source of a river is. Likewise, our understanding of the role of global climate change may be about a doubling of carbon dioxide, about sea level rise, or about increased mean global temperature. These characterizations have everything to do with what we decide to look at, and what we define as part of the problem or part of the solution. With these volumes, our understanding of the geography of global atmospheric problems expands considerably.

Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance Edited by Milton J. Esman and Ronald J. Herring. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 272p. \$49.50.

Stephen Ryan, *University of Ulster*

This excellent collection of essays takes the reader into a complex area: the relationship between economic development and ethnic conflict. It is such a tricky topic because there is consensus about neither what ethnicity is nor the contributions that economic factors make to the origins, dynamics, and resolution of ethnic strife. In fact the essays presented here steer clear of origins and resolution and focus instead on the less controversial area of how development policy impacts on the dynamics of ethnic conflicts. There is a great need for contributions in this area, because, as the introductory chapter by Herring and Esman notes, the international community is becoming more involved in humanitarian assistance and postviolence reconstruction initiatives in a number of protracted intercommunal conflicts. These include Bosnia, Kosovo, Israel and Palestine, Northern Ireland, and Lebanon. At the same time the increased awareness of ethnic conflict in the past decade has resulted in reassessments of what development means in a multicultural setting.

The volume is arranged into nine chapters. The contributors are all United States-based academics or analysts for aid agencies, and one is struck by the depth of knowledge that each brings to his/her respective area. At the core of the work are two chapters on the role of donor agencies (the World Bank and USAID) and five chapters that look at individual states. Perhaps the biggest strength of the volume are these detailed case studies of Kenya, Russia, and Ecuador and the two well-matched pieces on Sri Lanka. It is here that we learn how the grand theories of development economists and the political maneuvers of governments affect vulnerable people living in the real world.

The chapters on the donor organizations, by Gibson and McHugh, reach broadly similar conclusions. These are that

both the World Bank and USAID have attempted to pay more attention to the ethnic dimensions, but more could be done. In both organizations there is a tension between the ethnically aware fieldworkers and the policy makers back at headquarters. The result, at USAID, is a “curious failure to address ethnicity directly” (p. 69) and uncertainty about how to move forward in this area, while at the World Bank opinion is divided “between proponents of economic theory and those asserting the importance of qualitative social or cultural variables” (p. 43). However, disagreements are not just found in these organizations. Both writers point out that conflicts will also arise within ethnic groups in target areas about how to respond to development projects. This is a theme also taken up in Brysk’s chapter on Ecuador. Here she identifies three responses to the liberalization strategies of the IMF: passive participation, political resistance, and the development of alternative economic strategies. This alerts us to the importance of intraethnic conflict and warns us not to engage in the reification of the ethnic group.

Most of the country-specific chapters show very well how development assistance can reinforce destructive ethnic interaction. Herring’s analysis of the Sri Lankan conflict concentrates on the economic factors that contributed to the onset of the civil war in 1983. The chapter by Shenfield, on Russia, is perhaps the most dispiriting. He claims that the failure of development assistance to improve the dire economic circumstances of many Russians has resulted in a rise in support for extreme nationalist arguments that claim that Russia is being deliberately undermined by international aid agencies and a Jewish conspiracy. In addition, the rise of criminal gangs linked to groups in the Caucasus has resulted in a growing dislike and suspicion of minorities such as the Chechens. The final case study examines the adverse impact of IMF austerity programs on the Indian populations in Ecuador. A constant theme in these three chapters is the insecurity that can be produced by development programs.

The chapters by Cohen and Uphoff have slightly different emphases. Uphoff investigates the peacebuilding potential of development assistance through an analysis of the Gal Oya irrigation project in South East Sri Lanka. Cohen’s chapter on Kenya, published posthumously, claims that those involved in aid-funded interventions have paid far closer attention to the ethnic dimension of their work than those who theorize about them at universities. He then backs up this claim by identifying projects in Kenya where those involved in the delivery of assistance consciously dealt with ethnic issues. One conclusion is that academics should spend less time trying to help aid workers understand the link between aid and ethnicity, for they already have a good grasp of this. Instead they should redirect their attention to the production of comparative case studies involving contributions from indigenous academics or expatriate field-workers that will produce more evidence enabling the development of guidelines to reduce negative effects.

The concluding chapter by Esman, on the policy dimension of foreign aid, sets out some realistic guidelines for reducing the negative impact of aid. These include a greater sensitivity to the importance of context and a realization that one approach cannot fit all; a shift in the development assistance culture toward distributional and human rights themes; a priority on social peace rather than distributive justice; and ethnic conditionality on aid, with greater use of ethnic impact statements.

Interesting concepts such as “development diplomacy” (Ed Azar) and “ethnodevelopment” (Rudolpho Stavenhagen) are not addressed or tested in this volume, and this reviewer would have liked more on both the “peace through development” idea and the peacebuilding potential of foreign aid

discussed in the chapter by Uphoff. The role of NGOs, which are hardly mentioned in the case studies, might have been developed further. It is also a shame that although the editors seem to agree with Cohen’s plea for detailed comparative studies leading to more effective policy guidelines, they were not able to meet his call for a stronger input from indigenous academics. There are chapters from representatives of the aid givers but not the aid receivers. However, these comments cannot take away from the quality of the work presented here. The book illuminates the ethnic dimensions of development assistance and shows how ignorance, indifference, and commercial and state interest can turn international projects into catalysts for ethnic conflict. Fortunately, it also offers some sound advice on how this can be avoided.

Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency Edited by Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 371p. \$49.95.

Edward Comor, *American University*

According to editors Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, “the puzzle for analysts of international affairs” in relation to transparency is not only how it has weakened states, “but also how it has strengthened them” (p. 2). Transparency, for them, is “a condition in which information about governmental preferences, intentions, and capabilities is made available either to the public or other outsiders” (p. 3). This apparently increasing openness is the outcome of, among other things, emerging communication and information technologies, the widespread adoption of democratic institutions, and the global reach of mass media organizations. Although transparency is “transforming international politics” (p. ix), it has been underassessed and, as such, Finel and Lord aim to examine “the phenomenon” in a “comprehensive way and assess its impact on world security and diplomacy” (p. 6).

The 11 chapters presented between the editors’ “Introduction” and “Conclusion” (several of which have been published in some form elsewhere) generally follow these analytical parameters. Most begin with an empirical generalization. Authors then attempt to explain it through some kind of systematic analysis related to transparency. But the absence of a rigorous assessment of the concept itself—as conveyed, for example, in repeated references to transparency’s ascendancy as a result of post-Cold War “trends”—and the positivist approach used by most of the contributors ultimately lead to frustrating roadblocks and limited results.

Setting the tone is a broad analysis by Ann Florini (Chapter 1). She portrays transparency in terms of the decline of states and sees global civil society as an increasingly central arbiter of information. In tune with the forward march of democratization and globalization (both apparently as inevitable as death and taxes), “the world is embracing new standards of conduct, enforced not by surveillance and coercion but by willful disclosure: regulation by revelation” (p. 17). Beyond the inherent (but here unrecognized) theoretical and empirical problems involved in treating state-civil society relations in terms of what amounts to an either/or framework, the chapter constitutes a largely descriptive presentation. Both the book’s “Introduction” and this opening chapter leave the reader asking questions that emerge again in the pages that follow: Is transparency itself a concept (or phenomenon) worthy of this much attention and, if it is, what are the complex dynamics and processes shaping its trajectory and implications?

Following Florini, Robert Jervis’s 1985 piece “From Balance to Concert” is revived. Kenneth A. Schultz follows with a chapter on the impact of transparency on international

crisis bargaining (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, Jeffery Ritter assesses the diplomatic capabilities of democracies in light of transparency. These three focus on nation-state relations with little or no sociological nuance. A similarly limited analysis is found in Ronald Mitchell's "Sources of Transparency" (Chapter 7). It reiterates and expands upon trends promoting transparency and takes a particular interest in its implications for regime rules and effectiveness.

Such chapters are remarkable in that their theoretical and empirical limitations underline the fact that transparency, if it is to be taken as seriously as "global civil society," "global governance," and other such emerging concepts, cries out for analyses that venture significantly beyond the confines of neorealist assumptions and positivist models. Dealing with transparency in these terms is tantamount to assessing the cultural implications of international trade using a neoclassical economics perspective alone.

Some relief is provided in Douglas A. Van Belle's provocative chapter "Press Freedom and Peace" (Chapter 5). Van Belle assesses why press freedom is more strongly correlated with the absence of war than the latter is with the presence of democracy. Structural conditions, such as the commercial free press's penchant for entertainment and relatively sociological constructs like "legitimacy," are featured in the discussion. While helpful, these remain undertheorized and, as such (and as Van Belle himself puts it), his chapter "tends to generate more questions than answers" (p. 131).

Still more questions emerge in the chapter that follows by Finel and Lord (Chapter 7). Through case studies, they raise doubts in response to some of the more optimistic evaluations in the book. "It is possible," they write, "that both very high transparency, because it accurately signals intentions, and very low transparency, because it prevents the 'noise' of domestic politics from overwhelming diplomatic signals, allow states to diffuse crises. If accurate, only moderate transparency would exacerbate crises, because it would allow enough information to confuse the opponent, but not enough to clarify peaceful intentions" (p. 167). Again, the narrowness of the analytical worldview used to assess transparency delimits what can be revealed. The result is more ambiguity than precise elaboration. To their credit, Finel and Lord understand that in relation to particular issues "an unfortunate methodological gap between the most plausible explanations . . . and our ability to examine convincingly the causal processes" is present (p. 168). Indeed, the gap in question is more fundamentally an epistemological one, and recognizing this compels the reader to ask the editors why a more ambitious effort was not made to assess transparency's implications on interstate relations through supplemental critical and interpretative approaches.

Chapter 9, "Transparency and the News Media," by Steven Livingston, delineates three types of transparency—domestic, imposed, and systemic—and through these he argues convincingly that media effect transparency in different ways in different contexts. Chapter 8, by John C. Barker and Ray A. Williamson, provides a detailed overview of commercial satellite developments and, importantly, raises the issue of information's credibility (also addressed by Schultz, Ritter, and the editors). Clifford Bob's contribution (Chapter 10) provides still more nuance in asking, in effect, how information is related to what is known. Here, more than in any other chapter, structural factors are carefully assessed. Complementing Livingston's contribution, Bob demonstrates that information is produced and distributed in the context of historically produced (and power-laden) structures that, almost invisibly, influence what information is made available and to whom. Perhaps in response to some of the book's other authors, Bob concludes with the following observation: "While

for simplicity's sake, analysts may seek to understand the role of transparency in the dyadic relationship between two state opponents, a more comprehensive and accurate understanding is likely to be gained by expanding the conceptual and empirical scope. . . . Doing so also makes clear that transparency and the broader concepts of visibility and fit are not static, but dynamic and contested concepts in every conflict" (p. 308).

The final chapter in the collection is by James N. Rosenau. It is the most thought provoking and, perhaps not coincidentally, one of the least focused on transparency itself. Using his now-familiar concept "fraggementation," Rosenau treats transparency as more than just another variable and raises questions involving the affects (rather than straightforward effects) of information flows in shaping what different people think at different times and in different places.

In their "Conclusion," Finel and Lord write that "transparency is a complicated matter that rarely either harms or improves international security in any single, unequivocal way" (p. 339). Indeed, very few claims are made as a result of the preceding chapters. Two exceptions, however, are revealing. One is the effects of communications technologies and mass media on the timescales used to make decisions. As a result of instantaneous transnational information flows, "policies are likely to be examined in less depth and probably by a smaller group of participants. The participants may also filter incoming information to support previously held beliefs and rely heavily on cognitive shortcuts, the improper use of analogies, and unexamined assumptions, which can lead to misperception and faulty judgments" (p. 348). Another is the importance of "skills" in the task of comprehending and utilizing "information wisely" (p. 351).

When this book reaches such conclusions in light of its analytical limitations, the difficulty (if not impossibility) of assessing transparency's implications without a far more theoretical, sociological, and, indeed, epistemologically diverse inquiry becomes all too clear. Questions concerning forces and processes rather than relatively ahistorical trends, the complex implications of structures, standards of "legitimacy" and "credibility," the cultural (and even psychic) implications of rapidly changing time frames, and others raised in relative isolation need to be interconnected and fleshed out, and a more challenging research agenda suggested. Subjects directly relevant to the editors' mandate, but conspicuously absent here, include transparency's implications in relation to what communication theorists call "hegemonic framing," the potentials of what some critical scholars refer to as "the Panoptic gaze," and broader questions concerning power as more than just a reflection of state and/or civil society resources.

One has little doubt that many will find this collection to be helpful and interesting—it certainly has its moments. But those who recognize transparency to be a concept requiring some comprehension of the historical and sociological processes through which information shapes knowledge will be disappointed. Bold steps are needed in response to the big questions raised in this book. Sadly, only a few of its contributors begin the task of formulating a truly comprehensive response.

Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime By Marcus Franda. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2001. 255p. \$49.95.

Bernard I. Finel, *Georgetown University*

For many people, the Internet is simply a mass of information that arrives on their desktop through the miracle of e-mail or web browsers. The existence of reasonably efficient and intuitive interfaces, however, serves to mask the

incredible complexity inherent in the establishment, growth, and maintenance of a global tangle of computer networks administered by a variety of universities, private corporations, governments, and individuals.

In this impressive new book, Marcus Franda seeks to shed light on the emergence of a governance structure for the Internet by examining the process in light of Oran Young's multistage framework for understanding the development of international regimes (p. 20). He looks at governance in terms of the management of the technical side of the Internet, but in separate chapters he also examines the development of frameworks for e-commerce, intellectual property, international law, and international security. There are a number of importance conceptual puzzles in this topic. First, the subject has implications for theories of international cooperation. Scholars have largely focused on the sources of state cooperation, although some recent work has focused on the rise of transnational activist networks (Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 1998). There is a lack of theorizing about cooperation across level of analysis among states, individuals, and organizations—perhaps because of the daunting conceptual problems of theorizing about the collective behavior of such dissimilar actors. Second, the question of Internet governance is intriguing because it crosses various usually distinct policy issues areas, namely, technology, politics, security, law, business, and economics. There is extensive conceptual work about how cooperation evolves in each of these areas, but relatively less about how actors can develop cooperative frameworks that bridge these different sets of issues. Finally, the growth of the Internet raises important issues about the devolution of state power onto nongovernmental organizations—a trend noted but rarely fully explained in the globalization literature. Although the backbone of the Internet was created by the U.S. government, by the 1990s it had become U.S. government policy to surrender most of its regulatory authority to various nongovernmental organizations and committees. This commitment to devolution remained strong even after the massive commercial and political potential of the Internet became evident—indeed, it was in part the rapid growth of the Internet that prompted the U.S. government to shed its responsibilities. How do we explain this dynamic? This is especially interesting given that, in many countries around the world, governments try to control the Internet—not only authoritarian states such as China, but Western democracies such as France. What are the causes of these variances?

Franda's work is suggestive about some of these issues but, unfortunately, fails to address many of them explicitly. The book is largely descriptive. Franda tells a very complicated story as coherently as possible. This is an impressive accomplishment for a topic that requires an appendix with a full four and a half pages of acronyms, from the ABA (American Bar Association) to XML (Extensible Markup Language) (pp. 217–21). Still, there are places in which Franda seems to be writing in shorthand. For instance, his comments about the “DNS wars” of the 1990s are probably meaningful only to readers with detailed knowledge of the case (pp. 57–9). The problem with the narrative is not the lack of the detail; rather it is the overabundance of details. Franda describes literally dozens of initiatives in which proposals were put forward only to be defeated by affected stakeholders leading to compromises and new initiatives. Consider, for instance, his discussion about unsuccessful efforts of the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) to develop a new governance structure for the Internet (pp. 50–51). Franda is trying to paint a picture of a dynamic process in which agenda formation is a distinct and prior step to negotiation, but with the exception of some comments at the beginning and end

of chapters he rarely makes those conceptual points clearly, nor does he explain their significance to the development of regime theory. Indeed, in some cases, Franda acknowledges that his framework is largely irrelevant: “When one goes beyond the technical and commercial components of these early years of the Internet's evolution, however, one encounters a number of elements that are not yet fully within the scope of even rudimentary international regime arrangements” (p. 145). These areas include important issues such as the relation of cyberspace to international law, privacy issues, and regulations on content (pp. 145–46).

Significantly, Franda's conceptual framework is ill equipped to illuminate the most interesting aspects of the case. Though he relies heavily on Young's argument that regimes develop by stages—agenda formation, negotiation, and operationalization—Franda's work does not constitute a rigorous test of the framework, although the development of a governance structure for the Internet does seem to follow the stages described by Young. The lack of discussion of evaluative criteria and alternative explanations precludes this book from the claim of theory testing. Young's framework is, more than anything else, a loose organization device. Franda does not seem particularly interested in regime theory in any case, and the discussion of it seems tacked on. This book is largely descriptive, even if what is described is a uniquely interesting case.

Despite the lack of conceptual innovation, this book will be of interest to social scientists, especially those interested in technology policy. Franda's description of the way in which individuals and organizations maneuvered provides wonderful examples of the dynamics of agenda formation. His presentation is particularly interesting because of the role of several individuals who served as policy entrepreneurs and were empowered by their command over some of the technical details of how the Internet functions. It is quite amazing to realize that as recently as 1998, important policy decisions could be affected by essentially free agents, unaffiliated with any particularly powerful stakeholder. The picture one gets is less of the rise of an epistemic community but, rather, the way in which control over information can empower individual actors on complex technological issues or, theoretically, on any issue where there is a quasi-monopoly on information.

Franda's book provides fewer insights into Young's second and third stages. His discussion of various negotiations is cursory, limited to discussions of initial positions and ultimate agreements. Many of the negotiations Franda discusses required consensus to be successful, but Franda rarely provides us with enough details to see how consensus evolved. His discussion of the operationalization phase is similarly limited, although here Franda is at the mercy of publication deadlines and the fact that many issues were still unresolved at the time the book went to press (and remain unresolved today). Given how quickly Internet governance has evolved over the past several years, Franda could do little more than report on recent developments. His lack of discussion of whether the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), for instance, has been able to function as expected is understandable.

Franda also fails to discuss what seems to be one of the major puzzles of the case, namely, why the U.S. government sought to devolve control over the Internet to nongovernmental actors. Franda hints that the high costs of governance were part of the reason, but for the most part he simply states that U.S. policy was to support the development of an independent governance structure. Given the government's initial and continued investment, this seems curious. Furthermore, the willingness of the U.S. government to support essentially a preferential commercial regime—particularly with regard

to the issue of sales taxes—for Internet commerce is puzzling. Franda does not explain the sources of U.S. government preferences or how they are different from the preferences of other governments—this is an issue if we hope to draw larger conclusions from the case. Franda notes, “An indication of the unique U.S. legislative environment on international taxation of the Internet was the October 1999 vote in the House of Representatives (423–1) in support for a resolution calling for the Clinton administration to seek a *permanent moratorium* on international e-commerce tariffs at WTO meetings” (p. 95). Was this resolution the result of well-placed policy entrepreneurs such as Al Gore? What was the role of various stakeholders in affecting government policy, including people such as Microsoft founder Bill Gates? How important were emerging norms of openness and transparency in supporting a hands-off posture? These are all crucial issues given the U.S. government’s unique position vis-à-vis the Internet, but these concerns are largely outside of Franda’s focus.

With the “dot com meltdown” it is tempting to dismiss the importance of the Internet. However, its role in allowing information flows and, ultimately, its contribution to global commerce will undoubtedly make the Internet a continuing area of interest in the future. Marcus Franda’s examination of the rise of an Internet governance regime is an interesting contribution to what is ultimately likely to be a voluminous literature. He should be commended for tackling an important issue, and for his clear exposition of an incredibly complex process. Unfortunately, Franda’s focus on details at the expense of conceptual innovation or in-depth analysis limits the importance of this volume for most social scientists. For scholars working on issues related to the public policy of information technology, this book is a useful resource, albeit one that is rapidly aging. For the rest of the scholarly community, the definitive book on the conceptual issues related to Internet governance remains to be written.

The Environment, International Relations, and U.S. Foreign Policy Edited by Paul G. Harris. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 276p. \$65.00.

Adil Najam, *Boston University*

The basic premise of Paul Harris’s edited volume is that “understanding U.S. international environmental policy is central to the entire project of global environmental protection” because the United States is the “world’s largest polluter [as well as] the world’s wealthiest country” (p. 4). To argue that the United States is disproportionately important to international environmental policy (or to international policy on most other issues) is an important, but relatively uncontroversial, case to make; and it is made rather well throughout the chapters in this book.

This volume is the result of an extended project on environmental change and foreign policy and follows at the heels of a companion volume that looked specifically at U.S. foreign policy on climate change. Unlike its predecessor, this volume is not focused on a particular issue and is more interested in drawing general lessons about U.S. environmental foreign policy. Its chapters can be divided into two distinct streams. One set of chapters—including those by Braden Allenby, Jon Barnett, Douglas Blum, and Harris—deal with the still contentious but vibrant area of environment and security. A second stream, based on case studies, highlight the roles played by various stakeholders in the U.S. environmental foreign policy process. This set includes chapters by Srinivasan Sitaraman, John Barkdull, Robert Falkner, Morten Boas, Elizabeth DeSombre and Kristen Fletcher.

Between the two, the book provides a rich array of ideas and case evidence that will add to our understanding of U.S. foreign policy on the environment. Among the two, however, there is less than perfect coherence, in that the case studies do not seem to place the discussion on environmental security at the same level of centrality to the actual practice of U.S. foreign policy as the chapters in the first stream would suggest. For example, Barnett’s suggestion that “the concept of environmental security is now integral to the environmental diplomacy of the United States” (p. 68) seems not to be borne out by the various case studies of U.S. environmental diplomacy presented elsewhere in the book. The case made in the various chapters (particularly those by Allenby, Barnett, and Harris) for changing the way we look at the issue of environment and security is certainly appealing at a normative level, but may not be terribly useful at the pragmatic level. Indeed, other chapters in the book (especially Sitaraman and Falkner on the ozone regime, Barkdull on the role of the executive branch on ocean issues, and DeSombre on environmental sanctions) seem to suggest that meaningful advancement in terms of environmental foreign policy can be made without necessarily “securitizing” the issue.

The case chapters on how domestic and international concerns are intertwined in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy provide a rich and textured discussion of the various actors involved in the process. These chapters—in particular, the discussions on the pivotal role that the executive branch plays in international environmental policy and on the role of environmental sanctions—make significant new contributions to our understanding of what the “sausage factory” looks like from the inside. The major contribution of the book is that it depicts the much-commented-upon “messiness” of U.S. foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the environment, rather vividly. As the editor points out in his introduction: “Perhaps the foremost among the conclusions of this volume is this: the highly pluralistic nature of U.S. foreign policymaking results in an inevitably large number of players, ranging from individuals to businesses to nongovernmental organizations. The number of local, state (i.e., U.S. ‘states’), regional, national and international stakeholders involved in these issues is vast” (p. 35). But, Harris continues, “the number of actors is not the end of it; the U.S. Constitution created a contentious, multibranch government that does not resolve issues quickly, smoothly or easily. This convoluted democratic system is compounded by the number and complexity of the problems themselves. Thus foreign policy that emanates from Washington is almost inevitably unsatisfactory to all those involved” (p. 35).

It should be noted, however, that recognizing the complexity of the U.S. foreign policy process must not be confused with assuming that it is necessarily more complex than foreign policy processes elsewhere. While the U.S. environmental foreign policy process exhibits interesting peculiarities, U.S. peculiarities need not be any more peculiar than those of other states. Indeed, this volume does not seek to make that case. However, the point needs to be made simply because such a misunderstanding can be too easily construed from the book.

Which Lessons Matter?: American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987 By Christopher R. Hemmer. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000. 217p. \$17.95 cloth, \$55.50 paper.

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At least since Ernest May’s influential (1973) *Lessons of the Past*, students of American foreign policy have been conscious of the powerful hold that some analogies seem to

have on the minds of decision makers. All of us can think of “Munich” and “Vietnam” as shorthand for a whole series of judgments that we rely on to work through the maze of foreign policy calculus. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack in September 2001, we heard reference to “Pearl Harbor.” And we can now anticipate that “9-11” will take its place as a marker for a set of lessons concerning the struggle against terrorism.

As Christopher Hemmer reminds us in this useful book, analogies are relied upon by decision makers for understandable reasons. They need reference points from the past as they confront an uncertain future. But analytically, there is a problem: How much explanatory weight can one give to the role of analogies? And, as Hemmer asks, “which ones matter?” After all, there is an infinite repertoire of so-called lessons from the past. And we know, at least anecdotally, that those who make policy are likely to dress up the untidy process of decision making by evoking important-sounding “lessons of history,” even when these are little more than post facto rationalizations for actions taken.

Hemmer’s approach to answering these questions is twofold. First, he provides a framework for thinking about the role of analogical reasoning in the policy process. Second, he develops two case studies in depth, Carter’s response to the hostage crisis in Iran and Reagan’s handling of a similar crisis a few years later, the “Iran-Contra” affair.

Hemmer sees analogical reasoning as a complement, not an alternative, to realist notions of strategic reasoning. As he correctly points out, a rational strategist will have no trouble identifying why the United States should react to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iraq, for example, but will still not know precisely which of several plausible strategies is best suited to the specific situation: “[W]hile most policy makers often know what interests they want to promote, they often do not know what specific policy will further those interests, so they turn to historical analogies for crucial information concerning what policy will best advance their interests” (p. 15). That judgment requires some degree of reasoning involving “lessons” of history. My own research on the Gulf crisis of 1990–91 suggests that the “Korean analogy”—be careful of expanding goals in the midst of a war—and “Lebanon”—be careful of the fragmentation of the country—were both consciously discussed by President Bush and his closest advisers. One cannot understand the American decision to stop short of overthrowing Saddam’s regime without understanding the role of these lessons.

An important contribution of Hemmer is that he does not treat decision makers as passive victims of the analogies they carry in their heads. Instead, he sees them as actively analyzing the relevance of different lessons from the past. They tend to look first at recent history; they weigh the relative international and domestic consequences of a crisis as they look for appropriate guidelines; and they look for causal similarities. By attributing to analogies a role in structuring the definition of interests, Hemmer places himself in the constructivist camp within the international relations brotherhood.

Turning to the case studies, Hemmer finds that Carter and his colleagues consciously considered a wide range of historical precedents as they struggled to find a way to end the hostage crisis. Several examples of successful negotiations competed with more muscular examples of rescue attempts. Over the months of the crisis, the debate moved from one to another, and then back to negotiations. The result was not elegant, although the hostages were eventually released, but Hemmer’s case does show the extent to which policy was informed by a conscious use of analogical reasoning.

The Reagan case is different, at least in Hemmer’s telling. Although there was some attempt after the embarrassing

revelations of the arms for hostages dealings to dress up the policy as comparable to Nixon’s opening to China, the record shows that Reagan was primarily driven by another preoccupation—not being crippled by the hostage crisis as Carter had been. His “use of history” largely focused on the domestic consequences for Carter of struggling with the hostage issue. He was determined not to let Carter’s fate befall him, and so he sought a quick resolution to the crisis by offering arms in exchange for the release of the hostages. A bit more thought by the president and his inner circle might have led them to realize that they were inadvertently providing an incentive for more hostage taking, but that lesson was apparently not seen at the time.

I find the theoretical and empirical contributions of Hemmer’s book to be quite impressive. He writes clearly, has done his homework on the cases, and makes a modest contribution toward constructivist thinking in foreign policy analysis. I have used the book in an advanced course on foreign policy, and students find it accessible and generally convincing. The book ends with some suggestions for further research, and it will be interesting to see where Hemmer goes next. Based on his debut, his future work will be worth waiting for.

Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking By Adrienne Héritier, Dieter Kerwer, Christoph Knill, Dirk Lehmkuhl, Michael Teutsch, and Anne-Cécile Douillet. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 368p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

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National-level policy outcomes produced by European Union-level directives and regulations are much more diverse across member states than one might expect. This is especially true for those undramatic but complex policy areas that lack the salience of high-level negotiations and treaty signings. Adrienne Héritier and her five coauthors investigate the phenomenon of differential national responses to European policymaking in two transportation policy sub-areas across five states. They focus on the deregulation of road haulage (trucking) and the reform of publicly owned railways in the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. This allows them to show just how widely national policy outcomes can vary and still be generally in line with European Union (EU) requirements.

The authors point out that EU policies in road haulage and railroads aim at “market making” on the European level, that is, the reduction or abolition of previous national state interventions in order to allow market forces to deal with a problem. This represents an attempt to roll back the frontiers of the (interventionist) state. In principle, all stakeholders stand to benefit from the efficiency gains that can be achieved. In practice, of course, there are numerous conflicts over the distribution of costs and benefits.

The most crucial aspect of establishing a single European transport market in road haulage was the introduction of “cabotage,” the authorization of nonresident trucking firms to operate in foreign domestic markets. Thus, a Dutch trucking firm can now haul goods not just between Amsterdam and Paris but also between Lyon and Marseille, under the same regulatory conditions as a French firm. Even so, national policy responses have been markedly different. Cabotage and EU-level policies produced more deregulatory reform in the Netherlands, but resulted in significant new social reregulatory efforts in France, and increased economic interventionism in Italy.

In railway reform, the deregulatory thrust of EU-level policy directives was very cautious. It only required more